

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER  
*The World as Will and Representation*  
Volume 2

The purpose of the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Schopenhauer is to offer translations of the best modern German editions of Schopenhauer's work in a uniform format for Schopenhauer scholars, together with philosophical introductions and full editorial apparatus.

*The World as Will and Representation* contains Schopenhauer's entire philosophy, ranging through epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind and action, aesthetics and philosophy of art, to ethics, the meaning of life and the philosophy of religion. This second volume was added to the work in 1844, and revised in 1859. Its chapters are officially 'supplements' to the first volume, but are indispensable for a proper appreciation of Schopenhauer's thought. Here we have his most mature reflections on many topics, including sex, death, conscious and unconscious desires, and the doctrines of salvation and liberation in Christian and Indian thought. Schopenhauer clarifies the nature of his metaphysics of the will, and synthesizes insights from a broad range of literary, scientific and scholarly sources. This new translation reflects the eloquence and power of Schopenhauer's prose and renders philosophical terms accurately and consistently. It offers an introduction, glossary of names, bibliography and succinct editorial notes.

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*The World as Will and Representation*

Volume 2

TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY

JUDITH NORMAN

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with an Introduction by

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# *Contents*

<i>General Editor's Preface</i>	<i>page</i> viii
<i>Editorial Notes and References</i>	xi
<i>Introduction</i>	xiii
<i>Notes on Text and Translation</i>	xxxvii
<i>Chronology</i>	xlv
<i>Bibliography</i>	xlvii

## THE WORLD AS WILL AND REPRESENTATION

VOLUME 2	I
----------	---

SUPPLEMENTS TO THE FIRST BOOK	3
-------------------------------	---

<b>First Half: The Doctrine of Intuitive Representation</b>	5
---	---

Chapter 1    On the Fundamental View of Idealism	6
--	---

Chapter 2    On the Doctrine of Intuitive Cognition, or Cognition Based in the Understanding	23
---	----

Chapter 3    Concerning the Senses	30
------------------------------------	----

Chapter 4    On Cognition <i>a Priori</i>	36
---	----

<b>Second Half: The Doctrine of Abstract Representation, or Thinking</b>	63
--	----

Chapter 5    On the Intellect in the Absence of Reason	65
--	----

Chapter 6    On the Doctrine of Abstract or Rational Cognition	69
--	----

Chapter 7    On the Relation of Intuitive to Abstract Cognition	77
---	----

Chapter 8    On the Theory of the Comical	98
---	----

Chapter 9    On Logic in General	110
----------------------------------	-----

Chapter 10	On the Study of Syllogisms	115
Chapter 11	On Rhetoric	126
Chapter 12	On the Doctrine of Science	128
Chapter 13	On the Doctrine of Method in Mathematics	139
Chapter 14	On the Association of Ideas	142
Chapter 15	On the Essential Imperfections of the Intellect	146
Chapter 16	On the Practical use of Reason and Stoicism	157
Chapter 17	On Humanity's Metaphysical Need	169
SUPPLEMENTS TO THE SECOND BOOK		199
Chapter 18	On the Possibility of Cognizing the Thing in Itself	202
Chapter 19	On the Primacy of the Will in Self-consciousness	212
Chapter 20	Objectivation of the Will in the Animal Organism	258
Chapter 21	Review and More General Consideration	282
Chapter 22	Objective View of the Intellect	285
Chapter 23	On the Objectivation of the Will in Nature Devoid of Cognition	305
Chapter 24	On Matter	317
Chapter 25	Transcendent Considerations Concerning the Will as Thing in Itself	331
Chapter 26	On Teleology	341
Chapter 27	On Instinct and Creative Drive	357
Chapter 28	Characterization of the Will to Life	364
SUPPLEMENTS TO THE THIRD BOOK		377
Chapter 29	On the Cognition of the Ideas	380
Chapter 30	On the Pure Subject of Cognition	384
Chapter 31	On Genius	393

Chapter 32	On Madness	416
Chapter 33	Isolated Remarks Concerning Natural Beauty	420
Chapter 34	On the Inner Essence of Art	423
Chapter 35	On the Aesthetics of Architecture	428
Chapter 36	Isolated Remarks on the Aesthetics of the Visual Arts	436
Chapter 37	On the Aesthetics of Literature	441
Chapter 38	On History	456
Chapter 39	On the Metaphysics of Music	464
SUPPLEMENTS TO THE FOURTH BOOK		475
Chapter 40	Preface	478
Chapter 41	On Death and its Relation to the Indestructibility of our Essence in Itself	480
Chapter 42	Life of the Species	526
Chapter 43	The Heritability of Traits	533
Chapter 44	Metaphysics of Sexual Love	547
Chapter 45	On the Affirmation of the Will to Life	583
Chapter 46	On the Nothingness and Suffering of Life	588
Chapter 47	On Ethics	604
Chapter 48	On the Doctrine of the Negation of the Will to Life	618
Chapter 49	The Way to Salvation	650
Chapter 50	Epiphilosophy	657
<i>Variants in Different Editions</i>		664
<i>Glossary of Names</i>		681
<i>Index</i>		701

## *General Editor's Preface*

Schopenhauer is one of the great original writers of the nineteenth century, and a unique voice in the history of thought. His central concept of the will leads him to regard human beings as striving irrationally and suffering in a world that has no purpose, a condition redeemed by the elevation of aesthetic consciousness and finally overcome by the will's self-denial and a mystical vision of the self as one with the world as a whole. He is in some ways the most progressive post-Kantian, an atheist with profound ideas about the human essence and the meaning of existence which point forward to Nietzsche, Freud and existentialism. He was also the first major Western thinker to seek a synthesis with Eastern thought. Yet at the same time he undertakes an ambitious global metaphysics of a conservative, more or less pre-Kantian kind, and is driven by a Platonic vision of escape from empirical reality into a realm of higher knowledge.

Schopenhauer was born in 1788, and by 1809 had gone against his family's expectations of a career as a merchant and embarked on a university career. He completed his doctoral dissertation *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* in 1813, then spent several years in intensive preparation of what became the major work of his life, *The World as Will and Representation*, which was published at the end of 1818, with 1819 on the title page. Shortly afterwards his academic career suffered a setback when his only attempt at a lecture course ended in failure. Thereafter Schopenhauer adopted a stance of intellectual self-sufficiency and antagonism towards university philosophy, for which he was repaid by a singular lack of reaction to his writings. In 1835 he published *On Will in Nature*, an attempt to corroborate his metaphysics with findings from the sciences, and in 1841 two self-standing essays on free will and moral philosophy, entitled *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. A large supplementary second volume to *The World as Will and Representation* appeared in 1844, accompanied by a revised version of the original which now appeared as Volume One; then in 1851 another two-volume work,



*Parerga and Paralipomena*, a collection of essays and observations. Only in the 1850s did serious interest in Schopenhauer's philosophy begin, with a favourable review appearing in an English journal and a few European universities offering courses on his work. In this final decade before his death in 1860 he published a third edition of *The World as Will and Representation* and a second edition of *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. After Schopenhauer's death his follower Julius Frauenstädt produced the first six-volume edition of his works in 1873, providing the basis for many subsequent German editions up to the *Sämtliche Werke* edited by Arthur Hübscher, which we use as the basis for our translations in the present edition.

Though Schopenhauer's life and the genesis of his philosophy belong to the early part of the nineteenth century, it is the latter half of the century that provides the context for his widespread reception and influence. In 1877 he was described by Wilhelm Wundt as 'the born leader of non-academic philosophy in Germany', and in that period many artists and intellectuals, prominent among them Richard Wagner, worked under the influence of his works. The single most important philosophical influence was on Nietzsche, who was in critical dialogue throughout his career with his 'great teacher Schopenhauer'. But many aspects of the period resonate with Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory, his pessimism, his championing of the Upanishads and Buddhism, and his theory of the self and the world as embodied striving.

Over the last three decades interest in Schopenhauer in the English-speaking world has been growing again, with a good number of monographs, translations and collections of articles appearing, where before there were very few. More general trends in the study of the history of philosophy have played a part here. There has recently been a dramatic rise in philosophical interest in the period that immediately follows Kant (including the German Idealists and Romanticism), and the greater centrality now accorded to Nietzsche's philosophy has provided further motivation for attending to Schopenhauer. Yet until now there has been no complete English edition of his works. The present six-volume series of Schopenhauer's published works aims to provide an up-to-date, reliable English translation that reflects the literary style of the original while maintaining linguistic accuracy and consistency over his philosophical vocabulary.

Almost all the English translations of Schopenhauer in use until now, published though they are by several different publishers, stem from a single translator, the remarkable E. F. J. Payne. These translations, which

were done in the 1950s and 1960s, have stood the test of time quite well and performed a fine service in transmitting Schopenhauer to an English-speaking audience. Payne's single-handed achievement is all the greater given that he was not a philosopher or an academic, but a former military man who became a dedicated enthusiast. His translations are readable and lively and convey a distinct authorial voice. However, the case for new translations rests partly on the fact that Payne has a tendency towards circumlocution rather than directness and is often not as scrupulous as we might wish in translating philosophical vocabulary, partly on the fact that recent scholarship has probed many parts of Schopenhauer's thought with far greater precision than was known in Payne's day, and partly on the simple thought that after half a century of reading Schopenhauer almost solely through one translator, and with a wider and more demanding audience established, a change of voice is in order.

In the present edition the translators have striven to keep a tighter rein on philosophical terminology, especially that which is familiar from the study of Kant – though we should be on our guard here, for Schopenhauer's use of a Kantian word does not permit us to infer that he uses it in a sense Kant would have approved of. We have included explanatory introductions to each volume, and other aids to the reader: footnotes explaining some of Schopenhauer's original German vocabulary, a glossary of names to assist with his voluminous literary and philosophical references, a chronology of his life and a bibliography of German texts, existing English translations, and selected further reading. We also give a breakdown of all passages that were added or altered by Schopenhauer in different editions of his works, especially noteworthy being the changes made to his earliest publications, *On the Fourfold Root* and the single-volume first edition of *The World as Will and Representation*. A further novel feature of this edition is our treatment of the many extracts Schopenhauer quotes in languages other than German. Our guiding policy here is, as far as possible, to translate material in any language into English. The reader will therefore not be detained by scanning through passages in other languages and having to resort to footnote translations. Nevertheless, the virtuoso manner in which Schopenhauer blends Latin, Greek, French, Italian and Spanish extracts with his own prose style is not entirely lost, since we have used footnotes to give all the original passages in full.

## *Editorial Notes and References*

Three kinds of notes occur in the translation:

- (1) Footnotes marked with asterisks (\*, \*\* and so on) are notes original to Schopenhauer's text as it stands in the Hübscher edition.
- (2) Footnotes marked with small letters (*a*, *b*, *c*) are editorial notes. These either give information about the original wording in Schopenhauer's text (in German or other languages), or provide additional editorial information. All (and only) such *additional* information is enclosed in brackets [ ]. All footnote material *not* in brackets consists of words from the original text.
- (3) Endnotes marked with numerals 1, 2, 3. The endnotes are collected at the end of the volume and indicate some variations between the published texts of 1844 and 1859.

Schopenhauer's works are referred to by the following abbreviations. We give page references to the other volume in the Cambridge edition. *BM* and *FW* are found in the volume *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. *FR*, *VC*, and *WN* appear collected in one volume. The page numbers of the standard German edition by Hübscher, which appear as marginal numbers in the Cambridge translations, are supplied in all cases.

Hübscher <i>SW</i> 1–7	<i>Sämtliche Werke</i> , ed. Arthur Hübscher (Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus, 1988), vols. 1–7.
<i>BM</i>	<i>On the Basis of Morals</i> [Über die Grundlage der Moral].
<i>FR</i>	<i>On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason</i> [Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde].
<i>FW</i>	<i>On the Freedom of the Will</i> [Über die Freiheit des Willens].

<i>PP</i> I, 2	<i>Parerga and Paralipomena</i> [ <i>Parerga und Paralipomena</i> ], vols. 1 and 2.
<i>VC</i>	<i>On Vision and Colours</i> [ <i>Über das Sehn und die Farben</i> ].
<i>WN</i>	<i>On Will in Nature</i> [ <i>Über den Willen in der Natur</i> ].
<i>WWR</i> I, 2	<i>The World as Will and Representation</i> [ <i>Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung</i> ], vols. 1 and 2.

Unpublished writings by Schopenhauer are referred to thus:

<i>GB</i>	<i>Gesammelte Briefe</i> , ed. Arthur Hübscher (Bonn: Bouvier, 1978).
<i>HN</i> 1–5	<i>Der handschriftliche Nachlaß</i> , ed. Arthur Hübscher (Frankfurt am Main: Kramer, 1970), vols. 1–5.
<i>MR</i> 1–4	<i>Manuscript Remains</i> , ed. Arthur Hübscher, trans. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Berg, 1988), vols. 1–4 [a translation of <i>HN</i> vols. 1–4].

Passages in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* are referred by the standard method, using A and B marginal numbers corresponding to the first and second editions of the work. Other writings by Kant are referred to by volume and page number of the monumental 'Akademie' edition (Berlin: Georg Reimer/Walter de Gruyter, 1900– ), in the form Ak. 4: 397. References to works of Plato and Aristotle use the standard marginal annotations.

## Introduction

Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation* was first published in Leipzig at the end of 1818 (with 1819 as the date on its title page). It consisted of a single volume, which ranged through epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind and action, aesthetics and philosophy of art, to ethics, the meaning of life and the philosophy of religion, in an attempt to account for nothing less than *the world*: the nature of our cognition or knowledge of reality and how it relates to reality itself, the nature of our existence and the existence of everything in the world, what is and is not of value in existence, the pain of the human condition and the possibility of deliverance from it. *The World as Will and Representation* is the major achievement of Schopenhauer's life, and the backbone of his intellectual career. In 1844 he published a revised and extended edition of it, and now added a whole second volume of 'supplementary' essays. It is this second volume, even longer than the first, that we have here in translation. In 1859, the year before he died, Schopenhauer revised both volumes for a final time, making many further additions. The text we have used for this translation is essentially this last edition, subject to certain further revisions by various editors, starting with Julius Frauenstädt in 1873, through Paul Deussen's edition of 1911, to Arthur Hübscher's of 1988, which we treat as the standard text. Our endnotes give detailed information about changes between the different editions of Schopenhauer's lifetime.

On first publication of volume 1 of the work, its 30-year-old author stated in the Preface that it aimed 'to convey a single thought'. We are to assume that this also applies to the work in its entire two-volume manifestation with the supplementary essays. The nature of this single thought, however, has been the subject of some slightly perplexed debate.<sup>1</sup> If there is a single thought, it must be highly elusive or highly complex, or both. But we can perhaps make an initial approach towards what Schopenhauer

<sup>1</sup> For one substantial discussion see John E. Atwell, *Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The Metaphysics of Will* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 18–31.

means if we examine the framework of four Books into which the original *World as Will and Representation* is divided. The essays that comprise the present volume are expressly introduced as supplements (*Ergänzungen*) to the First Volume, and they are arranged according to that volume's four-fold division. So it will help the reader to outline the shape of the First Volume, which comprises four Books whose titles and discursive subtitles are as follows:

- (1) The world as representation, first consideration. Representation subject to the principle of sufficient reason: the object of experience and science.
- (2) The world as will, first consideration. The objectivation of the will.
- (3) The world as representation, second consideration. Representation independent of the principle of sufficient reason: the Platonic Idea: the object of art.
- (4) The world as will, second consideration. With the achievement of self-knowledge, affirmation and negation of the will to life.

What we first notice here is an oscillation between the two key terms from the book's title. At the core of the single thought, then, is this: one and the same world has two aspects, and we can learn about it by considering it as representation, then as will, then as representation in altered fashion, then as will in altered fashion. The two alterations in question introduce two more vital oppositions. With the world as representation, we can either consider it subject to the principle of sufficient reason, or independently of that principle. With the world as will, we can either consider it descriptively for what it is, or we can consider it on an evaluative dimension – with respect to its affirmation or negation. This, however, leaves us with an immense amount to explain. Let us next try to flesh out these bare bones a little, keeping in mind the four-part dynamic structure that any would-be 'single thought' really needs to have if it is to map on to the work as a whole.

Schopenhauer uses 'representation' (German *Vorstellung*) in the same way as his predecessor Kant uses it. It stands for anything that the mind is conscious of in its experience, knowledge, or cognition of any form – something that is present to the mind. So our first task in *The World as Will and Representation* is to consider the world as it presents itself to us in our minds. In ordinary human experience, and in the extension of this in the realm of scientific enquiry, we encounter objects, and these are ordered for us, necessarily, by space and time, and by relations of cause and effect. All the ways in which the world is thus ordered for us are species of the single

principle 'Nothing is without a ground for its being rather than not being', otherwise known as the principle of sufficient reason. Every object is experienced as related to something else which grounds it. Everything in space and time has a determinate position in relation to other things in space and time, everything that happens has a determinate cause, every action relates back to a motive and to its agent's character, every truth is grounded in some other truth or in the evidence of the senses. So starting, as we must, from the world *as we find it* in everyday experience and empirical investigation, we see a multiplicity of objects related in necessary ways. But all of this tells us how the world must *appear* to us as subjects; it does not tell us how the world *is* when we try to consider it apart from the way it presents itself to our minds. We must next move on to consider the aspect of the world beyond representation, the world as 'thing in itself'.

In a word, Schopenhauer argues in his Second Book that the thing in itself – what the world is beyond the aspect of it that appears to us – is *will*. His guiding thought is that there is one single essence that underlies all objects and all phenomena, ourselves included, one single way in which the 'riddle' of all existence can be deciphered. The single world manifests itself to experience as a multiplicity of individual objects – Schopenhauer calls this the *objectivation* of the will – and each member of this multiplicity, embodying the same essence, strives towards existence and life. Human individuals are primarily beings who will and act, and share their ultimate nature with every other being in the world. Human rationality and consciousness are extremely useful, and give us an instrumental superiority over other beings, but are really only a froth on the surface, and do not distinguish humanity from the rest of nature at the most fundamental level. Indeed, our advanced capacities for cognition can be explained, for Schopenhauer, as serving the ends of willing: our ability to perceive and investigate the world functions primarily to enable us to manipulate objects that confront us, in order to continue existing and to reproduce ourselves. If we are really to understand the world and our place within it, we must not remain at the surface of the world as representation, but must delve into this deeper and darker aspect of reality, the world as will – darker because everything that wills or strives is necessarily at the mercy of suffering, and because this suffering has neither point nor end. As long as we will, we suffer; but that we will, and ultimately what we will, is a function of our inescapable essence, not something rationally chosen, and not something we have the means to put an end to by willing.

At the mid-point of *The World as Will and Representation* we return to a new, and brighter, consideration of the world as representation. It can

happen, according to Schopenhauer, that we confront objects in a kind of experience that is out of the ordinary. We find all the usual kinds of relation – space, time and cause and effect – suspended, and lose ourselves in contemplation, forgetful of ourselves and of the distinction between ourselves and what we perceive. This is aesthetic experience, an extreme form of disinterestedness, a passive ‘mirroring’ of the world in which we cease to grapple with the world of objects, cease striving, and find temporary release from pain. While becoming as free as we can from subjectivity, we apprehend nature in a manner that takes our cognition as close as possible to the true essence of things: we perceive timeless features than run throughout nature, which Schopenhauer calls Ideas, intending us to take this notion in a sense close to Plato’s (or to what are often called Platonic Forms nowadays). Art provides the best opportunity for this kind of experience because it gives us a view of nature mediated through the exceptionally objective mind of a genius. Art enables in us as spectators a state of calm passivity and enhanced objectivity, and the various art forms allow us to recognize diverse aspects of the will’s manifestation in the world, from, as it were, a vantage point where our individual own will is not engaged.

The transition to the Fourth Book of *The World as Will and Representation* takes us back to the world as will, considered now with respect to its ‘affirmation and negation’, or at any rate the affirmation and negation of the ‘will to life’ that Schopenhauer finds to be the essence of each individual. This final part – by far the longest and, in Schopenhauer’s words, the ‘most serious’ – is concerned with ethics, in both a narrower and broader sense. Building on the descriptive account of the will from the Second Book, Schopenhauer gives his own answers to conventional ethical questions: What are morally good and bad actions and characters? What is the nature of right and wrong? What constitutes compassion, and the virtues of justice and loving kindness? In what sense, if at all, are our actions free? But the main thrust of the Fourth Book is a broader ethical treatment of the value of human existence as such – a profound and troubling discussion that borders on religious territory while remaining resolutely atheist in its conviction. Schopenhauer has argued that the life of the human individual is inevitably one of striving and suffering, unredeemed by any final purpose or resting point for the will that is our essence. Now he argues that some salvation is needed from such an existence, but that it can only come from the restless will’s becoming ‘quietened’ by a deep metaphysical insight that reveals individuality itself to be an illusion. The world in itself, outside of the forms of space and time that govern the world as



representation for us, cannot be separated into individuals. The truly wise human being would comprehend this and would cease to be attached to the strivings of the particular individual manifestation of will he or she is. Such a redemptive state – sometimes reached intuitively through the painful experiences of life itself – is the will's 'self-negation' or 'self-abolition'. The will that is the human being's essence recoils from pursuing any of its goals, and the sense of individuality weakens to the point where reality can be contemplated with a serenity that is void of the usual pains of existence because the subject has become void of all striving and void of the usual sense of self.

#### THE SECOND VOLUME SUPPLEMENTS

The fifty chapters in the Second Volume are advertised as 'supplements' (*Ergänzungen*). This they are in the sense that each relates to topics, and in many cases to specific sections, of the First Volume. The two volumes have the same structure, divided into four Books, beginning with idealism and the theory of cognition, going through the metaphysics and psychology of the will, the theory of aesthetic experience and its relation to different art forms, and culminating in ethics and the doctrine of salvation through the will's self-abolition. Some parts of the Second Volume have a distinctly 'supplementary' feel to them, in the sense that they are more or less extensions or footnotes to the existing discussions. But it would be a mistake to diminish the volume's importance for that reason. Many of the chapters are powerful, self-contained essays in their own right, and in the years since the first appearance of the book Schopenhauer has attained a greater degree of scholarly insight into other authors, and most importantly a depth of reflection on his own position. So the Second Volume contains many chapters that are indispensable for a proper appreciation of Schopenhauer's philosophy. Here we shall merely highlight a few such chapters.

The Supplements to the First Book range fairly widely through Schopenhauer's theory of cognition (both intuitive and conceptual), and rehearse systematic accounts of rhetoric, the association of ideas, logic, mathematics and the natural sciences. Schopenhauer includes a discussion of the use of reason in Stoic ethics, which gives him further opportunity to display his scholarship of ancient Greek texts, supplementing the similar discussion in § 16 of the First Volume. The distinction between intuitive and conceptual cognition is crucial to Schopenhauer, and to mark it he divides the Supplements to the First Book into two halves, the 'Doctrine of

Intuitive Representation' (Chapters 1–4) and the much longer 'Doctrine of Abstract Representation, or Thinking' (Chapters 5–17). Abstract representation comprises concepts, which human beings alone are capable of forming, and the use of these concepts in judgement and reasoning. Schopenhauer believes in the primacy of intuitive cognition, which is shared with non-human animals. While conceptual thought obviously lends vastly greater sophistication to human cognition, Schopenhauer always holds that the only concepts that have any genuine content are those grounded in intuition. Philosophy becomes empty verbiage when it forgets this. Schopenhauer is able to elaborate many interesting thoughts around this central distinction. One example is his theory of the comical (Chapter 8), which rests on the notion of incongruity between the abstract and the intuitive. (Schopenhauer provides – as not all philosophers have seemed able to – some quite amusing examples.)

The first and the last chapters of the supplements to the First Book are probably the most significant. Schopenhauer explains more clearly than ever his basic idealist position, and also his claim that idealism and materialism, or subject and matter, are correlatives. Subject and matter are personified at the end of Chapter 1 in a miniature dialogue in which each claims supremacy over the other, ultimately becoming reconciled to a mutual dependence. In Schopenhauer's view, it is true both that the world exists for subjective consciousness and that the objects in that world are exclusively material. Indeed, there is a sense in which the subject depends on matter for its existence, and a different sense in which matter, for the idealist, depends upon the subject. The final chapter of the First Book supplements is Chapter 17, 'On Humanity's Metaphysical Need', and expresses Schopenhauer's most fundamental convictions about the nature of philosophy. All humans have a metaphysical need: the human being is a 'metaphysical animal' (169), and by nature seeks a kind of interpretation of reality that 'claims to go beyond the possibility of experience, which is to say beyond nature or the given appearance of things, in order to disclose something about that which . . . conditions appearance; or in common parlance, about what is hidden behind nature and makes it possible' (173). Metaphysics takes two distinct forms which should be kept separate, though they have often been erroneously combined, or found to be in conflict with one another. The first form is philosophy, the second is religion. Schopenhauer's engagement with religion deepened throughout his life, and in the present volume, as we shall see, is most manifest in the supplements to the Fourth Book. But in the First Book he already privileges Christianity, Buddhism and Brahmanism, because of their

pessimism: they ‘present the existence of the world . . . as something that can only be comprehended as a consequence of our guilt and that therefore should not really exist’ (179). Schopenhauer’s attitude to religion as such is double-sided: ‘Religions are necessary to the people and are an incalculable boon. Still, if they try to obstruct the progress of humanity in the cognition of truth, they must with the greatest tact be put to the side’ (177–8). Philosophy’s concern is with truth in the literal sense (*sensu proprio*), which religion can never provide. The use of religion, however, is to provide truth in the allegorical sense (*sensu allegorico*), thus satisfying the universal metaphysical need for the benefit of the great mass of people who are not capable of philosophy.

Turning to philosophy itself, Schopenhauer explains that a mere *physics*, or philosophy of nature, will always be inadequate because it gives us understanding of a mere surface, of appearance, whereas ‘*metaphysics* aims beyond appearance itself to that which appears’ (187), in other words the thing in itself. However, Schopenhauer is insistent that his metaphysics is immanent rather than transcendent: ‘it never breaks entirely free of experience but rather remains nothing more than an interpretation and analysis of experience’ and ‘never speaks of the thing in itself other than in its relation to experience’ (192). It is vitally important for Schopenhauer that his metaphysics is not founded upon abstract concepts such as ‘essence, being, substance, perfection, necessity’ and so on, which previous metaphysicians had treated as though they were ‘primordial, as if fallen from heaven, or even innate’ (189). Rather, he claims that his metaphysics is rooted in, and gives an interpretation or ‘deciphering’ of what is available to intuitive cognition, what is given in inner and outer experience. Metaphysics is, for him, a unifying and sense-making account of the world as we experience it.

Schopenhauer shows penetrating psychological insights elsewhere, for example in Chapter 14:

The whole process of our thinking and deciding is rarely at the surface, i.e. it rarely consists of a linkage of clearly conceived judgments, although this is what we strive for in order to give an account to ourselves and to others: however, rumination on the material we receive from the outside, rumination in which our ideas are worked out, usually takes place in the obscure depths, proceeding almost as unconsciously as the transformation of nutrition into the humours and the substance of the body. This is why we are frequently unable to account for the origin of our deepest thoughts: they are the fruits of our mysterious interiority. Judgments, ideas, decisions arise from this depth unexpectedly and in ways that amaze us. (144–5)

The secret locus of control lies not in our consciousness but in the underlying *will*. But here, as Schopenhauer comments, we already anticipate the main theme of the Second Book of *The World as Will and Representation*.

The supplements to the Second Book concern Schopenhauer's central concept of will. The first essay tackles an important issue: how is it possible to have cognition of the thing in itself? Schopenhauer makes an important clarification about his position here, saying

what in the end is this will, which presents itself in the world and as the world, ultimately in itself? That is, what is it quite apart from the fact that it presents itself, or in general *appears*, which is to say is cognized, as *will*? – This question is *never* to be answered because, as was already mentioned, being-cognized inherently contradicts being-in-itself and everything we cognize is as such mere appearance. But the possibility of this question shows that the thing in itself (which we cognize most directly in willing) may have – entirely outside of any possible appearance – determinations, properties, and ways of being that entirely elude our grasp or cognition, but which would remain as the essence of the thing in itself even when, as we have shown in the Fourth Book, it has freely annulled itself as *will*. (209)

Schopenhauer, then, does not claim knowledge that penetrates beyond all experience to some ultimate reality (as might have been thought from his assertions that the thing in itself is will). He intends instead that the will is what we can understand the whole of the world of our experience (inner and outer) to be. So again it is an *immanent*, not a *transcendent* metaphysics that he propounds. The last part of the quoted passage raises an issue of serious concern for Schopenhauer, however. In the culmination of his philosophy in the Fourth Book he will say that the will can negate or annul itself. It is notoriously unclear how something whose *essence* is willing can transform into something that ceases to will. Here there is the hint of an answer: something that *ordinarily* manifests itself in our experience as will can in principle, in virtue of its unfathomable absolute nature, stop manifesting itself in that way.

Chapters 19–22 of this volume form a continuous and detailed discussion of the relation of will and intellect, centring around the idea that we may adopt both objective and subjective investigative standpoints. Schopenhauer states emphatically that 'what in self-consciousness, and thus subjectively, is the intellect, is presented in consciousness of other things, and thus objectively, as the brain: and what in self-consciousness, and thus subjectively, is the will, is presented in consciousness of other things, and thus objectively, as the entire organism' (258). For Schopenhauer the intellect, the capacity to understand and reason about

the world around us, is secondary, a tool or instrument of the will. The cognitive apparatus we are endowed with functions to serve ends which the will strives for. The will is simple and primordial, present in all living things, and at bottom is an 'attachment to life' as such (249). In self-consciousness we are likewise aware that the will is primary: the basis of consciousness is a 'direct awareness of a *longing* . . . and the alternating satisfaction and non-satisfaction of this longing' (215), and this applies to both human and animal consciousness.

The subjective side of the human case is explored in Chapter 19, 'On the Primacy of the Will in Self-consciousness', where Schopenhauer makes interesting observations concerning a number of psychological phenomena. One such is the observation that our conscious understanding of the world is frequently shaped by desires, inclinations and aversions that are not fully known to us or within our rational control. Thus we see things selectively because of the desires and purposes that are governing us: 'We are often quite unable to grasp or conceive anything that stands in opposition to our cause, our plan, our wish, our hope, even though it is obvious to everyone else: on the other hand, anything favourable strikes the eye, even from a great distance' (229–30). At the same time, what we will is sometimes hidden from conscious awareness:

We often do not know what we want, or what we fear. We can nourish a wish for years without either admitting it to ourselves or even letting it come clearly into consciousness because the intellect is not supposed to find out about it lest it spoil the good opinion we have of ourselves: but if the wish is granted, then we learn from our joy (not without some shame) that it is what we wanted: for instance, the death of some near relative from whom we are to inherit. And sometimes we do not know what we really fear because we lack the courage to bring it clearly into consciousness. (221)

The 'I' or self is a kind of composite of will and conscious intellect for Schopenhauer, and the interplay between the two is complex. The intellect guides all our action by providing motives for the will, but the will ultimately has hegemony. Schopenhauer seems to anticipate the psychoanalytic conception of repression when he comments that in order to avoid painful emotions 'the will forbids the intellect certain representations, when it simply blocks certain trains of thought' (219). In this long chapter Schopenhauer offers many more psychological insights concerning ways in which cognition can be both hindered and enhanced by the emotions, how the will forms the core of the individual's character and is not changeable in the same way as their intellectual capacities, and how many aspects of life reveal the naturalness of treating the will as the 'being and essence' of the

human being. With his knack for a vivid image, Schopenhauer likens the relation between will and intellect to ‘that of a strong blind man who carries a seeing but lame man on his shoulders’ (220).

In other chapters supplementary to the Second Book Schopenhauer turns to the objective investigation of organisms, human and non-human, and exhibits a studious engagement with contemporary physiological literature. His aim here is to show that his metaphysical concept of a will that permeates all natural processes is borne out by independent scientific work. Among those for whose work he shows appreciation is Marie François Xavier Bichat, whose distinction between ‘organic life’ and ‘animal life’ he maps on to the distinction between will and intellect, the former manifest objectively throughout the organism, the latter in the brain. Objectively occurring brain function shows up subjectively as unified consciousness, and this is how we acquire a sense of self:

this focus of brain activity remains in the first instance a mere subject of cognition and as such capable of being the cold and disinterested spectator, the mere guide and adviser to the will, and also of apprehending the external world in a purely objective manner without regard to the will’s well-being or woe. But as soon as it directs itself internally, it recognizes the will as the basis of its own appearance and blends with it into the consciousness of an I. That focal point of brain activity (or the subject of cognition) is, as an indivisible point, certainly simple, but not for that reason a substance (soul) but instead a mere state . . . This *cognitive* and conscious I is to the will (which is the basis of its appearance) what the image in the focus of a concave mirror is to the mirror itself, and as in the example, has only a conditional, indeed, strictly speaking, a merely apparent reality. (291)

Two notable features of this account are that the self or ‘I’ is not a substance or soul, reflecting Schopenhauer’s consistent rejection of the Cartesian, Christian and Platonic traditions of thinking thus about the self; and that the subject of cognition is capable of ‘being the cold and disinterested spectator’ and ‘apprehending the external world in a purely objective manner without regard to the will’s well-being or woe’. These claims are vital to Schopenhauer’s whole system of thought, since this potential independence of the subject of cognition from the will is what characterizes both aesthetic experience and the freedom from willing in which, as he argues, salvation consists.

The Second Book supplements range quite widely across the natural sciences, because for Schopenhauer the will must be found to manifest itself throughout the whole of nature. Thus we have chapters on ‘the objectivation of the will in nature devoid of cognition’, on matter, teleology in nature, and on animal instincts. Schopenhauer argues in favour of

teleological accounts of nature as opposed to mechanistic ones, provided that we free teleology of any connotation of conscious design by a divine mind, something Schopenhauer consistently finds repugnant. But mechanism is equally repugnant: Schopenhauer insists that science is mistaken in trying to eliminate the 'life force' from its explanations of phenomena, that atomism produces theoretical 'monstrosities', with atoms being nothing but 'a fixed idea of the French scholars, which is why they talk about them as if they have seen them' (314). Schopenhauer also collects many examples of instinctive behaviour in animals, favouring a teleological explanation in which the timeless will that is the essence of each animal provides for its future well-being and that of its offspring, but does so in a way that entirely bypasses cognition. The final chapter in this part of the book is the powerful 'Characterization of the Will to Life':

Everything strains and drives towards *existence*, towards *organic* existence if possible, i.e. towards *life*, and then towards the highest possible level of this: in animal nature it is obvious that *will to life* is the tonic note of its essence, its only immutable and unconditional property. Just consider this universal straining for life, look at the infinite zeal, ease and wantonness with which the will to life everywhere and at every moment strains wildly to exist in millions of forms, through fertility and seeds or even, where these are lacking, spontaneous generation, seizing every opportunity, grabbing greedily at every material capable of life; and then cast a glance at the terrified alarm and wild uproar when the will to life gives way in any individual appearance and slips out of existence, particularly where this takes place in the clarity of consciousness. (365–6)

In his final revision of *The World as Will and Representation* in 1859, Schopenhauer added a significant passage, which describes a scene witnessed in Java by the explorer Franz Wilhelm Junghuhn: a vast field of tortoise skeletons, the result of repeated attacks by wild dogs, who themselves were sometimes attacked by tigers. Schopenhauer responds: 'The whole misery has repeated itself thousands upon thousands of times, year in, year out. This is what these tortoises are born to. What have they done wrong to deserve this torture? What is the point of this whole scene of abomination? The only answer is: this is how the *will to life* objectifies itself' (370). In his notebooks Schopenhauer recorded another Javanese example, of a squirrel mesmerized and eaten by a snake. The example has made its way into a footnote thanks to Schopenhauer's editors, along with Schopenhauer's comment on it: 'This story is significant . . . as an argument for *pessimism* . . . How terrible is this nature to which we belong!' (371, n.).

The section of supplements to the Third Book is the shortest in length. Its chapters show Schopenhauer's continuing adherence to his theory of aesthetic experience and artistic genius, and his in-depth appreciation for the arts. There are chapters on natural beauty, the visual arts, architecture, literature and music, which parallel the treatments in the First Volume. In line with his previous acknowledgement that there can be no knowledge of the thing in itself in an absolute sense, Schopenhauer now makes clear that when aesthetic experience allows us to recognize the timeless Idea in a particular object of perception, we still do not grasp the thing in itself: 'the Ideas do not reveal the essence in itself of things but only their objective character, and hence they only ever reveal appearance' (381). By 'objective' here Schopenhauer means, as always, what pertains to objects that fall within the subject's experience (not what is absolutely real). The timeless objective character of a thing coincides with its species, a kind of universal existing in nature. Both Ideas and concepts are universal, but while the former are to be conceived as real prior to experience, the latter are constructs of rational reflection by the human mind. The state of mind in which Ideas can be grasped is one in which the principle of sufficient reason is not applied, so that the particular object can be viewed in isolation from its relations to other objects, and in which the intellect becomes free of its attachment to the will of the individual person. 'One grasps the world in a purely objective manner only when one no longer knows that one belongs to it; and the more we are conscious only of things, and the less we are conscious of ourselves, then the more beautifully everything presents itself' (385). Artistic contexts especially facilitate this detachment from self, because fictional things can have no real relation to our will: we can neither genuinely want them nor suffer from them. In real life, for the same reason, scenes that are foreign to our lives, such as distant destinations to which we travel, are more amenable to aesthetic detachment than our everyday surroundings, unless even there one were to experience 'some degree of abstraction from one's own will' (387). But all such will-lessness is only temporary, and one must eventually return to life. The value of aesthetic experience rests on its being a kind of respite, for 'To appear interesting, delightful, enviable, any state, person or scene of life need only be grasped in a purely objective way and made into the object of a portrayal, whether in brushstrokes or in words – but if you are stuck within it, if you yourself are it, then (it is often said) it is hell' (389).

Genius, which is required for the production of works that engender such detachment, is for Schopenhauer the rare capacity to sustain this very state to a heightened degree over extended periods of time. Schopenhauer



ventures to say that ‘if the normal person consists of  $\frac{2}{3}$  will and  $\frac{1}{3}$  intellect, the genius on the other hand possesses  $\frac{2}{3}$  intellect and  $\frac{1}{3}$  will’ (394). Intellect here claims for itself a kind of autonomy, but genius manifests itself not in conceptual thought, rather in intuition and imagination, the capacity to create fresh images. Art that is the product of conceptual thought is never authentic, for Schopenhauer. He expatiates at some length about the qualities of genius, its exceptional clarity of mind (*Besonnenheit*), its distinction from mere talent or practical cleverness, its childlike nature, the (alleged) fact that it goes with an enlarged brain, and so on. One of the prominent themes of his later works, for example *Parerga and Paralipomena* (1851), is that people of mere talent and practical ability are recognized by their time, but geniuses are often neglected; he picks up the same theme here, saying ‘Talent is like a marksman who hits a target others cannot reach; genius is like a marksman who hits a target too far for others even to see; that is why it is appreciated only indirectly, and therefore late’ (408).

The Third Book is not wholly devoted to the aesthetic: we also find chapters on madness and on history. These topics arise for Schopenhauer because they are corollaries of his central claims about the nature of genius and cognition of the timeless Ideas, as set out in the opening three chapters of this section. History (in Chapter 38) is for Schopenhauer a kind of knowledge that, as Aristotle already said in the *Poetics*, is inferior to poetry precisely because unlike the latter it cannot grasp what is universal. As for madness, Schopenhauer had already taken a close personal interest in particular mental patients during his earlier life in Berlin,<sup>2</sup> and in the First Volume (§ 36) he made much of the link between genius and madness, citing literary forerunners for this idea, such as Pope’s line ‘Great wits to madness sure are near allied’. In the Second Volume he now inserts a brief chapter on madness (*Wahnsinn*) as a self-contained topic. Mental health consists in good recall of the past, and particular kinds of disruption to memory characterize insanity. Schopenhauer’s theory is that madness occurs when the assimilation of cognitive material cannot be accomplished because of the resistance of the will. We all naturally encounter much material that is detrimental to our interests and contrary to our desires, and a healthy mind will, however painfully, accomplish the task of accepting it and so produce an ordered memory. However,

if the will’s resistance and refusal to assimilate some cognition reaches the point where the operation simply cannot be carried out; if, therefore, certain events or circumstances are fully repressed [*unterschlagen*] from the intellect because the will cannot bear the sight of them, and if the gap that then arises

<sup>2</sup> See David E. Cartwright, *Schopenhauer: A Biography* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 178.

is patched up with some invention due to the need for coherence – then there is madness. (417–18)

If the mind loses a memory in this way, it has to make up for it: ‘madness can be seen to originate from violently “casting something out of one’s mind”, and this is possible only by the “putting into one’s head” of something else’ (418): a delusion thus results.

In the aesthetic chapters per se Schopenhauer emphatically reiterates his central claim that art arising out of a predetermined conceptual plan is contrived and inferior in comparison with art that stems from the clear intuition of a genius. Art is fundamentally concerned with truth, because it answers the question ‘What is life?’ All genuine artworks ‘hold an intuitive image before the questioner and say: “look here, this is life!”’ (423) Chapter 35 comprises a full and detailed discussion of architecture, which for Schopenhauer expresses for our intuition the most fundamental Ideas in nature, those of gravity and rigidity. In order to do so properly, he concludes, architectural structures must consist essentially of loads and supports whose separate functions are clearly discernible. This predisposes him to a very strict classical style, and he even says that architecture as a fine art has been ‘perfected and finished since the high point of Greece, or at least it is no longer open to any significant enrichment’ (433). He concedes merely ‘a certain beauty in its own way’ to the Gothic style, but asserts that it can only be a degeneration from the proper way of doing architecture, so that ‘when it tries to set itself on equal footing with antique architecture, this betrays a barbaric presumptuousness that cannot be allowed to stand’ (434).

In the following chapters there are discussions of many particular points concerning painting, poetry and drama. Tragedy, which gives us the feeling of the sublime, retains its central importance among artistic representations for Schopenhauer because it portrays ‘the terrible side of life, the misery of humanity, the rule of chance and error, the fall of the just, the triumph of the evil: in other words, we see before our eyes the state of the world diametrically opposed to our will’ (450) – or in other words, life as it is. But even more important is the fact that tragedy displays (or in Schopenhauer’s view, should display) resignation on the part of its protagonists. In so doing, it rehearses for us the necessary step to salvation: ‘in the tragic catastrophe we turn away from the will to life itself’ (450).

The supplements to the Third Book end in the same way as the Third Book itself, with a discussion of music, which, as Schopenhauer reminds us here, ‘does not present the *Ideas* or the levels of objectivation of the will,

but rather directly presents the will *itself* (465). Music is as direct a manifestation of the will as is the objective world itself. However, in the supplementary remarks Schopenhauer does not dwell on the metaphysics of music, but rather on its physical properties and the psychology of our reception of it. Schopenhauer has a theory that ratios between frequencies that sound together are unpleasant to us ‘due to the fact that what resists our *apprehension*, the irrational or the dissonant, is a natural image for something that resists our *will*; and conversely, consonance, or the rational, since it easily facilitates our *apprehension*, is the image for the satisfaction of the *will*’ (468). Music is profound because it mirrors to us the very essence of willing, while leaving our personal will unmoved, as Schopenhauer says in this elegant passage:

Thus the affections of the will itself, which is to say actual pain and actual pleasure, are not to be excited but only their substitute, what is suitable to the *intellect*, as the *image* of the satisfaction of the will, and what offers it more or less resistance, as the *image* of the greater or lesser pain. It is only in this way that music never causes us actual pain but remains enjoyable even in its most painful harmonies, and we gladly perceive in its language the secret history of our will and all of its excitations and strivings, with their most varied prolongations, obstacles and agonies, even in the most melancholy melodies. When on the other hand, in reality with its horrors, our *will itself* is excited and pained, we are not dealing with notes and their numerical relations but are now ourselves the vibrating string that is stretched and plucked. (468)

The last paragraph of the supplements to the Third Book, which Schopenhauer added in the final edition of 1859, ends with an obscure quotation, in a strange mixture of languages, from *Oupnek’hat*, the two-volume compilation (principally in Latin) of texts from the ancient Indian Upanishads that Schopenhauer read and treasured throughout his life.<sup>3</sup> The quotation nicely primes us for the strong presence of Indian thought in the ensuing Fourth Book (a few pages into which Schopenhauer begins referring to Buddhism and Brahmanism), but its relevance to music is not straightforwardly obvious. We translate the passage as ‘And blissfulness, which is a sort of joy, is called the highest *ātman* because everywhere that joy might be, this is a part of its joy’ (474). Schopenhauer offers this as a rejoinder to someone tempted by the thought that if music so powerfully reveals to us the nature of willing, then it ‘serves to flatter only the will to life since it presents its essence, portrays its successes, and ends up expressing its satisfaction and contentment’. Isn’t all art, including music,

<sup>3</sup> See p. 474, n. a.

supposed to be about turning *away* from the will to life? Schopenhauer's response is that the joy in will-lessly contemplating music's image of the will is, like all joy, part of the joy of the *ātman*, the supreme self, which is equated with the bliss of salvation. Aesthetic release from willing is a glimpse of the state in which one is freed from willing altogether.

Thus we arrive at the Fourth Book, which for Schopenhauer is the 'final, most serious, and most important of our Books' (480). In the First Volume of *The World as Will and Representation* the theme of the Fourth Book is ethics. The same is true of the supplementary essays, but with a qualification which Schopenhauer makes in a short preface: there are two major ethical topics that he will not be dealing with this time around, namely freedom of the will and the basis of morality. Schopenhauer exempts himself from further discussion of these topics on the grounds that they have already been covered in the volume *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* (first published in 1841). What remains is the more broadly ethical theme of the affirmation and negation of the will, which lies at the heart of Schopenhauer's philosophy, and which receives its fullest and most powerful treatment in these pages. In introducing the supplements to the Fourth Book Schopenhauer singles out for mention the long Chapter 44, 'Metaphysics of Sexual Love'. This, he says, is a topic that belongs in ethics but has been neglected hitherto by philosophers. It has its place here because sexual desire and the sex drive are primary manifestations of the affirmation of the will to life. At the start of Chapter 44 he comments that it really forms a whole with the three preceding chapters, 'On Death and its Relation to the Indestructibility of our Essence in Itself', 'Life of the Species' and 'The Heritability of Traits'. These four chapters between them constitute well over half the length of this final section of the volume, and add significant new depth to *The World as Will and Representation*.

The first chapter 'On Death and its Relation to the Indestructibility of our Essence in Itself' is the longest in the book. Schopenhauer's attitude to death is one of consolation. He begins with the overwhelmingness of the fear of death, but immediately states that this fear cannot be rational in origin, because animals fear death without any knowledge that they will die. The elemental fear of death must therefore lie in what is common to humans and other animals, namely the will to life. It is because in essence we are concrete manifestations of this striving for life that the fear of life's ending is so ingrained in us. Views on this topic tend to 'vacillate between the view of death as an absolute annihilation and the assumption that we are immortal, flesh, blood and all', but, Schopenhauer continues, 'Both are

equally false: and we do not need to find a correct middle ground but rather a higher perspective from which both ideas fall away of their own accord' (481).

Anyway, if death *were* complete annihilation, why would that be a bad thing? Schopenhauer gives eloquent expression to some oft-expressed Epicurean arguments:

[I]t is . . . absurd to consider non-being an evil since every evil, like every good, presupposes existence and indeed consciousness; and consciousness comes to an end when life ends, as it does in sleep or in a faint; and so the absence of consciousness is no evil. (484)

It is irrefutably certain that non-being after death can be no different from non-being prior to birth, and therefore no more lamentable. An entire infinity has passed when we did *not yet* exist: but this does not upset us in the least. By contrast, what we find difficult, or even intolerable, is the fact that, after the momentary intermezzo of an ephemeral existence, there should be a second infinity in which we will *no longer* exist. Now has this thirst for existence arisen because we have tasted existence and found it so entirely wonderful? Certainly not . . . it is much more likely that our experiences would awaken in us a longing for the lost paradise of non-being. (483)

Another consoling thought might be that the matter of which we consist does *not* cease to exist:

'What?' people will say, 'the permanence of mere dust, of crude matter, is to be regarded as a continuation of our being?' – But oh! Are you acquainted with this dust? Do you know what it is and what it can do? Get to know it before you despise it. This matter that lies there now as dust and ashes will, when dissolved in water, sprout into a crystal, glisten as a metal, and then electric sparks will fly from it; by means of its galvanic tension it will express a force that dissolves the most solid ties and reduces earth to metal: in fact, it will form itself into plants and animals and from its mysterious womb develop the very life that you, in your narrow-mindedness, are so worried about losing. Is it really so meaningless to continue to exist as this kind of matter? I am serious when I say that even this permanence of matter bears witness to the indestructibility of our true being, even if only in images and metaphors, or rather only in silhouette. (489)

However, Schopenhauer's true solution to the problem of death is metaphysical: since time and space pertain only to the world as representation, the 'higher perspective' beyond empirical description allows us to consider reality as unchanging and non-individuated. From that perspective, Schopenhauer claims, we can deny both that the individual survives, and

that the individual's true essence perishes. Something timeless manifests itself in the individual that I am for a while, and it does not perish with the ending of this individual. The *species* renews itself over again:

Just as the spraying drops of the roaring waterfall change with lightning speed while the rainbow they support remains steadfast in immobile rest, entirely untouched by the restless change of the drops, so too every *Idea*, i.e. every *species* of living being, remains completely untouched by the constant change of its individuals. But it is the *Idea* or the species in which the will to life is genuinely rooted and in which it manifests itself: thus the will is only truly concerned with the continuation of the species. For instance, lions that are born and die are like the drops of the waterfall; but the *leonitas*, the *Idea* or form of the lion, is like the unmoving rainbow above. (499)

Just as we ordinarily think that the person who enters the unconsciousness of sleep and the one who wakes up next morning are one and the same, so this human being here and now and other humans elsewhere in the future are not distinct from the higher perspective that reveals their true essence.

For Schopenhauer the worst doctrine concerning death is that traditionally associated with Christianity – though he unfortunately does his best to blame it on Christianity's adoption of an allegedly purely Jewish idea of the creator God, which is 'alien' to Christianity and makes it into an unworkable hybrid. The view in question is that each individual comes into existence 'out of nothing' at some point in time, but then goes on existing forever. Against this:

anyone who considers a person's birth to be his absolute beginning must consider his death to be his absolute end. For both are what they are in the same sense: consequently we can only think of ourselves as *immortal* to the extent that we think of ourselves as *unborn*, and in the same sense . . . The assumption that a human being is created out of nothing leads necessarily to the idea that death is his absolute end. (503–4)

Far preferable to Schopenhauer are the ideas he finds in Indian thought (though giving them Greek names): metempsychosis (transmigration of souls) and palingenesis (rebirth). He does not regard these doctrines as literally true, since in his ontology there are no such things as souls. However, as allegories, they graphically represent the idea that something fundamental to me both survives and predates the existence of the particular individual I identify myself as. He explains thus: 'the word "I" contains a huge equivocation . . . Depending on how I understand this word, I can say: "death is my total end", but also: "my personal appearance is just as small a part of my true being as I am an infinitely small part of the world" (507).

Someone taking the latter view could happily 'leave his individuality behind, smile at the tenacity of his attachment to it and say: "why do I care about the loss of this individuality since I carry in myself the possibility of countless individualities?"' (507). In the sense of 'I' that attaches to the individual human being, 'death is the great opportunity not to be I any longer' (524).

In Chapters 42 and 43 Schopenhauer focusses on human reproduction. The will, the essential part of each human being, is neither conscious nor individual. Rather, it is the will to life which resides in the species as a whole, and this will to life (*Wille zum Leben*) is not just a will to *live*, it is most importantly a will to *propagate life*, hence the sex drive is the very kernel of the will to life:

Indeed, one can say that the human being is the sex drive made concrete, since he arose from an act of copulation, the wish of all his wishes is to engage in copulation, and this drive alone perpetuates and holds together the whole of his appearance. It is true that the will to life expresses itself mainly as the striving to preserve the individual; but this is only a stage in the effort to preserve the species . . . So the sex drive is the most complete expression of the will to life. (530)

Accordingly, sexual relations 'are the invisible focal point of all our doings and dealings, and they peep through in spite of all the veils thrown over them' (529). Schopenhauer has some definite, and in some cases rather bizarre, views about the continuities of character and ability that are passed on to new individuals through procreation. Certain traits must come from the mother and some from the father, and since he is confident in assigning these parents respectively to the 'inferior sex' and the 'stronger sex', he sees fit to associate the primary element in character, the will, with the father, and the secondary intellect with the mother: 'the human being inherits all moral features, character, inclinations, heart, from the father, while getting the degree, structure and direction of his intelligence from his mother', believing that this is 'confirmed by experience' (533). Typical of Schopenhauer's methods on many topics is that fact that the alleged confirmation comes largely from examples in Roman history, nineteenth-century authors and contemporary newspaper reports. Some of his remarks on heritability – such as 'sometimes the children of a second marriage still bear some resemblance to the first spouse, and children conceived through an adulterous relationship are similar to the legitimate father' (534) – are speculative, to say the least.

These chapters lead up to 'Metaphysics of Sexual Love'. Schopenhauer's topic in this magisterial essay is *Geschlechtsliebe*, which we translate as

‘sexual love’. Here we should think not just of a simple desire for sexual activity or gratification. The phenomenon Schopenhauer addresses is, he says, best described in fictional works such as *Romeo and Juliet*, *La Nouvelle Héloïse* and Goethe’s *Werther*: being in love (*Verliebtheit*), an exceptional state in which individuals are sometimes driven even to madness, homicide or suicide by the intensity of their passion. This state is rooted in the sex drive (*Geschlechtstrieb*), but is more specific: it occurs when the sex drive is ‘more precisely determined, specialized, and . . . individualized’ (549), while ‘mere sex drive is base because it is directed to everyone and not individualized’ (565). By contrast, the phenomenon that concerns Schopenhauer is the sex drive strongly and persistently addressed to a single personal love object, and intensified into an ‘excessive passion’. Thus ‘individualization, and with it the intensity of being love, can reach such a high pitch that if it is not satisfied, then everything good in the world, indeed life itself, loses its value’ (565–6). In other words, in the consciousness of one human individual another human individual can become such an exaggeratedly important and irreplaceable object of desire that other objects of desire, including even being alive, are no longer recognized as having value for the individual.

Sexual love leads, or tends to lead, to procreation of further human individuals, which is at least a relative good, a good for the human species. But the mere indiscriminate exercise of the sexual drive would accomplish that. Love is a more refined form of good in Schopenhauer’s eyes, though not what lovers usually think it is. Its remarkable selectivity of focus, its training of extreme desire and minute attentiveness exclusively upon a certain individual, serves the end of producing better human specimens in the succeeding generation. For Schopenhauer has the belief, which he expounds in some detail, that we are most powerfully attracted to the one with whom we can produce fitter offspring, and unconsciously select the anatomical features of the beloved under the guidance of this reproductive end. And yet, for the individual who feels the passion of sexual love, or for the recipient of such passion, there is no direct value at all. They are merely used as instruments by what Schopenhauer calls the will of the species. The will of the species succeeds by *deluding* the individual into the belief that he or she stands to gain something of value from the whole exercise. In happier cases (if that is ever the right word for Schopenhauer) the individual at least attains relief of sheer sexual appetite, but that again is something common to any exercise of the sexual drive and not specific to being in love. More importantly, being in love does not, in Schopenhauer’s view, deliver the bliss of high personal fulfilment it appears to promise.



One might go on to form a successful and rewarding relationship with the object of one's desire, because one also shares their likes and dislikes, appreciates their intellect, and so on, but those are not goods that arise from being in love as such. Being in love brings no peculiar value of its own to the individual lover, and is a good only because of its benefit to the unborn offspring likely to result from its consummation.

Schopenhauer's idea is that the whole process relies on our naturally dominant egoism, the state in which we identify with the ends, the pleasure and the fulfilment of what Schopenhauer calls our 'person' – the one individuated human individual we regard ourselves to be. So sexual love relies on a human being's retaining the natural, unreformed consciousness characteristic of individuals, and yet it does so only in the service of a value that bypasses the individual entirely:

egoistic goals are the only ones that can be relied upon to arouse an individual being into action . . . And so in such a case, nature can only achieve its aim by implanting a certain *delusion* [*Wahn*] in the individual that makes what in truth is good only for the species appear to be good for the individual . . . What therefore guides people here is really an instinct oriented towards the best for the species, while people themselves imagine they are seeking simply to heighten their own pleasure. (554–6)

So, in Schopenhauer's view, the individual is both powerless, driven by the force of nature at large, and necessarily blind to what is really happening. Though you continue to believe that you pursue a goal uniquely valuable to yourself, a larger will that permeates nature is using you, the individual, for ends that are not your own.

Equally weighty is Chapter 46, 'On the Nothingness and Suffering of Life'. *Nichtigkeit* is the stark German word in the title; we translate it as 'nothingness' to emphasize its connection with *Nichts*, nothing – although it might also be translated as 'nullity', 'worthlessness' or 'vanity' (in the sense of being in vain or for nothing). This chapter is very often cited as the encapsulation of Schopenhauer's philosophical pessimism (although this is not a term he uses to characterize his own philosophy directly). The message is hammered home throughout this chapter that life is a continual round of striving for one goal after another, with no genuine reward. Happiness is only the temporary cessation of our sense that something is lacking, and it is an illusion that we will ever achieve anything more by willing. Suffering is endemic to our condition, and saps value away from it, which nothing can replace or compensate. The rhetoric of this chapter is heartfelt and striking:

Awoken to life from the night of unconsciousness, the will finds itself as an individual in a world without end or limit, among countless individuals who are all striving, suffering, going astray; and it hurries back to the old unconsciousness, as if through a bad dream. – But until then its desires are unlimited, its claims inexhaustible, and every satisfied desire gives birth to a new one. No possible worldly satisfaction could be enough to quiet its longing, give its desires a final goal, and fill the bottomless pit of its heart . . . [H]appiness always lies in the future, or in the past, and the present is like a small dark cloud driven by the wind over the sunlit plains: both in front of it and behind it everything is bright, it alone casts a constant shadow. The present is therefore always unsatisfying, but the future is uncertain, and the past cannot be recovered. (588–9)

[I]t is fundamentally beside the point to argue whether there is more good or evil in the world: for the very existence of evil already decides the matter since it can never be cancelled out by any good that might exist alongside or after it, and cannot therefore be counterbalanced . . . [T]he mere existence of evil would still be sufficient to ground a truth that can be expressed in different ways although only ever somewhat indirectly, namely that we should be sorry rather than glad about the existence of the world; that its non-existence would be preferable to its existence; that it is something that fundamentally should not be, etc. (591–2)

Although he does not espouse pessimism explicitly by name, Schopenhauer inveighs against the philosophical optimism of Leibniz and others as a glaringly absurd and pernicious doctrine, given the state of the world as empirically manifest, but also given the nature of desire, satisfaction and the character of will to life as portrayed in his theory. Once again, he reads Brahmanism, Buddhism and also Christianity (if deprived of its optimistic theism) as correctly pessimistic because they ‘regard work, deprivation, misery and suffering, all crowned by death, as the goal of our lives’ (600). In customary fashion he ends this impressive chapter with confirmatory references to Voltaire, Byron, Homer, Greek tragedy, Shakespeare, Balthasar Gracián, Leopardi and others. But it would be short-sighted to leave Schopenhauer there, as a pessimist pure and simple. The clue comes when he praises the three ‘pessimistic’ religions on the grounds that by seeing the value of life correctly they ‘lead to the negation of the will to life’ (600). There is a way of seeing the world aright, which will bring us liberation, or salvation, from the life to which our will and individuated existence naturally condemn us, and the two penultimate chapters of the book, ‘On the Doctrine of the Negation of the Will to Life’ and ‘The Way to Salvation’ offer Schopenhauer’s mature thoughts on these issues.

In the first of these chapters Schopenhauer relies on an interpretation of Christianity that sees asceticism and self-denial as its central, defining feature, and not the belief in God. This enables Schopenhauer to run together his three favoured religions, speaking of 'the great fundamental truth of Christianity as well as Brahmanism and Buddhism, namely the need for redemption from an existence given over to suffering and death, and our ability to attain this redemption by means of the negation of the will' (644). Schopenhauer refers to much secondary literature on the Indian doctrines, but in the case of Christianity he displays detailed engagement with original sources, such as St Paul, St Augustine, Meister Eckhart, Luther and the anonymous *German Theology*. Other strands of Christianity come in for equally engaged critique. Clement of Alexandria's discussion of the advocacy of celibacy by various heretical groups is dissected, and charged with mixing the truly Christian ascetic viewpoint of the New Testament with the solely Old Testament doctrine of theism, with its verdict of 'everything was very good'. Mainstream Protestantism in Europe has given up on celibacy and self-denial, and in addition has succumbed to a 'shallow rationalism' (640), on which grounds Schopenhauer dares to say that is not even genuine Christianity any more.

Negating the will is not achieved by rational plan or resolve, but must come about as though from an outside source, similar to the effect of divine grace in Christianity. Having lamented the presence of a life of suffering and sorrow, Schopenhauer now turns the tables and suggests that 'it would be more accurate to posit the goal of life in our woe than in our well-being':

life . . . seems to be specifically intended to show us that we are *not* supposed to feel happy in it, since the whole structure of life has the character of something we have lost the taste for, something meant to disgust us, and that we have to distance ourselves from, as from an error, so that our heart can be cured of the craving for pleasure or, in fact, for life, and can turn away from the world. (651)

So Schopenhauer's philosophy comes to rest, not with the pessimistic description of the world, but with a way to salvation from the world, a reversal of the natural sense of self, so that the individual human being with its self-centred desires is left behind. Sainly human beings can attain an immediate sense of universal suffering that elevates their knowledge above the natural individualistic standpoint. For the majority of humans the 'second way' to salvation is the only one open, that is, being cleansed of their attachment to life by suffering itself. Schopenhauer concludes by reminding us that we are naturally equipped only to give explanations in

terms of the principle of sufficient reason, so that many questions will be left unanswered by all philosophy, his own included:

And so for instance, after all of my arguments, one can still inquire from where has this will arisen that is free to affirm itself (the appearance of this being the world) or to negate itself (an appearance of what we do not know)? What is the fatality that lies beyond all experience, and that has put the will in the highly precarious dilemma of either appearing as a world governed by suffering and death or of negating its ownmost being? Or in fact what could have induced it to leave behind the infinitely preferable peace of blissful nothingness? . . . [O]ne could even raise the question: 'What would I be if I were not the will to life?' (657–8)

Right at the end of this extended supplementary volume Schopenhauer makes the tentative suggestion that there might be a different form of willing, a willing away from the world and life, of which we might be capable. So what he has called negation may be another form of will, but we cannot provide an account, limited as we are by our existence as finite individual beings.

## Notes on Text and Translation

### GERMAN EDITION

The translation in this volume is based on the German edition of Schopenhauer's works edited by Arthur Hübscher, *Sämtliche Werke* (Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus, 1988), volume 3. Page numbers of that edition are given in the margins of the translation. Hübscher's definitive edition follows the first complete edition compiled by Julius Frauenstädt in 1873 and published by Brockhaus in Leipzig, with revisions taking account of numerous later editorial interventions. A paperback version of the Hübscher edition that preserves the same text, with different script and fewer editorial notes, is the so-called *Zürcher Ausgabe, Werke in zehn Bänden* (Zurich: Diogenes, 1977), in which *The World as Will and Representation* (volume 2) appears in volumes 3 and 4. (Those wishing to read the German text of the work that Schopenhauer himself last issued should consult Ludger Lütkehaus (ed.), *Arthur Schopenhauers Werke in fünf Bänden. Nach den Ausgaben letzter Hand* (Zurich: Haffmans, 1988), vol. 1.) Arguments for using Hübscher as the basis for translation are given by Richard Aquila in his 'Introduction' to Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Presentation*, vol. 1, trans. Richard E. Aquila in collaboration with David Carus (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2008), xli–xlii, the main reason being that Hübscher is commonly cited as the standard edition. When compiling our own editorial notes we have found it useful to consult those of Hübscher in the *Sämtliche Werke*, and also those in Paul Deussen (ed.), *Arthur Schopenhauers Sämtliche Werke* (Munich, 1911–12), whose notes are sometimes fuller.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> We have also sometimes found it useful to consult the editorial notes in *The World as Will and Presentation*, Volume 2, trans. Richard E. Aquila and David Carus (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2010).

## VOCABULARY

Many terms from the German text are given in editorial footnotes where this may be of help to the reader of a particular passage. Here we shall comment on some of the more important decisions that have been made about translating frequent items in Schopenhauer's vocabulary. The term *Vorstellung*, for whatever comes before the mind in consciousness, has been translated as 'representation'. This follows the most common rendering of the term in Kant's writings (Kant uses the Latin *repraesentatio* when he wishes to elucidate his use of *Vorstellung*).<sup>2</sup> A case could be made both for 'idea' and for 'presentation' as English translations of *Vorstellung*. The case for the former could be made, firstly, on the grounds of continuity with the use of 'idea' by Locke and other British empiricists; secondly, on the grounds that Schopenhauer himself uses 'idea' for *Vorstellung* in a sample of English translation composed in 1829, when he was proposing to translate Kant himself for an English audience;<sup>3</sup> and thirdly, 'idea' is simply a less clumsy word for the English reader.<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, the mainstream translation in Kantian contexts nowadays is 'representation', and this continuity is arguably more important to preserve. Finally, particularly in his all-important aesthetic theory, Schopenhauer himself uses the term *Idee* – which is most comfortably translated as 'idea' (or 'Idea') – in a quite different sense, which he intends to be very close to a Platonic usage. We have chosen to avoid introducing the opposition of 'idea' versus 'Idea' and have opted instead for 'representation' versus 'Idea', which better reflects the opposition *Vorstellung* versus *Idee*.<sup>5</sup> The case for 'presentation' might be that, while 'representation' unnecessarily imports the connotation of a definite item in the mind that is a copy, depiction, or stand-in for something other than itself, 'presentation' resembles *Vorstellung* in suggesting simply the occurrence of something's coming before the mind or entering into its conscious experience.<sup>6</sup> However,

<sup>2</sup> See *Critique of Pure Reason* A320 / B376.

<sup>3</sup> See Schopenhauer's letter 'To the author of Damiron's Analysis' (21 December 1829), in Arthur Hübscher (ed.), *Arthur Schopenhauer: Gesammelte Briefe (GB)*, 122–3. In this letter, written in English, Schopenhauer advocates a 'transplantation of Kant's works into England' and promotes his own translating abilities, at one point commenting 'I hope . . . to render Kant more intelligible in English than he is in German: for I am naturally fond of clearness and precision, & Kant by the by was not' (120).

<sup>4</sup> See David Berman, 'Introduction', in Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea: Abridged in One Volume* (London: Everyman, 1995), trans. Jill Berman, pp. xxxv–xxxvi.

<sup>5</sup> Paul F. H. Lauxtermann suggests 'Form' for *Idee*, in line with recent usage in translating Plato; but in the end he reverts to our policy of 'representation' versus 'Idea' (*Science and Philosophy: Schopenhauer's Broken World-View* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), 43 n.)

<sup>6</sup> See the case made by Richard E. Aquila, 'Translator's Introduction', in Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Presentation*, Volume 1, trans. Richard E. Aquila in collaboration with David Carus (New York: Longman: 2008), pp. xii–xvi. Aquila acknowledges 'representation' as 'commonplace' in translating both Kant and Schopenhauer.

this is a rather subtle difference, and since ‘presentation’ has to be construed as a term of art just as much as ‘representation’, we have not resisted the pull of the latter, more conventional term.

Already in the title of this work Schopenhauer presents the world as being both *Vorstellung* and *Wille*. This second central term in Schopenhauer’s philosophy can only be translated ‘will’. Some interpreters writing in English impose a distinction between ‘will’ and ‘Will’, intending by the latter *the* will, the will that Schopenhauer equates, or appears to equate with the world as a whole in itself. But there is in general no such orthographic differentiation in any of Schopenhauer’s texts themselves, and we have not made any such distinction in the translation. (Arguably one would anyway need more variants than just two if one wanted to reflect the many nuanced roles that Schopenhauer gives to the term *Wille*: standing for the individual’s will as manifested in his or her actions, for the underlying, non-empirical but individual character that is *my will*, for the one will that is common to all creatures, and so on.) The verb *wollen* is standardly translated as ‘to will’ (except in non-technical contexts where ‘to want’ is more appropriate) and *das Wollen* as ‘willing’. The vital Schopenhauerian notion *Wille zum Leben* is always rendered as ‘will to life’. It is not just a striving for individual survival, but also towards the end of propagating new life.

German has two words that are ordinarily translated as ‘knowledge’ – *Wissen* and *Erkenntniß*, and Schopenhauer makes a philosophical distinction between the two of them, arguing that *Wissen* is just one form of *Erkenntniß*. We have therefore tended to reserve the term ‘knowledge’ for *Wissen*, rendering *Erkenntniß* as ‘cognition’, its cognate verb *erkennen* as ‘recognize’, ‘cognize’ or ‘have cognition of’, and *erkennend* as ‘cognitive’ or ‘cognizing’ in contexts where they make a contribution to Schopenhauer’s epistemology and theory of mind. This group of terms occurs very often in the text. One of Schopenhauer’s major themes (from the very first line of § 1) is that *Erkenntniß* is common to human beings and other animals, but that animals have only an ‘intuitive’, immediate and non-conceptual understanding of the world, and lack the abstract, conceptual, or mediate kind of *Erkenntniß* that he calls *Wissen*. The other part of this theme is that the portion of cognition that we do not share with animals, conceptual thought, reasoning, *Vernunft*, is really of far less importance than philosophers have tended to think: it contains only what immediate cognition already contains, but in a more handy form. Schopenhauer ultimately argues that concepts and reason do not confer any particular ‘dignity’ or ‘freedom’ on human beings, and have nothing to do with moral value. This

is all fairly radical in the post-Kantian climate. Schopenhauer certainly uses the Kantian terms *Sinnlichkeit*, *Verstand*, *Anschauung* and *Begriff* (which we translate conventionally as ‘sensibility’, ‘understanding’, ‘intuition’ and ‘concept’), but he does so in order to present a theory of cognition that diverges markedly from Kant’s in many ways. ‘Intuition’ is therefore to be understood as a term of art denoting an awareness of objects in space and time through the senses; and we translate *anschaulich* as ‘intuitive’ and so on.

In this usage we differ from Payne’s well-known translation, which tended to translate *Anschauung* as ‘perception’. We, again more standardly, use ‘perception’ to translate *Wahrnehmung*. A similar case is that of *Erscheinung*, where we normally use the customary ‘appearance’ (not ‘phenomenon’, except in cases where to talk of ‘appearances’ could be misleading in English). Schopenhauer accuses Kant of misusing the terms *phenomenon* and especially *noumenon*, and his own philosophy can be stated entirely without use of either term. Behind the world’s aspect as appearance or representation lies the world as thing in itself (*Ding an sich*), and Schopenhauer uses somewhat novel expressions for the relation between thing in itself and appearance, saying that the latter is the *Objektivierung*, or the *Objektivität* of the former. The world of appearance is the world ‘become object’. We coin the equally novel English words ‘objectivation’ and ‘objecthood’ for these two terms. In his revision of the text for the 1859 edition Schopenhauer frequently replaces *Objektivität* with *Objektivierung* – though the difference between the two is one of nuance, the latter suggesting more a process, the former more its product.

We have been fairly scrupulous with the cluster of terms *Mensch* (‘human being’), *Person* (‘person’), *Individuum* (‘individual’), *Selbst* (‘self’) and *Ich* (‘I’), all of which should be kept distinct from the ubiquitous term *Subjekt* (‘subject’). Schopenhauer quite often talks about ‘my person’, ‘my individual’, and so on. I am the subject of cognition, while the individual that I am, unlike the subject, is something in the world that I experience. We translate *Leib* and *Körper* both as ‘body’.

The frequently occurring *Grund* is usually translated as ‘ground’. Sometimes this refers to a cause, at other times to a reason – and indeed there are four basic types of ground, as Schopenhauer had explained in his earlier essay *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*. In fact the principle referred to in that title, and throughout Schopenhauer’s work, is *der Satz vom zureichenden Grunde* which should in strictness be rendered as ‘the principle of sufficient ground’. However, in this one instance we have used ‘principle of sufficient reason’ simply as the more



readily recognizable set phrase in English. Everywhere else *Grund* is 'ground'.

German has two words that are commonly translated as 'poetry': *Poesie* and *Dichtkunst*. The English term 'poetry' has a somewhat narrower semantic field than either of these (the somewhat archaic 'poesie' corresponds more closely), but we decided to reserve 'poetry' for *Poesie* and translate *Dichtkunst* as 'literature'. This enables the reader to make sense of the fact that Schopenhauer refers to Shakespeare as a producer of *Dichtkunst* and the novel as a *Dichtungsart*.

The most important positive term in Schopenhauer's ethics is *Mitleid*. We translate it as 'compassion', not as 'pity'. The latter is in many contexts a legitimate rendering of the German term, but is a poor candidate for the fundamental incentive on which actions of moral worth are based, because instances of pitying often involve a sense of distance from or even superiority over those whose suffering one recognizes, whereas *Mitleid* for Schopenhauer must involve the collapse of any such distance or even distinction between the sufferer and the one who acts out of *Mitleid*. The two virtues in which *Mitleid* manifests itself are *Gerechtigkeit*, 'justice', and *Menschenliebe*, which we have translated as 'loving kindness'. It seems important that *Menschenliebe* is a species of *Liebe*, love. At some places in his text Schopenhauer originally had *Liebe*, but corrected it to *Menschenliebe*; and he glosses it as similar to the Christian concept of *agape*. Literally it is 'human-love', love of (and by) human beings. 'Philanthropy', though an exact parallel in Greek-based vocabulary, seems to refer less to a prevailing attitude of mind or incentive in one's character and more to the resultant good deeds.

In talking of human actions Schopenhauer varies his terminology without any detectable change in basic sense. Thus often he talks of *handeln* and *Handlung*, 'to act', 'action', then switches to *That*, *thun*, or *Thun* (modern German *Tat*, *tun*, *Tun*), which we generally translate as 'deed', 'to do', 'doing' or 'doings' to preserve a similar variation in style. The *th* for *t* here (see also *Theil*, *Werth* etc.) is one instance of divergence in spelling from that of the present day. All German words in editorial notes are given in the original orthography that the Hübscher edition preserves (other examples being *aa* for *a*, *ey* for *ei*, *ä* for *e*, and *dt* for *t*, thus *Spaafß*, *Daseyn*, *Säligkeit*, *gescheidt*).

The words *Moral* and *Moralität* are translated as 'morals' and 'morality' respectively. An immediate effect is to change the title of Schopenhauer's 1841 essay, sometimes referred to in footnotes in *The World as Will*, to *On the Basis of Morals* (when in Payne's version it was *On the Basis of Morality*).

Schopenhauer tends to treat 'morals' as a theoretical study or philosophical enterprise for which the term 'ethics' is equivalent, while 'morality' describes people's real-life actions and judgements. The adjective *moralisch* is easily translated as 'moral' (and the adverb as 'morally'), *Ethik* and *ethisch* likewise as 'ethics' and 'ethical'. In his revisions Schopenhauer replaced many occurrences of 'ethical' with 'moral', though it is hard to say whether this is a mere change in stylistic preference.

The culmination of Schopenhauer's ethics is the idea of the will to life negating itself. There are a number of somewhat tricky terms in this area, which we translate as follows: *Bejahung*, 'affirmation', *Verneinung*, 'negation'; *Selbstbejahung*, *Selbstverneinung*, 'self-affirmation', 'self-negation'; *Selbstverleugnung*, 'self-denial'; *Selbstaufhebung*, 'self-abolition'. *Nichts* ('nothing' or 'nothingness') and its compounds become increasingly prominent as the book reaches its conclusion. We usually tend to translate *Vernichtung* as 'annihilation', *nichtig* as 'unreal', *Nichtigkeit* as 'nothingness', but also as 'vanity', in the sense of being in vain.

#### STYLE, SYNTAX AND PUNCTUATION

Throughout this translation we have tried to render Schopenhauer into flowing, readable English. Schopenhauer is not a clumsy stylist – his German is fluent and very able. A translation that follows German syntax very closely might reflect the gross character of the original text quite accurately, but not its spirit. We aim for accuracy of translation in the sense of showing Schopenhauer for what he was, a clear and eloquent writer, successfully pursuing an ideal of clarity and readability. There are many factors to take into account in understanding Schopenhauer's stylistic decisions, but it is important to remember that he is positioning himself in relation to the constellation of post-Kantian thinkers. Kant had a notoriously dense style, which is famously taken up by Fichte and Hegel, whom Schopenhauer regards as his intellectual enemies. In making a point of writing fluently, Schopenhauer is explicitly breaking with this tradition, and announcing a new philosophical point of departure and a new function for philosophy, i.e. that it should not be confined to the academy, but should be a source of popular inspiration, something that Schopenhauer's work decidedly was in the latter part of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century.

Schopenhauer writes German sentences of great variety in length and structure. Often he uses a direct and punchy statement, or a balanced classical sentence with two or three well-constructed clauses. But the

greatest challenge for the translator is presented by those many occasions where Schopenhauer launches into a disproportionately long sentence. Helped by well-known features that distinguish German from English, notably the ability to frame long subordinate clauses with a verb postponed to the end, and three grammatical genders which allow nouns from earlier in the sentences to be picked up anaphorically without ambiguity, he can produce majestic sentences whose parts fit together perfectly and which make a powerful cumulative effect on the reader. In line with our policy of allowing Schopenhauer to speak eloquently to the English reader, we have sometimes divided up such longer sentences and reordered clauses within a sentence, always with the aim of reflecting the overall structure of his argument more clearly.

Schopenhauer's punctuation, as transmitted by way of the Hübscher editions, is unlike standard present-day usage. One feature retained in the translation is the use of a simple dash (—) between sentences to separate out parts within a long paragraph. But we have tried to reflect his practice of inserting commas, colons and semi-colons inside sentences loosely and idiomatically rather than copying it. Another feature is Schopenhauer's italicization of proper names, which we have tended to limit to occasions when Schopenhauer first mentions someone in a given context, or shifts back to discussing them.

#### SCHOPENHAUER'S USE OF OTHER LANGUAGES

A major decision has been made here which affects virtually every page of Schopenhauer's published writings. Schopenhauer is a master of many languages and delights in quoting extracts from other authors in Greek, Latin, French, Italian and Spanish. These extracts vary in length from the isolated phrase within a sentence to several unbroken pages of quotation which he thinks will substantiate his own view. Very often he will round off his argument with some apt words from Homer, Dante or Voltaire, always in the original language. He also has the scholar's habit of incorporating short tags in Latin or Greek into his own idiom (e.g. he will generally refer to something as a *petitio principii* rather than saying that it begs the question, or as a *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* rather than 'a false first step' or 'primary error'). Finally, when a substantial passage of Greek occurs Schopenhauer helpfully adds his own Latin translation for the reader's benefit.

The cumulative effect gives Schopenhauer's style historical depth and a pan-European literary flavour (with the occasional foray into transliterated Sanskrit). The question is how to deal with all of this in an English

translation. Earlier versions have taken two different lines. One is simply to reproduce all the non-German passages in their original languages and leave it at that. This was done by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp in their translation of *The World as Will and Idea* in 1883 and by Madame Karl Hillebrand in *On the Fourfold Root and On the Will in Nature* in 1891. While it may have been a reasonable assumption in those days, as it may have been for Schopenhauer himself, that anyone likely to read his book seriously would have sufficient access to the requisite languages, at the present time of writing such an assumption would appear misplaced. The second expedient is to leave all the original language passages where they stand in the text, but to add footnotes or parentheses giving English equivalents. This is the method, adopted in Payne's translations, that readers of Schopenhauer in English are now most familiar with. In the present translation, by contrast, we have adopted a third strategy: with a few exceptions, everything in the text is translated into English, and the original language version given in footnotes. This sacrifices some of the richness involved in reading Schopenhauer – but it arguably disadvantages only a reader who is a good linguist in several languages but not German. For all other readers of English, the relevance of Schopenhauer's quotations to his argument, and the overall flow of his writing, are better revealed by following the sense of quotations directly, especially on those many pages where he makes his point by way of a chunk of Greek followed by a chunk of Latin that gives a second version of the same, or where he quotes two or more pages in French. Nor is anything really lost by our policy, since every word of the original language extracts is given in footnotes on the same page.

Some exceptions to this practice occur where Schopenhauer specifically introduces a word in another language for discussion of its sense, or where he offers a Latin expression from the mediaeval scholastic tradition as especially apposite. In such cases the original language expression is retained in the text and the English equivalent offered in a footnote.

## Chronology

- 1788 Arthur Schopenhauer born on 22 February in the city of Danzig (now Gdansk), the son of the Hanseatic merchant Heinrich Floris Schopenhauer and Johanna Schopenhauer, née Trosiener
- 1793 Danzig is annexed by the Prussians. The Schopenhauer family moves to Hamburg
- 1797 His sister Adele is born. Schopenhauer begins a two-year stay in Le Havre with the family of one of his father's business partners
- 1799 Returns to Hamburg, and attends a private school for the next four years
- 1803–4 Agrees to enter career as a merchant and as a reward is taken by his parents on a tour of Europe (Holland, England, France, Switzerland, Austria). From June to September 1803 is a boarder in Thomas Lancaster's school in Wimbledon
- 1804 Is apprenticed to two Hanseatic merchants in Hamburg
- 1805 His father dies, probably by suicide
- 1806 Johanna Schopenhauer moves with Adele to Weimar, where she establishes herself as a popular novelist and literary hostess
- 1807 Schopenhauer abandons his commercial career for an academic one. Enters Gotha Gymnasium and then receives private tuition in Weimar
- 1809 Studies science and then philosophy (especially Plato and Kant) at the University of Göttingen
- 1811 Studies science and philosophy at the University of Berlin. Attends the lectures of Fichte and Schleiermacher
- 1813–14 Lives in Rudolstadt, writing his doctoral dissertation, *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, which is accepted by the University of Jena and published in 1814. Conversations with Goethe on colour and vision
- 1814 Begins reading a translation of the Upanishads. Stays with his mother in Weimar, but breaks with her permanently after a final quarrel. Lives in Dresden until 1818
- 1814–18 Works on *The World as Will and Representation*
- 1816 Publishes *On Vision and Colours*

- 1818 March: completion of *The World as Will and Representation*, published by Brockhaus at the end of the year, with '1819' on title page
- 1818–19 Travels in Italy (Florence, Rome, Naples, Venice) and returns to Dresden
- 1819 Is appointed as unsalaried lecturer (*Privatdozent*) at the University of Berlin
- 1820 Gives his only course of lectures, which is poorly attended
- 1822–3 Travels again to Italy (Milan, Florence, Venice). Returns from Italy to live in Munich. Is ill and depressed
- 1824 Lives in Bad Gastein, Mannheim and Dresden. Proposes to translate Hume's works on religion into German, but does not find a publisher
- 1826 Returns to Berlin
- 1829–30 Plans to translate Kant into English, without success; publishes *Commentatio Exponens Theoriam Colorum Physiologicam, Eandemque primariam, Auctore Arthurio Schopenhauero*
- 1831 Leaves Berlin because of the cholera epidemic. Moves to Frankfurt am Main
- 1831–2 Lives temporarily in Mannheim
- 1833 Settles in Frankfurt, where he remains for the rest of his life
- 1836 Publishes *On Will in Nature*
- 1838 His mother dies
- 1839 Enters competition set by the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences and wins prize with his essay *On the Freedom of the Will*
- 1840 Submits *On the Basis of Morals* in a competition set by the Royal Danish Society of Sciences, and is not awarded a prize
- 1841 *On the Freedom of the Will* and *On the Basis of Morals* published under the title *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*
- 1844 Publishes second, revised edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, adding a second volume consisting of fifty essays elaborating on ideas discussed in the first volume
- 1847 Publishes second, revised edition of *On the Fourfold Root*
- 1851 Publishes *Parerga and Paralipomena* in two volumes
- 1853 An article on his philosophy by J. Oxenford in *Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review* marks the beginning of his belated recognition
- 1854 Publishes second editions of *On Will in Nature* and *On Vision and Colours*. Julius Frauenstädt publishes *Letters on Schopenhauer's Philosophy*
- 1857 Schopenhauer's philosophy taught at Bonn University
- 1858 Declines invitation to be a member of Berlin Royal Academy
- 1859 Publishes third edition of *The World as Will and Representation*
- 1860 Publishes second edition of *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. Dies on 21 September in Frankfurt am Main

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# *The World as Will and Representation*

*Arthur Schopenhauer*

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Volume 2



## *Supplements to the First Book*

---

‘Warum willst du dich von uns Allen  
Und unsrer Meinung entfernen?’ –  
Ich schreibe nicht euch zu gefallen,  
Ihr sollt was lernen.

Goethe

[‘Why do you turn and walk away  
From all of us and what we say?’  
To gratify is not my aim,  
You might learn something all the same.

*(Zahme Xenien [Tame Invectives]), I, 2]*





## *Supplements to the Second Book*

---

Ihr folget falscher Spur,  
Denkt nicht, wir scherzen!  
Ist nicht der Kern der Natur  
Menschen im Herzen?

Goethe

[This is no jest!  
Your trail's wrong from the start,  
Nature's own secret nest  
Is in our own human heart    (*Gott und Welt*, 'Ultimatum')]



## *Supplements to the Third Book*

---

Et is similis spectatori est, quod ab omni separatus spectaculum videt.

*Oupnek'hat*, vol. 1, p. 304

[And he is like a spectator because he views the drama while separated from everything else. (Based on *Maitrī-Upanishad*, 2, 7. On *Oupnek'hat* see p. 474, n. a)



## *Supplements to the Fourth Book*

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Tous les hommes désirent uniquement de se délivrer de la mort: ils ne savent pas se délivrer de la vie. —  
[All men want only to be delivered from death: they do not know how to deliver themselves from life.]

Lao-Tzu, *Tao-te-King*, ed. Stanislas Julien [1842], p. 184



## *On the Fundamental View of Idealism*

In endless space countless luminous spheres, around each of which there revolve some dozen smaller, luminous spheres that are hot inside and covered by a hard, cold crust on top of which a film of mildew has generated living beings with cognition – this is the empirical truth, the real, the world. Nonetheless, it is a precarious position for a thinking being to be in, to stand on one of these countless spheres that float freely in boundless space without knowing where it has come from or where it is going; to be only one of innumerable, similar beings who throng, drive and struggle, coming rapidly and ceaselessly into existence and passing away in a time that has neither beginning nor end: nothing is permanent here except matter and the return, by means of particular paths and channels, of the same diversity of organic forms that exist once and for all. All that the

4 empirical sciences can teach is only the more precise nature and rules of these processes. – But recent philosophy, and *Berkeley* and *Kant* in particular, has finally realized<sup>a</sup> that all this is really only a *phenomenon of the brain* and is burdened<sup>b</sup> with so many and such extensive and diverse *subjective* conditions that its supposed absolute reality disappears, making way for a completely different world order, one that would underlie this phenomenon, i.e. would be to it as the thing in itself is to mere appearance.

‘The world is my representation’ – is, like Euclid’s axioms, a claim<sup>c</sup> that everyone must recognize as true as soon as he understands it, even if it is not the sort of thing that everyone does understand as soon as he hears. – To have brought this claim to consciousness and to have connected it to the problem of the relation of the ideal to the real, i.e. the relation of the world in one’s head to the world outside of it, this, along with the problem of moral freedom, is the distinguishing characteristic of modern philosophy. Only after people had tried for thousands of years to philosophize in a merely

<sup>a</sup> *sich darauf besonnen*

<sup>b</sup> *behaftet*

<sup>c</sup> *Satz*

*objective* way did they discover that first and foremost among the many things that make the world so puzzling and precarious<sup>a</sup> is the fact that, as massive and immeasurable as it may be, its existence nonetheless hangs by a single thread: and that thread comprises the consciousnesses in which it severally exists. This condition with which the existence of the world is irrevocably burdened<sup>b</sup> marks it, in spite of all *empirical* reality, with the stamp of *ideality* and thus of mere *appearance* so that, at least from one side, the world must be recognized as related to dreams, indeed as belonging in the same class as dreams. This is because the same brain function that conjures up a completely objective, intuitive<sup>c</sup> and even tangible world when we are asleep must have just as great a role in the presentation of the objective world when we are awake. Although they have different content, both worlds are clearly poured from a single mould.<sup>d</sup> This mould is the intellect, the functioning of the brain. – *Descartes* is probably the first to have achieved the degree of awareness<sup>e</sup> that this fundamental truth requires, and he therefore made it the starting point of his philosophy, albeit only provisionally, in the form of sceptical doubt. Because he took the *cogito ergo sum* as the sole certainty while provisionally treating the existence of the world as problematic, the one correct and essential starting point, and at the same time the *true* foundation<sup>f</sup> of all philosophy, was discovered. Essentially and unavoidably, this foundation is *the subjective*,<sup>g</sup> *one's own consciousness*, because only this is and remains immediate: everything else, whatever it might be, is first mediated and conditioned by it, and hence dependent on it. That is why modern philosophy is rightly said to begin with *Descartes* as its father. Not long afterwards, *Berkeley* travelled further along this path and reached the point of genuine *idealism*, i.e. the recognition that what is extended in space, and hence the objective, material world in general, exists as such only in our *representation*, and that it is false, even absurd to attribute to it *as such* an existence outside all representation and independent of the cognizing subject, and thus to assume a matter that is absolutely present and that exists in itself.<sup>h</sup> But this entirely accurate and profound insight in fact constitutes the whole of *Berkeley's* philosophy: there was nothing more to him than this.

<sup>a</sup> *bedenklich*

<sup>b</sup> *behaftet*

<sup>c</sup> *anschaulich*

<sup>d</sup> *Form*

<sup>e</sup> *Besinnung*

<sup>f</sup> *Stützpunkt*

<sup>g</sup> *das Subjektive*

<sup>h</sup> *eine schlechthin vorhandene an sich seiende Materie*



Accordingly, the true philosophy must in every case be *idealistic*: indeed simple honesty requires this of it, because nothing is more certain than that nobody can ever climb out of himself and identify himself directly with things that are distinct from him: rather, everything he is certain of and therefore has immediate information about lies within his consciousness. This is why there cannot be *immediate* certainty over and above this; but the first fundamental propositions of a science must possess immediate certainty. It is entirely appropriate for the empirical standpoint of other sciences to accept the objective world as simply present: not so for philosophy, which must go back to what is first and primordial. *Consciousness* alone is immediately given and so the foundation of *philosophy* is limited to facts of consciousness: i.e. it is essentially *idealistic*. – Realism recommends itself to crude minds<sup>a</sup> by giving the impression that it is factual, but it proceeds straight from an arbitrary assumption and is thus an unstable castle in the air, since it skips over or denies the very first fact: everything we are acquainted with lies within consciousness. The fact that the *objective existence* of things is conditioned by something representing them, and consequently that the objective world exists only *as representation*, is not a hypothesis, much less a decree, and certainly not a paradox put forward for debate; it is rather the simplest and most certain truth; it is difficult to recognize only because it is really too simple and not everyone has enough insight<sup>b</sup> to return to the primary elements of their consciousness of things. There can never be an existence<sup>c</sup> that is absolutely objective in itself; such a thing is in fact frankly unthinkable because what is objective has its existence<sup>d</sup> always and essentially in the consciousness of a subject, and is thus its representation, and is consequently conditioned by it as well as by the subject's forms of representation, which are attached to the subject, not to the object. –<sup>1</sup>

That the *objective world would exist* even in the absence of a cognizing being<sup>e</sup> seems at first glance to be certain, because it can be thought in the abstract<sup>f</sup> without revealing its inner contradiction. – Only when we try to *realize* this abstract thought, i.e. to trace it back to intuitive representations which alone give it (and everything abstract) content and truth, and accordingly when we try to imagine *an objective world without a cognizing subject* – only then do we become aware that what we are imagining is in

<sup>a</sup> *Verstande*

<sup>b</sup> *Besonnenheit genug haben*

<sup>c</sup> *Daseyn*

<sup>d</sup> *hat seine Existenz*

<sup>e</sup> *erkennendes Wesen*

<sup>f</sup> *in abstracto*

fact the opposite of what we intended, for what we are imagining is nothing other than a process in the intellect of an agent of cognition<sup>a</sup> who intuits an objective world, and thus precisely what we had wanted to exclude. For this intuitive and real world is clearly a phenomenon of the brain: and so there is a contradiction in the assumption that it might exist, as such as world, independently of all brains.

The main objection to the unavoidable and essential *ideality of all objects*, the objection that occurs to everyone, whether clearly or obscurely, is just this: even my own person is an object for another, and is thus their representation; and yet I know with certainty that I would exist<sup>b</sup> even if there was nobody to represent me. But all other objects stand in the same relation to that person's intellect as I do: hence they too would exist without that other person to represent them. – And here is the response: this other, whose object I now regard my person as being, is not simply *the subject* as such,<sup>c</sup> but is instead in the first instance an individual with cognition. Hence, even if he did not exist, or if there existed no other being with cognition apart from I myself, this would in no way abolish the *subject* in whose representation alone all objects exist. This is because I myself am also precisely this *subject*, as is every being with cognition. Consequently, in the case at issue, my person would certainly still exist, but again as representation, namely in my own cognition. This is because cognition of my person, even my cognition of my person, is only ever indirect and never direct, and this is because all being-represented<sup>d</sup> is something indirect. In fact it is only in the intuition of my brain that I have cognition of my own body as an *object*, i.e. as extended, occupying space, and causally efficacious, and this intuition is mediated by the senses: the intuitive understanding uses data from the senses to perform its function of going from effect to cause, and in so doing, by the eyes seeing the body or the hands feeling it, constructs the spatial figure that presents itself in space as my body. But there is no extension, shape and causality given to me immediately (in the general feeling<sup>e</sup> of the body for instance, or in inner self-consciousness) in a way that would then coincide with my being<sup>f</sup> itself, so that it could exist without presenting itself in the cognition of another. Rather, this general feeling, as well as this self-consciousness, has immediate existence only in relation to the *will*, namely as pleasing or

<sup>a</sup> *der Vorgang im Intellekt eines Erkennenden*

<sup>b</sup> *da wäre*

<sup>c</sup> *schlechthin*

<sup>d</sup> *Vorstellungseyn*

<sup>e</sup> *Gemeingefühl*

<sup>f</sup> *Wesen*

unpleasing, and as active in the acts of will that present themselves for outer intuition as actions of the body. It now follows from this that the existence of my person or my body *as something extended and causally efficacious* always presupposes something separate from itself that cognizes it, because it is essentially an existence within apprehension, within representation, and thus an existence *for another*. In fact it is a brain phenomenon, regardless of whether the brain it presents itself in is one's own or that of another person. In the first case, one's own person divides into the cognizer and the cognized, into object and subject, which confront each other here (as everywhere) as inseparable and irreconcilable. – So if my own person always requires some agent of cognition in order to exist as such, this is equally true of other objects, whose claim to an existence *independent* of cognition and its subject was the aim of the objection stated above.

Meanwhile, it is clear that existence conditioned by an agent of cognition is only ever existence in *space* and hence the existence of something extended and causally efficacious: only this existence is always cognized, and hence *for another*. And yet everything that exists like this might still have an existence *for itself*, without needing a subject. Yet this existence for itself cannot be extended and causally efficacious (which taken together constitute the filling of space); rather it is necessarily another sort of existence, namely that of a *thing in itself*, which, precisely as such, can never be an *object*. – This would thus be the response to the objection stated above which, accordingly, does not overturn the fundamental truth that the objectively present world can exist only in representation, and thus only for a subject.

Here we might also note that even *Kant*, to the extent that he remained consistent, cannot have thought of his things in themselves as *objects*. This already follows from the fact that he proved that space as well as time are mere forms of our intuition and consequently do not belong to the things in themselves. What is in neither space nor time cannot be an *object* either: thus the existence<sup>a</sup> of the *things in themselves* can no longer be *objective*, but can only be of a very different sort, a metaphysical existence. Consequently Kant's claim already contains the proposition that the *objective* world exists<sup>b</sup> only as *representation*.

Nothing is as persistently misunderstood again and again, no matter what one says, as *idealism*, since it is always being interpreted as a denial of the *empirical* reality<sup>c</sup> of the external world. This is what inspires the constant

<sup>a</sup> *Seyn*

<sup>b</sup> *existiert*

<sup>c</sup> *Realität*

return of an appeal to common sense, expressed in many different ways and emerging in many different guises, for instance as ‘fundamental conviction’ in the Scottish school, or as Jacobi’s *faith* in the reality of the external world. There is no sense in which the external world comes merely on credit, as *Jacobi* presents it, such that we accept it in good faith:<sup>a</sup> it is what it claims to be, and immediately does what it promises. It must be remembered that Jacobi – who established this sort of a credit system of the world and was lucky enough to impose it on a few philosophy professors who spent thirty years philosophizing extensively and comfortably about it – this Jacobi was the same person who once denounced *Lessing* as a Spinozist and later *Schelling* as an atheist, receiving from Schelling a famous and well-deserved rebuke. By reducing the external world to an article of faith, Jacobi only wanted, in accordance with his zealotry, to open a small gateway for faith in general and prepare credit for what would afterwards really be offered on credit: as if someone tried to introduce paper money by citing the fact that the value of coin money also only comes from the stamp that the state has set on it. Jacobi, in his philosopheme on the reality of the external world accepted on faith, is precisely the ‘transcendental realist who . . . plays the empirical idealist’ criticized by *Kant* (*Critique of Pure Reason*, first edition, p. 369).<sup>b</sup> –

True idealism on the other hand is not empirical but rather transcendental idealism. This idealism leaves the *empirical* reality of the world untouched, but insists that all *objects*, and thus the empirically real in general, are doubly conditioned by the *subject*: first *materially*, or as *object* in general, because an objective existence is conceivable only for a subject and as the representation of this subject; secondly, *formally*, since the *manner* of the object’s existence,<sup>c</sup> i.e. of its being represented (space, time, causality) comes from the subject and is a predisposition of the subject. Thus, *Kantian* idealism, which concerns the specially given *manner* of being an object,<sup>d</sup> is directly connected to simple or *Berkeleyan* idealism, which concerns the *object in general*. Kantian idealism establishes that the whole of the material world with its bodies in space (which are extended and, by means of time, causally related to each other) and everything that depends on this does not exist *independently* of our minds; rather, it has its fundamental presuppositions in our brain functions. Only *by these means* and *in the brain* is *this sort of* objective order of things

10

<sup>a</sup> *auf Treu und Glauben*

<sup>b</sup> [A369]

<sup>c</sup> *Existenz*

<sup>d</sup> *des Objektseyns*

possible, because all these real and objective processes rest on time, space and causality, and time, space and causality are themselves nothing more than brain functions; so this unchangeable *order* of things provides the criterion and guide to their empirical *reality* and itself comes from the brain and has its credentials from this alone: this is what *Kant* has shown thoroughly and at length; only he did not call it the brain, but instead said ‘the faculty of cognition’. He even tried to prove that this objective order in time, space, causality, matter, etc. on which all the processes of the real world ultimately rest cannot strictly speaking even be *thought* as something that subsists in itself,<sup>a</sup> i.e. as an order of things in themselves or as something absolutely objective and simply present, since if we try to carry this thought to its conclusion we end up contradicting ourselves. The Antinomies<sup>b</sup> were intended to establish this: in the Appendix to my work<sup>c</sup> however, I have shown that this attempt failed. – On the other hand, even without the Antinomies, Kant’s doctrine leads to the insight that things and the whole manner in which they exist are inseparably linked to our consciousness of them; so whoever has clearly understood this is soon convinced of the genuine absurdity of the assumption that things exist as such, i.e. even outside our consciousness and independently of it. The fact that we are so deeply immersed in time, space, causality and the whole law-like course of experience that rests on this, the fact that we (and even animals) are so perfectly at home in experience and know from the start how to find our way around in it – this would not be possible if our intellect and things were separate; it is only explicable if these two constitute a whole, the intellect itself creates that order, and the intellect exists only for things while these exist only for it.

II

Even apart from the profound insights that Kant’s philosophy alone reveals, the tenacious assumption of absolute *realism* can be immediately shown or at least felt to be unacceptable simply by clarifying what it means, using considerations such as the following. – According to realism, the world as we cognize it is supposed to exist even independent of this cognition. Now let us subtract out all cognizing beings, leaving only inorganic and vegetable nature. Let rocks, rivers and trees exist, and blue skies: the sun, moon and stars illuminate this world as before; although of course in vain, since there are no eyes to see it. But now let us add, after the fact, a being with cognition. And now this world presents itself *once more* in the brain of that being, repeating itself inside that brain just as it was before

<sup>a</sup> *eine für sich bestehende*

<sup>b</sup> [*Critique of Pure Reason*, A405 / B432 – A567 / B595]

<sup>c</sup> [i.e. to *WWR* I]

outside the brain. A *second* world has now been added to the *first*, which, although completely separate from it, resembles this first down to the smallest hair. Just as the *objective* world is created in *objective* infinite space, so in precisely the same way the *subjective* world of this intuition is now created in *subjective*, cognized space.<sup>a</sup> But the latter has the advantage over the former of recognizing that the space outside is infinite, and can even correctly state in advance and to within a hair's breadth the entire lawlike character of all the spatial relations that are possible and not yet actual, without first needing to investigate. It can be just as specific concerning the course of time and the relation between cause and effect that guides external alterations. I think that upon closer examination all this appears absurd enough and thus leads to the conviction that the absolutely *objective* world outside the mind<sup>b</sup> that we initially intended to think about, a world that is independent of the mind and *prior* to all cognition, is none other than the second, the *subjectively* cognized world, the world of representation, the only one we are really capable of thinking. Thus we are forced to assume that the world as we cognize it itself exists only for our cognition, hence in *representation* alone, and never outside of it.<sup>\*2</sup> Corresponding to this assumption, the thing in itself, i.e. the thing that exists independently of our and all cognition, is to be posited as wholly distinct from *representation* and all its attributes, and thus from objectivity in general: what it is will later be the theme of our Second Book.

12

On the other hand, the controversy over the reality of the external world, considered in § 5 of the First Volume, rests on the very assumption we have just criticized, of an objective and a subjective world that are both in *space*, and on the impossibility entailed by this assumption of any transition or bridge between the two; on this topic I have the following to add.

The subjective and the objective do not form a continuum: what we are immediately conscious of is demarcated by our skin, or rather by the outermost ends of the nerves that come from the cerebral system. Over and above this lies a world of which we have no information other than

\* Here I recommend in particular the passage in Lichtenberg's *Vermischte Schriften* [Assorted Writings], (Göttingen 1801, vol. 2, page 12ff.): 'Euler says in his letters on diverse topics concerning the theory of nature (vol. 2, p. 228) that there would be just as much thunder and lightning if nobody existed whom the lightning could strike. It is a common idea, but I must admit that I have never really been able to understand it. I always think of the concept of *being* as borrowed from our thinking, and if there are no longer any perceiving and thinking creatures then there no longer *is* anything.'

<sup>a</sup> *erkannten Raum*

<sup>b</sup> *außerhalb des Kopfes* [literally, 'outside the head']

- through images in our head. Now the question is whether and to what extent these images correspond to a world that exists independently of us. The relation between the two worlds could be brought about only by way of the law of causality, because this alone leads from something given to something completely different. But this law first must certify itself as valid. It must have either an *objective* or a *subjective* origin: but in either case it lies on one shore or the other and cannot serve as a bridge. If, as *Locke* and *Hume* assume, it is a *posteriori* and thus derived from experience, then it has an *objective* origin and itself belongs to the external world that is in
- 13 question and hence cannot answer for its reality: because then, according to *Locke's* method, the law of causality would be established from experience and the reality of experience from the law of causality. But if on the other hand, as *Kant* rightly taught us, it is given *a priori*, then it has a *subjective* origin and it is clear that we will always remain in the *subjective* with it. This is because the only thing that is actually given *empirically* in intuition is the entry of a sensation into the sense organs: the assumption that sensation must have a *cause*, if only in general, rests on a law that is rooted in a form of our cognition, i.e. in our brain functions, a law therefore, that has just as subjective an origin as that sensation of our senses itself. The *cause* of this given perception, a cause that is presupposed as a result of this law, presents itself immediately in intuition as an *object* with space and time as the form of its appearance. But even these forms themselves again have an entirely subjective origin, because they are the mode<sup>a</sup> of our faculty of intuition. That transition from the sensation by the senses<sup>b</sup> to its cause, which, as I have repeatedly shown, is at the basis of all sensory intuition, of course indicates quite adequately to us the empirical presence of an empirical object in space and time, and so it suffices for practical life; but it is far from adequate when it comes to providing us with information about the existence<sup>c</sup> and essence in itself of the appearances that originate in such a manner, or rather about their intelligible substrate. The fact therefore that on the occasion of certain sensations entering my sense organs there arises in my head an *intuition* of spatially extended, temporally enduring and causally efficacious things, in no way justifies me in assuming that similar things exist in themselves, with properties that belong to them as such, i.e. independently and outside of my head. – This finding of the *Kantian* philosophy is correct. It is connected with *Locke's* earlier, similarly correct but much more easily comprehensible result. Specifically, if, as

<sup>a</sup> *Art und Weise*

<sup>b</sup> *Sinnesempfindung*

<sup>c</sup> *Daseyn*

Locke's doctrine has it, external things are simply assumed as the causes of sensations by the senses, then there can be absolutely no *resemblance* between the *sensation* in which the effect consists and the objective *constitution* of the *cause* that occasions it; this is because the sensation, as an organic function, is above all determined by the very intricate<sup>a</sup> and complicated constitution of our sense organs, and so the sensation is merely simulated by the external cause, but then is completed entirely according to its own laws, and is thus completely subjective. – *Locke's* philosophy was a critique of the functions of the senses, while *Kant* provided the critique of the functions of the brain. – But now we must submit all of this to my revival of *Berkeley's* findings, namely that all *objects*, however they might arise, are, as *objects*, already conditioned by the subject, and are essentially only the *representation* of that subject. The goal of realism is precisely an object without a subject: but it is impossible to even think clearly about such a thing. 14

It emerges with certainty and clarity from this whole discussion that the goal of comprehending *the essence in itself* of things is absolutely unattainable along the path of mere *cognition* and *representation*, because these always come to things *from the outside* and hence must always remain *on the outside*. This goal could only be achieved if we found *ourselves* on the inside of things with which we would then be directly acquainted.<sup>b</sup> Now in my Second Book we will see the extent to which this is actually the case. But as long as we remain in this First Book with objective apprehension, and thus with *cognition*, the world is and remains for us a mere *representation* because there is no possible route from here that leads beyond it.

But besides this, an adherence to the *idealistic* perspective is a necessary counterweight to the *materialistic* perspective. The controversy over the real and ideal can be seen as concerning the existence<sup>c</sup> of *matter* as well, because it is the reality or ideality of matter that is ultimately at issue. Does matter as such exist merely in our representation, or is it independent of this as well? In the latter case it would be the thing in itself, and whoever accepts that matter exists in itself must logically be a materialist too, i.e. make it the explanatory principle of all things. On the other hand anyone denying it as thing in itself is *eo ipso* an idealist. *Locke* is the only modern to assert the reality of matter directly and straightforwardly: thus, his doctrine led, by way of *Condillac*, to French sensualism and materialism. Only *Berkeley* denied matter frankly and without qualification. This led to the 15

<sup>a</sup> *künstliche*

<sup>b</sup> *bekannt*

<sup>c</sup> *Existenz*



opposition between idealism and materialism, represented in its extremes by *Berkeley* and the French materialists (Holbach). *Fichte* should not be mentioned here: he does not deserve a place among real philosophers, among these select few of humanity who are profoundly serious in their pursuit of the *truth* instead of their own concerns and thus should not be confused with those who, under this pretence, are concerned only to promote themselves. *Fichte* is the father of *fake philosophy*, the *dishonest* method that tries to fool those who are eager to learn by using ambiguous language and incomprehensible speech along with sophisms and a haughty, imposing tone. After *Schelling* made use of this method too, it famously reached its apex with *Hegel*, where it ripened into true charlatan-ism. But anyone who so much as mentions this *Fichte* with seriousness alongside Kant proves that he has no idea of what Kant is. – On the other hand, materialism does have its justification. It is just as true that that which has cognition<sup>a</sup> is a product of matter as that matter is a mere representation of that which has cognition, but it is equally one-sided, because materialism is the philosophy of the subject that has forgotten to account for itself. This is precisely why, alongside the claim that I am a mere modification of matter, must also be asserted the claim that all matter exists merely in my representation: and this is no less correct. An as yet obscure recognition of this relation seems to lie behind the Platonic expression ‘matter is a lie that is true’.<sup>b,3</sup>

16 *Realism*, as we have said, necessarily leads to *materialism*, because if empirical intuition supplies the things in themselves as they exist independent of our cognition, so experience also supplies the *order* of things in themselves, i.e. the true and unique world order. This path leads to the assumption that there is only *one* thing in itself, namely matter, with everything else as its modification, because here the course of nature is the absolute and unique world order. As long as *realism* enjoyed undisputed prestige, *spiritualism* was set up alongside it to avoid these consequences; this is the assumption of a second substance outside and alongside matter, an *immaterial substance*. This dualism and *spiritualism*, both equally remote from experience, proof, or intelligibility, were denied by *Spinoza* and proven false by Kant who was able to do so because he established *idealism* in its rights at the same time. This is because spiritualism had been conceived as realism’s counterweight such that when *realism* falls, *materialism* falls of its own accord, since matter, along with the course of nature, becomes mere *appearance* conditioned by the intellect (for it

<sup>a</sup> *das Erkennende*

<sup>b</sup> ὅλη ἀληθινὸν ψεῦδος (*materia mendacium verax*) [this is probably from Plotinus, *Enneads*, II, 5, 5]

exists only in the *representation* of the intellect). Similarly, *spiritualism* is the illusory and false refuge from *materialism* while *idealism* is the real and true refuge; by making the objective world dependent *on us*, idealism provides the necessary counterweight to the fact that the course of nature makes *us* dependent *on it*. The world that I leave when I die was on the other hand only my representation. Existence's centre of gravity<sup>a</sup> falls back into the *subject*, not, as in spiritualism, by proving that which has cognition to be independent of matter, but rather by proving the dependence of all matter on it. Of course this is not as easy to grasp and as comfortable to maintain as spiritualism with its two substances, but 'what is noble is difficult'.<sup>b</sup>

Indeed, in opposition to the *subjective* starting point, 'the world is my representation', the *objective* starting point, 'the world is matter' or 'matter alone exists as such'<sup>c</sup> (since it alone is not susceptible to becoming and passing away), or 'everything that exists is material', initially stands with equal justification. This latter is the starting point of Democritus, Leucippus, and Epicurus. But looked at more closely, there is a real benefit to setting out from the *subject*: it has the advantage of a completely justified step. Specifically, only consciousness is *immediate*: but we bypass this when we go straight to matter and make it the starting point. On the other side, it would have to be possible to construct the world from matter and its accurately, completely, and exhaustively known<sup>d</sup> properties (which we are still far from understanding). This is because everything that has come about has actually done so through *causes* that can act and combine only by means of the *basic forces of matter*: and these must be perfectly demonstrable, at least objectively, even if we can never come to cognize them *subjectively*. But such an explanation and construction of the world would not only be grounded in the presupposition that matter has an existence in itself (while it is in truth conditioned by the subject), it would also have to leave untouched all the *original properties* in this matter, allowing them to pass as simply inexplicable and thus as occult qualities.<sup>e</sup> (See §§ 26, 27 of the First Volume.) This is because matter is only the bearer of these forces, just as the law of causality is only what orders their appearances. Accordingly, such an explanation of the world would only ever be relative and conditioned and in fact the work of a *physics* that longed for a *metaphysics* at each step. – On the other hand, there is also something

17

<sup>a</sup> *Schwerpunkt des Daseyns*

<sup>b</sup> χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ [a saying in Plato, e.g. *Republic*, 435c]

<sup>c</sup> *die Materie allein ist schlechthin*

<sup>d</sup> *erkannt*

<sup>e</sup> *qualitates occultae*

inadequate about the subjective point of departure and the subjective axiom<sup>a</sup> ‘the world is my representation’: this is in part because it is one-sided, since the world is much more than this (namely thing in itself, will), and indeed the state of being-represented is to a certain extent accidental to it; and in part also because it merely expresses the fact that the object is conditioned by the subject without also saying that the subject as such is conditioned by the object as well. The proposition that ‘the subject would still be something that has cognition even without an object, i.e. a representation of any sort’ is just as false as the proposition put forward by the crude understanding that ‘the world, the object, would exist even if there were no subject’. A consciousness without an object<sup>b</sup> is not a consciousness. A thinking subject has *concepts* for its object,<sup>c</sup> a sensuously intuiting subject has objects<sup>d</sup> with the qualities that correspond to its organization. Now if we deprive the *subject* of all of the most proximate determinations and forms of its cognition,<sup>e</sup> then all qualities would disappear from the *object* as well, and nothing would be left except *matter without form or quality*; such matter could as little occur in experience as could a subject without the forms of its cognition, but it remains opposed to the bare subject as such, as its reflex, and can only vanish at the same time as it can. Even though materialism imagines it is postulating nothing more than this matter (atoms or the like), it in fact unconsciously posits not only the subject but also space, time and causality as well, which rest on the special determinations of the subject.

Thus, the world as representation, the objective world, has two poles, as it were: namely the cognizing subject<sup>f</sup> as such, without the forms of its cognition, and then raw matter without form or quality. No cognition of either one is possible: of the subject because it is that which has cognition, and of matter because it cannot be intuited without form and quality. Yet they are the two fundamental conditions of all empirical intuition. And so the raw, formless, entirely dead (i.e. will-less) matter that is not given in any experience but presupposed by all experience, stands in direct opposition to the cognizing subject, merely as such, which is also the presupposition of all experience. This subject is not in time, because time is only the most proximate form of all the subject’s representation; the matter that opposes it is, accordingly, eternal, everlasting, persisting

<sup>a</sup> *Ursatz*

<sup>b</sup> *Gegenstand*

<sup>c</sup> *Objekt*

<sup>d</sup> *Objekte*

<sup>e</sup> *Erkennens*

<sup>f</sup> *das erkennende Subjekt*

through all time; but it has absolutely no extension, since extension confers form, and hence it is not spatial. Everything else is constantly occupied in coming to be and passing away, while these two present the unmoving poles of the world as representation. We can thus regard the permanence of matter as the reflex of the timelessness of the pure subject that is simply presupposed as the condition of all objects. Both belong to appearance, not to the thing in itself: but they are the basic framework of appearance. Both are discovered only through abstraction, and are not given immediately, purely, or by themselves.

The basic mistake of all systems is their failure to recognize the truth that *the intellect and matter are correlatives*, i.e. that the one exists only for the other, that the two stand and fall together, that one is only the reflex of the other, and that they are in fact really one and the same thing regarded from two opposing sides (this one thing – anticipating myself here – being the appearance of the will, or thing in itself), that both are therefore secondary: and that we should therefore not look for the origin of the world in either one. But as a result of the failure to recognize this, all systems (with the possible exception of Spinozism) sought out the origin of all things in one of the two. Namely, they posited either an intellect, *nous*,<sup>a</sup> as absolutely first and *dèmiourgos*,<sup>b</sup> and thus allowed a *representation* of things and the world to precede in this intellect prior to their reality, leading these systems to distinguish the real world from the world as representation, which is incorrect. Accordingly, *matter* now emerges as a thing in itself to distinguish the two. This gives rise to the predicament of how to create this matter, the *hulê*,<sup>c</sup> so that when it is added to the mere representation of the world it can give this world reality. Now either the original intellect has to discover it, in which case matter as well as intellect is absolutely primary and we have two absolutely primary things, the *dèmiourgos* and the *hulê*. Or the intellect creates matter from nothing; an assumption repulsive to our understanding, which can conceive only of alterations in matter, not of its coming into existence or passing away; which is at base due to the fact that matter is the essential correlate of the understanding. – The systems opposed to these, which make the second of the two correlatives, i.e. matter, into what is absolutely primary, posit a matter that would exist without being represented, which, as everything we have said above has made sufficiently clear, is a direct contradiction because we only ever think of the existence of matter in terms of its being represented. But then these

19

<sup>a</sup> νοῦς [also mind]

<sup>b</sup> δημιουργός [creator (literally, 'craftsman'), as in Plato's *Timaeus*]

<sup>c</sup> ὕλη

systems are faced with the predicament of adding intellect to this matter that they take to be absolutely primary, an intellect that is, in the end, supposed to experience this matter. I already described this weak spot of materialism in § 7 of the First Volume. – I, on the other hand consider matter and intellect to be inseparable correlatives, existing only for each other and thus only relatively: matter is the representation of the intellect; matter only exists<sup>a</sup> in the representation of the intellect. The two together  
 20 make up the *world as representation*, which is just *Kant's appearance*, and thus something secondary. What is primary is the thing that appears, the *thing in itself*, which we will later come to recognize as the *will*. This is in itself neither something that represents nor something represented; rather is it utterly distinct from its manner of appearing.

This consideration is as important as it is difficult, and to bring it to a strong and memorable conclusion I will now personify the two abstractions and put them in dialogue with each other in the manner of the *Prabodha Chandrodaya*.<sup>b</sup> we could also compare this to a similar dialogue between matter and form in *Ramon Llull's Twelve Principles of Philosophy*,<sup>c</sup> Chapters 1 and 2.

### The Subject

I am, and there is nothing outside of me, because the world is my representation.

### Matter

Presumptuous nonsense! I, I am: and there is nothing outside of me, because the world is my transient form. You are just a result of a part of this form and completely contingent.

### The Subject

What foolish arrogance! Neither you nor your form would exist without me: you are both conditioned by me. Anyone who does away with me in thought and then believes that he could still think about you and your form is caught in a crude deception: because your existence<sup>d</sup> outside my representation is a direct contradiction, iron-wood.<sup>e</sup> That *you are* just

<sup>a</sup> *existiert*

<sup>b</sup> [Philosophical drama by Krishna Mishra (eleventh or twelfth century)]

<sup>c</sup> *des Raimond Lullius Duodecim principia philosophiae* [thirteenth–fourteenth century]

<sup>d</sup> *Daseyn*

<sup>e</sup> *Sideroxylon* [Schopenhauer's invented Greek compound word to express a contradiction]

means that you're represented by me. My representation is the location of your existence: thus I am the first condition of this existence.

### **Matter**

Luckily the presumptuousness of your claim will soon be refuted, in reality, not just in words. In a few moments you – will really not exist anymore, you and your fancy talk will sink into nothing, and will slip by like a shadow and suffer the fate of each of my transient forms. But me, I will remain, intact and undiminished from millennium to millennium, through infinite time, and will observe undisturbed the play of changes of my forms.

21

### **The Subject**

This infinite time that you boast you will live through exists, like the infinite space that you fill, only in my representation, and indeed is the mere form of my representation, which I carry ready within myself and in which you present yourself, and which you enter into in order to exist in the first place. And the annihilation that you threaten me with does not affect me, or else you would be annihilated too: rather, it affects only the individual that supports me for a short time and which, like everything else, is represented by me.

### **Matter**

Even if I were to grant you this and agree to consider your existence – which is indeed inseparably linked to that of these transient individuals – as persisting in itself, it would still be dependent on mine. Because you are a subject only to the extent that you have an object, and I am this object. I am its core and its content, what endures within it, what holds it together and prevents it from being as disconnected and insubstantial as the dreams or fantasies of your individuals who have themselves borrowed even their illusory content from me alone.

### **The Subject**

You do well not to dispute my existence on the ground that it is tied to that of individuals: because as inseparably as I am bound to these, you are tied to your sister, form, and have never appeared without her. You, like me, have never been seen naked and in isolation: because we are both only abstractions. It is fundamentally *one* being that intuits itself and is intuited by itself, whose being in itself can consist in neither intuiting nor being intuited, since these are divided between the two of us.

**22 Both**

So we are inseparably linked, as necessary parts of a whole that encompasses us both and subsists<sup>a</sup> through us. Only a misunderstanding can pit us against each other and then draw the misleading conclusion that one of us contests the existence<sup>b</sup> of the other, an existence with which its own stands and falls.

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This whole that encompasses the two is the world as representation, or appearance. If this is taken away all that remains is the purely metaphysical,<sup>c</sup> the thing in itself which we will recognize in the Second Book as the will.

<sup>a</sup> *besteht*

<sup>b</sup> *Daseyn*

<sup>c</sup> *das rein Metaphysische*

*On the Doctrine of Intuitive Cognition,  
or Cognition Based in the Understanding*

Notwithstanding its *transcendental* ideality, the objective world retains its *empirical* reality: the object is certainly not a thing in itself; but as an empirical object it is real. Space is indeed only in my head; but empirically my head is in space. Certainly, the law of causality can never be used to refute idealism by building a bridge between things in themselves and our cognition of them, thereby securing absolute reality for the world that presents itself as a result of the application of that law. But this in no way abolishes causal relations between objects and thus the relation that indisputably obtains between the body of every subject of cognition<sup>a</sup> and all the other material objects. However, the law of causality only connects appearances and does not lead beyond them.<sup>4</sup> With this law we are and remain in the world of objects, i.e. of appearances, and thus in fact of representations. Nonetheless, the whole of such a world of experience remains conditioned in the first place by the cognition of a subject in general as its necessary presupposition, and then by the special forms of our intuition and apprehension, and thus necessarily devolves to mere *appearance* and has no claim to be valid for the world of things in themselves. Even the subject itself (to the extent that it merely cognizes) belongs to mere appearance, complementing experience as its other half.

23

But there could never be an intuition of an *objective* world without the application of the law of causality because this intuition, as I have frequently argued, is essentially *intellectual* and not merely *sensual*. The senses provide only *sensation*, which is far from being *intuition*. *Locke* separated out the part played by sensuous sensation in intuition using the term *secondary qualities*, which he rightly denied to things in themselves. But *Kant* took *Locke*'s method further, in addition separating out and denying to the things in themselves what belongs to the *processing* of the content of sensuous sensation through the *brain*, and the result was that this included

<sup>a</sup> *jedes Erkennenden*



everything Locke had left to the things in themselves as *primary* qualities, namely extension, shape, solidity, etc., and so with Kant the thing in itself became a fully unknown = x. So with Locke the thing in itself is indeed without colour, sound, smell or taste, neither hot nor cold, neither soft nor hard, neither smooth nor rough; nonetheless it still has extension, shape, impenetrability, quantity, and number, and is in a state of rest or motion. With Kant however it has discarded even these latter qualities, because they are possible only by means of time, space and causality, and these come from our intellect (brain) just as much as colours, tones, smells, etc. come from the nerves of the sense organs. The thing in itself in Kant has become something non-spatial, unextended, incorporeal. Thus, what the mere *senses* provide to intuition (in which the objective world exists) is related to what is provided to it by the *brain function* (space, time, causality) as the mass of the sense nerves is related to the mass of the brain, after discounting those parts of the brain that are used for something else, i.e. actual *thinking*, i.e. forming abstract representation, and are thus absent from animals. This is because if the nerves of the sense organs give the appearing objects their colour, sound, taste, smell, temperature, etc., then the brain gives them their extension, form, impenetrability, mobility, etc., in short everything that can be represented only by means of time, space and causality. Senses contribute much less to intuition than does the intellect, as we can see by comparing the system of nerves dedicated to receiving impressions with the system dedicated to processing these impressions; we find that the mass of the sensitive nerves of all the sense organs taken together is very small compared to that of the brain, even in animals, whose brains serve only to produce intuition (since they do not really think, i.e. they do not think abstractly), and yet where this is perfect, that is with mammals, it has a significant mass, even after we discount the cerebellum whose function is to regulate motion.

24 *Thomas Reid's* excellent book, *Inquiry into the Human Mind* (first edition 1764, 6th edition 1810)<sup>a</sup> corroborates the Kantian truths in a *negative* way, demonstrating in a thoroughly convincing manner both the inadequacy of the *senses* for providing an objective intuition of things as well as the non-empirical origin of the intuitions of space and time. He refutes Locke's doctrine that intuition is a product of the *senses* by demonstrating thoroughly and astutely that sensations by the senses are without exception entirely dissimilar to the intuitively cognized world, and in particular that Locke's five primary qualities (extension, shape, solidity, movement,

<sup>a</sup> [An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense]

number) could not possibly be given to us in sensation by the senses. He therefore abandons as completely intractable the question of the origin of intuition and the manner in which it arises. So, although wholly unacquainted with Kant, he provides (along the *regula falsi*,<sup>a</sup> as it were) a thorough proof of the intellectuality of intuition<sup>b</sup> (which I was in fact the first to establish, following Kant's teaching) and of what Kant discovered to be the a priori origin of the basic components of intuition, i.e. space, time and causality, from which each of Locke's primary qualities arose in the first place, but by means of which they can easily be constructed. Thomas Reid's book is very instructive and well worth reading, 25 ten times more so than all the rest of the philosophy written since Kant. Another indirect proof for the same doctrine, albeit along the path of error, is provided by the French sensualist philosophers who, since *Condillac* followed in Locke's footsteps, have been trying hard to show in fact that all our representing and thinking traces back to sensations by the senses ('to think is to sense'),<sup>c</sup> which they, following Locke, call *simple ideas*;<sup>d</sup> they believe that the whole of the objective world can be constructed in our heads merely by the convergence and comparison of these ideas. These gentlemen really do have very simple ideas:<sup>e</sup> it is amusing to see how, lacking both the profundity of German philosophers and the honesty of the English, they twist and turn that impoverished material of sensation by the senses to try to make it important enough to put together such a meaningful phenomenon as the world of thought and representation. But the human being they construct must, anatomically speaking, be an *anencephalus* with a toad's head,<sup>f</sup> having the instruments of the senses but no brain. To cite only the better of the countless efforts along these lines, there is *Condorcet* at the beginning of his book: *Of the Progress of the Human Mind*,<sup>g</sup> and *Tourtual* on vision in the second volume of the *Scriptores ophthalmologici minores*, published by Justus Radius (1828).<sup>h</sup>

The feeling that a merely sensualist explanation of intuition is inadequate is also seen in a view expressed shortly before the appearance of the

<sup>a</sup> [false position method in algebra]

<sup>b</sup> *Intellektualität der Anschauung*

<sup>c</sup> *penser c'est sentir*

<sup>d</sup> *idées simples*

<sup>e</sup> *des idées bien simples*

<sup>f</sup> *tête de crapaud*

<sup>g</sup> [*Esquisse d'un tableau historique*] *des progrès de l'esprit humain* (*Outline of a historical picture of the progress of the human mind*) (1795)]

<sup>h</sup> [Caspar Theobald Tourtual, *De mentis circa visum efficacia* (*On the mind's efficacy concerning vision*), in *Scriptores ophthalmologici minores* (*Minor ophthalmological writers*): Schopenhauer's own theory of colours (Latin version) appeared in a subsequent edition of this publication (1830)]

Kantian philosophy, the view that we do not simply have *representations* of things that are aroused by sensations in the senses, but rather that we perceive *the things themselves* directly, although they lie outside of us; which is of course incomprehensible. And this was not intended as idealistic, it was pronounced from the typical realistic standpoint. The famous Euler expressed this view well and concisely in his 'Letters to a German Princess',<sup>a</sup> vol. 2, p. 68. 'I therefore believe that sensations (of the senses) contain something more than philosophers imagine. They are not merely empty perceptions from certain impressions made in the brain: they do not give the soul mere *ideas* of things; rather, *they really present*<sup>b</sup> *the soul with objects*, objects that exist outside of it, although we cannot comprehend how this in fact works.' This claim can be explained by the following. Although, as I have sufficiently established, intuition occurs by way of application of the law of causality (which we are conscious of a priori), nonetheless, in vision we are never clearly conscious of the act of the understanding that takes us from effect to cause: thus, the sensation by the senses is never separated from the representation developed by the understanding, using the sensation as raw material. Still less can we become conscious of a distinction between object and representation, a distinction that never occurs; rather, we immediately perceive *the things themselves* and in fact as located *outside us*, although it is certain that only *sensation* can be immediate, and this is restricted to the area beneath our skin. This can be explained by the fact that '*outside us*' is an exclusively *spatial* determination, but space itself is a form of our faculty of intuition, i.e. a function of our brain: thus the '*outside us*' to which we transfer objects on the occasion of a visual sensation is itself inside our heads, because that is its entire field of action.<sup>c</sup> This is similar to the fact that we see mountains, forests and seas in the theatre, although everything stays inside the building. This makes clear that we intuit things with the determination of '*outside*', and in fact intuit them *directly*, but that we do not have within us a representation of the things lying outside of us that is distinct from them. This is because things are *in space* and consequently *outside of us* only to the extent that we *represent* them: hence these *things* that we intuit directly in this way (rather than something like their mere image<sup>d</sup>) are themselves only *our representations*, and as such exist only in our heads. Thus it is not so much that we

<sup>a</sup> *Briefe an eine Deutsche Prinzessin* [Leonhard Euler, *Lettres à une Princesse d'Allemagne sur divers sujets de Physique & de Philosophie* (Letters to a German princess on various subjects in physics and philosophy), first published 1768]

<sup>b</sup> *stellen . . . vor*

<sup>c</sup> *Schauplatz*

<sup>d</sup> *Abbild*

directly intuit the things themselves located outside (as *Euler* says), but rather the things that we intuit as located outside are only our representations and thus something perceived by us directly. The whole of the perfectly accurate remark that was cited above in *Euler's* words thus provides a fresh corroboration of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic and of my theories of intuition that are based on Kant, and of idealism in general. The immediacy and lack of consciousness mentioned above with which we complete the *transition from the sensation to its cause* can be explained through an analogous process in *abstract* representation or thought. When we read or listen we receive mere words but make the transition so immediately from these to the concepts they signify that it is as if we receive *the concepts directly*, since we have no consciousness of the transition to them. Thus, sometimes we remember what we read yesterday without knowing what language we read it in. But the fact that such a transition nonetheless takes place each time becomes apparent whenever it fails to occur, i.e. when we are distracted and read without thinking and then become aware of the fact that we have absorbed all of the words but none of the concepts. We are only conscious of the transformation when we make the transition from abstract concepts to pictures in our imagination.<sup>a</sup>

27

Moreover, within empirical perception, it is really only in intuition in the narrowest sense (and thus in *vision*) that the transition from sensation to its cause takes place without consciousness; in all other forms of sense perception the transition takes place with more or less clarity of consciousness, and its reality can therefore be directly ascertained as a fact when apprehending things with the four cruder senses. In the dark, we feel a thing on all sides until we can use the different effects it has on our hands to construct the cause as a determinate shape. More, when something feels smooth, we sometimes wonder whether we have fat or oil on our hands: or when it feels cold, whether our hands are very warm. Sometimes when we hear a sound we are not sure whether it was just an internal affection or whether it really came from the outside, and then whether it was near and weak or distant and strong, and then what direction it came from, and finally whether it was a human or animal sound or the sound of an instrument: in other words, given an effect, we look for the cause. With smells and tastes we very often experience some uncertainty as to the objective cause of the effect we sense: they are so clearly separate here. In *vision* the transition from effect to cause takes place on a completely unconscious level, thus generating the illusion that this type of perception

28

<sup>a</sup> *Phantasie*

is completely direct and consists in sensuous sensation alone without the operation of the understanding; this peculiarity of vision is due in part to the higher perfection of the organ, and in part to the entirely linear way in which light operates. This is why the impression itself already points us to the location of the cause, and there the eye is able to sense most subtly and at a single glance all nuances of light, shade, colour and outline, as well as the data that the understanding uses to assess distance; and so, given impressions on this sense, the understanding operates with a rapidity and assurance that makes us as little conscious of it as we are of spelling when we read, and thus there arises the illusion that sensation itself gives us objects directly. Nonetheless, it is precisely with vision that the operation of *the understanding* (which consists in cognition of the cause from the effect) is most significant: it allows what is sensed twice, with two eyes, to be intuited once; it allows the impression that enters the retina upside down (due to the crossing of the rays in the pupil) to be corrected, by following its cause back in the same direction, or, as we say, we see things properly although their image in our eye is upside down; finally, this operation of the understanding allows us to assess size and distance in direct intuition from five different sources of data, as was described so well by Thomas Reid. I have already argued for all this and also given irrefutable proof of the *intellectual nature of intuition* in my 1816 essay *On Vision and Colours* (second edition 1854) but with significant additions in the improved Latin reworking of the essay that appeared fifteen years later and which was published under the title *Theoria colorum physiologica eademque primaria*<sup>a</sup> in the third volume of *Justus Radius's* 1830 *Scriptores ophthalmologici minores*, but most thoroughly and in greatest detail in the second edition of my essay *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, § 21. On this important subject I thus refer to those sources, so as not to extend the present explanations any further.

29

However, one remark concerning aesthetics might be in order here. Given the established fact of the intellectual nature of intuition, the sight of beautiful objects (such as a beautiful view) is also a *phenomenon of the brain*. Its purity and perfection are not therefore dependent merely on the *object*, but on the constitution of the brain, namely its form and size, the fineness of its texture and the stimulation of its activity through the energy of the pulses in the cerebral arteries. Accordingly, the image of the same view will turn out very differently in different heads, even if their eyesight is equally good, somewhat like the first and last imprint of a well-used copperplate.

<sup>a</sup> ['Physiological and primary theory of colours.' On the publication see p. 25, n. h]

This accounts for the great difference in people's abilities to enjoy the beauties of nature and consequently to imitate them, i.e. to produce the same brain phenomena by means of an entirely different sort of cause, namely colour patches on canvas.

Moreover, the apparent immediacy of intuition, which rests on its completely intellectual nature (by virtue of which, as Euler says, we apprehend the things themselves as situated outside of us) has an analogy in the way we feel the parts of our own body, particularly when they hurt (which is usually the case as soon as we feel them). Just as we believe we perceive things directly where they are, while in fact this really happens in the brain, we also believe that we feel the pain of a limb in the limb itself, when this is likewise felt in the brain, which is where the nerve of the affected part leads. Thus we only feel the affections of those parts whose nerves go to the brain and not those whose nerves belong to the ganglion system; unless an unusually strong affection of the part pushes through to the brain in a roundabout way, where it still usually only makes itself known as a dull discomfort<sup>a</sup> and never with any precise determination of its location. We do not feel an injury to a limb whose nerve stem is cut or blocked. And finally, someone who has lost a limb still sometimes feels pain in it, because the nerves that go to the brain are still there. – Thus in the two phenomena under comparison, what takes place in the brain is apprehended as outside the brain: in intuition this happens by means of the understanding which stretches its tentacles into the external world; in the sensation of limbs this takes place by means of the nerves.

30

<sup>a</sup> *Unbehagen*

*Concerning the Senses*

The purpose of my writings is not to repeat what others have said: so I will give only a few of my own observations concerning the senses.

The senses are merely the outlets through which the brain receives material from the outside (in the form of sensation), and it works this matter up into intuitive representation.<sup>5</sup> Those sensations that are supposed to serve primarily for the *objective* apprehension of the external world cannot themselves be either pleasant or unpleasant: this really means that they must have absolutely no effect on the will. Otherwise, the sensation *itself* would capture our attention and we would stay with the *effect* instead of proceeding at once to the *cause*, as is the purpose here: this is due to the decisive preference that our attention always gives to the *will* over mere representation: we turn to representation only when the will is silent. Accordingly, colours and sounds are intrinsically neither painful nor pleasant sensations, as long as their impression is within normal bounds, and they arise with an indifference appropriate for the material of purely objective intuitions. This is as much the case as could possibly be expected in a body that is through and through will, and is remarkable in this respect. Physiologically it is due to the fact that in the organs of the nobler senses, which is to say seeing and hearing, the nerves that receive the specific external impression are not even capable of feeling pain, they are only familiar with the sensations specifically characteristic of them, the ones that serve pure perception. Thus the retina as well as the optical nerve is insensible to injury, as is the auditory nerve: in both organs pain is felt only elsewhere, in the areas surrounding the distinctive sense nerves and never in the sense nerves themselves: in the eye primarily in the *conjunctiva*; in the ear in the *meatus auditorius*. The same thing is true even with the brain, since if it is cut directly, which is to say from above, it will not have any sensation of this.<sup>6</sup> It is only due to this indifference (an indifference specific to these nerves) with respect to the will that the sensations of the eye are fit to provide the understanding with the multitude of finely

31

nuanced data that it uses to construct the marvellous objective world in our heads, using the law of causality and on the basis of the pure intuitions of space and time. It is precisely this failure of colour sensations to affect the *will* that enables them, when their energy is enhanced through transparency such as in the case of sunsets, coloured windows and the like, to transport us very easily into the state of purely objective, will-less intuition which, as I have shown in the Third Book, constitutes a major component of the aesthetic impression.<sup>a</sup> This very indifference with respect to the *will* is what makes sounds suitable for providing the material to describe the infinite variety of the concepts of reason.

Since *outer sense* (i.e. the receptivity for external impressions as pure data for the understanding) is divided into *five senses*, these are directed towards the four elements, i.e. the four states of aggregation, along with imponderability. So the sense for solidity (earth) is touch, for fluidity (water) it is taste, for the vaporous, i.e. volatile (vapors, scents) it is smell, for the permanently elastic (air) it is hearing, for the imponderable (fire, light) it is sight. The second imponderable, heat, is in fact not an object of the senses, but rather of general feeling,<sup>b</sup> and thus always acts directly on the *will*, as either pleasant or unpleasant. This classification also indicates the relative dignity of the senses. Sight is ranked highest to the extent that it has the broadest sphere and the most subtle sensibility, which is due to the fact that what stimulates it<sup>c</sup> is an imponderable, i.e. something quasi-spiritual and barely corporeal. Hearing is ranked second, corresponding to the air. Touch, meanwhile, is a thorough and versatile teacher, because while each of the other senses give us an exclusively one-sided reference to the object (such as its sound or its relation to light), touch is firmly united with our general feeling and muscular strength and provides the understanding data concerning the form, size, hardness, smoothness, texture, firmness, temperature, and weight of the body, and all this with the least possibility of illusion and deception, which all the other senses are much more prone to. The two lowest senses, smell and taste, are not free from an immediate stimulation of the *will*, i.e. their effect is always either pleasant or unpleasant, and they are thus more subjective than objective.

The perceptions of *hearing* are exclusively in *time*, which is why the entire essence of music consists of measurements of time, which is the basis for both the quality and pitch of tones (through vibrations), as well as their quantity or duration (though rhythm). *Visual* perceptions are by contrast

<sup>a</sup> *Eindruck*

<sup>b</sup> *Gemeingefühl*

<sup>c</sup> *sein Anregendes*



primarily and predominantly in *space*; but secondarily, through their duration, in time as well.

Sight is the sense of the *understanding*, which intuitively, while hearing is the sense of *reason*, which thinks and learns.<sup>a</sup> Words are represented only imperfectly through visible signs: hence I doubt that someone who is deaf and dumb and can read but has no representation of the sounds of words is able to handle the merely visual signs for concepts as readily as we handle the actual, i.e. audible words. If he cannot read, he is, as we know,  
 33 almost like an irrational animal, while someone congenitally blind is entirely rational from the very beginning.<sup>7</sup>

Sight is an *active* sense, hearing is *passive*. Thus tones can strike our minds as disturbing and hostile, and the more so the more active and developed our mind is: they tear apart all thoughts, instantaneously disrupting our power to think. On the other hand, there is no analogous disturbance from the eyes, no immediate effect of what is seen *as such* on the activity of thought (because we are not talking here about the influence of the objects we are viewing on the will); rather, our thinking proceeds peacefully and without hindrance in spite of the greatest variety of things passing before our eyes. Accordingly, the thinking mind<sup>b</sup> lives in eternal peace with its eyes and eternal war with its ears. This opposition of the two senses is also confirmed by the fact that when the deaf and dumb are cured through galvanism, they turn deadly pale with fear the first time they hear a sound (Gilbert's *Annals of Physics*,<sup>c</sup> vol. 10, p. 382); blind people, on the other hand, are delighted with their first glimpse of light, and are reluctant to put bandages back over their eyes. But all of this can be explained by the fact that hearing takes place by a mechanical shock on the auditory nerve that immediately travels to the brain, while seeing is a real *action* of the retina which is merely provoked and produced by light and its modifications, as I have shown in detail in my physiological theory of colours.<sup>d</sup> This whole opposition is contested by the coloured ether drumbeat theory, which is now dished up everywhere with a singular lack of shame, and which would degrade the visual sensation of light to a mechanical shock such as is really the case with hearing, while there can be no greater contrast than that between the calm, gentle effect of light and the alarm drum of hearing. If we now link this to the particular circumstance that, despite having two ears, often with very different sensitivities, we never hear a tone in a double form in the same way that we often see double with our two eyes; then we will begin

<sup>a</sup> *vernimmt* [Schopenhauer makes a verbal link here between *Vernunft*, reason, and the verb *vernehmen*]

<sup>b</sup> *Geist*

<sup>c</sup> *Annalen der Physik* [journal edited by Ludwig Wilhelm Gilbert from 1799 to 1824]

<sup>d</sup> [See *VC*; also *PP* 2, ch. 7]

to suspect that the sensation of hearing does not arise in the labyrinth or cochlea, but rather only deep within the brain where the two auditory nerves meet and thus make only one impression: but this is where the *pons Varolii* encircles the *medulla oblongata*, which is to say the absolutely lethal spot which if injured will kill any animal instantly, and where the auditory nerve makes only a short journey to the labyrinth, the site of the acoustical shock. It is precisely its origin in this dangerous area, also the source of all motion of the limbs, that causes us to be startled by a sudden bang, something that certainly does not happen with a sudden illumination, e.g. a flash of lightning. The optic nerve on the other hand projects much further forward from its *thalami* (although it probably first arises from behind them), and throughout its progression it is covered by (although always separated from) the frontal lobes until, stretching away from the brain completely, it extends into the retina where the sensation arises when stimulated by light, and it is there that sensation can really be said to reside, as I have demonstrated in my essay *On Vision and Colours*.<sup>8</sup> From this origin of the auditory nerve we can also understand why sound is able to cause such enormous disruptions to our power of thought, and why thinking minds and people with a great deal of intellectual energy cannot, without exception, tolerate any noise at all. It disturbs the constant flow of their thoughts and interrupts and paralyses their thinking precisely because the shock of the auditory nerve travels so deeply into the brain that (because the brains of such people are much easier to move around than those of most people) its entire mass perceives the resounding force of the oscillations aroused through the auditory nerves. It is due to this high degree of agility and conductivity of their brains that every one of their thoughts so quickly evokes any analogous or related thought; similarities, analogies and connections between things in general occur to them so quickly and readily, that the same opportunities that millions of ordinary minds have had before will bring them to *the* thought, *the* discovery that the others have not made. These others then wonder why they did not think of it themselves, because they can think ideas *over*<sup>a</sup> but cannot think them *up*:<sup>b</sup> and so the sun shone on all the pillars, but Memnon's was the only one to sound.<sup>c</sup> Accordingly, Kant, Goethe, and Jean Paul were all extremely sensitive to all noise, as their biographies show.\*<sup>9</sup> Goethe, in later years, purchased a

34

35

\* Lichtenberg says in his 'Reports and Remarks by and about Myself' (*Vermischte Schriften* (Assorted Writings), Göttingen 1800, vol. 1, p. 43): 'I am extraordinarily sensitive to all noise, although it loses its repulsive impression entirely as soon as it is connected with a rational goal.'

<sup>a</sup> *nachdenken*

<sup>b</sup> *vordenken*

<sup>c</sup> [A legendary pillar in Egypt that was said to speak at sunrise]

dilapidated house next to his own just so that he would not have to listen to the noise as it was being repaired. When he was still young, he played the drums to inure himself to noise, but in vain. It is not something you can get used to. On the other hand, the truly Stoic indifference of ordinary minds to noise is really remarkable: no noise disturbs them when they are thinking or reading, writing, etc., and yet this is utterly disabling for superior minds. But precisely what makes them so insensitive to noise of all sorts also makes them insensitive to beauty in the visual arts, and to profound thoughts or subtle expressions in the rhetorical arts, in short to everything that does not concern them personally. On the other hand, the following remark of *Lichtenberg* addresses the paralysing effect that noise has on the intellectual: 'It is always a good sign when artists can be hindered from practising their art properly by trivialities. F— stuck his fingers in sulphur when he wanted to play the piano . . . Such things do not disturb the mediocre mind: . . . it acts somewhat like a course sieve.' (*Assorted Writings*, vol. 1, p. 398.) I have actually thought for some time that the quantity of noise someone can tolerate is in inverse proportion to his mental powers, and can be regarded as an approximate measure of these. And so when I hear a dog left to bark for hours on end in the courtyard of a house, I already know what to think about the mental abilities of the inhabitants. Anyone who has a habit of slamming doors instead of closing them by hand, or who allows this in their house, does not simply have bad manners but is crude and narrow-minded. That 'sensible' means 'intelligent' in English is thus an accurate and subtle observation. We will only be really civilized when our ears are no longer outlawed and it is no longer the case that anyone has the right to shred the consciousness of every thinking creature within a radius of a thousand paces by whistling, wailing, shouting, pounding, cracking whips, letting dogs bark, and so on. The Sybarites banned loud trades from within the city: the worthy sect of the Shakers in North America does not tolerate any unnecessary noise in their villages: the same is said of the Moravians. — There is more on this subject in the thirtieth chapter of the second volume of the *Parerga*.

From the *passive* nature of hearing as we have described it, we can understand both how music has such a penetrating, immediate, and unfailing effect on the mind as well as the particular sublimity of mood that sometimes follows it. The combinations of tonal vibrations following rational, numerical relations cause the same vibrations in the brain fibres. On the other hand, the *active* nature of seeing, which is in complete opposition to that of hearing, makes clear why there can be no visual analogy to music and why the piano of colours<sup>a</sup> was a ridiculous mistake. It

<sup>a</sup> *Farbenklavier*

is also due to its *active* nature that the sense of sight is exceptionally sharp in predatory animals, which is to say beasts of prey, and conversely, the *passive* sense, hearing, is exceptionally sharp in the predated, fearful, fleeing animals, so that it can give timely warning of the pursuer that is running or creeping up to them.

Just as we have recognized vision to be the sense of the understanding and hearing to be the sense of reason, we could call smell the sense of memory, because it recollects in us more immediately than any other sense the specific impression of an event or a scene, even from the most distant past.<sup>10</sup>

## On Cognition *a Priori*

From the fact that we ourselves provide and determine the laws governing relations in space without requiring any experience to do so, *Plato* concluded (*Meno*, p. 353 Bipont)<sup>a</sup> that all learning is mere recollection; *Kant* on the other hand concluded that space is subjectively conditioned and merely a form of the cognitive faculty. How far *Kant* towers above *Plato* in this respect!

*Cogito, ergo sum*<sup>b</sup> is an analytic judgment: Parmenides even considered it an identical judgment: ‘because thinking and being are the same’<sup>c</sup> – Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* VI, 2, § 23. But as an identical judgment, or even a merely analytic one,<sup>ii</sup> it can not contain any special wisdom; nor can it do so if, even more fundamentally, we want to derive it as a conclusion from the major premise ‘that which is not has no predicates’.<sup>d</sup> But in fact Descartes wanted to use this judgment to express the great truth that immediate certainty can be attributed only to self-consciousness, which is to say, to the subjective; and that certainty about what is objective, which is to say everything else, is only indirect and must be mediated by what is subjective; and thus the objective must be regarded as problematic because it comes to us second hand. The value of his famous claim is based on this. In the spirit of the Kantian philosophy, we could propose its opposite as:<sup>12</sup> *cogito, ergo est*<sup>e</sup> – i.e. just as I think of things in certain relations (mathematical ones),<sup>13</sup> they must always turn out in exactly that way in every possible experience, – this was an important, profound, and mature *aperçu*<sup>f</sup> that appeared in the guise of the problem of the *possibility of synthetic judgments a priori* and truly prepared the way for profound discovery.<sup>g</sup> This problem is the slogan of Kant’s philosophy,

<sup>a</sup> [See *Meno*, 86b. Here and elsewhere Schopenhauer refers to the Bipont edition of Plato published in Zweibrücken, 1781–7]

<sup>b</sup> [I think therefore I am]

<sup>c</sup> τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι (*nam intelligere et esse idem est*) [fragment B3]

<sup>d</sup> *non-entis nulla sunt praedicata*

<sup>e</sup> [I think, therefore it is]

<sup>f</sup> *Aperçu*

<sup>g</sup> *Erkenntniß*

just as the former claim is the slogan of Descartes', and shows 'from which to which'.<sup>a</sup>

Very appropriately, Kant places his investigations into time and space ahead of all others, because these questions confront the speculative mind<sup>b</sup> above all others: What is *time*? What is this being that consists of pure motion without anything that moves? – And what is *space*? – this omnipresent nothing from which no thing can escape without ceasing to be something? – 38

The fact that time and space depend on the *subject*, and are the manner in which the process of objective apperception is carried out in the brain, is already sufficiently proven by the utter impossibility of thinking away time and space, while we can very easily think away everything presented in them. The hand can drop everything except itself. Nevertheless, I want to explain Kant's more detailed proofs for this truth with some examples and remarks, not to refute foolish objections but rather for the use of those who will someday be teaching Kant's theories.

There is no logical contradiction in the notion of an equilateral right triangle, because the predicates in no way annul the subject, nor are they mutually incompatible. It is only with the construction of their object in pure intuition that their incompatibility appears in the object. If we were to consider it a contradiction on these grounds, then any physical impossibility that it took centuries to discover would be a contradiction as well: for instance, the composition of a metal from its component parts, or a mammal with more or less than seven cervical vertebrae,<sup>\*14</sup> or horns and upper incisors in the same animals. Only purely *logical* impossibility is a contradiction, not physical impossibility, and mathematical possibility just as little. 'Equilateral' and 'right-angled' do not contradict each other (they are together in squares) nor does either of them contradict the triangle. Hence the incompatibility of these concepts can never be recognized merely by *thinking* about them, but rather only as the result of intuition – but only an intuition that does not need experience, does not need a real object, that needs only a mental intuition. It is the same for *Giordano Bruno's* claim, which will also be found in *Aristotle*: 'an infinitely large body is necessarily immovable',<sup>c</sup> – a claim that can appeal to neither experience nor the principle of contradiction; since it speaks of things 39

\* The claim that the three-toed sloth has nine vertebrae should be recognized as an error although Owen still states it, *Ostéologie comp.*, p. 405. [Richard Owen, *Principes d'ostéologie comparée, ou recherches sur l'archétype et les homologues du squelette vertébré* (*Principles of comparative osteology, or investigations into the archetype and homologues of the vertebrate skeleton*, 1855). Translators' note: in fact, both sloths and manatees have nine cervical vertebrae.]

<sup>a</sup> ἐξ οὐκ εἰς οὐκ

<sup>b</sup> *Geist*

<sup>c</sup> [cf. *de caelo* (*On the Heavens*), I, 5, 272a21]

that could never take place in experience, and the concepts ‘infinitely large’ and ‘movable’ do not contradict each other; rather it follows only from pure intuition that motion requires a space outside the body, yet its infinite size does not leave room for any another space. – If we wanted to object to the first mathematical example on the grounds that it only depends on how complete a concept the person judging has of a triangle – and that if the concept were perfectly complete then it would also entail the impossibility that a triangle could be right-angled and still equilateral – then we could reply: assuming that someone has an incomplete concept of a triangle, then that person could expand it in his imagination through mere construction<sup>a</sup> without bringing in experience, and could convince himself of the impossibility of this combination of concepts for all eternity: but this very process is a synthetic judgment a priori, i.e. a judgment through which we form<sup>b</sup> and complete our concepts without any experience and yet with validity for all experience. – Generally speaking, the question of whether a given judgment is analytic or synthetic can, in particular cases, be determined only by how complete the concept of the subject is in the mind of the person judging: the concept ‘cat’ in *Cuvier’s* mind contains a hundred times more than it does in the mind of his servant: hence the same judgment concerning cats would be synthetic for the latter and analytic for the former. But if we consider the concepts objectively and want to decide whether a given judgment is analytic or synthetic, then we should transform the predicate into its contradictory opposite and join this to the subject without the copula; if this results in a contradiction in terms,<sup>c</sup> then the judgment was analytic, otherwise it was synthetic.

That *arithmetic* is based on the pure intuition of *time* is not as obvious as the fact that geometry is based on the pure intuition of space.<sup>\*,15</sup> But it can be

\* This however does not excuse a certain professor of philosophy occupying Kant’s chair, who has been heard to say: ‘It is true that mathematics as such contains arithmetic and geometry; but still it is wrong to think of arithmetic as the science of time for no other reason than to give geometry, as the science of space, a pendant (sic)’ [Schopenhauer is pointing to the fact that the author has the wrong gender for the German word *Pendant*.] (Rosenkranz, in *Deutsches Museum [German Museum]*, 1857, 14 May, Nr. 20.) These are the fruits of Hegeltry [*Hegelerei*]; if your mind has ever been thoroughly spoiled with its senseless gibberish, then serious Kantian philosophy will not enter it any more and you inherit from the master the impertinent habit of speaking all day about things that you do not understand: and then in the end you quickly condemn the fundamental teachings of a great mind in a peremptory and decisive tone, as if they were Hegelian foolishness. But we cannot help but notice that these petty souls try to stay out of the tracks of the great thinkers. They would thus do better not to pick fights with Kant but to content themselves with giving their public more information about God, the soul, the fact of freedom of the will, and whatever else goes along with these, and then have a little private fun in their dark little backroom shop, the philosophical journal: there they can work freely and do what they want, nobody will look at it.

<sup>a</sup> *Konstruktion*

<sup>b</sup> *bilden*

<sup>c</sup> *contradictio in adjecto*

proved in the following manner. Counting always involves positing a unit again and again: we mark the unit with a different word each time, just so we will know how often a unit has been posited: these are the numerals. Now repetition is possible only through succession:<sup>a</sup> while this, which is to say having one thing follow another,<sup>b</sup> is based directly on the intuition of *time*, and is comprehensible as a concept only by this means: so, counting is possible only by means of time. – That all counting is based on *time* is also revealed by the fact that in all languages, multiplication is described by the word ‘times’, which is a temporal concept: *sexies*, *hexakis*,<sup>c</sup> *six fois*, *sechsmal*. But simple counting is itself multiplication by one, which is why in Pestalozzi’s school the children must always multiply in this way: ‘2 times 2 is 4 times one.’ – Even *Aristotle* recognized the close relationship between number and time, presenting it in the fourteenth chapter of the fourth book of the *Physics*.<sup>d,16</sup> Time is for him ‘the number of motion’ (ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμός ἐστὶ κινήσεως). He raises the profound question of whether there could be time without the soul, and he answers in the negative. – If arithmetic were not grounded in this pure intuition of time, it would not be an a priori science, and its claims would lack infallible certainty.<sup>17</sup>

Although *time*, like space, is the subject’s form of cognition, it nevertheless presents itself (as does space) as existing in a completely objective manner, independent of the subject. It hurries by or hesitates, against our will or without our knowledge: we ask what time it is, we investigate time as we would investigate something completely objective. And what is this objective thing? Not the progress of the stars or of our watches, which serve merely to measure the course of time itself: rather it is something different from all things, but, like these things, it is independent of our willing and knowing. It exists only in the minds of cognizing beings; but the constancy of its passage and its independence of the will give it the right to objectivity.

*Time* is in the first instance the form of *inner* sense. Anticipating the next Book, I will say that the only object of the inner sense is the *will* particular to the cognizing being.<sup>e</sup> Time is thus the form that makes self-cognition possible for the individual will, which originally and in itself lacks cognition. Through time, its intrinsically simple and self-identical essence appears separated out over the course of a life. But precisely due to the

<sup>a</sup> *Succession*

<sup>b</sup> *das Nacheinander*

<sup>c</sup> ἑξάκις

<sup>d</sup> [223a16–28]

<sup>e</sup> *der eigene Wille des Erkennenden*



original simplicity and self-identity of the thing presented in this way, its *character* always remains exactly the same; which is why a life history retains the same *ground tones* throughout, and in fact the many different events and scenes of a life are fundamentally like variations on one and the same theme. –

42 Sometimes the English and the French fail even to *notice* the a priori *nature of the law of causality*, while at other times they fail only to understand it properly: thus some of them continue earlier attempts to find an *empirical* origin for this law. *Maine de Biran* claims it originates in our experience of the act of will as a cause followed by the movement of the body as an effect. But this fact is itself incorrect. We never recognize the genuine, immediate act of will as different from the action of the body, and the two as joined by the bond of causality; rather, they are united and inseparable. There is no succession from one to the other: they are simultaneous. They are one and the same, perceived in a double manner: what announces itself to *inner* perception (to self-consciousness) as a true *act of will*, presents itself immediately in *outer* intuition, in which the body exists *objectively*, as the *action* of that body. The fact that physiologically the action of the nerves precedes that of the muscles does not matter here since it does not enter self-consciousness, and the topic here is not the relationship between muscles and nerves but the relationship between act of will and action of the body. This does not claim to be a causal relation. If these two things presented themselves to us as cause and effect, their connection would not be as incomprehensible to us as it in fact is: for when we understand something by way of its cause, we understand it as much as we can understand anything at all. By contrast, the movement of our limbs by way of mere acts of will is such an everyday miracle that we do not even notice it anymore: still, if we stop and think about it, we are struck forcefully by its incomprehensibility, precisely because we are confronted with something that we do *not* understand as the effect of its cause.<sup>18</sup> Hence, this perception could never lead us to a representation of causality, which does not take place in it at all. *Maine de Biran* himself acknowledges the complete simultaneity of the act of the will and the motion. (*New considerations concerning the relationship of the physical to the moral*,<sup>a</sup> pp. 377–8.) – In England, Thomas Reid has already stated that cognition of the causal relation is grounded in the constitution of our faculty of cognition itself (*On the first principles of contingent truths*, essay VI, ch. 5).<sup>b</sup> Most recently,

<sup>a</sup> *Nouvelles considérations des rapports du physique au moral [de l'homme]* (*New considerations on the relationships between the physical and the moral in man*), published posthumously in 1834]

<sup>b</sup> [In *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (1785)]

Thomas *Brown* seems to teach the same thing in his excruciatingly long-winded book: *Inquiry into the relation of cause and effect* (4th edition, 1835), namely that this cognition comes from an innate, intuitive and instinctive conviction: so he is essentially on the right track. Nonetheless, we cannot excuse the crass ignorance involved in the fact that, of the 130 pages of this 476 page book that are devoted to a refutation of *Hume*, none mention *Kant's* refutation, which had already settled this matter seventy<sup>19</sup> years ago. If Latin were still the only language of scholarship, this would not have happened. In spite of *Brown's* (largely accurate) argument, England has nevertheless been receptive to a modified form of the doctrine, advanced by *Maine de Biran*, of the empirical origin of the fundamental cognition of the causal relation, a doctrine that is not without plausibility. It is that we abstract the law of causality from the empirically perceived effect of our own body<sup>a</sup> on other bodies.<sup>b</sup> *Hume* had already refuted this. But I have shown in my work *On Will in Nature* (p. 75 of the second edition)<sup>c</sup> that this refutation is not viable by demonstrating that cognition of causality must already exist in order for us objectively to perceive both our own bodies and those of other people in spatial intuition, because it is the condition of this kind of intuition. In fact, it is precisely in the necessity of a *transition* from the sensation by the senses (which is given only empirically) to its *cause*, a transition that brings about an intuition of the external world, that we find the only true grounds for proving we are conscious of the law of causality *prior to all experience*. Thus I have substituted this proof for that of *Kant*, the unsoundness of which I have demonstrated. The most complete and detailed presentation of this important topic (only touched upon here), which is to say the *a priori* nature of the law of causality and the intellectual nature of empirical intuition, can be found in the second edition of my essay *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, § 21, which I refer to here so as not to repeat all that I have said there. There I showed the vast difference between mere sensation by the senses and the intuition of an objective world, and revealed the wide gulf between these two:<sup>20</sup> the law of causality is the only thing that bridges this gulf, but its application presupposes the two other forms that are related to it, space and time. It takes these three together to give us *objective* representation. But whether the *sensation* from which we start out to get perception arises through the resistance that our muscles experience when they exercise their strength, or whether it arises through the impression of light on the retina, or a sonic impression on the auditory nerves, etc., does not really make any difference: *sensation* always

43

44

<sup>a</sup> *Leib*

<sup>b</sup> *Körper* [i.e. physical bodies]

<sup>c</sup> [WN, 390 (Hübscher SW 4, 82)]

remains a mere *datum* for the *understanding*; only the understanding is capable of grasping it as an *effect* of a *cause* different from it, a cause that it now intuitively as something external, i.e. that it transfers into the form of *space*, which is inherent in the intellect prior to any experience, as something that occupies this space and fills it out. Without this intellectual operation, for which the forms must lie ready within us, the intuition of the *objective, external world* could never arise from a mere *sensation* inside our skin. How could anyone think that the mere feeling that we are hindered in some voluntary movement, an experience even paralytics have, is enough to do this? In addition, there is the fact that external things must have already affected me as motives in order for *me* to try to affect *them*: but this already presupposes an apprehension of the external world. The theory as it stands would have it that (as I already noted in the place cited above) a person born without arms and legs would not have any representation of causality and consequently could not perceive the external world. That this is not the case is testified to by a fact communicated in *Froriep's Notizen*,<sup>a</sup> 1838, July, no. 133, namely a detailed report accompanied by illustrations concerning an Estonian girl, *Eva Lauk*, then 14 years old, born without arms or legs; the report ends with the following words: 'her mother reports that her intellectual development was just as rapid as that of her siblings: in particular, she was just as quickly able to correctly estimate the size and distance of visible objects, without the use of hands. – Dorpat, 1 March, 1838. Dr A. Hueck'.

45 *Hume's* doctrine that the concept of *causality* arises merely from the habit of seeing two states constantly following one another can be *factually* refuted by the oldest of all successions, namely that of day and night, which nobody considers as cause and effect of each other. And this very succession is what also refutes *Kant's* false claim that the *objective* reality of a succession is recognized only when the two successive things are grasped as being in a relation of cause and effect. In fact the truth is the opposite of what Kant says: namely, it is only in their succession that we recognize *empirically* which of two connected states is the *cause* and which is the *effect*. On the other hand, the absurd claim made by many of today's philosophy professors that cause and effect are *simultaneous* can be refuted by the fact that in cases where the succession is too quick to be perceptible, we nonetheless presuppose a priori and with certainty both this succession and the passage of a certain amount of time: so for instance we know that a certain amount of time must pass between pulling a trigger and the bullet flying out, although we do not perceive it, and again that this time must be divided

<sup>a</sup> [The journal *Notizen aus dem Gebiete der Natur- und Heilkunde* (*Reports from the field of natural science and medicine*), edited by Friedrich Ludwig von Froriep]

into several states that appear in strongly determined succession, namely the pulling of the trigger, the spark striking, catching fire, the spread of the fire, the explosion, and the exit of the bullet. Nobody has ever perceived this succession of states, but because we know which one *gives rise* to the other, this lets us know which one must *precede* the other in time, and consequently that a certain amount of time passes during the course of the whole series, although it is so short it escapes our empirical perception: for nobody will claim that the bullet actually flies out simultaneously with the pulling of the trigger. Thus it is not just the law of causality that we are aware<sup>a</sup> of a priori, but its reference to *time*, and the necessity of the *succession* of cause and effect. When we know which of two states is the cause and which is the effect, we also know which one precedes the other in time: but if on the other hand we are *not* aware of this, but only of their causal relation in general, then we try to decide the succession empirically, and use it to determine which of the two is the cause and which is the effect. – The falsity of the claim that cause and effect are simultaneous is also demonstrated by the following consideration. An uninterrupted chain of causes and effects fills the whole of time. (If it were interrupted, then the world would stand still, or in order to get it started again there would have to be an effect without a cause.) Now if every effect were *simultaneous* with its cause, then every effect would be drawn up into the time of its cause, and a chain of causes and effects with just as many links would not fill any time at all, much less an infinite amount of time; instead, everything would be together in a single moment. And so if we assume that cause and effect are simultaneous, the course of the world would shrink into the work of a moment. This proof is analogous to the fact that every sheet of paper must have a thickness, because otherwise the whole book would not have one. In almost all cases it is difficult and often impossible to specify *when* the cause stops and the effect begins, because *alterations* (i.e. successions of states) constitute a continuum, just like the time that they fill, and are similarly infinitely divisible. But the order of these alterations is just as necessarily determined and irreversible as the order of the moments of time themselves: and each of these is called ‘effect’ with reference to its predecessor and ‘cause’ with reference to its successor.

46

*Every alteration in the material world can appear only insofar as it was immediately<sup>21</sup> preceded by another:* this is the true and complete content of the law of causality. But no concept has been more abused in philosophy than that of *cause*, given the ever-popular trick (or mistake) of thinking it in the abstract<sup>b</sup> and grasping it too *broadly*, taking it too *generally*. Since the

<sup>a</sup> *ist uns . . . bekannt*

<sup>b</sup> *in abstracto*

scholastics, or in fact since Plato and Aristotle, philosophy has been, for the most part, an *on-going abuse of universal concepts*. Examples of this are substance, ground, cause, the Good, perfection, necessity, possibility and many, many others. Almost every age has demonstrated the intellectual tendency to operate with abstract concepts such as these, concepts that are too broadly conceived: it might ultimately be based on a certain intellectual inertia that is tired of constantly using intuition to keep tabs on thinking. These overly-broad concepts then gradually come to be used almost like algebraic symbols, and are bandied about in the same way, reducing

47 philosophizing to the level of mere combinatorics, to a type of calculation which (like all calculating) requires and preoccupies only the lower faculties. And in fact in the end this gives rise to empty *verbiage*: the most despicable example of which is provided by the mind-rotting ravages of Hegeltry, which takes it to the point of pure nonsense. But even scholasticism frequently degenerated into empty verbiage. In fact, even Aristotle's *Topics*<sup>a</sup> (very abstract principles, taken completely generally, and which can be used for arguing either *pro* or *contra* about the most diverse objects and put to work anywhere) arose from an abuse of universal concepts. The writings of the scholastics provide countless examples of their treatment of these abstractions, most of all in *Thomas Aquinas*. But philosophy has really followed in the tracks of the scholastics right up to *Locke* and *Kant*, who finally started thinking about the origin of concepts. In fact, we find Kant himself in his earlier years still on the same path, in his *Argument in Support of the Existence of God*<sup>b</sup> (p. 191 of the first volume of the Rosenkranz edition), where the concepts of *substance*, *ground*, *reality* are used in a way that would have been impossible if people had gone back to the *origin* of the concepts and to their *true content* as determined by the origin: because then people would have discovered that the origin and content of *substance* is matter alone, and the origin and content of *ground* (when we are talking about things in the real world) is cause alone, i.e. the earlier alteration that leads to the later, etc. Of course this would not have led to the intended result. But false claims (and from these false systems) have always come, as in this case, from such overly-broadly conceived concepts, concepts that therefore subsume more than their true content permits. *Spinoza's* whole method of demonstration rests on such under-investigated and overly-broadly conceived concepts. *Locke's* eminent service was to

<sup>a</sup> *Topoi* [Schopenhauer has *Topi*]

<sup>b</sup> [The full title of the work is *Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseyns Gottes* (*The only possible argument in support of a demonstration of the existence of God*) (1763). The passage in question is at Ak. 2: 87]

counteract this dogmatic mischief by insisting on investigating the *origin of concepts*, which led him back to the *intuitive* and to *experience*. Before him, *Bacon* was working in the same spirit, although with reference to physics rather than metaphysics. Kant followed the path opened up by Locke, although pursuing it in a higher sense and much further, as we have said. But Locke's and Kant's conclusions were tiresome to those people interested only in showmanship and such people succeeded in drawing the public's attention away from Kant and onto themselves. But in a case such as this, they know how to ignore the dead as well as the living. So they lost no time in departing from the one true path that these sages had finally discovered, and philosophized at random using all sorts of concepts scraped together without worrying about their origin or true content, so that the Hegelian pseudo-wisdom ended up with the claim that concepts have no origin at all but are instead themselves the origin of things. – Kant's failing was to neglect empirical intuition too much in favour of *pure* intuition, as I discussed at length in my critique of his philosophy.<sup>a</sup> For me, intuition is the source of all cognition. Recognizing quite early the problematic and insidious nature of abstractions, I demonstrated the diversity of the relationships that are thought under the concept of the principle of sufficient reason in my 1813 essay concerning this principle.<sup>b</sup> Universal concepts should certainly be the material *in* which philosophy sets down the fruits of its cognition,<sup>c</sup> but not the source *from* which its cognition is drawn: the 'end towards which', not 'from which'.<sup>d</sup> Philosophy is not, as Kant defines it, a science *from* concepts, but rather *in* concepts. – And so even the concept of *causality*, which we are discussing here, has always, in order to further their dogmatic intentions, been conceived much too broadly by philosophers, and this has allowed content that in no way belongs to the concept to enter it, giving rise to claims such as 'all that is has a cause', – 'the effect can contain no more than the cause, which is to say nothing that is not in the cause as well', – 'the cause is nobler than its effect'<sup>e</sup> – and many other claims that are equally unwarranted. A detailed and particularly illuminating<sup>f</sup> example is the following pseudo-rationality of *Proclus* in the dull conversations of his *Institutio theologica*, § 76: 'Everything that comes from an immovable cause has an immutable essence; but everything that comes from a movable cause has a mutable

48

49

<sup>a</sup> [Appendix to *WWR* 1]

<sup>b</sup> [i.e. *FR*]

<sup>c</sup> *ihre Erkenntniß*

<sup>d</sup> *der terminus ad quem, nicht a quo*

<sup>e</sup> *causa est nobilior suo effectu*

<sup>f</sup> *lukulent*

essence. For if the operative factor is in every sense immutable, it will put forth the other from itself, not through a movement but rather through its mere being.<sup>a</sup> Quite right! But show me just one unmoved cause: it is utterly impossible. Here, as in so many cases, abstraction has thought away all determinations except the one that is needed at the moment, without noticing that the latter cannot exist without the former. – The only accurate expression of the law of causality is this: *every alteration has its cause in another alteration that immediately<sup>22</sup> precedes it*. If something *takes place*, i.e. a new state emerges, i.e. something is *altered*, then something else must have been *altered* immediately before this; prior to this there was something else again, and so on to infinity: for it is just as impossible to think of a *first* cause as it is to think of a beginning of time, or a limit to space. The law of causation does not state more than what we have given: its claims only apply in the *alterations*. As long as nothing *alters* there is no cause to inquire about, because there is no a priori ground for deducing from the existence of things at hand<sup>b</sup> (i.e. states of matter) their previous non-existence, and deducing from this non-existence their origin, which is to say an alteration. Thus, the mere *existence* of a thing does not justify us in concluding that it has a cause. There can nonetheless be a *posteriori* grounds, i.e. grounds drawn from earlier experience, for assuming that the present state was not *always* there, but only *arose* in consequence of another state, which is to say through an *alteration*, for which we must then find a cause, and then a cause for this as well: here we are caught in the *infinite regress* to which the use of the law of causality always leads. We said above: *‘things, i.e. states of matter’*; because alterations and causality refer only to *states*. These states are what we understand by *form*, in a broader sense: and only the *forms* change; matter persists. So only the *form* falls under the law of causality. But the *form* also constitutes *the thing*, i.e. it is the ground for the *differences* between things, while matter must be thought as the same in everything. This is why the scholastics say: ‘form gives a thing being’;<sup>c</sup> a more accurate statement of which would be ‘form gives a thing essence, matter gives it existence’.<sup>d</sup> Thus the question of the cause of a *thing* only ever concerns its form, i.e. its condition or constitution, but not its

<sup>a</sup> Πάν τὸ ἀπὸ ἀκινήτου γινόμενον αἰτίας, ἀμετάβλητον ἔχει τὴν ὑπαρξιν· πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ κινουμένης, μεταβλητὴν· εἰ γὰρ ἀκινήτὸν ἐστὶ πάντῃ τὸ ποιοῦν, οὐ διὰ κινήσεως ἀλλ’ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι παράγει τὸ δεύτερον ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ. *Quidquid ab immobili causa manat, immutabilem habet essentiam* [substantiam]. *Quidquid vero a mobili causa manat, essentiam habet mutabilem. Si enim illud, quod aliquid facit, est prorsus immobile, non per motum, sed per ipsum Esse producit ipsum secundum ex se ipso.*

<sup>b</sup> *Daseyn vorhandener Dinge*

<sup>c</sup> *forma dat esse rei*

<sup>d</sup> *forma dat rei essentiam, materia existentiam*



matter, and it concerns form only to the extent that one has grounds for assuming that it has not *always* existed but rather arose through an *alteration*. The connection of *form* with *matter*, or *essence* with *existence*,<sup>a</sup> produces the *concrete*, which is always an individual, and thus *the thing*: and it is the *forms* whose combination with matter, i.e. whose entry into matter by means of an *alteration*, are subject to the law of *causality*. The *overly broad* grasp of the concept in the abstract<sup>b</sup> allows us to abuse it by thinking that causality can be extended to the *thing per se*, and thus to its whole essence and *existence*, and therefore also to matter, and ultimately justifies us in asking even about the cause of the world. This is how the *cosmological proof* arose. This proof in fact assumes without any justification that the non-existence of the world can be inferred from its existence; a non-existence, that would precisely have preceded its existence: but the proof ends with a terrible inconsistency that abolishes the very law of causality that gives it its strength, since it stops at a *first* cause and does not want to go any further, thus ending with a parricide, as it were, just as bees kill the drones after the drones have finished their work. But all talk of an *Absolute* leads back to an embarrassed and therefore disguised cosmological proof, and this is what has passed for philosophy in Germany for the last sixty<sup>23</sup> years, in the face of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. But what does the Absolute really mean? – Something that simply is, and about which (on pain of punishment) one may not ask further whence it comes and why it is. A collector's item for philosophy professors! – But in an honest presentation of the cosmological proof, the assumption of a first cause, and thus of a first beginning in an absolutely beginning-less time, would keep pushing this beginning earlier and earlier by means of the question 'why not earlier?'; so early that we would never get from it to the present, and instead would always have to wonder that all this did not already exist<sup>c</sup> millions of years ago. In general, the law of causality can be applied to everything in the world but not to the world itself: this is because it is *immanent* to the world, not *transcendent*: it is posited along *with* the world and abolished *with* it as well. This rests ultimately on the fact that it belongs to the mere form of our understanding, and is conditioned by it, together with the objective world, which is therefore mere appearance. Thus the law of causality can be applied perfectly and without exception to everything in this world, in accordance with their forms of course, to every change in these forms, and thus to their alterations: it is as valid for a human action as it is for the impact of a rock – nevertheless, as we said, it is only ever valid with reference to events, to *alterations*. If we wish to

51

<sup>a</sup> *der Essentia mit der Existentia*

<sup>b</sup> *in abstracto*

<sup>c</sup> *gewesen*



abstract from its origin in our understanding and grasp it purely *objectively*, the most fundamental basis of this law is the fact that everything that acts does so<sup>a</sup> by virtue of its primordial<sup>b</sup> and thus eternal i.e. atemporal force, and thus its present effect<sup>c</sup> would necessarily have arisen infinitely earlier, namely prior to any conceivable time, if the temporal condition for this had not been lacking: this is the occasion, i.e. the cause by virtue of which alone the effect emerges only *now*, but necessarily now: this condition provides it a place in time.

It is only because, as discussed above, the concept of *cause* was grasped *too broadly* in abstract thought that this concept became mixed up with that of *force*,<sup>d</sup> which, although totally distinct from cause, is nonetheless what gives every cause its causality, i.e. the possibility of acting; this I have demonstrated thoroughly and in detail in the Second Book of the First Volume, as well as in *On Will in Nature* and finally also in the second edition of the essay *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, § 20, p. 44.<sup>e</sup> Such a confusion of terms is particularly awkward in the book by *Maine de Biran* mentioned earlier, which I look at more closely in the second essay just cited: still, it is frequent elsewhere too, for instance when someone asks about the cause of some original force such as gravity. Even *Kant* himself (52 *On the Only Possible Argument*, vol. 1, pp. 211 and 215 of the Rosenkranz edition)<sup>f</sup> calls forces of nature ‘effective causes’ and says: ‘gravity is a cause’. Still, it is impossible to make sense of his ideas unless force and cause are clearly recognized as completely distinct. But the use of abstract concepts allows them to be very easily mistaken for each other when consideration of their origin is set aside. We abandon cognition of causes and effects, which is based on the form of the understanding and is always *intuitive*, in order to cling to the abstraction of *cause*: this is precisely why, in spite of its simplicity, the concept of causality is so frequently misunderstood. Thus, even in *Aristotle* we find (*Metaphysics*, IV, 2) causes divided into four classes, which are grasped in a fundamentally false and in fact truly crude manner. Compare this to my division of the causes, as first established in my essay *On Vision and Colours*, ch. 1, and touched on briefly in § 6 of our First Volume, but demonstrated in detail in the prize essay *On the Freedom of the Human Will*, pp. 30–33.<sup>g</sup> – Two things<sup>h</sup> in nature are untouched by

<sup>a</sup> *jedes Wirkende . . . wirkt*

<sup>b</sup> *ursprünglich*

<sup>c</sup> *Wirkung*

<sup>d</sup> *Kraft*

<sup>e</sup> [FR, 47 (Hübscher SW I, 470)]

<sup>f</sup> [Ak. 2: 103, 106; on the work see p. 44, n. b)]

<sup>g</sup> [FW, 52–5 (Hübscher SW 4, 29–33)]

<sup>h</sup> *Wesen*

the chain of causality, which is endless both forward and backward: matter and the forces of nature. These two are the conditions of causality, while everything else is conditioned by it. This is because the one (matter) is that *in* which states and their alterations emerge; the other (forces of nature) is the only thing that *allows* them to emerge at all. But we must keep in mind that in the Second Book, and later and more thoroughly in *On Will in Nature*, the forces of nature prove to be identical with the *will* in us, and matter will prove to be the mere *visibility of the will*; so that it too can be ultimately regarded as identical with the will in a certain sense.

On the other hand, what I argued in § 4 of the First Volume and even better in the second edition of the essay *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason* at the conclusion of § 21, p. 77,<sup>a</sup> is no less true and accurate, namely that matter is causality itself, grasped objectively, since its entire essence consists in *action*<sup>b</sup> *in general*, and it itself is the *effectiveness*<sup>c</sup> (*energeia* = actuality)<sup>d</sup> of things in general, the abstraction of all their different ways of acting, as it were. Since the essence, *essentia*, of matter therefore consists of *acting in general*, while the actuality, *existentia*, of things consists in their materiality, which is itself in turn the same as acting in general, then we can maintain that *existentia* and *essentia* coincide in matter and are the same, because it has no other attribute than *existence itself* in general and abstracted from any more precise determination. By contrast, all *empirically given* matter,<sup>e</sup> and thus material content<sup>f</sup> (which today's ignorant materialists mistake for matter)<sup>24</sup> is already wrapped in *forms* and manifests itself only through the qualities and accidents of these forms, because in experience, every action has a fully determined and particular nature and is never simply universal. This is precisely why pure matter is an object of *thought* alone, not of *intuition*; which *Plotinus* (*Enneads* II, Book 4, chs. 8, 9) and *Giordano Bruno* (*On Cause*,<sup>g</sup> dialogue 4) expressed paradoxically by saying that matter has no extension, because extension is inseparable from form, and thus matter is *incorporeal*; but *Aristotle* had already said that it is not a body although it is corporeal: σῶμα μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, σωματική δέ (Stobaeus, *Eclogues*, Book I, ch. 12, § 5).<sup>25</sup> We in fact think of *pure matter* as mere *action* in the abstract,<sup>h</sup> quite apart from the nature of this action, and thus

53

<sup>a</sup> [FR, 80 (*Hübscher SW* I, 82)]

<sup>b</sup> *Wirken*

<sup>c</sup> *Wirksamkeit*

<sup>d</sup> ἐνέργεια = *Wirklichkeit*

<sup>e</sup> *Materie*

<sup>f</sup> *Stoff*

<sup>g</sup> *Della causa* [*Della causa, principio ed uno* (*On Cause, Principle and the One*) (1584)]

<sup>h</sup> *in abstracto*

as *pure causality* itself: and as such it is not an *object* but a *condition* of experience, just like space and time. This is the reason why, in the accompanying table of our pure fundamental cognition a priori, *matter* can occupy the place of *causality* and be featured, along with time and space, as the third item that is purely formal, and thus dependent on our intellect.

54 This table contains all the fundamental truths rooted a priori in our intuitive cognition and expresses them as mutually independent first principles; the table does not present anything specific, it does not present what comprises the content of arithmetic and geometry, nor anything that results merely from the combination and application of this formal cognition; such an application is precisely the theme of *Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, and, in a certain sense, this table serves as an introduction and propaedeutic to that book, with which it is therefore directly connected. In this table, I focus above all on the very remarkable *parallelism* of our a priori cognition that provides the basic framework of all experience, but in particular also the fact that, as I argued in §4 of the First Volume, matter (just like causality) should be regarded as a unity, a fusion if you will, of space with time. Correspondingly, we find that what geometry is for the pure intuition of space, and arithmetic is for the pure intuition of time, Kant's phoronomy is for the pure intuition of the two *together*: this is because matter is in the first instance what is *mobile* in space. The mathematical point can never be thought as mobile, as *Aristotle* has already shown: *Physics*, VI, 10. This philosopher has himself already provided the first example of such a science by determining the laws of rest and motion a priori in the fifth and sixth books of his *Physics*.

Now this table can, according to taste, be viewed either as a collection of the eternal and fundamental laws of the world, and thus as the basis of an ontology, or as a chapter from the physiology of the brain, depending on whether we take a realist or idealist perspective; although in the last analysis the second perspective is the correct one. We already made this clear in the first chapter: still, I will single it out for illustration with an example. Aristotle's book *On Xenophanes etc.*<sup>a</sup> begins with these important words of Xenophanes: 'He claims that if there is anything at all it must be eternal, since it is impossible for something to come out of nothing.'<sup>b</sup> *Xenophanes* is

<sup>a</sup> [*On Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias*, now not regarded as a work by Aristotle]

<sup>b</sup> Ἀἰδίων εἶναι φησιν εἴ τί ἐστιν, εἴπερ μὴ ἐνδεχέται γενέσθαι μηδὲν ἐκ μηδενός (*Aeternum esse, inquit, quicquid est, siquidem fieri non potest, ut ex nihilo quippiam existat*) [These opening words in the Greek text are actually introduced with 'Melissus says that'; a similar claim about Xenophanes occurs later (977a14)]

making a judgment here about the origin of things, according to their possibility, things that he can have no experience of, not even by analogy: nor does he refer to any; rather, he judges apodictically and hence a priori. How can he do this when he is looking in from the outside, like a stranger, onto a world that exists purely objectively, i.e. independently of his cognition? How can he, a transient piece of ephemera that is permitted only a passing glance into such a world, judge it in advance, apodictically and without experience, making judgments concerning the possibility of its existence and origin? – The solution to this riddle is that man is concerned only with his own representations and these are as such the work of his brain; the lawlikeness of these representations is thus nothing but the way that his brain functions can be carried out, i.e. the form of his representation. He is therefore only making judgments about his own *brain phenomena* and expresses what enters into its forms, time, space, and causality, and what does not: he is perfectly at home here and speaks apodictically. The following table of the *praedicabilia* a priori of time, space, and matter is to be taken in the same sense.

55

### *Praedicabilia* a priori

Of Time	Of Space	Of Matter
(1) There is only <i>one</i> time and all different times are parts of the same time.	(1) There is only <i>one</i> space and all different spaces are parts of the same space.	(1) There is only <i>one</i> matter <sup>a</sup> and all different material contents <sup>b</sup> are different states of the same matter: as such it is called <i>substance</i> .
(2) Different times are not simultaneous but successive.	(2) Different spaces are not successive but simultaneous.	(2) It is not substance but accidents that make for different sorts of matter (material content).
(3) Time cannot be thought away, although everything can be thought away from it.	(3) Space cannot be thought away, although everything can be thought away from it.	(3) We cannot think of an annihilation of matter, although we can think of an annihilation of all of its forms and qualities.

<sup>a</sup> *Materie*

<sup>b</sup> *Stoffe*

(cont.)

Of Time	Of Space	Of Matter
(4) Time has three dimensions: past, present, and future, which form two directions with a point of indifference.	(4) Space has three dimensions: height, width, and length.	(4) Matter exists, <sup>a</sup> i.e. acts in all spatial dimensions and through the entire length of time, thereby uniting the two and filling them: this is its essence: it is therefore causality through and through.
(5) Time is infinitely divisible.	(5) Space is infinitely divisible.	(5) Matter is infinitely divisible.
(6) Time is homogenous and a continuum: i.e. no part of it is different from any other or separated from it by anything that is not time.	(6) Space is homogenous and a continuum: i.e. no part of it is different from any other or separated from it by anything that is not space.	(6) Matter is homogeneous and a continuum: i.e. it does not arise out of originally heterogeneous (homoimeries) or originally separate parts (atoms); it is therefore not put together from parts that are essentially separated by something that is not matter.
(7) Time has no beginning or end, but all beginning and ending is in time.	(7) Space has no boundaries, but all boundaries are in space.	(7) Matter has no origin and does not decay, but all coming into being and passing out of being are <i>in it</i> .
(8) Time allows us to count.	(8) Space allows us to measure.	(8) Matter allows us to weigh.
(9) Rhythm is only in time.	(9) Symmetry is only in space.	(9) Equilibrium is only in matter.
(10) We have a priori cognition of the laws of time.	(10) We have a priori cognition of the laws of space.	(10) We have a priori cognition of the laws of the substance of all accidents.

<sup>a</sup> *existiert*

(cont.)

Of Time	Of Space	Of Matter
(11) Time can be intuited a priori, albeit only using the image of a line.	(11) Space can be directly intuited a priori.	(11) Matter can merely be thought a priori.
(12) Time does not abide, <sup>a</sup> but rather it passes away as soon as it is there.	(12) Space can never pass away, but endures for all time.	(12) Accidents change, substance endures.
(13) Time does not rest.	(13) Space is immobile.	(13) Matter is indifferent between rest and motion, i.e. it does not have an original tendency to either.
(14) Everything in time has duration. <sup>b</sup>	(14) Everything in space has position.	(14) Everything material has efficacy.
(15) Time has no duration, but all duration is in time, and is the persistence of what remains in contrast to the restless course of time.	(15) Space has no motion but all motion is in space, and is the change of position of mobile things in contrast to the imperturbable restfulness of space itself.	(15) Matter is what persists in time and what moves in space: we measure duration by comparing what is at rest to what is in motion.
(16) Motion is possible only in time.	(16) Motion is possible only in space.	(16) Motion is possible only of matter.
(17) Velocity is in inverse proportion to time given the same amount of space.	(17) Velocity is in direct proportion to space given the same amount of time.	(17) The <i>quantity</i> <sup>c</sup> of motion is in direct geometrical proportion to matter (mass) given the same velocity.

<sup>a</sup> *hat keinen Bestand*<sup>b</sup> *Dauer*<sup>c</sup> *Größe*

(cont.)

Of Time	Of Space	Of Matter
(18) Time cannot be measured directly, by means of itself, but only indirectly, by means of motion, as something simultaneously in space and time; this is how the motion of the sun or a watch measures time.	(18) Space can be measured directly by means of itself, and indirectly by means of motion, as something that is simultaneously in time and space: thus for instance an hour's distance, or the distance of the stars expressed as so many light years.	(18) Matter as such (mass) can be measured, i.e. determined as to its quantity, <sup>a</sup> only indirectly, namely only through the <i>quantity of motion</i> that it receives and gives when it is repelled or attracted.
(19) Time is omnipresent: every part of time is simultaneously everywhere, i.e. in all of space.	(19) Space is eternal: every part of space is everlasting.	(19) Matter is absolute: i.e. it cannot come into existence or pass away, and thus it never increases or decreases in quantity.
(20) If time existed alone and by itself, everything would be successive.	(20) If space existed alone and by itself, everything would be simultaneous.	(20, 21) Matter unites the never-resting flight of time with the rigid immobility of space: hence it is the enduring substance of changing accidents. This change is determined at every place and in every time by causality, which in precisely this way combines time and space and constitutes the entire essence of matter.
(21) Time makes the change of accidents possible.	(21) Space makes the persistence of substance possible.	

<sup>a</sup> *Quantität*

(cont.)

Of Time	Of Space	Of Matter
(22) Every part of time contains all parts of matter.	(22) No part of space contains the same matter as any other part of space.	(22) For matter is as enduring as it is impenetrable.
(23) Time is the principle of individuation. <sup>a</sup>	(23) Space is the principle of individuation. <sup>b</sup>	(23) Individuals are material.
(24) The now has no endurance.	(24) Points have no extension.	(24) Atoms have no reality.
(25) In itself, time is empty and without determination.	(25) In itself, space is empty and without determination.	(25) In itself, matter lacks form and quality and is likewise inert, i.e. is indifferent between rest and motion and is thus without determination.
(26) Every moment is conditioned by the previous one, and exists only to the extent that the other has stopped being. (Principle of the sufficient reason of being in time. – See my essay <i>On the Principle of Sufficient Reason</i> .)	(26) The position of every boundary in space with respect to every possible boundary in space is strongly and thoroughly determined by the position of every boundary in space with respect to every other boundary in space. – (Principle of the sufficient reason of being in space.)	(26) Every alteration in matter can appear only by virtue of a prior alteration in matter: hence a first alteration and thus a first state of matter are as inconceivable as a beginning of time or a boundary to space. – (Principle of the sufficient reason of becoming.)

<sup>a</sup> *principium individuationis*<sup>b</sup> *principium individuationis*



(cont.)

Of Time	Of Space	Of Matter
(27) Time makes arithmetic possible.	(27) Space makes geometry possible.	(27) Matter as mobility in space makes phoronomy possible.
(28) The simple in arithmetic is the unit.	(28) The simple in geometry is the point.	(28) The simple in phoronomy is the atom.

*Remarks on the accompanying table***(1) On number 4 concerning matter**

The essence of matter consists in action:<sup>a</sup> it is action itself, in the abstract,<sup>b</sup> and thus action in general apart from any differences in the mode of action: it is causality through and through. This is precisely why its own existence<sup>c</sup> does not fall under the law of causality, and hence why it is everlasting and without origin: if it were not, then the law of causality would be applied to itself.<sup>26</sup> Now since we are a priori conscious of causality, the concept of matter, as the indestructible foundation of everything existent,<sup>27</sup> can assume its position among the things we cognize a priori, since it is only the realization of a form of cognition given to us a priori. For as soon as we intuit something acting, it presents itself *eo ipso* as material, just as, conversely, something material necessarily presents itself as active: these are in fact interchangeable concepts. Thus the word ‘actual’<sup>d</sup> is used as synonymous with ‘material’: and the Greek *kat’ energeian*<sup>e</sup> in contrast to *kata dunamin*<sup>f</sup> reveals the same origin, since *energeia*<sup>g</sup> means action in general: just like *actu* in contrast to *potentiā*,<sup>h</sup> as well as the English *actually* for the German *wirklich*. – What people call ‘filling space’ or ‘impenetrability’ and consider to be the defining characteristic of bodies (i.e. of material things) is just that *mode of action* shared by *all* bodies without exception, namely mechanics. This universality by virtue of which it belongs to the concept of

<sup>a</sup> *Wirken*<sup>b</sup> *in abstracto*<sup>c</sup> *Daseyn*<sup>d</sup> *wirklich*<sup>e</sup> κατ’ ἐνέργειαν [according to actuality]<sup>f</sup> κατὰ δύναμιν [according to possibility]<sup>g</sup> ἐνέργεια<sup>h</sup> [Latin: actually ... possibly]

a body follows a priori from this concept: it cannot therefore be thought away without annulling the concept itself, and this is the only thing that distinguishes it from other modes of action such as those of electricity, chemistry, light, heat. *Kant* was entirely correct to divide this filling of space or mechanical mode of action into the forces of repulsion and attraction, just as we divide a given mechanical force into two others through the parallelogram of forces. Yet this is at base merely a lucid<sup>a</sup> analysis of the phenomenon into its component parts. Both forces together present the body within its limits, i.e. within a particular volume; by contrast, the one on its own would disperse it into infinity, while the other on its own would contract it to a single point. Disregarding this mutual balance or neutralization, the body acts with the first force to repel other bodies that compete with it for space, and acts with the other to attract (in gravitation) all bodies in general; so the two forces are not extinguished in their product, the body, as with two impulsive forces acting equally in opposite directions, or  $+E$  and  $-E$ , or oxygen and hydrogen in water. The empirical inseparability of impenetrability and gravity proves they are actually in exact correspondence, although we can separate them in thought, since the one never appears without the other.

I cannot however fail to note that the doctrine of *Kant* cited here, which constitutes the fundamental thought of the second chapter of his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, the section on Dynamics, was already shown clearly and thoroughly *before Kant* by *Priestley* in his excellent *Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit*, sections 1 and 2, a book that appeared in 1777, second edition in 1782, while the *Metaphysical Foundations* is from 1786. Unconscious memories can if necessary be used to explain things like peripheral ideas, clever insights and metaphors, but not primary or foundational thoughts. So should we believe that *Kant* silently appropriated such an important thought belonging to someone else? And this from a book that was still new at the time? Or, that he did not know about this book and the same thought arose in two minds within a short space of time? Even the explanation *Kant* gives in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (first edition, p. 88, Rosenkranz edition, p. 384)<sup>b</sup> of the real difference between fluids and solids is essentially already present in *Kaspar Friedrich Wolff's Theory of Generation*,<sup>c</sup> Berlin 1764, p. 132. But what can we say when we find *Kant's* most important and brilliant

57

<sup>a</sup> *besonnene*

<sup>b</sup> [Ak. 4: 526–7]

<sup>c</sup> *Theorie von der Generation* [The work – Wolff's dissertation – is actually entitled *Theoria Generationis* (1759)]

fundamental theory, that of the ideality of space and the merely phenomenal existence of the physical world, already articulated thirty years earlier by *Maupertuis*?<sup>a</sup> This can be seen more clearly in *Frauenstädt's* letters concerning my *Philosophy*,<sup>b</sup> letter 14. *Maupertuis* articulates this paradoxical doctrine so decisively and yet without a proof, that it is possible to suspect that he took it from somewhere else as well. It would be highly desirable to research this matter further; and since this requires difficult and extensive research, some German academy should really set this as a prize question.<sup>28</sup> As *Kant* stands to *Priestley*, and perhaps to *Kaspar Wolff* and to *Maupertuis* or his predecessor,<sup>29</sup> this is how *Laplace* stands to *Kant*; *Laplace's* remarkable and certainly accurate theory of the origin of the solar system, presented in his *Exposition of the World System*,<sup>c</sup> Book V, Chapter 2 was in the main and in its fundamental thought presented roughly fifty years earlier, in 1755, by *Kant* in his *Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*,<sup>d</sup> and more completely in 1763 in his *Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God*, Chapter 7; and since in this last text he also made it known that *Lambert* in his *Cosmological Letters* (1761)<sup>e</sup> quietly borrowed that theory from him, and these letters appeared at the same time in French (*Lettres cosmologiques sur la constitution de l'univers*), we must assume that *Laplace* was familiar with *Kant's* theory. Of course<sup>30</sup> he presented the subject more thoroughly, conclusively, extensively, and yet more simply than *Kant*, in keeping with his deeper acquaintance<sup>f</sup> with astronomy; but in the main it is already clearly present in *Kant*, and would, given its great importance, be enough in itself to immortalize his name. – It is deeply depressing to suspect first-rate minds of a level of dishonesty that would be enough to disgrace the smallest of minds, since we feel that theft is less pardonable with a rich man than with a poor one. But we must not be silent on this matter, since we are posterity in this case and must do justice as we hope posterity will one day do us justice too. Thus I want to mention as a third example of this type, that the fundamental thoughts in *Goethe's Metamorphosis of Plants*<sup>g</sup> were already articulated by *Kaspar Friedrich Wolff* in his *Theory of Generation* (Berlin, 1764) p. 148, 229, 243, etc. – Indeed, is it any different with the system of

<sup>a</sup> [Pierre Louis de Maupertuis, *Lettres philosophiques* (Philosophical letters) (1755)]

<sup>b</sup> [Briefe über die Schopenhauer'sche Philosophie (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1854)]

<sup>c</sup> *Exposition du système du monde* [1796]

<sup>d</sup> [Allgemeine] *Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels*

<sup>e</sup> [Johann Heinrich Lambert, *Kosmologische Briefe über die Einrichtung des Weltbaues* (Cosmological letters on the constitution of the universe)]

<sup>f</sup> *Kenntniß*

<sup>g</sup> *Metamorphose der Pflanzen* [Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären (Attempt to explain the metamorphosis of plants) (1790)]

gravitation? In continental Europe, its discovery is always ascribed to *Newton*, while in England scholars at least know full well that it belongs to *Robert Hooke*, who demonstrated it quite clearly as early as 1666 in a *Communication to the Royal Society*, although only as hypothesis and without proof. The main section from this work is printed in Dugald Stewart's *Philosophy of the Human Mind*,<sup>a</sup> vol. 2, p. 434, and probably taken from R. Hooke's *Posthumous Works*. The course of events here and the trouble it caused for *Newton* can be found in the *Biographie universelle* article on *Newton*.<sup>b</sup> Hooke's priority is treated as a settled matter in a short history of astronomy, *Quarterly Review*, August 1828. You can find more on this topic in my *Parerga*, vol. II, § 86. The story of the falling apple is a fairytale, as baseless as it is beloved, and entirely without authority.

## (2) On number 18 concerning matter

The *quantity of motion* (*quantitas motus*, already in Descartes) is the product of mass and velocity.

This law is the basis not only of the theory of impact in *mechanics*, but also of the theory of equilibrium in *statics*. The relation of the masses of two bodies can be determined from their force of impact, given that they have the same velocity: if two hammers strike with equal speed, the one with greater mass will drive the nail farther into the wall, or the pole deeper into the earth. For instance, a hammer that weighs six pounds and has a velocity = 6 has an effect equal to that of a three-pound hammer with a velocity = 12: because in both cases the *quantity of motion* = 36. If there are two balls rolling with equal speed, the one with the greater mass will be able to push a third ball at rest farther than the ball with the smaller mass because the mass of the first, multiplied by the same velocity, results in a greater *quantity of motion*. The canon has a greater range than the gun because there the same velocity imparted to a much greater mass delivers a much greater *quantity of motion*, which resists the dampening effect of gravity for a greater amount of time. This is why the same arm will throw a lead ball farther than a stone ball of the same size, or a larger stone farther than a very small one. Thus too, a canister shot will not reach as far as a shot with a bullet.

The same law is the basis of the principle of the lever and of the scale: because here too the smaller mass on the longer arm of the lever or beam of the scale has a greater speed *when falling*, and when this speed is multiplied it can equal or even exceed the *quantity of motion* of a greater mass located

<sup>a</sup> [*Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind* (1792–1827)]

<sup>b</sup> [*Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne*, edited by Joseph F. Michaud (1843)]

on the shorter arm. If an *equilibrium* results in a state of *rest*, this velocity is merely intentionally or virtually present, potentially and not actually,<sup>a</sup> and yet operates just as though actually, which is quite remarkable.

After calling these truths to mind, the following explanation will be more readily grasped.

- 60 The *quantity of a given matter* can in general be assessed only by its *force*, and this can be recognized only by its *expression*. Where the matter is considered only in its quantity, and not its quality, this expression can only be a *mechanical* one, i.e. it can only consist in the *motion* that it imparts to other matter. This is because the force of matter only comes to life, as it were, in *motion*: hence the term *living force*<sup>b</sup> for the expression of the force of matter in motion. Thus the only measure of the quantity of a given matter is the *quantity of its motion*. In this however, when it is given, the quantity of the matter appears mixed and mingled with the other factor involved, the *velocity*: this other factor must therefore be eliminated if one wants to know<sup>c</sup> the quantity of matter (the mass). Now the *velocity* is, of course, known directly: because it is  $S/T$ . But the other factor, which remains after this is eliminated, i.e. the mass, can only ever be known *relatively*, namely in comparison with other masses that themselves can be known only by means of the *quantity of their motion* and thus in combination with velocity. Thus one *quantum of motion* must be compared with the other, and then velocity can be deducted from both to see how much each owes to its mass. This is done by weighing the masses against each other and comparing that *quantity of motion* that the gravitational pull of the earth excites in each according to the measure of the quantity in each mass. Thus there are two methods of weighing: either the two masses under comparison receive the *same* velocity in order to see which of them *imparts* motion to the other and thus itself *has* a greater quantity of motion that can then be ascribed to the other factor of the *quantity of*
- 61 *motion*, i.e. mass, since both sides have the same velocity (this is the hand balance): or they can be weighed by investigating how much *more velocity* the one mass must receive than the other in order to equal the *quantity of motion* of the second, and thus to have this second impart no more motion to it, since its mass (i.e. the quantity of its matter) must be smaller than that of the other in proportion to the degree to which its *velocity* exceeds that of the other (this is the beam scale). This estimation of mass through *weight* relies on the fortunate circumstance of the

<sup>a</sup> *potentiā nicht actu*

<sup>b</sup> *lebendige Kraft*

<sup>c</sup> *erkennen* [here and for the rest of this paragraph]

moving force in itself acting on both absolutely equally, and each of the two being in a position to *impart* its surplus of *quantity of motion* directly to the other and thus become visible.

The essential elements of these theories were expressed a long time ago by Newton and Kant, but I believe that the coherence and clarity of my presentation has made the issue comprehensible in a way that allows anyone access to the insight I regard as necessary to justify claim number 18.



*On the First Book*

3

*First Half*

*The Doctrine of Intuitive Representation*  
*(Concerning §§ 1–7 of the First Volume)*



*On the Intellect in the Absence of Reason*

A perfect understanding<sup>a</sup> of animal consciousness must be possible, since we can construct it by simply subtracting out certain qualities of our own consciousness. But animal consciousness involves instinct, which is more highly developed in animals than it is in human beings, and in some animals becomes a creative drive.<sup>b</sup>

Animals possess understanding<sup>c</sup> but not reason, so they have *intuitive* but not abstract cognition: they apprehend things correctly and grasp immediate causal connections, indeed the higher animals do so through several links of the causal chain; still, they do not really *think*, because they lack *concepts*, i.e. abstract representations. This leads first of all to the lack of a real memory, which afflicts even the most intelligent animals and is the principal reason why their consciousness is so different from that of humans. Perfect *clarity of mind*<sup>d</sup> rests on a distinct consciousness of the past and of the eventual future *as such* and in connection with the present. This requires a true memory which is thus an orderly, coherent, thoughtful recollection: but this is possible only by means of *universal concepts*, which are needed even with respect to things that are entirely individual, so that they can be recalled in order and succession. Our lives being filled with immense quantities of things and events that are similar or the same, we cannot recall each one of these immediately, intuitively and individually; not only do we have insufficient time for such a feat, but even the most comprehensive memory would be incapable of such an act: so all this can be retained only if it is subsumed under universal concepts, and consequently reduced to a relatively small number of propositions by means of which we then have an orderly and adequate overview of our past at our ready disposal. There are only a few scenes from our past that we can recall vividly, and our

63

\* This chapter, together with the next, relates to §§ 8 and 9 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *Kenntniß*

<sup>b</sup> *Kunsttriebe*

<sup>c</sup> *Verstand*

<sup>d</sup> *Besonnenheit*

64 awareness of the time that has elapsed since then and the events that have taken place during it is merely abstract, mediated by concepts of things and numbers that now represent days and years and what has taken place in them. Like the whole of its intellect, an animal's ability to remember is by contrast limited to the *intuitive* and consists for the most part merely of a returning impression that informs it that it had been there before, something that occurs when an intuition in the present revives the trace of an earlier one: an animal's memory is thus always filtered through what is actually present at that moment. But this is precisely why memory re-excites the sensation and mood that the earlier appearance had produced. Accordingly, a dog recognizes acquaintances, distinguishes friends from enemies, easily rediscovers a path he has once taken or houses he has already visited, and is instantly put into the appropriate mood by the sight of a food bowl or a stick. Training<sup>a</sup> of all sorts is based on the use of this intuitive faculty of recollection as well as on force of habit, which is extremely strong in animals: thus, training is as different from human education as intuition is from thought. When our proper memory fails to do its duty, we too are sometimes left with this merely intuitive recollection, and this allows us to assess the difference between the two from our own experience: for instance, when we see someone who looks familiar even though we cannot remember when and where we have seen him before; the same thing happens when we visit a place we have been to in early childhood, that is, before the development of our reason, so that we have forgotten it entirely, but now we perceive the impression of the present as something that had been there before. An animal's recollection is always of this sort. But additionally, in the most intelligent animals, this merely intuitive memory can reach to the point of *imagination*,<sup>b</sup> and this in turn can help them along so that for instance a dog can call to mind an image of his absent master, making the dog long for the master and look for him everywhere if he has been away for a long time. The dog's dreams are also based on this imagination. Animal consciousness is thus a mere succession of presents, none of which exist as future prior to its appearance or as past after its disappearance, since this is the distinguishing characteristic of human consciousness. This is precisely why animals also experience infinitely less *suffering* than we do, because they are not aware of any other sufferings than those brought about directly in the *present*. But the present has no extension; the future and the past on the other hand, which contain the majority of the causes of our suffering, are extended far and wide, and added to their actual content there is also their merely possible content, which opens up an immense field of fears and desires: untroubled by this,

<sup>a</sup> *Abrichtung*

<sup>b</sup> *Phantasie*

animals calmly and cheerfully enjoy the present, even when it is itself only just tolerable. Human beings with very limited abilities might approximate animals closely on this account. But the only suffering that can belong *exclusively* to the present is physical suffering. Animals do not even really experience death: they can only come to know<sup>a</sup> it when it occurs, but then they no longer exist.<sup>b</sup> The life of an animal is thus a continuous present. It lives in the present without reflection<sup>c</sup> and is always absorbed entirely in the present:<sup>31</sup> most human beings live with very limited reflection too. Another consequence of the constitution of animal intellect as we have presented it is the precise connection between their consciousness and their environment. Nothing comes between an animal and the external world: by contrast, our thoughts about this world always come between us and it and often make us inaccessible to it and it to us. Only with children and very uneducated human beings is this bulwark sometimes so flimsy that to know what is going on inside them you only need to see what is going on around them. This is also why animals are incapable of either premeditation or disguise: they have nothing in reserve. In this respect a dog is to a human being what a glass cup is to a metal one, and this is one of the reasons why we value dogs so highly: because it gives us great amusement to see on display in them, bare and in full daylight, all those affections and emotions that we so often hide away. In general, animals always lay their cards on the table, as it were: this is why we take so much pleasure in their comings and goings and their dealings<sup>d</sup> with each other, whether they belong to the same or to different species. These are characterized by a certain stamp of innocence, in contrast to the deeds of human beings in which the innocence of nature has been removed by the emergence of reason, and with it, of deliberation.<sup>e</sup> But that is why our deeds are characterized by premeditation throughout, while the basic character of animal deeds is the absence of premeditation and hence determination through the impulse of the moment. No animal is capable of genuine premeditation: it is the prerogative of human beings – and a highly momentous one – to formulate and follow a premeditated plan. Of course instincts like those of bees or migratory birds, or more, a sustained, long-term desire, a longing like that of a dog for his absent master, can create the appearance of premeditation, but must nevertheless not be mistaken for it.<sup>32</sup> – All of this is ultimately based on the relation of human to animal intellect, which can also be expressed by saying that

65

<sup>a</sup> *kennen lernen*

<sup>b</sup> *sind die schon nicht mehr*

<sup>c</sup> *Besinnung*

<sup>d</sup> *Thun und Treiben*

<sup>e</sup> *Besonnenheit*

66

animals have only *immediate* cognition, while we have *mediate* cognition as well; and the advantage of the mediate over the immediate in many things such as trigonometry and analysis, in working with machines instead of by hand, etc. is the case here as well. Accordingly, we can repeat: animals have a *simple* intellect while we have a *double* one; namely, a thinking intellect along with an intuitive one; and the operations of the two often proceed independently of each other: we intuit one thing and think about another; on the other hand, they often have an impact on each other. This description of the situation renders particularly comprehensible what we described above as the essential transparency and naivety of animals as opposed to human diffidence.<sup>a</sup>

Meanwhile, the law ‘nature makes no leaps’<sup>b</sup> has not been entirely abolished with respect to animal intellect; even if the step from animal intellect to that of humans is in fact the greatest that nature exhibits in the production of its creatures. A weak trace of reflection, of reason, of linguistic comprehension, of thinking, of premeditation, of deliberation is sometimes (to our constant amazement) apparent in the most select individuals of the highest animal species. Elephants provide the most striking features in this regard, since their highly developed intellect is enhanced and supported by practice and experience over a life that sometimes spans two hundred years. They have frequently shown unmistakable signs of premeditation,<sup>c</sup> which is always what we find most surprising in animals, and is therefore recorded in well-known anecdotes: in particular there is the story of the elephant that took revenge upon a tailor on account of a pinprick. I nonetheless wish to retrieve from oblivion a side note to this, which has the advantage of being substantiated by judicial investigation. On 27 August, 1830, a coroner’s inquest was held in Morpeth, England on the elephant-keeper *Baptist Bernard* who had been killed by his elephant: witness testimony showed that two years earlier he had grossly insulted the elephant, and now the elephant, without provocation, but when suddenly presented with an opportunity, had seized and smashed him. (See the *Spectator* and other English papers of that day.) For specific information on animal intellect, I recommend the excellent book by *Leroy*, *On Animal Intelligence*,<sup>d</sup> new edition 1802.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *Verstecktheit*

<sup>b</sup> *Natura non facit saltus*

<sup>c</sup> *Prämeditation*

<sup>d</sup> *Sur l’intelligence des animaux* [Charles-Georges Leroy, *Lettres philosophiques sur l’intelligence et la perfectibilité des animaux, avec quelques lettres sur l’homme* (*Philosophical Letters on Animal Intelligence and Perfectibility, with Some Letters on Humans*), originally published in 1762–9]

## *On the Doctrine of Abstract or Rational Cognition*

The impression of something external on the senses, together with the state<sup>a</sup> that it alone and by itself produces in us, disappears when the presence of the thing disappears. These two cannot therefore by themselves constitute genuine *experience* that instructs us and is supposed to guide our actions in the future. The image of the impression preserved in the imagination is already weaker than the impression itself, grows fainter every day, and disappears altogether with time. Only one thing is not subject either to the instantaneous disappearance of the impression or to the gradual disappearance of its image, and is thus free from the ravages of time: the *concept*.<sup>b</sup> Experience of the kind that instructs us must therefore be lodged in the concept, and only the concept is fit to guide our steps securely through life. Seneca thus rightly said: 'if you want to subordinate everything to yourself, subordinate yourself to reason'<sup>c</sup> (letter 37). And I would add that in actual life, *deliberation*,<sup>d</sup> i.e. proceeding according to concepts, is the indispensable condition of superiority<sup>e</sup> to others. An instrument of intelligence as important as *concepts* clearly cannot be the same as *words*, these mere sounds, sense impressions that fade as the present fades, or as aural illusions<sup>f</sup> would fade with time. Nonetheless, the concept is a representation, and its safe keeping and clear consciousness are bound up with the word: which is why the Greeks called word, concept, relationship, thought, and reason by the name of the first of these: *logos*.<sup>g</sup> Nevertheless, the *concept* is as absolutely distinct from the *word* it is linked to as it is from the intuitions that it arose from. It is of an entirely different nature from these sense impressions. Still, it is able to absorb all the results of intuition into itself in order to give them back, unaltered and

<sup>a</sup> *Stimmung*

<sup>b</sup> *Begriff*

<sup>c</sup> *Si vis tibi omnia subicere, te subijce rationi*

<sup>d</sup> *überlegt seyn*

<sup>e</sup> *überlegen zu seyn*

<sup>f</sup> *Gehörphantasma*

<sup>g</sup> ὁ λόγος

- undiminished, even after the longest stretch of time: only in this way does *experience* arise. But the concept does not preserve what is intuited or what is thus sensed: rather, it preserves only what is essential to this and in an entirely altered form, yet as its adequate representative. Similarly, flowers cannot be preserved, but their ethereal oil, their essence can be, and with the same fragrance and the same powers.<sup>a</sup> The action that is guided by correct concepts will, as a result, meet with the intended reality. – We can assess the inestimable value of *concepts* and thus of *reason* when we survey the infinite quantity and diversity of things and states that exist both successively and simultaneously, and reflect on the fact that language and writing (the signs of concepts) can nevertheless give us precise information as to each thing and each relation, whenever and wherever it might have been; because even a relatively *small number* of concepts can deal with and represent an infinity of things and states. – In our own reflection, *abstraction* involves discarding useless baggage in order to deal more easily with those aspects of cognition that are to be compared and thus put to work. In so doing, we leave out many non-essential aspects of real things that serve only to confuse us, and work with the few but essential determinations that are thought in abstraction.<sup>b</sup> But precisely because universal concepts arise only by thinking away and leaving out some of the determinations that are present, so that the more universal they are, the emptier they are, the utility of this procedure is limited to *working up*<sup>c</sup> of elements of cognition that we have already acquired, including conclusions drawn from premises that are already contained in cognition. By contrast, novel fundamental insights can only be drawn, with the help of the power of judgment, from intuitive cognition, the sole type of cognition that is full and rich. – Since, moreover, the content of concepts is inversely proportional to their scope, and the more that is thought *under* a concept, the less is thought *in* it: it follows that concepts form a stepwise progression, a hierarchy from the most specific to the most general, at the bottom of which scholastic realism could almost be correct, and at the top, nominalism. The most specific concept is practically individual, and thus practically real: and the most universal concept, e.g. being<sup>d</sup> (i.e. the infinitive of the copula) is practically no more than a word. Thus too, philosophical systems that keep within such entirely universal concepts without descending to the real are almost entirely empty verbiage; this is because abstraction consists in merely thinking something away, and the further one takes this,

<sup>a</sup> *Kräfte*<sup>b</sup> *in abstracto*<sup>c</sup> *Verarbeitung*<sup>d</sup> *das Seyn*

the less that remains. And thus, when I read these modern philosophemes that operate purely in far-flung abstractions, I soon have almost nothing to think about, however much I try; because I am not given any content for thinking, but am supposed to operate only with empty husks; this feels like trying to throw something that weighs very little: the force and the effort are there, but there is no object to apply these to so as to produce the other moment of motion. Anyone wanting to experience this just needs to read the writings of the Schellingians or even better, the Hegelians. *Simple* concepts must really be unanalyzable<sup>a</sup> concepts; and accordingly, they can never be the subject of an analytic judgment: this I consider to be impossible, since when you think of a concept, you must also be able to specify its content. What people tend to give as simple concepts are in fact not concepts at all, but rather in part mere sense sensations, something like the sensations of a particular colour, and in part the forms of intuition that we are conscious of a priori; and thus in fact the ultimate elements of *intuitive cognition*. But this plays the same role in the system of all our thoughts that granite plays in geognosy, that of the ultimate, solid ground that supports everything and beyond which one cannot go. For a concept to be *clear*, it is not only necessary that it be decomposable into its distinguishing features, these must always be capable of further analysis, even if they are abstractions, and so on and so forth until we come to *intuitive* cognition and thus refer to concrete things. We give substance to the last of the abstractions through clear intuition of these concrete things, and thereby guarantee their reality as well as the reality of all the higher abstractions that rest on them. Thus, the usual explanation, that the concept is clear as soon as we can give its distinguishing characteristics, is insufficient because the decomposition of these characteristics might lead only to concepts without being ultimately grounded in intuitions that give reality to all these concepts. For instance, take the concept of 'spirit'<sup>b</sup> and analyze it into its distinguishing characteristics, 'a thinking, willing, immaterial, simple, indestructible being that does not fill space'; in so doing, nothing clear is thought because the elements of these concepts cannot be verified by intuitions: and this is because a thinking being without a brain is like a digesting being without a stomach. In fact it is only intuitions that are *clear*,<sup>c</sup> not concepts: concepts can, at best, be *distinct*.<sup>d</sup> Thus, as absurd as it was, people put 'clear and confused' together and used them as synonyms when they declared intuitive cognition to be only a confused abstract cognition, because it is only abstract cognition that is

70

<sup>a</sup> unauf lösbar<sup>b</sup> Geist<sup>c</sup> klar<sup>d</sup> deutlich

distinct. *Duns Scotus* was the first to do this, but *Leibniz* held fundamentally the same view as the basis of his identity of indiscernibles:<sup>a</sup> see *Kant's* refutation of this, p. 275 of the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.<sup>b</sup>

The close connection mentioned earlier between word and concept, and thus between language and reason, rests in the last instance on the following. Our whole consciousness, with its inner and outer perception, always has *time* as its form. Concepts on the other hand, as representations that have arisen through abstraction and are thoroughly general and distinct from all particular things, have (in this quality) a being that is certainly objective to a certain extent, and yet does not belong to any temporal sequence. Thus, in order to enter into the immediate presence of an individual consciousness and therefore be capable of being inserted into a temporal sequence, they must to a certain extent be reduced again to the nature of particular things, individualized and thus linked to a sensible representation: i.e., to a *word*. The word is therefore the sensuous sign of the concept and as such the necessary means of *fixing* it, i.e. of making it present to consciousness (bound up as this is with the form of time), and hence of creating a connection between reason (whose objects are merely general universals<sup>c</sup> that know neither time nor place) and consciousness (which is sensible, bound up with time, and to this extent merely animal). Only by this method<sup>d</sup> is the reproduction of concepts at will<sup>e</sup> possible, which is to say remembering and retaining them, and only this makes possible other operations such as judging, inferring, comparing, restricting, etc. In fact it sometimes happens that consciousness is occupied with concepts even without their signs, since we occasionally run through a chain of inference so quickly that we would not have time to think of the words. But this sort of thing is exceptional and presupposes considerable practice (that can only be achieved through language) on the part of reason. We can see in deaf mutes the extent to which the use of reason is tied to language; when they have not been taught any sort of language, they barely exhibit intelligence above the level of an orangutan or elephant: their reason is almost entirely potential, not actual.<sup>f</sup>

Word and language are thus the indispensable means<sup>g</sup> of clear thinking. But just as every tool and machine is also a burden and obstacle, language is

<sup>a</sup> *Identitas indiscernibilium* [*New Essays on Human Understanding*, ch. 27, § 1, 3]

<sup>b</sup> [A275 / B331]

<sup>c</sup> *allgemeine* ... *Universalia*

<sup>d</sup> *Mittel*

<sup>e</sup> *willkürliche Reproduktion*

<sup>f</sup> *potentiā* nicht *actu* Vernunft

<sup>g</sup> *Mittel*



as well, because it forces infinitely nuanced, mobile, and modifiable thoughts into certain firm and stable forms, and in fixing a thought, it also chains it down. This obstacle is partly removed by learning several languages, since this enables the thought to be poured from one form into another and to be altered by each of its forms, becoming increasingly free from any given form or shell. In this way, its very own essence enters consciousness more clearly and regains its original modifiability. But ancient languages perform this service significantly better than modern languages do. Because they are so different from modern languages, the same thought must be expressed in an entirely different manner and assume a wildly different form, to which we must add that the more complete grammar of ancient languages allows for a more artistic and complete construction of thoughts and their context. Thus a Greek or Roman could, if need be, make do with his own language. But someone who does not understand anything other than his own modern patois will quickly betray this poverty in his writing and speaking, since his thoughts will necessarily sound clumsy and monotonous, being firmly tied to such impoverished, stereotypical forms. Genius of course compensates for this, as for everything, for instance in Shakespeare.

Burke, in his *Inquiry into the Sublime and the Beautiful*<sup>a</sup> (Part 5, sections 4 and 5) has already given an entirely accurate and very detailed analysis<sup>b</sup> of the position I have presented in § 9 of the First Volume, namely that spoken words are understood perfectly without occasioning intuitive representations, images in our minds; but Burke draws from this the completely false conclusion that we hear, perceive and use the words without any representation (*idea*) to combine them with. He should have concluded that not all representations (*ideas*) are intuitive images, and in fact precisely those that must be designated by words are mere *concepts* (*abstract notions*),<sup>c</sup> and these by nature are not intuitive. – Precisely because words communicate merely universal concepts that are completely distinct from intuitive representations, all listeners will retain the same *concepts*, for instance, when an event is recounted; but if they subsequently wish to visualize the event, each will conjure up a different *image* of it in their imagination, an image that will deviate significantly from the correct one that only the eyewitnesses have. This is the primary reason (to which we can add others) why every fact is necessarily distorted by repeated retelling: the second person to

72

<sup>a</sup> [A *Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* (1757)]

<sup>b</sup> *Auseinandersetzung*

<sup>c</sup> [Schopenhauer gives a German version with the English terms parenthetically: *Vorstellung* (idea); *anschauliche Bilder* (images); *Begriffe* (abstract notions)]

retell the facts imparts to them concepts that he has abstracted from the images in *his* imagination, and from which the third person will in turn construct another even more distorted image, which he again transposes into concepts, and it keeps going on in this way. The person who is matter-of-fact enough to remain with the concepts that have been communicated to him and to report on these will be the most reliable source of information.

The best and most rational argument that I have seen anywhere concerning the essence and nature of concepts is in *Thomas Reid's Essays on the powers of human mind*,<sup>a</sup> vol. 2, essay 5, ch. 6. – Since then, *Dugald Stewart* has criticized the argument in his *Philosophy of the Human Mind*.<sup>b</sup> I do not want to waste paper on this, so I will only say briefly that he is one of many people to whom favour and friends have given an undeserved reputation: so I can only advise people not to lose time with the scribblings of this fool.

- 73 The princely scholastic, *Pico della Mirandola*, already noted that *reason* is the faculty of abstract representations and *understanding* the faculty of intuitive representations, and in his book *On the Imagination*,<sup>c</sup> ch. 11, he painstakingly distinguishes understanding from reason, describing reason as the discursive faculty distinctive to human beings, while understanding is the intuitive faculty that is related to the angelic or in fact divine mode of cognition. – Even *Spinoza* correctly characterized reason as the faculty of constructing universal concepts: *Ethics* II, prop. 40, schol. 2. – We would not need to mention this if it were not for the farces that have been performed with the concept of *reason* over the last fifty<sup>34</sup> years by all the philosophers in Germany; with unabashed impertinence, they have wanted to smuggle in under the name of reason a completely fabricated faculty of immediate, metaphysical, so-called supersensuous cognitions, while calling actual reason the *understanding* and overlooking the genuine understanding entirely, since it is completely foreign to them, and ascribing its intuitive functions to sensibility.

As with all things of this world, every expedient, every advance, every advantage is followed closely by new setbacks; reason, which gives human beings such great advantages over animals, carries its own characteristic disadvantages and leads us astray in ways that never happen with animals. Reason allows an entirely new type of motive, one inaccessible to animals, to gain power<sup>d</sup> over our will; namely *abstract* motives, mere thoughts that are

<sup>a</sup> [*Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind* (1788)]

<sup>b</sup> [See p. 59, n. a]

<sup>c</sup> *Liber de imaginatione* [*Book on the Imagination* (1501)]

<sup>d</sup> *Macht*

not derived exclusively from our own experience, but often come to us only through other people's words and examples, through tradition and writing. Being open to thoughts leaves us open to *errors* as well. And every error must sooner or later cause harm, the greater the error the greater the harm. Someone who makes his own error will have to repent and often pay dearly for it: the same thing holds true on a greater scale for the collective errors of entire nations. This is why we cannot repeat often enough that every error, wherever it may be found, must be hunted down and rooted out as an enemy of humanity and that there should be no privileged, certainly no sanctioned errors. Thinkers ought to attack errors even when this causes an outcry on the part of humanity, like an invalid when the doctor touches his sores. – Animals cannot stray far from the path of nature: because their motives lie in the *intuitive* world alone, which only has scope for the possible or in fact the actual: by contrast, everything that is merely conceivable, and thus even things that are false, impossible, absurd, and nonsensical go into abstract concepts, into thoughts and words. Now since reason is given to all but judgment only to a few, the result is that human beings are open to delusion,<sup>a</sup> insofar as they are abandoned to all merely conceivable chimeras that they have been talked into believing, and which, acting as motives of their willing, can move them to perversities and stupidities of every sort, to the most unheard-of extravagances as well as to the actions that are most repulsive to their animal nature. Only a few people can receive a genuine education in which cognition and judgment go hand in hand, and even fewer are capable of absorbing it. In its place, the masses are subject to a kind of training regime:<sup>b</sup> they are managed through example, habit, and the very early and firm imprinting of certain concepts before any experience, understanding, or judgment exist to disrupt the work. Thoughts are thus indoctrinated; they then take strong hold and are as impervious to instruction as if they were *innate*, and are frequently regarded as such, even by philosophers. In this way, and with equal effort, human beings can be imprinted with the true and the rational or with the wildest absurdities, for example they get into the habit of being overcome with holy awe when approaching this or that idol, and when hearing its name they throw not only their bodies but their whole spirit into the dirt; it becomes a habit to stake their lives and possessions on words, on names, and in defence of the most far-flung whims; to arbitrarily attach the greatest honour or the deepest shame to one thing or another, and then to

74

<sup>a</sup> *dem Wahne*

<sup>b</sup> *eine Art Abrichtung*

75

esteem or repudiate everyone with inner conviction; to renounce all animal nourishment as in Hindustan, or to consume chunks, still warm and quivering, cut from living animals, as in Abyssinia; to eat human beings as in New Zealand, or to sacrifice their children to Moloch, to castrate themselves, to throw themselves willingly onto a dead person's funeral pyre, – in a word, *whatever you want*. Hence the Crusades, the excesses of fanatical sects, hence the Chiliasts and Flagellants, the persecutors of heretics, the *auto da fé* and everything else on offer in the long register of human perversities. Lest we think that it is only the Dark Ages that provides such examples, I will add a pair of more recent ones as well. In 1818, 7,000 Chiliasts<sup>a</sup> moved from Württemberg to the area around Ararat, because it was supposed to be the site of the new kingdom of God that had been announced in particular by Jung-Stilling.\* *Gall* tells how in his time a mother killed and roasted her child in order to use its fat to cure her husband's rheumatism.\*\*<sup>35</sup> The tragic side of error and prejudice is found in practice, the comic side in theory: if we were to begin by firmly convincing only three people that the sun is not the cause of daylight, we could hope to see it soon accepted as universal conviction. A repulsive, mindless charlatan and unexampled nonsense scribbler like *Hegel* could be proclaimed in Germany as the greatest philosopher of all times, and many thousands of people have believed it firmly and faithfully for twenty years; even outside of Germany, the Danish Academy, which has come out in opposition to me and in support of his fame, would have it that he is a 'distinguished philosopher'.<sup>b</sup> (On this see the Preface to my *Fundamental Problems of Ethics*.)<sup>c</sup> – These then are the disadvantages linked to the existence of reason because the power of judgment is so rare. In addition, there is the possibility of madness: animals do not go mad, although carnivores are prone to fury and herbivores to a type of frenzy.

\* Illgen's *Zeitschrift für historische Theologie* [*Journal of Historical Theology*], 1839, first volume, p. 182. [In the journal edited by Christian Friedrich Illgen, the article in question was by Wilhelm Bruno Lindner, based on Robert Pinkerton, *Russia: or Miscellaneous observations on the past and present of that country* [etc.], and narrated events triggered by Heinrich Jung-Stilling's prediction of the reappearance of Christ]

\*\* Gall and Spurzheim, *Des dispositions innées*, 1811, p. 253. [Franz Josef Gall and Johann Kaspar Spurzheim, *Des dispositions innées de l'âme et de l'esprit* (*Inner dispositions of the soul and the mind*)]

<sup>a</sup> [Also known as Millenarians, believers that Christ will reign for a thousand years]

<sup>b</sup> *summus philosophus*

<sup>c</sup> [The Danish Academy described Hegel and Fichte in these terms, criticizing Schopenhauer for giving offence in his treatment of them. See *BM*, 258 (Hübscher, *SW* 4, 276), and Preface to the Second Edition, in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*]

## *On the Relation of Intuitive to Abstract Cognition*

Now since, as we have shown, concepts borrow their content from intuitive cognition, and the entire edifice of our world of thought therefore rests on the world of intuitions; we must accordingly be able to trace each concept, even if there are intermediary stages, back to the intuitions from which either it is itself immediately derived, or from which the concepts whose abstraction it is have been derived: i.e. we must be able to verify it with intuitions that act as examples in relation to the abstractions. These intuitions therefore provide the real content of all our thinking, and wherever they are lacking we do not have concepts but instead only words in our head. In this respect, our intellect is like a bank of issue which, when solvent, must have enough money ready in the registers to be able to redeem on demand all the notes that have been issued: intuitions are the ready cash, concepts are the receipts. – In this sense, intuitions could quite fittingly be called *primary* representations, and concepts by contrast *secondary* representations: not quite so aptly, the scholastics, at the insistence of Aristotle (*Metaphysics* VI, 11; XI, 1),<sup>a</sup> called real things primary substances<sup>b</sup> and concepts secondary substances.<sup>c</sup> – Books communicate only secondary representations. Mere concepts of a thing, in the absence of intuition, give a merely general acquaintance with it. We get a completely thorough understanding of things and their relations only to the extent that we are able to picture them entirely in clear intuitions, without the help of words. To explain words using words, to compare concepts to other concepts, which is what most philosophizing consists of, is basically a game of back-and-forth across the conceptual spheres, in order to see which ones go into the others and which ones do not. At best this lets you draw some conclusions, but conclusions do not give completely new cognition, they

77

\* This chapter relates to § 12 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> [Book VII (Z), 11; XII (Λ), 1]

<sup>b</sup> *substantias primas*

<sup>c</sup> *substantias secundas*

only show us everything that is already present and what aspects of it might be applied in any given case. Intuiting, on the other hand, letting the things themselves speak to us, grasping new relations between them and then putting or recording all this into concepts so as to possess it more securely: this provides new cognitions. Still, while almost everyone has the ability to compare concepts with other concepts, only a select few have the gift of comparing concepts with intuitions: this appears as wit, judgment, acuity,<sup>a</sup> or genius, depending on how gifted the individual is at this. By contrast, the ability to compare concepts with other concepts never produces much more than something like rational reflections. – Intuition is at the innermost core of every authentic and actual cognition, and every new truth is the result of intuition as well. All primordial thinking<sup>b</sup> takes place in images: this is why imagination<sup>c</sup> is such an essential tool of such thinking, and unimaginative minds will never achieve anything great – except in mathematics.<sup>36</sup> – By contrast, merely abstract thoughts with no intuitive core are like images in clouds, without reality. Even texts and spoken language, whether as theories or as poems, ultimately aim to lead the reader to the same intuitive cognition from which the author began: if this is not their aim, then they are poorly done. This is precisely why the contemplation and observation of everything *real* is more instructive than any reading or listening, as long as it offers the observer something new. Fundamentally, every actual thing contains all truth and wisdom, and in fact the ultimate secret of things, but of course only concretely,<sup>d</sup> and therefore in the same way as gold is hidden in ore: everything depends on getting it out. In a book, by contrast, we can receive truth second hand at best, and more typically not at all.

78 With most books that do not deal exclusively with empirical topics (unless they are truly awful) the author has of course *thought*, but has not *intuited*: he has written from reflection, not from intuition;<sup>37</sup> and this is precisely what makes such books boring and mediocre. Given a little effort, the reader could always have thought what the author has: these are nothing more than reasonable thoughts, more detailed explanations of what is implicitly contained in the topic. They do not serve to introduce any really new cognition into the world; new cognition, by contrast, is generated only at the moment of intuition, when a new side of things is grasped immediately, which is to say when the author's thinking is based

<sup>a</sup> *Scharfsinn*

<sup>b</sup> *Urdenken*

<sup>c</sup> *Phantasie*

<sup>d</sup> *in concreto*

on *a vision*.<sup>a</sup> It is as if he is writing from a country where the reader has never been; everything is fresh and new, because it is drawn directly from the well-spring of all cognition. I would like to illustrate the distinction touched upon here through a very simple and easy example. Any ordinary writer will describe a steady stare or petrified stupefaction<sup>38</sup> simply by saying 'he stood like a statue', but Cervantes said 'like a clothed statue: because the wind moved his clothes'. (*Don Quixote*, Book 6, ch. 19). This is how great minds have always thought, namely *in the presence of intuition*, fixing their gaze on intuition while they think. We see this, for instance, in the fact that the most dissimilar among them still agree so often and coincide when it comes to particulars, because they all talk about the same things that are collected before their eyes: the world and intuitive reality. In fact, there is a sense in which they all even say the same things, and other people never believe them. We recognize this again in the aptness and originality of their expressions, how they are always so perfectly suited to the occasion, because the expressions have been inspired by intuition;<sup>39</sup> it can be seen in the naïvety of their avowals, the novelty of their images, and the forcefulness of their metaphors, all of which characterize the works of great minds without exception and are on the other hand always absent from others. These others have only banal expressions and worn-out images at their disposal and can never allow themselves to be naïve, on pain of demonstrating the pathetic truth of their banality: so instead of naïve they are precious. This is why *Buffon* says: 'style is the man himself'.<sup>b</sup> When ordinary minds sit down to write, they have a couple of traditional, indeed conventional (and thus appropriated in the abstract) opinions,<sup>c</sup> passions, noble sentiments and the like that they supply to the heroes of their works, making the heroes into mere personifications of these ideas, and thus to a certain extent themselves abstractions, and accordingly flat and boring. When they philosophize, they take a couple of broad and abstract concepts and toss them around as if they were algebraic equations, hoping that something will come out of it: at most, one sees that they have all read the same things. But tossing around abstract concepts as if they were algebraic equations (a procedure that is called dialectic these days) does not give secure results as real algebra does, because the concept represented by the word in such cases is not a fixed and precise quantity such as is designated by algebraic variables, but is instead unstable and

79

<sup>a</sup> *ein Schauen*

<sup>b</sup> *le style est l'homme même* [*Discours sur le style* (*Discourse on style*), delivered at the Académie française, 25 August 1753]

<sup>c</sup> *Gesinnungen*

ambiguous and can expand and contract. To be precise, thinking, i.e. combining of abstract concepts, has for its content at most *memories* of things intuited earlier, and this only indirectly, namely to the extent that it constitutes the basis of all concepts: by contrast, only intuition, which is to say fresh, new perception itself, is real cognition, i.e. immediate cognition. Now the concepts erected by reason and preserved in memory can never all be present at once in consciousness, only a very small number of them at a time. By contrast, the energy with which we take up the intuitive present, in which the essential aspect of all things in general is contained and represented in a virtual form,<sup>a</sup> fills consciousness in a single moment with all its power. This is the basis of the infinite superiority of genius over erudition:<sup>b</sup> they are related to each other like a classical ancient text to its commentary. All truth and all wisdom ultimately lie in *intuition*. But unfortunately intuition cannot be held fast or communicated: at best, its *objective* conditions can be presented to others, purified and clarified through visual arts, and much more indirectly through poetry; but this rests just as firmly on *subjective* conditions that are not always at the disposal of one and all, and indeed in the higher degrees of their perfection only a few are favoured with them. Only the poorest sort of cognition is unconditionally communicable, that which is abstract, secondary, the concept, the mere shadow of genuine cognition. If intuitions were communicable, then there would be something worth communicating; but in the end, everyone must remain inside his own skin and skull, and nobody can help anyone else. Poetry and philosophy are constantly trying to use intuitions in order to enrich concepts. – Meanwhile, human beings' essential goals are *practical*; and for practical goals it is enough that what someone grasps intuitively leaves a trace in him enabling him to recognize it again in another, similar situation: this is what makes him worldly wise. This is why a man of the world usually cannot teach the truths and wisdom he has amassed, but can only practise them: he has an accurate grasp of everything that takes place, and he makes the right decisions accordingly. – The fact that books are no substitute for experience and the fact that erudition can never take the place of genius, are related phenomena: the reason for them both is that the abstract can never replace the intuitive. Books cannot substitute for experience because *concepts* will always be *universal* and can therefore never attain the particular, which is precisely what life confronts us with: in addition to this, concepts are all abstracted *from* what is particular and intuitive in experience, and so one must already

<sup>a</sup> *virtualiter*

<sup>b</sup> *Gelehrsamkeit*



be familiar with these to understand properly the universals that books communicate. Erudition is no substitute for genius because it too provides only concepts, while the cognition of a genius involves grasping the (Platonic) Ideas of things, and is therefore essentially intuitive. The first phenomenon therefore lacks the *objective* condition for intuitive cognition; the second lacks the *subjective*: the former can be acquired but not the latter.

Wisdom and genius, these twin peaks of the Parnassus of human cognition, are not rooted in the abstract, discursive faculty, but in the intuitive faculty. Genuine wisdom is something intuitive, not something abstract. It does not consist of statements and thoughts that someone carries around ready-made in his mind as the result of someone else's research, or his own: rather, it is the entire manner in which the world is presented in his mind. There is such an enormous difference between these, that wise people live in a different world from fools and a genius sees a different world from a nitwit. Works of genius far surpass those of everyone else simply because the world that a genius sees and discusses is so much more clearly and, as it were, profoundly worked through than the world in the minds of others. Of course this second world contains the same objects, but it is to the world of the genius what a Chinese picture without shadow or perspective is to a perfected oil painting. The material is the same in all minds; but the difference is in the perfection of form it assumes in each, and this is the basis for the many gradations of intelligence: this is already present in the root, in *intuitive* apprehension, and does not arise only in abstractions. And this is why original intellectual superiority is so easily demonstrated on any occasion, and is instantly felt by others and hated.

81

In the practical sphere, the intuitive cognition of the understanding can immediately direct our deeds and behaviour, while the abstract cognition of reason can do so only when mediated by memory. This is the source of the advantage of intuitive cognition whenever there is no time for deliberation, and thus for the daily business at which women excel for this very reason. Only someone who has recognized intuitively the essence of human beings as they generally are and likewise grasps the particularity of the individuals present will understand with certainty how to deal with them properly. Someone else might have all three hundred of *Gracián's* rules for wisdom<sup>a</sup> memorized; but this will not protect him from oafishness and error if he lacks intuitive cognition because *abstract cognition* in the

<sup>a</sup> *Klugheitsregeln* [Schopenhauer translated Gracián's *Handbook and Art of Worldly Wisdom* (*Oráculo Manual y Arte de Prudencia*) into German. See HN 4/ii, 131–267]

first instance gives only general principles and rules; but the particular case is almost never precisely cut to the rule: memory is first supposed to present the rule at the right moment, something that rarely takes place punctually, because the minor premise<sup>a</sup> is supposed to be constructed from the existing case – and the conclusion finally drawn. Typically, the opportunity will have turned its back on us before all this can take place, and then those pertinent principles and rules will at most allow us to assess after the fact the magnitude of the mistake we have just made. Of course given time, experience, and practice, worldly wisdom will gradually grow from this; which is why rules in the abstract<sup>b</sup> can certainly bear fruit in combination

82 with these. By contrast, *intuitive cognition*, which only ever grasps the particular, has an immediate connection with the present case: rule, case, and application are one and the same thing for intuitive cognition, and action comes right on their heels. This explains why in real life, scholars who have the advantage of a wealth of abstract cognition stand so far behind the man of the world, whose advantage lies in the perfect intuitive cognition that an original disposition has granted him and that a wealth of experience has developed in him. The two modes of cognition always stand in the same relation that paper money does to coin: just as there are many cases and occasions in which paper is preferable, there are things and situations for which abstract cognition is more useful than intuitive cognition. When, on some occasion, our deed is guided by a concept, it has the advantage of being inalterable once grasped, and so by following its lead we can go to work with perfect security and steadfastness. But the security conferred on the concept from the subjective side is offset by the insecurity accompanying it on the objective side: namely, the whole concept can be false or groundless, or the object in question might not belong under it, since it is not at all, or not entirely, of that sort. Now if we suddenly become aware of this in an individual case, then we are put out: if we do not become aware of it, then we find out in the results. Thus *Vauvenargues* says: ‘nobody is in greater danger of making a mistake than someone who acts only upon reflection’.<sup>c,40</sup> – If on the other hand our deed is guided directly by an intuition of the object we are dealing with and its relations, then we waver at each step, since intuition can always be modified: it is ambiguous, contains inexhaustible details, and shows many sides one after the other. In this case we act without full confidence. But this subjective insecurity is

<sup>a</sup> *propositio minor*

<sup>b</sup> *in abstracto*

<sup>c</sup> *Personne n'est sujet à plus de fautes, que ceux qui n'agissent que par réflexion* [Luc de Clapiers, Marquis de Vauvenargues, *Reflexions et Maximes* (*Reflections and Maxims*) (1746), 131]

offset by objective security, because there is no concept between us and the object and we do not lose sight of the object: so if only we see correctly what is in front of us and what we do, then we will do the right thing. – Accordingly, our deeds are perfectly assured only when they are guided by a concept whose proper ground, completeness, and applicability to the case at hand are fully certain. Acting according to concepts can turn into pedantry, acting according to intuitive impressions can turn into frivolity and stupidity.

83

*Intuition* is not only the *source* of all cognition, it is itself cognition *par excellence*,<sup>a</sup> it is the only unconditionally true, authentic cognition that is completely worthy of the name. This is because it alone gives genuine *insight*, it alone is actually assimilated by human beings, enters into their essence and can really be called their *own*, while concepts merely cling to them. In the Fourth Book we will see that even virtue really begins with intuitive cognition, because only actions that stem directly from such cognition and thus are performed out of a pure urge<sup>b</sup> in our own nature are genuine symptoms of our true and inalterable character; not so actions that come from reflection and its dogmas, actions that are often extorted from character, and thus do not have an inalterable basis within us. But *wisdom* too, true insight into life, the proper view and the apt judgment, stem from the way human beings grasp the intuitive world, and not from mere knowledge,<sup>c</sup> i.e. not from abstract concepts. Just as the foundation<sup>d</sup> or basic content of a science does not consist in proofs or what is proven, but in what is not proven, i.e. what the proofs are based on, and what is ultimately grasped only intuitively, similarly the foundation of the genuine wisdom and actual insight of every human being does not consist in concepts and knowledge in the abstract,<sup>e</sup> but in what is intuited and in the degree of acuity, accuracy, and profundity with which this is grasped. Someone who excels at this recognizes the (Platonic) Ideas of the world and of life: each case that he sees represents for him countless others; he increasingly grasps every essence according to its true nature, and his deeds, like his judgment, correspond to his insight. Even his countenance gradually assumes the expression of this proper view, of true rationality, and, if it goes far enough, of wisdom. It is only superiority in intuitive cognition that is expressed in facial features, while superiority in abstract

84

<sup>a</sup> κατ' ἐξοχήν

<sup>b</sup> aus reinem Antriebe

<sup>c</sup> Wissen

<sup>d</sup> fonds

<sup>e</sup> in abstracto

cognition cannot do the same. Consistent with what we have said, intellectually superior human beings, often without any formal schooling,<sup>a</sup> can be found in all walks of life. This is because natural understanding can replace almost any degree of education, but no education can replace natural understanding.<sup>41</sup> The scholar<sup>b</sup> certainly has the advantage of an abundance of cases and facts (historical understanding) and causal determinations (theories of nature), all connected in a clear and orderly manner: but this does not give him a more accurate or profound insight into what is genuinely essential in each of the cases, facts, and causal links. Someone with acuity and penetration but no formal schooling knows how to forego this abundance: enough is as good as a feast. His own experience of a single case teaches him more than many a scholar learns from thousands of cases that he is *acquainted* with<sup>c</sup> but does not truly *understand*: the little knowledge that such unscholarly types have is *alive*, since each fact they are acquainted with is supported by accurate and well-comprehended intuitions, each of which represents for them a thousand similar ones. By contrast, the considerable knowledge amassed by ordinary scholars is *dead*, because even when it does not consist in mere words, as is often the case, it consists in nothing but abstract cognition: but this derives its value only from the *intuitive* cognition of the individual to which it relates, and which must ultimately realize all concepts. But if this is very meagre, then such a mind is in the same state as a bank whose demands payable are ten times in excess of its ready cash, ultimately rendering it bankrupt. Thus, while an accurate grasp of the intuitive world marks the brows of some non-scholars with the stamp of insight and wisdom, the faces of many scholars bear no traces of their many studies other than those of exhaustion and wear and tear, through excessive, enforced effort of memory in the unnatural accumulation of dead concepts: in addition, such people often look so naïve, foolish and sheep-like that we are compelled to conclude that the excessive effort of the indirect cognitive forces devoted to abstraction weakens the direct and intuitive cognitive forces, and that natural and accurate vision is rendered increasingly blind by the light

85 that illuminates books. Certainly the incessant influx of other people's thoughts will necessarily constrain and suffocate one's own; in fact it will paralyse the power of thought in the long run, unless the latter has a high degree of elasticity, which can resist that unnatural stream. Thus, ceaseless reading and studying positively spoils the brain, and this is also because the

<sup>a</sup> *Gelehrsamkeit*

<sup>b</sup> *Gelehrte*

<sup>c</sup> *kennt*

system of our own thoughts and cognitions loses its unity and consistency when we arbitrarily interrupt it so often to make room for a chain of thoughts belonging to someone else entirely. To chase away my own thoughts in order to make room for those of a book seems to me like Shakespeare's complaint about the travellers of his age, that they sell their own land to see that of others.<sup>a</sup> Still, the reading mania of most scholars is a type of abhorrence of a vacuum,<sup>b</sup> of the paucity of thoughts in their own head, which forcefully draws in those from outside: they need to read something in order to have thoughts, just as inanimate bodies are moved only from the outside; while people who think for themselves are like living bodies that can move by themselves. It is even dangerous to read about a topic before thinking about it for oneself, because other people's insights and treatment of the new material will also sneak into your head at the same time, and all the more when inertia and apathy recommend that the effort of thinking be spared and that ready-made thoughts be taken up and considered valid. These now install themselves and henceforth our thoughts on this topic always take the path they are accustomed to, like brooks guided by ditches: finding new ideas of one's own is now twice as difficult. This contributes a great deal to scholars' lack of originality. Added to which is the fact that they believe they need to divide their time between work and pleasure like other people. Now they consider reading to be work, their real job, and feed themselves on it to the point of indigestibility. And at this point reading does not merely precede thinking, it takes it over entirely: so they think about an issue only for as long as they are reading about it, and thus with someone else's brain instead of their own. But if the book is put away, then entirely different things make much more lively demands on their interest, namely personal business as well as the theatre, card games, ball games, news of the day and small talk. A thinking mind is what it is by virtue of the fact that such things are of no interest to it; it is interested only in its problems and gives itself up to them of itself and without a book: it is impossible to give oneself this interest if it is not already there. That is the point. And the point is also that the first sort of people talk only about what they have read, while the second sort talk about what they have thought, and that the first are, as *Pope* says:

86

Forever reading, never to be read.<sup>c,42</sup>

<sup>a</sup> [*As You Like It*, Act IV, sc. 1]

<sup>b</sup> *fuga vacui*

<sup>c</sup> [*The Dunciad* (1728), III, 194. Schopenhauer quotes the English, and adds a translation in a footnote]

The mind is by nature free, not a servant:<sup>a</sup> only those things that it does itself and is glad to do will turn out well. By contrast, the compulsory exertion of a mind in studies it is unsuited for, or when it has become tired, or in general too persistently and against the will of Minerva,<sup>b</sup> this dulls the brain, just as reading by moonlight dulls the eyes. This results particularly from straining a still immature brain in the early years of childhood: I believe that the teaching of Latin and Greek grammar between the ages of six and twelve is the basis of the subsequent dullness of most scholars. It is true that the mind needs nourishment, material from the outside. But our organism does not immediately absorb everything we eat, only what is digested, so that really only a small part is assimilated and the rest is discarded, which is why it is useless or even harmful to eat more than one can assimilate; – and it is just the same with what we *read*: it contributes to our insight and genuine knowledge only to the extent that it gives food<sup>c</sup> for thought. This is why *Heraclitus* said ‘a smattering of many things does not improve the understanding’:<sup>d</sup> but I think that scholarship can be compared to a heavy suit of armour that certainly makes the strong man absolutely invincible, but for a weak one is a burden that sinks him completely. –

87 In our Third Book we give an account of the cognition of (Platonic) Ideas as the highest cognition that human beings can attain and at the same time as a completely *intuitive* cognition. This is evidence that the source of true wisdom lies not in abstract knowledge but in an accurate and profound intuitive grasp of the world. This is also why there can be wise people in every age, and those from antiquity remain so for all generations to come: scholarship<sup>e</sup> on the other hand is relative: the scholars of antiquity are children compared to us, and require our forbearance.

But for someone who studies to gain *insight*, books and studies are mere rungs of the ladder on which he climbs to the heights of cognition: as soon as a rung has raised him up a step, he leaves it where it is. By contrast, most people who study to fill their memories do not use the rungs of the ladder for climbing, but remove them and pack them up so they can be taken along, rejoicing in the growing weight of their burden. They will always stay below, since they carry what should be carrying them.

<sup>a</sup> *Fröhling*

<sup>b</sup> *invita Minerva* [proverbial for ‘against one’s natural inclinations’]

<sup>c</sup> *Stoff*

<sup>d</sup> πολυμαθὴ γόνον οὐ διδάσκει (*multiscitia non dat intellectum*) [fragment B40; in *Diogenes Laertius* 9.1]

<sup>e</sup> *Gelehrsamkeit*

The truth that we are presenting here, that *intuitive* comprehension is the inner core of all cognition, is the basis of *Helvétius*' true and profound remark<sup>a</sup> that the really distinctive and original basic insights of which a gifted individual is capable (and all his works, even those written much later, are the development, working through, and multiple application of these insights) – these insights begin to dry up when he is thirty-five or forty<sup>43</sup> at most, and in fact are really the results of combinations from his earliest youth. This is because they are precisely not mere chains of abstract concepts, but are his very own intuitive grasp of the objective world and the essence of things. Now the fact that this needs to be completed by the aforementioned age rests in part on the fact that at this point the ectypes of all the (Platonic) Ideas have presented themselves to him already, and later will no longer appear with the strength of their first impression; and in part it is because the greatest energy of mental activity is required for this quintessence of all cognition, for this impression before the fact<sup>b</sup> of comprehension, and this energy is conditioned by the vigour and flexibility of the brain's fibres and through the strength with which the arterial blood streams into the brain: but this is at its strongest only as long as the arterial system has a decisive superiority over the venous system, which starts to decline in one's early thirties until the venous system finally has the

88

No more – no more – Oh! never more on me  
The freshness of the heart can fall like dew,

<sup>a</sup> [De l'esprit (On the mind) (1758), Discourse III, ch. VIII]

<sup>b</sup> avant la lettre

<sup>c</sup> [See p. 223, n. b]

<sup>d</sup> Kenntniß

Which out of all the lovely things we see  
 Extracts emotions beautiful and new,  
 Hived in our bosoms like the bag o' the bee:  
 Thinkst thou the honey with those objects grew?  
 Alas! 'twas not in them, but in thy power  
 To double even the sweetness of a flower.<sup>a</sup>

89 I hope that all this sheds some light on the important truth that just as all abstract cognition has arisen from intuitive cognition, it also derives all its value from this connection alone, and thus from the fact that its concepts or their partial representations are to be realized – which is to say verified – by intuition, and furthermore, that most of them depend on the quality of these intuitions. Concepts and abstractions that do not ultimately lead to intuitions are like paths through the forest that come to an end without leaving the forest. Concepts are extremely useful for making the original content of cognition easier to manage, review, and arrange: but however varied, logical and dialectical the operations might be that they can perform, they will never give rise to an entirely original and novel cognition, i.e. one whose content was not already present in intuition or drawn from self-consciousness. This is the true sense of the doctrine attributed to Aristotle, that there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in sense perception:<sup>b</sup> it is likewise the meaning of Locke's philosophy which, by finally and seriously articulating the question of the origin of our cognitions, forever constitutes an epoch in philosophy. This is also the main point taught by the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It does not want people to remain with *concepts* either, but wants us to return to their *point of origin*, and thus to *intuition*; but Kant added the true and important observation that what is valid for intuition also extends to the subjective conditions of intuition, and thus to the forms that lie predisposed in the intuiting and thinking brain as its natural functions. This is true in spite of the fact that these forms precede actual sense intuition, at least virtually,<sup>c</sup> i.e. they are a priori, and are therefore not dependent on the intuition but the intuition on them, because these forms clearly do not have any other aim, and are not suitable for anything else, than to produce an empirical intuition upon stimulation of the sense nerves; just as other forms are subsequently determined from the material

<sup>a</sup> [*Don Juan* (1819–23), I, 214. Schopenhauer quotes the English and gives his own translation in a footnote]

<sup>b</sup> *nihil est in intellectu, nisi quod antea fuerit in sensu* [Compare *De Anima* (*On Soul*) III, 8 (432a6); also Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate* (*Disputed Questions on Truth*) (1256–9), II, III, 19 : *nihil est in intellectu, quod non sit prius in sensu*]

<sup>c</sup> *virtualiter*



of this intuition for the construction of thoughts in the abstract.<sup>a</sup> The *Critique of Pure Reason* is therefore to Locke's philosophy what the analysis of the infinite is to elementary geometry; it is nonetheless to be regarded as the *continuation of Locke's philosophy* in every way. – The given material of any philosophy is accordingly nothing other than the *empirical consciousness* that is divided into the consciousness of one's own self (self-consciousness) and consciousness of other things (outer intuition), because this alone is immediate, actually given. Every philosophy which, instead of starting with this, starts with arbitrarily selected abstract concepts such as, for instance, the Absolute, absolute substance, God, infinity, finitude, absolute identity, being, essence, etc. etc. – such a philosophy hovers in the air without a foothold, and therefore can never lead to any actual results. Nevertheless, philosophers have always attempted something of this nature so that even *Kant* occasionally, in the customary way and more from habit than from consistency, defined philosophy as a science from mere concepts. But such a science would be an attempt to use merely partial representations (because that is what abstractions are) to produce what cannot be found in complete representations (intuitions), the former having been derived from the latter by omission. People are led to do this by the possibility of inference, because here, assembling judgments leads to a new result, albeit more apparent than actual, since the inference only points out what was already present in the given judgments, because the conclusion cannot in point of fact contain more than is contained in the premises. Of course concepts are the material of philosophy, but only as marble is the material of the sculptor: philosophy should not work *from* them but rather *in* them, i.e., record its results in this material, not start out from it as something given. Anyone who wants a truly glaring example of this wrong-headed procedure of starting from pure concepts should look at Proclus' *Institutio theologica* in order to drive home to themselves the futility<sup>b</sup> of this whole method. There, abstractions such as the One, the Many, the Good, coming-into-being and passing-away, self-sufficiency, cause, the Better, the Movable, the Immovable, the Moving,<sup>c</sup> and so on are taken up, but the intuitions to which they owe their origin and all their content are ignored and passed over with disdain: then a theology is constructed from

90

<sup>a</sup> *in abstracto*

<sup>b</sup> *das Nichtige*

<sup>c</sup> ἓν, πλῆθος, ἀγαθόν, παράγον καὶ παραγόμενον, αὐταρχες, αἴτιον, κρείττον, κινητόν, ἀκίνητον, κινούμενον (*unum, multa, bonum, produciens et productum, sibi sufficiens, causa, melius, mobile, immobile, motum*)

these concepts, in which the goal, the *theos*,<sup>a</sup> is kept concealed so that everything seems quite unbiased, as if the reader did not know just as well as the author where all this is headed from the very first page. I have  
 91 already cited a fragment of this above. In fact, this production of Proclus' is a particularly appropriate vehicle for showing how utterly useless and illusory these sorts of combinations of abstract concepts really are, since we can do whatever we want with them, particularly when we also trade on the ambiguities of many words, as for instance *kreitton*.<sup>b</sup> If such a conceptual architect were present in person, then we would only need to ask in all innocence where all the things are that he has so much to tell us about, and where he gets the laws he uses to draw the conclusions regarding them? Then he would soon need to refer to the empirical intuitions from which these concepts are drawn, for the empirical world is presented in empirical intuitions, and them alone. Then it would only remain to ask why he did not begin honestly with the given intuition of such a world, where he could use the intuitions to verify and support his claims at every step, instead of working with concepts that are derived from them and them alone, and thus can have no more validity than the validity lent to them by intuition. But of course this is precisely his trick: to use concepts so that abstraction makes it possible to think what is in fact inseparable as separate, and what is in fact irreconcilable as united, far surpassing the intuition from which these concepts arose, and thereby going beyond the limits of their applicability and into an entirely different world from the one that provided their building materials, a world that is, for this very reason, one of phantoms and speculation. I have quoted *Proclus* here simply because this procedure is particularly clear with him due to the unrestrained self-assurance with which he goes about it: but you can find several examples of this sort (albeit less glaring) even in Plato, and the philosophical literature of all ages generally provides a great many similar examples. The literature of our age is particularly rich in this respect: just look for instance at the writings of *Schelling's* school, and look at the constructions that are built from abstractions such as finitude, the infinite; being, non-being, being-  
 other; activity, restraint, product; to determine, to become determined, determinateness; limit, to delimit, to be limited; unity, plurality, multiplicity; identity, diversity, indifference; thinking, being, essence and so on. Not only does everything we said above apply to constructions from  
 92 such material, but, because an infinite number of things are thought

<sup>a</sup> θεός<sup>b</sup> κρείττον [better]

*through* abstractions as wide as these, exceptionally little can be thought *inside* of them: they are empty shells. But this leaves an astonishingly small and impoverished amount of material for the whole enterprise of philosophy, giving rise to that unspeakable and torturous boredom specific to all such writings. Now if I wanted to call to mind those abuses that *Hegel* and his companions have perpetrated with these sorts of broad and empty abstractions, I would worry about making the reader sick, and myself as well: because the most gruesome state of boredom hovers over the empty verbiage of this repulsive philosophaster.

The fact that in *practical* philosophy as well, no wisdom can be gleaned from merely abstract concepts is the only thing to be learned from the moral essays of the theologian *Schleiermacher*, whose lectures on this subject over the course of several years have bored the Berlin Academy, and which have recently been published together in one volume. He starts out with purely abstract concepts such as duty, virtue, the highest good, ethical law, and suchlike, without introducing them any more than to say that they tend to occur in moral systems: they are then treated as given realities. They are then bandied about in an overly-subtle manner without addressing the origin of these concepts, the issues themselves, the actual human lives that are the sole reference of these concepts as well as their origin and the genuine concern of morality. This is precisely why such diatribes are as futile and useless as they are boring; which is saying a lot. People like this theologian, who are only too happy to philosophize, can be found in every age; they are famous while they live and afterwards quickly forgotten. I would recommend instead the writings of people who suffer the opposite fate, because time is short and precious.

Now, if, given all that has been said here, broad and abstract concepts that are above all unrealizable by means of intuition can never be the source of cognition, the point of departure, or the genuine material of philosophizing – still, certain results of this philosophy might nonetheless sometimes be such that they can be thought only in abstraction<sup>a</sup> and cannot be verified by any intuition. Cognitions of this sort will certainly be only semi-cognitions: they indicate only as it were the place where what is to be cognized can be found; but this itself remains concealed. Thus, only in the most extreme case, when we have arrived at the limits of cognition possible for our faculties, should we make do with concepts like these. One example of this type would be something like the concept of a being<sup>b</sup> outside of time as in the statement: ‘the indestructibility of our true being through death is

93

<sup>a</sup> *in abstracto*

<sup>b</sup> *Wesen*

not its continued existence'. With concepts such as these, intuition, which is to say the solid ground that supports all our cognition, begins to falter. This is why philosophy can sometimes, when necessary, conclude with such cognitions, but it can never begin with them.

The operation criticized above, of dealing with broad abstractions while thoroughly neglecting the intuitive cognition from which they have been derived and which thus exerts a permanent natural check upon them, has always been the main source of the errors of dogmatic philosophy. A science constructed merely from the comparison of concepts and thus from universal claims could be certain only if all its claims were synthetic a priori, as is the case with mathematics, since only mathematical claims are without exceptions. If by contrast there is any empirical content to the claims, then it must always be kept on hand as a check on the universal claims. This is because no truths in any way drawn from experience are ever unconditionally certain; they therefore have only an approximate general validity, because in this case there is an exception to every rule. Now if I were to link together statements like this using the intersection of their conceptual spheres, then one concept would quickly meet with another precisely where the exception lies: but even if this occurs only once over the course of a long chain of inferences, the entire edifice will be torn loose from its foundations and hang in the air. If I say for instance 'ruminants do not have frontal incisors' and apply this and its consequences to camels, then everything is false: because it is true only of horned ruminants. — This is precisely what Kant censured so often as *overly-subtle reasoning*:<sup>a</sup> because it consists in subsuming concepts under concepts without paying attention to where they come from or testing the propriety<sup>b</sup> or exclusiveness of the subsumption; and sooner or later this gives you almost any result you had been hoping for all along; so this overly-subtle reasoning differs from genuine sophistry only in degree. Sophistry is in the theoretical sphere what chicanery is in the practical. Nonetheless, even *Plato* very often permits such overly-subtle reasoning: as already mentioned, *Proclus*, like all imitators, carried his hero's<sup>c</sup> error much further. *Dionysius the Areopagite*, *On Divine Names*,<sup>d</sup> is likewise strongly afflicted with it. But already in the fragments of the Eleatic *Melissus* we find clear examples of such overly-subtle reasoning (particularly §§ 2–5 in *Brandis*, *Eleatic Commentaries*):<sup>e</sup> his treatment of concepts can be compared to

<sup>a</sup> *Vernünffteln*

<sup>b</sup> *Richtigkeit*

<sup>c</sup> *Vorbild*

<sup>d</sup> *De Divinis nominibus* [Pseudo-Dionysius, fifth to sixth century]

<sup>e</sup> *Commentationes Eleaticae* [Christian August Brandis, *Xenophanis Parmenidis et Melissi doctrina e propriis philosophorum reliquiis veterorumque auctorum testimoniiis exposita* (*Exposition of the doctrines of Xenophanes, Parmenides and Melissus* [etc.]) (1813)]

blows given for sake of appearance that never hit their mark – he treats them so as never to come into contact with the reality from which they receive their content, flying right over them instead, sailing through the atmosphere of abstract generalities. A true model of such overly-subtle reasoning is the booklet *On the Gods and the World*<sup>a</sup> by the philosopher Sallustius, and in particular chapters 7, 12, and 17. But a real collector's item of philosophical, overly-subtle reasoning, crossing over into decided sophistry, is the following piece of reasoning by the Platonist, Maximus of Tyre,<sup>b</sup> which I will quote here since it is short: 'Every injustice is the taking away of a good: there is no good other than virtue: but virtue cannot be taken away: and thus it is not possible for virtuous people to suffer injustice at the hands of evil people. Now what remains is that either nobody can ever suffer injustice, or that it is something that evil people experience at the hands of other evil people. But an evil person does not possess any goodness at all, since only the virtuous can be good, and thus goodness cannot be taken from him. Thus he cannot suffer injustice either. Thus injustice is an impossible state of affairs.' – The original, which is made less concise by repetition, is as follows: 'Every injustice is the taking away of a good; but what could be understood by 'good' besides virtue? – But virtue cannot be taken away. So either the virtuous man cannot suffer injustice, or we must assume that injustice is not the tearing away of a good, because no good can be torn away or lost or taken away or stolen away. And so, the virtuous man cannot suffer injustice, even from evil people, because nothing can be torn away from him. All that remains is that either nobody at all can suffer injustice, or only evil people can at the hands of other evil people; but the evil person has no part in any good; while as we have said, injustice is the taking away of a good; but someone who has nothing that can be taken from him also has nothing that injustice can be done to' (*Discourse 2*).<sup>c</sup> I want to add a modern example of this sort, a proof from abstract concepts that establishes an obvious absurdity as truth, and I take it from the work of a great man, *Giordano Bruno*. In his book *On the Infinite, Universe and Worlds*<sup>d</sup>

95

<sup>a</sup> *De Diis et mundo* [Serenus Sallustius, originally *Περὶ θεῶν καὶ κόσμου* (fifth century)]

<sup>b</sup> *Maximus Tyrius* [second century]

<sup>c</sup> Ἀδικία ἐστὶ ἀφαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ· τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τί ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἢ ἀρετή; – ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ ἀναφαίρετον. Οὐκ ἀδικήσεται τοῖνυν ὁ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχων, ἢ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀδικία ἀφαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἀφαίρετον, οὐδ' ἀπόβλητον οὐδ' ἐλετόν, οὐδὲ ληιστόν. Εἴεν οὖν, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖται ὁ χρηστός, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τοῦ μοχθηροῦ· ἀναφαίρετος γάρ. Λείπεται τοίνυν ἡ μηδὲνα ἀδικεῖσθαι καθάπαξ, ἡ τὸν μοχθηρὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου· ἀλλὰ τῷ μοχθηρῷ οὐδενὸς μέτεστιν ἀγαθοῦ· ἡ δὲ ἀδικία ἦν ἀγαθοῦ ἀφαίρεσις· ὁ δὲ μὴ ἔχων ὁ, τι ἀφαιρεθῇ, οὐδὲ εἰς ὁ, τι ἀδικηθῇ, ἔχει (*Sermo 2*) [*Sermones (Discourses)*, 2, 11]

<sup>d</sup> *Del Infinito, universo e mondi* [the correct title is *De l'Infinito Universo e Mondi*] (1584)

(p. 87 of the edition by A. Wagner) he has an Aristotelian prove (using and exaggerating the passage at I, 5 of Aristotle's *On the Heavens*<sup>a</sup>) that there *cannot be space* outside of the world. To be precise, the world is enclosed within the eight spheres of Aristotle; and beyond these there cannot be *any more space*. This is because if there were another body beyond these spheres, it would be either simple or composite. And now it is proved sophistically from principles that are completely begged that there cannot be any *simple* bodies there; but there cannot be any *composite* bodies either: because these would have to be composed of simple bodies. And thus there cannot be any bodies there at all – but then there *cannot be space* either. Because space is defined as 'that in which bodies can exist': but now it has just been proved that there *cannot* be bodies there. And thus there *cannot be space* there either. This last is the main trick of this proof from abstract concepts. Fundamentally, it rests on the fact that the claim 'where there is no space there cannot be bodies' is taken as universally negative and is thus simply reversed<sup>b</sup> into: 'where there cannot be bodies, there is no space'. But looking closely, we see that the claim is a universal affirmative, namely this: 'everything that is not spatial lacks a body': and thus it cannot be simply reversed. But not every proof from abstract concepts whose result obviously conflicts with intuition (here, the finitude of space) can be reduced to such a logical error. This is because the sophistry does not always lie in the form, but instead often lies in the material, in the premises and in the indeterminateness of the concepts and their scope. We find countless examples of this in *Spinoza*, whose method is in fact to prove things from concepts; just look for instance at the pathetic sophistry of his *Ethics*, part IV, prop. 29–31, which trades on the ambiguity of the unstable concepts 'to agree'<sup>c</sup> and 'to have in common'.<sup>d</sup> But of course this did not prevent the neo-Spinozists of our time from taking everything he said as gospel. Particularly the Hegelians among them, several of whom are still around, provide an ample source of amusement with their traditional respect for Spinoza's claim 'all determination is negation'.<sup>e</sup> With the spirit of charlatanism that characterizes their school, they put on such airs that you would think that this claim could lift the very world off its hinges; while in truth it couldn't tempt a dog out of an oven, since even the simplest of them would understand

<sup>a</sup> *De Coelo*

<sup>b</sup> *simpliciter konvertirt*

<sup>c</sup> *convenire*

<sup>d</sup> *commune habere*

<sup>e</sup> *omnis determinatio est negatio*

that when I delimit something through determinations, this very act excludes what lies beyond this limit, which is thereby negated.<sup>45</sup>

Thus, it is quite obvious with all overly-subtle reasoning of this sort how such an algebra of mere concepts unchecked by intuition can be led astray, and that intuition is to our intellect what the solid ground we stand upon is to our body: if we abandon intuition, then everything is 'land we cannot stand upon, water in which we cannot swim'.<sup>a</sup> The instructiveness of these arguments and examples will compensate for their length. I wanted to use them to emphasize and illustrate the great and, until now, too often ignored distinction – indeed opposition – between intuitive and abstract or reflective cognition; a basic feature of my philosophy has been to establish just this distinction; since only this can explain many phenomena of our mental life. The middle term between such different modes of cognition is formed by the *power of judgment*,<sup>b</sup> as I have shown in § 14 of the First Volume. Of course this power is active even in the realm of merely abstract cognition, where it compares concepts exclusively with other concepts: this is why every judgment in the logical sense of the word is certainly a work of the power of judgment, since it always involves subsuming a narrower concept under a broader one. Still, this activity of the power of judgment in comparing mere concepts with each other is a lesser and easier activity than making the transition from the entirely particular, the intuitive, to the essentially universal, the concept. In the former case, the ability or inability of concepts to be unified by means of analysis into their essential predicates must be decidable through purely logical methods for which the faculty of reason alone – innate to everyone – is sufficient; so the power of judgment is active here only in abbreviating that process, since anyone gifted with this power can quickly grasp what it takes other people a series of reflections to produce. Its activity in the narrower sense only really emerges where what is cognized intuitively, which is to say the real or experience, is translated into clear, abstract cognition and subsumed under precisely equivalent concepts, and is thus set down in reflective knowledge. It is therefore this faculty that has established a firm *foundation* for all the sciences, consisting in what is immediately cognized and what cannot be traced back any further. As a result, the difficulty with the sciences lies in these basic judgments, not in inferences from them. Inferences are easy, judgments hard. False inferences are a rarity: false judgments take place every day. In practical life, the power of judgment has no less a task than that of making every important

97

<sup>a</sup> *instabilis tellus, innabilis unda* [Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, I, 16]

<sup>b</sup> *Urtheilskraft*

resolution and major decision; its work is therefore, in its most important aspect, comparable to a judicial pronouncement. Just as the burning-glass concentrates the rays of the sun into a narrow focus, so too with the activity of the power of judgment the intellect gathers all the information it might have on a topic closely together so that it can grasp it in a single glance and fix it accurately, and then makes the result clear to itself through deliberation.<sup>a</sup> The great difficulty of judgment rests in most cases on the fact that we need to go from the consequent to the ground, a path that is always uncertain; in fact, I have demonstrated that this is the source of all error. And yet, in every empirical science as well in as the events of actual life, this way is usually the only one available. An experiment is an attempt to go back in the opposite direction: this is why it is decisive, and at least brings the error to light; assuming that it is chosen correctly and set up honestly, not like Newton's experiments in the theory of colours: but the experiment must in turn itself be judged. The perfect certainty of the *a priori* sciences, which is to say logic and mathematics, rests for the most part on the fact that in them we have access to the path from the ground to the consequent, and this is always certain. This lends them the character of purely *objective* sciences, i.e. sciences in which anyone who understands them must reach the same judgment; which is all the more striking since they are the very sciences that rest on the subjective forms of the intellect, while only the empirical sciences are concerned with tangible, objective things.

Wit and acuity are expressions of the power of judgment: in the former it reflects while in the latter it subsumes.<sup>b</sup> In most people, the power of judgment is present only nominally: it is a type of irony that it is included among the ordinary powers of intellect, and is not ascribed solely to unnatural, exceptional cases.<sup>c</sup> Ordinary minds demonstrate a lack of confidence in their own judgment in even the most trivial affairs because they know from experience that it does not deserve their confidence. They fill its place with prejudice and reliance on the judgment of others,<sup>d</sup> which keeps them in a state of perpetual infantilism from which hardly one in many hundreds is able to break loose. Of course nobody admits to this, because everybody seems, even to themselves, to make judgments, yet all the while glancing around at other people's opinions, which remain their secret point of orientation. While any of them would be ashamed of walking around in a borrowed jacket, hat or coat, they all have their opinions solely

<sup>a</sup> *mit Besonnenheit*

<sup>b</sup> [cf. Kant's distinction in *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790), e.g. Ak. 5: 159]

<sup>c</sup> *monstris per excessum*

<sup>d</sup> *Vorurtheil und Nachurtheil*



on loan, eagerly pulling them together wherever they can be found and then strutting around, giving them out as their own. Other people in turn borrow these from them and do exactly the same thing. This explains the rapid and wide-spread dissemination of errors, as well as the fame of what is bad; because journalists and people like them, whose profession is to loan out opinions, usually only hand out false wares, just as people who loan out fancy dress costumes only give out false jewels.

## *On the Theory of the Comical*

My theory of the comical is also based on the opposition between intuitive and abstract representations that I laid such particular emphasis on in the previous chapters; and that is why the remarks I now offer in clarification of this topic belong here, although the arrangement of the text would dictate that they should appear only later.

The problem of the origin of laughter (an origin that is everywhere the same) and its proper meaning was already recognized by *Cicero*, who also immediately abandoned it as unsolvable. (*On the Orator*,<sup>a</sup> II, 58.) The oldest attempt I am aware of to give a psychological explanation of laughter is in *Hutcheson's Introduction into moral philosophy*,<sup>b</sup> Book I, ch. I, § 14. – A somewhat later, anonymous text, *Treatise on the physical and moral causes of laughter*,<sup>c</sup> 1768, is not without its use in giving the subject an airing. *Platner*, in his *Anthropology*,<sup>d</sup> § 894, collected together the opinions of philosophers from *Home* to *Kant* who attempted an explanation of this distinctively human phenomenon. *Kant's* and *Jean Paul's* theories of the comical are well known. I do not think it is necessary to demonstrate their falsity, because anyone who tries to refer a given instance of the comical to them will in the vast majority of cases be immediately convinced of their inadequacy.

As I explained in my First Volume, the comical always comes from a paradoxical and therefore unexpected subsumption of some subject matter<sup>e</sup> under a concept that is, however, different from it, and so<sup>46</sup> the phenomenon of laughter always signifies the sudden perception of an

\* This chapter relates to § 13 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *De Orat[ore]*

<sup>b</sup> [*A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, in three books, containing the elements of ethics and the law of nature* (1747)]

<sup>c</sup> *Traité des causes physiques et morales du rire* [in fact by Louis Poinsinet de Sivry]

<sup>d</sup> *Anthropologie* [Ernst Platner, *Neue Anthropologie* (New Anthropology) (1790)]

<sup>e</sup> *Gegenstand*

incongruity between a concept and the real subject matter that is thought through it, and thus between the abstract and the intuitive. The greater and more unexpected the incongruity is to the person who is laughing, the more uproarious his laughter will be. Accordingly, with everything that causes laughter there will always prove to be a concept and a particular, which is to say a thing or event that certainly *can* be subsumed under this concept and therefore thought through it, but nevertheless does not remotely belong there in any other or more pertinent respect, and is clearly different from everything else that is thought through this concept. If (as often happens with witticisms in particular) instead of this sort of intuitive real object, a species concept emerges that is subordinate to the higher or generic concept, then it will excite laughter when it is realized, i.e.<sup>47</sup> represented intuitively, in the imagination, and so what is thought comes into conflict with what is intuited. In fact, if you want to have explicit cognition of<sup>a</sup> what is at issue, you can trace anything comical back to a syllogism in the first figure, with an uncontested major premise and an unexpected minor premise which can in a sense only exist through a sleight of hand; and as a result of this combination, the conclusion has the quality of the comical.<sup>48</sup>

100

In the First Volume I did not think it necessary to illustrate this theory with examples, since anyone who puts his mind to it can easily do so himself by recalling his own instances of the comical. Nevertheless, to aid the intellectual inertia of those readers who are determined to remain passive, I will deign to do so here. In this third edition I will go so far as to multiply and pile up the examples so that it will be incontestable that, after so many fruitless earlier attempts, the true theory of the comical is given here, and the problem, already advanced but also abandoned by Cicero, has been definitively solved.<sup>49</sup> –

When we consider that two lines need to meet to form an angle, and that they would intersect if they were extended, and that by contrast a tangent touches the circle at only a single point, although it truly runs parallel with the circle at this point, we have thus made palpable the abstract conviction of the impossibility of an angle between the curve of the circle and the tangent; yet this very angle is sitting before us, clearly visible on a piece of paper; and this will easily make us smile. The comical element in this case is certainly extremely weak but it does show with unusual clarity that the comical element comes from the incongruity between what is thought and what is intuited. – But, as is argued in the text, once we have found such an

101

<sup>a</sup> *explicite erkennen*

incongruity, the question of whether the comical element that emerges is a witticism or an absurdity (or at the higher levels, particularly in practical affairs, a stupidity) depends on whether we go from the real (i.e. intuitive) to the concept, or conversely from the concept to the real. Looking now at examples of the first case, which is to say witticisms, we will begin with the well-known anecdote about the Gascon who the king laughed at to see dressed in light summer clothes in the freezing cold of winter, and who said to the king: 'If Your Majesty were to wear what I am wearing, you would find it very warm', – and to the question of what he was wearing, the Gascon replied 'my entire wardrobe'. – This last concept includes the vast wardrobe of a king but also the single summer tunic of this poor devil, the sight of which on his freezing body appears extremely incongruous with the concept. The audience of a theatre in Paris once demanded that the Marseillaise be played, and when this did not happen broke into shouts and rage, to the point where a police commissioner in uniform finally came on to the stage and explained that it is not allowed in the theatre to perform things that are not on the programme. A voice called out: 'And you, sir, are you on the programme too?',<sup>a</sup> which caused universal laughter, because the subsumption of dissimilar things is immediately clear and unforced here.<sup>50</sup> – The epigram:

*Bavius*<sup>b</sup> is the shepherd true of whom the Bible speaks,  
He alone remains awake while all his flock sleeps

subsumes under the concept of shepherd remaining awake with his sleeping flock the concept of a boring preacher who has put the entire congregation to sleep and now keeps yapping away to himself unheard by anyone else. – There is a doctor's tombstone that is analogous: 'Here he lies, like a hero, surrounded by those he has slain' – it takes the concept that honours the hero, that of 'lying surrounded by the slain', and subsumes under it that of the doctor who should be preserving life.<sup>51</sup> – A witticism very often consists of a single expression by which only the concept under which the present case can be subsumed is given, but which is nonetheless very different from everything else that can be thought under it. So in *Romeo*, when the vivacious but fatally wounded *Mercutio* answers the friends who promise to visit him the next day: 'ask for me tomorrow, and you shall find me a *grave man*',<sup>c</sup> a concept under which a corpse is

<sup>a</sup> *Et vous, Monsieur, êtes-vous aussi sur l'affiche?*

<sup>b</sup> *Bav* [a (boring) Roman poet]

<sup>c</sup> [*Romeo and Juliet*, Act III, sc.1. The German translation Schopenhauer uses is 'einen stillen Mann' – literally, a 'still' or 'silent' man]

subsumed. In English there is the additional pun of the fact that ‘a grave man’ means both a serious man and a man of the grave. – The well-known anecdote about the actor Unzelmann is of this type: after improvisation was strictly banned at the Berliner Theater, he had to appear on the stage on horseback, and just as he was approaching the proscenium, the horse relieved itself; this in itself caused the audience to start laughing, but the laughter only increased when Unzelmann said to the horse, ‘What are you doing? Don’t you know we’re not allowed to improvise?’ Here the subsumption of heterogeneous elements under a general concept is very clear, and so the witticism is particularly striking and achieves an extremely strong comic effect. – This is also true of a news item from Hall in March 1851: ‘The gang of Jewish thieves we mentioned was redelivered to us with an *obligato* accompaniment’.<sup>a</sup> The subsumption of a police escort under a musical expression is very adept; although it comes close to being a mere play on words.<sup>52</sup> – But precisely this sort of thing is seen when *Saphir*, in a pen and ink war with the actor Angeli, described him as ‘Angeli, equally great in mind and body’ – where the unusually small was vividly placed under the concept of ‘great’ thanks to the actor’s famed slightness of stature; and it was the same when *Saphir* described the aria to a new opera as ‘a good *old* friend’, and in thus placing it under a concept that in other cases serves as a commendation, emphasized precisely the quality that was critized; and likewise when one says of a lady whose favour can be influenced by gifts, that she knows how to combine the useful with the pleasant,<sup>b</sup> whereby the concept of a rule that Horace had recommended in an aesthetic context is expanded to include something morally base; likewise when one refers to a bordello as something like a ‘modest residence of quiet pleasures’. Polite society, in order to be thoroughly insipid, has banned the use of all decided assertions and thus all strong expressions, and tries to describe things that are scandalous or in any way shocking by softening them using general concepts: but such concepts also subsume things of greater or lesser similarity,<sup>c</sup> and precisely this gives rise to a comic effect corresponding to the relevance of these other contents. An example of this is the ‘useful with the pleasant’ described above: similarly, ‘there was some unpleasantness at the ball’, when in fact a man got into a fight and was thrown out; or ‘he had too much of a good thing’, when he got drunk; as well as ‘the woman has her moments of weakness’ when she was

103

<sup>a</sup> *unter obligater Begleitung* [the German *obligat* can be used to translate both the English ‘obligatory’ as well as the specific musical term *obligato*]

<sup>b</sup> *utile dulci* [Horace, *Ars poetica*, 343]

<sup>c</sup> *mehr oder minder heterogen*

unfaithful to her husband, etc. This is also where double entendres<sup>a</sup> belong, namely concepts which in and of themselves do not contain anything indecent, but which put forward contents that lead to an indecent representation. They are very common in society. But a perfect model of a sustained and excellent double entendre is the incomparable gravestone of the 'Justice of the Peace' by Shenstone which, in a pompous lapidary style, seems to speak of things noble and sublime, while each of its concepts subsumes something entirely different, which emerges only with the very last word, and provides the unexpected key to the whole, and the reader finds himself laughing out loud at the fact that he has just read extremely dirty double entendre. In this tightly buttoned age it is simply not permissible to quote or especially translate it: it can be found in *Shenstone's Poetical Works*, under the title of *Inscription*.<sup>b,53</sup> Double entendres sometimes turn into mere wordplays, of which we have said enough in the text.

104 The subsumption of a concept that is distinct in one respect under another concept that is appropriate in other respects, a feature that is basic to everything comical, can also take place unwittingly: for instance, one of the free Negroes in North America who try to imitate white people in everything, recently placed an epitaph on the grave of his dead child which read: 'Darling Lily, broken too soon'. – If on the other hand, something real and intuitive is intentionally placed under the concept of its opposite then we get banal, common irony. For instance, if someone says about a rainy day: 'what nice weather we're having'; or of an ugly bride: 'what a beautiful treasure he's found himself'; or, of a swindler: 'a real man of honour', and so on. Only children and completely uneducated people will laugh at this sort of thing, because it presents a *total* incongruity between thought and intuition. But in this obvious exaggeration of the mechanism of the comical, its basic character, namely incongruity, emerges very clearly. – Due to its exaggeration and clear intentionality, this species of the comical is somewhat related to *parody*. Its method is to take insignificant, base characters or petty motives and actions and to slip them into the events and words of a serious poem or drama. It therefore subsumes the trite realities it presents under the lofty concepts given by the theme, to which they now need to conform, in a certain respect, while remaining very incongruous in other respects, which is what brings the contrast between intuition and thought into sharp relief. There are numerous well-known examples of this, so I will cite only one, from *Zobeide* by Carlo Gozzi,<sup>c</sup> act 4,

<sup>a</sup> *Aequivoken*

<sup>b</sup> [Schopenhauer refrains from quoting the last line: 'Dar'd to let a f—t']

<sup>c</sup> [1763]

scene 3, where he has two clowns who have just been in a fight and are lying next to each other, peacefully recovering, recite word for word Ariosto's famous verse (*Orlando Furioso*, I, 22) 'Oh the most wonderful excellence of the knights of old' etc.<sup>a</sup> – This is also what happens in the practice, much loved in Germany, of applying serious verses, particularly those of Schiller, to trivial events, and this clearly entails a subsumption of heterogeneous things under the general concept expressed in the verse. So for instance when someone demonstrates a really characteristic trait, someone else will almost always remark: 'that's how I know my Pappenheimers'.<sup>b</sup> But it was original and very clever when a man quoted the closing lines (I don't know how audibly) of Schiller's ballad 'The Surety'<sup>c</sup> to a newly-wed couple, the female half of which rather pleased him: 105

I'll be, if you'll permit for me,  
In your union, number three.

The comic effect here is strong and irresistible, because we take a concept that Schiller wanted us to consider in a moral, ennobling context, and use it to think about a forbidden and immoral context, although it fits correctly and does not need any alterations to do so. – In all of the examples of wit cited here we find that something real is subsumed either directly or by means of a narrower concept under another concept or abstract thought in general; strictly speaking it does belong there, but it is in fact extremely different from the true and original intention and tendency of the thought. And so wit, as a faculty of mind, consists of an ability to find, for any given object, a concept under which it can certainly be thought, but which is nonetheless quite different from everything else belonging under the concept.<sup>54</sup>

The second type of comical effect goes, as we have said, in the opposite direction, from abstract concept to the real, i.e. intuitive, that is thought in it, so that this now exposes some overlooked incongruity between the two and gives rise to an absurdity or, in practice,<sup>d</sup> a foolish action. Since the theatre requires action, this type of comic effect is a fundamental part of comedies. This is the basis of Voltaire's remark: 'I believe I have observed in the theatre that almost nothing gives rise to general laughter so much as an action resulting from a *misunderstanding*' (preface to

<sup>a</sup> *oh gran bontà de' cavalieri antichi u.s.w* [Ludovico Ariosto, poem published in 1516]

<sup>b</sup> [In other words: that's how I know who I'm dealing with. Schiller, *Wallensteins Tod* (*Wallenstein's Death*) (1799), III, 15]

<sup>c</sup> *Die Bürgschaft* [1798]

<sup>d</sup> *in praxi*

106

*Prodigal Son*).<sup>a</sup> The following can serve to illustrate this species of the comic. When someone remarked that he likes to take walks alone, an Austrian said to him: 'You like walking alone. I do too: so we can go together.' He started from the concept that 'a pleasure that two people share can be enjoyed together' and subsumed under it the case that specifically excludes company.<sup>55</sup> Additionally there is the servant who spread Macassar oil on his master's trunk where the sealskin had been scraped off, so that the hair would grow back; he started from the concept 'Macassar oil makes hair grow'. The soldiers in the watchtower let a recently arrested man play cards with them, but when he cheated and caused a fight they threw him out: they were being guided by the general concept 'bad companions should be thrown out', forgetting that he had just been arrested, and was therefore someone that they should be holding on to. – Two farm boys had loaded their guns with crude shot, and they wanted to get it out so they could put in finer powder instead, but they did not want to lose any of it. So one of them laid the mouth of the barrel in his hat, which he took between his legs and said to the other: 'now press it slowly, slowly, slowly and the shot will come out'. He was starting with the concept that 'slowing down the cause will slow down the effect'.<sup>56</sup> – Most of Don Quixote's actions are examples of the same thing: he takes concepts from knightly romances and subsumes under them the very different realities he is experiencing, so for instance aiding the oppressed by freeing the galley slaves. All Münchhausenisms<sup>b</sup> really belong here as well: except that they are not foolish<sup>57</sup> actions that have been completed, but rather impossible ones, foisted upon the reader as if they were true. In all these tales the facts are presented so that they seem possible and plausible when they are thought merely abstractly<sup>c</sup> and thus comparatively a priori: but afterwards, when you stop to intuit the individual case, which is to say *a posteriori*, the impossibility of the situation, indeed the absurdity in the assumption, comes to the fore and causes laughter through the palpable incongruity between intuition and thought: for instance, when the melody frozen in the post horn thaws in the warm room; when Münchhausen, sitting in a tree in a hard frost, lifts his fallen knife with the frozen stream of his urine, etc. Another example is the story of the two lions who break down the barrier during

<sup>a</sup> *J'ai cru remarquer aux spectacles, qu'il ne s'élève presque jamais de ces éclats de rire universels, qu'à l'occasion d'une méprise (Préface de l'enfant prodigue) [comedy in five acts (1738)]*

<sup>b</sup> [Tales of Münchhausen first appeared in Rudolf Erich Raspe, *Baron Münchhausen's Narrative of his Marvellous Travels and Campaigns in Russia* (1785) and have been much retold]

<sup>c</sup> *in abstracto*



the night and eat each other in their rage, so that in the morning only their two tails can be found.

There are also cases of the comical where the concept under which the intuitive is brought does not need to be explained or expressed, but rather enters consciousness on its own because of the ideas associated with it. *Garrick* started laughing in the middle of a performance because a butcher standing in the front of the parterre had temporarily put his wig onto his dog so he could wipe away his sweat, and the dog was looking at the stage with his forelegs on the separation between the stalls; and this laughter was caused by Garrick bringing to bear the thought of a spectator. This is why certain animal forms, like those of apes, kangaroos, jumping hares and the like sometimes seem comical to us, because there is something human-like in them that causes us to subsume them under the concept of the human shape, and with this in mind we then perceive the incongruity between the two. 107

Now the concepts whose evident incongruity with intuition makes us laugh are either someone else's or our own. In the first case, we laugh at the other person: in the second case, we feel an often pleasant or at least amused sort of surprise. Children and vulgar people laugh at the slightest occasion, even at the most disgusting events if they are unexpected and therefore show their preconceived conception to be in error. – Laughter is generally enjoyable: perception of the incongruity between thought and intuition, i.e. reality, gives us pleasure and we gladly submit to the spasmodic convulsion this perception arouses. The reason for this is the following. In that sudden emergence of a conflict between intuition and thought, intuition is always and incontestably in the right: because it is in no way prone to error and it requires no external justification but rather stands for itself. Its conflict with thought stems ultimately from the fact that thought cannot, with its abstract concept, descend to the endless variety and nuance of intuition. This victory of intuitive cognition over thinking gives us pleasure. Intuition is the original mode of cognition, inseparable from animal nature, in which everything that gives the will immediate pleasure is presented; it is the medium of the present, of pleasure and of happiness: and it is not associated with any effort. The opposite is true of thought: it is cognition squared, and its exercise always requires effort, sometimes considerable effort; moreover, its concepts are so often opposed to the satisfaction of our immediate wishes because, as the medium of the past, the future, and the serious, they provide the vehicle for our misgivings, our regrets, and all our cares. To see for once an exhibition of the shortcomings of this strict, inexhaustible, overtaxing governess called reason is therefore 108

necessarily highly amusing. This is why the expression of laughter and that of joy<sup>a</sup> are very closely related.

Animals are incapable of both laughter and language because they lack reason, i.e. universal concepts. Hence laughter is the privilege and the distinguishing characteristic of human beings. Nonetheless, we can remark in passing that dogs, the only friends human beings have, possess the advantage over all other animals of a unique and distinctive yet analogous gesture of their very own, namely wagging their tails in such an expressive, well-meaning, and thoroughly honest fashion. How favourably this greeting that nature has bestowed on dogs compares to the bowing and the simpering civilities of human beings; the dogs' gesture is a thousand times more reliable than any human assurance of devoted friendship and loyalty, at least in the present.<sup>58</sup> –

109 The opposite of laughter and joking is *seriousness*. Accordingly, it consists in a consciousness of the complete correspondence and congruence of the concept or thought with intuition, or reality. The serious person is convinced that he thinks of things as they are, and that they are as he thinks them. This is precisely why the transition from deep seriousness to laughter is particularly easy to orchestrate through trivialities, because the more complete that earnestly assumed correspondence appears, the easier it is to abolish through a minor incongruity that unexpectedly comes to light. This is why the more capable a man is of complete seriousness, the more heartily he can laugh. People whose laughter always sounds affected and forced are intellectual and moral lightweights; just as in general the type of laughter and the occasions for laughter are highly characteristic and personal. The fact that relations between the sexes make the easiest material for jokes, material that is always available and accessible to the dullest wits (as we see by the frequency of dirty jokes) would not be possible if it were not grounded in the most profound seriousness.

Other people's laughter over what we do or say in earnest is profoundly insulting because it implies that there is a huge incongruity between our concepts and objective reality. This is also why the predicate 'laughable'<sup>b</sup> is insulting. – Truly derisive laughter shouts triumphantly at the vanquished opponent how incongruous his cherished concepts are to the reality that has now been revealed to him. Our own bitter laughter at the terrible truth that reveals itself to us and dashes our long-cherished hopes is the vivid expression of our discovery of an incongruity between the thoughts we

<sup>a</sup> *Freude*

<sup>b</sup> *lächerlich* [elsewhere translated as 'comical']

have held dear, trusting foolishly in humanity or fate, and the reality that now unveils itself.

A *joke* is something *intentionally* comical: it is the attempt to bring about a discrepancy between somebody else's concepts and reality by displacing one of these two; while the opposite, *seriousness*, consists in at least attempting to conciliate these two. Now if the joke is hidden behind seriousness then we have *irony*: for instance, if we seem to agree seriously with another person's opinions when they are, in fact, the opposite of our own, and pretend to share these views until the result ultimately leads him to doubt both us and them. This is how Socrates acts with Hippias, Protagoras, Gorgias, and other sophists, and often his interlocutors in general.<sup>a</sup> – The converse of irony would therefore be to hide seriousness behind a joke, and this is *humour*. We could call this the double counterpoint of irony.<sup>59</sup> – Explanations such as 'humour is the interpenetration of the finite and the infinite' express nothing more than a complete inability to think on the part of those who take pleasure in such empty phrases. – Irony is objective, which is to say it is aimed at other people; *humour* on the other hand is subjective, which is to say it exists primarily only for oneself. This is why we find masterpieces of irony in the ancients and masterpieces of humour in the moderns.<sup>60</sup> Looking more closely, humour is based on a subjective but serious and sublime mood that comes into involuntary conflict with a common external world very different from itself and which it can neither evade nor abandon itself to; thus, it tries to reconcile this by thinking its own views and the external world using the same concepts; but this gives the concepts a two-fold incongruity with the real that is thought through them, an incongruity that lies sometimes on the one side and sometimes on the other and generates an impression of an intentional comical effect, and thus of a joke behind which the most profound seriousness nevertheless lies concealed and shines forth. If irony begins with a serious look on its face and ends with a comical one, humour is the other way around. An example is the remark by Mercutio, cited above. Similarly, in *Hamlet* Polonius says: 'My honourable lord, I will most humbly take my leave of you. – Hamlet: You cannot, sir, take from me any thing that I will most willingly part withal; – except my life, except my life, except my life.'<sup>b</sup> – And also, before the performance of the play at the court Hamlet says to Ophelia: 'What should a man do but be merry? For, look you, how cheerfully my mother looks, and my father died within's two hours. – Ophelia: Nay, 'tis twice two months,

110

<sup>a</sup> [In Plato's dialogues]

<sup>b</sup> [Act II, sc. 2]

my lord. – Hamlet: So long? Nay then, let the devil wear black, for I'll have a suit of sables.<sup>a</sup> – Also, in Jean Paul's *Titan*,<sup>b</sup> when *Schoppe*, who has become melancholy and has been brooding about himself looks frequently at his hands and says to them: 'There sits a lord in the flesh, and I in him. But who is such a one?' – Heinrich Heine emerges as a true humorist in his *Romanzero*:<sup>c</sup> behind all of his jokes and farces we notice a deep seriousness that is ashamed to emerge unconcealed.<sup>61</sup> – Accordingly, humour rests on a particular type of *mood*<sup>d</sup> (probably from 'moon'<sup>e</sup>), a concept that, in all of its modifications, implies a decisive preponderance of the subjective over the objective in the apprehension of the external world. Also, every poetic or artistic presentation of a comic or even farcical scene that nevertheless has a serious thought shining through as its hidden background is a product of humour, and is therefore humorous. This includes for instance a coloured drawing by *Tischbein*: it presents a completely empty room that is illuminated only by a fire blazing in the grate. In front of the fire stands a man in a waistcoat so that, starting from his feet, his shadow stretches over the whole room. 'That is someone,' *Tischbein* commented, 'who did not want to succeed in the world, and who came to nothing: now he is pleased that he can cast such a big shadow.' To express the serious thought that is concealed behind this joke, I could do no better than to use the following verse by the Persian poet Anwari Soheili:

If a world you possessed is now lost and gone,  
Do not suffer from this, it is nothing;  
If you come to possess a new world that you've won  
Don't feel glad about this, it is nothing.  
All pains and all triumphs, they go as they come,  
Go over the world, it is nothing.<sup>f</sup>

The fact that the notion of 'humorous'<sup>g</sup> has entirely taken on the meaning of 'comic'<sup>h</sup> in German literature these days arises from the pitiful attempt to give things nobler names than they deserve, specifically the name of the class above them: so every inn wants to be called a hotel, every money-changer a banker, every horseman's stall a circus, every concert a musical academy, the salesman's accounting house is an office, the potter

<sup>a</sup> [Act III, sc. 2]

<sup>b</sup> [novel published in 1800–3]

<sup>c</sup> [*Romanzero*, collection of poems published in 1851]

<sup>d</sup> *Laune*

<sup>e</sup> *Luna*

<sup>f</sup> [From Moslicheddin Sadi, *Gulistan (Rosegarden)*, translated by Karl Heinrich Graf (1846)]

<sup>g</sup> *humoristisch*

<sup>h</sup> *komisch*

an artist in clay, – and so too, every clown is a humorist. The word *Humor* is borrowed from the English, in order to distinguish out and describe an idiosyncratic type of comic effect that they were the first to notice, an effect that is even related to the sublime, as was shown above; and not to designate every clownishness and bit of fun, as literary men and scholars all over Germany now do, without opposition; for the true concept of that variety, that intellectual tendency, that child of the comedic and sublime would be too subtle and too elevated for their public, which they are concerned to please by flattening everything and bringing it down to the level of the rabble. Well ‘lofty words and debased meaning’ is everywhere the motto of the noble ‘time of now’,<sup>a</sup> and what they term a humorist today is what used to be called a clown.<sup>62</sup>

112

<sup>a</sup> *Jetztzeit* [a current term that Schopenhauer finds abhorrent]

*On Logic in General*

Logic, dialectic, and rhetoric belong together since they comprise the entirety of a *technique of reason*, and they should also be taught together under this title, with logic as the technique of one's own thinking, dialectic as the technique of disputing with others, and rhetoric as the technique of speaking to many (*concionatio*); this also corresponds to the singular, dual, and plural as well as monologue, dialogue and panegyric.

In agreement with *Aristotle* (*Metaphysics* III, 2, and *Posterior Analytics* I, 11),<sup>a</sup> I understand *dialectic* to be the art of a dialogue directed to the collective pursuit of truth, specifically philosophical truth. But dialogue of this sort necessarily devolves into controversy, more or less; thus *dialectic* can also be described as the art of disputation. The Platonic dialogues give us examples and models of dialectic: but so far very little has been achieved by way of a genuine theory of dialectic, which is to say the technique of disputation, eristic. I have attempted something along these lines and shared a sample of it in the second volume of the *Parerga*,<sup>b,63</sup> so I will entirely omit any discussion of this science here.

113 The rhetorical figures in rhetoric are approximately what the syllogistic figures are in logic; in any case, they are worth considering. They do not seem to have become objects of theoretical investigation yet in Aristotle's time, because he does not treat them in his *Rhetoric*, and we are referred in this matter to Rutilius Lupus, the epitomizer of a later Gorgias.

All three sciences have in common the fact that everyone follows their rules without having learnt them, these rules having been originally abstracted from natural practice. – And so, although they are of great theoretical interest, they have only limited practical use: in part because although they certainly give us the rule, they do not give the case of

\* This chapter, along with the one that follows, relates to § 9 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> [*Met.* IV (Γ), 1004b17–26; *Post. An.*, 77a25–35]

<sup>b</sup> [*PP* 2, § 174, the dialogue between Demopheles and Philaethes]

application, and in part because in practice there is usually no time to remember rules. So they teach only what everyone already knows and does on his own. Still, abstract cognition of them is both interesting and important. *Logic* does not have obvious practical uses, at least for one's own thinking. This is because the mistakes in our own reasoning are almost never in the conclusions or even in the form, but rather in judgments i.e. in the material of thinking. On the other hand, we can sometimes make practical use of logic in controversies, since we take the deceptive argumentation that our opponent offers under the cover of a constant stream of speech (regardless of whether he is clearly or obscurely conscious of the intention to deceive), put it in the rigorous form of rule-governed syllogisms, and then show him to be guilty of logical errors such as simple reversal of a universal affirmative judgment,<sup>64</sup> syllogisms with four terms,<sup>a</sup> conclusions that go from the consequent to the ground, syllogisms of the second figure from only affirmative premises, and the like. –

It seems that the doctrine of the *laws of thought* could be simplified if only two of them were put forward, namely the principle of the excluded middle and the principle of sufficient reason. The former as: 'any given predicate is either to be attributed to or to be denied of any subject'. Here the 'either/or' already entails that both cannot take place at once, and consequently has the same meaning as the laws of identity and contradiction, which accordingly are added as corollaries to this claim. The claim really means that any two conceptual spheres can be thought as united or separated but never as both at the same time; and so where words are joined together to denote the latter, they indicate an unfeasible process of thought: we become conscious of this in the feeling of contradiction. – The second law of thought, the principle of sufficient reason, would mean that the attribution or denial discussed above must be determined by something different from the judgment itself, and this can be a (pure or empirical) intuition or simply another judgment: this other and different thing is then called the (sufficient) reason<sup>b</sup> for the judgment. A judgment is *thinkable* to the extent that it satisfies the first law of thought; it is *true* to the extent that it satisfies the second; at least it is logically or formally true, meaning that the sufficient reason for the judgment is in turn itself only a judgment. But a material or absolute truth is, in the end, only ever a relation between a judgment and an intuition, which is to say between an abstract and an intuitive representation. This relation is either immediate or mediated through other judgments, i.e. through other abstract

II4

<sup>a</sup> *Terminis*

<sup>b</sup> *Grund* [also trans. as 'ground']

representations. This makes it clear that one truth can never displace another, and instead they must ultimately all be in agreement; for contradiction is impossible in the intuitive sphere, the foundation common to them all. Hence no truth need fear any other truth. Deception and error on the other hand need to fear every truth, because the logical concatenation of all truths means that even the most distant must play a role in repulsing every error. This second law of thought is accordingly where logic joins on to what is no longer logic but rather the material of thinking. Consequently, the agreement of concepts, which is to say of abstract representation with what is given in intuitive representation, constitutes, on the side of the object, *truth*; and on the side of the subject, *knowledge*.<sup>a</sup>

115 The function<sup>b</sup> of the copula 'is/is not' is to express the above-mentioned unity or separation of two conceptual spheres. The copula is what allows every verb to be expressed by means of its participle. Thus all judging consists in the use of a verb, and vice versa. Accordingly, the meaning of the copula is that the predicate is to be thought along with the subject – nothing more. Now let us consider what the content of the infinitive of the copula, 'to be', amounts to. This is a major theme for the philosophy professors of the present age. Still, we should not be too strict with them: most of them want to use it only to describe material things, the corporeal world, to which they, being at the bottom of their hearts perfectly innocent realists, accord the highest reality. But it strikes them as unacceptably vulgar to speak so directly about bodies, so they say 'Being', which sounds a bit more distinguished – but they think of the tables and chairs in front of them when doing so.<sup>65</sup>

'For, because, why, therefore, hence, since, although, indeed, nevertheless, rather,<sup>66</sup> if/then, either/or' and more of the same – these are really *logical particles*, since their only function is to express the formal aspects of our thought processes. They are therefore a valuable property of a language and do not all belong to all languages in equal numbers. In particular, it seems that *zwar*<sup>c</sup> (the condensation of '*es ist wahr*'<sup>d</sup>) is an exclusive possession of the German language: it always relates to a subsequent or assumed '*aber*',<sup>e</sup> just as '*if*' does to a '*then*'.<sup>67</sup>

The logical rule that judgments that are *particular* according to quantity, which is to say those that have a *particular concept* (*notio singularis*) for a

<sup>a</sup> *Wissen*

<sup>b</sup> *Bestimmung*

<sup>c</sup> [Translated above as 'indeed']

<sup>d</sup> [it is true]

<sup>e</sup> [but]



subject should be treated like *universal judgments* – this logical rule is based on the fact that they are indeed universal judgments, but ones whose subject is a concept that can only be demonstrated by a single real object and thus contains under it only one thing, which happens when the concept is signified by a proper name. But this really only comes into consideration when we go from the abstract to the intuitive representation, and thus want to make the concepts real. In thought itself, in working with judgments, the distinction does not arise just because there is no logical distinction between particular concepts and universal ones: ‘Immanuel Kant’ has the logical meaning of ‘all Immanuel Kants’. Accordingly, there are really only two quantities of judgments: universal and particular.<sup>a</sup> A *singular<sup>b</sup> representation* can never be the subject of a judgment because it is not an abstraction, not something thought, but rather something intuitive: every concept on the other hand is essentially universal, and every judgment must have a *concept* for its subject.

116

The difference between *special judgments* (*propositiones particulares*) and *universal judgments* is often based only on the external and contingent circumstance that the language has no word for the part of the universal concept set aside here that is the subject of such a judgment, in which case many special judgments would be universal. For instance, the special judgment ‘some trees have oak galls’ becomes universal because we have a dedicated word for what is set aside from the concept of tree: ‘all oaks have oak galls’. The judgment ‘some human beings are black’ bears the very same relation to the judgment: ‘all moors are black’. – Or this distinction is based on the fact that the person doing the judging has not clearly distinguished the concept he is making into the subject of the special judgment from the part of the universal concept that he is seeking to describe. If the distinction were clear, he would have been able to express this part using a universal judgment: for instance, instead of the judgment: ‘some ruminants have upper incisors’, he would have: ‘all ruminants without horns have upper incisors’.

*Hypothetical and the disjunctive judgments* are statements of the relationship between two (or more, with a disjunctive judgment) categorical judgments. – A *hypothetical judgment* states that the truth of the second of the categorical judgments that are connected here depends on that of the first, and the falsity of the first depends on that of the second: and therefore that these two claims are directly associated with respect to truth and falsity. – By contrast, a *disjunctive judgment* states that the truth of one of

<sup>a</sup> *partikulare*

<sup>b</sup> *einzelne*

the categorical judgments connected here is the basis for the falsity of all the others, and vice versa; and thus that these claims are in conflict with respect to truth and falsity. – A *question* is a judgment, one of whose three elements is left open: either the copula, ‘is Caius a Roman – or not?’ or the predicate, ‘is Caius a Roman – or something else?’ or the subject, ‘is *Caius* a Roman – or is it someone else who is?’ – The position of the concept left open can also remain completely empty, for instance: ‘*what* is Caius?’, ‘*who* is a Roman?’<sup>68</sup>

- 117 In Aristotle, *epagôgê*<sup>a</sup> (*inductio*) is the opposite of *apagôgê*.<sup>b</sup> The latter establishes that a claim is false by showing that what would follow from it is not true; and thus by the proof from the opposite.<sup>c</sup> *Epagôgê* by contrast establishes the truth of a claim by showing that what would follow from it is true. Accordingly, it uses examples to lead to an assumption; by the same token, *apagôgê* leads away from the assumption. Therefore, *epagôgê* or induction is an inference from consequent to ground, and indeed through *modus ponens*:<sup>d</sup> because it establishes the rule from a number of cases, and these are then the consequences of the rule. This is precisely why it is never absolutely certain, but instead has at most a very high degree of probability. Nevertheless this *formal* uncertainty can leave room for a *material* certainty given a large number of consequences; similarly, in the mathematics of irrational relations, we can use fractions to achieve an infinite approximation to rationality. *Apagôgê* on the other hand is above all inference from ground to consequent, and yet works thereafter through *modus tollens*,<sup>e</sup> since it establishes the non-being of a necessary consequent and thereby annuls the truth of the assumed ground. This is precisely why it is always absolutely certain and by means of a single, certain example of a contradiction<sup>f</sup> provides more than induction does through countless examples for the claim that is being tabled. So much easier is it to refute than to prove, to upset than to establish.

<sup>a</sup> ἐπαγωγή [induction]

<sup>b</sup> ἀπαγωγή [deduction]

<sup>c</sup> *instantia in contrarium*

<sup>d</sup> *modo ponente*

<sup>e</sup> *modo tollente*

<sup>f</sup> *in contrarium*

## *On the Study of Syllogisms*

Although it is very difficult to put forward a novel, accurate, and foundational view on a subject that has been discussed by countless people for more than two thousand years, a subject, moreover, that cannot be enhanced through experience, this will not stop me from attempting just this, so that thinkers can examine my efforts.

A syllogism<sup>a</sup> is that operation of our reason by means of which two judgments, when compared, give rise to a third, without any other or further input from cognition. The condition for this is that the two judgments must share *one* concept: otherwise they are strangers to each other with nothing in common. But when this condition is fulfilled they become father and mother of a child that inherits something from each of them. Moreover, this operation is not arbitrary but rational; dedicating itself to the consideration of these judgments, reason accomplishes this on its own, according to its own laws, to the extent that it is objective, not subjective, and thus obeys the most rigorous rules.

118

We can ask in passing whether someone drawing the conclusion really learns something new from the claim that has just arisen, something he did not already know?<sup>b</sup> – Not absolutely: but in a certain respect, yes. What he learns was present in what he knew: thus he already knew it implicitly.<sup>c</sup> But he did not know that he knew it, which is comparable to having something but not knowing that you have it: which is as good as not having it. Specifically, he used to know it only implicitly, now he knows it explicitly:<sup>d</sup> but this distinction can be so great that the conclusion looks like a new truth to him. For instance:

All diamonds are rocks;  
All diamonds are flammable;

<sup>a</sup> *Schluss*

<sup>b</sup> *etwas Unbekanntes*

<sup>c</sup> *wußte er es schon mit*

<sup>d</sup> *explicite*

Therefore some rocks are flammable.

Consequently, the essence of the syllogism consists in our becoming clearly conscious of the fact that we have already implicitly thought the statement of the conclusion in the premises: it is accordingly<sup>69</sup> a way of becoming more clearly conscious of our own cognition, experiencing more closely – or increasing our awareness of – what we know. The cognition that delivers the conclusion was *latent*, and thus has as little an effect as latent temperature on a thermometer. Someone who has salt has chlorine, but it is as if he does not have it, because it can act like chlorine only when it is chemically released; only then is it really his. But this is what happens with something acquired merely by concluding from premises that are already known: it *liberates* a previously *bound* or *latent* cognition. These comparisons can certainly seem a bit overblown, but they are not. Many of the conclusions  
 119 that can be drawn from elements in our cognition come very soon, very quickly, and without any formality, so we have no clear memory of them; and so it seems to us that the premises of possible conclusions do not remain unused for very long, and the conclusions to all the premises in our field of knowledge lie ready and waiting. However, this is not always the case: two premises can exist in a mind for a long time in isolation until some occasion finally brings them together and then the conclusion suddenly jumps out, like a spark from steel and stone when they first strike each other. Premises taken from the outside often lie inside of us for a long time, both premises for theoretical insights as well as premises for motives that lead to decisions. Partly through obscurely conscious or even wordless acts of thinking, these premises are compared with other items in the warehouse of our cognitions, we ruminate on them and, as it were, shake them up until finally the right major premise meets up with the right minor premise; these immediately present themselves as belonging together, and all of a sudden there is a conclusion, as if a light suddenly went on, without our having done anything, as if it were an inspiration: then we cannot conceive of how we and how other people failed to recognize it for so long. Of course this process takes place more quickly and easily in a well-ordered mind than in an ordinary mind: and precisely because it happens spontaneously and in fact in the absence of clear consciousness, it cannot be learned. This is why *Goethe* says:

It is best known,  
 How simple it is, by whoever has done it and made it his own.<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> [*West-East Divan*, VI, 4]

A metaphor for the thought process we are describing is given by the sort of padlock that is made of a ring with letters on it: hanging on the trunk of a travelling carriage, it will be shaken for such a long time that the letters of the word will come together in the proper order and the lock will open. But we must also keep in mind that the syllogism consists of the thought process itself, while the words and sentences in which it is expressed merely describe the trace that is left behind: they are to the syllogism what the acoustic figures drawn in sand are to the sounds whose vibrations they present. When we want to think about something, we bring our data together and consolidate it into judgments that can be quickly held up together and compared, allowing the possible conclusions to be drawn instantly using all three syllogistic figures; although given the great speed at which these operations take place, we use only a few words and sometimes none at all, and only the conclusion is formally expressed. And so it sometimes happens that when we become conscious of some new truth in this way or even in a merely intuitive way, i.e. through a lucky *aperçu*,<sup>a</sup> we look for the premises for this conclusion, i.e. we want to prove it, since cognitions usually precede their proofs. Then we rummage through the warehouse of our cognitions to see if we cannot find some truth there in which our new discovery was already implicitly contained, or two claims whose rule-governed connection would give this as a result. – By contrast, any legal process supplies the most formal and well-composed syllogism, and indeed in the first figure. The civil or criminal offence that has gone to court is the minor premise: it is stated by the plaintiff. The law for such cases is the major premise. The judgment is the conclusion which, being necessary, is therefore merely ‘recognized’<sup>b</sup> by the judge.

120

But now I will try to give the simplest and most accurate presentation of the true mechanism of syllogistic reasoning.<sup>c</sup>

*Judging*, that elementary and most important process of thinking, consists in comparing two concepts; *syllogistic reasoning* consists in comparing two *judgments*. Yet in text books, syllogistic reasoning is generally reduced to a comparison of *concepts*, albeit *three*, since we recognize the relation two of these concepts have to each other from the relation they have to the third. The truth of this view cannot be denied, and since this gives rise to the intuitive presentation of syllogistic relations through the drawing of conceptual spheres, a presentation I also praised in the text, it has the advantage of making the matter easy to grasp. Only it seems to me that

121

<sup>a</sup> *Aperçu*

<sup>b</sup> *erkannt*

<sup>c</sup> *Schließen*

here, as in so many cases, comprehensibility comes at the cost of thoroughness. This view does not allow us to recognize the true thought process in syllogistic reasoning, the process that accurately connects the three syllogistic figures and their necessity. In syllogistic reasoning we do *not* operate with *concepts* alone, but with entire *judgments*, in which the quality (which lies in the copula alone and not in the concepts) as well as the quantity is absolutely essential, and modality is added to this as well. The problem with presenting syllogistic reasoning as a relation between *three concepts* is that it immediately dissolves the judgment into its ultimate components (the concepts), thus losing sight of the ties that bind them and failing to see what is distinctive about the judgment *as such* and in its entirety, which is precisely what introduces the necessity of the conclusion that is drawn from them. This leads to an error analogous to one found in organic chemistry when, in the analysis of plants for instance, it immediately dissolves these into their *ultimate* components, finding carbon, hydrogen and oxygen in all plants while losing sight of their specific differences; in order to recover these, one must stop at the more *proximal* components, the so-called alkaloids, and be careful not to decompose these again. – We cannot construct a syllogism from three given *concepts*. This is freely admitted: the relation of two of these to the third must be given as well. But it is precisely the *judgments* binding the concepts together that are the expression of this relationship: thus the content of a syllogism consists in *judgments* and not mere *concepts*. Accordingly, syllogistic reasoning is essentially a comparison between two *judgments*: the thought process in our minds takes off from these, from the thoughts they express, and not merely from three concepts; and this is true even when the linguistic description of this process is incomplete or indeed non-existent, so that the process must be considered as such, as a holding together of whole and un-decomposed judgments, if we are to truly understand the technical procedure of syllogistic reasoning; and the necessity of three truly rational syllogistic figures will result from this.

- 122 When presenting the study of syllogisms using *conceptual spheres*, we picture them as circles. Similarly, when we use entire *judgments*, we picture them as sticks that for the sake of comparison are sometimes held together at the one end and sometimes at the other. The different ways in which this can take place result in the three figures. Now since each premise contains a subject and a predicate, these two concepts can be presented as located on the ends of each stick. The two judgments can now be compared with respect to the *different* concepts in each of them: because the third concept must be the same in both, as was already mentioned; thus it is not subject

to any comparison, but rather is that *in which* (i.e. with reference to which) the other two are compared: it is the *middle term*. This accordingly is only ever the means and not the main focus. The two dissimilar concepts on the other hand are the object of reflection, and the purpose of the syllogism is to bring out their relationship to each other by means of the judgment in which they are contained: that is why the conclusion speaks only of them, not of the middle term which was merely a means, a measure that can be dropped as soon as it has been of use. Now if this middle term, i.e. the concept that is *the same* in both claims, is the subject of *one* premise, then the concept it is going to be compared with must be the predicate of that premise, and vice versa. This immediately gives rise a priori to three possible cases: either the subject of the *one* premise is compared to the predicate of the *other*, or the subject of the one is compared with the subject of the other, or finally the predicate of the one is compared with the predicate of the other. This gives rise to the three syllogistic figures of *Aristotle*: the fourth, which was added somewhat impertinently, is inexact and spurious: it is ascribed to *Galen*, but based only on Arabian authorities. Each of the three figures presents a completely different, accurate, and natural thought process that is pursued by reason in syllogistic reasoning.

If the goal in comparing the two judgments is to investigate the relation between *the predicate of the one and the subject of the other*, then this gives rise to *the first figure*. This is the only figure that has the advantage that both the concepts serving as the subject and predicate in the conclusion already appeared in the premises in the same character; while in the other two figures one of them must always switch roles in the conclusion. But this is why the result in the first figure always has less novelty and is less surprising than in either of the others. The first figure's advantage is achieved only if the predicate of the major premise is compared with the subject of the minor, and not vice versa: this is essential here and leads to the middle term occupying the two positions that have different names, i.e. being the subject in the major premise and the predicate in the minor: which is again responsible for its inferior significance, since it figures as a mere weight that arbitrarily gets put on the one end of the scale at some times and on the other end at others. The thought process in this figure is that the predicate of the major premise belongs to the subject of the minor because the subject of the major is the very own predicate of that other, or the other way around in the negative case, for the same reason. Here a property is attributed to the things thought through one concept because the property depends on another that we already see in them, or vice versa. Thus, the governing principle here is: 'a property that belongs to the predicate also

123

belongs to its subject, and a property that does not belong to the predicate does not belong to its subject either'.<sup>a</sup>

124 If on the other hand we compare two judgments with the intention of bringing out the relation that the *subjects of both* might have to each other, then we must take their predicate as a common measure: so this becomes the middle term and must consequently be the same in both judgments. This gives rise to the *second figure*. Here the relation of the two *subjects* is determined by the relationship they have to the predicate they share. This relation, however, can only become meaningful if the predicate attributed to the one subject is denied of the other, making it the essential ground of the difference between the two. This is because, if it were to be attributed to both subjects, then it could not be decisive with respect to their relationship, because almost every predicate is attributed to countless subjects. It would be even less decisive if it were denied of both. This leads to the basic character of the second figure, namely that the two premises must have *opposing qualities*: the one must affirm, the other deny. The supreme rule here is therefore: 'the one antecedent must be negative';<sup>b</sup> and a corollary of this is: 'nothing follows from merely affirmative antecedents';<sup>c</sup> a rule that is sometimes violated in a loose argument when it is concealed under a number of incidental claims. The thought process presented in this figure follows clearly from what has been said: it is the investigation of two kinds of things with the intention of distinguishing between them, which is to say, of establishing that they do not belong to the same category; and this is decided here by showing that a property essential to one kind is lacking in the other. An example demonstrates quite by itself that this thought process assumes the second figure and that the contours of this process are sharply outlined only in this figure:

All fish have cold blood;  
No whale has cold blood:  
Therefore, no whale is a fish.

In the first figure, by contrast, this thought is forced, obscure, and cobbled together:

Nothing with cold blood is a whale;  
All fish have cold blood:  
Therefore no fish is a whale  
And consequently no whale is a fish. –

<sup>a</sup> *nota notae est nota rei ipsius, et repugnans notae repugnat rei ipsi.*

<sup>b</sup> *sit altera negans*

<sup>c</sup> *e meris affirmativis nihil sequitur*



And also an example with an affirmative minor premise:

No Mohammedan is a Jew;  
Some Turks are Jews;  
Therefore some Turks are not Mohammedans.

Accordingly, I suggest that (for the mode with the negative minor premise) the governing principle of these figures be: *cui repugnat nota, etiam repugnat notatum*<sup>a</sup>; and (for the mode with the affirmative minor premise): *notato repugnat id cui nota repugnat*. In translation,<sup>a</sup> it can be summarized as follows: two subjects that have an oppositional relationship with respect to a predicate have a negative relationship to each other.

In the third case, it is the *predicates* of the two judgments whose relation we investigate by combining the judgments: this gives rise to the *third figure*, in which, accordingly, the middle term appears in both premises as the subject. In this case too, the middle term is what the other terms of the comparison have in common;<sup>b</sup> it is the measure applied to both of the concepts under investigation, a sort of chemical reagent as it were, in which both are tested in order to learn by their reactions what takes place between them: consequently, the conclusion expresses whether a relation of subject and predicate exists between the two and how far this extends. Accordingly, this figure presents a deliberation concerning two *properties* that we are inclined to treat either as *incompatible* or as *inseparable*, and which we try to make predicate of one and the same subject in two judgments so as to decide the matter. The result is either that both properties are attributed to one and the same thing and are consequently *compatible*, or that a thing clearly has one but not the other property, and they are consequently *separable*: the first of these is the case in all modes that have two affirmative premises, the second in all modes that have a negative premise: for instance

125

Some animals can speak;  
All animals are irrational;  
Therefore some things that are irrational can speak.

According to Kant (*The False Subtlety*,<sup>c</sup> § 4) this syllogism would be conclusive only if we add the thought: ‘therefore some things that are

<sup>a</sup> *Deutsch* [in German; Schopenhauer’s own translations of the principles in his lecture notes read ‘The subject that a predicate contradicts is also contradicted by the subject of that predicate’ and ‘the subject of a predicate is contradicted by every subject that that predicate contradicts’. See Hübscher SW 7, 241]

<sup>b</sup> *tertium comparationis*

<sup>c</sup> *Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit [der vier syllogistischen Figuren erwiesen (The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures Proved) (1762)]*


irrational are animals'. But this seems utterly superfluous here and has no part in our natural thought process. But to complete the same thought process directly by means of the first figure, I would have to say:

'All animals are irrational;  
Some things that can speak are animals'


which is clearly not the natural thought process: in fact, the conclusion that then results – 'some things that can speak are irrational' – needs to be inverted in order to uphold the concluding claim, a claim that flows from the third figure and that the entire thought process had had in view. – Let us take another example:

All alkali metals float in water;  
All alkali metals are metals;  
Therefore some metals float in water.

126 Transferring it into the first figure, the minor premise has to be inverted, to read as follows: 'some metals are alkali metals': and this only means that some metals fall within the sphere of 'alkali metals', thus:



while we really know that *all* alkali metals fall within the sphere of metals, thus:



Consequently, if the first figure is supposed to be the only normal one, then in order to think naturally we must think less than we know, and think indeterminately when we know determinately. This assumption has too much going against it. We must therefore roundly deny that we tacitly

invert a statement when we reason syllogistically in the second and third figures. Rather, the third as well as the second figure present just as rational a thought process as the first. Now let us consider another example of the other type of the third figure, which results in the separability of the two predicates; so in this case a premise must be negated:

No Buddhist believes in God;  
Some Buddhists are rational people:  
Therefore some rational people do not believe in God.

Just as the *compatibility* of two properties was the problem for reflection in the examples given above, now the *separability* of two properties is the problem, which here too is decided by means of a comparison in *one* subject so that the *one property* is established without the *other*: which brings us directly to our goal, a goal that we could reach only indirectly using the first figure. If we were to reduce the syllogism to this, we would have to invert the minor premise and therefore say: 'Some rational people are Buddhists', which mistakes the sense of the claim, namely that: 'some Buddhists are nevertheless rational people'.

127

I therefore propose that the governing principle of this figure be (for the affirmative mode): *ejusdem rei notae, modo sit altera universalis, sibi invicem sunt notae particulares*: and (for the negative mode): *nota rei competens, notae eidem repugnanti, particulariter repugnat, modo sit altera universalis*. Translated,<sup>a</sup> this reads: if two predicates are affirmed of one subject, and at least one universally, then they are also affirmed of each other particularly; but they are denied of each other particularly as soon as one of them contradicts the subject of which the other is affirmed; and the contradiction or affirmation must take place universally.

In the *fourth figure* the subject of the major premise is supposed to be compared to the predicate of the minor premise: but in the conclusion they would have to change places and values, so that what was the subject in the major premise would emerge as the predicate and what was the predicate in the minor premise would emerge as the subject. This shows clearly that this is just the *first figure* arbitrarily turned upside down, and is in no way the expression of an actual thought process that comes naturally to reason.

By contrast, the first three figures are the ectype of three actual and essentially different mental operations. What these have in common is that they all consist in the comparison of two judgments: but this becomes productive only when they have *one* concept in common. We can do this if

<sup>a</sup> Zu deutsch [in German]

128

we think of the premises as two sticks and the concept as a hook that joins the sticks together: in fact sticks like this could be used during a lecture. By contrast, what distinguishes the three figures from each other is that the judgments are compared either with respect to their two subjects or their two predicates, or finally with respect to the subject of the one and the predicate of the other. Since each concept has the property of being a subject or predicate only insofar as it is already part of a judgment, this confirms my view that, in a syllogism, it is in the first instance only judgments that are compared, and concepts are compared only insofar as they are parts of judgments. But what is essential in comparing two judgments is the respect *in* which they are being compared, not the means *by which* they are being compared: the former is the dissimilar concepts themselves, the latter is the middle term, i.e. the concept identical in both. Therefore *Lambert*, and indeed *Aristotle* and almost all the moderns have not adopted the correct point of view for analysing syllogisms because they began with the *middle term* and made it the principal focus and its position the essential feature of the syllogism. But it is of only secondary importance and its position is a consequence of the logical value of the concepts that are really to be compared in the syllogism. These are like two substances that are to be chemically tested and compared, but the middle term is the reagent *in* which they are tested. It therefore always takes the place left vacant by the concepts to be compared, and is no longer found in the conclusion. It is chosen in accordance with our understanding of its relation to both concepts and its suitability for the position to be occupied: this is why in many cases it can be exchanged for any other we might care to choose, without this having any impact on the syllogism: for instance, in the syllogism:

All men are mortal,  
Caius is a man

I can exchange the middle term 'man' for 'animal being'. In the syllogism:

All diamonds are rocks,  
All diamonds are flammable

I can exchange the middle term 'diamond' for 'anthracite'. The middle term is always very useful as a distinguishing characteristic that lets us recognize the figure of a syllogism immediately. But when it comes to a basic characterization of the explanandum, we must select its essential feature: and this is determined by the choice of whether one combines

two statements in order to compare their predicates, their subjects, or the predicate of one with the subject of the other.

So, in order to be premises that generate a conclusion, two judgments must share a common concept; they cannot both be negative or particular; and finally if the concepts in them to be compared are both subjects, they cannot both be affirmative either.

129

The voltaic pile can be seen as a symbol of the syllogism: its indifference point in the middle represents the middle term that holds the two premises together and gives them the power to form a conclusion:<sup>a</sup> the two dissimilar concepts on the other hand, which are really to be compared, are represented by the two different poles of the pile: only by combining these through both of their conducting wires, which signify the copulas of both judgments, can their contact generate the spark – the new light of the conclusion.

<sup>a</sup> *Schlusskraft*

*On Rhetoric*

Eloquence is the ability to inspire in others our idea or view about something, to spark in them our feelings about it and make them in sympathy with us: and all this by having our words conduct the flow of our thoughts into their heads, and this with such vehemence that it diverts their thoughts from the course they had already taken and sweeps them along with our own. This masterstroke is all the greater the more the course of their thoughts had previously diverged from our own. This shows why personal conviction and passion make someone eloquent, and why, in general, eloquence is more a gift of nature than a work of art: although here too art assists nature.

130 In order to convince somebody of a truth that conflicts with an error he is wedded to, the first rule to follow is easy and natural: *let the premises come first and the conclusion follow*. Yet this rule is seldom observed and people do the reverse, because zeal, haste, and pigheadedness make us scream the conclusion loudly and shrilly at the person clinging to the opposing error. This can easily intimidate him and set his will against all reasons and premises since he knows what conclusion they will give. That is why one should keep the conclusion completely hidden and give only the premises, clearly, completely, and comprehensively. If possible, one should not mention the conclusion at all: it must turn up in the listener's own reasoning in accordance with its laws, and the conviction that is born in him will be all the more sincere, and in addition be accompanied by self-esteem instead of shame. In difficult cases we can even pretend that we were aiming for the opposite of the conclusion we really intended to reach. A model of this is Antony's famous speech in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*.<sup>a</sup>

When defending some position, many people make the mistake of confidently putting forward everything that can possibly be said in its favour, the

\* This chapter relates to the conclusion of § 9 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> [Act III, sc. 2]

true, the half-true, and the merely apparent all jumbled up together. But what is false will quickly be recognized or even felt, and will cast suspicion on the valid and true remarks that are presented along with it: these should thus be given purely and on their own, and one should take care not to defend a truth with inadequate reasons that will appear sophistical as soon as they are put forward as adequate: because the opponent will defeat these and in so doing gain the appearance of having defeated the truth that is supported by them as well: i.e. he puts forward arguments *ad hominem* as arguments *ad rem*.<sup>a</sup> The Chinese go perhaps too far in the other direction, since they have the following saying: ‘The eloquent, sharp-tongued man can always leave half a sentence unspoken; and the man with truth on his side can confidently yield three-tenths of his claim.’<sup>70</sup>

<sup>a</sup> argumenta ad hominem *als* argumenta ad rem [*ad hominem*: literally, ‘to the person’; *ad rem*, ‘to the thing’]

## *On the Doctrine of Science*<sup>a</sup>

The analysis given in the previous chapters of the different functions of our intellect shows that the requirements for a legitimate use of the intellect, whether with a view to theory or to practice, are as follows: (1) The accurate,<sup>b</sup> intuitive grasp of the real things under consideration and all their essential characteristics and relations, which is to say all the *data*. (2) The formation of accurate *concepts* from these, which is to say the *unification* of those characteristics under the correct<sup>c</sup> abstractions, which now become the material for subsequent thinking. (3) The comparison of these concepts, sometimes with what is intuited, sometimes with each other, sometimes with the rest of the supply of concepts; so as to generate accurate and exhaustive *judgments* that are relevant to the matter at hand and deal with it comprehensively; that is, correct judging<sup>d</sup> of the matter. (4) The compilation or *combination* of these judgments into the premises of *sylogisms*: these can turn out very differently according to the selection and arrangement of the judgments, yet this is the primary determinant of the real *result* of the whole operation. This should entail that the process of free deliberation will come across precisely the most useful and decisive of the many possible combinations of different judgments relevant to the issue. – But if any essential point is overlooked in the first function, which is to say with the intuitive grasping of things and relations, the accuracy of all subsequent intellectual operations cannot prevent a false result: because this is where the *data* are found, the material of the whole investigation. Without the certainty that these are all correct and complete, one should abstain from any definitive decision in important matters. –

\* This chapter relates to § 14 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *Zur Wissenschaftslehre* [*Wissenschaftslehre* is also, perhaps coincidentally, the title of Fichte's major work, frequently disparaged by Schopenhauer]

<sup>b</sup> *richtige*

<sup>c</sup> *richtige*

<sup>d</sup> *Beurtheilung*



A concept is *correct*; a judgment is *true*; a body is *real*; a relation is *evident*.<sup>71</sup> – A proposition<sup>a</sup> that is immediately certain is an *axiom*. Only the principles of logic and those of mathematics that are drawn a priori from intuition, and finally the law of causality as well – only these have immediate certainty. – A proposition that is indirectly certain is a *theorem*, and what brings about this certainty is the proof. – If immediate certainty is attributed to a proposition that does not have it, this is begging the question.<sup>b</sup> – A proposition that refers directly to empirical intuition is an *assertion*: its confrontation with empirical intuition requires the power of judgment. – Empirical intuition can initially establish only *particular* and not universal truths: but through many repetitions and confirmations these can also acquire universality, although only a comparative and precarious one, because it can always be contested. – But if a proposition has absolutely universal validity, then the intuition it is based on is not empirical but a priori. This is why only the sciences of logic and mathematics are perfectly certain: but they only really tell us what we already know, because they are mere clarifications of what we are conscious of a priori, namely the forms of our own cognition, the one being the science of the form of thinking cognition, the other the science of the form of intuitive cognition. We therefore spin them from out of ourselves alone. All other knowledge<sup>c</sup> is empirical.

132

A proof proves *too much* if it extends to things or cases to which the thing to be proved clearly does not apply, and it is therefore apagogically refuted by these. – The *deductio ad absurdum* really consists of setting up a false claim as the major premise and adding a correct claim as the minor premise and drawing a conclusion that contradicts experiential facts or indubitable truths. Every false theory must be indirectly susceptible to this, to the extent that its advocate is cognizant of some truth and admits to it: because the conclusions drawn from this truth on the one hand and from the false claim on the other must be able to proceed until they give two propositions that are in direct contradiction. We find many examples in *Plato* of this neat trick of real dialectics.

A *correct hypothesis* is nothing more than the true and complete expression of the facts at hand, which have been grasped intuitively and in their true nature and inner connection by the person making the claim. This is because it only tells us what is really taking place.

133

<sup>a</sup> Satz

<sup>b</sup> *petitio principii*

<sup>c</sup> Wissen

The contrast between *analytic* and *synthetic methods* is already suggested by *Aristotle*, but perhaps clearly defined only in *Proclus* who quite rightly says: 'These methods have been handed down: the best of them uses analytic routes to trace what is to be proved to an acknowledged principle; Plato is said to have handed this down to Laodamas etc.' *On the First Book of Euclid's Elements*, Book III.<sup>a</sup> The analytic method consists of tracing what is given back to an acknowledged principle; the synthetic method on the other hand consists of a derivation from such a principle. They are thus analogous to *epagôgê* and *apagôgê*<sup>b</sup> as discussed in Chapter 9; except that the latter is not directed towards grounding propositions but rather towards overturning them. The analytic method goes from facts, the particular, to theorems, the universal, or from the consequent to the ground; the other method goes in the opposite direction. Thus it would be much more accurate to call them *the inductive and the deductive methods*: because the conventional names are inappropriate and express the matter poorly.

If a philosopher wants to start by thinking out the method according to which he will philosophize, he is like a poet who first writes an aesthetics for himself so that he can then write poetry in accordance with it: and both are like someone who first sings a song and then dances to it. The thinking mind must find its way with its original impulses: rule and application, method and achievement must, like form and matter, appear inseparably. But when you have arrived, you can look back at the path covered. Aesthetics and methodology are by nature younger than poetry and philosophy; just as grammar is younger than language, the figured bass younger than music, logic younger than thought.

134 This might be the place for a remark that I hope might help put an end to a growing source of corruption before it is too late. – The disadvantage that accrues to the fact that Latin is no longer the language of all scientific investigation is that there is no longer a scholarly<sup>c</sup> literature shared directly throughout the whole of Europe, but only national literatures, a situation that, at present, confines every scholar to a much smaller public, one moreover that is trapped in national one-sidedness and prejudices. So now a scholar must learn the four major European languages in addition to the two ancient languages. It is therefore a great source of relief that, as a legacy

<sup>a</sup> Μέθοδοι δὲ παραδίδονται· καλλίστη μὲν ἡ διὰ τῆς ἀναλύσεως ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ὁμολογουμένην ἀνάγουσα τὸ ζητούμενον· ἦν καὶ Πλάτων, ὡς φασί, Λαοδάμαντι παρέδωκεν, κ.τ.λ. (*Methodi traduntur sequentes: pulcherrima quidem ea, quae per analysin quaesitum refert ad principium, de quo jam convenit; quam etiam Plato Laodamanti tradidisse dicitur.*) *In primum Euclidis librum*, L. III.

<sup>b</sup> ἐπαγωγή und ἀπαγωγή [see p. 114]

<sup>c</sup> *wissenschaftliche*

from our ancestors, the technical terms<sup>a</sup> of all the sciences (with the exception of mineralogy) are Latin or Greek. The nations are therefore all wise to retain them. Only the Germans have had the unhappy idea of translating the technical terms of each science into German. There are two great disadvantages to this. First, foreign and even German scholars need to learn all the terms of art of their sciences twice over, and when there are many of them (for instance in anatomy) this is incredibly long and tedious. If other nations were not more sensible than Germans in this matter, we would be put to the trouble of learning every technical term five different times. If Germans continue like this, scholars abroad will have to leave German books aside, unread, since they are in addition usually much too long and written in a careless, poor, and often affected and tasteless style, as well as frequently with a disrespectful lack of consideration for the reader and his needs. – Secondly, these Germanizations of technical terms are almost always long, cobbled-together, clumsily chosen, laboured, hollow-sounding words that are not sharply distinguished from the rest of the language, and that are therefore difficult to remember, while the Greek and Latin expressions that have been selected by the ancient and never-to-be-forgotten founders of the sciences are quite the reverse, possessing all the good qualities, as well as having a sonorous ring to them that make them easy to remember. What an ugly, cacophonous word the German ‘*Stickstoff*’<sup>b</sup> is in place of nitrogen!<sup>72</sup> ‘Verb, noun, adjective’ is remembered and differentiated much more easily than the German ‘*Zeitwort*, *Nennwort*, *Beiwort*’<sup>c</sup> or particularly ‘*Umstandswort*’<sup>d</sup> instead of ‘adverb’.<sup>73</sup> In anatomy the situation is intolerable and even vulgar, pitched at the level of a journeyman barber.<sup>74</sup> It is easier to get ‘*Pulsader*’ and ‘*Blutader*’ confused than it is with ‘artery’ and ‘vein’: but what is totally baffling are expressions such as ‘*Fruchthälter*’, ‘*Fruchtgang*’ and ‘*Fruchtleiter*’ instead of ‘uterus, vagina and fallopian tubes’, which every doctor needs to learn anyway, and that allow him to get along in all European languages; similarly ‘*Speiche*’ and ‘*Ellenbogenröhre*’ instead of ‘*radius*’ and ‘*ulna*’, which all of Europe has understood for millennia: so what is the point of this clumsy, confusing, belaboured, and in fact tasteless Germanization? No less repulsive is the translation of logical technical vocabulary, where our beloved philosophy professors have created a new terminology, and almost each of them has his own: with G. E. Schulze<sup>e</sup> for instance the subject is the

135

<sup>a</sup> *termini technici*

<sup>b</sup> [Literally, ‘sticky matter’]

<sup>c</sup> [Literally, ‘time-word, name-word, at-word’]

<sup>d</sup> [Literally, ‘circumstance-word’]

<sup>e</sup> [In *Grundsätze der allgemeinen Logik* (*Principles of general logic*) (second edition, 1810; third edition, 1817)]

‘Grundbegriff’, the predicate the ‘Beilegungsbegriff’, then there are the ‘Beilegungsschlüsse’, ‘Voraussetzungsschlüsse’ and ‘Entgegensetzungsschlüsse’, judgments have ‘Größe’, ‘Beschaffenheit’, ‘Verhältniß’ and ‘Zuverlässigkeit’, i.e. quantity, quality, relation and modality.<sup>a</sup> The same tiresome<sup>75</sup> influence of all this Germanification is to be found throughout the sciences. – The Latin and Greek expressions have the additional advantage that they mark out the scientific concept for what it is and distinguish it from words in everyday use and the ideas that have come to be associated with such everyday usage; whereas, for instance ‘Speisebrei’ instead of chyme seems to be talking about young children’s food. ‘Lungensack’ instead of ‘pleura’, as well as ‘Herzbeutel’ instead of ‘pericardium’, seems to come from butchers rather than anatomists.<sup>b,76</sup> Finally, the most immediate necessity for learning the ancient languages is connected with these old technical terms,<sup>c,77</sup> and the use of living languages for scholarly investigation is increasing the danger that the study of these ancient languages will be set aside entirely. But if we get to this point, the spirit of the ancients (which is tied to their languages) will disappear from scholarly education, and the whole of literature will be seized by crassness, triviality and vulgarity. This is because the works of the ancients are the North Star for every artistic or literary endeavour: if this disappears, then you will be lost.<sup>78</sup> Even now it is obvious from the wretched and puerile style of most writers that they have never written in Latin.<sup>\*,79</sup> An engagement with the writers of antiquity is most appropriately termed *Humanities*:<sup>d</sup> because it is primarily through this that the student becomes *human* again,<sup>e</sup> since he enters a world that was still pure of all the buffoonery of the Middle Ages and the romantics, which subsequently forced their way so deeply into European humanity that, even today, everyone enters the world plastered with it and must first wipe it off in order just to become *human* again. Do not think that your modern wisdom could ever replace that initiation *into being human*; you are not born freemen, like Greeks and

\* One of the principal uses of studying the ancients is that it protects us from long-windedness; since the ancients are always concerned to write with conciseness and accuracy and the error of almost all moderns is long-windedness, which the newest of the moderns try to make good by suppressing syllables and letters. This is why the study of the ancients should be pursued throughout life, although the time that can be devoted to it may be limited. The ancients knew that one should not write as one speaks: the most recent of the moderns, on the other hand, have so little shame that they print up the lectures they have given.

<sup>a</sup> *Quantität, Qualität, Relation und Modalität*

<sup>b</sup> [The German terms can be literally translated as ‘mush for eating’ (the term ‘chyme’ has an exclusively physiological meaning and no connection to infants’ food); ‘lung sack’; ‘heart bag’]

<sup>c</sup> *terminis technicis*

<sup>d</sup> *Humanitätsstudien*

<sup>e</sup> *wird ... wieder ein Mensch*

Romans were, the free sons of nature. You are before all else the sons and heirs of the crude Middle Ages with its nonsense, of the scandalous priestcraft and the half brutal, half foppish knighthood. If both of these are gradually coming to an end, this does not mean that you can now stand on your own two feet. Without the school of antiquity, your literature will degenerate into vulgar gossip and banal philistinism. – For all of these reasons, it is my friendly advice that an immediate end be put to this Germanizing criticized above.

Further, I want to take the opportunity here to point to a source of mischief that has been haunting German orthography for several years now in a shocking manner. Literary hacks in all genres have started abbreviating expressions without realizing that this involves carefully eliminating everything superfluous, which in their case would mean the whole of their writings. They think that this lets them shave off words, like a miser with coins, and each syllable that looks superfluous to them (because they do not have a proper sense of its value) gets snipped off without further ado. For instance, our forefathers showed a proper sense of nuance in using the terms ‘*Beweis*’ and ‘*Verweis*’ and, on the other hand, ‘*Nachweisung*’. The fine distinction, analogous to the one between ‘*Versuch*’ and ‘*Versuchung*’ and ‘*Betracht*’ and ‘*Betrachtung*’,<sup>80</sup> is undetectable to thick ears and thick skulls; thus they have invented the word ‘*Nachweis*’ which immediately entered daily use, something that happens only when an idea is really clumsy or a blunder is really crude. And so the same amputation has already taken place on countless words: for instance, instead of ‘*Untersuchung*’ people write ‘*Untersuch*’, and in fact instead of ‘*allmählig*’ we even get ‘*mählig*’, instead of ‘*beinahe*’ there is ‘*nahe*’, instead of ‘*beständig*’, ‘*ständig*’. If a Frenchman started to say *près* instead of *presque*, or an Englishman *most* instead of *almost* he would be universally regarded as a fool: in Germany though this passes for the work of an original mind. Chemists already write ‘*löslich* and *unlöslich*’ instead of ‘*unauflöslich*’ and unless they get their hands slapped by the grammaticians, the language will be robbed of a valuable word: knots, shoelaces, and conglomerates whose cement has softened are *löslich*, as is everything analogous:<sup>81</sup> *auf löslich* on the other hand is what completely disappears in a fluid, like salt in water. ‘*Auflösen*’ is the specific term<sup>a</sup> which means this and nothing else, specifying a particular concept: but our sharp-witted language-improvers want to pour it into the universal washtub of ‘*Lösen*’: to be consistent, they must then replace all instances of ‘*ablösen*’ (for relieving a military watch),

137

<sup>a</sup> *terminus ad hoc*

138 ‘*auslösen*’, and ‘*einlösen*’ with ‘*lösen*’, and accordingly blunt the specificity of the term in this case as in every case. But to deprive language of a term means to deprive the nation’s thinking of a concept. But this has been the tendency of the collective efforts of almost all of our authors for the past ten to twenty years: because what I have shown here with a *single* example can be proven by a hundred more, and<sup>82</sup> the meanest stinginess with syllables rages like an epidemic. Miserable wretches actually count every letter and have no compunction about crippling a word or giving it the wrong meaning if only two more letters can be squeezed out of it. Someone who is incapable of new thoughts will at least want to put new words on the market, and everyone who spills ink considers himself called upon to improve the language. Journalists have the least shame about it, and since their pages have the very largest public (because of the triviality of their contents) and indeed a public that for the most part does not read anything else, they constitute a great threat to the language; this is why I seriously advise that they be subjected to orthographic censorship, or be made to pay a fine for every unusual or garbled word: because what could be more ignoble than that linguistic change begin from the very lowest branches of literature? A language, and in particular a relatively original language<sup>a</sup> like German, is a nation’s most precious legacy, and besides that, it is an enormously complex work of art that is easy to spoil and cannot be repaired, and is therefore a ‘touch me not’.<sup>b</sup> Other peoples have sensed this and have shown great piety towards their own languages, even though they are far less perfect: so the language of Dante and Petrarch is only trivially different from that of today, Montaigne is still entirely readable, as is Shakespeare in his oldest editions.<sup>83</sup> – It is even good for a German to have a big word in his mouth, because Germans think slowly and big words give them more time to collect their thoughts. But this destructive economy of language is seen in yet more characteristic phenomena: for instance, contrary to all logic and grammar, they put the imperfect tense in place of the perfect and<sup>84</sup> pluperfect; they frequently pocket the auxiliary verb; they use the ablative instead of the genitive; for the sake of getting rid of a couple of logical particles, they create such entangled sentences that they need to be read four times over to be understood: this is all because it is only paper that is to be spared, not the reader’s time: in true Hottentot fashion, they do not give the case of proper nouns either with inflection or with an article: the reader is left to guess it. But they are particularly keen to swindle away the double vowels and the use of an ‘h’ to lengthen the sound, these

<sup>a</sup> *Ursprache*

<sup>b</sup> *ein noli me tangere*

letters that are dedicated to prosody, a procedure akin to banning η and ω from the Greek language and replacing them with ε and ο.<sup>a</sup> Anyone who writes *Scham*, *Märchen*, *Maß*, *Spaß*, should also write *Lon*, *Son*, *Stat*, *Sat*, *Jar*, *Al*, etc. But since writing is in fact the copy of speech, later generations will imagine that one must express oneself as one writes: which means that all that will be left of the German language will be a befuddled, sharp-nosed, musty sound of consonants, and all prosody will be lost. Another well-loved ploy is to write '*Literatur*' instead of the proper German '*Litteratur*' in order to save a letter. This is defended by giving the participle of the verb *linere* as the origin of the word. But *linere* means *to scrawl*: and so the popular spelling might indeed be the proper one for the majority of German hack writers, and we could distinguish between a very small *Litteratur* and a very extensive *Literatur*. – In order to write concisely, people should refine their style and avoid all useless blather and chitchat: then they would not need to swindle away syllables and letters on account of the cost of paper. But to write so many useless pages, useless sheets, useless books, and then to want to make innocent syllables and letters pay for this waste of time and paper – this is really the limit case of what the English call being 'pennywise and pound foolish'.<sup>b</sup> – It is too bad that there is no German Academy to take the language into its protection in the face of this literary *sansculottism*,<sup>c</sup> particularly in an age when even those unversed in ancient languages dare to use the press. I have elaborated on the subject of the unforgiveable mischief that is being done to the German language these days in my *Parerga*, vol. II, ch. 23. –

139

I will give a small sample of the most general *classification of the sciences* according to the form of the principle of sufficient reason that predominates in them, a classification that I have already proposed in my essay *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, § 51, and touched on again here, in §§ 7 and 15 of the First Volume – although there are doubtless many ways in which this sample can be improved and made more complete.

### I. Pure sciences a priori

1. The doctrine of the ground of being
  - (a) in space: geometry.
  - (b) in time: arithmetic and algebra.
2. The doctrine of the ground of cognition: logic.

140

<sup>a</sup> [long and short *e* and *o* respectively]

<sup>b</sup> [In English in the original]

<sup>c</sup> *Sansculottismus* [a coinage referring to the *sans coulottes* ('those without knee breeches'), lower-class French radicals]

**II. Empirical or *a posteriori* sciences**

All according to the ground of becoming, i.e. the law of causality and indeed according to its three modes.

1. The doctrine of causes:
  - (a) universal: mechanics, hydrodynamics, physics, chemistry.
  - (b) particular: astronomy, mineralogy, geology, technology, pharmacy.
2. The doctrine of stimuli:
  - (a) universal: physiology of plants and animals, along with their auxiliary science of anatomy.
  - (b) particular: botany, zoology, zootomy, comparative physiology, pathology, therapeutics.
3. The doctrine of motives:
  - (a) universal: ethics, psychology.
  - (b) particular: doctrine of right, history.

Philosophy or metaphysics, as the doctrine of consciousness and its contents in general, or of the whole of experience as such, does not have a place here, because it does not, without further ado, follow the line of thought required by the principle of sufficient reason, but instead has this principle itself as its object. It is to be seen as the ground bass of all sciences, but is of a higher type than these and is related to art almost as much as it is to science. – Just as in music each individual phrase must correspond to the tonality to which the ground bass has progressed, similarly every writer will, according to the standards of his discipline, bear the mark of the dominant philosophy of his age. – But in addition to this, each science has its special philosophy: hence we speak of a philosophy of botany, of zoology, of history, etc. What we rationally understand by this is nothing other than the main results of each science itself, considered from and united according to the highest, i.e. the most general standpoint possible from within each of them. These most universal results link directly to universal philosophy, since they provide it with important data and spare it the trouble of looking for these data itself in the material of the special sciences, material that has not been worked through with an eye to philosophy. These special philosophies therefore have an intermediate position between their special sciences and genuine philosophy. Since philosophy must provide the most general information about the entirety of things, this information must be capable of being brought down to and applied to the particulars of every sort of thing. The philosophy of each science arises independently of universal philosophy, namely from the data of its own particular science: thus, these special philosophies do not have to wait for universal philosophy to be finally



discovered, instead they have been worked out in advance, and will always be consistent with the true, universal philosophy. Such philosophy, for its part, must be susceptible to confirmation and clarification from the philosophies of the individual sciences, because the most general truth must be capable of being verified by the more specific. Goethe has provided a good example of the philosophy of zoology in his reflections on *Dalton's* and *Pander's* skeletons of rodents. (*Volumes on Morphology*,<sup>a</sup> 1824.) To the extent that they have all have put forward the general analogy, inner relatedness, permanent type, and law-like connection of animal forms, *Kiellmayer*, *Delamark*, *Geoffroy St-Hilaire*, *Cuvier* and others have rendered similar services to the same science. – Empirical sciences pursued for their own sake and not guided by philosophical tendencies are like a face without eyes. They are a suitable occupation for clever people who still lack the highest abilities, abilities that, in any event, would only hinder minute investigations such as this. Such men concentrate the whole of their energy and all their knowledge on a single, well-defined field in which they can therefore attain the most complete cognition possible, on condition that they know absolutely nothing about any other field;<sup>85</sup> while the philosopher surveys all fields, and in fact must be at home in them all to a certain extent, and so the sort of perfection that is only attained through details is necessarily out of the question for him. The first sort of researchers can be compared to those Genevan workers, one of whom makes only wheels, the other only springs, the third only chains; the philosopher on the other hand is like the watchmaker who makes all these into a whole, endowed with motion and meaning.<sup>b</sup> The first type of researcher can also be compared to the musicians in the orchestra, each master of his instrument, while the philosopher is like the conductor who must be familiar with the nature of each instrument and how to play it, yet without playing all or even only one of them with any great perfection. *Scotus Erigena* includes all the sciences under the name of *scientia*, in contrast to philosophy, which he calls *sapientia*.<sup>c</sup> The Pythagoreans had already made the same distinction, as can be seen in *Stobaeus, Anthology*,<sup>d</sup> vol. I, p. 20, where it is argued in a very clear and graceful manner.<sup>86</sup> But a very happy and suggestive metaphor for the relation between these two types of intellectual endeavour has been repeated so often by the ancients that we no longer know where it comes from.

142

<sup>a</sup> *Hefte zur Morphologie* [concerning Christian Heinrich Pander and Eduard d'Alton's *Vergleichende Osteologie* (*Comparative Osteology*), a series of engravings begun in 1821]

<sup>b</sup> *Bedeutung*

<sup>c</sup> [wisdom]

<sup>d</sup> *Florilegium*

Diogenes Laertius (II, 79)<sup>a</sup> attributes it to Aristippos, Stobaeus (*Anthology*, Tit. IV, 110) to Ariston of Chios; it is attributed to Aristotle by his scholiast (p. 8 of the Berlin edition), while Plutarch (*On the Education of Children*),<sup>b</sup> ch. 10) attributes it to Bion, ‘who said: just as Penelope’s suitors, when they could get nowhere with Penelope, lay with her maids, similarly those for whom philosophy cannot be brought to life employ their powers in other and lesser disciplines’.<sup>c</sup> In our overwhelmingly empirical and historical age, it cannot hurt to bear this in mind.

<sup>a</sup> [*Lives of Ancient Philosophers* (third century)]

<sup>b</sup> *De puer[orum] educ[at]ione*

<sup>c</sup> *qui aiebat, sicut Penelopes proci, quum non possent cum Penelope concumbere, rem cum ejus ancillis habuissent; ita qui philosophiam nequeunt apprehendere, eos in aliis nullius pretii disciplinis sese contere*

*On the Doctrine of Method in Mathematics*

The Euclidian method of demonstration has produced its most biting parody and caricature from out of its own womb in the famous controversy over the theory of *parallels* and the attempt, repeated yearly, to prove the eleventh axiom. This asserts, and indeed through the intermediary criterion of an intersecting third line, that two lines inclined towards each other (which really means: 'smaller than two right angles') if sufficiently extended, must meet, a truth that is supposed to be too complicated to pass for self-evident, and thus is in need of a proof which, however, is not to be found, precisely because there is nothing more immediate. This scruple of conscience reminds me of Schiller's question of right:

143

For years I have used my nose to smell:  
But do I really have a demonstrable right to it?<sup>a</sup>

And indeed it seems to me that the logical method rises to the point of *niaiserie*<sup>b</sup> here. But precisely through the controversies concerning this, along with the futile attempts to present what is *immediately* certain as merely *mediately* certain, the independence and clarity of what is intuitively evident is in contrast with the uselessness and difficulty of logical conviction, a contrast that is no less instructive than it is amusing. People do not want to admit the immediate certainty of the parallel axiom because it lacks that merely logical certainty that follows from the concept and is thus based solely on the relation of the predicate to the subject in accordance with the principle of contradiction. This axiom is a synthetic a priori claim and as such is guaranteed by pure, non-empirical intuition, which is just as immediate and certain as the principle of contradiction itself, a principle from which all proofs first receive their tenure of certainty. This is fundamentally true of every geometrical

\* This chapter relates to § 15 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> [From *Die Philosophen* (*The Philosophers*)]

<sup>b</sup> [folly, foolishness]

theorem, and the line between what is immediately certain and what first needs to be proven is an arbitrary one. – I am surprised that the eighth axiom is not the target of attacks instead: ‘figures that coincide<sup>a</sup> are equal to each other’. Because *coinciding*<sup>b</sup> is either a mere tautology or something entirely empirical that does not belong to pure intuition but to outer, sensuous experience. Namely, it presupposes the mobility of figures: but only matter is mobile in space. Thus, the reference to coinciding leaves aside pure space, the sole element of geometry, in order to pass over to what is material and empirical. –

144 The supposed inscription over Plato’s lecture hall, ‘Let no one enter who has not studied geometry!’<sup>c</sup> which mathematicians are so proud of, was doubtless motivated by the fact that *Plato* regarded geometric figures as intermediaries between the eternal *Ideas* and the particular things, as *Aristotle* frequently mentions in his *Metaphysics* (in particular I, ch. 6, pp. 887, 998 and scholia, p. 827, Berlin edition).<sup>d</sup> Besides, the contrast between those eternal Forms or *Ideas* that exist for themselves, and transient particular things, can be grasped most readily using geometric figures, and so this contrast lays the ground for the doctrine of the Ideas, which is the heart of *Plato*’s philosophy, and indeed his only serious and decisive theoretical dogma: when discussing it he begins with geometry. In the same sense, we are told that he considered geometry to be a preliminary exercise that habituates the minds of students to dealing with incorporeal objects, having so far, in practical life, dealt only with corporeal things (scholia to *Aristotle*, pp. 12, 15). So this is the sense in which *Plato* recommended geometry to philosophers: and consequently there is no justification for extending it any further. Instead, for an investigation of the influences of mathematics on our mental powers and its use in scientific culture in general, I recommend a very thorough and knowledgeable essay, in the form of a review of a book by *Whewell*, in the *Edinburgh Review* from January 1836: the author, who published the review later with several other essays under his name, is *W. Hamilton*, professor of logic and metaphysics in Scotland. It was also discovered by a German translator, and appeared by itself under the title: *On the Value and Lack of Value of Mathematics*, from the English, 1836.<sup>e</sup> The essay concludes that the value of

<sup>a</sup> *Figuren, die sich decken*

<sup>b</sup> *das Sichdecken*

<sup>c</sup> Ἀγεωμέτρητος μηδὲς εἰσίτω

<sup>d</sup> [987b15, 998a6]

<sup>e</sup> [Schopenhauer gives the German title, of which this is the translation. The original English title of Sir William Hamilton’s essay is ‘Attacks upon the Study of Mathematics as a Training of the Mind’. The book reviewed was William Whewell, *Thoughts on the Study of Mathematics as a Part of a Liberal Education* (1835)]

mathematics is only indirect, namely in its application to ends that can only be reached by its means; but that in itself mathematics leaves the mind where it found it, is in no way requisite for the general training and development of the mind, and is in fact a definite obstacle. This can be concluded not only from thorough dianoiological investigation of mathematical mental activity, but is also confirmed by a very learned accumulation of examples and authorities. The only immediate use that mathematics is allowed to have is that it can habituate fickle and wandering minds to the practice of attentiveness. — Even *Descartes*, who was himself famous as a mathematician, had a similar judgment about mathematics. In the *Life of Descartes*<sup>a</sup> by Baillet, 1693, it says, Book II, ch. 6, p. 54: ‘His own experience convinced him that mathematics was of little use, particularly when it is pursued for its own sake . . . He found that there was nothing more pointless than occupying oneself with mere numbers and imaginary figures etc.’<sup>b,87</sup>

145

<sup>a</sup> *Vie de Descartes* [Adrien Baillet, *La vie de Mr Des-Cartes. Contenant L’histoire de sa Philosophie et de ses autres ouvrages* (*Life of Monsieur Descartes: containing the history of his philosophy and other works*)]

<sup>b</sup> *Sa propre expérience l’avait convaincu du peu d’utilité des mathématiques, surtout lorsqu’on ne les cultive que pour elles mêmes. — — Il ne voyait rien de moins solide, que de s’occuper de nombres tout simples et de figures imaginaires u.s.f.*

*On the Association of Ideas*<sup>a</sup>

The presence of representations and ideas in our consciousness is as rigorously subject to the principle of sufficient reason in its different forms as the movement of bodies is to the laws of causality. It is as impossible for an idea to enter consciousness without an occasion as it is for a body to start moving without a cause. Now this occasion is either *external*, which is to say an impression on the senses; or *internal*, which is to say it is itself an idea that introduces another one by way of *association*. This in turn is either based on a relation of ground and consequent holding between them, or on similarity (even a mere analogy), or finally on their first being apprehended at the same time, which is in turn grounded in the spatial proximity of their objects. These last two cases are signified by the term '*à propos*'. The intellectual worth of a mind is characterized by the predominance of one of these three linkages of association of ideas over the others: the first one mentioned will be dominant in thoughtful and thorough minds, the second in witty, spirited, poetic minds, and the third in feeble minds. No less characteristic is the facility with which one idea calls forth others that stand in some relation to it: this constitutes the quickness of the mind. But the impossibility of the appearance of an idea in the absence of its sufficient occasion, even with the strongest will that it be brought forward, is attested to by all those times when we try in vain *to remember*<sup>b</sup> something, and search through the entire warehouse of our ideas to find some one of them that is associated with what we are looking for: if we find the former, the latter is there as well. Somebody trying to dredge up a memory will always begin by looking for a thread on which it hangs by the association of ideas. This is the basis of mnemonics as well: it seeks to provide us with easily found occasions for all the concepts, ideas, or words that we want to keep in reserve. But the problem with this is that the

146

<sup>a</sup> *Gedankenassociation* [The term *Gedanke* is elsewhere rendered as 'thought', reserving *Idee* for 'idea'. We have frequently made an exception in this section, however, since Schopenhauer is discussing the notion whose canonical English formulation is the 'association of ideas'.]

<sup>b</sup> *besinnen*

occasions themselves also need to be recovered, and require their own occasion for doing so. How much work the occasion does in supplying the memory can be established by the fact that someone who has read fifty anecdotes in an anecdote book and then put it down sometimes cannot remember a single one immediately afterwards: yet if the occasion arises, or if he is struck by an idea that has some sort of analogy with one of the anecdotes, then the anecdote suddenly occurs to him; and so with all fifty, if the occasion arises. The same thing is true of everything that one reads. – Our immediate memory of words, which is to say the memory that is not mediated by the mnemonic arts and with this our entire linguistic ability, is fundamentally based on the immediate association of ideas. This is because language learning consists in permanently linking a concept with a word to the point where the word always occurs to us with the concept and the concept with the word. We need to repeat the same process afterwards every time we learn a new language. Yet if we learn a new language for passive rather than active use, i.e. for reading and not for speaking, as most people learn Greek for instance, then the linkage is one-sided, since we think of the concept when given the word, but the concept does not always make us think of the word. The same procedure we see in language becomes apparent in the particular case of learning a new proper name. But sometimes we do not trust ourselves to immediately connect the name of *this* person, or city, river, mountain, plant, animal, etc. tightly enough to the thought of it for the name to be able to pull the thought up on its own: then we make use of some mnemonic device to tie the image of the person or thing to some intuitive quality whose name occurs with it. But this is only a temporary scaffolding: we later leave it behind since the association of ideas becomes an immediate support.<sup>88</sup>

The search for a thread of memory is shown in a peculiar way in the case of a dream that we have forgotten on waking: we then search in vain for something that, only a few minutes ago, engaged us with the power of the brightest present, but has now escaped us entirely. This is why we grasp at any remaining impression that offers the little thread that could pull that dream back into our consciousness by way of association. According to Kieser, *Tellurism*,<sup>a</sup> vol. II, § 271, memories can sometimes remain from magnetic-somnambulant sleep, through a sensuous sign found in waking consciousness. The fact that we can successfully determine to do something at a particular time only if we think of nothing else until that time, or if something *reminds* us of it at the particular time, is based on this same impossibility of a thought occurring without an occasion; the reminder can

147

<sup>a</sup> *Tellurismus* [Dietrich Georg Kieser, *System des Tellurismus oder Thierischen Magnetismus* (*System of Tellurism or Animal Magnetism*) (1822)]

be either an external impression previously prepared with this in mind, or a idea that is itself introduced in a regular fashion. Both then belong to the class of motives. – When we wake up each morning, consciousness is a *tabula rasa*<sup>a</sup> that is then rapidly refilled. To begin with, the previous evening's surroundings reappear and remind us of what we were thinking about in those very surroundings; the events of the previous day are linked up with this, and so one thought rapidly calls forth others until everything that engaged us yesterday has returned. Our mental health is based on this taking place correctly, while madness, as we have shown in the Third Book, is the presence of large gaps in the connection of our recollections. We can see how thoroughly sleep breaks the thread of memory (to the point that we need to reattach it every morning) by the occasional imperfections in this operation: for instance, in the morning we sometimes cannot think of a melody that was driving us to the point of distraction the night before.

148

Cases where a thought or image in the imagination occurs to us suddenly and without a conscious occasion appear to be an exception to what we are saying. But this is generally an illusion based on the fact that the occasion was so minimal and the thought itself so clear and interesting that it momentarily displaced that occasion from consciousness; sometimes however this sort of very sudden appearance of a representation is caused by inner, physical impressions, either of the parts of the brain on each other or even of the organic<sup>89</sup> nervous system on the brain.

In general, the reality of the thought process<sup>b</sup> inside us is not as simple as its theory; since here many things are interconnected. We can visualize the situation by comparing our consciousness with water of some depth; the thoughts that are clearly conscious are merely those on the surface: the greater part is made up of what is unclear, of feelings, the retrospective sensation<sup>c</sup> of intuitions and of experience in general, mingled with the particular disposition of our will, which is the core of our being. Now this greater part of our entire consciousness is in more or less constant motion (proportionate to intellectual vivacity) and consequently what rises to the surface are the clear images of the imagination, or clear, conscious, verbally articulated thoughts, and resolutions of the will. The whole process of our thinking and deciding is rarely at the surface, i.e. it rarely consists of a linkage of clearly conceived judgments, although this is what we strive for in order to give an account to ourselves and to others: however, rumination on the material we receive from the outside,

<sup>a</sup> [blank slate]

<sup>b</sup> *Gedankenproceß*

<sup>c</sup> *Nachempfindung*



rumination in which our ideas are worked out, usually takes place in the obscure depths, proceeding almost as unconsciously as the transformation of nutrition into the humours and the substance of the body. This is why we are frequently unable to account for the origin of our deepest thoughts:<sup>a</sup> they are the fruits of our mysterious interiority. Judgments, ideas,<sup>b</sup> decisions arise from this depth unexpectedly and in ways that amaze us. A letter brings us some surprising and important news, leading to a confusion of our thoughts and motives; we put it out of our minds for the time being and stop thinking about it, but on the next day, or the third or fourth day, we sometimes see the whole situation lying clearly before us with a sense of what we have to do. Consciousness is only the surface of our mind and, like the terrestrial sphere, we do not know its interior but only its crust.

149

But what sets in motion the association of ideas itself, an association whose laws we explained above, is in the final instance (or in the mystery of our interiority) the *will*, which drives its servant, the intellect (in proportion to its strength) to link one thought to another, to recall similar things, things that happened at the same time, to recognize grounds and consequences, because it is in the interest of the will that thinking should take place, so that we are as prepared as possible to deal with whatever happens. Thus the form of the principle of sufficient reason that governs the association of ideas and keeps it busy is, in the final analysis, the law of motivation; because what controls the sensorium and determines it to pursue an analogy or some other association of ideas in this or that direction is the will of the thinking subject. Just as here the laws of the nexus of ideas only exist on the basis of the will, so the causal nexus of bodies in the real world also exists only on the basis of the will that expresses itself in their appearances; and this is why explanation from causes is never absolute and exhaustive but rather refers back to natural forces as their condition, the essence of which is precisely the will as thing in itself – with this of course I anticipate the next Book.<sup>90</sup>

Now since the *outer* (sensible) occasions for the presence of our representations are constantly affecting our consciousness as much as the *inner* (the association of ideas),<sup>91</sup> and both independently of each other, our train of thought<sup>c</sup> is frequently interrupted, lending a certain choppiness and confusion to our thinking which is one of the ineradicable imperfections of our thinking that we will now examine in a chapter of their own.

<sup>a</sup> *Gedanken*

<sup>b</sup> *Einfälle*

<sup>c</sup> *Gedankenlauf*

## *On the Essential Imperfections of the Intellect*

The form of our self-consciousness is not space but only *time*: this is why our thinking does not, like our intuition, occur in *three* dimensions, but only in *one*, and thus in a line without breadth or depth. This gives rise to the greatest of the fundamental imperfections of our intellect. Namely, we can have cognition of things only *successively* and can be conscious only of one thing at a time, and in fact this one thing only under the condition that we forget everything else in the meantime, that is, have no consciousness of anything else, so that nothing else exists for us during this time. In this respect, our intellect can be compared to a telescope with a very narrow field of vision, because our consciousness is not lasting but transient. The intellect apprehends things only successively and must leave one thing behind in order to grasp another, retaining only ever fainter traces of what is left behind. The thought that engages me keenly now will *necessarily* have entirely slipped my mind in a little while: and if I get a good night's sleep in between, then I might never find it again unless I have some personal interest in it, i.e. it is connected to my will, which always carries the day.<sup>92</sup>

This imperfection of the intellect is the basis for the rhapsodic and often<sup>93</sup> *fragmentary character of our train of thought*,<sup>a</sup> which I already mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, and gives rise to the inevitable *scattering* of our thoughts. Sometimes external sense impressions disturb and interrupt our thinking and keep forcing complete irrelevancies upon it, and sometimes *one* idea will bring in *another* through the ties of association and be displaced by it; and finally, sometimes the intellect itself will not be able to sustain one single idea for very long, but be rather like the eyes when, after staring for a long time at a single object, they no longer see it very clearly since the edges run together and become confused and everything finally becomes obscure – similarly, when constantly pondering  
 151 a single topic for a long period of time, thinking gradually becomes

<sup>a</sup> *Gedankenlauf*

confused and blunted and ends up completely stupefied. Thus, with every meditation or deliberation that is lucky enough to carry on without disturbance but has not yet come to an end, even when it concerns matters that are of the highest importance and most relevance to ourselves, we need to let it go for a certain amount of time (for how long depends on the particular case) and free our consciousness of this very engaging topic so as to busy ourselves with insignificant and indifferent matters, however much our concern with the one subject oppresses us. During this time, our important concern is no longer present to us: it is now, like heat in cold water, *latent*. And when we take it up again at another point in time, we approach it as if it were a new topic in which we need to orient ourselves anew, albeit more quickly, and its impression on our will, whether pleasant or repellent, is new as well. Meanwhile, we ourselves are not entirely unchanged when we return. This is because our disposition and view change along with the physical composition of the humours and tension of the nerves which are constantly shifting during the hours, days, and years: in addition, the disparate representations that were there in the meantime have left behind an echo, and its sound influences subsequent representations. This is why the same subject often seems very different to us at different times, mornings, evenings, afternoons, or on different days: opposing points of view have forced themselves upon us and increased our doubts. This is why people speak of sleeping on an issue and need plenty of time to think about big decisions. Now if this constitution of our intellect has its obvious disadvantages arising from its weaknesses, it nevertheless affords us the advantage that after distraction and physical reorientation, we return to our business as, comparatively speaking, a different person, fresh and new, and are therefore able to view our affairs several times over in very different lights. – From all this it is apparent that human consciousness and thinking is by nature necessarily fragmentary, which is why the theoretical or practical results derived from the combination of such fragments usually leave something to be desired. In this way our thinking consciousness is like a magic lantern<sup>a</sup> that can focus on only one picture at a time; each picture must soon disappear, even if it presents the noblest of things, to make room for very different sorts of pictures, indeed pictures of the most vulgar of things. – In practical affairs the most important plans and decisions are established in general outline: but these determine the arrangement of others beneath them as means to an end, and these in turn determine others, and so on down to the particular details that are to be

152

<sup>a</sup> *laterna magica*

carried out concretely.<sup>a</sup> But these are not carried out in the order of their dignity – instead, while we are occupied with plans in general and universal outline, we must do battle with the petty details and the cares of the moment. This makes our consciousness even more desultory. In general, an intellectual engagement with theoretical issues renders one hopeless with practical affairs and *vice versa*.

As a result of what we have been describing as the unavoidably scattered and fragmentary nature of all our thinking and the resulting mixture of the most diverse representations, something evident in even the noblest human minds, we really have only a *half-awareness*<sup>b</sup> and we use it to feel our way through the labyrinth of our life and the obscurity of our investigations: our path is illuminated by bright moments as if by flashes of lightning. But what can we really expect from minds when even the wisest among them is turned into a playground for the wildest and most senseless dreams every night, and is supposed to emerge from these to resume its meditations?<sup>94</sup> Clearly, a consciousness that is subject to such restrictions is little suited to take on the riddle of the world, and this sort of endeavour would seem strange and pathetic to beings of a higher nature whose intellect is not in the form of time and whose thinking would therefore be truly whole and united. In fact, it is a wonder that we are not completely confused by having such a diverse mix of fragments of all sorts of thoughts and representations constantly passing through our heads, and that we can always find our way and make everything fit together. Clearly there must be a simple thread that puts everything into order: but what could it be? – Memory alone is not equal to this task, since it has fundamental limitations that I will soon describe and is in addition imperfect and unfaithful in the extreme. The *logical I* or even the *transcendental synthetic unity of apperception* – are expressions and clarifications that do not obviously serve to make the issue easy to grasp, and instead will cause many people to think:

153

Sure your keys are strong, but you cannot unbolt the door.<sup>c</sup>

Kant's claim that 'the *I think* must accompany all our representations'<sup>d</sup> is not enough, because the I is an unknown quantity, i.e. it is itself a mystery. – What gives consciousness unity and coherence cannot itself be conditioned

<sup>a</sup> *in concreto*

<sup>b</sup> *eine halbe Besinnung*

<sup>c</sup> *Zwar euer Bart ist kraus, doch hebt ihr nicht die Riegel.* [Goethe, *Faust I*, 671. Literally, 'Sure your beard is curly']

<sup>d</sup> [*Critique of Pure Reason* B 131–2: Schopenhauer misquotes the passage which in fact states that 'the "I think" must be able to accompany all my representations' – emphasis added]

by consciousness and thus cannot be a representation, since throughout all of its representations, it is the base, the enduring support; instead, it must be the *prius*<sup>a</sup> of consciousness and the root of the tree of which consciousness is the fruit. This, I say, is the *will*: it alone is unchangeable and absolutely identical, and it has brought consciousness forth for its own ends. Thus it is also what lends consciousness its unity and holds all its representations and thoughts together, accompanying them as a sort of continuous ground bass.<sup>b</sup> Without the will the intellect would have no more unity of consciousness than a mirror that successively presents one thing after another, or at most only as much as a convex mirror whose beams converge in an imaginary point behind its surface. It is the *will* alone that endures and remains unaltered in consciousness. It is what holds all thoughts and representations together, as means to its ends, colouring them with its character, its mood, and its interests, commanding our attention and holding the thread of motive, whose influence ultimately activates the memory and association of ideas: and it is at base what we are talking about whenever 'I' occurs in a judgment. It is thus the true and ultimate point of unity for consciousness and the bond of all of its functions and acts: it does not, however, itself belong to intellect, but is rather only its root, origin, and commander.

From the *form of time and the single dimension* of the series of representations, because of which the intellect needs to leave everything else behind to grasp one thing – from this it follows that the intellect is *forgetful* as well as scattered. It never picks up most of what it drops; particularly because picking anything up is linked to the principle of sufficient reason, and thus requires an occasion that must first be provided by motivation and the association of ideas, although this occasion can be slighter and more distant if our sensitivity for it is increased by interest in the object. But memory, as I have already demonstrated in my essay *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, is not a vessel but rather merely an acquired ability for bringing forth whatever representations are chosen, which therefore can only be retained through the practice of constant repetition or else they are gradually lost. Accordingly, knowledge is only virtually<sup>c</sup> present, even in the most learned minds, as a practice acquired through the production of certain representations: while in actuality it too is restricted to a single representation and is, at any given time, aware only of this. It is here that a peculiar contrast arises between what is known potentially<sup>d</sup> and what is known

154

<sup>a</sup> [prior thing]

<sup>b</sup> *Grundbaß*

<sup>c</sup> *virtualiter*

<sup>d</sup> *potentiâ*

actually,<sup>a</sup> i.e. between one's knowledge and what one is thinking at any given time: the former is a vast and somewhat chaotic mass, the latter is a single clear thought. Their relationship is like the relationship between the innumerable stars in the sky and the narrow field of vision of a telescope: it is especially striking when we have some occasion for wanting to recall clearly some detail we know, but which takes time and effort to find in that chaos. Rapidity in doing so is a particular gift, but is highly dependent on the day and the hour: this is why memory sometimes fails in its duties, even with things that are within easy reach at other times. This consideration encourages us to strive more for accurate insight than increased erudition in our studies, and to bear in mind that the *quality* of knowledge is more important than the *quantity*. Quantity adds only thickness to books while quality gives them thoroughness as well as style, because it is *intensive* while the other is merely extensive. It consists in the clarity and completeness of concepts, along with the purity and accuracy of the intuitive cognition on which they are based, and so this fills the whole of knowledge in all its components and determines the extent to which knowledge is valuable or trifling. More can be done with a little quantity but superior quality than with enormous quantity and poor quality. –

The most perfect and satisfactory cognition is intuitive cognition: but it is restricted to the particular, to the individual. We can combine what is many and varied into a single representation only by using *concepts*, i.e. by omitting differences, and this is therefore a very imperfect type of representing. Of course even the particular can be immediately grasped as a universal, namely when it is raised to the level of a (Platonic) *Idea*: but in this process (that I analysed in the Third Book) the intellect withdraws from the limitations of individuality and thus time: and this is only an exception.

These internal and essential imperfections of the intellect are exacerbated by a disruption that is in a sense external to it but nonetheless unavoidable, namely the influence that the *will* exercises on all intellectual operations as soon as it is in any way interested in the results. Every passion, and in fact every inclination or aversion colours the objects of cognition. Most common is the falsifying influence in which wishes and hopes influence cognition by making what is barely possible seem probable or almost certain and making us almost incapable of grasping obstacles: fear has a similar effect; and every preconceived opinion, every partiality is analogous and also, as I said, every interest, every impulse and every inclination of the will.

<sup>a</sup> *actu*

Lastly, to all these imperfections of the intellect we can add the fact that it ages along with the brain, i.e. like all physiological functions it loses its energy in later years; at which point all of its imperfections are greatly increased.

We will not be surprised by what we have shown to be the defective constitution of the intellect if we look back at its origin and function, as I have described them in the Second Book. Nature produced the intellect in the service of an individual will: so it is dedicated to the cognition of things only to the extent that they provide motives for this will, not in order to fathom them or to grasp their essence in itself. The human intellect is only a higher intensification of the animal intellect: and since this latter is entirely restricted to the present, ours too bears strong traces of this restriction. This is why our memory and powers of recollection are really very imperfect: how little we can recall of what we have done, experienced, learned and read! And even this little usually only imperfectly and with difficulty. This is also why we find it so difficult to keep ourselves free from present impressions. – Absence of consciousness<sup>a</sup> is the original and natural state of all things, and therefore also the basis from which consciousness is generated in isolated species of beings as their highest efflorescence, so that even so an absence of consciousness is still always the predominant state. Accordingly, most beings have no consciousness: nevertheless they act according to the laws of their nature, i.e. their will. Plants have at most a very weak analogue to consciousness, the lowest animals merely a glimmering of it. But even after it has risen through the entire range of animals to the level of human beings and their faculty of reason, the distinctively botanical lack of consciousness (from which it began) remains the foundation, and traces of it can be seen in the need for sleep as well as in all the great and fundamental imperfections we have shown to exist in every intellect that is a product of physiological functions: and we have no concept of any other.

What we have shown here to be the *essential* imperfections of the intellect can, in certain cases, always be heightened by *non-essential* imperfections. The intellect never lives up to its possibilities in *every* respect; its possible perfections are in such mutual opposition as to exclude each other. This is why nobody can be both Plato and Aristotle, or Shakespeare and Newton, or Kant and Goethe *at the same time*. By contrast, the imperfections of the intellect work very well together, so that in reality it usually remains far from what it could be. Its functions depend on conditions that

156

157

<sup>a</sup> *Bewusstlosigkeit*

are given to us only in *appearance*, within which we can comprehend them only as anatomical and physiological; and these conditions are so numerous that an intellect excelling decisively along even a single dimension is one of the rarest of natural phenomena;<sup>a</sup> thus the products of such intellects are preserved for millennia and each relic of such a precious individual is treasured. There are countless gradations between an intellect such as this and one that verges on idiocy. Given these gradations, each of us proves to have a very different *intellectual horizon*,<sup>b</sup> ranging from a mere grasp of the present (which even animals have), to a horizon that extends to the following hour, to one that encompasses the entire day or even the next day as well, the week, the year, a lifetime, centuries, millennia, up to a consciousness whose present almost always includes (albeit obscurely) the dawning horizon<sup>c</sup> of infinity, and whose thoughts accordingly assume a character appropriate to this. – Moreover, this difference in degrees of intelligence is revealed by *rapidity* of thought, which is very important and might be as diverse and finely differentiated as the speed of the points of the radius in a spinning disc. The distance one's thought can span from a ground to a consequent seems to stand in a certain relation to rapidity of thinking, since the most sustained exertion of thought can generally only be maintained for a very short amount of time, yet it is only during this time that a thought can be thought through in its complete unity; and this is why the question then becomes how far the intellect can pursue this thought in such a short span of time, and thus how much ground it can cover during this time. Yet for some people, the ability to attenuate the period in which the thought has attained its complete unity is a substitute for the lack of rapidity. It is probably slow and sustained thinking that makes for a mathematical mind and rapidity of thought that makes a genius: the latter is a flight, the former a steady advance on solid ground, step by step. Still, this latter is insufficient even in the sciences as soon as we

158 are no longer interested only in quantities and want instead to understand the essence of appearances, as is proved for instance by *Newton's* theory of colours<sup>d</sup> and later by *Biot's* drivel over colour-rings, which is nonetheless linked to the whole atomistic view of light in France, with their 'light molecules'<sup>e</sup> and in general their fixed idea of wanting to reduce everything in nature to merely mechanical effects. – Finally, the great differences in

<sup>a</sup> *Naturerscheinungen*

<sup>b</sup> *geistige Gesichtskreis*

<sup>c</sup> *Horizont*

<sup>d</sup> [Schopenhauer consistently regards this theory as erroneous: see *VC*, and *PP* 2, ch. 7. On Jean Baptiste Biot see *VC*, 280 (Hübscher *SW* 1, 85) and *PP* 2, 177 (Hübscher *SW* 6, 208)]

<sup>e</sup> *molécules de lumière*



individual intelligence under discussion are demonstrated primarily in the *degree of clarity of comprehension* and thus in the *distinctness of the whole of thinking*. What one person regards as understanding is what another sees as merely something analogous to observation; the former is already finished and at the goal while the latter is only at the beginning; what for the former is already the solution, the latter sees as only the problem. This is due to the *quality of thinking* and knowing, as was already mentioned above. Minds, like rooms, have different degrees of brightness. This *quality of the whole of thinking* can be sensed when one has read only a few pages of an author, because this requires one to understand using the author's understanding, as it were, and in his sense: thus, before one knows *what* an author has thought about things, one already sees *how* he thinks, namely the *formal* elements of his thinking, its *texture*, which remains the same in everything he thinks, and which is imprinted on his style and thought process. One senses in this both the pace and stride, the suppleness and ease, and in fact even the hastening of his soul, or conversely, its awkwardness, stiffness, slowness and leaden state. Because just as language is the mark of a people's spirit, style is the immediate mark of an author's spirit,<sup>a</sup> the physiognomy of his mind. We should throw away a book if we see that it takes us to a region more obscure than our own; unless it is only facts we are after, not ideas. Apart from this, we stand to gain only from those authors whose understanding is sharper and clearer than our own, authors who accelerate the pace of our thinking, not those who slow it down, like the dull minds who want to make us join the snail's pace of their thinking; we stand to gain from those minds that encourage and relieve us when we join their thoughts, minds that we feel are taking us to places we could not reach on our own. *Goethe* once said to me that when he read a page of *Kant* he felt as though he had entered a bright room. Minds are poor not just because they are distorted and therefore judge falsely, but rather primarily because of the *lack of clarity* that pervades their entire thought, which is comparable to seeing through a bad telescope that blurs and confuses all shapes and makes different objects indistinguishable. Such minds do not demand of themselves the sort of conceptual clarity from which their weak understandings recoil in alarm; rather, they make use of a sort of haze in which they comfort themselves by grasping at *words*, particularly those that describe indeterminate, highly abstract and unusual concepts that are hard to explain, such as, for instance, infinity and finitude, sensuous and super-sensuous, the Idea of Being, Ideas of reason, the Absolute, the Idea of the

159

<sup>a</sup> *des Geistes* [*Geist* also means 'mind']

Good, divinity, moral freedom, the power of self-creation, the absolute Idea, subject–object, etc. They confidently throw around terms such as these and actually think they are expressing thoughts and expect everyone to be happy about it: because the highest level of wisdom they can imagine is to have words like these ready and waiting for every possible question. This inexpressible *gratification with words* is entirely characteristic of poor minds: it is due precisely to their incapacity for clear concepts as soon as they quit the sphere of the simplest and most trivial concerns, and is thus due to the weakness and inertia of their intellects, in fact to a secret consciousness of this which with scholars is connected to an early recognition of the harsh necessity of passing for thinking beings, which requires that they keep ready a supply of words prepared for all occasions. It must be quite funny to see a philosopher of this ilk at the lectern, lecturing in all sincerity with this sort of empty verbiage, standing in front of students who are just as sincere (i.e. equally deluded) and are listening and writing everything down with rapt attention, while basically neither one has gone past the words, which, along with the scratching of the pens, are the only real things in the whole affair. This characteristic *gratification with words* has perpetuated more errors than anything else. Buttressed by words and phrases inherited from their predecessors, they all pass confidently over obscurities and problems, and so these continue on unnoticed for centuries from book to book, and thinking minds, particularly when young, will be unsure of whether they are simply unable to understand or whether there is really nothing comprehensible in front of them; similarly they will not know whether the problem (that other people are all creeping around on the same path with such laughable seriousness) really is not a problem at all or whether they just do not want to see it. Many truths lie undiscovered simply because nobody has the courage to look the problem in the eye and really take it on. – By contrast, the genuinely lucid thoughts and clear concepts characteristic of eminent minds shed new light or at least new interest on even familiar truths: to hear or read them, you would think that you had traded a bad telescope for a good one. Just read, for instance, *Euler's* presentation of the foundations of mechanics and optics in his *Letters to a Princess*.<sup>a</sup> This is the basis for the remark Diderot makes in passing in *Rameau's Nephew*,<sup>b,95</sup> that only perfect masters are capable of discussing the elements of a science really well; because only they really understand the subject and never let words take the place of ideas.

<sup>a</sup> [See p. 26, n. a]

<sup>b</sup> [*Le Neveu de Rameau* [written 1761–72]]

But one should know that poor minds are the rule, good minds the exception, eminent minds exceedingly rare, and genius is a miracle.<sup>a</sup> How else after six thousand years could the human race with its approximately eight hundred million individuals still have so much that is yet to be discovered, found, thought and said? The intellect is charged only with ensuring the survival of the individual, and yet it is for the most part barely able to do even this. But nature has wisely been very sparing in bestowing any greater quantity: because limited minds can gain an overview and handle a lever for the few and simple tasks that lie within their scope of activity much more easily than eminent minds, who survey an immeasurably greater and richer sphere and work with a longer lever. And so the insect sees everything on its stem and leaf with the minutest precision, and better than we can, but is not aware of the person three steps away. This is why fools are sly, and it also explains the paradox: 'The intellect of people who do not have one is a curious thing.'<sup>b</sup> Genius is as useful in practical life as an astronomical telescope is in the theatre. – Nature is, accordingly, highly *aristocratic* with respect to the intellect. The differences that it introduces in this sphere are greater than those established by birth, rank, wealth, or social class in any country: but as with other aristocracies, there are many thousands of plebeians for one nobleman, many millions for one prince, and the great majority is merely the common people, mob, rabble, *la canaille*.<sup>c</sup> Of course there is a glaring contrast between the order of rank in nature and that of convention, and we can only hope to see them brought into balance in a golden age. Still, those at the very top of the one order of rank and those at the very top of the other have in common the fact that they usually live in splendid isolation, which *Byron* indicates by saying:

161

To feel me in the solitude of kings,  
Without the power that makes them bear a crown.  
(*The Prophecy of Dante*, Canto 1)<sup>d</sup>

The intellect is a differentiating, and therefore separating principle; its different levels give different concepts to each person, much more than mere education does, and as a result each person lives to a certain extent in a different world, a world in which he directly encounters only those who are similarly situated, and can call to other people only from a distance,

<sup>a</sup> *portentum*

<sup>b</sup> *Il y a un mystère dans l'esprit des gens qui n'en ont pas*

<sup>c</sup> *Pöbel, mob, rabble, la canaille*

<sup>d</sup> [lines 166–7. Schopenhauer quotes the English and adds a German translation in a footnote]

162

trying to get them to understand him. Great differences between the degree, and with it the development, of the understanding create wide gulfs between people, which only kind-heartedness<sup>a</sup> can cross, this by contrast being the unifying principle that enables us to identify ourselves with other people. Still, the connection remains a moral one: it cannot become intellectual. Even given the same level of education, the conversation between a great mind and a common head is like a man on a high-spirited steed travelling with someone on foot. It soon becomes very annoying to both and in the long run impossible. Of course the rider can dismount and walk a short way with the other person, but even then he will have to contend with the impatience of his horse. –

Still, nothing could be better for the public than to recognize this *intellectual aristocracy of nature*. It would let them see that when it comes to facts – that is, when we refer to experiments, travelogues, codices, history books, and chronicles – a normal mind will suffice; but, by contrast, in matters that refer exclusively to *thoughts*,<sup>b</sup> particularly to thoughts for which the material, the data, is available to everyone, and therefore where it is really just a matter of *thinking ahead* of other people, what is imperative is that decisive superiority and innate eminence provided only by nature and then very rarely, and anyone who cannot provide immediate proof that they possess this does not deserve an audience. If only the public could see this, it would stop squandering its precious allotment of education time on the products of ordinary minds, on the countless botched works of poetry and philosophy that get hatched each day, it would stop grabbing at whatever is most novel in the childish delusion that books, like eggs, must be enjoyed fresh; rather, it would stick to the achievements of the few who are selected and called upon from all ages and peoples, it would try to get to know and understand them and could in this way gradually achieve a genuine education. And then those thousands of undistinguished products would disappear, products that impede our growth as weeds impede the growth of good wheat.

<sup>a</sup> *Herzensgüte*

<sup>b</sup> *Gedanken*

## *On the Practical Use of Reason and Stoicism*

In Chapter 7 I showed that, in the theoretical realm, starting from *concepts* leads to mediocre achievements, while superior achievements are drawn from intuition itself, as the well-spring of all cognition. But it is the other way around in the practical realm: here being determined by intuition is the way of animals, and this is unworthy of human beings whose actions are guided by *concepts* and who are thereby emancipated from the power of what lies before them in the intuitive present,<sup>a</sup> the very present that has unconditional control over animals. A human being's actions can be called *rational* to the extent that he exercises this privilege, and it is only in *this* sense that we can speak of *practical reason*, not in the Kantian sense, the untenability of which I discussed at length in the prize essay *On the Basis of Morals*.<sup>b</sup>

However, it is not easy to be determined by *concepts* alone: the external world, as it lies before us with its intuitive reality, will intrude forcefully on even the strongest mind. But the human spirit shows its dignity and greatness precisely in vanquishing this impression, in negating its mocking illusion.<sup>c</sup> So when someone's spirit is unmoved by the charms<sup>d</sup> of pleasure and enjoyment, untouched by the threats and furies of enraged enemies, when his resolve is unshaken by the entreaties of misguided friends or the illusions surrounding him as a result of agreed-upon schemes, when his self-command is not shattered by the spite of fools and the masses so that he misjudges his own value – then he seems to stand under the influence of a spiritual world (it is the spiritual world of concepts) visible to himself alone, and that intuitive present that is open to everyone flees like a phantom before it. – On the other hand, what gives the external world

164

\* This chapter relates to section § 16 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *der Macht der anschaulich vorliegenden Gegenwart*

<sup>b</sup> [See *BM*, ch. II]

<sup>c</sup> *Gaukelspiel*

<sup>d</sup> *Reizungen*

and visible reality its great power<sup>a</sup> over the mind is its proximity and immediacy. We can think of the needle of the compass that maintains its direction throughout the united effect of widely distributed natural forces across the entire earth, and yet can be disturbed and made to sway wildly by a tiny piece of iron that happens to come too close; similarly, even a strong spirit can sometimes be disturbed and lose self-command due to petty circumstances and people, simply because they are too close, and the most thoughtful decision can be momentarily shaken by an insignificant but directly present counter-motive. This is because the relative influence of the motive is subject to a law that is the precise opposite of the law governing weights on a scale, as a result of which a very small but very close motive can outweigh a motive that is much stronger but more distant. But the feature whereby the mind is determined by such a law and does not escape by dint of actual practical reason is what the ancients called a lack of self-control,<sup>b</sup> which really means ‘reason unable to govern the will’.<sup>c</sup> Every *affect* (disturbance of the soul)<sup>d</sup> arises when a representation working upon our will comes so excessively close to us that it blocks everything else out and we cannot see beyond it, which makes us momentarily unable to consider any alternative. A good remedy for this would be to imagine the present as if it were the past, and thus habituate our apperception to the Roman epistolary style. We are of course eminently capable of the converse, of viewing the distant past as vividly present so that old, long dormant affects reawake in full force. – On the other hand, nobody would get upset about some misfortune, some aggravation and lose his temper if reason constantly reminded him what the human being really is: a creature in the greatest need of help, subject to countless misfortunes both small and large, every day and every hour, ‘the most miserable creature’,<sup>e</sup> and who must therefore live in constant worry and fear. ‘Man is entirely chance’<sup>f</sup> as Herodotus already said.<sup>96</sup>

165

The use of reason in the practical sphere leads reason first to piece back together the one-sided and divided elements of merely intuitive cognition, and, using the opposites that such cognition provides as mutual correctives, to obtain objectively accurate results. For instance, if we keep our eyes fixed on someone’s profligate acts, we will condemn him; if, on the other hand, we think only of the distress that moved him to do these

<sup>a</sup> *Gewalt*<sup>b</sup> *animi impotentia*<sup>c</sup> *ratio regendae voluntatis impotens*<sup>d</sup> *animi perturbatio*<sup>e</sup> τὸ δειλότατον ζῶον [possibly a paraphrase of Plato, *Laws*, 814b: πάντων δειλότατον φύσει θηρίων]<sup>f</sup> Πᾶν ἔστι ἀνθρώπος συμφορῇ (*homo totus est calamitas*) [*Histories*, 1, 32]

things, we will have compassion for him: using these concepts, reason weighs both considerations and leads to the result that he must be chastised, restrained, and guided using an appropriate punishment.

I am reminded here of Seneca's expression: 'If you want to subdue everything, let reason subdue you!'<sup>a</sup> But, because (as we showed in the Fourth Book) the nature of suffering is positive and that of pleasure negative, someone who takes abstract or rational cognition as the standard for his conduct and so always takes into consideration its results and the future, will very often have to practise 'endure and forego';<sup>b</sup> this is because he will usually have to sacrifice lively joys and pleasures in order to make life as painless as possible, keeping in mind Aristotle's 'the prudent man strives for painlessness, not for pleasure'.<sup>c</sup> Hence for him, the future always borrows from the present, as opposed to dim-witted fools who always pay the present by borrowing from the future, which is then impoverished and goes bankrupt. With them of course reason plays, for the most part, the role of a bad-tempered mentor, constantly demanding self-denial without being able to promise anything in return except a moderately painless existence. This is because reason with its concepts can survey the *whole* of life, whose result can, in the best possible scenario, be nothing other than what we have said.

This striving for a painless existence, as far as it may be possible, through the use and guidance of rational considerations and acquired knowledge<sup>d</sup> of the true constitution of life, has produced *Cynicism*, which pursued this endeavour with rigorous consistency and followed it to its furthest extremes. *Stoicism* was later derived from this, and I wish to pursue this briefly in order to reinforce the basis of the discussion that concluded our First Book.

166

All ancient systems of morals, except Plato's, were guides to a happy<sup>e</sup> life: accordingly, these systems do not hold that there is any purpose at all for virtue after death but only in this world. They consider virtue as nothing more than the proper way to a truly happy life, and this is why the wise man chooses it. This is the origin of the extensive debates (preserved for us by Cicero) and the penetrating investigations that were constantly rejoined about whether virtue on its own and by itself is sufficient for a happy life, or whether something else is needed besides;

<sup>a</sup> *Si vis tibi omnia subicere, te subijce rationi* [Epistles, 37, 4]

<sup>b</sup> *Sustine et abstine* [Epictetus in Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* (Attic Nights) XVII, 19, 6]

<sup>c</sup> ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ ἄλυτον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ (*quod dolore vacat, non quod suave est, persequitur vir prudens*) [See *Nicomachean Ethics* VII, 12 (1152b15)]

<sup>d</sup> *Erkenntnis*

<sup>e</sup> *glücklich*

whether the virtuous and wise man is happy even on the rack or the wheel or in the bull of Phalaris;<sup>a</sup> or whether this is going too far. That would clearly be the litmus test for an ethics of this sort: its practice would have to cause immediate and unconditional happiness. If it does not, then it does not do what it should and must be rejected. So *Augustine* is as correct as he is Christian when he begins his discussion of ancient systems of morals (*City of God*,<sup>b</sup> Book XIX, chapter 1) by explaining: ‘it is incumbent on us to explain the proofs through which mortal men have attempted to obtain for themselves a happiness *in the unhappiness of this life*, so as to make clear how great the difference is between their vain endeavours and that for which we hope. Philosophers have argued a great deal with each other about the highest good and the highest evil; and by treating this question with the greatest eagerness they try to discover what makes human beings happy; because this is what is called the highest good.’<sup>c,97</sup> I want to leave no doubt as to what I have indicated as the eudaimonistic<sup>98</sup> goal of ancient ethics, and I want to do so by citing several explicit pronouncements from the ancients. *Aristotle* said in the *Magna Moralia*, I, 4: ‘Happiness consists of a happy life, while a happy life consists of a virtuous life’,<sup>d</sup> which can be compared with *Nicomachean Ethics* I, 5. – Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations* V, 1: ‘For, since this was the cause that drove people who began to busy themselves with the study of philosophy to regard everything else as less important and to devote themselves entirely to the study of the best way of leading a life, they have actually done so in the hope that this would enable them to lead a happy life, and have thus taken such care and effort with this study.’<sup>e</sup> – According to *Plutarch* (*On Stoic Self-contradictions*,<sup>f</sup> ch. 18) *Chrysippus* said: ‘To live a life of vice is the same as living an unhappy life.’<sup>g</sup> – *Ibid.*, ch. 26: ‘Wisdom is not different from happiness, but is itself

<sup>a</sup> [Seneca, *Epistles*, 66. The legendary bronze bull was an instrument of torture in which victims were boiled alive]

<sup>b</sup> *De Civitate Dei*

<sup>c</sup> *Exponenda sunt nobis argumenta mortalium, quibus sibi ipsi beatitudinem facere in hujus vitae infelicitate moliti sunt; ut ab eorum rebus vanis spes nostra quid differat clarescat. De finibus bonorum et malorum multa inter se philosophi disputarunt; quam quaestionem maxima intentione versantes, invenire conati sunt, quid efficiat hominem beatum: illud enim est finis bonorum* [Schopenhauer adds the emphasis and shortens the passage by omitting several clauses]

<sup>d</sup> Ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῷ εὖ ζῆν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ εὖ ζῆν ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ζῆν (*Felicitas in bene vivendo posita est: verum bene vivere est in eo positum, ut secundum virtutem vivamus*) [1184b29. The attribution of *Magna Moralia* to Aristotle is disputed]

<sup>e</sup> *Nam, quum ea causa impulerit eos, qui primi se ad philosophiae studia contulerunt, ut, omnibus rebus posthabitis, totos se in optimo vitae statu exquirendo collocarent; profecto spe beate vivendi tantam in eo studio curam operamque posuerunt* [V, 1, 2]

<sup>f</sup> *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis*

<sup>g</sup> Τὸ κατὰ κακίαν ζῆν τῷ κακοδαιμόνως ζῆν ταύτόν ἐστιν (*Vitiose vivere idem est, quod vivere infeliciter*) [ch. 18, 1042a]



happiness.’<sup>a</sup> – Stobaeus, *Eclogues*, Book II, ch. 7: ‘They call their goal happiness, for the sake of which everything is done.’ – ‘They consider happiness synonymous with the highest goal.’<sup>b,99</sup> – Arrian, *The Discourses of Epictetus*, I, 4: ‘Virtue carries within itself the promise of happiness.’<sup>c</sup> – Seneca, *Epistles* 90: ‘And also, it (wisdom) strives for the state of happiness; it leads to this, it opens the path to this.’ – Also Epistle 108: ‘I remind you that listening to and reading the philosophers must be included in the plan of a happy life.’<sup>d</sup>

The ethics of the *Cynics* therefore promoted this goal of the happiest life, as Emperor *Julian* clearly establishes: *Orations* VI: ‘The goal and final purpose for the *Cynics* – as indeed for every other philosophy – is the happy life: the happy life however consists in living according to nature and not according to the opinions of the crowd.’<sup>e</sup> But the *Cynics* suggested a very particular path to this goal, one diametrically opposed to the typical path: that of the most wide-ranging deprivations possible. Specifically, they began with the thought that the motions into which the will is put by the objects that stimulate and excite it the most, the laborious and mostly futile efforts to acquire these objects or, if they are acquired, the fear of losing them, and finally of course the loss themselves – all these create much greater pain than would arise from forgoing all these objects in the first place. This is why the *Cynics* chose the path of the greatest possible deprivation in order to achieve the most painless life, and fled all pleasures as snares that would only deliver one over to more pain. Then they could boldly defy happiness and its caprices. This is *the spirit of Cynicism*: it is clearly expressed by Seneca in the eighth chapter of *On Peace of Mind*:<sup>f</sup> ‘One must consider how much less pain there is in not having something than in losing it: and we understand that poverty causes less suffering the less there is to lose.’<sup>g</sup> So: ‘It is easier and more tolerable not to gain than to lose . . . Diogenes has shown that someone who has freed himself from everything accidental . . .

168

<sup>a</sup> Ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἕτερον ἐστὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καθ’ ἑαυτὸ, ἀλλ’ εὐδαιμονία (*Prudentia nihil differt a felicitate, estque ipsa adeo felicitas*) [1046e]

<sup>b</sup> Τέλος δέ φασιν εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται (*Finem esse dicunt felicitatem cuius causa fiunt omnia*) – Εὐδαιμονίαν συνωνυμεῖν τῷ τέλει λέγουσι (*Finem bonorum et felicitatem synonyma esse dicunt*) [Schopenhauer’s reference is to Arnold Heeren’s edition of the *Eclogues* (1792)]

<sup>c</sup> Ἡ ἀρετὴ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν, εὐδαιμονίαν ποιῆσαι (*Virtus proficitur, se felicitatem praestare*) [I, 4, 3]

<sup>d</sup> *Ceterum (sapientia) ad beatum statum tendit, illo ducit, illo vias aperit* [90, 27] – *Id. ep. 108. Illud admono, auditionem philosophorum, lectionemque, ad propositum beatae vitae trahendam* [108, 35]

<sup>e</sup> Τῆς Κυνικῆς δὲ φιλοσοφίας σκοπὸς μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ τέλος, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ πάσης φιλοσοφίας, τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν· τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν τῷ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας (*Cynicae philosophiae, ut etiam omnis philosophiae, scopus et finis est feliciter vivere: felicitas vitae autem in eo posita est, ut secundum naturam vivatur, nec vero secundum opiniones multitudinis*) [193d]

<sup>f</sup> *De tranquillitate animi* [see VIII, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7]

<sup>g</sup> *cogitandum est, quanto levior dolor sit, non habere, quam perdere: et intelligemus, paupertati eo minorem tormentorum, quo minorem damnum esse materiam.*

can never be robbed . . . I think he has said: 'Do your worst, O Fate, with Diogenes there is nothing more you can call your own.'<sup>a,100</sup> This final claim has a parallel in this passage in Stobaeus (*Eclogues*, II, 7): 'Diogenes said that he thought he looked upon Fate as it looked upon him and said: I am not able to touch this mad dog.'<sup>b</sup> Another testimony to this same spirit of Cynicism can be found on *Diogenes'* gravestone, in *Suidas*, under the heading *Philiskos*,<sup>c</sup> and Diogenes Laertius,<sup>d</sup> VI, 2:

Even brass wears away in time; but, Diogenes, detractors  
Will never take your fame from future ages;  
Because you alone have shown the easiest and most worthy path  
To a self-sufficient life, to mortal happiness.<sup>e</sup>

Accordingly, the basic thought of Cynicism is that life is most tolerable in its simplest and barest form with the hardships given to it by nature and so this is what should be chosen; because every succour, comfort, diversion or pleasure with which people try to make it more pleasant only brings in new and greater plagues than those it originally had. Thus the claim that should be seen as the basic expression of its doctrine is: 'Diogenes was in the habit of frequently calling out that the gods have vouchsafed for men to live easy lives, but this remains concealed from those who crave honey cakes, ointments, and things of this sort.'<sup>f</sup> – Diogenes Laertius, VI, 2. Moreover: 'Those who strive only to live according to nature instead of engaging in useless endeavours will necessarily live a happy life; people are unhappy only because of their foolishness . . . And he claimed to lead the same sort of life as Heracles, since there was nothing he prized higher than freedom.' *Ibid.*<sup>g</sup> Accordingly, the genuine, ancient Cynics,

<sup>a</sup> *Tolerabilis est, facilisque, non acquirere, quam amittere.* — — *Diogenes effecit, ne quid sibi eripi posset.* — — *qui se fortuitis omnibus exiit.* — — *Videtur mihi dixisse: age tuum negotium, fortuna: nihil apud Diogenem jam tuum est.*

<sup>b</sup> Διογένης ἔφη νομίζειν ὁρᾶν τὴν Τύχην ἐνορῶσαν αὐτὸν καὶ λέγουσαν· τοῦτον δ'οὐ δύναμαι βαλέειν κύνα λυσσητήρα (*Diogenes credere se dixit, videre Fortunam, ipsum intuentem, ac dicentem: ast hunc non potui tetigisse canem rabiosum*) [II, ch. 7, 21 (ch. 8 in the Heeren edition)]

<sup>c</sup> *voce Φιλίσκος*

<sup>d</sup> [See p. 138, n. a]

<sup>e</sup> Γηράσκει μὲν χαλκὸς ὑπὸ χρόνου· ἀλλὰ σὸν οὐτὶ / Κῦδος ὁ πᾶς αἰὼν, Διόγενης, καθελεῖ. / Μοῦνος ἐπεὶ βιοτῆς αὐτάρκεια δόξαν ἔδειξας / Ὦνητοῖς, καὶ ζωῆς οἶμον ἐλαφροτάτην (*Aera quidem absumit tempus, sed tempore numquam / Interitura tua est gloria, Diogenes: / Quandoquidem ad vitam miseris mortalibus aequam / Monstrata est facilis, te duce, et ampla via.*) [VI, 2, § 78]

<sup>f</sup> Διογένης ἐβόα πολλάκις λέγων, τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίον ῥάδιον ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν δεδόσθαι, ἀποκεκρῦφθαι δὲ αὐτὸν ζητούντων μελίπηκτα καὶ μύρα καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια (*Diogenes clamabat saepius, hominum vitam facilem a diis dari, verum occultari illam quaerentibus mellita cibaria, unguenta, et his similia.*) [VI, 2, § 44]

<sup>g</sup> Δέον, ἀντὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων πόνων, τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν ἐλομένους, ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως· παρὰ τὴν ἄνοιαν κακοδαίμονοῦσι. — — τὸν αὐτὸν χαρακτῆρα τοῦ βίου λέγων διεξάγειν, ὄντερ καὶ Ἡρακλῆς, μηδὲν ἐλευθερίας προκρίνων (*Quum igitur, repudiatis inutilibus laboribus, naturales insequi, ac vivere beate debeamus, per summam mentem infelices sumus.* — — *eandem vitae formam, quam Hercules, se vivere affirmans, nihil libertati praeferens.* — *Ibid.*) [VI, 2, § 71]

Antisthenes, Diogenes, Crates and their disciples permanently renounced all possessions, comforts, and pleasures, in order permanently to escape all the toil and care, the dependency and pain that are inexorably linked to these and can never be outweighed by them. By satisfying only the most pressing needs and only when necessary, and by forgoing everything superfluous, they thought they could get off lightly. Accordingly, they made do with what they could get for almost nothing in Athens and Corinth, such as lupins, water, a bad *tribonion*,<sup>a</sup> a knapsack and a staff, begging occasionally and when necessary, but not working. Nor would they accept anything that went beyond these bare necessities. Their objective was independence in the broadest sense. They passed their time in resting, walking about, talking with everyone, and with a lot of mockery, laughter and joking around: their character was carefree and enormously cheerful. Since they had nothing in view with this way of life, no intentions or goals to pursue, having raised themselves above human strivings, and enjoyed perfect leisure, they were very well suited, as men of proven mental powers, to advise and admonish everyone else. This is why *Apuleius* says (*Florid Writings*,<sup>b</sup> IV): ‘Crates was honoured by the people of his age as a household god. No house was ever closed to him, and no head of a household had a secret that was so hidden that Crates was not let in on it in the due course of time, so he could investigate and reconcile all conflicts and squabbles between relatives.’<sup>c</sup> In this as in so many other ways, they are very similar to the mendicant friars of modern times, or at least to the better of these, the genuine monks whose ideal is brought to life in the Capuchin *Cristoforo* of *Manzoni*’s famous novel.<sup>d</sup> Still, they are similar only in their effects, not in their causes. They agree in their results, but<sup>101</sup> their basic ideas are entirely different; with the friars as with their relatives, the Sanyassis, the basic idea is a goal that has been posited outside of life; with the Cynics however it is only the conviction that it is easier to set one’s needs and desires to the minimum than to achieve a maximal satisfaction, which is even impossible since needs and desires grow to infinity when satisfied; which is why, to achieve the goal of all ancient ethics, the greatest possible happiness in this life, they adopt renunciation as the shortest and easiest path: ‘this is why they call cynicism the short road to virtue’.<sup>e</sup> (Diogenes Laertius, VI, 9). The fundamental difference between the spirit of

170

<sup>a</sup> [a small threadbare cloak]

<sup>b</sup> *Florida*

<sup>c</sup> *Crates, ut lar familiaris apud homines suae aetatis cultus est. Nulla domus ei unquam clausa erat: nec erat patrisfamilias tam absconditum secretum, quin eo tempestive Crates interveniret, litium omnium et jurgiorum inter propinquos disceptator et arbiter*

<sup>d</sup> [*I Promessi sposi* (*The Betrothed*) (1827)]

<sup>e</sup> ὅθεν καὶ τὸν Κυνισμὸν εἰρήκασιν σύντομον ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν ὁδὸν (*unde et Cynismum dixere compendiosam ad virtutem viam.*) [VI, 9, § 104]

cynicism and that of asceticism is palpable in the humility<sup>a</sup> that is essential to the ascetic but so foreign to Cynicism that the Cynic is, on the contrary, more inclined towards pride and a sense of contempt for everyone else:

The wise man stands one below Jupiter,  
Rich and free and honoured and beautiful, the king among kings.  
Horace<sup>b</sup>

On the other hand, the Cynic's view of life is very close to the spirit of *J. J. Rousseau* as he describes it in the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*,<sup>c</sup> since he too would like to lead us back to a raw state of nature, and he considers the reduction of our needs to their minimum as the surest path to happiness.<sup>102</sup> – Besides, the Cynics were exclusively *practical* philosophers: at least I have never heard of their theoretical philosophy.

171 Now the *Stoics* depart from Cynicism by transforming practice into a theory. They believe that it is not necessary to *actually* do without everything that can be done without, that it is enough to continually regard possessions and pleasures as things that *can* be done without, as resting in the hands of chance: then if we actually do need to do without these things it will be neither unexpected nor difficult. In the meantime, we can have and enjoy everything, only we must always keep in mind on the one hand the conviction that such goods are worthless and can be done without, and on the other that they are insecure and unstable, and so we must consider them all as of little value and always be prepared to give them up. Indeed, anyone who really needs to do without such things so as to remain unmoved by them shows precisely thereby that he holds them in his heart to be genuine goods that need to be completely out of his sight to prevent him from coveting them. A wise man on the contrary will recognize that they are not goods at all but things of absolutely no significance, *adiaphora*,<sup>d</sup> and at best *proëgmena*.<sup>e</sup> Thus he will accept them when they are offered, but is nonetheless always ready to let them go with supreme indifference if chance, to which they belong, demands them back again; because they are things 'not belonging to us'.<sup>f</sup> It is in this sense that *Epictetus* says in Chapter 7 that the wise man, like someone who has come off a ship onto the land, etc., will take pleasure in his wife or little boy, but still is

<sup>a</sup> *Demuth*

<sup>b</sup> *Sapiens uno minor est Jove, dives, / Liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum* [*Epistles*, I, 1, 106]

<sup>c</sup> *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité* [*Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (*Discourse on the origin and foundations of inequality among men*) (1755)]

<sup>d</sup> ἀδιάφορα

<sup>e</sup> προηγμένα [unexceptionable]

<sup>f</sup> τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν

always ready to leave them again as soon as the captain calls.<sup>a</sup> – Thus the *Stoics* perfected the theory of equanimity<sup>b</sup> and independence at the cost of practice, since they reduced everything to a mental process and through arguments such as we find in the first chapter of Epictetus, justified sophistically to themselves all the comforts of life. But in so doing they did not take account of the fact that everything to which we are accustomed becomes a need,<sup>c</sup> and can therefore be given up only painfully; that the will cannot be trifled with, that it cannot take pleasure without loving pleasures; that a dog does not remain indifferent when we pull a piece of sausage through its mouth, and a wise man does not either when he is hungry: and that there is no middle ground between desire and renunciation.<sup>d</sup> But they thought they could do justice to their basic principles by assuring themselves, when sitting down to a luxurious Roman table and tasting every dish, that they were all nevertheless just *proëgmena*<sup>e</sup> and not *agatha*<sup>f</sup> at all; or, to put it plainly,<sup>g</sup> that they ate, drank and made merry without offering up thanks to God, and instead pulled long faces and let it be known that the whole feast could go to hell as far as they were concerned. This was the explanation that the *Stoics* resorted to: as such, they were just a bunch of braggarts, and were in approximately the same relation to the *Cynics* as the well-fed Benedictines and Augustinians were to the Franciscans and Capuchins. The more they neglected practice, the more meticulously they refined their theory. Here I want to add a couple of examples and addenda to the discussion of this issue from the end of the First Book.

172

If we look into the writings the *Stoics* have left behind (which are all unsystematic) to find the ultimate reason for the imperturbable equanimity that is continually demanded of us, we find nothing other than the cognition that the way of the world is completely independent of our will and consequently that the troubles<sup>h</sup> we encounter are unavoidable. If only we adjust our expectations to an accurate understanding of all this, then sorrow, joy, hopes and fears become a foolishness to which we are no longer susceptible. And then, particularly in the commentaries of Arrian, there occurs the subreption that everything that is *ouk eph' hêmin*<sup>i</sup> (i.e. not

<sup>a</sup> [*Enchiridion* (*Manual*), ch. 7]

<sup>b</sup> *Gleichmuth*

<sup>c</sup> *Bedürfnis*

<sup>d</sup> *zwischen Begehren und Entsagen*

<sup>e</sup> [unexceptionable]

<sup>f</sup> ἀγαθὰ [good]

<sup>g</sup> *Deutsch zu reden* ['to speak in German']

<sup>h</sup> *Uebel*

<sup>i</sup> οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν

dependent on us) is also at the same time *ou pros hêmas*<sup>a</sup> (i.e. does not matter to us). Of course it remains true that all the goods of life are under the power of chance, and that as soon as it exercises this power they are torn from us and we are unhappy if we have invested our happiness in them. The proper use of reason is supposed to deliver us from this unworthy fate, since reason tells us that we should never regard these goods as our own, but only as on loan to us for an indeterminate amount of time: only in this way can we really never lose them. Thus *Seneca* says (Epistle 98): 'If one has considered what the fickleness of human things can do before we have come to feel this'<sup>b</sup> and *Diogenes Laertius* (VII, 1, 87): 'To live according to virtue is the same as living according to the experience of those who go along with natural events.'<sup>c</sup> It is here in particular that the passage from *Arrian's* Epictetan essays belongs, Book III, Chapter 24, 84–9; and in particular, as further evidence for what I said in this regard in § 16 of the First Volume, there is the passage: 'For this is the cause of all troubles for men, that they are not able to apply universal concepts to particular things',<sup>d</sup> *ibid.*, IV, 1, 42. This is like the passage in *Marcus Aurelius* (IV, 29): Εἰ ξένος κόσμου ὁ μὴ γνωρίζων τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντα, οὐχ ἥττον ξένος καὶ ὁ μὴ γνωρίζων τὰ γιγνόμενα, i.e.: 'If someone is a stranger in the world because he does not know what is in it, then someone else is no less a stranger for not knowing how things take place.' Also the eleventh chapter of *Seneca's On the tranquillity of the Soul*<sup>f</sup> is a perfect example of this view.<sup>103</sup> The opinion of the Stoics generally leads to the conclusion that if a human being has at some time seen through the illusory nature of happiness and is now in possession of his reason, he will recognize both the rapid change of the dice as well as the intrinsic worthlessness of the reckoning-penny, and so will necessarily remain unmoved from then on. In general, the Stoic view can be expressed as follows: Our suffering always springs from a mismatch between our wishes and the way of the world. Therefore, one of these must be changed and made to fit the other. Now since the way of things is not under our power (*ouk eph' hêmin*), we must adapt our willing and wishing to the way of things: because the will alone is *eph' hêmin*.<sup>g</sup> This

<sup>a</sup> οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς

<sup>b</sup> *Si, quid humanarum rerum varietas possit, cogitaverit, ante quam senserit* [98, 5]

<sup>c</sup> ἴσον δέ ἐστι τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν τῷ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων ζῆν (*Secundum virtutem vivere idem est, quod secundum experientiam eorum, quae secundum naturam accidunt, vivere.*)

<sup>d</sup> Τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάντων τῶν κακῶν, τὸ τὰς προλήψεις τὰς κοινὰς μὴ δύνασθαι ἐφαρμόζειν τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους, *ibid.* IV, 1, 42. (*Haec enim causa est hominibus omnium malorum, quod anticipationes generales rebus singularibus accommodare non possunt.*)

<sup>e</sup> *Antoninus* [in *Meditations*, IV, 29]

<sup>f</sup> *De tranquillitate animi*

<sup>g</sup> ἐφ' ἡμῖν [under our power]

adjustment of willing to the way of the external world, and thus to the nature of things, is very often what is understood by the ambiguous phrase: 'living according to nature'.<sup>a</sup> Just look at Arrian, *Discourses*, II, 17, 21, 22. Seneca describes this view further (*Epistles* 119) when he says: 'There is no difference between not-wanting and having. The main thing is the same in both cases: one is free of pain.'<sup>b</sup> Cicero too (*Tusculan Disputations* IV, 26), using the words: 'Only wanting to have something is the greatest stupidity.'<sup>c</sup> Similarly Arrian (IV, I, 175): 'It is not attaining what one craves that makes one free, but rather the suppression of the craving.'<sup>d</sup>

The quotations collected together in Ritter and Preller's *History of Greco-Roman Philosophy*<sup>e</sup> (§ 398) may be viewed as evidence for what I have said in the passages cited concerning the Stoics' notion of 'living harmoniously';<sup>f</sup> as can the remarks of Seneca (*Epistle* 31 and again in *Epistle* 74): 'Complete virtue consists in equableness and in leading a life that is always in harmony with oneself.'<sup>g</sup> The spirit of the Stoa in general is described clearly in this passage from Seneca (*Epistle* 92): 'What does a happy life consist in? In security and imperturbable peace. It is achieved by greatness of soul and by constancy that adheres to what is correctly known.'<sup>h</sup> Anyone who undertakes a systematic study of the Stoics will be convinced that the goal of their ethics, just like that of *Cynicism* from which they arose, is absolutely none other than that of the most painless and thereby happiest life possible; from which it follows that the Stoic morality is only a particular type of *eudaimonism*. Unlike Indian, Christian, and even Platonic ethics, it has no metaphysical tendency or transcendental goal, but an entirely immanent one that is attainable in this life: the imperturbability (*ataraxia*)<sup>i,104</sup> and the untroubled bliss of the wise man whom nothing can touch. Of course it cannot be denied that the later Stoics, namely Arrian, sometimes lose sight of this goal and betray a genuinely ascetic tendency that can be ascribed to the Christian and generally Oriental spirit that was already spreading. – When we look

174

<sup>a</sup> κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν

<sup>b</sup> *Nihil interest, utrum non desideres, an habeas. Summa rei in utroque est eadem: non torqueberis* [119, 2]

<sup>c</sup> *Solum habere velle, summa dementia est* [IV, 26, 56]

<sup>d</sup> Οὐ γὰρ ἐκπληρώσει τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων ἐλευθερία παρασκευάζεται, ἀλλὰ ἀνασκεινῇ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας (*Non enim explendis desideriis libertas comparatur, sed tollenda cupiditate.*)

<sup>e</sup> *Historia philosophiae Graeco-Romanae* [This volume by Heinrich Ritter and Ludwig Preller (1838) collects further passages from Stobaeus, Diogenes Laertius, Epictetus, Cicero and Seneca]

<sup>f</sup> ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν

<sup>g</sup> *Perfecta virtus est aequalitas et tenor vitae per omnia consonans sibi* [*Epistle* 31, 8]

<sup>h</sup> *Quid est beata vita? Securitas et perpetua tranquillitas. Hanc dabit animi magnitudo, dabit constantia bene iudicati tenax* [*Epistle* 92, 3]

<sup>i</sup> ἀταραξία

175 closely and seriously at the aim of Stoicism, that *ataraxia*, we find in it a mere hardening and insensibility to the blows of fate, achieved by always keeping in mind the brevity of life, the emptiness of pleasure, and the inconstancy of happiness, and also an understanding that the difference between happiness and unhappiness is much smaller than our anticipation of them leads us to expect. This however is not a happy state but only the calm endurance of suffering seen as inevitable. Of course there is greatness of soul and dignity in bearing the inevitable in silence and tranquillity, remaining constant in melancholy peace while others pass from exaltation to despair and from the latter to the former. – Accordingly Stoicism can also be thought of as a spiritual dietetics according to which the mind must be hardened against unhappiness, danger, loss, injustice, treachery, betrayal, disdain and the idiocy of men just as the body can be hardened against the influences of the wind and weather, against hardship and exertion.

I have yet to remark that the *kathêkonta*<sup>a</sup> of the Stoics, which Cicero translates as *officia*, means something like obligations,<sup>b</sup> or what is appropriate to do on an occasion, in English *incumbencies*,<sup>c</sup> Italian *quel che tocca a me di fare, o di lasciare*, and thus in general what it is *fitting* for a rational person to do. See Diogenes Laertius, VII, 1, 109. – Finally, the *pantheism* of the Stoics, which flies in the face of so much of *Arrian's* sermonizing, is expressed most clearly by *Seneca*: 'What is God? The soul of the universe. What is God? Everything that you see and everything that you do not see. Only in this way is his greatness recognized and nothing greater can be thought: if he alone is everything, then he encompasses his work and fills it entirely.'<sup>d</sup> (*Natural Questions* I, preface, 12.)<sup>e</sup>

<sup>a</sup> καθήκοντα

<sup>b</sup> *Obliegenheiten*

<sup>c</sup> [Schopenhauer uses the English term]

<sup>d</sup> *Quid est Deus? Mens universi. Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum, et quod non vides totum. Sic demum magnitudo sua illi redditur, qua nihil majus excogitari potest: si solus est omnia, opus suum et extra et intra tenet.*

<sup>e</sup> *Naturales quaestiones* [in fact section 13 rather than 12]



*On Humanity's Metaphysical Need*

With the exception of humans no being feels a sense of wonder<sup>a</sup> at its own existence;<sup>b</sup> in fact, all other beings consider it so self-evident they do not even notice it. The wisdom of nature still speaks from the tranquillity of the animal's gaze, because in animals the will and the intellect are not yet far enough apart that they can find one another surprising<sup>c</sup> when they encounter one another again. The whole of appearance still hangs tightly onto the trunk of nature from which it sprouted, and is part of the unconscious omniscience of the great mother. – Only after the inner essence of nature (the will to life in its objectivation) has advanced vigorously and cheerfully through the two realms of beings that lack consciousness and then through the long and wide series of animals does it finally, with the onset of reason (which is to say in the human being), reach the point of awareness:<sup>d</sup> then it is surprised by its own work and asks itself what it is. But its sense of wonder is all the more serious since this is its first conscious confrontation with *death*, and along with the finitude of all existence, the futility of all striving becomes more or less evident. Thus together with this awareness and this sense of wonder there arises the *need for metaphysics* that is distinctive to humans alone; a human being is, accordingly, a metaphysical animal.<sup>e</sup> At the beginning of his consciousness of course he takes himself as something self-evident as well. But this does not last for long: very early, at the same time as the first act of reflection,<sup>f</sup> we already find that sense of wonder that some day is to become the mother of metaphysics.<sup>105</sup> Accordingly, *Aristotle* says at the beginning of his

176

\* This chapter relates to § 15 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *wundert sich*

<sup>b</sup> *Daseyn*

<sup>c</sup> *sich über einander verwundern*

<sup>d</sup> *Besinnung*

<sup>e</sup> *animal metaphysicum*

<sup>f</sup> *Reflexion*

*Metaphysics*: 'For it is due to this sense of wonder that people begin to philosophize now as before.'<sup>a</sup> And the truly philosophical state consists in the first instance in being able to entertain a sense of wonder about habitual and everyday things, since this causes one to problematize the *universal aspects* of appearance; researchers in the sciences of the real, meanwhile, only wonder about contrived and rare appearances, and for them the problem is just to reduce these rare appearances to more familiar ones. The lower a person's intellectual stature, the fewer riddles existence itself holds for him: everything for him seems self-evident, both as it is and that it is. This is due to the fact that his intellect is still completely faithful to its original function, to be of service to the will as a medium of motives; it is therefore closely tied to the world and nature, as integral parts of them, and is consequently in no position to sever itself from the totality of things so as to confront them, or to subsist on its own so as to grasp the world in a purely objective manner. By contrast, the philosophical sense of wonder that arises from this in certain individuals is conditioned by a higher development of intelligence, and yet not only by this; doubtless it is knowledge of death, together with reflection on suffering and the needs of life, that give a strong impetus to philosophical deliberation<sup>b</sup> and metaphysical interpretations<sup>c</sup> of the world. If our lives were endless and painless, it might never occur to anyone to ask why the world exists and has precisely the nature it does; rather, this too would be self-evident. Accordingly we find that interest in philosophical or religious systems is inspired most strongly by the dogmas of continuation after death: and even if religious systems focus on the existence of their gods and seem most eager to defend this, it is fundamentally only because their dogmas of immortality are linked to these gods and are considered inseparable from them: this is really all that matters to them. If there were some other way of establishing these dogmas, the avid concern for these gods would quickly die away; and it would give way to an almost complete indifference if the complete impossibility of immortality could be proven to the followers of these religions, because interest in the existence of gods would disappear along with any hope of a closer acquaintance with them, except for whatever role they might continue to play in influencing events in the present life. But if one could prove that continuation after death is incompatible with the existence of gods, perhaps by showing that this

<sup>a</sup> Διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν (*Propter admirationem enim et nunc et primo inceperunt homines philosophari*) [982b12]

<sup>b</sup> *Besinnen*

<sup>c</sup> *Auslegungen*

continuation presupposes the primordiality<sup>a</sup> of beings, then people would soon sacrifice these gods to personal immortality and become avid atheists. This is why genuinely materialistic systems, as well as systems of absolute scepticism, have never been able to gain any general or lasting influence.

Temples and churches, pagodas and mosques in all countries and all ages, with their grandeur and splendour, bear witness to the strong and ineradicable human need for metaphysics, which follows closely on the heels of our physical needs. Of course someone with a satirical turn of mind could add that the former is a modest companion who is cheaply satisfied. He is sometimes content with crude fables and insipid fairytales: and if they are imprinted early enough, they are adequate interpretations of his existence and supports for his morality. Look for instance at the Koran: this awful book sufficed to found a world religion and satisfy the metaphysical needs of countless millions of people for the past 1200 years, becoming the foundation of both their morals and their significant disdain for death, as well as inspiring them to bloody wars and the most extensive conquests. This book shows us theism in its most impoverished and miserable form. Much can be lost in translation, but I have not been able to find a single valuable thought in it. This proves that metaphysical capability does not go hand in hand with metaphysical need. Yet it seems that in earlier ages the surface of the earth was different from how it is now, and that those who were significantly closer to the origin of the human race and the well-springs of organic nature than we are at present also had both greater energy in their powers of intuitive cognition and also a more accurate cast of mind,<sup>b</sup> which made them capable of a purer, more immediate grasp of the essence of nature and thus able to satisfy the metaphysical need in a worthier fashion: thus arose among the Brahman forefathers, the Rishis, the almost superhuman conceptions<sup>c</sup> that were later recorded in the Upanishads of the *Vedas*.

178

On the other hand, there have always been people who have made a living out of the human need for metaphysics and have tried to exploit this as much as possible, and this is why all peoples have had monopolists and farmer-generals for this need: namely priests. Priests have always had to secure their trade by claiming the right to impart their metaphysical dogmas to people at a very early age, before their power of judgment has been roused from its morning slumbers, i.e. in earliest childhood: because any dogma firmly imprinted at that age will be there forever, however

<sup>a</sup> *Ursprünglichkeit*

<sup>b</sup> *richtigere Stimmung des Geistes*

<sup>c</sup> *übermenschlichen Konzeptionen*

senseless it might be. If priests were obliged to wait until the power of judgment was mature, they would never be able to retain their privileges.

179 A second although not numerous class of people who make a living from the human need for metaphysics are those who live off *philosophy*: the Greeks called them Sophists, the moderns call them philosophy professors. *Aristotle* does not hesitate to include *Aristippus* among the Sophists (*Metaphysics* II, 2);<sup>a</sup> we find the reason for this in Diogenes Laertius (II, 65), namely that he was the first of the Socratics to be paid for doing philosophy. This is why even *Socrates* gave him back his gift. Even with the moderns, those who live *off* philosophy are not only, in the main and with the rarest of exceptions, completely different from those who live *for* philosophy, they are very often even their antagonists, their secret and irreconcilable enemies; because every real and significant philosophical achievement will cast too great a shadow over their own, and moreover will not accommodate itself to the intentions and restrictions of the guild; which is why they have always been determined not to allow such achievements to succeed. To this end, the typical methods (according to the age and circumstances) have sometimes involved concealment, cover-ups, silence, ignoring them or hiding them away, sometimes denials, belittlement, criticisms, slander and distortions, sometimes denunciations and persecution. This is why many a great mind has had to drag himself gasping through life, unrecognized, unhonoured, unrewarded, until finally after his death the world is undeceived about him and about them. Meanwhile, those who lived off philosophy have achieved their goals and seen their points through by not letting him prove *his* point, and lived *off* philosophy with their wives and children while he lived *for* it. But once he is dead, the situation is quite the reverse; the new generation of ubiquitous philosophy professors is now the heir to his achievements, which it cuts to its own standard, and now lives off *him*. The fact that *Kant* could live both *off* and *for* philosophy is due to the rare circumstance that, for the first time since the divine Marcus Aurelius<sup>b</sup> or the divine Julian the Apostate,<sup>c</sup> a philosopher sat on the throne: only under such auspices could the *Critique of Pure Reason* ever have seen the light of day. The king was barely dead when we see even *Kant* seized by fear because he belonged to the guild; he modified, castrated and spoiled his masterpiece in the second edition, and still was in danger of losing his position; so that *Campe* invited him to come to live with him in Braunschweig as the tutor of his family (*Rink, Scenes*

<sup>a</sup> [*Met.* III (B), 996a32]

<sup>b</sup> *Divo Antonino*

<sup>c</sup> *Divo Juliano*

from the *Life of Kant*,<sup>a</sup> p. 68). University philosophy is, in the main, mere shadow boxing: its true goal is give the students, in the deepest recesses of their thought, the cast of mind that the ministry responsible for appointing professors considers to be in line with its purposes. From the perspective of a statesman this might be all well and good: it is just that this sort of lecture-hall philosophy is a 'wooden toy moved by foreign powers',<sup>b</sup> and cannot be considered serious philosophy, but only a joke philosophy. And it is in any case true that such supervision or guidance can extend only to lecture hall philosophy, not to real philosophy, which is seriously intended. Because if there is anything in the world to be desired, so much so that even crude and dull brains, in moments of lucidity, value it more highly than silver and gold, then it is that a beam of light should fall on the obscurity of our being and offer us some sort of key to this perplexing existence<sup>c</sup> in which nothing is clear except its misery and its nothingness. But even if this were feasible, it would be rendered impossible by forced and artificial solutions to the problem. 180

But now we want to take a general look at the different ways of satisfying so strong a need for metaphysics.

By *metaphysics* I understand any cognition that claims to go beyond the possibility of experience, which is to say beyond nature or the given appearance of things, in order to disclose something about that which in some sense or another conditions appearance; or in common parlance, about what is hidden behind nature and makes it possible. – But the great and primal differences between powers of understanding, as well as differences in the extent to which these powers have been developed (something that requires considerable leisure), creates such great differences between people that as soon as one group of people have worked themselves out of a primitive state, a single metaphysics will not be enough for everyone; which is why in civilized peoples we always encounter two different sorts of metaphysics, which are differentiated by the fact that the one is authenticated *internally* and the other *externally*. Since metaphysical systems of the first sort require reflection, education, leisure and judgment for their authentication to be acknowledged, they can be accessible only to a tiny fraction of humanity, and can arise and thrive only in advanced civilizations. By contrast, the great majority of people can only make use of systems of the second sort, since such people are not capable of thinking 181

<sup>a</sup> *Ansichten aus [Immanuel] Kants Leben* [(1805); Schopenhauer identifies the author, Friedrich Theodor Rink, incorrectly as 'Ring']

<sup>b</sup> *nervis alienis mobile lignum* [Horace, *Satires* II, 7, 82]

<sup>c</sup> *räthselhafte Existenz*

but only of believing, and are not receptive to reasons but only to authority: accordingly, these can be called folk-metaphysics<sup>a</sup> in analogy with folk-poetry as well as folk-wisdom, by which people mean proverbs. These systems are known as religions, and are found among all peoples except for the most primitive. As we have said, their authentication comes from outside, and as such is termed revelation and documented through omens and miracles. Their arguments are mainly threats of eternal (but also temporal) ills directed against unbelievers or even the merely doubtful: among many peoples we find the burning stake or some such thing acting as the final argument of the theologians.<sup>b</sup> If they look for some other authentication or use other arguments, then they are transitioning to systems of the first sort and can degenerate into a hybrid of the two, which is more of a danger than an advantage. This is because what best assures these second sorts of system their continued custody over minds is their invaluable prerogative of being taught to *children*, which allows their dogmas to grow into a sort of second innate intellect, like twigs grafted onto a tree; by contrast the first sort of systems only ever appeal to adults, but adults always have a system of the second sort already in possession of their convictions. – The difference between the two types of metaphysics can be summarized as the difference between doctrines of conviction and doctrines of belief, but they have this in common, that every individual system *within* each type entertains an antagonistic relation to all others *of* its type. Between those of the first type, the war is fought only with words and writings, between those of the second it is fought with fire and swords as well: many of these systems owe their dissemination in part to this second kind of polemic, and in the course of time they have all divided the world between themselves and have in fact done so with such decisive authority that peoples are divided and separated more by them than by nationality or government. *They* alone are *dominant*, each in its region, while systems of the first sort are at best *tolerated*, and even this only because they have so few adherents that they are not thought worth the trouble of fighting with fire and with sword: although these can also be successfully used against them when it is deemed necessary; moreover, they are found only sporadically. For the most part they have been tolerated only under conditions of domestication and subjugation since the system of the second sort that happens to be dominant in the country stipulates that their doctrines need to conform more or less closely to its own. Sometimes it has not only subjugated these systems of the first sort but

<sup>a</sup> *Volksmetaphysik*

<sup>b</sup> *ultima ratio theologorum*

has even tried to make them serviceable, using them as a change of horses, as it were. This is nonetheless a dangerous experiment for the following reason: since systems of the first sort have been deprived of power, they feel they can resort to cunning and they never completely abandon a secret malice that then sometimes unexpectedly comes to the fore, causing wounds that are difficult to heal. Moreover, the danger is intensified by the fact that all the hard sciences,<sup>a</sup> not excepting the most innocuous among them, are secretly allied with systems of the first sort against systems of the second, and, without themselves being in open conflict with these latter, suddenly and unexpectedly render great harm in their province. Besides, it is dangerous, in pursuit of the aforementioned serviceability, to try to provide internal authentication for a system that was originally authenticated externally; because if it was amenable to internal authentication, it would not have needed it externally. It is in general always a risky business to give a completed building a new foundation. And how could a religion still need the approval of a philosophy! Everything is on its side: revelation, testimonials, miracles, prophecies, the protection of the government, the highest rank due to truth, the agreement and reverence of all, thousands of temples in which it is proclaimed and practised, sworn troops of priests, and more than anything, the invaluable privilege of being allowed to imprint its doctrines on children at a tender age, making these doctrines almost into innate ideas. With such a wealth of methods, it would have to be very greedy to demand the concurrence of miserable philosophers, and very fearful to worry about their opposition – greedier and more fearful than seems compatible with a good conscience.

183

The following remarks are related to the distinction made above between the first and second types of metaphysics. A system of the first type, which is to say a philosophy, makes the claim – and therefore has the duty in all that it says – to be true in a strict and proper sense,<sup>b</sup> because it appeals to thinking and conviction. A religion, by contrast, intended for countless people who are incapable of investigation or thought and will never grasp the deepest and most difficult truths in the proper sense,<sup>c</sup> only has the duty to be true in an allegorical sense.<sup>d</sup> Truth cannot appear naked before the people. A symptom of this *allegorical* nature of religion is the *mysteries* that are found in perhaps all religions, namely certain dogmas that cannot be clearly thought, much less literally true. In fact, it can perhaps be

<sup>a</sup> *Realwissenschaften*

<sup>b</sup> *sensu stricto et proprio*

<sup>c</sup> *sensu proprio*

<sup>d</sup> *sensu allegorico*

said that several pieces of complete nonsense, a couple of genuine absurdities, are essential ingredients in a complete religion: because these are precisely the mark of its *allegorical* nature and the only adequate way of allowing common sense and crude understanding to *feel* something that would otherwise be incomprehensible to it, namely that religion is fundamentally about a completely different order of things, the order of *things in themselves*, in the face of which the laws of this world of appearance (which is the vocabulary it must use) disappear, and so not only the ridiculous dogmas but even the comprehensible ones are really only allegories and concessions to human powers of comprehension. This is the spirit in which Augustine and even Luther seem to me to have grasped the mysteries of Christianity, in contrast to Pelagianism, which wants to pull everything down to the level of trite comprehensibility. From this perspective we can understand how Tertullian could say without sarcasm: 'It is completely believable because it is absurd: . . . it is certain because it is impossible.'<sup>a</sup> (*Treatise on the Incarnation*, ch. 5) – This *allegorical* nature also exempts religions from the proofs that philosophy must provide and from investigation in general; instead of this, religions demand faith, i.e. a voluntary acceptance that it is so. Since, then, faith guides action and allegory is always structured in practice so as to lead just where literal<sup>b</sup> truth would also lead, it is right that religion promises eternal bliss to those who believe. People feel an inescapable need for metaphysics as such; and we see that religions are therefore very good at taking the place of this metaphysics for the great mass of people, who cannot be obliged to think; this is in part with a view to practice, as a beacon for their actions, as the public standard for rectitude and virtue (as Kant expressed it so well); in part as an indispensable comfort in the difficult sufferings of life, where it completely replaces an objectively true metaphysics by lifting human beings above themselves and their temporal existence as well as any metaphysics ever could; this is an excellent display of the great value of religion, indeed of its indispensability. After all, 'it is impossible for the great masses to have a philosophical education',<sup>c</sup> as Plato already correctly noted (*Republic* VI, p. 89, Bipont). The only stumbling block here is that religions can never acknowledge their allegorical nature, but have to claim to be literally true. This causes them to encroach on the sphere of genuine metaphysics, which they antagonize, an antagonism that metaphysics has given voice to in all ages in which it was not in chains. – This failure to recognize the allegorical

<sup>a</sup> *Prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est: – certum est, quia impossibile* (*De Carne Christi*)

<sup>b</sup> *sensu proprio* [translated as 'literal', 'literally' in the following passage]

<sup>c</sup> φιλόσοφον πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι (*vulgus philosophum esse impossibile est*) [494a]



nature of all religions is also the basis of the quarrel between supernaturalists and rationalists that has been relentlessly fought in recent times. Both sides would have it that Christianity is literally true: the supernaturalists claim it to be the case down to the last detail, omitting nothing, which is a tough sell given the level of knowledge<sup>a</sup> and the general education of the age. The rationalists on the other hand try to interpret out<sup>b</sup> everything truly Christian, which leaves them with a remainder that is true in neither a literal nor an allegorical sense,<sup>c</sup> but rather mere platitude, practically Judaism, or at most a shallow Pelagianism, or worst of all a vile optimism that is utterly foreign to genuine Christianity. In addition, the attempt to ground a religion in reason places it within the other class of metaphysics, metaphysical systems that have *internal* sources of authentication, in other words places it on foreign ground, the ground of philosophical systems, and even into the battles that these wage against each other in their own arena, and consequently under the fire of scepticism and the heavy artillery of the *Critique of Pure Reason*; but it would be clearly presumptuous for it to venture here.

185

It would be most beneficial for both types of metaphysics if each were to remain clearly separated from the other and were to keep to its own sphere so it could completely develop its nature. Instead, throughout the entire Christian age, people have tried to work out a way of combining the two by transferring the dogmas and concepts of the one into the other, hence ruining them both.<sup>106</sup> This occurs most explicitly in our day in that strange hybrid or centaur called philosophy of religion,<sup>d</sup> which, as a type of gnosis, tries to explain some given religion and to interpret what is allegorically<sup>e</sup> true through what is literally true. But to do this, one must already be familiar with and possess the literal truth: in which case interpretation would be superfluous. For to suppose that metaphysics (i.e., literal truth) can be found from religion alone, by means of commentary and interpretation, would be a dubious and dangerous undertaking, and one that could only be chosen if it were already settled that truth, like iron and other base metals, could only occur in a mixed state, not in its native purity, and hence that it could only be attained through chemical reduction. –

Religions are necessary to the people and are an incalculable boon. Still, if they try to obstruct the progress of humanity in the cognition of truth,

<sup>a</sup> *Kenntnissen*

<sup>b</sup> *hinauszuexegesieren*

<sup>c</sup> *weder sensu proprio noch sensu allegorico wahr*

<sup>d</sup> *Religionsphilosophie*

<sup>e</sup> *sensu allegorico*

they must with the greatest tact be put to the side. And to demand that even a great mind – a Shakespeare, a Goethe – be implicitly persuaded by the dogmas of any religion, in good faith and in the literal sense,<sup>a</sup> is like demanding that a giant put on the shoes of a dwarf.<sup>107</sup>

Religions are pitched to the intellectual capacities of the great majority and can possess truth only indirectly, not directly: to demand the latter of them is like wanting to read the letters set on a printing press rather than reading their imprint. The value of a religion will therefore depend on the greater or lesser amount of truth it contains beneath the veil of allegory, as well as the greater or lesser clarity with which it is visible through this veil, and thus on the veil's transparency. It almost seems as if, just as the oldest languages are the most perfect, so too are the oldest religions. If I wished to take the results of my philosophy as the standard of truth, I would have to privilege Buddhism above all other religions. I am pleased in any case to see that my doctrines are in such profound agreement with a religion followed by the majority of people on earth – because Buddhism does have many more adherents than any other. This agreement is all the more satisfying because I was certainly not influenced by it in my philosophizing. Until 1818, when my work appeared, there was very little information in Europe about Buddhism, and that little was itself very incomplete and problematic; it was restricted almost entirely to a few articles in the earlier volumes of *Asiatic Researches* and was mainly about Burmese Buddhism. Only since then have we been gradually receiving more complete information about this religion, mainly through the detailed and scholarly papers by the worthy member of the St Petersburg Academy, *I. J. Schmidt*, in the records of that Academy,<sup>b</sup> and then gradually from several English and French scholars, so that I have been able to provide a fairly extensive list of the best work on this religious doctrine in my text *On Will in Nature* under the heading 'Sinology'.<sup>108</sup> – Unfortunately, *Csoma Körösi*, the tenacious Hungarian who spent many years in Tibet and in Buddhist monasteries in particular so that he could study the language and the holy texts of Buddhism, died immediately afterwards, just as he was beginning to write up the results of his research. I cannot deny that I was delighted to read in his preliminary reports several passages taken directly from the *Kahgyur* itself, for instance the following conversation between the dying *Buddha* and *Brahma* who is paying him homage: 'There is a description of their conversation on the subject of creation, – by whom was the world made. *Shakya* asks several questions of *Brahma*, – whether was it he, who

<sup>a</sup> *implicite, bona fide et sensu proprio*

<sup>b</sup> [Isaak Jacob Schmidt, cf. p. 288, n. a; p. 525, n.]

made or produced such and such things, and endowed or blessed them with such and such virtues or properties, – whether was it he who caused the several revolutions in the destruction and regeneration of the world. He denies that he had ever done anything to that effect. At last he himself asks *Shakya* how the world was made, – by whom? Here are attributed all changes in the world to the moral works of the animal beings, and it is stated that in the world all is illusion, there is no reality in the things; all is empty. *Brahma* being instructed in this doctrine, becomes his follower.<sup>a</sup> (*Asiatic Researches*, vol. 20, p. 434.)

I cannot consider the *fundamental distinction* between religions to rest, as it commonly does, with the question of whether they are monotheistic, polytheistic, pantheistic, or atheistic, but instead with the question of whether they are optimistic or pessimistic, i.e. whether they present the existence of the world as justified by itself and therefore praise it, or whether they regard it as something that can only be comprehended as a consequence of our guilt and that therefore should not really exist, since they recognize that pain and death cannot be part of the eternal, original, and immutable order of things, part of what should in every respect exist. The power with which Christianity was able to defeat first Judaism and then Greek and Roman paganism is entirely due to its pessimism, to the acknowledgment that our situation is utterly miserable and at the same time sinful, while Judaism and paganism were optimistic. That truth, deeply and painfully felt by all, hit home, and brought with it the need for redemption.<sup>b,109</sup> –

188

I turn to a general discussion of that other type of metaphysics, the type that is authenticated internally and is called *philosophy*. Recall that it originates, as mentioned above, from a *sense of wonder* about the world and our own existence, since this strikes the intellect as a riddle whose solution occupies humanity without respite. Here I will begin by calling attention to the fact that this could not be the case if the world were an ‘absolute substance’<sup>c</sup> (in the Spinozistic sense that has so often been put forward as pantheism in our age, in modern forms and accounts) and therefore an *absolutely necessary being*.<sup>d</sup> This means that it would exist with such a great degree of necessity that in comparison any other necessity our understanding could grasp as such would look like a contingency: it would therefore be something that encompassed not only all actual existence but

<sup>a</sup> [Schopenhauer quotes this passage in the original English and translates it in a footnote, emphasizing ‘was it he’ (twice), ‘the moral works of the animal beings’, and ‘illusion’]

<sup>b</sup> *Erlösung*

<sup>c</sup> *absolute Substanz*

<sup>d</sup> *schlechthin nothwendiges Wesen*

all existence that is in any way possible and that, as Spinoza himself stated, its possibility and actuality would be one and the same thing, and thus its non-being would be impossibility itself, which is to say its non-being or being-otherwise would have to be completely unthinkable, and could therefore as little be thought away as, for instance, space or time. And since, moreover, *we ourselves* would be parts, modes, attributes or accidents of such an absolute substance, the only substance that could exist ever, anywhere, or in any sense, then both our existence and that of this  
 189 substance along with its constitution would be absolutely incapable of presenting themselves to us as in any way remarkable or problematic, or indeed as an unfathomable and always disquieting riddle; to the contrary, they would be much more self-evident than that 2 times 2 is four. We would be utterly incapable of thinking anything other than that the world is and is as it is: thus we would have no more consciousness of our existence *as such*, i.e. as a problem that needs to be reflected upon, than we have perception of the unbelievably rapid movement of our planet.

But none of this is remotely the case. The world and existence seem self-evident only to animals lacking thought: to humans the world is a problem that even the most primitive and limited are vividly aware of in moments of lucidity, and that appears in consciousness all the more clearly and steadily the brighter and more thoughtful that consciousness is, and the more material for thinking it has absorbed through education, which culminates, in the philosophically-inclined mind, in Plato's 'wondering, a very philosophical cast of mind',<sup>a</sup> namely that *sense of wonder* that grasps in its entire magnitude the problem that has occupied the nobler segment of humanity in every age and every country without cessation, robbing it of all rest. This unrest, which keeps the clock of metaphysics in perpetual motion, is in fact the consciousness that the non-being<sup>b</sup> of this world would be every bit as possible as its being. Hence the Spinozistic view of the world as an absolutely necessary existence, i.e. something that simply and in every sense should and must exist, is false. But if simple theism, in its cosmological proof, tacitly infers from the existence of the world its previous non-existence, it assumes in advance that it is contingent. What is more, we very quickly come to regard the world as something whose non-existence is not only conceivable but even preferable; therefore our sense of wonder about it shifts easily into a brooding over that *fatality* that could call it into existence and by virtue of which the immeasurable power<sup>c</sup> required for the production and

<sup>a</sup> θαυμάζειν, μάλα φιλοσοφικὸν πάθος (*mirari, valde philosophicus affectus*) [*Theaetetus*, 155d]

<sup>b</sup> *Nichtseyn*

<sup>c</sup> *Kraft*

190 maintenance of such a world could be guided in a direction so profoundly contrary to its own advantage. As such, the philosophical sense of wonder is fundamentally disconcerting and depressing: philosophy, like the overture to Don Giovanni,<sup>a,110</sup> begins with a minor chord. This entails that it can be neither a Spinozism nor an optimism. – The more precise configuration of this astonishment,<sup>b</sup> which we have just described and which leads people to philosophize, clearly comes from the sight of *the ill and evil*<sup>c</sup> in the world which, even if they stood in the most just relation to each other, indeed even if they were far outweighed by the good, are nevertheless things that should absolutely never exist<sup>d</sup> in any way, shape or form. But because nothing can come from nothing, these must also have their roots in the origin of things, or in the inner core of the world itself. This is hard to accept if we look at the grandeur, orderliness, and perfection of the physical world, since we think that what has the power to create such a thing would certainly also have been able to avoid ill and evil. This is of course the very hardest thing of all for theism to accept (and it is expressed most candidly in Ormuzd and Ahriman).<sup>e</sup> Accordingly, freedom of the will was invented in the first instance to deal with *evil*; but this is only an oblique method of making something out of nothing, since it assumes an acting<sup>f</sup> that does not come from a being<sup>g</sup> (see ‘The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics’, pp. 58ff.).<sup>h</sup> People tried to free themselves of *ills* by blaming matter or some unavoidable necessity; and they were loath to get rid of the devil, who was really the proper means to this end.<sup>i</sup> *Death* is another ill: *evil* on the other hand is merely the transferring-from-onself-to-another of any given ill. And thus, as we said above, evils, ills, and death are what qualify and intensify philosophical astonishment: it is not merely that the world exists, but more, that it is so miserable that is the sticking point<sup>j</sup> of metaphysics, the problem that robs humanity of its peace, giving rise to an unrest that cannot be allayed through scepticism or criticism.

We find *physics* (in the broadest sense of the word) also occupied with giving explanations for the appearances in the world. But by their very nature, its explanations will not be enough. *Physics* is not able to stand on 191

<sup>a</sup> *Don Juan* [Mozart’s opera]

<sup>b</sup> *Erstaunen*

<sup>c</sup> *des Uebels und des Bösen*

<sup>d</sup> *seyn*

<sup>e</sup> [Deities in Zoroastrianism]

<sup>f</sup> *operari*

<sup>g</sup> *esse*

<sup>h</sup> [See FW, 76–7 (Hübscher SW 4, 57–8)]

<sup>i</sup> *Expediens ad hoc*

<sup>j</sup> *punctum pruriens*

its own feet, but needs a *metaphysics* to support it, however haughtily it might behave towards metaphysics. This is because it explains appearances using something that is even less familiar than the appearances themselves: namely laws of nature that rest on forces of nature that include the life force<sup>a</sup> as well. Of course the entire present state of everything in the world or in nature must necessarily be explicable from purely physical causes. But such an explanation (if we ever really reach the point of being able to give one) must just as necessarily always be tainted by two essential imperfections (the two sore points, as it were, like Achilles with his vulnerable heel or the devil with his cloven hooves) which entail that everything explained in this way really remains unexplained. First there is the fact that the *beginning* of the universally explanatory chain of causes and effects, i.e. the concatenation of alterations, will absolutely *never* be reached; but rather, like the boundaries of the world in space and time, recedes continually and to infinity; and secondly, the collection of effective causes used to explain everything always rest on something completely inexplicable, namely the original *qualities* of things and the *natural forces* that emerge in them and enable each to operate in a determinate manner, e.g. gravity, solidity, momentum, elasticity, temperature, electricity, chemical forces, etc., and that remain in every given explanation, like an ineradicable unknown quantity in an otherwise completely soluble algebraic equation; and so there is not a single shard of broken clay, however worthless it may be, that is not composed of quite inexplicable qualities.<sup>111</sup> Thus these two unavoidable deficiencies in every purely physical, i.e. causal explanation show that such an explanation can only be *relatively* true, and that its whole method and manner cannot be the only one, the ultimate one, and therefore cannot be the adequate one, i.e. the one that might ever lead to a satisfying solution of the difficult riddle of things and to a true understanding of the world and of existence; rather, that any *physical* explanation, in general and as such, still needs a *metaphysical* one that provides the key to all its presuppositions, and for this very reason must follow a completely different path. The first step along this path is to become and remain clearly conscious of the difference between the two, i.e. of the difference between *physics* and *metaphysics*. In general, this difference is based on the Kantian distinction between *appearance* and *thing in itself*. But because Kant declared that we could have absolutely no cognition of this latter, he thought there could be no *metaphysics* but only immanent cognition, i.e. only *physics*, which can only ever talk about appearances,

<sup>a</sup> *Lebenskraft*

and along with it a critique of reason insofar as reason strives for metaphysics. But here, in order to demonstrate the correct point of contact between my philosophy and that of Kant, I will anticipate the Second Book and make the claim that Kant, in his excellent explanation of the compatibility of freedom and necessity (*Critique of Pure Reason*, first edition, p. 532–554,<sup>a</sup> and *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 224–231 of the Rosenkranz edition),<sup>b</sup> shows how one and the same action is perfectly explicable as, on the one hand, necessitated by someone's character, by the influence he has experienced over the course of his life, and the motives currently before him; and yet how this action must also, on the other hand, be seen as the product of his free will: in the same vein he says, in § 53 of the *Prolegomena*: '... natural necessity will indeed attach to every connection of cause and effect in the sensible world, and yet that cause which is not an appearance (though it underlies appearance) will still be entitled to freedom, and therefore nature and freedom can be ascribed without contradiction to the very same thing, but in different respects, in the one case as appearance, in the other as a thing in itself'.<sup>c</sup> Since my writings ground these appearances in the *will* as thing in itself, they take what Kant wrote about the appearance of a human being and his deeds and extend it to *all* appearances in nature. This procedure is justified mainly by the fact that human beings cannot be assumed to be specifically, fundamentally and absolutely different in kind<sup>d</sup> from the rest of the beings and things in nature, but rather different only in degree. – From this anticipatory digression I return to our discussion of the inadequacy of physics when it comes to providing the ultimate explanation of things. – And so, what I say is this: everything is admittedly physical, but nothing is explicable physically. Just as it is in principle possible to give a physical explanation of the motion of a projectile, so it must also ultimately be possible to give one for the thinking of a brain, and indeed, one that makes the latter just as comprehensible as the former. But the former, which we imagine we understand so perfectly, is fundamentally just as obscure to us as the latter: what the inner essence<sup>e</sup> of expansion in space, of impenetrability, mobility, solidity, elasticity and gravity really are – this remains, after all physical explanations, just as much a mystery as thinking. But because the inexplicable emerges most immediately here, people leaped at once out of physics and into metaphysics,

193

<sup>a</sup> [A532 / B560 – A554 / B582]

<sup>b</sup> [Ak. 5: 94–100]

<sup>c</sup> [Ak. 4: 344, cited from the Cambridge edition of *Prolegomena*]

<sup>d</sup> *toto genere und von Grund aus verschieden*

<sup>e</sup> *innere Wesen*

and hypostasized a substance of an entirely different nature from anything corporeal – they inserted a soul into the brain. If people had not been so obtuse as to be impressed only by the most striking appearances, then they would have to have explained digestion by a soul in the stomach, vegetation by a soul in the plant, elective affinity by a soul in the reactants, and even the falling of a stone by a soul in it. For the quality of every inorganic body is just as mysterious as life is in living things. In the same way, physical explanation always runs up against something metaphysical by which it is negated, i.e. stops being explanation. Strictly speaking, we could claim that none of the natural sciences really do anything more than botany: namely, bring similar things together and classify them. – A physics that claimed that its explanations of things (of particular things from causes and things in general from forces) were really adequate and hence accounted exhaustively for the essence of the world, would be a genuine *naturalism*. From Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus down to the *System of Nature*,<sup>a</sup> and then to Lamarque, Cabanis and the materialism that has been warmed over again in recent years,<sup>112</sup> we can follow the progressive attempts to set up a *physics without metaphysics*, i.e. a theory that makes appearance into the thing in itself. But all such explanations beg the main question without ado and then try to hide this from the explainer himself and from others. They attempt to show that all phenomena, even mental phenomena, are physical: and this is quite correct; only they do not see that everything physical is, on the other hand and at the same time, metaphysical as well. But this is also hard to see without *Kant*; since it presupposes the distinction between appearance and thing in itself. Nonetheless, even without this, *Aristotle*, as strongly as he was inclined to empiricism and distant from Platonic hyperphysics, kept himself free from this restricted perspective: he said: ‘Now if there is no other substance than what is formed by nature, physics will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior, and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way because it is first. And it will belong to this to study being qua being.’<sup>b</sup> *Metaphysics*, V, 1. Such an absolute physics, as described above, that leaves no room for a metaphysics, would

<sup>a</sup> *Système de la nature* [Baron d’Holbach, *Système de la nature ou des lois du monde physique et du monde moral* (*System of nature, or of the laws of the physical world and the moral world*) (1770)]

<sup>b</sup> Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔσθι τις ἕτερα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἡ φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη· εἰ δὲ ἔσθι τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη, καὶ καθόλου οὕτως, ὅτι πρώτη· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν, ταύτης ἂν εἴη θεωρεῖσθαι (*Si igitur non est aliqua alia substantia, praeter eas, quae natura consistunt, physica profecto prima scientia esset: quodsi autem est aliqua substantia immobilis, haec prior et philosophia prima, et universalis sic, quod prima; et de ente, prout ens est, speculari hujus est.*) [*Met.* VI (E), 1026a27–31, translation by W. D. Ross, slightly adapted]



make *natura naturata* into *natura naturans*:<sup>a</sup> it would be physics installed on the throne of metaphysics, and yet in this high position it would look almost like Holberg's theatrical tinker who was made mayor.<sup>b</sup> Behind the intrinsically absurd and usually malicious accusation of atheism there lies, as its inner meaning and animating truth, the obscure concept of this sort of physics without metaphysics. In any event, such a thing would necessarily be destructive of ethics, and while theism has been falsely considered inseparable from morality, this is in fact only true of *metaphysics in general*, i.e. of cognition that the order of nature is not the only and absolute order of things. Thus one can propose the following as the necessary credo<sup>c</sup> of everyone just and good: 'I believe in a metaphysics.' On that account it is important and necessary that people be convinced of the untenability of an *absolute physics*; and all the more since this, genuine *naturalism*, is a view that continually and automatically urges itself on people, and can only be done away with through deeper speculation, although of course any number of systems and doctrines of faith can serve as the surrogate for such speculation, insofar and as long as such systems and doctrines are generally upheld.<sup>d</sup> The fact that a fundamentally false perspective automatically urges itself on people and can only be removed artificially can be explained by the fact that the intellect did not originally exist<sup>e</sup> to enlighten us as to the essence of things, but rather merely to show us their relations with respect to our will: the intellect is, as we will find in the Second Book, simply the medium of motives. Now the fact that the way the world is schematized in the intellect presents a completely different order of things from what is strictly true (since it does not show us the kernel but only the outer shell) is something that occurs accidentally<sup>f</sup> and cannot be a reproach to the intellect; so much the less since the intellect has discovered within itself the means to rectify this error by distinguishing between the appearance and the essence in itself of things; a distinction that basically existed in all ages, except that it has been for the most part very imperfectly brought to consciousness and hence expressed poorly, often even emerging in strange garb. Even the Christian mystics, for instance, describe the intellect as inadequate for grasping the true essence of things, by calling it the *light of nature*. It is merely a superficial power, like electricity, and does not get to the interior of essences.<sup>g</sup>

195

<sup>a</sup> [literally, 'natured nature', 'naturing nature']

<sup>b</sup> [Ludvig Holberg, *Den Politiske Kandestøber* (*The Political Tinker*) (1722)]

<sup>c</sup> *Credo*

<sup>d</sup> *gelten*

<sup>e</sup> *ursprünglich nicht bestimmt ist*

<sup>f</sup> *accidentaliter*

<sup>g</sup> *das Innere der Wesen* [*Wesen* also means 'beings']

196

As we have said, the inadequacy of pure naturalism first emerges on the path of empiricism itself, in that every physical explanation explains the particular from its cause, while the chain of causes, as we know a priori and therefore with full certainty, recedes to infinity, so that no cause could ever be the first. Moreover, the efficacy of any cause is referred to a law of nature, and this is ultimately referred to a force of nature, which is now an absolutely inexplicable remainder. We refer all appearances from the highest through to the lowest, appearances of a world that is so clearly given and so naturally explicable, to an inexplicable thing – and this inexplicable thing is precisely what betrays the fact that this whole type of explanation is merely conditional and, as it were, on the basis of concessions,<sup>a</sup> and not remotely genuine or satisfying: this is why I stated above that everything and nothing is explicable physically. That absolutely inexplicable thing that pervades all appearances and is most striking in the highest, e.g. in procreation, and is nonetheless just as present in the lowest, e.g. the mechanical, points to an order fundamentally different from the physical order of things and that underlies it, precisely what Kant called the order of things in themselves, and it is this that constitutes the goal of metaphysics. – Secondly, however, the inadequacy of pure naturalism is made clear by the fundamental philosophical truth that we considered at length in the first half of this Book and that is also the theme of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: namely that all *objects*, in their objective existence in general as well as in the manner (the formal element) of this existence,<sup>113</sup> are thoroughly conditioned by the cognition of a *subject* and are therefore mere appearance, not thing in itself; as § 7 of the First Volume argued and as was shown there, nothing can be clumsier than to blindly take the objective as absolutely given, as the materialists do, so as to deduce everything from it without regard to the subjective by means of which, and indeed within which alone, the objective exists. Our contemporary, fashionable materialism provides an example of this procedure, a materialism that for this reason has become a real philosophy for barbershop people and apothecaries' apprentices. In its innocence, it unthinkingly takes matter, considered as absolutely real, to be a thing in itself, and momentum to be the only capacity of a thing in itself, since all other qualities could only be appearances of momentum.<sup>114</sup>

Therefore, naturalism, or the purely physical way of looking at things, will never be sufficient: it is like an arithmetical sum that never works out. The series of causes without end or beginning, inscrutable basic forces,

<sup>a</sup> *ex concessis*

infinite space, time without beginning, endless divisibility of matter, and all this conditioned by the cognition of a brain in which alone it exists just like a dream<sup>115</sup> and without which it disappears – this is the labyrinth through which naturalism leads us endlessly about. The heights to which the natural sciences have risen in our age put all earlier centuries in deep shadows in this respect, and represent an apex that humanity has achieved for the first time. But however great the progress of *physics* (understood in the broad sense in which the ancients used the term) might be, this does not bring it the least bit closer to *metaphysics* any more than a surface will ever increase in cubic volume, no matter how far it is extended. This sort of progress will only ever increase our understanding<sup>a</sup> of *appearance*, while *metaphysics* aims beyond appearance itself to that which appears. And even if we achieved a perfected experience, this would not be an improvement with respect to essentials. Indeed, even if someone wandered among all the planets of all the fixed stars he will not have taken a single step in *metaphysics*. Rather, the greatest advances in *physics* will only make the need for a metaphysics more palpable, because, on the one hand, a corrected, extended and more thorough understanding of nature always subverts and ultimately overturns the metaphysical assumptions held to that point; and, on the other hand, it lays out the problem of metaphysics itself more clearly, correctly, and completely, separating it out more cleanly from everything merely physical; and also because a more perfect and precise cognition of the essence of particular things brings with it a more urgent demand for the explanation of the whole and the universal, which only presents itself as a greater riddle the more accurate, thorough and complete our empirical cognition of it is. All this is of course not immediately and clearly apparent to the simple and solitary researcher in a discrete branch of physics; instead he sleeps comfortably with his chosen maid in the house of Odysseus, dismissing all thoughts of Penelope (see Chapter 12 at the end). This is why we see the *outer husk of nature* so thoroughly researched these days, the intestines of intestinal parasites and the vermin on vermin are understood<sup>b</sup> down to the last hair: but if someone comes along, me for example, and talks about the *kernel of nature*, they do not listen and they think that this is irrelevant and return to gnawing at their husks. We are tempted to call every excessively microscopic or micrological research scientist a meddler into the private life of nature. But the people who claim that crucibles and chemical retorts are the true and unique source of all wisdom are in their way just as wrong as their

197

198

<sup>a</sup> *Kenntniß*<sup>b</sup> *gekannt*

antipodes, the scholastics, used to be. Just as the scholastics were completely ensnared in their abstract concepts, arming themselves with these and neither recognizing nor investigating anything else, the research scientists are completely ensnared in their empiricism, not allowing for anything they do not see with their eyes, and believing that this allows them to reach the ultimate ground of things, not guessing that there is a deep gulf between the appearance and what manifests itself in the appearance, the thing in itself, not guessing that there is a radical difference between them that can only be illuminated by the cognition and exact demarcation of the boundaries of the subjective elements of appearance and through the insight that the ultimate and most important disclosures concerning the essence of things can be drawn only from self-consciousness – and without all this nobody can take a single step past what is immediately given to the senses, and therefore cannot go any further than the problem.<sup>116</sup> – On the other hand, it should also be noted that the most perfect possible cognition of nature is the correct *statement of the problem* of metaphysics: and therefore nobody should venture on this without having previously acquired a thorough, clear, and coherent (if only general) understanding of all the branches of natural science. For the problem must precede the solution. But after this the gaze of the investigator must turn inwards: because intellectual and ethical phenomena are more significant than physical phenomena to the same degree that, for instance, animal magnetism<sup>a</sup> is an incomparably more significant appearance than magnetism in minerals. Human beings carry the ultimate and fundamental mystery within themselves, and it is immediately accessible to them; so it is only here that they can hope to find the solution to the riddle of the world and to grasp the essence of all things by a single thread. The sphere to which *metaphysics* most properly belongs is therefore certainly within what has been called philosophy of mind.<sup>b</sup>

199

You lead the ranks of living creatures  
 Before me, and teach me to know my brothers  
 In the air, the water, and silent wood:  
 ...  
 Then you lead me to the safe cave, and show  
 Me there my self, and in my own breast  
 Secret, deep miracles reveal themselves.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *der animalische Magnetismus* [a current term for hypnotism; see Schopenhauer's essay in *PP* I, 'Essay on spirit-seeing and related issues']

<sup>b</sup> *Geistesphilosophie*

<sup>c</sup> [Goethe, *Faust* I, 3225–34]

Now when it finally comes to *the source* or *the foundation stone* of metaphysical cognition, I have, above, already declared my opposition to that presupposition, reiterated even in Kant, that it must lie in *mere concepts*. Concepts can never come first in any cognition because they are always derived from some intuition. But it was probably the example of mathematics that led to this assumption. Mathematics can leave intuition behind entirely, which happens in particular with algebra, trigonometry, and analysis, and work with merely abstract concepts, and in fact with concepts represented through signs instead of words, and yet can achieve completely certain and far reaching results that could never have been reached by remaining on the solid ground of intuition. But the possibility of this rests, as Kant has sufficiently shown, on the fact that the concepts of mathematics are derived from the most certain and determinate intuitions, namely from the a priori and yet intuitive cognition of relations of quantity, and can thus always be reinstantiated<sup>a</sup> by and checked against these intuitions, either arithmetically, by performing calculations that are merely indicated by these signs, or geometrically, using what *Kant* called the construction of concepts. This advantage is not however shared by those concepts on which people claimed to be able to build a metaphysics, concepts such as essence, being, substance, perfection, necessity, reality, finitude, infinity, the Absolute, ground, etc. For such concepts are by no means primordial,<sup>b</sup> as if fallen from heaven, or even innate; rather, like all concepts, they too were derived from intuitions and since, unlike mathematical concepts, they do not contain the merely formal elements of intuition but instead contain more, they presuppose empirical intuitions: therefore nothing can be drawn from them that empirical intuition did not also contain, i.e. what had been the content of experience and had been received much more securely and first-hand from experience (since these concepts are very distant abstractions). For we can never get anything more from concepts than is contained in the intuitions from which they were derived. If someone demands *pure* concepts, i.e. concepts that do not have an empirical origin, then only those concerning space and time, i.e. the merely formal aspects of intuition, should be produced, and consequently only mathematical concepts, then at most the concept of causality, which of course did not come from experience but only enters consciousness by means of experience (beginning in sensuous intuition); hence experience is indeed possible only through it, but it too is valid only within the territory of experience; and this is why Kant showed that this concept serves only to

200

<sup>a</sup> *realisirt*<sup>b</sup> *ursprünglich*

give coherence to experience, not to surpass it, and hence that it allows only for physical and not metaphysical application. Apodictic certainly can of course accrue to some cognition only by virtue of its origin a priori: but this is precisely what restricts it to the merely *formal* elements of experience in general, since it establishes that the cognition is conditioned by the subjective constitution of the intellect. So cognition like this, far from leading us beyond experience, gives merely a *part* of experience itself, namely the *formal* part which is thoroughly its own and hence universal and therefore mere form without content. Now since metaphysics is the last thing that can be restricted to mere form, it too must have *empirical* sources of cognition: therefore that earlier conception of a purely a priori metaphysics is necessarily in vain. Kant really begs the question<sup>a</sup> when, in § 1 of the *Prolegomena*, he claims most clearly that metaphysics cannot derive its basic concepts and principles from experience. This presupposes in advance that only what we know *prior* to all experience can reach farther than possible experience. Bolstered by this, Kant comes in and proves that all such cognition is nothing more than the form of the intellect operating for the sake of experience, and consequently cannot lead beyond this; from which he then correctly infers the impossibility of any metaphysics. But does it not seem precisely wrong that in order to solve the riddle of experience, i.e. the only world we have before us, we need to look away from it entirely, ignore its content and take and use as our material only the empty forms that we are conscious of a priori? Would it not be more to the point if the *science of experience in general* and as such were to be derived from experience as well? Its problem is given to it empirically: why should the solution not enlist the aid of experience too? Is it not absurd that someone who talks about the nature of things does not look at things themselves but sticks only to certain abstract concepts? The task of metaphysics is of course not the observation of particular experiences, but the correct explanation of experience as a whole. Its foundations must therefore certainly be empirical. Indeed, even the *aprioricity* of a part of human cognition is grasped by it as a given *fact*, from which it draws conclusions as to the subjective origin of this part. Only to the extent that it is accompanied by consciousness of its aprioricity does Kant call it *transcendental* in contrast to *transcendent*, which means ‘exceeding any possibility of experience’, and is the opposite of *immanent*, i.e. remaining within the confines of this possibility. I am glad to recall the original meaning of this expression introduced by Kant, as well as that of *category* and many others, since

<sup>a</sup> *es ist wirklich eine petitio principii Kants*

philosophical apes just play around with such expressions these days. – In addition, the source of metaphysical cognition is not *outer* experience alone, it is just as much *inner* experience; in fact, what is most distinctive to it, the thing that makes possible the only decisive move that can solve the great question consists (as I showed thoroughly and in detail in *On Will in Nature* under the heading ‘Physical Astronomy’) in the fact that at the right point, metaphysics puts outer experience into connection with inner experience and makes the latter the key to the former.

The empirical sources of cognition that stand at the origin of metaphysics (an origin that we have been discussing here and that cannot honestly be denied) naturally rob it of the type of apodictic certainty that is possible only through a priori cognition: a priori cognition remains the preserve of logic and mathematics, sciences that really only teach what everyone already knows, albeit obscurely, on their own: at most the primary elements of the theory of nature can be derived from a priori cognition. In admitting this, metaphysics relinquishes only an old claim that, given what was said above, was based on a misunderstanding and that had been contested in every age by the great variety and variability of metaphysical systems as well as by the scepticism that always accompanied them. Yet this variability cannot be made to speak against the possibility of metaphysics in general, since it is just as true of all the branches of natural science, chemistry, physics, geology, zoology, etc. – and even history has not remained unaffected. But if the correct system of metaphysics is ever discovered (as far as the limitations of the human intellect allow it to be) then the unvarying nature of a science cognized a priori will accrue to it: because its foundation can be nothing but *experience in general*, not the particular and individual experiences through which the natural sciences are always being modified, and history is always accreting new material. Experience in general and overall will never change its character for a new one.

202

The next question is: how can a science derived from experience lead beyond experience and so earn the name of *metaphysics*? – It might not be able to do this in the same way that three numbers in a ratio determine a fourth, or a triangle can be drawn from two sides and an angle. This was the path of pre-Kantian dogmatism, which wanted to use laws that we are conscious of a priori and with certainty to reason from the given to what is not given, from the conclusion to the ground, and thus from experience to what could not possibly be given in any experience. Kant demonstrated the impossibility of this kind of metaphysics by showing that those laws are valid only for experience, even if they are not derived from experience. He

correctly taught us that we cannot surpass the possibility of all experience in this way. But there are other paths to metaphysics. The whole of experience is like a secret code; philosophy deciphers this code, and it proves its accuracy through the coherence that emerges everywhere out of this. If the whole of experience were only grasped deeply enough, and if inner experience were linked to outer, then it would have to be explicable, comprehensible from itself. After Kant irrefutably demonstrated that experience in general develops from two elements, namely the forms of cognition and the essence in itself of things, and that these two can even be distinguished from each other in experience, namely as what we are conscious of a priori and what is added to it a posteriori, we can determine (at least in general) what in the given experience (which is primarily mere appearance) belongs to the *form* of this appearance that has been conditioned by the intellect, and what, after this has been taken away, remains for the *thing in itself*. And even if nobody is able to recognize the thing in itself through the shell of the forms of intuition, it still remains the case that everyone carries the thing in itself within himself, and indeed is himself it: it must therefore be somehow accessible to him in self-consciousness, even if only in a conditional way. And so the bridge upon which metaphysics reaches beyond experience is nothing other than that very division of experience into appearance and thing in itself that I hold to be Kant's greatest contribution. For it contains the proof for a kernel of appearance that is different from appearance itself. This can of course never be entirely divorced from appearance and considered on its own as an extramundane being;<sup>a</sup> it is only ever cognized in its relations and connections to appearance itself. Only the interpretation and analysis of appearance with reference to its inner kernel can disclose to us anything about it that could not otherwise enter consciousness. This is the sense in which metaphysics goes beyond appearance (i.e. nature) to what is hidden within or behind it (*to meta to phusikon*),<sup>b</sup> nonetheless only ever considered as what appears in it, not as something independent of all appearance: thus it remains immanent and does not become transcendent. This is because it never breaks entirely free of experience but rather remains nothing more than an interpretation and analysis of experience, in that it never speaks of the thing in itself other than in its relation to appearance. This at least is the sense in which I have tried to solve the problem of metaphysics, keeping firmly in mind the limitations Kant established for human cognition: hence I consider his prolegomena to any metaphysics to be valid for my own as well. Accordingly,

<sup>a</sup> *ens extramundanum*

<sup>b</sup> τὸ μετὰ τὸ φυσικόν [what goes beyond the natural]



it never really goes beyond experience but rather merely opens up the true understanding of the world that lies before us in experience. It is neither a science from mere concepts (as even Kant repeatedly defines metaphysics), nor is it a system of inferences from a priori claims, whose unsuitability for metaphysical purposes was demonstrated by Kant. Rather it is a knowledge<sup>a</sup> derived from the intuition of the real, external world and the disclosure that the most intimate facts of self-consciousness provide about this world, set down in clear concepts. It is accordingly a science of experience:<sup>b</sup> but its theme and its source are not particular experience but rather the entirety of experience and its universal aspects. I have absolutely no objections to Kant's doctrine that the world of experience is mere appearance and that a priori cognition is valid only with respect to this: but I add that this world, precisely as appearance, is the manifestation of what appears, and with Kant I call this the thing in itself. The thing in itself must therefore express its essence and its character within the world of experience, and it must therefore be possible to interpret this essence and character from experience, and indeed from the material, not from the mere form of experience. Accordingly, philosophy is nothing other than the accurate, universal understanding of experience itself, the true interpretation of its sense and content.<sup>c</sup> This is what is metaphysical, i.e. what is merely clothed in appearance and wrapped in its form; it is to appearance what a thought is to the words.

Such a deciphering of the world with respect to what appears in it must be confirmed from itself by the harmony it brings to the profoundly heterogeneous appearances of the world, a harmony that would not be perceived without it. – When we discover a text in an unknown alphabet, we try to interpret it until we reach a hypothesis concerning the meaning of the letters that allows for intelligible words and coherent sentences. And then there is no doubt as to whether we have deciphered it correctly, because it is not possible that the harmony and coherence that this interpretation brings to all the signs of the script could be merely accidental, nor is it possible that a completely different value<sup>d</sup> given to the letters would allow us to recognize words and sentences in this new arrangement. Similarly, deciphering the world must be confirmed completely from itself. It must spread a uniform light over all the appearances of the world and bring even the most diverse into harmony, so that contradiction is resolved

205

<sup>a</sup> *ein Wissen*

<sup>b</sup> *Erfahrungswissenschaft*

<sup>c</sup> *ihres Sinnes und Gehaltes*

<sup>d</sup> *Werth*

between even those appearances that conflict the most. This self-confirmation is the mark of its genuineness,<sup>a</sup> because every false deciphering, even if it coheres with some appearances, will contradict the rest even more harshly. So for instance the manifest misery of existence contradicts Leibnizian optimism; Spinoza's doctrine that the world is the only possible and the absolutely necessary substance is incompatible with our sense of wonder over its being and essence; Wolff's doctrine that human beings get their existence and essence<sup>b</sup> from a will foreign to them conflicts with our moral responsibility for the actions that emerge with strict necessity from our essence and existence but in conflict with our motives; the frequently repeated doctrine of a progressive development of humanity to ever greater perfection, or of any sort of becoming by means of the world process, is opposed to the a priori idea that an infinite time has already elapsed prior to any given point in time, and consequently everything that could come about in time must already exist; and so we can compile an endless register of contradictions between dogmatic assumptions and the given reality of things. I can in all honesty deny that any doctrine of my philosophy would be entered in this register, precisely because they have all been thought through in the presence of intuitive reality and none of them is rooted in abstract concepts alone. But since it has a fundamental thought that is applied to all the appearances of the world as their key, this proves itself to be the correct alphabet whose application gives sense and meaning to all words and sentences. A solution to a riddle proves itself to be correct by the fact that it fits with all ways of expressing the riddle, and my doctrine allows harmony and coherence to be seen in the conflicts and confusion of the appearances of this world, and solves the countless contradictions that are apparent when viewed from any other standpoint; it is to this extent like an arithmetical problem that leaves no remainder, although not at all in the sense of leaving no problem to be solved, no possible questions to be answered. To claim such a thing would be a presumptuous denial of the limits of human cognition in general. Whatever torch we might light and whatever space it might illuminate, our horizon will always remain bounded by deep night. This is because the ultimate solution to the riddle of the world will necessarily speak only of things in themselves and no longer of appearances. But all our forms of cognition are directed to appearances alone, and we must make everything comprehensible to ourselves by thinking in terms of succession, coexistence and causal relation. But these forms have sense and meaning only in relation to appearance:

<sup>a</sup> *Aechtheit*

<sup>b</sup> *Existentia und Essentia*

things in themselves and their possible relations cannot be grasped through these forms. Hence the actual, positive solution to the riddle of the world must be something that the human intellect is completely unable to grasp or think: so that if a higher being were to come and take the trouble to teach it to us, we would be completely incapable of understanding what it was saying. And so people who claim to have cognition of the ultimate, i.e. the first grounds of things, which is to say a primal being, Absolute, or whatever you wish to call it, along with the process, the grounds, motives or what have you as a result of which the world comes about, or originates, or falls, or is produced, put into being, 'set loose' and shown to the door with compliments, – such people are playing tricks, they are windbags if not outright charlatans.<sup>117</sup>

I see it as a great advantage of my philosophy that its truths have all been discovered independently of each other through observation of the real world, while their unity and coherence, which I did not worry about, always arose subsequently and on its own. This gives it richness as well as wide roots in the soil of intuitive reality that is the source of all nourishment for abstract truths: and this is also why it is not boring, a quality one might otherwise think essential in a philosophy, judging by the philosophical writings of the last fifty<sup>118</sup> years. If on the other hand all the doctrines of a philosophy are simply derived one from the other and ultimately from a first proposition, then philosophy necessarily comes across as meagre and impoverished and therefore boring as well, since nothing more can follow from a proposition than what it really already says: in addition to which everything would then depend on the accuracy of a single claim, and a single error in the deduction would endanger the truth of the whole. – There is even less security in the systems that begin with an intellectual intuition, i.e. a type of ecstatic experience or clairvoyance: every item of cognition gained in this way must be discarded as subjective, individual and consequently problematic. Even if it actually existed, it would not be communicable, because only normal brain cognition is communicable: if it is abstract cognition, then it is communicable through concepts and words; if purely intuitive cognition, then by means of artworks.

If, as is so frequently the case, metaphysics is accused of having made such little progress over the course of so many hundreds of years, we should also take into account the fact that no other science has developed under the continuous oppression that metaphysics has experienced, none have been as hindered and obstructed from the outside as metaphysics has always been by religions of every country; always possessing the monopoly on metaphysical cognition, religion looks at philosophical metaphysics as a

wild weed, an undocumented worker, a gypsy horde, and it generally only tolerates such metaphysics when the metaphysics adapts itself to serve religion and follow in its wake. So where has there ever been true freedom of thought? People have boasted about it often enough: but as soon as it diverges from the national religion on anything more than some piece of subordinate dogma, the proclaimers of tolerance are seized with a holy  
 208 shudder over the temerity and we hear: ‘not another step!’ – Given such oppression, what sort of progress could metaphysics make? – And in fact, the coercion exercised by the privileged metaphysics extends not only to the *communication* of thoughts, but even to *thinking* itself, in that its dogmas are impressed so firmly during the tender, developing, trusting and thoughtless age of childhood, and with such studied, solemn and serious airs that they grow with children’s brains and almost assume the character of innate ideas, which is what many philosophers have taken them for, and still more have pretended to do so. Nothing can obstruct the comprehension of even the *problem* of metaphysics so much as an entrenched prior solution that has been grafted onto the mind at an early age: the necessary starting point for all true philosophizing is the profound Socratic sensibility: ‘The one thing I know is that I know nothing.’<sup>a</sup> In this respect too, the ancients had an advantage over us: although their state religion certainly limited the communication of ideas to some extent, this did not detract from freedom of thought itself, because it was not formally and solemnly imprinted on children just as it was not taken so seriously in general. Hence the ancients are still our teachers in metaphysics.

In the context of this reproach of the meagre progress in metaphysics and of its failure, in spite of such steady efforts, to reach its goal, we should also bear in mind that it has in the meanwhile constantly been performing the invaluable service of setting limits on the endless claims of the privileged metaphysics and in so doing at the same time opposing naturalism and materialism proper, which appear as the inevitable reaction to this privileged metaphysics. Just consider the extent to which the priesthood of every religion would take over if faith in the priests’ doctrines was as solid and blind as the priests want it to be. Just think back on all the wars, riots, rebellions and revolutions in Europe from the eighth to the eighteenth century: how little we find that did not have a religious conflict – which is to say a metaphysical problem – at its core or as a pretext, a problem that  
 209 was the occasion for pitting peoples against each other. This whole millenium has been an ongoing massacre, sometimes on the battlefield,

<sup>a</sup> [cf. Plato, *Apology of Socrates*, 23b]

sometimes on the scaffold, sometimes in the streets<sup>119</sup> – over metaphysical concerns! I wish I had an accurate list of all the crimes that Christianity actually prevented and all the good deeds that it actually inspired so that I could put them on the other end of the scale.

Finally, as far as the *obligations* of metaphysics are concerned, it has only one: because it is one that does not tolerate any others besides itself: the obligation to be *true*. If other obligations were added to this, such as being spiritual, optimistic, monotheistic, or in fact simply moral, we could not know in advance whether these would stand in the way of the fulfilment of the first obligation, without which anything else it might achieve would be obviously worthless. Accordingly, there is no other measure of the value of a given philosophy than that of truth. – Philosophy is in its essence a *world wisdom*:<sup>a</sup> its problem is the world: this is the only thing that concerns it, and it leaves the gods in peace, expecting however that they will return the favour by leaving it in peace as well.

<sup>a</sup> *Weltweisheit*



*Second Half*  
*The Doctrine of Abstract Representation,*  
*or Thinking*

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62





*On the Possibility of Cognizing<sup>a</sup> the Thing in Itself*

This book contains what is most characteristic as well most important about my philosophy, namely the transition from appearance to thing in itself that Kant dismissed as impossible; and I have already published an essential supplement to it in 1836 under the title *On Will in Nature* (2nd edition, 1854). That text is small in scope but important in substance, and it would be a great mistake to treat those foreign expressions that I linked to my own explanations as its true content and theme: those expressions are rather merely the occasion for beginning my discussions of the fundamental truth of my teaching, which in fact I do more clearly than anywhere else, taking it as far as our empirical knowledge of nature.<sup>b</sup> I do this most exhaustively and rigorously in the section entitled ‘Physical Astronomy’, and I could never hope to find a more accurate or exact expression of this kernel of my teaching than I have given there. So anyone who wants to become thoroughly acquainted with my philosophy and wishes to examine it seriously must take into account the above-mentioned section before anything else. In general therefore, everything said in that short work would have comprised the main content of the present supplements if I were not obliged to exclude it due to its prior appearance. However, I will assume that the reader is familiar with that text, since otherwise the very best part would be missing.

First of all I want to make some preliminary remarks from a general point of view about what it means to talk about cognition of the thing in itself, and about the necessary constraints on this meaning.

What is *cognition*? – It is first and foremost *representation*. – What is *representation*? – A very complicated *physiological* process in the brain of an animal that results in consciousness of an *image* precisely there. – Clearly

\* This chapter relates to § 18 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *Erkennbarkeit*

<sup>b</sup> *Naturerkenntniß*

such an image can refer only very indirectly to something so completely different from the animal in whose brain the image exists. – This is perhaps the simplest and most comprehensible way to expose *the deep chasm between the ideal and the real*. It is one of those things, like the motion of the earth, of which we are not directly aware: and this is why, like the motion of the earth, the ancients did not notice it. But since *Descartes* first demonstrated it, it has not left philosophers in peace. And after Kant finally proved most thoroughly that the ideal and the real are completely different, the dogmatic attempt was made to try to claim the *absolute identity* of the two based on a supposed intellectual intuition,<sup>a</sup> an attempt as impudent as it was absurd, and yet so perfectly calibrated to the power of judgment of the German philosophical public that it was crowned with brilliant success. – In truth however both a subjective and an objective existence are given to us immediately, a being for self and a being for others, a consciousness of one's own self and a consciousness of other things; and both are given to us in such fundamentally different ways that no other difference is comparable to it. Everyone knows *himself* directly, but everything else only very indirectly. This is the fact and the problem.

But whether (by means of further processes inside the brain) universal concepts<sup>b</sup> (*universalia*) are abstracted from the intuitive representations or images that arise in the brain, and this leads to further combinations so that cognition becomes a *rational* cognition, now called *thinking* – none of this is of primary but rather only of secondary importance. For all such *concepts* borrow their content from intuitive representation alone, which is therefore *primary cognition*<sup>c</sup> and thus the only one to come into consideration when investigating the relation between the ideal and the real. Accordingly, it shows a complete ignorance<sup>d</sup> of the problem (or is at least very awkward) to want to describe the problem as the relation between *being* and *thinking*. *Thinking* has, in the first place, a relation only to *intuiting*, but *intuiting* has a relation to the *being in itself* of the intuited, and this last is the great problem with which we are now occupied. But empirical being, as it lies before us, is nothing other than being-given in intuition:<sup>e</sup> and the relation of intuition to *thinking* is no mystery, since concepts – the immediate material of thought – are clearly *abstracted* from intuition, something no reasonable person can doubt. Incidentally, you can see how important

215

<sup>a</sup> *intellektuale Anschauung*

<sup>b</sup> *Allgemeinbegriffe*

<sup>c</sup> *Urkenntniß*

<sup>d</sup> *Unkenntniß*

<sup>e</sup> *das Gegebenseyn in der Anschauung*

choice of expression is in philosophy from the fact that the awkward expression criticized above, and the misunderstanding that arose out of it, became the basis of the whole Hegelian pseudo-philosophy<sup>a</sup> that has occupied the German public for twenty-five years. –

Suppose however someone were to say: ‘Intuition is already cognition of the thing in itself, because it is the effect of what is present outside of us, and the way this *has effects* is the way it *is*, its acting is its being’,<sup>b</sup> then the following objections can be made: (1) the law of causality, as has been sufficiently demonstrated, is of subjective origin, and so is the sensation by the senses<sup>c</sup> from which intuition arises; (2) time and space—in which the object presents itself—are likewise of subjective origin; (3) if the being of the object consists merely in its acting,<sup>d</sup> this means that it consists merely in the alterations it produces in others, and hence is itself and in itself nothing at all. – As I have said in the text and explained in detail at the end of § 21 of the essay *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, it is true only of *matter* that its being consists in its acting, that it is merely causality through and through, and that it is therefore causality itself, objectively viewed; consequently matter really is nothing in itself (matter is a true lie),<sup>e</sup> but is rather, as an ingredient of the intuited object, a mere abstraction that cannot be given by itself in any experience. I will deal with this in detail below, in its own chapter. – But the intuited object must be something *in itself* and not merely *something for others*: for otherwise it would be merely representation and we would have an absolute idealism that would, in the end, become a theoretical egoism, and all reality would fall away, and the world would become a purely subjective phantasm. If, meanwhile, we remain completely with the *world as representation*, with no further questioning, then it is admittedly one and the same whether I declare objects to be representations in my head or appearances that present themselves in time and space because time and space are in fact themselves only in my head. It is always possible to claim an identity of the ideal and the real in this sense: but, after *Kant*, this would not be saying anything new. In addition, this claim would clearly not exhaust the essence of things and of the appearing world; rather you would still be standing only on the *ideal* side. The *real* side must be something totally different in kind<sup>f</sup> from the *world as representation*,

<sup>a</sup> *Afterphilosophie*

<sup>b</sup> *wie dies wirkt, so ist es: sein Wirken ist eben sein Seyn*

<sup>c</sup> *Sinnesempfindung*

<sup>d</sup> *Wirken*

<sup>e</sup> ἡ ὕλη τὸ ἀληθινὸν ψεῦδος, *materia mendacium verax*

<sup>f</sup> *toto genere Verschiedenes*

namely what things are *in themselves*: and this complete disparity<sup>a</sup> between the ideal and the real is what Kant demonstrated most thoroughly.

*Locke* denied that the senses had cognition of things as they are in themselves; while *Kant* did the same for intuitive *understanding* (I include under this term both what Kant called *pure* sensibility and the law of causality that mediates empirical intuition, to the extent that this law is given a priori). Not only were both right, but it can also be seen immediately that there is a contradiction in the claim that we can have cognition of a thing according to what it is in and for itself, i.e. outside of cognition. The reason is that all cognition is, as I have said, essentially representing; but my representing, precisely because it is mine, can never be identical with the essence in itself of the thing outside of me. The being in and for itself of every thing must necessarily be *subjective* even though it exists just as necessarily in the representation of another as something *objective*. This distinction can never be completely eliminated, because it alters the entire mode of the thing's existence from the ground up: as objective, it posits a foreign subject, since it exists as this subject's representation, and in addition, as Kant has proven, enters into forms foreign to its own essence because they belong to precisely that foreign subject whose cognition is first made possible by their means. If, engrossed in these reflections, I intuit inanimate bodies (for instance) with regular, comprehensible<sup>b</sup> shape and easily observable size, and then try to understand this three dimensional, spatial being as being in itself, and hence as being that is subjective to the things,<sup>c</sup> then I become immediately sensible of the impossibility of the situation<sup>d</sup> because I can never think these objective forms as the being that is subjective to things; on the contrary, I will be immediately conscious that what I am representing is an image that is produced in my brain and that exists only for me as a cognizing subject, so that it cannot constitute the final and hence subjective being in and for itself of even these inanimate bodies. But on the other hand, I cannot assume that even these inanimate bodies exist only in my representation; rather, I must attribute to them a *being in itself* of some sort, because they possess unfathomable properties<sup>e</sup> that lend them effectiveness.<sup>f</sup> But the very fact that the properties are unfathomable, just as it indicates something that exists independently of our cognition, also provides empirical proof that, because our cognition

217

<sup>a</sup> *Diversität*

<sup>b</sup> *faßlicher*

<sup>c</sup> *das den Dingen subjektive Daseyn derselben*

<sup>d</sup> *Sache*

<sup>e</sup> *unergründliche Eigenschaften*

<sup>f</sup> *Wirksamkeit*

218

consists only in *representing* by means of subjective forms, it only ever provides *appearances* and not the essence in itself of things. In fact, this explains why in everything of which we have cognition, a certain something unfathomable to us is concealed, and we must admit that we cannot thoroughly understand even the commonest and simplest appearances. It is not only the highest productions of nature, living beings, or the *complex* phenomena of the inorganic world that remain unfathomable to us, but also all rock crystal,<sup>a</sup> all iron pyrite, is, by virtue of its crystallographic, optical, chemical and electrical properties, an abyss of incomprehensibilities and mysteries for the investigations of reflection and research. This could not be the case if we possessed cognition of things as they are in themselves, because then at least the simpler appearances (the path to whose properties is not blocked by ignorance) would be thoroughly comprehensible to us and their whole being and essence would be available for cognition. The problem does not stem from deficiencies in our acquaintance with things, but from the essence of cognition itself. For if our intuition, and with it our whole empirical comprehension of the things that present themselves to us, is essentially and fundamentally determined by our cognitive faculties and conditioned by their forms and functions, then things cannot but present themselves to us in a manner completely different from their ownmost essence,<sup>b</sup> and hence they appear as if in a mask that only ever allows what it covers to be presupposed, but never allows for cognition; as a result, it peers through as an unfathomable mystery, and the nature of a thing can never be made completely and unreservedly available for cognition. Still less can anything real be constructed a priori, as with mathematics. Consequently, the empirical unfathomability of all natural beings is an a posteriori proof of the ideality of their empirical existence and its reality merely as appearance.<sup>c</sup>

It follows from all this that you will never get beyond representation, that is, appearance, along the path of *objective cognition* (starting out from representation), and hence will remain on the external side of things, never able to penetrate into and investigate their interior, what they may be in themselves, i.e. for themselves. To this extent, I agree with Kant. But I have also emphasized another truth as a counterweight to this one, namely that we are not only the *cognitive subject* but, on the other hand *ourselves* belong amongst the beings available to cognition, *we are ourselves the thing in itself*; and hence that an *inside path* remains open for us to this ownmost<sup>d</sup> and

<sup>a</sup> Bergkrystall

<sup>b</sup> auf eine von ihrem selbst-eigenen Wesen ganz verschiedene Weise

<sup>c</sup> bloßen Erscheinungswirklichkeit

<sup>d</sup> selbsteigenen

inner essence of things, which we cannot access *from the outside*. It is, as it were, an underground passage, a secret connection that suddenly transfers us, as if by treachery, into the citadel that could not be taken by attack from the outside. – The *thing in itself* can, as such, enter consciousness with complete immediacy only by *becoming itself conscious of itself*: to want to have objective cognition of it is to demand something contradictory. Everything objective is representation and hence appearance, indeed a mere phenomenon of the brain.

219

In its essentials, Kant's main result can be summarized as follows: 'All concepts not based on intuition in space and time (sensible intuition), i.e. concepts that are not drawn from such an intuition, are absolutely empty, i.e. they yield no cognition. And since intuition can provide only *appearances*, not things in themselves, it follows that we have absolutely no cognition of things in themselves' – I accept this for everything except the cognition everyone has of his own *willing*: this is neither an intuition (because all intuition is spatial), nor is it empty; on the contrary, it is more real than any other cognition. It is also not *a priori*, as purely formal intuitions are, but completely *a posteriori*, which is why we cannot anticipate it in particular cases, but are often mistaken about ourselves. – In fact, our *willing* is the only opportunity we have to understand the interior of a process that also presents itself externally, and hence it is also the only thing that we are acquainted with *directly* and not, like everything else, given merely in representation. This is therefore the only datum capable of becoming the key to all others, or, as I have said, the single, narrow, gateway to the truth. Accordingly, we must learn to understand nature through ourselves, and not the other way around, understanding ourselves through nature. What we are acquainted with directly must serve to elucidate what we are acquainted with only indirectly, not the other way around. Do you really understand the forward thrust of a ball that has been pushed more thoroughly than you understand your own movement in response to a perceived motive? Some may think so, but I say: it is the other way round. However, we will achieve the insight that what is essential in the two above mentioned processes is identical, just as the deepest audible harmonic tone is identical with the same note ten octaves higher.

220

In the meantime, we might well note, and I have always maintained, that even the inner perception<sup>a</sup> we have of our own will in no way provides an exhaustive and adequate cognition of the thing in itself. This would be the case if the cognition were completely immediate; but it is mediated by

<sup>a</sup> *Wahrnehmung*

the fact that the will, with and by means of corporealization, creates for itself an intellect (in order to relate to the external world), and through this intellect now cognizes itself in self-consciousness (the necessary counterpart to the external world) as will – and it is because of this mediation that cognition of the thing in itself is not perfectly adequate. For one thing, it is tied to the form of representation – it is perception, and therefore divides into subject and object.<sup>1</sup> This is because even in self-consciousness the I is not absolutely simple, but rather consists of something that cognizes, an intellect, and something that is cognized, the will; there *is* no cognition of the former, and the latter *has* no cognition, even though both flow together into the consciousness of a single I. But for precisely this reason the I is not thoroughly *intimate* with itself, does not shine through, as it were, but is instead opaque and hence remains a riddle to itself. And thus in inner cognition too there is still a difference between the being in itself of its object and of the perception of the object in the cognitive subject. Inner cognition is nonetheless free of two forms belonging to outer cognition, namely those of *space* and *causality*, the forms that mediate all sense intuition. On the other hand, it still possesses the form of *time*, as well as the forms of being-cognized and cognizing in general. Thus, although the thing in itself has largely thrown off its veils in inner cognition, it still does not emerge fully naked. Because the form of time still belongs to it, everyone cognizes his *will* only in the succession of its individual *acts*, not in and for itself, as a whole: thus nobody is acquainted with his character a priori, but only gets to know it empirically, and always imperfectly. Still, the perception in which we cognize the excitations and acts of our own will is far more direct than any other: it is the point at which the thing in itself enters most directly into appearance, and is most closely illuminated by the cognitive subject; this is why that process is the only one that can be used to interpret every other process, because we have such intimate cognition of it.

221

Whenever an act of will emerges from out of the dark depths of our interiority into cognitive consciousness, there is an immediate transition of the thing in itself (lying outside of time) into appearances. Accordingly, although the act of will is indeed only the closest and clearest *appearance* of the thing in itself, it nevertheless follows that if we could have such direct and inward cognition of all other appearances, we would have to pronounce them to be the same thing that the will is in us. This is the sense in which I claim that the inner essence of any given thing is *will*, and I call the will the thing in itself. As a result, *Kant's* doctrine that we can have no cognition of the thing in itself is modified in the following way: what we lack is only absolute and exhaustive cognition of the thing in itself, but

what is by far the most immediate of its appearances (the immediacy of which distinguishes it totally<sup>a</sup> from all other appearances) stands in its place for us, and accordingly we have to trace the whole world of appearances back to this one, in which the thing in itself presents itself in the simplest of disguises, and remains an appearance only insofar as my intellect (the only thing capable of cognition) still remains distinct from myself as what wills,<sup>b</sup> and does not set aside the form of cognition of time, even in *inner* perception.

Accordingly, even this last and most extreme step still leaves the following question: what in the end is this will, which presents itself in the world and as the world, ultimately in itself? That is, what is it quite apart from the fact that it presents itself, or in general *appears*, which is to say is cognized, as *will*? – This question is *never* to be answered because, as was already mentioned, being-cognized inherently contradicts being-in-itself and everything we cognize is as such mere appearance. But the possibility of this question shows that the thing in itself (which we cognize most directly in willing) may have – entirely outside of any possible appearance – determinations, properties, and ways of being<sup>c</sup> that entirely elude our grasp or cognition, but which would remain as the essence of the thing in itself even when, as we have shown in the Fourth Book, it has freely annulled itself as *will*, and hence completely departed appearance, and, for our cognition, i.e. with respect to the world of appearances, passed over into an empty nothingness. If the will were simply and absolutely the thing in itself, then this nothingness would be *absolute*, instead of which it expressly proves precisely here to be a *relative* nothingness.

222

I now wish to add some relevant considerations to the explanation<sup>d</sup> (given in the Second Book as well as in the essay *On Will in Nature*) of the doctrine that what objectifies itself in the totality of appearances of this world (on different levels) is the very same thing that announces itself in its most direct cognition as will; and I want to begin by introducing a series of psychological facts showing that the *will* always emerges as what is first and fundamental in our own consciousness, and always claims precedence over the intellect, which, by contrast, proves to be secondary, subordinate and conditional. This proof is all the more necessary because all philosophers before me, from the first to the last, make *cognitive* consciousness the true essence or kernel of the human being, and accordingly have grasped and

<sup>a</sup> *toto genere*

<sup>b</sup> *als dem Wollenden*

<sup>c</sup> *Daseynsweisen*

<sup>d</sup> *Begründung*



presented the I<sup>2</sup> (or in many cases its transcendent hypostasis, termed ‘soul’) first and foremost as *cognizing*, indeed, *thinking*, and only in consequence of this and in a secondary and derivative manner, as *willing*. This ancient and fundamental error, to which there are no exceptions,<sup>3</sup> this enormous, first false step<sup>a</sup> and fundamental confusion of ground with consequent,<sup>b</sup> must be eradicated before anything else and replaced by a fully clear consciousness of the natural constitution of the situation. But since this is taking place here, for the first time, after millennia of philosophizing, I will go into some detail on this point. The striking phenomenon of all philosophers being mistaken on this most fundamental of points – indeed the fact that they have turned truth on its head – may, with philosophers in the Christian age, be explained in part by the fact that they were all trying to make the human being as different from animals as possible, while however having an obscure feeling that the difference between the two lay in the intellect and not in the will; and this inclined them unconsciously to make the intellect the essential and principal element and even to present willing as a mere function of the intellect. – Consequently, the concept of the *soul* is not only inadmissible as a transcendent hypostasis (as is established in the *Critique of Pure Reason*), it has even become the source of irreparable errors since, with its ‘simple substance’,<sup>4</sup> it fixes in advance the indivisible unity of cognition and willing, whereas it is precisely their separation that is the path to truth. The concept should no longer appear in philosophy, but should be left to German doctors and physiologists who, once they have set aside scalpel and scoop, start philosophizing with concepts they received at their confirmations. They might perhaps try their luck in England; the French physiologists and zootomists<sup>c</sup> have (until recently)<sup>5</sup> kept themselves free from this charge.

The first consequence of this collective and fundamental error is very uncomfortable to all philosophers who commit it. It is this: since, to all appearances, cognitive consciousness is destroyed by death, philosophers must either allow death to be an annihilation of the human being (although something inside us resists this prospect); or they must resort to the assumption of an enduring cognitive consciousness, which requires strong faith, since everyone’s own experience is enough to prove that cognitive consciousness is absolutely and completely dependent on the brain, so that one can as easily believe in cognitive consciousness without a brain as in digestion without a stomach. My philosophy alone has a way out of this dilemma, as it is the first to locate the essence of the human being not in consciousness

<sup>a</sup> πρῶτον ψεῦδος

<sup>b</sup> ὕστερον πρότερον

<sup>c</sup> *Zootomen*

but in will, which is not essentially tied to consciousness; rather, the will is to consciousness, i.e. to cognition, what substance is to accident, what an illuminated object is to the light, what a musical string is to the sounding board; the will comes into consciousness from within as the corporeal world comes from without. Now we can grasp the indestructibility of this, our real kernel and true essence, despite the obvious destruction of consciousness in death and the corresponding absence of consciousness before birth. The intellect is as ephemeral as the brain whose product (or better: action<sup>a</sup>) it is. But the brain, like the whole organism, is the product or appearance of the will and is in short something secondary, while the will alone is what is imperishable.<sup>b,6</sup>

224

<sup>a</sup> *Aktion*<sup>b</sup> *das Unvergängliche*

*On the Primacy of the Will in Self-consciousness\**

As thing in itself, the will constitutes the true, inner and indestructible essence of the human being; in itself, however, it is not conscious. This is because consciousness is conditioned by the intellect, and intellect is a mere accident of our essence, being a function of the brain which (along with the nerves and spinal cord attached to it) is merely a fruit, a product, even a parasite of the rest of the organism, not interfering directly in the organism's inner workings, but serving the purpose of self-preservation by regulating the organism's relations to the external world. The organism, for its part, is the visibility, the objecthood<sup>a</sup> of the individual will, its image as it presents itself in that very brain (which we came to know in the First Book as the condition of the objective world in general), and hence as mediated by its forms of cognition, space, time and causality, and so presenting itself as something extended, acting in succession, and material, i.e. efficacious.<sup>b</sup> Only in the brain are the limbs both sensed directly and intuited by means of the senses. – Accordingly, it can be said: the intellect is the secondary phenomenon, the organism is the primary i.e. the direct appearance of the will; the will is metaphysical, the intellect physical; the intellect, like its objects, is mere appearance; only the will is thing in itself; similarly, in an increasingly *figurative* sense and therefore metaphorically: the will is the substance of the human being, the intellect is the accident; the will is the matter, the intellect the form; the will is the heat, the intellect the light.

225

We wish to document and at the same time elucidate this thesis using the following facts concerning the inner life of the human being; and perhaps this occasion will result in a better understanding<sup>c</sup> of the inner human than is found in many systematic psychologies.

\* This chapter relates to § 19 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *Objektivität*

<sup>b</sup> *Wirkendes*

<sup>c</sup> *Kenntniß*

(1) As already mentioned, it is not only consciousness of other things (i.e. perception of the external world) but also *self-consciousness* that contains something that has cognition and something that is cognized:<sup>a</sup> otherwise it would not be *consciousness*. This is because *consciousness* consists in cognition: but cognition involves that which has cognition and that which is cognized; hence there could be no self-consciousness if in it that which has cognition were not confronted with something distinct from it, that is cognized. Just as there can be no object without a subject, neither can there be a subject without an object, i.e. there cannot be that which has cognition without something distinct from it that is cognized. Thus, it would be impossible for there to be a consciousness that was pure intelligence through and through. Intelligence is like the sun: it does not illuminate space unless there are objects to reflect its rays.<sup>7</sup> That which has cognition cannot be cognized as such: for otherwise it would be what *is cognized* by something else that has cognition. But we find only the *will* as what *is cognized* in self-consciousness. For not only willing and deciding<sup>b</sup> in the narrowest sense, but also all striving, wishing, fleeing, hoping, fearing, loving, hating, in short everything that directly comprises our own weal and woe,<sup>c</sup> pleasure and pain, is clearly nothing but the affection of the will, agitation, modification of willing and not-willing, precisely what presents itself as a genuine act of will when it acts outwardly.<sup>\*,8</sup> But the thing cognized is what is primary and essential in all cognition, not that which has cognition, insofar as the former is the prototype and the latter the ectype.<sup>d</sup> Therefore even in self-consciousness, what is cognized, i.e. the will, must also be what is primary and primordial, and that which has cognition must, by contrast, be secondary and additional, the mirror. They are related in approximately the same way as a self-luminous body is to a reflective one; or also as the vibrating string is to the musical sounding board, where consciousness would be the tone that it produces. – We can also regard the plant as the same sort of symbol for

226

\* It is worth noting that *Augustine* already recognized this. In the fourteenth book of *De civitate Dei* [*The City of God*], ch. 6 he talks about the *affectionibus animi* [affections of the soul], which, in the previous book, he brought under four categories, *cupiditas*, *timor*, *laetitia*, *tristitia* [desire, fear, joy, sadness], and continues: *voluntas est quippe in omnibus, imo omnes nihil aliud, quam voluntates sunt: nam quid est cupiditas et laetitia, nisi voluntas in eorum consensionem, quae volumus? et quid est metus atque tristitia, nisi voluntas in dissensionem ab his, quae nolumus? cet.* [The will is in all of them; indeed they are nothing other than expressions of will. For what are desire and joy but the will in agreement with what we want? And what are fear and sadness but the will in disagreement with what we reject? etc.]

<sup>a</sup> *ein Erkennendes und ein Erkanntes*

<sup>b</sup> *Beschliessen*

<sup>c</sup> *Wohl und Wehe*

<sup>d</sup> *Jenes der πρωτότυπος, dieses der ἑκτύπος ist*

consciousness. A plant is known to have two poles, the root and the crown: the root striving towards darkness, damp, cold, and the crown towards light, dryness, heat so that the rootstock (rhizome, collar)<sup>a</sup> lies at the point of indifference between the two poles where they separate themselves from each other, right at ground level. The root is what is essential, primordial, and perennial; if it dies off, then the crown follows, making the root primary; the crown, by contrast, is ostensible but it is sprouted, and since it passes away without the root dying, it is secondary. The root represents the will and the crown represents the intellect, and the point of indifference between the two, the rootstock, would be *the I*, which belongs to them both as their common endpoint. This I is the temporarily<sup>b</sup> identical subject of cognition and willing, an identity that I have called in my very first essay (*On the Principle of Sufficient Reason*)<sup>c</sup> as well as in my first philosophical astonishment, the miracle *par excellence*.<sup>d</sup> It is the temporal point of departure and connection of the whole of appearance, i.e. of the objectivation of the will: while it conditions appearance, it is also conditioned by it. – The comparison I present here could even be extended to the individual constitution of the human being. Just as a large crown tends to spring only from a large root, so the greatest intellectual capacities are to be found only in conjunction with a vehement and passionate will. A genius of phlegmatic character and feeble passions would be like a succulent with an imposing crown made out of thick leaves but with very small roots: it is not to be found. The fact that a vehement will and passionate character are conditions of heightened intelligence is shown physiologically by the fact that brain activity is conditioned by the motion communicated to it with every beat of the pulse from the large arteries running along the base of the brain;<sup>e</sup> as a result, an energetic heartbeat, and even, according to *Bichat*,<sup>f</sup> a short neck, facilitates greater brain activity. But the converse of the above does occur: vehement desires, a passionate, hot-headed character conjoined to a weak intellect, i.e. a small and badly formed brain in a thick skull; something as frequent as it is repugnant – one could in any case compare it to a beetroot.

(2) But now to acquire thorough knowledge<sup>g</sup> of consciousness rather than merely describe it in images, we must first of all find out what is present in the same way in every consciousness and hence what, being common and

<sup>a</sup> *rhizoma, le collet*

<sup>b</sup> *pro tempore*

<sup>c</sup> [FR, 136 (Hübscher SW I, 143)]

<sup>d</sup> das Wunder κατ' ἐξοχήν

<sup>e</sup> *basis cerebri*

<sup>f</sup> [See below, p. 260, n. b; and p. 278ff.]

<sup>g</sup> *gründlich zu erkennen*

constant, is essential. So we will consider what distinguishes *one* consciousness from another, and what therefore is added and secondary.

We are acquainted with consciousness only as a property of animal beings:<sup>a</sup> consequently we should not – indeed we cannot – think of it as anything other than *animal consciousness*; so that this expression is already tautological. – Thus, what is always found in *each* animal consciousness, even in the weakest and most imperfect, indeed the basis of this consciousness, is the direct awareness of a *longing*<sup>b</sup> (albeit at very different degrees) and the alternating satisfaction and non-satisfaction of this longing. We know this a priori to a certain extent. For however wonderfully various the innumerable species of animal might be, however strange we find the form of a new, never-before seen animal species, we nevertheless assume in advance, and with certainty, that we have a deep familiarity – indeed an intimate acquaintance – with its innermost nature.<sup>c</sup> To be precise: we know that the animal *will*s; in fact, we also know *what it will*s, namely existence, well-being, life and propagation: and in presupposing with complete certainty an identity with ourselves, we do not hesitate to attribute to this animal all the affections of the will that we are familiar with in ourselves, and indeed in unaltered form, so that we talk confidently about its desires, aversions, fear, anger, hatred, love, joy, sadness, yearning, etc. By contrast, as soon as the discussion turns to phenomena of pure cognition, we become uncertain. We do not venture to claim that the animal comprehends, thinks, judges, or knows: we are confident only in attributing to it representations in general, because without them its *will* could not engage in the movements described above. But we have only an indeterminate and conjectural conception of the exact mode of cognition of animals, and the exact extent of cognition in a given species; as a result it is often difficult to reach an understanding with animals and we can only do so artfully, with experience and practice. So here we find distinctions in consciousness. By contrast, a longing, desiring, willing or aversion, fleeing, non-willing is native to every consciousness: human beings have this in common with polyps. Accordingly, this is the essence and the basis of every consciousness. The variety of its expressions in the different orders of animal nature is based on the differing extensions of the cognitive spheres in which the motives of those expressions lie. Our understanding of the animal actions and gestures that express movements of the will is always direct and based on our own nature; this is why we can sympathize with

228

<sup>a</sup> als Eigenschaft animalischer Wesen

<sup>b</sup> eines Verlangens

<sup>c</sup> das Innerste ihres Wesens

them in so many ways, to the extent that we do. By contrast, the gulf between us and them arises solely and exclusively due to difference of intellect. The gulf between a very clever animal and a very limited human might not be much smaller than that between an idiot and a genius; hence here, on the other hand, a similarity between the two arising from a likeness of inclinations and affects and assimilating them will also occasionally become surprisingly evident and cause astonishment. – This observation makes it clear that the *will* is the primary and substantial element in all animal beings,<sup>a</sup> whereas the *intellect* is secondary, adventitious, indeed a mere tool in the service of the will, and its completeness and complexity varies according to the demands of this service. Just as an animal species emerges arrayed with hoof, claw, hand, wings, horns or fangs as is appropriate for the purposes of its will, so also it emerges with a more or less developed brain, whose function is to provide the level of intelligence requisite for the particular species' survival. That is, the more complicated its organization within the ascending series of animals, the more its needs multiply, the more varied and specifically determined are the objects that serve to satisfy them, and the more tortuous and remote are the paths to these objects, paths that must all now be found and recognized: the animal's representations must hence also become proportionally more multifaceted, precise, determinate, and cohesive, just as its attention must become tauter, steadier, and more sensitive, and hence its intellect must be more developed and complete. Accordingly, we see that the organ of intelligence, the cerebral system, along with the instruments of the senses, advances in step with the needs and complexity of the organism, and an advance in the *representing* (as opposed to the *willing*) aspect of consciousness manifests itself corporeally as an increase in coordination between the brain in general and the rest of the nervous system, and also between the cerebrum and the cerebellum since, according to *Flourens*,<sup>b</sup> the former is the laboratory of representations while the latter guides and organizes motion. Nature's final step here is disproportionately large. For in human beings it is not only the powers of *intuitive* representation (the only ones that had existed up to now) that have reached the highest degree of perfection, but also *abstract* representation, thinking, i.e. *reason* and with it deliberation,<sup>c</sup> that are now added. Given this significant increase of

<sup>a</sup> *thierischen Wesen*

<sup>b</sup> [Presumably in Marie-Jean-Pierre Flourens, *Recherches expérimentales sur les propriétés et les fonctions du système nerveux dans les animaux vertébrés* (*Experimental investigations on the properties and functions of the nervous system in vertebrate animals*) (1842)]

<sup>c</sup> *Besonnenheit*

intellect, that is, of the secondary aspect of consciousness, from now on it achieves predominance over the primary aspect to the extent that it now becomes the major actor.<sup>a</sup> For an animal, the principal aspect of consciousness is comprised of a direct awareness of its desires (satisfied or unsatisfied), and the lower the animal the more this holds true, so that the lowest animals are distinguished from plants only by a dull representation. But the opposite is the case in a human being: however vehement his desires, even if they are more vehement than any animal's and grow into passions, his consciousness nevertheless remains continually and predominantly occupied with and filled by representations and thoughts. Doubtless this is the main reason for the fundamental error of all philosophers, and causes them to posit thinking as the essential and primary function of the so-called soul, i.e. the inner or mental life of the human being, always focusing on this and letting the will follow only afterwards, as a secondary addition and mere result of the former. But if willing came only from cognition, then how could animals, even the lower ones, with such extremely limited cognition, so often exhibit an indomitably vehement will? So because this fundamental error of the philosophers transforms the accident into the substance, as it were, it leads them down false paths from which there is subsequently no return. – The relative predominance (that emerges with human beings) of *cognition* over *desiring* consciousness, and hence of the secondary over the primary aspect of consciousness, can (in the isolated cases of unusually gifted individuals) go so far that when it achieves its greatest intensity the secondary or cognitive aspect of consciousness detaches itself completely from willing and achieves free activity on its own, i.e. activity that is not stimulated by the will and hence no longer serves the will. It then becomes a purely objective and clear mirror of the world; this is the origin of the conception of the *genius*, which is the topic of our Third Book.

230

(3) Descending through the graded series of animals, we see the intellect growing weaker and more imperfect: but we most assuredly do not see any corresponding degradation of the will. On the contrary, the will retains the same essence everywhere and manifests itself as a great attachment<sup>b</sup> to life, concern for the individual and the species, egoism and a lack of consideration for anyone else, along with the affects that arise from these. The will is present, whole and undivided, in even the smallest insect: the insect wills what it wills just as decisively and completely as a human being. The only difference lies in *what* it wills, that is in motives, which are the province of

231

<sup>a</sup> *der vorwaltend thätige wird*

<sup>b</sup> *Anhänglichkeit*



the intellect. Naturally the intellect, as something secondary that is tied to a bodily organ, possesses innumerable grades of perfection and is anyway essentially limited and incomplete. The *will* on the other hand, as primordial and thing in itself, can never be imperfect; rather, every act of the will is everything it can be. Due to the simplicity that attaches to the will as thing in itself, as the metaphysical aspect of appearance, its *essence* has no gradations but is always wholly itself: it has degrees only of *excitation*, from the weakest inclination up through passion, as well as of its capacity for excitation, i.e. its vehemence, from the phlegmatic up through the choleric temperament. The *intellect*, by contrast, has not only degrees of *excitation* (from lethargy up through capriciousness and enthusiasm), but even degrees of its essence itself, of its perfection which, accordingly, rise stepwise from the lowest animals with dull perceptions, through to human beings, and among these from the idiot to the genius. Only the *will* is everywhere wholly itself. For its function is of the greatest simplicity: it consists of willing and not willing, which happens with the greatest of ease, without effort and does not require any practice; on the other hand, cognition has multiple functions and never takes place wholly without effort, which is needed for fixing attention and making the object clear, and then further for thought and reflection; hence the intellect is also capable of great improvement through practice and education. Let the intellect hold a simple intuitive object before the will: the will immediately expresses its approval or disapproval; it does this even if the intellect has laboriously pondered, ruminated and searched through many difficult permutations so as finally to bring out from the mass of data the result that seems most appropriate to the interests of the will; meanwhile, the will had been resting in idleness; it enters once the result has been reached, like a sultan on a divan, to express its monotonous approval or disapproval. There can of course be different degrees of approval, but its essence is always the same.

232 This fundamental difference between the nature of the will and that of the intellect, the essential simplicity and primordially of the one in contrast to the complex and secondary constitution of the other becomes even clearer to us if we observe within ourselves the curious way in which they interact, and attend to the details of how the images and thoughts that arise in the intellect set the will in motion, as well as the completely separate and different roles they play. Indeed we can already perceive this difference in the actual events that vividly excite the will even though they are in the first instance and intrinsically solely objects of the intellect. But for one thing, it is not obvious in these cases that this reality as such is in the first instance present only in the intellect; and for another, the change does not take place rapidly enough

for the situation to be easily taken in and thus easily grasped. However, both of these scenarios obtain when we allow mere thoughts and fantasies to work on the will. For example, if we are alone with ourselves, thinking over our personal affairs, and then vividly imagine something like the threat of an actually existing danger along with the possibility of an unfortunate outcome, then our heart instantly feels constricted by anxiety and our blood freezes in our veins. But then, if the intellect moves on to the possibility of the opposing outcome and lets the imagination paint a picture of a consequent and long-desired happiness, all our pulses beat a joyful rhythm<sup>a</sup> and our heart feels light as a feather – until the intellect awakes from its dream. But let something trigger the memory of an insult or injury suffered long ago: all at once anger and resentment flow through the breast that was at peace a moment before. But then the image of a long-lost love appears by chance, along with the magical scenes of the whole romance; anger just as quickly makes way for deep longing and sorrow. Finally, let some shameful incident from the past occur to us: we shrivel up, want the ground to swallow us up, we blush with shame and often try to divert and distract ourselves violently through some loud exclamation, as if warding off evil spirits. – We see that when the intellect starts to play, the will must dance to its tune: indeed, the intellect lets the will play the role of a child put into different moods by its nurse with her chatter and tales that alternate between joyful and sad. This is due to the fact that in itself, the will is without cognition, while the understanding associated with it has no will. Hence the will acts like a body that is set in motion, while the understanding acts like the cause that sets it in motion, because it is the medium of motives. But the primacy of the will becomes clear once more when in the last instance it makes palpable its sovereignty over the intellect, whose plaything we saw it become as soon as it lets the intellect rule over it. This happens when the will forbids the intellect certain representations, when it simply blocks certain trains of thought, because it knows (i.e. it has learned from the very same intellect) that they will arouse in it one of the emotions described above. The will then reins in the intellect and forces it to focus on other things. As difficult as this may often be, it must nevertheless succeed as soon as the will takes it seriously: this is because the resistance involved does not come from the intellect (which always remains indifferent) but rather from the will itself, which is inclined towards a representation in one respect that it abhors in another. This representation is then intrinsically interesting to the will precisely because it moved the will; but at the same time, abstract cognition

233

<sup>a</sup> *gerathen alsbald alle Pulse in freudige Bewegung*

tells the will that the representation will senselessly<sup>a</sup> expose it to an excruciating or disgraceful agitation: in response to this cognition, the will then decides to force the intellect to obey. This is termed 'self-mastery':<sup>b</sup> clearly it is the will that is master here and the intellect the servant; this is because it is always the will that, in the last instance, retains the regiment, and hence constitutes the true kernel, the essence in itself of the human being. In this respect the honour of being the *Hêgemonikon*<sup>c</sup> would belong to the will: but, on the other hand, it seems appropriate for the *intellect* as well, in so far as the intellect is the guide and leader, like the retainer who walks in front of the stranger. But the truth is that the most apt simile for the relation of the two is that of a strong blind man who carries a seeing but lame man on his shoulders.

234 The relation presented here of the will to the intellect can also be recognized in the fact that the intellect is originally quite foreign to the resolutions of the will. The intellect furnishes the will with motives: but it only finds out afterwards, completely a posteriori, what effects they have had, like someone who performs a chemical experiment, combining the reagents and then waiting for the result. Indeed, the intellect is so completely excluded from the authentic decisions and secret resolutions of the will that sometimes it can only learn of them through eavesdropping and taking the will by surprise, as would be the case with a stranger, and must catch the will unawares while it is acting on its decisions simply to find out its true intent. For example, I have hatched a plan, but one that I myself have some scruples about, and one that in addition I am not at all certain can be carried out, because it depends on external circumstances that have not yet been decided; hence it would be quite unnecessary to make any decision about it right away; and so I put the issue on the back burner for now. But I often do not know how secretly invested<sup>d</sup> I already am in the plan and how much I want to carry it out, despite my scruples: that is, my intellect does not know. But now let me hear just one piece of news favourable to its execution, and right away, to my own astonishment, a jubilant and irrepressible joy arises inside me, spreads over my whole being and takes permanent possession of it. Only now does my intellect learn how firmly my will had already taken hold of the plan and how entirely my will was in agreement with it, even while the intellect had regarded it as quite problematic and barely a match for my scruple. – Or, to take another

<sup>a</sup> *zwecklos*

<sup>b</sup> *Herr über sich seyn*

<sup>c</sup> ἡγεμονικόν [ruling or guiding part (a Stoic term)]

<sup>d</sup> *im Geheimen verbrüdet*

case: I have enthusiastically taken on a mutual obligation that I thought was very much in accordance with my wishes. But now, as the business progresses and I become conscious of its disadvantages and difficulties, I begin to suspect that I have come to thoroughly regret what I had so enthusiastically undertaken: however, I rid myself of these suspicions by assuring myself that I would have done the same thing even if I had not been obliged to. Now however the obligation is unexpectedly dissolved by the other party and I see with astonishment that this comes as a relief to me and gives me great pleasure. – We often do not know what we want, or what we fear. We can nourish a wish for years without either admitting it to ourselves or even letting it come clearly into consciousness because the intellect is not supposed to find out about it lest it spoil the good opinion we have of ourselves: but if the wish is granted, then we learn from our joy (not without some shame) that it is what we wanted: for instance, the death of some near relative from whom we are to inherit. And sometimes we do not know what we really fear because we lack the courage to bring it clearly into consciousness.<sup>9</sup> – Indeed, we are often quite mistaken even about the real motive we have for doing or forgoing something, until something like an accident finally reveals the secret and we recognize that what we took to be our motive was not the motive, but rather it was something else that we had not wanted to admit to ourselves because it utterly failed to conform to the good opinion we cherish of ourselves. For example, we refrain from doing something on purely moral grounds (so we think); but then afterwards we learn that it was only fear that held us back because we did it as soon as all danger was removed. In isolated cases this can go so far that someone does not even suspect the real motive of his action, indeed he does not regard himself as capable of being moved by such a motive: and yet it is the true motive of his action.<sup>10</sup> – By the by, all this confirms and illustrates a tenet of La Rochefoucauld: ‘self-love is cleverer than the cleverest man in the world;’<sup>a</sup> and even provides a commentary on the Delphic *know thyself*<sup>b</sup> and its difficulty.<sup>11</sup> – Now if, on the other hand, as all philosophers claim, the intellect comprised our true being, and resolutions of the will were simply the result of cognition, then our moral value would be decided only by *that* motive we *claim* we act on; this is analogous to the way intention rather than result is decisive here. But then in fact the distinction between imaginary and actual motive would be rendered impossible. – So

235

<sup>a</sup> *L’amour-propre est plus habile que le plus habile homme du monde* [François Duc de la Rochefoucauld, *Reflexions, ou sentences et maximes morales* (*Reflections, or aphorisms and moral maxims*), first published in 1664, maxim 4]

<sup>b</sup> γνῶθι σεαυτόν [inscription on the temple at Delphi]

236

all the cases presented here – and any attentive person can observe analogous cases in himself – allow us to see that the intellect is so foreign to the will that it is sometimes even mystified by the will: for, although the intellect furnishes the will with motives, it does not penetrate into the secret workshop of the will's decisions. The intellect is certainly the will's confidant, but not one that learns everything.<sup>12</sup> This is also confirmed by the fact that the intellect on occasion does not fully trust the will, something that almost everyone will have the opportunity to observe in himself. Thus, if we have made some great and daring decision – a decision that is, as such, really only a promise by the will to the intellect – we are often left with an unacknowledged doubt at the back of our minds as to whether the decision is completely seriously intended, whether we might not hesitate when it comes to carrying it out, or even go back on ourselves, or whether we will rather be firm and tenacious enough to carry it through. We need the deed itself to convince ourselves of the good faith<sup>a</sup> of the resolution. –

All these facts show that the will is completely different from the intellect, and that the former has primacy and the latter occupies a subordinate position.

(4) The *intellect* grows tired; the will is inexhaustible. – After sustained intellectual labour our brain feels tired, just as our arm feels tired after sustained manual labour.<sup>13</sup> All *cognition* is associated with exertion: *willing* on the other hand is our ownmost being,<sup>b</sup> which expresses itself effortlessly and automatically. So if our *will* is highly excited, as it is in all affects, i.e. in anger, fear, desire, depression, etc., and someone then urges us on to *cognition* (perhaps with the intention of rectifying the motive for these affects) we see the violence we must do to ourselves in order to pass from the primordial, natural, ownmost activity over to the derived, mediated and forced activity. – For only the will is self-moving<sup>c</sup> and hence 'inexhaustible and forever unaging'.<sup>d</sup> Only the will acts unbidden, and hence often too early and too intensely, and knows no fatigue. Nursing infants who barely exhibit the first weak signs of intelligence are already full of self-will:<sup>e</sup> they are filled to the bursting point with will, and they show this pressure through unruly, aimless rages and screaming, despite the fact that their willing does not yet have an object, i.e., they will without knowing what they will.<sup>f</sup> Here we might recall *Cabanis's* remark: 'All these

<sup>a</sup> *Aufrichtigkeit*

<sup>b</sup> *selbststeigenes Wesen*

<sup>c</sup> αὐτόματος

<sup>d</sup> ἀκάματος καὶ ἀγήρατος ἡματα πάντα (*lassitudinis et senii expers in sempiternum*) [adapted quotation from *Iliad* VIII, line 539]

<sup>e</sup> *Eigenwillen*

<sup>f</sup> *wollen, ohne zu wissen was sie wollen*

passions following one another so rapidly are displayed with such naïveté on the infant's mobile features. While the feeble muscles of their arms and legs scarcely know how to create a couple of indecisive movements, the distinct movements of the facial muscles already express practically the whole range of general affects typical of human nature: and the attentive observer will easily recognize the characteristic features of the future man in this display'<sup>a</sup> (*Relations Between the Physical and Moral*,<sup>b</sup> vol. I, p. 123). – By contrast, the intellect takes a long time to develop, following the completion of the brain and the maturity of the whole organism; these are the conditions for the intellect precisely because the intellect is only a somatic function. Because the brain has already achieved its full size by the age of seven, children of that age start to become strikingly intelligent, inquisitive and rational. But then comes puberty: it gives the brain a sort of support or a sounding-board, and all at once raises the intellect to a new level, up an octave, as it were, to match the octave drop in the voice. But at the same time, animal desires and passions emerge that oppose the rationality that was formerly dominant, and this increases.<sup>14</sup> The inexhaustibility of the will is now also demonstrated through the error to which all people are more or less susceptible by nature, and which can be overcome only through education, namely: *rashness*.<sup>c</sup> Rashness is when the will rushes prematurely about its business. Its business is purely active and executive, and should come into the picture only after the explorative, deliberative work is completely and decisively accomplished, namely by cognition. But we seldom really wait for this time. Scarcely does the cognition grasp and hastily assemble some small information about an existing situation, an unfolding event, or another person's opinion, when the ever-ready and never-tiring will has already emerged unbidden from the depths of the mind<sup>d</sup> and manifests itself as horror, fear, hope, joy, desire, envy, grief, jealousy, rage, or courage, driving us to rash words or deeds that we usually regret after time has taught us that the hegemo-

<sup>a</sup> *Toutes ces passions, qui se succèdent d'une manière si rapide, et se peignent avec tant de naïveté, sur le visage mobile des enfans. Tandis que les faibles muscles de leurs bras et de leurs jambes savent encore à peine former quelques mouvemens indécis, les muscles de la face expriment déjà par des mouvemens distincts presque toute la suite des affections générales propres à la nature humaine: et l'observateur attentif reconnait facilement dans ce tableau les traits caractéristiques de l'homme futur.*

<sup>b</sup> *Rapports du physique et moral* [Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, *Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'homme* (*Relations Between the Physical and the Moral in Man*), second edition, 1805]

<sup>c</sup> *Voreiligkeit*

<sup>d</sup> *aus der Tiefe des Gemüths*

238 nikon,<sup>a</sup> the intellect, is not even halfway finished with its job of comprehending the situation, deliberating about its context, and making an informed decision; the will did not wait for this to take place, but jumped in long before it was time with ‘now it’s my turn!’ and immediately seized the initiative without any resistance from the intellect, which is a mere slave or livery servant of the will and is not, like the will, self-moving,<sup>b</sup> acting from its own force and its own urge.<sup>c</sup> And so the intellect is easily pushed aside by the will and silenced by a nod, while the intellect, for its part, exerting itself to the utmost, can hardly get the will to stop for even a minute so that it can get a word in edgeways. This is why there are so few people (and they are nearly all Spanish and Turkish, although sometimes English as well) who can *keep their heads* under even the most provoking circumstances and continue unperturbed with their comprehension and investigation of the lie of the land so that, where other people would already be beside themselves, they can pose a further question with considerable composure;<sup>d</sup> this is something quite different from the placidity of many Germans and Dutch, which is based on a phlegmatic and dull temperament. There is no better illustration of this admirable quality than that of Iffland, when playing the hetman of the Cossacks in *Benyowski*:<sup>e</sup> when the conspirators had lured him into their tent and held a rifle to his head to show that they would fire if he cried out, Iffland blew into the muzzle of the rifle to see whether it was loaded. – Nine out of ten things that make us angry would not do so if we understood them properly, if we understood what caused them, and hence recognized their necessity and true constitution: but this would happen much more frequently if we made them objects of reflection before making them objects of annoyance or jealousy. – For what bridle and bit are to an unruly horse, the intellect is to the human will: it must be guided by this bridle through teaching, reprimands, education, etc., because in itself it is just as wild and impetuous an urge<sup>f</sup> as the force that appears in a downward plunging waterfall – in fact, as we know, these are at the most basic level identical. At the height of anger, in intoxication, 239 in despair, the will has taken the bit between its teeth, it has bolted away<sup>g</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *das Hegemonikon*

<sup>b</sup> αὐτόματος

<sup>c</sup> *aus eigener Kraft und eigenem Drange*

<sup>d</sup> *con mucho sosiego*

<sup>e</sup> [The play *Graf Benjowsky oder die Verschwörung auf Kamtschatka* (1795) by August von Kotzebue]

<sup>f</sup> *Drang*

<sup>g</sup> *ist durchgegangen*

and follows its primordial nature. In madness without delirium<sup>a</sup> the will has lost the bridle and bit entirely, showing its primordial nature most clearly, and demonstrating that the intellect is as different from the will as the bridle is from the horse: in this state it can also be compared to a clock that keeps buzzing away once a particular screw is removed.

This observation too shows us that the will is what is primordial and hence metaphysical, and the intellect by contrast is something secondary and physical. As such, the intellect, like everything physical, is subordinated to the force of inertia,<sup>b</sup> and consequently only becomes active when it is driven on by something else, by the will that controls and guides it and encourages its exertion, and, in short, endows it with the activity that it does not originally possess. This is why the intellect is always willing to rest as soon as it is allowed to, and often proves itself *lazy*<sup>c</sup> and disinclined to action: continued exertion tires it out to the point of complete insensibility and it becomes exhausted, like a voltaic pile after repeated shocks. This is why every extended period of intellectual labour requires breaks and rest: or else the result is dullness and incapacity. Admittedly these will only be temporary at first. But if the intellect is continuously denied such breaks, it becomes excessively and perpetually strained, and the result is a permanent insensibility of the intellect, which, in old age, can turn into a complete incapacity, a child-like state, or into stupidity and madness. It is not old age in and of itself, but rather extended, continuous, and tyrannical over-exertion of the intellect or brain that is to blame when this malady<sup>d</sup> is found in the final years of life. This explains why *Swift* went mad, *Kant* became child-like and *Walter Scott* as well as *Wordsworth*, *Southey* and many other lesser lights<sup>e</sup> became insensible and incapable. *Goethe* remained lucid as well as mentally strong and active to the end because, always a man of the world and of the court, he never pursued his mental affairs with self-compulsion. The same is true of *Wieland* and the ninety-one-year-old *Knebel*, as well as of *Voltaire*. All this however shows just how secondary and physical the intellect is, how it is a mere tool.<sup>15</sup> This is precisely why the intellect requires the complete suspension of its activity – for almost a third of its lifetime – in sleep, which is a resting of the brain, for the intellect is purely a function of the brain which is therefore prior to it just as the stomach is prior to digestion, or bodies to their impact, and along with

240

<sup>a</sup> *mania sine delirio*

<sup>b</sup> *vis inertiae*

<sup>c</sup> *träge*

<sup>d</sup> *Übel*

<sup>e</sup> *minorum gentium*



which the intellect fades and wears out in old age. – The will, by contrast, as thing in itself, is absolutely tireless and never lethargic, its activity is its essence<sup>a</sup> and it never stops willing, and when, in deep sleep, it is released by the intellect and hence cannot act anything out externally on the basis of motives, it remains active as life force,<sup>b</sup> and takes care (with that many fewer interruptions) of the inner economy of the organism, bringing also, as nature's healing force,<sup>c,16</sup> any irregularities that have infiltrated themselves back into order. For the will is not, like the intellect, a function of the body; rather, *the body is its function*: and so it is prior in the order of things<sup>d</sup> to the body as its metaphysical substrate, as the in-itself of the body's appearance. It shares its inexhaustibility with the *heart* for the duration of life, this first cause<sup>e</sup> of the organism which, for this reason, has become its symbol and synonym. Moreover it does not disappear in old age, but goes on willing what it has always willed, indeed it becomes firmer and less flexible than it was in youth, more unforgiving, stubborn and unmanageable because the intellect becomes less receptive: so we can get the better of someone in old age only by taking advantage of the weakness of his intellect.

Equally, the complete *weakness* and *imperfection* of the intellect, as exhibited by the lack of judgment, the narrow-mindedness, perversity and stupidity of the great majority of people, would be entirely inexplicable if the intellect were not secondary, additional, and merely instrumental, and were instead the immediate and primordial essence of the so-called soul, or quite generally of a person's inner being, as all previous philosophers have assumed. For how could the primordial essence so often fail and go wrong in its immediate and characteristic function? – *Willing*, which is really primordial in human consciousness, takes place perfectly all the time: every being continually wills in a capable and decisive manner. It would be a fundamentally flawed point of view to regard immorality in willing as an imperfection: rather, morality has a source that in fact already lies beyond nature so that it contradicts nature's utterances. As a result, morality is precisely opposed to natural willing, which is in itself and as such egoistic; indeed, progress down the path of morality leads to the annulment of the will. On this point, I refer to our Fourth Book and to my prize essay, *On the Basis of Morals*.

<sup>a</sup> *Essenz*

<sup>b</sup> *Lebenskraft*

<sup>c</sup> *vis naturae medicatrix*

<sup>d</sup> *ordine rerum*

<sup>e</sup> *primum mobile*

(5) That the *will* is what is real and essential in man, while the *intellect* is secondary, conditioned and produced, can also be seen from the fact that the latter can perform its function purely and properly only so long as the will pauses and is silent; by contrast, every noticeable excitation of the will disturbs the functioning of the intellect and falsifies its results by its interference: but the inverse is not the case, as the intellect does not hinder the will in a similar way. The moon has no effect while the sun is in the sky; but the moon does not hinder the sun.

A great *fright* often scares us out of our senses to such an extent that we become petrified or do the most inappropriate thing, like running straight into the flames when a fire breaks out. When we are *angry*, we no longer know what we are doing, still less what we are saying. *Eagerness*<sup>a</sup> is described as 'blind' because it renders us incapable of assessing other people's arguments, or even of looking for our own and laying them out in an orderly way. *Joy* makes us unreflective, inconsiderate and foolhardy: and *desire* has almost the same effect. *Fear* stops us from seeing and taking hold of any means of rescue that might be nearby, often even close at hand. This is why *sangfroid* and *presence of mind*<sup>b</sup> are the most essential capacities<sup>c</sup> for surviving the sudden onset of danger as well as conflict with opponents and enemies. Presence of mind involves silencing of the will so that the intellect can act; *sangfroid* involves the undisturbed activity of the intellect under the impetus of the circumstances that affect the will: hence the former is in fact the condition of the latter, and the two are closely related and also rare, and in addition only ever exist to a comparative extent. They are however of inestimable advantage because they permit the use of the intellect at exactly those times when it is most needed, and thus confer a decisive advantage. Someone who lacks them will recognize what he should have said or done only after the opportunity has passed. When a person succumbs to a highly emotional state,<sup>d</sup> i.e. his will is so strongly excited that it cancels out the purity of the function of the intellect, he is very appropriately described as '*disarmed*'<sup>e</sup> because a correct assessment of circumstances and relations are our sword and shield in the struggle with things and people. It is in this sense that *Balthasar Gracián*<sup>f</sup> says: *es la pasión*

242

<sup>a</sup> *Eifer*

<sup>b</sup> *Kaltblütigkeit und Geistesgegenwart*

<sup>c</sup> *Befähigung*

<sup>d</sup> *in Affekt geräth*

<sup>e</sup> *entrüstet* [Schopenhauer is making use of the fact that the German term originates in the notion of disarming, but is used to mean 'indignant' or 'enraged'. This does not translate into English – indeed, English makes the opposite connection, in the phrase 'up in arms', which suggests that the infuriated person does have possession of weaponry]

<sup>f</sup> [See p. 81, n. a]

*enemiga declarada de la cordura* (passion is the avowed enemy of prudence). – Now, if intellect and will were not completely distinct, but instead, as has been thought up to now, cognition and willing were at root the same, and were equally primordial functions of an absolutely simple being, then the intellect would be intensified along with the excitation and intensification of the will that is constitutive of affect:<sup>a</sup> but as we have seen, the intellect is instead hindered and depressed by this process, which is why the ancients described affect as a perturbation of the soul.<sup>b</sup> In fact, the intellect is like the mirrored surface of water, while the water itself is like the will, the agitation of which destroys both the purity of the mirror and the clarity of its images as well. The *organism* is the will itself, it is embodied *will*, i.e. will intuited objectively in the brain: as a result, the joyful, and especially vigorous affects elevate and accelerate many of its functions, such as respiration, circulation of the blood, bile secretion, and muscular force. The *intellect*, on the other hand, is a mere function of the *brain*, which is carried and nourished by the organism as a mere parasite: as a result, every perturbation of the *will*, and with it of the *organism*, must paralyse or disturb brain function, which is self-subsistent and has no other needs than those of rest and nourishment.

243 This disruptive influence of the will's activity on the intellect can be proven not only by means of the perturbations raised by the affects, but just as effectively by means of many other more gradual and hence more continual falsifications of thought by our inclinations. *Hope* lets us see what we want, and *fear* lets us see what we are afraid of as both are probable and close at hand, and both magnify their objects. According to Aelian (*Various Histories*,<sup>c</sup> 13, 28), *Plato* gave an excellent description of *hope* as the dream of someone who is awake. It consists essentially in this: when the will's servant, the *intellect*, cannot procure what the will wants, the will compels the intellect to at least picture it to the will, and in general to take on the role of consoler, and to appease and support its master as the nursemaid does for the child with fairy tales that take on the appearance of truth; but the intellect must thereby do violence to its own nature, which is directed to truth, inasmuch as it forces itself, in contravention of its own laws, to treat as true things that are neither true, nor probable, and are often barely possible, all in order briefly to appease, pacify and put to sleep the unruly and ungovernable *will*. Here we see clearly who is the master and who the servant. – Many people will certainly have observed that when a

<sup>a</sup> *Affekt*

<sup>b</sup> *animi perturbatio*

<sup>c</sup> *V[ariae] H[istoriae]*

matter of importance to them can turn out in several possible ways, and they think they have brought all these possible conclusions together in a single and complete disjunctive judgment, the outcome will be something quite different and wholly unexpected; however, people might not have noticed that this outcome will almost always be the one most unfavourable to them. This can be explained by the fact that the worst case scenario remained completely invisible to their *intellect*, even though it thought it had conducted a complete survey all the possibilities, because the *will* held its hand, as it were, in front of this possibility; that is, it had so mastered the intellect that the intellect was completely incapable of catching sight of the worst case of all, even though this case must have been the most probable, since it became actual. However, in decidedly melancholic dispositions, or in those that have grown wiser through these same experiences, the process is also reversed: here apprehensiveness plays the role of hope. The first semblance of danger puts such people into transports of groundless anxiety. And if the intellect starts to investigate the situation, it is dismissed as incompetent, indeed as a deceptive sophist, because the heart is to be believed, a heart whose timidity is now treated as a cogent argument for the reality and scope of the danger.<sup>17</sup> In this way, the intellect is completely prohibited from looking for good counter-arguments, ones that it would recognize right away if it were left to itself. Instead it is forced to picture to them the very worst outcome, even when the intellect itself can scarcely think it possible:

244

Such as we know is false, yet dread in sooth,  
Because the worst is ever nearest truth.  
(Byron, *Lara*, Canto 1)<sup>a</sup>

*Love* and *hate* corrupt<sup>b</sup> our judgment completely: we see nothing but faults in our enemies and merit in our loved ones, whose very flaws seem lovable to us. Our *advantage*, whatever sort it might be, exerts a similar secret power over our judgment: what suits it suddenly appears to us as fair, right and reasonable; what crosses it presents itself to us, in all seriousness, as wrong and abhorrent, or absurd and counterproductive. This is why there are so many prejudices at the level of class, profession, nation, sect and religion. A set and accepted hypothesis<sup>c</sup> gives us hawks' eyes for anything that confirms it, and blinds us to anything that contradicts it. We are often quite unable to grasp or conceive anything that stands in

<sup>a</sup> [XXVIII, lines 31–2; Schopenhauer quotes the passage in English and provides a German translation]

<sup>b</sup> *verfälschen*

<sup>c</sup> *Eine gefälschte Hypothese*

opposition to our cause, our plan, our wish, our hope, even though it is obvious to everyone else: on the other hand, anything favourable strikes the eye, even from a great distance. What goes against the heart, the head does not admit. – We cling to many errors throughout our whole lives, and take care not to investigate their rationale merely out of a fear, unconscious even to ourselves, that we will discover we have so often and for so long believed and claimed falsehoods.<sup>18</sup> – And so our intellect is daily duped and corrupted by the trickery of inclination, something that Bacon of Verulam has expressed very well in the following terms: ‘the intellect is not a *dry light*, but receives infusions from the will and from the passions; and this produces knowledge as we desire to have it. For man will believe most of all what he wants most to believe. Passion influences and infects the intellect in innumerable ways that are sometimes imperceptible’<sup>a</sup> (*Novum Organum* I, 14). Clearly this is also what stands in the way of all fundamental but novel insights in the sciences, and also obstructs the refutation of sanctioned errors: a man will not find it easy to acknowledge the correctness of anything that convicts him of incredible thoughtlessness.

245 This alone can explain why truths so clear and simple as those in Goethe’s theory of colours are still denied by physicists, so that even Goethe had to experience just how much more difficult is the position of someone who promises instruction rather than entertainment; and hence how much luckier it is to be born a poet than a philosopher. On the other hand, the more stubborn the grip of an error, the more humiliating its subsequent unmasking<sup>b</sup> will be: with an overturned system as with a defeated army, the most prudent is the first to desert.

A trivial and comical but striking example of this secret and direct power the will exercises over the intellect is the following: when we do accounts, we make mistakes in our favour far more often than mistakes to our disadvantage, and in fact without the slightest dishonest intent, but simply through an unconscious tendency to minimize our debts and maximize our credit.<sup>c</sup>

Finally, the following fact also belongs at this point: the slightest ulterior intent<sup>d</sup> on the part of a counsellor will usually outweigh his insight, however great it may be; consequently, we cannot assume he speaks from

<sup>a</sup> *Intellectus luminis sicci non est; sed recipit infusionem a voluntate et affectibus: id quod generat ad quod vult scientias: quod enim mavult homo, id potius credit. Innumeris modis, iisque interdum imperceptibilibus, affectus intellectum imbuunt et inficit* (*Org. nov.* I, 14) [In fact I, 49; Schopenhauer also omits a passage after *credit*]

<sup>b</sup> *Ueberführung*

<sup>c</sup> *Debet . . . Credit*

<sup>d</sup> *Absicht* [Schopenhauer frequently, as here, opposes *Absicht* to *Einsicht*, insight]

the former where we suspect the latter. How little we can expect complete rectitude, even from otherwise honest people, as soon as their own interests are in play, is something we can measure from the frequency with which we deceive ourselves when we are seduced by hope, duped by fear, tormented by suspicion, flattered by vanity, blinded by a hypothesis, or when a minor purpose lying close by gets in the way of an important but distant one: for in these cases we see the direct, unconscious, and detrimental influence of the will on cognition. Accordingly, we should not be surprised by the fact that, when someone is asked for advice, the answer is immediately dictated by his will before the question can even enter the tribunal of his judgment.

Here I want to devote only a word to something that will be explained in full in the next Book, namely that the most perfect cognition, that is the genius's purely objective grasp of the world, is conditioned by such a deep silencing of the will that, while it lasts, even individuality disappears from consciousness and the human being is left as the *pure subject of cognition*, which is the correlate of the Idea. 246

The disruptive influence of the will on the intellect exemplified by all these phenomena, and, on the other hand, the feebleness and fragility of the intellect (that make it unable to operate as soon as the will has started to move in any way), provide us with yet another proof that the will is the root<sup>a</sup> of our being and acts with primordial energy,<sup>b</sup> while the intellect, as something additional and conditioned in so many ways, acts only secondarily and conditionally.

There is no direct disturbance of the will by the intellect that corresponds to the disturbance and disruption of the intellect by the will as presented here: in fact we cannot even form the concept of such a thing. No one would want to interpret falsely conceived motives as leading the will astray like this; for this is a failure of the intellect to perform its own function and is committed entirely within the province of the intellect, and its influence on the will is entirely indirect. It would be more plausible to cite *irresolution*<sup>c</sup> as an example since it involves the will coming to a standstill when presented by the intellect with a conflicting set of motives, and being prevented<sup>d</sup> from acting. But, on closer inspection, it becomes very clear that the cause of this obstruction<sup>e</sup> does not lie in the activity of the *intellect* as such, but rather entirely in the *external objects* provided by this activity:

<sup>a</sup> *das Radikale*

<sup>b</sup> *mit ursprünglicher Gewalt*

<sup>c</sup> *Unschlüssigkeit*

<sup>d</sup> *gehemmt*

<sup>e</sup> *Hemmung*

these objects now stand in just such a relation to the will concerned that they pull on it in different directions, but with nearly equal strength: the true cause works merely *through* the intellect, as the medium of motives; although of course, only on the assumption that the intellect is acute enough to apprehend the objects and their several relations.<sup>19</sup> Indecisiveness<sup>a</sup> as a character trait is just as much the result of the properties of the will as of the intellect. The most limited minds are of course not susceptible to indecisiveness, in part because their weak understanding does not allow them to discover such a multitude of properties and relations among things, and in part because it is so unequal to the exertion of subtle and reflective thought<sup>b</sup> in these matters and consequently concerning the conjectural consequences of each step, that such people would rather decide at once, either on first impressions or according to some simple rule of behaviour. The opposite is the case for people of considerable understanding: as soon as such people develop a tender concern for their own well-being, i.e. a very sensitive egoism that has no desire to come off badly but also always wants to remain secure, then this leads to a certain anxiety at every step, and thus to indecisiveness. So this characteristic certainly does not signify a lack of understanding, although it does point to a lack of courage. But highly eminent minds survey these relations and their probable developments with such speed and assurance that, when supported by their own courage, they attain that kind of swift decisiveness and firmness that enables them to play a significant role in world affairs, as long as time and circumstances offer them the opportunity to do so.

The only definitive and direct obstruction and disruption that the will can suffer at the hands of the intellect as such may well be the completely exceptional one that is the consequence of an abnormally preponderant development of the intellect, and hence of that high gift that is described as genius. Genius is indeed a decided hindrance to energy of character and consequently to power of action. Hence it is not really great minds that provide historic characters, since, although they are capable of guiding and mastering the mass of humanity, they struggle through world affairs; such affairs are suited for people of far more limited mental capacity, but with greater firmness, decisiveness and perseverance of the will, things that simply cannot exist along with very great intelligence; accordingly it is really the case here that the intellect directly obstructs the will.<sup>20</sup>

(6) In contrast to this account of the hindrances and obstructions that the intellect suffers from the will, I would like now to give some examples

<sup>a</sup> *Unentschlossenheit*

<sup>b</sup> *der Anstrengung des Nachdenkens und Grübelns*

of how, conversely, the intellect's functions are sometimes furthered and improved through the inducement and spur of the will; these will also enable us to recognize the primary nature of the will and the secondary nature of the intellect, and it will become clear that the intellect bears the relation of instrument to the will.

A highly effective<sup>a</sup> motive, like a fervently desired wish or pressing need, sometimes enhances the intellect to a degree that we had previously never imagined possible. Untoward circumstances require us to accomplish certain things or develop entirely new talents, the seeds of which had been hidden and which we would never have guessed that we had. – The dullest man's understanding becomes sharp when it has to do with objects very close to what he wills:<sup>b</sup> he then can note, observe and discriminate with great subtlety the minutest circumstances relating to his wishes or fears. This is closely tied to the cunning of simple folk, which is often remarked upon with surprise. This is why Isaiah is right to say that vexation bestows intelligence,<sup>c</sup> which has therefore become a proverb: it is akin to the German proverb<sup>21</sup> 'necessity is the mother of invention'<sup>d</sup> – although an exception should be made for inventiveness in the fine arts<sup>e</sup> because the heart of every work of fine art is its conception, and if this is to be genuine, it must come from a completely will-less, and hence purely objective, intuition. – Need significantly enhances the understanding even of animals, so that in difficult straits they accomplish things that astound us: for example, almost all of them calculate that it is safer not to flee when they think they have not been seen: so the hare lies still in the furrowed field, letting the hunter go right by him; and when insects cannot run away, they play dead, and so on. We can come to understand this influence more specifically through the particular case of self-discipline in the wolf, which is spurred on by the great difficulties of its position in civilized Europe: this can be found in the second letter of *Leroy's* excellent *Letters on the Intelligence and Perfectibility of Animals*.<sup>f</sup> The higher education of the fox follows immediately after this, in the third letter. This animal finds itself in equally difficult circumstances, but with far less bodily strength, for which it compensates with greater understanding; but it is only after a continual struggle with need on the one side and danger on the other, that is to say,

248

<sup>a</sup> *wirkendes*

<sup>b</sup> *sehr angelegene Objekte seines Wollens*

<sup>c</sup> *vexatio dat intellectum* [Isaiah 28:19, Vulgate]

<sup>d</sup> *Die Noth ist die Mutter der Künste* [the German is literally 'need is the mother of the arts' – hence Schopenhauer's subsequent qualification]

<sup>e</sup> *schöne Künste*

<sup>f</sup> [See p. 68, n. d]



after being spurred on by the will, that the understanding reaches the high degree of cunning distinctive of foxes, especially in old age.<sup>22</sup> In all these cases of enhancement of the intellect, the will plays the role of the rider who drives the horse on beyond the natural measure of its strength by means of the spur.

The impulse of the will enhances *memory* in just the same way. Even when the memory itself is weak, its retention is perfect for anything of value to a ruling passion. The lover never forgets a favourable opportunity, the ambitious man never forgets a circumstance in favour of his plans, the miser never forgets a loss, the proud man never forgets a wound to his honour, and the vain man retains every word of praise as well as the slightest mark of his distinction. This extends even to animals: a horse comes to a halt in front of the inn where it once was fed a long time ago: dogs have an outstanding memory for all occasions, times and places that have involved good things to eat; and foxes for the various hiding-places where they have stored their booty.

Self-observation affords material for more discriminating remarks on this topic. Sometimes a disturbance makes me forget entirely what I had just been thinking about, or even what news had just reached my ears.<sup>23</sup> But if the matter had been of personal interest to me, no matter how remotely, then an echo of the impression that this interest makes on the will lingers on: that is, I am still conscious of precisely how agreeably or disagreeably it affected me, as well as of the particular way this occurred, that is, whether it even slightly aggrieved, worried, embittered, or saddened me, or whether it evoked contrary emotions. Thus, after the affair itself has been forgotten, a memory of its relation to the will is retained, and this is what often becomes the guiding thread that leads back to the affair itself. An analogous situation is the sight of a man who we remember quite generally having dealt with before, but without knowing where, when or what the affair was, or who he might be; on the other hand, the sight of him brings back quite precisely the sensation we had of our business with him, that is, whether it was pleasant or unpleasant and to what extent and in what way it was so: thus memory has preserved merely the echo of the *will* and not whatever it was that produced the echo. What lies at the bottom of this process could be termed the heart's memory, a memory that is much more intimate than that of the head. But fundamentally, the connection between these two goes so far that, if you think the matter through deeply, you reach the conclusion that memory in general requires the support of the will as point of contact, or better, as the thread upon which memories are strung, and which holds them firmly together, or that the will is like the

background on which individual memories are affixed and without which they could not be held down; and that consequently it is unthinkable that a pure intelligence, that is a purely cognitive and completely will-less being, could possess a memory. Accordingly, the enhancement of the memory described above as spurred on by a ruling passion is simply a higher degree of something that is present in all retention and remembering, inasmuch as these are always based on and conditioned by the will.<sup>24</sup> – Thus all this also makes it apparent how much more internal to us the will is than the intellect. The following facts will also serve to confirm this.

The intellect often obeys the will: as, for example, when we want to recollect something and finally succeed in doing so after some effort – and equally when we want to consider something precisely and with deliberation, and so on. But sometimes the intellect refuses to obey the will, for example when we try in vain to focus on something, or when we unsuccessfully demand that our memory give us back something we have entrusted to it: the anger of the will against the intellect on such occasions makes very clear both the relation of the will to the intellect, and also the differences between the two. Pained by this anger and eager to please, the intellect even sometimes unexpectedly produces what is demanded of it at the wrong time, hours later or even the next day.<sup>25</sup> – By contrast, the will never really obeys the intellect; the intellect is instead the cabinet council of this sovereign: the intellect lays everything before the will, and the will selects what conforms to its essence, although this choice is necessarily determined, because the will's essence is unalterably set, and its motives now lie before it. This is in fact why it is impossible to have an ethics that forms and improves the will itself. For any teaching can affect only *cognition*: and this never determines the will itself, that is, the *fundamental character* of willing, but merely its application to the circumstances at hand. An amended cognition can modify action only in more accurately showing the will the objects available to it and allowing it to judge them more correctly; in this way the will can gauge its relation to things more correctly, can see more clearly what it wills, and consequently will be less likely to make a mistake in its choice. But the intellect has no power over willing itself, over its basic direction or fundamental maxims. The belief that cognition really determines the *will* at a basic level is like the belief that the lantern someone carries at night is the first cause<sup>a</sup> of his movement. – Anyone who, either through experience or the reproofs of others, has recognized and regretted a fundamental failing in his character might

251

<sup>a</sup> *primum mobile*

well make a firm and honest resolution to improve himself and cast off the failing; but in spite of this, the failing is once again fully in evidence at the very next opportunity. New remorse, new resolution, new offence. When this has happened several times, he becomes conscious of the fact that he is incapable of improving himself, that the failing lies in his nature and personality, indeed that it *is* his personality. Now he will curse and condemn his nature and personality, he will experience a painful feeling that can rise to the level of a pang of conscience: but he can do nothing to change this. Here we see that what condemns and what is condemned come cleanly apart: we see the former as a purely theoretical capacity to construct and resolve upon a praiseworthy and desirable course of one's life; but we see the latter as something real, existing and immutable that pursues quite a different course, in spite of the former; and then we see the former remaining behind again with impotent remonstrance against the constitution of the other, with which it identifies itself again, and by means of this very affliction. Here will and intellect are broken very cleanly apart. In the process the will shows itself to be the stronger, indomitable, unchangeable, primitive and at the same time essential as well, the one on which everything depends; the intellect bemoans the will's failings but takes no comfort in the correctness of its *cognition*, as its proper function. And thus the intellect shows itself to be completely secondary, in part as the observer of foreign deeds that it accompanies with impotent praise or blame, and in part as something capable of being determined from the outside insofar as it learns through experience, drawing up and then changing its prescriptions. Particular elucidations of this topic are to be found in *Parerga*, vol. 2, § 118. – Accordingly, a comparison of our ways of thinking at different stages of life presents us with a peculiar patchwork of permanence and change. On the one side, the moral tendency of both a young and an elderly man is still the same as it was in the boy: on the other side, there is so much that is foreign to him that he cannot recognize himself and is astonished that he was once able to say this and do that. In the first half of life, today mostly laughs at yesterday, and indeed looks down on it with contempt; by contrast in the second half, today increasingly looks back on yesterday with envy. On close inspection however, we find that what was changeable was the *intellect*, with its tasks of insight and cognition, absorbing new material every day, presenting an ever-changing system of thought, even while it itself also rises and falls with the blooming and withering of the organism. By contrast, the basis of the latter, the will, and hence the inclinations, passions, affects and character, proves itself to be precisely what is immutable in consciousness; but here the

modifications that depend on the body's capacities for enjoyment, and hence on age, are also be taken into account. So, for example, an eagerness for sensual pleasure manifests itself as a fondness for delicacies<sup>a</sup> in boyhood, as a tendency towards voluptuousness in youth and manhood, and again as a fondness for delicacies in old age.

(7) If, as is universally assumed, the will came from cognition as its result or product, then there would have to be considerable cognition, insight and understanding in cases where there was considerable will. But this is not remotely the case: on the contrary, many people possess a strong, i.e. a decisive, resolute, controlling, unyielding, single-minded and vehement will combined with a very weak and incompetent understanding and it is maddening to deal with such people because their will is beyond the reach of reason and representation; it is as if it is hidden in a sack and wills blindly from out of it. Animals have far less understanding even than this, and yet often will vehemently and obstinately; plants, finally, have only will and no cognition at all.

253

If willing arose from cognition alone, then our *anger* would be exactly proportionate to each of its provocations<sup>b</sup> (or at least to our understanding of them) as it would be nothing more than the result of our present cognition. But this is very seldom the case: much more often, anger goes far beyond what provokes it. Our ranting and raving, the petty fury<sup>c</sup> that often occurs at the slightest of provocations (even when we correctly judge the provocations) is like the rages of an evil spirit that had been locked up and waiting for the chance to break loose, and rejoices in now having found it. This could not be the case if the ground of our being were something that *cognizes*,<sup>d</sup> and if willing were merely the result of *cognition*: because how could there be something in the result that was not in the elements? Surely the conclusion cannot contain more than the premises? Here too, the will reveals itself as an essence entirely different from cognition, which it uses only to communicate with the external world while following the laws of its own nature, taking nothing more from cognition than the occasion.<sup>e</sup>

As the mere tool of the will, the intellect is as different from the will as the hammer from the hammer smith. As long as it is only the intellect that is active in a conversation, the conversation remains *cold*. It is almost as if

<sup>a</sup> *Naschhaftigkeit*

<sup>b</sup> *Anlaß*

<sup>c</sup> *furor brevis* [Horace, *Epistles* I, 2, 62]

<sup>d</sup> *ein Erkennendes*

<sup>e</sup> *Anlaß*

the person himself were not present. Nor can he really compromise himself under these circumstances; at most, he can blunder. Only when the will comes into play is the person really present: he now becomes *warm*, in fact things often get *heated*. We always attribute vital heat<sup>a</sup> to the *will*: by contrast we say the ‘*cold* understanding’ or that a matter has been ‘*coolly* investigated’, i.e. thought through without the influence of the will. – If we were to try to invert the relation and regard the will as the tool of the intellect, it would be like making the hammer smith the tool of the hammer.

254 Nothing is more annoying than when, in arguing with someone, you give reasons to defend your position and take every trouble to convince him, thinking that you are dealing only with his *understanding*, and finally discover that he *will* not understand, that it is his *will* you are dealing with, and this has closed itself off to truth, throwing malicious misunderstandings, tricks, and sophisms into the field to shelter his understanding with its supposed incomprehension. And then of course he is impervious to argument: because *the use of reasons and proofs against the will* is like the impact of an illusion cast by a concave mirror<sup>b</sup> against a solid body. And hence the often-repeated expression: ‘my will stands in place of my reason’.<sup>c</sup> – We see plenty of examples of this every day. But unfortunately such examples are also strewn along the paths of science. It is futile to expect the most important truths and rarest achievements to be acknowledged by people who have an interest in their not being recognized, either because these truths contradict what such people teach each day, or because they do not dare to use and then teach them; or, if none of this is the case, it is because the catchword of the mediocre will always be: ‘If some one among us excels, let him do so elsewhere’<sup>d</sup> as *Helvétius* so marvellously recorded the saying of the Ephesians in Cicero’s fifth Tusculan book (ch. 36);<sup>e</sup> or, as the saying of the Abyssinian *Fit Arari*<sup>f</sup> has it: ‘the diamond is an outlaw among quartzes’.<sup>26</sup> So anyone who expects a fair appraisal of his achievements from this ever numerous crowd will find himself sorely disappointed and might not be able to understand his betrayal for a while, until he finally realizes that while he appeals to *cognition*, he is dealing with the *will*, and

<sup>a</sup> *Lebenswärme*

<sup>b</sup> *die Stöße eines Hohlspiegelphantoms*

<sup>c</sup> *Stat pro ratione voluntas* [Juvenal, *Satires* VI, 223: *sit pro ratione voluntas*]

<sup>d</sup> *Si quelqu’un excelle parmi nous, qu’il aille exceller ailleurs*

<sup>e</sup> [Claude-Adrien Helvétius, *De l’esprit (On the Mind)*, vol. 1, p. 57 (Paris 1758 edition), after Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* V, 36, 105]

<sup>f</sup> [Unidentified. *Fit’awrari* is a traditional Ethiopian (Abyssinian) court title. Hübscher’s speculation that Schopenhauer refers to ‘a Persian poet’ (*SW* 7, 384) seems unlikely]

thus finds himself in precisely the situation described above, and is in fact like someone who brings his case before a court presided over by judges who have all been bribed. In particular cases he will have the most conclusive proof that he is opposed by their *will* and not their *insight*, namely when one or another of them decides to plagiarize him. Then he will be astonished to see what refined critical minds they have,<sup>a</sup> how accurately they can appraise what other people can do, and how adept they are at seeking out what is best; like sparrows that never fail to pick the ripest cherries. –

255

The counterpoint to the will's victorious resistance to cognition, as we have presented it here, comes in when one presents reasons and proofs to someone whose will is on one's side: then everything is immediately convincing, all arguments are compelling, the issue is at once clear as day. Public orators know this. – In the one case as much as the other, the will shows itself as the primal forcefulness<sup>b</sup> against which the intellect can achieve nothing.

(8) We wish now to consider the individual characteristics – which is to say merits and flaws – of, on the one hand, the will and the character, and, on the other, the intellect; by doing so, we hope to clarify the complete difference of both fundamental capacities through their relation to each other and their relative value. Both history and experience tell us that the two emerge completely independently of each other. The fact that the greatest excellence of mind is not easily found united with a similarly excellent character can be sufficiently explained from the extreme rarity of each; on the other hand, their opposites are the order of the day, and we therefore find them in combination on a daily basis. Nobody ever thinks that an excellent mind entails a good will, nor that a good will implies an excellent mind, nor the reverse: rather any unbiased person will assume them to be completely separate qualities whose presence must be found out through experience, each for itself. A profoundly limited mind can exist in tandem with great goodness of heart, and I do not think that *Balthasar Gracián* (*The Complete Gentleman*,<sup>c</sup> p. 406) was correct in saying: *No ay simple, que no sea malicioso* (there is no simpleton who is not evil as well), although he has on his side the Spanish proverb: *Nunca la necedad anduvo sin malicia* (stupidity never goes without evil).<sup>27</sup> Still it might be the case that many stupid people become evil for the same reason many hunchbacks do, namely because they are embittered by this natural set-back, and they

<sup>a</sup> wie feine Kenner sie sind

<sup>b</sup> das Urkräftige

<sup>c</sup> [E] *Discreto* [1646]

256 sometimes seek a brief victory by compensating for their deficiency of understanding through dirty tricks. This, by the way, also explains why almost everyone quickly becomes malicious in the presence of a very superior mind. On the other hand, stupid people often have a reputation for a particular goodness of the heart, but this is so rarely in evidence that I have wondered how they came by it; however, I might flatter myself that I have found the key as follows. Some secret impulse<sup>a</sup> moves everyone to prefer to associate with people of slightly inferior understanding: because this is the only company with whom they feel comfortable; because, according to Hobbes, ‘all joy of the heart and all happiness depend on having people in comparison with whom one can think highly of oneself’ (*On the Citizen*, I, 5).<sup>b</sup> For the same reasons, everyone flees what is superior to himself; which is why Lichtenberg was quite right to remark: ‘For certain people, a thinking man is more fatal a creature than the most pronounced rogue.’<sup>c</sup> Corresponding to this, Helvétius said: ‘mediocre people have a sure and quick instinct for finding out men of intelligence and fleeing them’,<sup>d</sup> and Dr Johnson assures us that ‘there is nothing by which a man exasperates most people more, than by displaying a superior ability of brilliancy in conversation. They seem pleased at the time; but their envy makes them curse him at their hearts’ (Boswell, age 74).<sup>e</sup> Because such universal and painstaking attempts are taken to cover up this truth, I will attempt to expose it even more pitilessly by citing Merck, Goethe’s famous friend from youth, in his story, *Lindor*.<sup>f</sup> ‘He possessed talent given to him by nature and acquired by knowledge,<sup>g</sup> in consequence of which he left the worthy people present in many gatherings far behind him. If in the moment of delight upon seeing an extraordinary man, the public swallows these merits without at the same time giving a bad spin to them, nevertheless a certain impression of this phenomenon remains which, when it is repeated frequently, may on serious occasions have unpleasant future

257 results for the one guilty of creating it. Without anyone consciously noting that he was insulted on any one occasion, nobody is unhappy to stand

<sup>a</sup> Zug

<sup>b</sup> *omnis animi voluptas, omnisque alacritas in eo sita est, quod quis habeat, quibuscum conferens se, possit magnifice sentire de se ipso* (*de Cive* [1647], I, 5)

<sup>c</sup> [*Vermischte Schriften* (*Assorted Writings*) (new edition, 1844), II, 177]

<sup>d</sup> *Les gens médiocres ont un instinct sûr et prompt, pour connaître et fuir les gens d’esprit* [*De L’esprit* (*On the Mind*), Discourse II, chapter 3. See p. 238, n. e]

<sup>e</sup> [Schopenhauer gives this English quotation from James Boswell’s *Life of Samuel Johnson* (first published in 1791), and provides a German translation in a footnote]

<sup>f</sup> [Johann Heinrich Merck, *Lindor, eine bürgerlich-teutsche Geschichte* (*A German story of ordinary people*) (1781)]

<sup>g</sup> *Kenntnisse*

quietly in the way of this man's advancement.'<sup>28</sup> – This is why great mental superiority is more isolating than any other, and creates, at a minimum, a quiet hatred. The inverse is what makes stupid people so universally beloved; particularly since many people can find what they are looking for only in such people, given the above-mentioned law of their nature. Nobody will admit the true grounds for this inclination even to himself, and much less to others, and so he will, as a plausible pretext, ascribe to his selected companions a certain goodness of heart which, as we have said, is highly rare and only ever coincidentally present alongside mental limitations. – Ignorance, then, is in no way favourable to or related to a good character. But on the other hand it cannot be claimed that greatness of understanding is either: on the contrary, it is generally speaking hard to find a villain without it. In fact even the greatest intellectual eminence can exist in concert with the most serious moral depravity. An example of this is *Bacon of Verulam*: ungrateful, manipulative, malicious and base, he finally went to the point of accepting bribes in many civil proceedings in his role as Lord High Chancellor and highest judge of the realm: accused before his peers, he acknowledged his guilt and was thrown out of the House of Lords, assessed a fine of forty thousand pounds, and sentenced to confinement in the Tower. (See the notice for the new edition of Bacon's works in the *Edinburgh Review*, August 1837.) This is why Pope called him 'the wisest, brightest, meanest of mankind'.<sup>a</sup> *Essay on Man*, IV, 282. A similar example is provided by the historian *Guicciardini*, of whom *Rosini* says in the historical notes<sup>b</sup> (drawn from reliable contemporary sources and attached to his historical novel, *Luisa Strozzi*):<sup>c</sup> 'By those who put mind and learnedness above all other human qualities, this man will be considered among the greatest of his century: but for those who put virtue above all else, his memory can never be sufficiently condemned. He was the cruellest of all citizens in persecuting, killing, and banishing.'<sup>d,29</sup>

258

Now if it is said of a person: 'he has a good heart but a bad head', but of another: 'he has a very good head but a bad heart'; then everyone thinks that with the first, the praise far outweighs the blame; with the second, it is the other way around. Accordingly, we see when someone commits a bad

<sup>a</sup> [Alexander Pope, *Essay on Man* (1732–44). Schopenhauer quotes the passage in English and provides a German translation in a footnote]

<sup>b</sup> *Notizie Storiche*

<sup>c</sup> [Giovanni Rosini, *Luisa Strozzi, storia del secolo XVI (Luisa Strozzi: a sixteenth-century story)* (1833); Francesco Guicciardini (1483–1540)]

<sup>d</sup> *Da coloro, che pongono l'ingegno e il sapere al di sopra di tutte le umane qualità, questo uomo sarà riguardato come fra i più grandi del suo secolo: ma da quelli, che reputano la virtù dovere andare innanzi a tutto, non potrà esecrarsi abbastanza la sua memoria. Esso fu il più crudele fra i cittadini a perseguitare, uccidere e confinare etc.* [Schopenhauer provides a German translation in a footnote]



act, his friends and even he himself are concerned to shift the blame from the *will* onto the *intellect* and to pass off a fault of the heart for a fault of the head; dirty tricks are called *aberrations*, they are supposed to have been mere pieces of ignorance, thoughtlessness, recklessness, folly; indeed, they are pawned off when necessary as paroxysms, temporary madness, or, in cases of serious crime, even insanity, all simply to clear the *will* of guilt. And likewise we ourselves, when we have caused a misfortune or an injury, will very gladly plead folly,<sup>a</sup> before ourselves and others, just to avoid the reproach of malice.<sup>b</sup> Accordingly, when a judge sends down an equally unjust decision, there is a huge difference between his having erred and having been bribed.<sup>30</sup> All this is enough to show that the *will* alone is the actual and essential, the kernel of a human being, while the intellect is merely its tool and always prone to error without the will being involved. Before the judgment seat of morality, the charge of ignorance is no charge at all; in fact, it even confers privileges. And likewise before the world's courts, it is quite enough to release a criminal from all punishment that the guilt be shifted from his will to his *intellect*, by establishing either an unavoidable error or a mental disturbance: because then it does not matter any more than if a hand or foot had slipped against his will. I have discussed this in depth in the appendix to my prize essay *On the Freedom of the Will* entitled 'On Intellectual Freedom' to which I refer here, so as not to repeat myself.

People trying to achieve something with unsatisfactory results always appeal to their good will, which they claim was not lacking. In so doing they believe they will secure what is most important, what they are genuinely responsible for, and their genuine self: that their abilities did not answer is something they attribute to lack of a workable tool.

If someone is stupid, he is excused on the grounds that he cannot do anything about it: but if we tried excusing somebody who is *bad*<sup>c</sup> in similar fashion we would be laughed at. And yet the one like the other is innate. This proves that the will is the genuine person,<sup>d</sup> the intellect merely its tool.<sup>31</sup>

So it is only ever our *willing* that is regarded as dependent upon us, i.e. as an expression of our genuine essence, and for which we are therefore held responsible. This is precisely why it is absurd and unfair if we are called to account for our beliefs, and thus for our cognition: because we must regard

<sup>a</sup> *stultitia*

<sup>b</sup> *malitia*

<sup>c</sup> *schlecht*

<sup>d</sup> *der eigentliche Mensch*

this as something that, although it holds sway in us, is as little under our control as the events in the external world. This also makes clear that the *will* alone is the inner and ownmost kernel<sup>a</sup> of the human being, while the *intellect* with its operations that proceed as regularly as those in the external world, is to each person as something external, as a mere tool.

Great intellectual endowment has always been viewed as a *gift* of nature or the gods: this is why it has always been called *Gaben*, giftedness, *ingenii dotes*, gifts (a man highly gifted),<sup>b</sup> and viewed as something different from the person himself, falling his way through grace and favour. But nobody speaks of moral merits in this way, although they too are innate: rather, they have always been seen as something that comes from the person himself, essentially belonging to him, and in fact constituting his own self. But it follows from this that the will is the genuine essence of the human being while the intellect is secondary, a tool, an endowment.<sup>c,32</sup>

260

In keeping with this, all religions promise a reward beyond this life, in eternity, for merits of the *will* or heart; but none for intellectual merits, merits of understanding. Virtue expects its reward in the other world, prudence hopes for it in this; genius in neither one: it is its own reward. Accordingly, will is the eternal part, intellect the temporal.

Associations, community, interactions between people are generally speaking based on relations<sup>d</sup> of the will, and more rarely on relations of intellect: the first type of community can be called *material*, the second can be called *formal*. The former are the bonds of family and relationship,<sup>e</sup> as well as all associations based in a common goal or interest, such as that of a profession, class, corporation, party, faction, etc. These are based merely on disposition,<sup>f</sup> intention, which is consistent with great differences in intellectual abilities and their development. Thus not only can everyone live with everyone else in peace and unity, but they can also act and be connected with the other for the common good of both. Marriage too is a union of hearts, not of heads. But it is not like this with merely *formal* communities, which are aimed only at the exchange of ideas: these require a certain equality of intellectual abilities and education. Large discrepancies here create an insurmountable gap between people, the kind of gap that lies, for instance, between a great mind and an idiot, between a scholar and a peasant, between a courtier and a sailor. Such heterogenous beings have

<sup>a</sup> *das Innere und Eigene*

<sup>b</sup> [Schopenhauer uses the English in 'gifts' and the following phrase]

<sup>c</sup> *Ausstattung*

<sup>d</sup> *Verhältnisse*

<sup>e</sup> *Verwandschaft*

<sup>f</sup> *Gesinnung*

261

trouble understanding each other when it comes to the communication of ideas, representations, and insights. Nevertheless, a close *material* friendship can arise between them, and they can be true companions, confederates, and co-conspirators. This is because in everything concerning the *will* alone, which includes friendship, enmity, honesty, loyalty, perfidy and treachery, they are absolutely the same, cut from the same wood, and neither mind nor education make a difference in this: in fact, the vulgar man often puts the scholar to shame, as does the sailor the courtier. The reason is that under the most different degrees of education there are the same virtues and vices, affects and passions and, though somewhat modified in their expression, they very quickly recognize each other even in the most diverse individuals, and those with similar dispositions will come together while those who are opposed will fall apart.

262

Luminous intellectual qualities inspire wonder but not affection: affection is reserved for moral qualities, qualities of character. Everyone will prefer someone honest, good-natured, even obliging, easy-going, and agreeable for a friend over someone who is merely intellectually clever. Indeed, many people will be preferred over the clever man, simply because they have insignificant, accidental outer qualities that strike someone else's fancy. Only someone with a great mind himself will want the company of the clever man; his friendships on the other hand will be guided by moral qualities: for these are what he truly values in a person, and a single good character trait will conceal and cancel out a great lack of understanding. Our recognition of the goodness of someone's character will make us patient and indulgent towards weaknesses of understanding, as well as towards the feebleness, and childish character, of old people. In the complete absence of intellectual merits and education, a decidedly noble character stands out as one that lacks nothing; on the other hand, the greatest mind will always appear reprehensible when burdened by strong moral flaws. – For just as torches and fireworks pale in the sunlight and cannot be seen, the mind – even genius – and likewise beauty, are outshone and obscured by goodness of the heart. When these appear at a high level, they can compensate for the lack of the former qualities so completely that you are ashamed at having regretted the former's absence. Even the most limited understanding, as well as grotesque ugliness are, as it were, transfigured as soon as extraordinary goodness of heart declares itself as their companion; they are outshone by a beauty of a higher sort, since now a wisdom speaks from them that silences any other kind of wisdom. For goodness of heart is a transcendent quality; it belongs to an order of things reaching beyond this life and is incommensurable with every other

perfection. Where it is present to a high degree, it swells the heart to the point where it embraces the world, so that now everything lies within it and nothing remains outside, since it identifies all beings with its own. It then extends to others that limitless forbearance that people usually reserve for only themselves. Such a person is not capable of anger: rather, if something like his own intellectual or bodily flaws provoke the malicious scorn or derision of others, he will in his heart blame only himself for being the cause of such expressions, and continue, unforced, to treat those people in the kindest manner, confidently hoping that they will reconsider their error with respect to him, and come to recognize themselves in him as well. – What is wit and genius to this? What is Bacon of Verulam?

An investigation of our estimation of our own worth leads to the same results that we found in our consideration of our estimation of others. How fundamentally different our self-satisfaction with respect to our moral qualities is from our self-satisfaction when it comes to intellectual qualities! The first arises when, in looking back at our behaviour, we see that we made difficult sacrifices and exercised loyalty and honesty, that we have helped or forgiven many people, that we acted better towards other people than they did towards us, so that we might say with King Lear: ‘I am a man more sinn’d against than sinning’,<sup>a</sup> and it reaches its apex when perhaps some noble deed shines brightly in our memory! A profound seriousness accompanies the quiet joy we derive from such a review: and if we then see others who do not pass similar muster, we take no joy in this reflection; rather we regret it and truly wish that everyone was like us. – How differently we are affected by recognition of our intellectual superiority! Its ground-bass is really very much the passage from *Hobbes* cited above: ‘all joy of the heart and all happiness depend on having people in comparison with whom one can think highly of oneself’. Exuberant, triumphant vanity, proud, scornful looks cast down upon others, a gleeful frisson<sup>b</sup> at the consciousness of a decisive and significant superiority, which is related to the pride we feel over physical advantages – such is the result in this case. – This contrast between the two types of self-satisfaction demonstrates that the one is our true, inner and eternal essence, the other involves a more external, merely temporal merit, which is indeed not much more than a physical advantage. If in fact the *intellect* is a mere brain function, the *will* on the other hand is something whose function is the whole human being in his being and essence.

263

<sup>a</sup> Shakespeare, *King Lear*, Act III, sc. 2 [Schopenhauer gives the quotation in German]

<sup>b</sup> Kitzel

If, looking to the outside, we ponder the fact that life is short and art is long,<sup>a</sup> and consider how death carries away the greatest and most excellent minds, often when they have hardly reached the peak of their productivity, as well as great scholars just as they have gained a fundamental insight into their field of scholarly activity; this is additional confirmation that the meaning and aim of life is not intellectual but moral.<sup>33</sup>

264 Finally, the thoroughgoing difference between intellectual and moral qualities can also be recognized in the fact that the intellect undergoes highly significant alterations in time, while the will and character remain untouched by time. – The newborn has absolutely no use of its understanding, but achieves this within the first two months, up to the level of intuition and apprehension of things in the external world; a process that I examined more closely in the essay *On Vision and Colours*, p. 10 of the second edition.<sup>b</sup> This first and most important step is followed much more slowly, usually beginning in the third year, by the development of reason, to the point of speech and thereby thought. Still, early childhood remains irretrievably abandoned to stupidity and foolishness, mainly because the brain is still physically incomplete, until the seventh year, when it is perfected with respect both to size and texture. But its energetic activity still requires the antagonism of the genital system, and therefore only begins with puberty. But with puberty, the intellect achieves merely the *ability* to develop psychically: development itself can only be achieved with practice, experience, teaching. Thus, as soon as the mind has been delivered from childish foolishness, it falls into the snares of countless errors, prejudices, chimeras, including those of the most absurd and crass variety, and these hold it in a single-minded grip until experience releases it eventually, and many also fade away unnoticed: all this happens only over the course of many years; so that we may indeed consider people to have come of age soon after the twentieth year, but we locate complete maturity beginning in the forties, the Swabian age. But while this *psychic* process is still developing, assisted by external factors, the inner *physical* energy of the brain is already beginning to decline. The brain's development in fact culminates at around the thirtieth year because of its dependence on blood pressure and the effect of the pulse on the brain, and consequently on the preponderance of the arterial system over the venous system, as well as on the fresh and delicate nature of the brain fibres, and thus the energy of the genital system: after the thirty-fifth, a slight decline

<sup>a</sup> ὁ βίος βραχύς, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρά (*vita brevis, ars longa*) [Hippocrates, *Aphorisms*, 1, 1; cf. also Seneca *De brevitate vitae* (*On the brevity of life*), 1, 1]

<sup>b</sup> [VC, 215–16 (Hübscher SW 1, 10)]

in the physical energy of the brain becomes appreciable; this decline accelerates due to the gradual increase in predominance of the venous system over the arterial, as well as through the ever firmer and drier consistency of the brain fibres, and would become much more noticeable if not counteracted on the other side by the process of *psychic* improvement achieved through practice, experience, the growth of knowledge<sup>a</sup> and an acquired skill in mobilizing this knowledge; it is fortunate that this counteracting activity continues until late old age, since the brain comes increasingly to resemble a depleted instrument.<sup>34</sup> But in old age the original and entirely organically based energy of the intellect continues slowly but surely to decline; the faculties of original conception, the imagination, plasticity,<sup>b</sup> memory become noticeably weaker, and thus begin step by step to decline, down to a garrulous, forgetful, half-unconscious, and in the end, completely childish, old age.

265

The *will* on the other hand is not affected by all this becoming, change and alteration but rather is, from beginning to end, unalterably the same. Unlike cognition, willing does not need to be learned but rather operates perfectly from the start. The newborn infant moves itself wildly about, storms and screams: it wills with the greatest vehemence, although it does not yet know what it wills, because the medium of motives, the intellect, is still entirely undeveloped: the will is in the dark concerning the external world, where its objects lie, and rages like a prisoner against the walls and bars of his cell. But it gradually becomes light: and right away, the basic features of universal human willing proclaim themselves, along with the individual modifications of these features present in this particular case. Of course the already emerging character first shows itself in weak and fluctuating features because of the deficient service of the intellect, which is supposed to be providing it with motives. But character quickly announces its complete presence to the attentive observer, and it soon becomes unmistakable. Character traits emerge that remain throughout life: the main tendencies of the will, the easily excitable affects, the ruling passions all express themselves. This is why for the most part events at school are to those of the future course of a life what the silent prelude that precedes the court drama in *Hamlet* is to the play itself, whose contents are announced in the form of pantomime. But the intellectual abilities shown in the boy are no predictors of his future abilities: rather, the precocious intellects,<sup>c</sup> the *Wunderkinder*, usually become dolts; on the other hand, the young

<sup>a</sup> *Zuwachs der Kenntnisse*

<sup>b</sup> *Bildsamkeit*

<sup>c</sup> *ingenia praecocia*

266

genius often grasps things slowly and with difficulty, precisely because he is grasping them deeply. This is in keeping with the fact that everyone talks laughingly and without restraint about the silliness and stupidities of his childhood, for instance *Goethe*, how he threw all the cooking utensils out of the window (*Poetry and Truth*,<sup>a</sup> vol. I, p. 7): for he knows that all this is subject to change. On the other hand no clever man will admit the bad traits, the malicious and deceitful streaks of his youth: because he feels that they still testify against his present character. I have heard that the phrenologist and researcher of humanity, *Gall*, when he had to associate with a man he did not yet know, had him talk about his youthful years and tendencies, so as to discover by stealth the features of his character, for they will have remained the same to this day. This is the basis for the fact that, while we are indifferent to the idiocies and ignorance of our youthful years, and indeed look back at them with smiling pleasure, the wicked character traits of precisely those years, the evils and outrages of which we were then guilty, remain even into late old age as ineradicable reproaches, and are sources of disquiet to our conscience. – Just as the character manifests itself as finished, it also remains unaltered into old age. The assaults of age that gradually consume our intellectual powers leave our moral qualities untouched. Goodness of heart ensures that an elderly person will continue to be loved and honoured once his mind shows the weaknesses that begin to return him to childhood. Sweetness of temper, patience, honesty, sincerity, selflessness, magnanimity, etc. endure through the whole of life and are not lost in the weakness of old age: in each of the decrepit old man's lucid moments they come into view undiminished, like the sun through winter clouds. And on the other hand, evil, malice, greed, selfishness, treachery, egoism, and every sort of wickedness also remain in undiminished force up through the end of old age. We would not believe someone who told us: 'in early years I was an evil brat, but now I am an honest and noble man' – in fact, we would laugh at him. In *Nigel's Fortunes*,<sup>b</sup> Walter Scott showed beautifully in the figure of an old usurer how burning ambition, egoism and dishonesty were still in full bloom, like the poisonous plants in autumn, and still expressed themselves with vehemence after the intellect had become childish. The only changes that take place in our inclinations are such that are immediate results of the decline of our bodily powers and with it the capacities for pleasure: so sensuousness gives way to gluttony, sumptuousness gives way to greed, and vanity to ambition:

<sup>a</sup> *Dichtung und Wahrheit* [*Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit* (*From my life: Poetry and Truth*), first published in 1811]

<sup>b</sup> [*The Fortunes of Nigel* (1822)]

similarly, a man who wears a false beard before he grows one of his own, 267  
 will later dye his graying beard brown. While all organic forces, the  
 muscular strength, the senses, memory, wit, understanding, genius,  
 become worn and dull in old age, the will alone remains intact and  
 unaltered: the impulse and direction of willing remains the same. Indeed  
 in many respects the will shows itself to be more decisive in old age: for  
 instance in the attachment to life, which is known to increase, and also in  
 obstinacy, the insistence and persistence regarding anything it has grasped,  
 which is explained by the fact that the receptivity of the intellect for other  
 impressions and thus the mobility of the will through the stream of  
 motives, has declined: thus the implacability of the anger and hatred of  
 older people:

The young man's wrath is like light straw on fire;  
 But like red-hot steel is the old man's ire.  
 (Old Ballad.)<sup>a</sup>

From all these considerations, the deeper view cannot fail to recognize  
 that while the *intellect* must pass through a long series of gradual devel-  
 opments, and then, like everything physical, fall into decay, the *will* takes  
 no part of this; since only at the beginning must it contend with the  
 imperfection of its tool, the intellect, and finally again, with its depletion,  
 while it itself emerges finished and ready, and remains unaltered, not  
 subject to the laws of time or any temporal coming to be or passing away.  
 In this way it shows that it is metaphysical, and does not belong to the  
 world of appearances.

(9) The expressions '*heart*' and '*head*' are universal and very well under-  
 stood by all; they come from a correct feeling of the fundamental difference  
 under discussion here, and this is why they are also apt and descriptive and  
 to be found in all languages. *Seneca* says of Emperor *Claudius* 'he has  
 neither head nor heart'<sup>b</sup> (*Play on the Death of Claudius*,<sup>c</sup> ch. 8). It is entirely  
 accurate for the heart, this first mover<sup>d</sup> of animal life, to be chosen as the  
 symbol, indeed synonym for the *will*, the primal core of our appearance, 268  
 and that it should signify this in contrast to the *intellect*, which is identical  
 with the *head*. Everything that in the broadest sense is the business of the  
 will, such as wishes, passion, joy, pain, goodness, evil, as well as what  
 people tend to understand by 'someone's nature'<sup>e</sup> and what Homer

<sup>a</sup> [Schopenhauer quotes the passage in English and provides a German translation in a footnote]

<sup>b</sup> *Nec cor nec caput habet*

<sup>c</sup> *Ludus de morte Claudii Caesaris*

<sup>d</sup> *primum mobile*

<sup>e</sup> *Gemüth*



expresses as *philon êtor*<sup>a</sup> is attributed to the heart. Accordingly, people say: he has a bad heart; he puts his heart into it; it comes from the heart; it grieved him to his heart; it broke his heart; his heart swelled; his heart leapt with joy; who can see into a man's heart?; it is heart-rending, heart-crushing, heart-breaking, heart-lifting, heart-warming; he is kind-hearted, hard-hearted, heartless, hearty, faint-hearted, and many others. It is particularly significant that love affairs are called affairs of the heart, *affaires de cœur*; because the sex drive is the focal point of the will, and selection in this regard constitutes the principle business of natural human willing, the reason for which I will establish at length in a chapter supplementing the Fourth Book. In *Don Juan* (Canto 11, verse 34), Byron satirically has women make love an affair of the head rather than the heart.<sup>35</sup> – By contrast, the *head* signifies everything that is a matter of *cognition*. Thus: 'a man with a good head on his shoulders', 'a sound head', 'a head for figures', a 'wrong-headed approach', 'to lose one's head', 'to have one's head on straight', etc.<sup>b</sup> Heart and head signify the entire human being. But the head is always secondary, derivative: for it is not the centre but rather the highest efflorescence of the body. When a hero dies his heart is embalmed, not his brain; on the other hand, people gladly preserve the skulls of poets, artists, and philosophers. Thus Raphael's skull is preserved in the *Accademia de S. Luca* in Rome, though it was recently proven to be a fake; Descartes' skull was sold at auction in Stockholm in 1820.<sup>\*,36</sup>

269 The Latin language also demonstrates a sure sense<sup>c</sup> for the true relationship between the will, intellect, and life. The intellect is *mens*, *nous*,<sup>d</sup> the will on the other hand is *animus*; which comes from *anima*, and this comes from *anemôn*.<sup>e</sup> *Anima* is life itself, the *Athem*,<sup>f</sup> *psuchê*:<sup>g</sup> *animus* on the other hand is the animating principle<sup>h</sup> and at the same time the will, the subject of inclinations, intentions, passions, and affects: thus *est mihi animus, fert*

\* *Times*, 18 October, 1845; according to the *Athenaeum*.

<sup>a</sup> φίλον ἑτορ [a phrase that might be translated as 'beloved life' or 'beloved spirit' – for instance in *Iliad* V, 250; ἑτορ is a term that does not appear outside of the Homeric epics]

<sup>b</sup> *ein Mann von Kopf, ein kluger Kopf, feiner Kopf, schlechter Kopf, den Kopf verlieren, den Kopf oben behalten u.s.w.* [Many of these expressions do not have a direct equivalent in English and thus have been somewhat freely translated to make use of the closest English phrase. Throughout the text, we have frequently translated the German '*Kopf*' as 'mind' rather than 'head'. 'Head' is not as frequent a metaphor in English as 'heart', although the reader will have no trouble recognizing the point Schopenhauer is making]

<sup>c</sup> *ein gewisses Gefühl*

<sup>d</sup> νοῦς

<sup>e</sup> ἀνεμῶν [cf. ἀνεμος (*anemos*): wind]

<sup>f</sup> [breath]

<sup>g</sup> ψυχή

<sup>h</sup> *das belebende Princip*

*animus*, means ‘I have a desire’, as well as *animi causa*, and many more; it is the Greek *thumos*, which is to say someone’s nature, their heart, but not their head.<sup>a</sup> *Animi perturbatio* is an affect, *mentis perturbatio* would mean insanity. The predicate *immortalis*<sup>b</sup> would modify *animus*, not *mens*. All this is the rule based on the vast majority of cases, although, with such closely related concepts, the words necessarily become mixed up every once in a while. The Greeks seem to have understood *psuchê* to mean primarily and originally the vital force, the animating principle; which gave rise to the suspicion that it must be something metaphysical, and consequently untouched by death. This is established by, among other things, the investigations of the relationship between *nous* and *psuchê* preserved by Stobaeus (*Eclogues*, Book I, ch. 51, §§ 7, 8).<sup>37</sup>

(10) What is the basis for *personal identity*? – Not the material aspect of the body: it is completely different after a few years. Not the form of the body: it alters in the whole and in all the parts; except for an expression in the eyes<sup>c</sup> by which you can still recognize a person even after many years, which proves that in spite of all the alterations time brings about in the person, something in him still remains fully untouched: it is precisely this that enables us to recognize him again even after the longest intervals, and rediscover whole and intact just what he was before: it is the same with our own selves: for however old we become, inside us we feel exactly the same as we were when we were young, indeed as when we were children. That which always remains unaltered and completely the same and does not age, is precisely the kernel of our being, which does not lie in time.<sup>38</sup> – You assume that the identity of the person<sup>d</sup> rests on identity of consciousness. But if you understand this identity to be merely the interconnected memories of the course of life, then it is not enough. We might know more about our lives than we do about a novel we have once read, and yet we only know the very slightest facts. The principal events, the scenes of interest have imprinted themselves: as for the rest, thousands of events have been forgotten for every one that is retained. The older we become, the more things pass over us without leaving a trace. Advanced age, illness, brain injuries, madness, can all rob the memory in its entirety. But personal identity is not lost along with these. It is grounded in the identical *will* and the inalterable character itself. This is precisely what makes the expression of the eyes so inalterable. The man<sup>e</sup> lies in the *heart*, not in the head. As a

270

<sup>a</sup> *Gemüth, Herz, nicht aber Kopf*

<sup>b</sup> [immortal]

<sup>c</sup> *Ausdruck des Blickes*

<sup>d</sup> *Person*

<sup>e</sup> *der Mensch*

result of our relation to the external world, we are used to regarding the subject of cognition, the cognizing I, as our real self, this I that grows weary at night and vanishes in sleep and shines brightly in the morning with renewed vigour. But this is a mere function of the brain and not our ownmost self. Our true self, the kernel of our being, is what lies behind this brain function and really knows<sup>a</sup> nothing but willing and not-willing, satisfaction and lack of satisfaction, with all their modifications, which people call feelings, affects, and passions. This is what produces that other; it does not sleep when that other does, and it remains whole and intact when that other perishes in death.<sup>39</sup> – By contrast, everything belonging to *cognition* is prey to forgetfulness: sometimes we cannot clearly remember even actions of moral significance years later, and we no longer know precisely and in detail how we acted in a critical situation. But we cannot forget *character itself*, to which the deeds merely bear witness; it is exactly the same now as it formerly was. The will itself endures, alone and by itself: for it alone is inalterable, indestructible, does not age, is not physical, but rather metaphysical, does not belong to appearance but rather to what itself appears. In Chapter 15 above, I have shown how identity of consciousness, as far as it goes, is grounded in this as well; so I do not need to discuss the matter further here.

271 (11) Aristotle says in passing, in his book on comparing desirables, ‘to live well is better than to live’ (βέλτιον τοῦ ζῆν τὸ εὖ ζῆν, *Topics* III, 2).<sup>b</sup> From this could be inferred, by double contraposition: not living is better than living badly. This is apparent to the intellect, yet the vast majority of people would rather live very badly than not at all. And so this attachment<sup>c</sup> to life cannot be grounded in its *object*, since life, as is shown in the Fourth Book, is in fact a constant suffering, or at least as will be shown below, in Chapter 28, a business that does not cover its costs. This attachment therefore can be grounded only in its *subject*. It is not however grounded in the *intellect*, it is not a result of deliberation and is absolutely not a matter of choice; rather this life-willing<sup>d</sup> is something self-evident: it is a thing prior<sup>e</sup> to the *intellect* itself. We are ourselves the will to life: thus we must live, well or badly. It is only by keeping in mind that this attachment to this life, which is of such little intrinsic value, is entirely a priori and not a posteriori, that we can explain the overwhelming fear of death inherent in all living things, which

<sup>a</sup> *kennt*

<sup>b</sup> [118a7]

<sup>c</sup> *Anhänglichkeit*

<sup>d</sup> *Lebenwollen*

<sup>e</sup> *ein Prius*

Roche foucauld has described with rare candour and naïvety in his final reflection,<sup>a</sup> and which gives all tragedies and heroic deeds their efficacy, which would be lost if life were assessed at its true value. This inexpressible horror of death<sup>b</sup> is at the bottom of that favourite maxim of all common minds, that anyone who takes his life must be crazy, and no less the astonishment, linked to a certain wonder, that this act never fails to produce in even thoughtful minds; for it is so contrary to the nature of all living things that we must in some respect marvel at someone who can pull it off, and indeed even find a certain consolation in the thought that, if worst comes to worst, there really is this exit, which we might doubt if it were not proven by experience. For suicide comes from a resolution of the intellect, while our life-willing is prior to intellect. – This consideration too, which Chapter 28 will discuss at length, establishes the primacy of the *will* in self-consciousness.

(12) By contrast, nothing establishes the secondary, dependent, conditioned nature of the *intellect* more clearly than its periodic intermission. In deep sleep, all cognition and representing comes to an end. Only the kernel of our being, its metaphysical aspect (which the organic functions necessarily presuppose as their first mover<sup>c</sup>) can never pause if life is to continue; nor does it require rest, since it is metaphysical and therefore incorporeal. Thus philosophers, who have set up a *soul*, i.e. a primordial and essentially *cognitive* being as this metaphysical kernel, have been forced to claim that this soul is absolutely inexhaustible in its representing and cognition, that these continue even in the deepest sleep, and it is only that we have no recollection of this once we are awake. But it was easy to see the falsity of this claim as soon as this *soul* was set aside, as a result of *Kant's* doctrines. For sleeping and waking offer the clearest proof to the unbiased mind that cognition is a secondary function, conditioned by the organism just as much as any other. Only the *heart* is inexhaustible, because its beating and the circulation of blood are not directly conditioned by nerves, but rather are the original expression of the will. All the other physiological functions that are guided merely by the ganglia nerves and have only a very indirect and distant connection with the brain continue in sleep, although secretions take place more slowly: even the pulse becomes a little slower along with respiration, on which it depends, and which is conditioned by the cerebral system (*medulla oblongata*). The stomach is perhaps the most active in sleep, which is to be attributed to its special consensus with the

272

<sup>a</sup> [*Reflexions*, no. 504. See p. 221, n. a]

<sup>b</sup> *horror mortis*

<sup>c</sup> *primum mobile*

now furloughed brain, a consensus that causes disruptions on both sides. The *brain* alone, and with it cognition, breaks off entirely in deep sleep. This is because it is merely the foreign minister, as the ganglion system is the interior minister. The brain, with its cognitive function, is nothing more than a sentry<sup>a</sup> set up by the will for its external goals: up in the watch-tower of the head, it peers around through the window of the senses, looking out for where dangers threaten and advantages are to be found, and  
 273 after it reports back, the will decides. Like every sentry in active service, this one is in a state of tension and effort and glad to be withdrawn after its watch is done, just as every sentry is glad to be relieved from his post. Being relieved in this case is falling asleep, which for this reason is so sweet and pleasant and to which we are so ready to yield: on the other hand it is unwelcome to be roused again because the sentry is suddenly called back to his post: after the beneficial systole, you feel the difficult reappearance of diastole, the renewed separation of the intellect from the will. By contrast, a so-called *soul* (which would be a *cognitive* being primordially and from the very start) would be revived when it awoke, like a fish returned to water. In sleep, where merely vegetative life is continued, the will acts only according to its original and essential nature, undisturbed by the outside, without diminution of its strength by the activity of the brain and the effort of cognition, which is the most difficult organic function, and is merely a means, not a goal for the organism: thus in sleep the whole force of the will is directed to the maintenance and (where necessary) repair of the organism; which is why all healing, all beneficial crises take place in sleep; since the healing power of nature<sup>b</sup> has free rein only when it is rid of the burden of the cognitive function. The embryo, which has yet to build its body, sleeps continuously and the newborn sleeps the majority of the time. In this sense Burdach too is quite right in declaring sleep to be the *original state* (*Physiology*, vol. 3, p. 484).<sup>c</sup>

With respect to the brain itself, I explain the need for sleep in greater detail through a hypothesis that seems to have been first proposed in Neumann's book, *On Human Illnesses*,<sup>d</sup> 1834, vol. 4, § 216. It is that the nutrition of the brain,<sup>40</sup> and thus the renewal of its substance from blood, cannot take place on its own while we are awake since the highly eminent, organic functions of cognition and thinking would be disturbed or

<sup>a</sup> *Vedette*

<sup>b</sup> *vis naturae medicatrix*

<sup>c</sup> [Karl Friedrich Burdach, *Die Physiologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft* (*Physiology as Empirical Science*) (1826–40)]

<sup>d</sup> *Von den Krankheiten des Menschen* [Karl Georg Neumann]

annulled by such low and material functions as nutrition. This explains why sleep is not a purely negative state, a mere pause in cerebral activity, but also shows a positive character. This is already apparent from the fact that the difference between sleep and wakefulness is not merely one of degree, but rather a firm boundary that, as soon as sleep enters in, announces itself through dream images that are completely different from the immediately preceding thoughts. Another example of this is the fact that in anxiety dreams we try in vain to cry out, or to ward off attacks or shake off sleep; so that it is as if the ties binding the brain to the motor nerves or the cerebrum to the cerebellum (as the regulator of motion) have been annulled: for the brain remains in its isolation, and we remain in the grips of sleep as if grasped by iron claws. Finally, the positive character of sleep can be seen in the fact that a certain degree of energy is required for sleep, which is why extreme exhaustion as well as natural weakness prevents us from attaining it, falling asleep.<sup>a,41</sup> The explanation is that the *nutrition process* must be introduced when we begin sleeping: the brain needs a snack, as it were. Even the increased flow of blood to the brain during sleep can be explained by the nutrition process, as well as the instinct of placing one's arms above one's head, a position that promotes this process; and also why children need so much sleep, as long as their brains are still growing, while sleep is sparse with the elderly, in whom there is a certain atrophy of the brain as there is with all parts; and finally even why excessive amounts of sleep cause a certain dullness of consciousness, namely as a result of a temporary hypertrophy of the brain which, given a habitual excess of sleep, can also become permanent and lead to madness: 'Even abundant sleep is a hardship',<sup>b</sup> *Odyssey* XV, 394. – Accordingly, the need for sleep is in direct proportion to the intensity of the cerebral life, and thus to the clarity of consciousness. Those animals whose cerebral lives are weak and dull get only small amounts of light sleep, for instance reptiles and fish: and we should recall that hibernation (winter sleep) is really almost nominally sleep, namely an inactivity not only of the brain, but of the entire organism, and thus a type of death-trance. Animals with a significant degree of intelligence sleep deep and long. Even humans need more sleep the more developed and active their brain, both quantitatively and qualitatively. *Montaigne* reports that he always slept for a long time, that he spent a large part of his life asleep, and in old age still slept eight to nine hours at a time (Book III, ch. 13).<sup>c</sup> It is reported of *Descartes* too, that he slept a great deal

274

275

<sup>a</sup> *capere somnum*

<sup>b</sup> ἀνὴν καὶ πολὺς ὕπνους (*noxae est etiam multus somnus*)

<sup>c</sup> [*Les Essais* (*Essays*) (1603)]

(Baillet, *Life of Descartes*,<sup>a</sup> 1693, p. 288).<sup>42</sup> Kant set aside seven hours for sleep: but it was so difficult for him to wake up that he ordered his servant to force him against his will to get up at a certain set time, and not listen to any objections (Jachmann, *Immanuel Kant*, p. 162).<sup>b</sup> Because the more fully awake someone is, i.e. the clearer and more awake his consciousness, the greater need he has of sleep, and thus the deeper and longer he sleeps. A great deal of thinking or strenuous mental labour will therefore increase the need for sleep. The fact that continuous muscular exertion makes you sleepy can be explained by the fact that in such exertion, the brain continuously stimulates the muscles by means of the *medulla oblongata*, the spinal marrow, and<sup>43</sup> the motor nerves, and this stimulation affects the muscles' irritability, and this exhausts the brain's energy. The tiredness we feel in our arms and legs is therefore really located in the brain; just as the pain that these very limbs feel is actually sensed in the brain: for the brain acts the same way with motor nerves as it does with sensible nerves. This is precisely why the muscles that are not activated by the brain, e.g. those of the heart, do not get tired.<sup>44</sup> This also explains why people cannot think clearly either during or following strenuous muscular exertion. The fact that people have much less mental energy in summer than in winter can in part be explained by the fact that people sleep less in summer: because the deeper you have slept, the more completely you wake up, and the 'wider awake'<sup>c</sup> you subsequently are. But this should not tempt us to prolong sleep to excess because what is gained in extension is lost in intensity, i.e. soundness and depth; and it becomes purely a waste of time. This is what Goethe says too, when (Part II of *Faust*) he says of a morning slumber: 'sleep is a shell: throw it off'.<sup>d,45</sup> – Overall, the phenomenon of sleep offers excellent confirmation of the fact that consciousness, perception, cognition and thinking are not primordial in us, but are rather a conditional and secondary state. Cognition is an expense on the part of nature, indeed its most extravagant expense, so the higher the level at which it operates, the less it can proceed without interruption. It is the product, the efflorescence of the cerebral nervous system, which is itself nourished by the rest of the organism like a parasite. This is also related to what our Third Book shows, that cognition becomes all the more pure and perfect the more it has freed and separated itself from willing, whereby purely objective apprehension,

<sup>a</sup> *Vie de Descartes* [see p. 141, n. a]

<sup>b</sup> [Reinhold Bernhard Jachmann, *Immanuel Kant geschildert in Briefen an einen Freund* (*Immanuel Kant portrayed in letters to a friend*) (1804)]

<sup>c</sup> *aufgeweckter*

<sup>d</sup> *Schlaf ist Schaale: wirf sie fort* [line 4661]

aesthetic apprehension, can come on the scene, just as an extract is all the more pure the more it is separated from what it has been extracted from and has been purified of all sediment. – We see the reverse with the *will*, the most direct expression of which is the whole of organic life, and most of all the inexhaustible heart.

This final consideration is related to the topic of the following chapter, which it therefore serves to introduce: but the following remark still belongs here. In magnetic somnambulism, consciousness is doubled: two sequences arise within cognition,<sup>a</sup> each coherent in itself but fully divorced from each other; the waking consciousness knows nothing about the somnambulist consciousness. But the will retains the same character in each and remains completely identical: it expresses the same inclinations and disinclinations in both. This is because the function can be doubled, but not the essence in itself.

<sup>a</sup> *zwei . . . Erkenntnißreihen entstehen*



## *Objectivation of the Will in the Animal Organism*

By *objectivation* I mean self-presentation in the real world of bodies. In addition, as I have shown in detail in the First Book and its supplements, this is itself thoroughly conditioned by the cognitive subject, which is to say the intellect, and is thus absolutely unthinkable outside its cognition: for it is in the first instance only intuitive representation and, as such, a phenomenon of the brain. After it has been eliminated, what remains is the thing in itself. The fact that this is the *will* is the theme of the Second Book, where it is first established in the human and animal organism.

Cognition of the external world can also be referred to as *consciousness of other things*, in contrast to *self-consciousness*. After having found within self-consciousness that the will is the true object or material of self-consciousness, we will now, with the same intention, take into account consciousness of other things and hence objective cognition. My present thesis then is this: *what in self-consciousness, and thus subjectively, is the intellect, is presented in consciousness of other things, and thus objectively, as the brain: and what in self-consciousness, and thus subjectively, is the will, is presented in consciousness of other things, and thus objectively, as the entire organism.*

I now add the following supplements and clarifications to the proofs of this claim as presented both in our Second Book as well as in the first two chapters of the essay *On Will in Nature*.

278 Most of what is needed to establish the first part of this thesis was presented in the previous chapter, since the necessity of sleep, alterations due to age, and the distinctions between anatomical formations all prove that the intellect, being secondary in nature, is completely dependent on a single organ, the brain, whose function it is, just as grasping is the function of the hand; and that the intellect is therefore physical like digestion, not metaphysical like the will. Just as good digestion requires a strong and healthy stomach, and athletic prowess requires strong and muscular arms,

\* This chapter relates to § 20 of the First Volume.

extraordinary intelligence requires an unusually developed, supremely well-constructed brain that is marked by a fine texture and animated by an energetic pulse. By contrast, the constitution of the will does not depend on any organ nor can it be prognosticated by any. The great mistake of *Gall's* phrenology<sup>a</sup> is that it associates the organs of the brain with moral qualities as well. – Head injuries resulting in a loss of brain substance generally have a very detrimental effect on the intellect: they result in complete or partial madness, or a forgetting of language, permanently or temporarily, although sometimes only one of several languages known by the victim will be forgotten, or sometimes only proper names, and similarly the loss of other items of knowledge possessed,<sup>b</sup> and suchlike. By contrast, we never read that the *character* has been altered after this sort of accident, that the person has improved or degenerated morally or lost certain inclinations or passions, or acquired any new ones; never. For the will is not located in the brain and besides, being metaphysical, it is the thing prior<sup>c</sup> to the brain, as it is to the entire body, and therefore cannot be altered by injuries to the brain. – According to an experiment\* performed by *Spallanzani* and repeated by *Voltaire*, a snail remains alive after decapitation, and after a few weeks grows a new head along with antennae: with these, it re-establishes consciousness and representations; while until that point, the animal's unregulated movements showed it to be nothing but blind will. Here too we find the will as the enduring substance, the intellect on the other hand, conditioned by its organ, as a changing accident. It can be described as the regulator of the will.

279

*Tiedemann* might have been the first to compare the cerebral nervous system to a *parasite* (*Tiedemann and Treviranus, Journal for Physiology*,<sup>d</sup> vol. 1, p. 62). The comparison is an apt one to the extent that the brain, along with the spinal cord and nerves that depend on it, is planted in the organism as it were, and nourished by it, without itself contributing *directly* to the maintenance of the organism's economy; this is why life can continue without a brain, as with deformed infants who are born brainless, as well as with turtles, which can live for three weeks after their heads have

\* *Spallanzani, Risultati di esperienze sopra la riproduzione della testa nelle lumache terrestri* [Results of experiments on the reproduction of the head in terrestrial snails], in *Memorie di matematica e fisica della Società Italiana*, vol. 1, p. 581. – *Voltaire, Les colimaçons du révérend père l'escarbotier* [The snails of the Reverend Father L'Escarbotier (1768)]

<sup>a</sup> *Schädellehre*

<sup>b</sup> *anderer besessener Kenntnisse*

<sup>c</sup> *das Prius*

<sup>d</sup> *Journal für Physiologie* [Zeitschrift für Physiologie, ed. Friedrich Tiedemann and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus]

been cut off; only the *medulla oblongata* must be spared, for it is the organ of respiration. Even a hen from which *Flourens*<sup>a</sup> removed the whole of the cerebrum lived and thrived for another ten months. Even with humans, the destruction of the brain does not lead directly to death, but only by way of the lungs and then the heart (Bichat, *On Life and Death*,<sup>b</sup> part II, article II, § 1). On the other hand, the concern of the brain is to guide relations with the external world: this is its only commission, and the way it discharges its debt to the organism that feeds it, since the organism's existence is conditioned by these external relations.<sup>46</sup> Accordingly, of all organs, only the brain needs sleep: for its *activity* is completely separate from its *maintenance*, its activity merely consumes strength and substance, its maintenance is performed by the rest of the organism, which acts as a nursemaid: since the brain's activity does not contribute to its subsistence, it becomes exhausted, and only when it pauses, in sleep, does its nourishment proceed without hindrance.

280 The second part of the thesis stated above will require a more detailed discussion, even after everything I have already said about it in the writings I have cited. – Above, in Chapter 18, I have already shown that the thing in itself, which must lie at the base of every appearance and therefore our own as well, sets aside *one* of the forms of its appearance in self-consciousness, namely space, and retains only the other, that of time; which is why it registers its presence here more directly than elsewhere, and we refer to it according to its most undisguised appearance, as will. Now no *permanent substance* such as matter, can present itself merely in time alone because, as § 4 of the First Volume has shown, such a thing is possible only through the intimate unity of space with time. Thus, in self-consciousness, the will is not perceived as the permanent substrate of its activities,<sup>c</sup> and hence is not intuited as a permanent substance; instead, only its individual acts, movements, and states (such as decisions, wishes and affects) are cognized one after the other for as long as they last, and the cognition is immediate but nonetheless not intuitive. The cognition of the will in self-consciousness is therefore not an *intuition* of the will but rather a wholly immediate awareness of its successive activities. By contrast, when cognition is directed *outwards*, mediated through the senses, completed in the understanding, and when it has the form of *space* as well as time (the two being most intimately linked in causation, a function of the understanding, by means of

<sup>a</sup> [See p. 216, n. b; p. 278, n. d]

<sup>b</sup> *Sur la vie et la mort* [Marie François Xavier Bichat, *Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort* (*Physiological researches on life and death*) (1800)]

<sup>c</sup> *Regungen*

which they become an *intuition*), then in this case, the same thing that is grasped in inner, immediate perception as *will* is presented *intuitively* as the *organic body* whose individual movements make visible the acts of the individually given will, and whose parts and forms make visible its permanent strivings, its fundamental character; indeed, its pains and comforts are the absolutely immediate affections of this will itself.

We first become aware of this identity of the body and the will in the individual actions of each, since what we recognize in self-consciousness as a direct and actual act of will is at the same time presented outwardly and inseparably as a movement of the body, and everyone sees that his momentary resolutions of will, determined by momentary appearances of motives, are just as faithfully and instantaneously reflected in precisely as many actions of his body as this body itself is reflected in his shadow; for the unbiased observer this is the simplest way of seeing that his body is merely the outer appearance of his will, i.e. it is the manner in which his will displays itself in his intuitive intellect; or his will itself, under the form of representation. Only when we forcibly deprive ourselves of this basic and simple piece of information can we subsequently be amazed by the proceedings of our own bodily activities as a miracle, and this rests on the fact that there is really no causal connection between the act of will and the action of the body: for they are immediately *identical*, and their apparent difference stems only from the fact that one and the same thing is perceived by two different modes of cognition, the inner and the outer. – Actual willing is inseparable from the deed, and an act of will in the narrowest sense is only one that is stamped as such by the deed. By contrast, mere resolutions of the will,<sup>a</sup> until they are carried out, are only intentions<sup>b</sup> and thus the business of the intellect alone: as such, they are situated in the brain alone and are nothing more than completed calculations of the relative strength of the different and conflicting motives, and therefore might be very probable indeed, but never infallible. They could prove false, not only because of changes in the circumstances, but also because of errors in estimating the respective effects of motives on the genuine will, something that becomes apparent as soon as the deed belies the intention: this is why no decision<sup>c</sup> is certain until it is carried out. And thus *the will itself* is active only in actual deeds,<sup>d</sup> which is to say in muscular activity, and consequently in *irritability*: thus the true *will* objectifies itself in this.

281

<sup>a</sup> *Willensbeschlüsse*

<sup>b</sup> *Vorsätze*

<sup>c</sup> *Entschluss*

<sup>d</sup> *im wirklichen Handeln*

Motives are located in the cerebrum, and it is there, by means of these motives, that the will becomes voluntary,<sup>a</sup> i.e. more closely determined through motives. These motives are representations that arise on the occasion of external stimulation of the sense organs and through brain functions, and are also worked up into comprehension and then resolutions. When an actual act of will takes place, these motives (whose workshop is the cerebrum) act, through the intervention of the cerebellum, on the spinal cord and its motor nerves, which then act on the muscles, but merely by way of *stimulating* their irritability, since galvanic, chemical and even mechanical stimuli can produce the same contractions as the motor nerves. Thus, what in the brain was a *motive* acts as a mere *stimulus* when, guided by the nerves, it reaches the muscles. Sensibility is in itself utterly incapable of contracting a muscle: only the muscle itself can do this, and its ability to do so is called *irritability*, i.e. *susceptibility to stimuli*: it is the exclusive property of the muscle, just as sensibility is the exclusive property of the nerve. Sensibility certainly gives the muscles the *occasion* for contraction, but absolutely does not somehow mechanically pull the muscles together: rather, this takes place only by virtue of the *irritability* that is the muscles' very own force. Viewed from the outside, this is an occult property,<sup>b</sup> and only self-consciousness reveals it to be the *will*. In the causal chain briefly described here, from the influence of the exterior motive to the contraction of the muscle, nothing like the will enters in as the final link in the chain; instead the will is the metaphysical substrate of the irritability of the muscle: it plays exactly the same role as that played by the mysterious forces of nature underlying the causal chain in a physical or chemical process, forces that are not themselves implicated as links in the causal chain, but that confer upon the links the ability to cause effects; this I have shown in detail in § 26 of the First Volume. Thus we would attribute an equally mysterious natural force to the contraction of the muscles too, if it were not revealed to us as *will* by an alternative cognitive source: self-consciousness. This is why, as we said above, our own muscle movement seems miraculous to us when we start from the will: because a strict causal chain leads from the exterior motive to the action of the muscles, but the will itself is not implicated in this chain as a link; instead, it lies at the basis of the present activity of the muscles too, as the metaphysical substrate of the possibility of an actuation of the muscles through the brain and nerves; this action then is not really its *effect* but rather its *appearance*. As such, it enters into the world of representation, which is entirely different from the

<sup>a</sup> *der Wille zur Willkür wird*

<sup>b</sup> *Qualitas occulta*

*will* in itself, and whose form is the law of causation; thus, if you start out from the *will*, it retains the appearance of a miracle for the attentive reflection, but on closer inspection it offers the most direct evidence for the great truth that what enters into appearance as a body and its activity is in itself the *will*. – Now if something like the motor nerve guiding my hand is cut, then my will cannot move it any more. But this is not because the hand has stopped being – like every other part of my body – the objecthood,<sup>a</sup> the mere visibility of my will, or in other words because irritability has vanished; rather it is because the influence of the motive in consequence of which alone I can move my hand cannot reach it and act as a stimulus on its muscles, for the path that leads to it from the brain has been interrupted. And so my will has been deprived only of the influence of the motive in this limb. The will objectifies itself directly in irritability, not in sensibility.

283

So as to guard against all misunderstandings on this important point, and particularly those that come from purely empirical physiology, I wish to explain the entire process somewhat more thoroughly. – According to my doctrine, the whole of the body is the will itself, presenting itself as intuition in the brain, and consequently entered into the brain's cognitive forms. It follows that the will is equally present throughout the entire body, as is demonstrably the case, since the organic functions are no less its work than animal functions. But how is this to be reconciled with the fact that *voluntary* actions,<sup>b</sup> these most undeniable expressions of the will, clearly come from the *brain*, and only reach the nerve fibres through the spinal marrow, and that these set the limbs in motion only if paralysis or severance does not eliminate the possibility of intentional motion? You would think that the will, like the intellect, is located only in the brain, and is, like the intellect, a mere brain function.

But this is not the case; rather, the whole body is and remains the presentation of the will in intuition, and thus the will itself, intuited objectively by virtue of the brain functions. But with acts of will, the chain of events is based on the fact that the will, which according to my doctrine expresses itself in every appearance of nature, even the vegetable and inorganic appearances, emerges in the human and animal body as a *conscious will*. A *consciousness* is, however, essentially unified, and therefore always requires a central point of unity. The necessity of consciousness, as I have often argued, is introduced by the fact that, as a result of the heightened complications (and the correspondingly more numerous requirements) of an organism, the acts of its will must be directed by

284

<sup>a</sup> *Objektivität*

<sup>b</sup> *willkürlichen Aktionen*

*motives* and no longer mere stimuli, as is the case on the lower levels. In order for this to take place, the organism must be provided with a consciousness capable of cognition, which is to say an intellect, as the medium and location of motives. This intellect, when it is itself intuited objectively, presents itself as the brain, along with the brain's dependent organs, that is to say the spinal cord and nerves. Now representations arise in the intellect, occasioned by external impressions, and these representations become motives for the will. In the *rational* intellect however they experience in addition to this a further elaboration through reflection and deliberation. Such an intellect must begin by taking all impressions, along with their elaboration through its functions, whether merely into intuition or into concepts, and unifying them in a single point, which is as it were the focal point for all of its rays, so that there arises that *unity* of consciousness that is the *theoretical I*, the support of the whole of consciousness, which presents itself in this consciousness as identical with the *willing I*, of which it is the mere cognitive function. This point of unity of consciousness, or the theoretical I, is precisely Kant's synthetic unity of apperception, on which all representations line up like on a string of pearls, and by virtue of which the 'I think', as the thread in the string of pearls, 'must be able to accompany all of our representations'.<sup>\*a</sup> – This meeting place for motives, where they make their entrance into the unified focus of consciousness, is the brain. Here in non-rational consciousness they are merely intuited, while in *rational* consciousness they are clarified through concepts, and thus thought through and compared abstractly<sup>b</sup> for the very first time; at this point the will decides in accordance with its individual and unchangeable character, and so the *decision* goes forward, setting the external limbs into motion by means of the cerebellum, the spinal cord, and the nerve trunks. Then, even though the will is immediately present in these too, since they are its mere appearance, yet when its movement is governed by *motives* or simply by deliberation, it needs an apparatus like this to apprehend and elaborate the representations into such motives, in accordance with which its acts now appear as decisions – just as the nourishment of the blood by the chyle requires a stomach and entrails, in which it is prepared, and then flows to it as such through the *ductus thoracicus*, which here plays the role that the spinal cord does in the other case. – This can be grasped at its simplest and most general level as follows: the will is

285

\* Compare p. 314 [p. 290 below]

<sup>a</sup> [*Critique of Pure Reason*, B131: Kant has 'my representations', not 'our']

<sup>b</sup> *in abstracto*

immediately present in all the muscle fibres of the entire body as irritability, and as a continuous striving for activity in general. Now if this striving realizes itself, expressing itself as motion, then this motion, such as it is, must have a direction; but this direction must be *determined* by something, i.e. it needs a guide: and this guide is the nervous system. This is because mere irritability, which is contained in the muscle fibres and is in itself pure will, is indifferent to all directions: so it is not determined by any of them, but is instead like a body that is pulled equally in all directions; it is at rest. Since the nerve activity intercedes as a motive (with reflex motion as stimulus), the striving force, i.e. irritability, is given a determinate direction and now produces movements. – But external acts of will that do not require motives and thus do not need mere stimuli to be worked up in the brain into representations that then become motives, but rather follow immediately from stimuli, mostly internal stimuli – such external acts of will are reflex motions proceeding merely from the spinal cord, such as spasms and cramps, in which the will acts without the participation of the brain. – Analogously, the will pursues organic life from nervous stimuli that likewise do not come from the brain. Namely, the will appears in every muscle as irritability and is consequently able to contract the muscle, but only *in general*: for a particular contraction to occur at a given moment, it requires (as it does everywhere) a cause, which here must be a stimulus. This stimulus is always given by the nerve that leads into the muscles. If the nerve is connected to the brain, then the contraction is a conscious act of will, i.e. it takes place in accordance with motives that arise in the brain as representations, in consequence of an *external* impression. If the nerve is *not* connected to the brain, but rather to the *sympathicus maximus*, then the contraction is involuntary and unconscious, an act in the service of organic life, and the nervous stimulus for this act is occasioned by an *inner* impression, e.g. the pressure on the stomach of nourishment that has been absorbed, or of the chyme on the intestine, or of the influx of blood on the walls of the heart: accordingly, it is digestion in the stomach, or peristaltic motion,<sup>a</sup> or the heartbeat, etc.<sup>47</sup>

286

Now if we go back another step in this chain of events, we find that muscles are the product and condensation of blood, and in fact are to a certain extent nothing other than solidified, coagulated or crystallized blood, since they have absorbed the fibrin (cruor) and the colouring of blood, almost without alteration (Burdach, *Physiology*, vol. 5, p. 686).<sup>b</sup> But the force that forms muscles out of blood should not be considered

<sup>a</sup> *motus peristalticus*

<sup>b</sup> [See p. 254, n. c]



different from the force that subsequently, as irritability, moves the muscles in accordance with the nervous stimulus provided by the brain, where it then registers itself in self-consciousness as what we call will. The close connection between blood and irritability is also proven by the fact that when a portion of the blood returns deoxygenated to the heart due to imperfections in the lesser circulatory system, irritability is also unusually weak, as with the batrachians. Also, the movement of the blood, just like that of the muscles, is autonomous<sup>a</sup> and original, it has no need at all of the influence of the nerves, as irritability does, and is even independent of the heart; this is shown most clearly in the return of the blood through the veins to the heart, since this is not propelled by a force from behind,<sup>b</sup> as with the circulation in the arteries, and all other mechanical explanations fall short, such as a suction force of the right ventricle of the heart.

287 (See *Burdach's Physiology*, vol. 4, § 763, and *Rösch, On the Significance of Blood*, pp. 11ff.)<sup>c</sup> It is remarkable to see how the French, who acknowledge<sup>d</sup> only mechanical forces, argue amongst each other with insufficient reasons on both sides, and *Bichat* attributes the return of blood through the veins to the pressure of the walls of the capillary tubes, while *Magendie* attributes it to the continuous action of the impulse of the heart (*Magendie's Summary of Physiology*,<sup>e</sup> vol. 2, p. 389).<sup>48</sup> The fact that the movement of the blood is independent of the nervous system too, at least of the cerebral nervous system, is demonstrated in the foetus, which (according to *Müller's Physiology*)<sup>f</sup> has blood circulation but no brain or spinal cord. And even *Flourens*<sup>49</sup> says: 'The movement of the heart, looked at in itself and apart from anything else that is not essentially the same, such as its duration, regularity, intensity, is neither directly nor indirectly dependent on the central nervous system, and consequently you must look for the original and immediate principle of this motion in a completely separate point of the system than the nervous system itself'<sup>g</sup>

<sup>a</sup> selbstständige

<sup>b</sup> vis a tergo

<sup>c</sup> *Ueber die Bedeutung des Bluts* [Carl Heinrich Rösch, *Ueber die Bedeutung des Bluts im gesunden und kranken Leben* [etc.] (*On the significance of blood in healthy and sick lives* [etc.]) (1839)]

<sup>d</sup> kennen

<sup>e</sup> *Précis de physiologie par Magendie* [François Magendie, *Précis élémentaire de physiologie* (*Elementary summary of physiology*) (second edition, 1825)]

<sup>f</sup> *Physiologie* [Johannes Peter Müller, *Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen* (*Manual of human physiology*), 2 vols. (1833–40)]

<sup>g</sup> *Le mouvement du coeur, pris en soi, et abstraction faite de tout ce qui n'est pas essentiellement lui, comme sa durée, son énergie, ne dépend ni immédiatement, ni coinstantanément, du système nerveux central, et conséquemment c'est dans tout autre point de ce système que dans les centres nerveux eux-mêmes, qu'il faut chercher le principe primitif et immédiat de ce mouvement* [Marie Jean Pierre Flourens, *Nouvelles expériences sur le système nerveux* (*New experiments on the nervous system*)]

(*Annals of Natural Science*,<sup>a</sup> edited by Audouin and Brongniard, 1828, vol. 13). – Cuvier too says: ‘the circulation of blood survives the destruction of the whole brain and the whole spinal cord’ (*Notes of the Academy of Science*, 1823, vol. 6; *History of the Academy* by Cuvier, p. cxxx).<sup>b</sup> Haller says: ‘The heart is the first to live and the last to die.’<sup>c,50</sup> – In death, the heartbeat is the last thing to come to an end. Blood constructed the vessels themselves, since it appears earlier than they do in the egg: they are only its paths, freely taken, then firmly established, and finally gradually condensed and enclosed, as Kaspar Wolff has taught in the ‘Theory of Generation’,<sup>d</sup> §§ 30–35. In addition, the movement of the heart which is inseparable from that of blood is certainly original, to the extent that it is independent of the nervous system and sensibility, even if it is occasioned by the need to send blood into the lungs, as Burdach has shown in detail. ‘In the heart,’ he says, ‘a minimum of sensibility appears with a maximum of irritability’ (*op cit*, § 769). The heart belongs as much to the muscle system as to the blood or vascular system, which clearly shows that the two are related, indeed that they form a whole. Now since the metaphysical substrate of the force that moves the muscle, i.e. irritability, is the *will*, then the will must also be the force that underlies the movement and development of blood, through which the muscle is produced. The course of the arteries also determines the shape and size of all the limbs: consequently, the entire shape of the body is determined by the course of blood. In general then, the blood, since it nourishes all parts of the body, originally formed and created them from itself, as the primal fluid of the organism; and the nourishment of the parts, which presumably constitutes the main function of blood, is only a continuation of their original creation. This truth is thoroughly and most convincingly defended in the work of Rösch mentioned above, ‘On the Significance of Blood’ (1839). He shows that blood is what is originally animated, and the basis as much of the existence as the maintenance of all parts, that all organs have split off from it, as has (simultaneously) the nervous system, which directs their functions; this nervous system appears partly as *plastic*, ordering and guiding the life of the particular parts from the inside, and partly as

288

<sup>a</sup> *Annales des sciences naturelles*

<sup>b</sup> *La circulation survit à la destruction de tout l'encéphale et de toute la moëlle épinière* (*Mém. d. l'acad. d. sc.*, 1823, vol. 6; *Hist. d. l'acad. p. Cuvier*, p. cxxx) [Schopenhauer omits parts of the text, and the correct page reference would be cxxxiii]

<sup>c</sup> *Cor primum vivens et ultimum moriens* [Albrecht von Haller, author of *Elementa physiologiae corporis humanae* (*Elements of the physiology of the human body*) (1766) – though the cited passage is not found there]

<sup>d</sup> *Theorie der Generation* [Kaspar Friedrich Wolff, *Dissertatio inauguralis sistens theoriam generationis* (*Inaugural dissertation presenting a theory of generation*) (1759)]

*cerebral*, ordering and guiding the relation to the external world. ‘The blood,’ he says (p. 25), ‘was flesh and nerve alike, and in the same moment when the muscles broke off from it, the nerves, separated in the same way, remained opposed to the flesh.’ This makes clear that the blood had a different constitution before those fixed parts separated off from it than it had afterwards: it was, as *Rösch* describes it, the chaotic, animate, mucous primal fluid, an organic emulsion in which all subsequent parts were implicitly<sup>a</sup> contained: nor was it red in colour from the beginning. This removes the objection that could otherwise be made, that the brain and spinal cord start to develop before the circulation of blood is visible and the heart is formed. In this sense Schultz too says (*System of Circulation*,<sup>b</sup> p. 297): ‘We do not believe that *Baumgärtner*’s view that the nervous system developed prior to the blood is defensible; since *Baumgärtner* dates the origin of blood only from the development of the vesicles, while even much earlier, in the embryo and the series of animals, blood appeared in the form of pure plasma.’ – The blood of invertebrate animals is never red; and yet we do not, like Aristotle, deny that they have blood. – It should be added that, according to the report of *Justinus Kerner* (*Story of Two Somnambulists*,<sup>c</sup> p. 78), a somnambulant at the highest level of clairvoyance said: ‘I am as deep within myself as a human can ever go: the force of my earthly life seems to me to have originated in the blood; and by running through the veins using the nerves, this force communicates with the whole of the body, and the noblest part of it, over itself, the brain.’<sup>d</sup>

289

It follows from all this that the will objectifies itself most directly in the *blood*, which originally created and formed the organism, then completed it through growth, and subsequently maintained it continuously, as much by regularly renewing all the parts as by exceptional cases where it produces parts that are injured. The first products of the blood are its own vessels and then the muscles in whose irritability the will registers itself for self-consciousness, but then the heart, which is both vessel and muscle, and therefore the true centre and first mover<sup>d</sup> of the whole of life. The will needs two systems to assist it in an individual life that subsists in the

<sup>a</sup> *implicite*

<sup>b</sup> *System der Circulation* [Carl Heinrich Schultz, *Das System der Cirkulation in seiner Entwicklung durch die Thierreiche und im Menschen* [etc.] (*The circulation system in its development through the animal kingdoms and in humans* [etc.]) (1836)]

<sup>c</sup> [Justinus Andreas Christian Kerner, *Geschichte zweyer Somnambülen. Nebst einigen andern Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Gebiete der magischen Heilkunde und der Psychologie* (*Story of two somnambulists, together with a few other memorabilities from the sphere of magic healing arts and psychology*) (1824)]

<sup>d</sup> *primum mobile*

external world: one for the direction and arrangement of its inner and outer activities, and the *other* for the steady renewal of the mass of the blood, and hence a guide and a sustainer. It therefore creates itself a nervous system and an intestinal system: thus, the most primal and essential vital functions<sup>a</sup> are intimately tied to subsidiary systems, the animal functions<sup>b</sup> and the natural functions.<sup>c</sup> Accordingly, the will objectifies itself only indirectly and secondarily in the *nervous system*, to the extent that the nervous system appears as a mere helpmate, as an arrangement that enables the will to gather information about the occasions (which are sometimes internal and sometimes external) on which the will needs to express itself in accordance with its goals: the *inner* occasions are perceived as mere stimuli by the *plastic* nervous system, i.e. the sympathetic nerve, this *cerebrum abdominale*, and the will reacts to them on the spot, without the brain being conscious of them; the *outer* occasions are received by the *brain* as *motives*, and the will reacts to them through conscious actions directed outward. And so the whole nervous system constitutes the antennae of the will, as it were, that it stretches both within and without. The brain and spinal nerves split at their root into sensible and motor. The sensible nerves receive information from the outside, which collects itself together in the focus<sup>d</sup> of the brain and is processed there, creating representations, primarily as motives. The motor nerves however, like couriers, bring the results of the brain function to the muscles, whose irritability is the immediate appearance of the will, acting as stimuli on them. The plastic nerves probably fall likewise into sensible and motor nerves, although on a subordinate scale. — We must think of the role the ganglia play in the organism as a diminutive brain, in which the one becomes the elucidation of the other. The ganglia lie wherever the organic functions of the vegetative system need surveillance. It is as if the will, in order to achieve its goals, cannot rely on its direct and simple actions but instead needs a guide and therefore a control for these actions. Just as if in performing a task, someone could not rely on his mere natural reflection, but needed to take notes on everything he did. Mere ganglia are enough for the interior of the organism precisely because everything takes place within its own domain. On the other hand, the organism needs a very complicated arrangement of the same sort for the exterior: this is the brain with its tentacles, the sense nerves, which reach out into the external world. But even in the organs that communicate with

290

<sup>a</sup> *functiones vitales*

<sup>b</sup> *functiones animales*

<sup>c</sup> *functiones naturales*

<sup>d</sup> *Heerde*

291 this huge nerve centre, the business does not need to be brought before the highest authority in very simple cases; instead a subordinate authority is enough to do what is needed: the spinal cord is just such an authority, in the reflex movements discovered by *Marshall Hall*,<sup>a</sup> like sneezing, yawning, vomiting, the second part of swallowing, among others. The will itself is present in the whole organism, since the organism is its mere visibility; the nervous system is present everywhere merely in order to make possible a *direction* for its deed by monitoring it, serving as a mirror for the will so that it sees what it does, just as we use a mirror when we shave. In this way, small sensoria, namely the ganglia, arise in the interior for specific and therefore simple tasks: the main sensorium however, the brain, is a grand and elaborate apparatus for complicated and many-sided tasks involving the external world, which is constantly changing in unexpected ways. In an organism, anywhere the nerve fibres run together into a ganglion, there is to some extent an animal, complete and on its own, one that has, by means of the ganglia, a type of weak cognition whose sphere is nonetheless limited to the parts out of which these nerves emerge directly. Now what actuates these parts in such quasi-cognition is clearly *will*, indeed, we cannot think of it in any other way. This is the basis for the life proper to each part,<sup>b</sup> and also, in insects that have a doubled nerve stem with ganglia at regular distances instead of a spinal cord, it is the basis for the ability of each part to live for days after being separated from the head and rest of the trunk; and finally it is also the basis for actions not motivated by the brain, i.e. instinct and the mechanical drive. Marshall Hall, whose discovery of reflex movements I mentioned above, has thus provided the *theory of involuntary movements*. These are sometimes normal or physiological, including the closing of the entry and exit points of the body, and thus the *sphincters vesicae et ani* (which begin from the nerves of the spinal cord), the closing of the eyelids in sleep (which starts from the fifth pair of nerves), the closing of the larynx (from the *N. vagus*) when food passes over it or carbonic acid tries to enter, but also swallowing (from the pharynx on), yawning, sneezing, respiration (entirely when asleep, and partially when awake), and finally also erection, ejaculation, as well as conception, and others. Voluntary movements are sometimes abnormal or pathological, including stuttering, sobbing, vomiting, as well as cramps and convulsions of all sorts, especially in epilepsy, tetanus, rabies, and other diseases, finally the twitches and palpitations produced by galvanic or other stimuli, which occur without feeling or consciousness in paralysed limbs, i.e. limbs that

<sup>a</sup> [See below, p. 271]

<sup>b</sup> *vita propria jedes Theils*

have been disconnected from the brain, and likewise the convulsions of decapitated animals, and finally all the movements and actions of children born without brains. All cramps are a rebellion of the nerves of the limbs against the sovereignty of the brain; by contrast, the normal reflex movements are the legitimate autocracy of subordinate civil servants.<sup>52</sup> These movements taken together are therefore involuntary because they do not come from the brain and therefore do not occur from motives but rather from mere stimuli. The occasioning stimuli reach only as far as the spinal cord or the *medulla oblongata* and from here the reaction that causes movement takes place immediately. The same relation that the brain has to motives and actions, the spinal cord has to involuntary movements; and what the 'sentient and voluntary nerve' is for the former, the 'incident and motor nerve'<sup>a</sup> is for the latter. The fact that nonetheless, in the one case as in the other, the thing that really does the moving is the *will*, is all the more strikingly apparent since the muscles that move involuntarily are for the most part the same ones that are moved by the brain in other circumstances, namely in intentional actions where their first mover<sup>b</sup> is intimately familiar to us in self-consciousness as *will*. Marshall Hall's superb book, *On the Diseases of the Nervous System*,<sup>c</sup> does an excellent job of distinguishing between voluntary action and will,<sup>d</sup> and confirms the truth of my basic doctrine.

In order to clarify what we have been saying, let us now recall the organism whose origin is most accessible to our observation. Who constructs the chick in the egg? Is there some power or art that penetrates the shell from the outside? No! The chick makes itself, and the very force that performs and completes this inexpressibly complicated, well-calculated and purposive labour breaks through the shell as soon as it is ready, and now, under the name of *will*, executes the chick's external actions. The force could not do both at the same time: previously occupied with perfecting the organism, it was not concerned with the exterior. Once the organism is complete, such concerns enter in under the guidance of the brain and its tentacles, the senses; the brain is a tool prepared in advance for this goal, and its service only begins when it awakes in self-consciousness as intellect, the lantern that lights the steps of the will, the will's *hêgemonikon*<sup>e</sup> and at the same time the support of the objective external world, however

<sup>a</sup> [Schopenhauer uses the English terms for the expressions inside the single quote marks (misspelling the word 'nerve' in both instances by omitting the final 'e', a Germanizing error)]

<sup>b</sup> *primum mobile*

<sup>c</sup> [*Lectures on the nervous system and its diseases* (1836)]

<sup>d</sup> *Willkür und Wille*

<sup>e</sup> ἡγεμονικόν [see p. 220, n. c]

restricted the horizon of this external world might be in the self-consciousness of a chicken. But what the chicken can now do in the external world by means of this organ is (given that it is mediated by something secondary) infinitely less significant than what it accomplished in its primordial existence when it created itself.

In the preceding discussion we have become acquainted with the cerebral nervous system as an organ *assisting* the will,<sup>a</sup> in which the will therefore objectifies itself in a *secondary* manner. Although the cerebral nervous system does not interfere directly in the circuit of the vital functions of the organism, but only directs its relations from without, it is nonetheless based in the organism and nourished by it as a reward for its service; moreover, cerebral or animal life should be seen as a product of organic life – and similarly, the brain and its function, cognition, and thus intellect, belong indirectly and secondarily to the appearance of the *will*; the will objectifies itself in the intellect, and indeed as the will to perceive the external world, and thus as a *willing of cognition*.<sup>b</sup> However great and fundamental the difference between willing and cognition might be in us, the final substrate of both is nonetheless the same, namely the *will* as the essence in itself of the whole of appearance: cognition however, the intellect, which presents itself in self-consciousness as thoroughly secondary, is to be viewed not only as its accident but also as its product and thus, in a roundabout manner, cognition leads back to the will again. Just as the intellect proves physiologically to be the function of an organ of the body, it is to be viewed metaphysically as a product of the will, whose objectivation or visibility is the whole of the body. Thus the will to *cognition*, intuited objectively, is the brain; just as the will to *walk*, intuited objectively, is the foot; the will to *grasp* is the hand, the will to *digest* is the stomach, to *procreate* is the genitals, and so on. Of course in the end this whole objectivation is only there for the brain, as its intuition: the will presents itself in this intuition as the organic body. But to the extent that the brain *cognizes*, it is *itself* not cognized; rather it is the *cognizing thing*, the subject of all cognition. To the extent, however, that we have cognition *of* it in objective intuition, i.e. in consciousness of *other things*, and thus secondarily, to this extent, it belongs, as an organ of the body, to the objectivation of the will. For the whole process is the *self-cognition of the will*, takes the will as its point of departure and returns back to it, and constitutes what *Kant* called *appearance*, in contrast to the thing in itself. What is thus *cognized*, what *becomes representation*, is the *will*: and this

<sup>a</sup> ein Hilfsorgan des Willens

<sup>b</sup> Erkennenwollen

representation is what we call the *body* which, as something extended in space and moving in time, exists only by means of the functions of the brain, and thus only in these functions. What on the other hand cognizes, what *has those representations*, is the *brain*, which nonetheless does not cognize itself but rather only becomes conscious of itself as intellect, i.e. as *something that has cognition*,<sup>a</sup> and thus only subjectively. What, seen from the inside, is the cognitive faculty is, seen from without, the brain.<sup>53</sup> This brain is a part of that very body because it itself belongs to the objectification of the *will*; in other words, its *willing to cognize*,<sup>b</sup> its direction in the external world, is objectified in the brain. Accordingly, the brain and therefore the intellect are clearly conditioned directly by the body, and the body is in turn conditioned by the brain, but only indirectly, namely as something spatial and corporeal, in the world of intuition but not in itself, i.e. as will. The whole is ultimately will becoming representation to itself, and is therefore the unity we express as 'I'. The brain itself, to the extent that it is *represented* – and thus present in consciousness of other things, and therefore secondarily – is itself only representation. But in itself and to the extent that it *represents*, it is the will, because will is the real substrate of the whole of appearance: its willing to cognize objectifies itself as the brain and its functions. – We can view the voltaic pile as a metaphor, certainly an imperfect one, but still one that to a certain extent illustrates the essence of the human appearance as we have seen it here: the metal along with the fluid would be the body; the chemical action as the basis of the whole effect would be the will, and the resulting electrical tension that generates strikes and sparks is like the intellect. But every metaphor has its flaws.<sup>c</sup>

295

Pathology has at last, but only recently, established the *physiatric* view according to which illnesses are themselves a healing process of nature: nature introduces illnesses as a way of removing, by overcoming, the causes of a disorder that has somehow entered the organism; after a decisive struggle, the crisis, nature either emerges victorious and achieves its aim, or is defeated. Our standpoint reveals the rationality of this view: it allows the *will* to be recognized in the life force,<sup>d</sup> which emerges as a healing power of nature.<sup>e</sup> This will, that in its healthy state is the basis of all organic functions, upon the entry of disorders that threaten its whole work, vests itself with dictatorial power in order to quell the rebellious potencies

<sup>a</sup> als Erkennendes

<sup>b</sup> Erkennenwollen

<sup>c</sup> omne simile claudicat

<sup>d</sup> Lebenskraft [also 'vital force']

<sup>e</sup> vis naturae medicatrix



through wholly extraordinary expedients and abnormal operations (illness) that put everything back on track. The fact that *Brandis*, on the other hand, in the passages of his book *On the Application of Coldness*<sup>a</sup> (which I cited in the first part of my essay *On Will in Nature*)<sup>b</sup> repeatedly claims that *the will itself* is ill, is a crude misunderstanding. When I take this into consideration, and also note that *Brandis*, in his earlier book *On the Life Force* (1795),<sup>c</sup> showed no inkling of the suspicion that this force was in itself the *will*, instead saying (p. 13): ‘It is impossible for the life force to be the being we are familiar with only through our consciousness, since the majority of movements take place without our consciousness. The claim that this being affects the body in the absence of consciousness when we are familiar with it only as consciousness is unmotivated and unproven to say the very least’; and on p. 14: ‘I believe Haller’s objections to the opinion that all vital movements are effects of the soul are irrefutable’; when I further recall that he wrote his book *On the Application of Coldness*, in which the will emerged so decisively as the life force, when he was in his seventies, an age when nobody begins to have new ideas at a basic level; when I then also consider that he uses my very expressions ‘will and representation’ rather than the much more common ‘faculties of desire and cognition’ – then, contrary to my earlier assumptions, I am now convinced that he has borrowed his basic idea from me, and with the integrity typical of today’s scholarly world, kept silent on the subject. This topic is discussed further in the second edition of the work *On Will in Nature*, p. 14.<sup>d</sup>

Nothing is better able to confirm and clarify the thesis with which we are presently concerned than Bichat’s justly famous book, *On Life and Death*.<sup>e</sup> Our separate discussions support each other, since his is the physiological commentary on mine, and mine is the philosophical commentary on his, and we are best understood if read together. I have in mind primarily the first half of his work, called *Physiological Researches on Life*.<sup>f</sup> He grounds his arguments in the opposition between *organic* and *animal* life, which corresponds to my distinction between will and intellect. Anyone who attends to his meaning rather than his words will not be misled by the fact that he attributes will to animal life, since he shares the conventional understanding of will merely as conscious

<sup>a</sup> *Ueber die Anwendung der Kälte* [Joachim Dietrich Brandis, *Erfahrungen über die Anwendung der Kälte in Krankheiten* (*Experiments in the application of cold to illnesses*) (1833)]

<sup>b</sup> [WN, 331–4 (Hübscher SW 4, 9–13)]

<sup>c</sup> *Ueber die Lebenskraft* [*Versuch über die Lebenskraft* (*Investigation concerning the life force*) (1795)]

<sup>d</sup> [WN, 334–5 (Hübscher SW 4, 14)]

<sup>e</sup> *Sur la vie et la mort* [see p. 260, n. b]

<sup>f</sup> *Recherches physiologiques sur la vie*

power of choice;<sup>a</sup> such power of choice certainly does come from the brain, where, nonetheless, as was shown above, it is not yet true willing, but merely an examination and calculation of motives, the conclusion or product of which ultimately emerges as an act of will.<sup>54</sup> Everything that I attribute to the genuine *will* he ascribes to *organic* life, and everything that I consider *intellect* is for him *animal* life: for him, the latter has its seat<sup>b</sup> only in the brain and its appendages; the former on the other hand is in the whole of the rest of the organism. The thorough opposition he establishes between the two corresponds to the opposition I see between the will and intellect. As an anatomist and physiologist he takes what is objective as his point of departure, i.e. consciousness of other things; I, as a philosopher, begin with what is subjective, self-consciousness: and it is a joy to see how we move forward in harmony, like two voices in a duet, although you hear something different from each of us. And so whoever wants to understand me should read him; and whoever wants to understand him more thoroughly than he understands himself, should read me. In article 4, *Bichat* shows us that *organic* life begins earlier and is extinguished later than *animal* life, and consequently, since animal life also ceases operation during sleep, organic life lasts almost twice as long; then he shows in articles 8 and 9 that organic life does everything perfectly, at once and on its own, while animal life on the other hand requires a long period of practice and education. But of greatest interest is the sixth article, where he shows that *animal* life is entirely limited to intellectual operations and thus proceeds coolly and disinterestedly, while the affects and passions are located in *organic* life, although the occasions for them lie in the animal, i.e. cerebral life: here he has ten magnificent pages that I would like to transcribe in their entirety. On p. 50 he says: 'it is doubtless astonishing that the passions neither begin nor end in the different organs of animal life; that on the contrary these parts that serve internal functions are constantly affected by the passions and even determine them according to circumstances in which they find themselves. Nevertheless, this is what precise observation demonstrates. I claim first that the effect of all types of passions is always foreign to animal life and consists instead in creating an alteration, some sort of modification in organic life.'<sup>c</sup> Then he describes how anger affects the

297

<sup>a</sup> *bloß die bewußte Willkür*

<sup>b</sup> *hat ... seinen Sitz*

<sup>c</sup> *Il est sans doute étonnant, que les passions n'ayent jamais leur terme ni leur origine dans les divers organes de la vie animale; qu'au contraire les parties servant aux fonctions internes, soient constamment affectées par elles, et même les déterminent suivant l'état où elles se trouvent. Tel est cependant ce que la stricte observation nous prouve. Je dis d'abord que l'effet de toute espèce de passion, constamment étranger à la vie animale, est de faire naître un changement, une altération quelconque dans la vie organique.* [p. 50 of the 1805 edition which Schopenhauer possessed (see *HN* 5, 239)]

blood circulation and heartbeat, then how joy does the same, and finally how it works with fear; and then how the lungs, stomach, intestines, liver, glands and pancreas are affected by these and related emotions, and how grief hinders nutrition: but also how animal life, i.e. cerebral life remains untouched by all this and calmly follows its own course. He appeals to the fact that we signify intellectual operations by putting our hand on our head, yet we place it on the heart, stomach, or guts when we want to express our love, joy, sadness or hatred, and he remarks that it would be a bad actor who touched his head

298 when speaking of his grief, or his heart when discussing his mental exertions; he also appeals to the fact that, while scholars would have it that the so-called soul resides in the head, folk wisdom<sup>a</sup> has always signalled the familiar distinction between intellect and affections of the will through apposite sayings when they refer for instance to a capable, shrewd or subtle head, but to a good heart, a heart full of feeling; and also ‘my blood boils with rage’, ‘it gets my gall’, ‘one’s insides jump with joy’ – ‘jealousy poisons my blood’, etc. ‘Song is the language of the passions, of organic life, as the spoken word is the language of the understanding, of animal life: declamation is in the middle, it animates the cold language of the brain through the expressive language of the internal organs, the heart, the liver, the stomach, etc.’<sup>b</sup> As a result: ‘organic life is the terminating point in which the passions come to an end, and the centre from which they depart’.<sup>c</sup> This superb and thorough book offers the best possible confirmation and clarification of the fact that the body is only the embodiment of *will* itself (i.e. as will is intuited through the brain functions, that is, time, space, and causality), from which it follows that the will is primary and primordial, the intellect on the other hand, as mere function of the brain, is secondary and derivative. But the most admirable and for me the most enjoyable aspect of *Bichat*’s train of thought is that this great anatomist, in the course of his purely physiological treatment, is able to explain the inalterability of the *moral character* from the fact that only *animal* life, which is to say brain function, is subject to the influence of education, practice, development and custom, while *moral character* belongs to *organic* life (i.e. all the other parts), which cannot be modified externally. I cannot resist the temptation to copy out the passage here: it is found in article 9, § 2: ‘Such is then the great difference between the two lives of the animal (cerebral or animal, and organic life) with respect to the unequal perfection of the

<sup>a</sup> *das Volk*

<sup>b</sup> *Les chants sont le langage des passions, de la vie organique, comme la parole ordinaire est celui de l’entendement, de la vie animale: la déclamation tient le milieu, elle anime la langue froide du cerveau, par la langue expressive des organes intérieurs, du coeur, du foie, de l’estomac etc.* [p. 55]

<sup>c</sup> *La vie organique est le terme où aboutissent, et le centre d’où partent les passions.* [p. 57]

different systems of functions of which each is the result; that is to say, in the one, the predominance or inferiority of one system in relation to the others is almost always related to the greater or lesser activity or inertia of this system, and to habitual action or inaction; whereas in the other, on the contrary, this predominance or inferiority is immediately tied to the structure of the organs and never to their education. This is why the physical temperament and *moral character* are not at all susceptible to change through education, which modifies the actions of animal life so prodigiously, because, as we have seen, both *belong to organic life*. The character is, if I might express myself thus, the physiognomy of the passions; temperament is that of the internal functions: but since both always remain the same, having a direction that habit and exercise never disturb, it is obvious that temperament and character must therefore be removed from the domain of education. Education can moderate the influence of character, and can perfect the judgment and reflection to some extent and render their domain superior to its own; it can fortify animal life so that it can resist the drives of organic life. But to want to change the nature of a character by means of education, to tone down or enhance the passions of which character is the habitual expression, to want to increase or constrain the sphere of the passions, is an enterprise akin to that of a doctor who tries to elevate or reduce the ordinary, healthy state of the contractive force of the heart by some degree and for the whole of life, or to habitually increase or diminish the movement of the arteries that is both natural and necessary for their action, etc. We would observe to this doctor that circulation, respiration, etc., are not under the control of the will (voluntary choice), that they cannot be modified by man without his becoming ill, etc. We would make the same observation to those who believe that one can change the character, and by means of the character *the passions*, since these are a *product of the action of all the internal organs*, or at least are located in them.<sup>a</sup> The

<sup>a</sup> Telle est donc la grande différence des deux vies de l'animal (cerebrales oder animales, und organisches Leben) par rapport à l'inégalité de perfection des divers systèmes de fonctions, dont chacune résulte; savoir, que dans l'une la prédominance ou l'infériorité d'un système, relativement aux autres, tient presque toujours à l'activité ou à l'inertie plus grandes de ce système, à l'habitude d'agir ou de ne pas agir; que dans l'autre, au contraire, cette prédominance ou cette infériorité sont immédiatement liées à la texture des organes, et jamais à leur éducation. Voilà pourquoi le tempérament physique et le caractère moral ne sont point susceptibles de changer par l'éducation, qui modifie si prodigieusement les actes de la vie animale; car, comme nous l'avons vu, tous deux appartiennent à la vie organique. Le caractère est, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi, la physionomie des passions; le tempérament est celle des fonctions internes: or les unes et les autres étant toujours les mêmes, ayant une direction que l'habitude et l'exercice ne dérangent jamais, il est manifeste que le tempérament et le caractère doivent être aussi soustraits à l'empire de l'éducation. Elle peut modérer l'influence du second, perfectionner assez le jugement et la réflexion, pour rendre leur empire supérieur au sien, fortifier la vie animale, afin qu'elle résiste aux impulsions de l'organique. Mais vouloir par elle dénaturer le caractère, adoucir ou exalter les passions dont il est l'expression habituelle, agrandir ou resserrer leur sphère, c'est une entreprise analogue à celle d'un médecin qui essaierait d'élever ou d'abaisser de quelques degrés, et pour toute la vie, la force de contraction ordinaire au cœur dans l'état de santé, de

reader familiar with my philosophy may imagine how happy I was when I discovered the proof of my theory in research from a completely different field by an extraordinary man, torn so prematurely from this world.<sup>a</sup>

300

A special piece of evidence that supports the truth that the organism is merely the visibility of the will is found in the fact that when dogs, cats, domestic fowl, and probably other animals as well, bite out of intense anger, the wounds can become fatal; indeed, coming from a dog they can cause rabies in the human they encounter without the dog being mad or becoming so. This is because the heat of anger is nothing but the most decisive and vehement will to negate its object. This is manifest in the fact that the saliva can instantly assume a destructive and to a certain extent magically effective force, and shows that the will and the organism are in truth one and the same. It can also be demonstrated from the fact that intense anger can quickly turn breast milk so rotten that the nursing infant dies at once from convulsions. (Most, *On Sympathetic Remedies*,<sup>b</sup> p. 16.)<sup>55</sup>

### *Remark on what was said concerning Bichat*<sup>56</sup>

As we have shown, *Bichat* looked deeply into human nature and in consequence gave an utterly remarkable account that belongs among the most profound reflections in the whole of French literature. Now, sixty years later, Mr *Flourens* suddenly emerges with a polemic against Bichat, in his work *On Life and Intelligence*,<sup>c</sup> and has the audacity to summarily declare false everything that Bichat brought to light on this subject that was so peculiarly his own. And what does he offer in opposition? Counter-arguments? No, counter-assertions\* and authorities who are in fact as odd

\* 'Tout ce qui est relatif à l'entendement appartient à la vie animal', dit Bichat, et jusque-là point de doute; 'tout ce qui est relatif aux passions appartient à la vie organique, — et ceci est absolument faux.' — ['Everything related to cognition belongs to animal life' claims Bichat, and there is no doubt on this point; 'everything related to the passions belongs to organic life, — and that is completely false.'] So?! — decrevit Florentius magnus. [Really?! — The great Flourens has proclaimed it so.] — précipiter ou de ralentir habituellement le mouvement naturel aux artères, et qui est nécessaire à leur action etc. Nous observerions à ce médecin, que la circulation, la respiration etc. ne sont point sous le domaine de la volonté (Willkür), qu'elles ne peuvent être modifiées par l'homme, sans passer à l'état maladif etc. Faisons la même observation à ceux qui croient qu'on change le caractère, et par-là même les passions, puisque celles-ci sont un produit de l'action de tous les organes internes, ou qu'elles y ont au moins spécialement leur siège. [pp. 140–2; the emphases and parenthetical remarks inserted in this passage are Schopenhauer's, and he has made a few minor edits]

<sup>a</sup> [Bichat died in 1802, aged 30]

<sup>b</sup> *Ueber sympathetische Mittel* [Georg Friedrich Most, *Die sympathetischen Mittel und Curmethoden* (*Sympathetic remedies and treatment methods*) (1842)]

<sup>c</sup> *De la vie et de l'intelligence* [Marie-Jean Pierre Flourens, 1858]

as they are inadmissible: namely Descartes – and Gall! – Mr Flourens is a Cartesian in his beliefs, and, in the year 1858, still considers Descartes ‘*le philosophe par excellence*’. – To be sure, Descartes is a great man, but only as a trail-blazer: there is not a single word of truth in the whole of his collected dogmas; and to call upon the authority of these dogmas in this day and age is simply ridiculous. In the 19th century, being a Cartesian philosopher is like being a Ptolemaic astronomer or a Stahlian chemist. But for Mr Flourens, the Cartesian dogmas are articles of faith. Descartes taught that ‘acts of will are thoughts’:<sup>a</sup> and thus it is so; even if every single person feels inside himself that willing and thinking are as different as black and white; thus in the nineteenth chapter above I was able to demonstrate and clarify this thoroughly, in detail, and always guided by experience. But above all, according to Descartes, Mr Flourens’ oracle, there are two fundamentally different substances, body and soul: accordingly, Mr Flourens says, as an orthodox Cartesian: ‘the first point is to separate, even verbally, what belongs to the body from what belongs to the soul’<sup>b</sup> (I, 72). He further tells us that this ‘soul resides uniquely and exclusively in the brain’<sup>c</sup> (II, 137); from where, according to a passage in Descartes, it sends ‘animal spirits’<sup>d</sup> as couriers to the muscles, yet itself can only be affected by the brain, and thus the passions have their location (*siège*) in the heart, which is altered by them, but nonetheless have their place (*place*) in the brain. Thus speaks the oracle of Mr Flourens, and he finds this claim so edifying that he repeats it twice over (II, 33 and II, 135) as an infallible triumph over the ignorant *Bichat*, who is not aware of either the soul or the body but only an animal and an organic life, and whom he condescendingly informs ‘that one must carefully distinguish the parts where the passions are located (*siègent*) from those that they *affect*, for the passions *act* in *one* place, while *being* in another’. Corporeal things tend to act only where they are: but with an immaterial soul the situation might be different. What might he and his oracle really have had in mind with this distinction between *place* and *siège*, between *siéger* and *affecter*? – The fundamental error of Mr Flourens and his Descartes stems from the fact that they confuse the motives, or occasions of the passions (which, as representations, clearly lie in the intellect, i.e. the brain) with the passions themselves, which, as movements of the will, lie in the whole body, and we know that the body is the intuited will itself. – Mr Flourens’ second

301

302

<sup>a</sup> *les volontés sont des pensées*

<sup>b</sup> *Le premier point est de séparer, même par les mots, ce qui est du corps de ce qui est de l'âme*

<sup>c</sup> *âme réside uniquement et exclusivement dans le cerveau*

<sup>d</sup> *spiritus animales*

authority is, as I have said, *Gall*. I said at the beginning of this twentieth chapter (and in fact even in the earlier edition): ‘the great mistake of Gall’s phrenology is that it associates the organs of the brain with moral qualities’. But what I criticize and find objectionable is precisely what Mr Flourens praises and admires: because he takes Descartes’ ‘acts of the will are thoughts’ to heart. Accordingly, he says (p. 144): ‘The first service that Gall rendered for *physiology* (?) was to reduce the moral to the intellectual, and to show that the moral faculties and the intellectual faculties belong to the same order and in fact, that they all, the one as much as the other, belong uniquely and exclusively in the brain.’<sup>a</sup> In a sense, my whole philosophy, and particularly the nineteenth chapter of this volume consists in the refutation of this fundamental error. Mr Flourens, on the other hand, does not tire of praising precisely this as a great truth, and Gall as its discoverer: for instance, p. 147: ‘If it were up to me to list the services Gall has performed for us, I would say that the first is situating moral qualities in the brain.’<sup>b</sup> – On p. 153: ‘The brain alone is the organ of *the soul*, and indeed of *the soul* in all its functions (it is clear that the Cartesian simple *soul* is always hidden in the background, as the heart of the matter); it is the seat of all the moral faculties, as it is of all the intellectual faculties . . . Gall has reduced the *moral to the intellectual*, he has situated the moral qualities in the same place, in the same organ, as the intellectual faculties.’<sup>c</sup> – Oh how Bichat and I must blush in the presence of such wisdom! – But in all seriousness, what can be more depressing, or rather more infuriating, than to see true and profound thoughts rejected and the false and perverse  
 303 praised; to experience how deeply hidden, difficult and vital truths, achieved only at a late date, are torn out again and the old, trite, recently overturned errors are put in their place; and indeed, to have to fear that this process will ultimately reverse the difficult progress of human knowledge! But let us be calm: because ‘great is the power of the truth, it will win the day’.<sup>d</sup> Mr Flourens is doubtless a man of much merit, which he has,

<sup>a</sup> *Le premier service que Gall a rendu à la physiologie (?) a été de rammener le moral à l’intellectuel, et de faire voir que les facultés morales et les facultés intellectuelles sont des facultés du même ordre, et de les placer toutes, autant les unes que les autres, uniquement et exclusivement dans le cerveau* [Schopenhauer’s emphasis and question-mark]

<sup>b</sup> *Si j’en étais à classer les services que nous a rendu Gall, je dirais que le premier a été de rammener les qualités morales au cerveau.*

<sup>c</sup> *Le cerveau seul est l’organe de l’âme, et de l’âme dans toute la plénitude de ses fonctions* (man sieht, die Cartesianische einfache Seele steckt, als Kern der Sache, noch immer dahinter); *il est le siège de toutes les facultés morales, comme de toutes les facultés intellectuelles.* — — — *Gall a rammené le moral à l’intellectuel, il a rammené les qualités morales au même siège, au même organe, que les facultés intellectuelles.* [The parenthetical remark and emphases are Schopenhauer’s]

<sup>d</sup> *magna est vis veritatis et praevalēbit* [I Esdras 4:41 (Apocrypha)]

however, earned along the path of experimentation. But the most important truths are not to be gained through experiment, but rather only through reflection and penetration. Through reflection and through profound vision, *Bichat* too brought to light the sort of truth that remains inaccessible to the experimental endeavours of Mr Flourens, even if, as a true and consistent Cartesian, he were to torture another hundred animals to death. But there is something he should have noted and thought about before too long: ‘watch out, you old goat, it’s burning’. But now the audacity and conceit that only false presumption combined with superficiality will give, and that leads Mr Flourens to imagine that a thinker like *Bichat* can be refuted through mere counter-assertions, old wives’ tales, and futile authorities, and even leads him to reprimand, admonish, and almost mock Bichat – has its origin in the academy with its *fauteuils*;<sup>a</sup> and enthroned on these and greeting one other as ‘illustrious colleague’,<sup>b</sup> these gentlemen cannot resist equating themselves with the best who have ever lived, considering themselves as oracles, and dictating accordingly what is true and what is false. This prompts and justifies me in saying that the truly superior and privileged minds, which are sometimes born to enlighten the rest, and among which Bichat certainly belongs, are such ‘by the grace of God’ and therefore are to the academies (in which for the most part they occupy only the forty-first *fauteuil*) and their ‘illustrious colleagues’, what born princes are to the numerous representatives of the people who are chosen from the masses. Thus a secret awe<sup>c</sup> should warn these gentlemen of the academy (and there are always droves of them) before they provoke such people – unless they have the most pressing reasons to urge, not mere counter-assertions and appeals to the dogmas<sup>d</sup> of Descartes, which is utterly ridiculous in this day and age.

304

<sup>a</sup> [armchairs]

<sup>b</sup> *illustre confrère* [used in the plural below]

<sup>c</sup> [Schopenhauer first uses a German phrase and then glosses it parenthetically with this English expression]

<sup>d</sup> *placita*



*Review and More General Consideration*

If the *intellect* were not secondary, as the two preceding chapters have shown it to be, then we would not find that everything that takes place in the absence of intellect, i.e. without the intervention of representation (such as, for instance, the procreation, development, and maintenance of the organism, the healing of wounds, the replacement or vicarious supplementation of mutilated parts, the salutary crisis in illnesses, the works of animal mechanical drives and the creation of instinct in general) turns out so infinitely better and more perfectly than things that take place with the assistance of intellect, namely all conscious and intentional human products and accomplishments which, compared to the former, are the works of a blundering amateur.<sup>a</sup> Overall, *nature* signifies that which acts, drives, and creates without the mediation of the intellect. Now the fact that this is identical with what we find in ourselves as *will* is the single and sole theme of this Second Book as well as the essay *On Will in Nature*. The possibility of this fundamental insight is based on the fact that the will is immediately illuminated *in us* by the intellect, which comes forward in our own case as self-consciousness; otherwise we would have just as little a chance of getting to know it better within ourselves as without, and we would be forever stymied when confronted with the unfathomable forces of nature. We need to think away the assistance of the *intellect* when we grasp the essence of the will in itself, if we want to penetrate as far as possible into the interior of nature.

305 This is why, by the way, my direct antipode among philosophers is *Anaxagoras*, since he assumed that a *nous*,<sup>b</sup> an intelligence, something that represents, is primary and primordial, and that everything else came from this; he is considered the first to take such a view. According to this view, the world existed earlier in mere representation than in itself; while I believe that it is the *will* devoid of cognition that grounds the reality of

<sup>a</sup> *bloße Strümperei*

<sup>b</sup> νοῦς [also 'mind']

things, whose development must have already progressed fairly far before representation and intelligence finally come about in animal consciousness; so that for me, thinking comes about last of all. Moreover, according to the testimony of Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, I, 4),<sup>a</sup> *Anaxagoras* himself did not know how to achieve very much with his *nous*, but really only set it up and then let it stand as it was, like a painted saint in the entryway, without using it in his account of the developments of nature unless he found himself in an emergency situation without anything else to call upon. – All physico-theology is an application of the truth-defying error (mentioned at the beginning of this chapter) that the most perfect way for things to originate is through the mediation of an *intellect*. This is precisely why physico-theology blocks off any deeper grounding of nature.

From *Socrates*' time until our own, we find one of the main topics of endless philosophical dispute is that rational entity<sup>b</sup> called the *soul*.<sup>c</sup> We see the majority claim it to be immortal, which is to say a metaphysical essence; others however persevere in maintaining the opposite, bolstered by facts that incontrovertibly show the complete dependence of the intellect on bodily organs. That *soul* was taken by everyone to be above all *absolutely simple*: for precisely this was the basis for the proof of its metaphysical essence, its immateriality and immortality; although even this certainly does not follow necessarily because, even if we can only imagine the destruction of a formed body as a division into its component parts, it does not follow that the destruction of a simple being (of which moreover we have no concept) is not possible in some other way, such as by gradual disappearance.<sup>57</sup> I, on the other hand, begin by dismissing the presupposed simplicity of our subjective, conscious essence or of the 'I', by proving that the manifestations from which it is inferred have two very different sources and that the *intellect* is certainly physically conditioned, the function of a material organ and thus dependent on this organ (without which it would be as impossible as grasping would be without the hand) and thus that it belongs to mere appearance and therefore shares the fate of mere appearance – but, on the other hand, that the *will* is not linked to any specific organ but is present everywhere, that the will is everywhere what truly moves and creates and therefore conditions the whole organism, that in fact the will constitutes the metaphysical substrate of the whole of appearance and is consequently not something posterior<sup>d</sup> like the

306

<sup>a</sup> [985a18–23; but see also Plato, *Phaedo*, 97b–98c for a view of Anaxagoras closer to the one Schopenhauer reports]

<sup>b</sup> *ens rationis*

<sup>c</sup> *Seele*

<sup>d</sup> *ein Posterius*

intellect, but is instead the thing prior<sup>a</sup> to the intellect which depends on it, not the other way around. But the body is degraded to a mere representation since it is only the manner in which the *will* presents itself in the intuition of the intellect or brain. The *will*, on the other hand, which emerges as the final result in all earlier systems (however different they might otherwise be), is for me the very first thing of all. The *intellect*, as mere brain function, participates in the decline of the body; but the will does not. From the differences between these two, along with the secondary nature of the intellect, it is understandable that the human being feels eternal and indestructible in the depths of his self-consciousness, but cannot for that matter remember anything beyond the span of his life, either before or after.<sup>b</sup> I do not want to anticipate the discussion of the true indestructibility of our essence, a discussion that belongs in the Fourth Book, but only indicate the point to which it connects.

Now the fact that we call the body a mere representation, a claim that is certainly one-sided yet true from our standpoint, is based on the fact that existence in space, as extended, and in time, as changing, but determined more closely in both by the causal nexus, is possible only in *representation*, on whose forms those determinations all rest, and so is possible only in the brain in which such an existence emerges, accordingly, as objective, i.e. foreign. Hence even our own body can exist in this way only in a brain. For the cognition I have of my body as something extended, spatial, and mobile, is merely *indirect*: it is an image in my brain which comes about by means of the senses and the understanding. The body is given to me *directly* only in muscular activity and in pain or pleasure, both of which belong primarily and immediately to the will. – Combining these two different modes of cognition of my own body leads next to the idea that all other things, which likewise have this objective existence that is initially only in my brain, are therefore not absolutely non-existent outside of the brain but rather must likewise ultimately *in themselves* be precisely what is registered in self-consciousness as *will*.

<sup>a</sup> *das Prius*

<sup>b</sup> *weder a parte ante noch a parte post*

*Objective View of the Intellect*

There are two fundamentally different ways of investigating the intellect, based on two different standpoints; but however opposed this difference makes them, they must nonetheless be brought into agreement. – The one is the *subjective* view which, starting from the *inside* and taking *consciousness* as given, shows us the mechanism through which the world presents itself in consciousness, and how it constructs itself in consciousness from materials provided by the senses and the understanding. *Locke* must be regarded as the originator of this mode of investigation: *Kant* perfected it to an incomparable extent, and our First Book, together with its supplements, is also dedicated to this view.

The opposite way of investigating the intellect is the *objective* way, which starts from the *outside* and does not take one's own consciousness for its object but instead takes the beings that are given in outer experience and that are conscious of themselves and the world; it examines the relationship their intellect has to their other qualities, what makes their intellect possible, what makes it necessary, and what it does for them. The standpoint of this type of investigation is empirical: it takes the world and the animal beings present in it as simply given, since it proceeds from these. It is therefore primarily zoological, anatomical, physiological, and only becomes philosophical in connection with the first type of investigation and the higher standpoint this has achieved. We are indebted to (mostly French) zootomists and physiologists for the only groundwork provided so far for this investigation. *Cabanis* in particular should be cited in this regard, since his superb work, *The Relations of the Physical to the Moral*<sup>a</sup> was a pioneering text in establishing the physiological perspective. The famous *Bichat* was working at the same time, although his subject was much broader. Even *Gall* deserves to be mentioned here, even though his

308

\* This chapter relates to the last half of § 27 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> [See p. 223, n. b Schopenhauer gives slightly different versions of Cabanis's title]

principal goal went astray. Ignorance and prejudice have levelled the charge of materialism against this mode of investigation, because, in sticking purely to experience, it does not recognize<sup>a</sup> the immaterial substance, the soul. The most recent advances in the physiology of the nervous system, by *Charles Bell, Magendie, Marshall Hall* and others have corrected and enriched the material of this type of investigation. A philosophy like that of Kant, which completely ignores this perspective on the intellect, is one-sided and hence inadequate. It leaves an insurmountable gap between our philosophical and our physiological knowledge, which prevents us from ever gaining satisfaction.

Although what I said in the two preceding chapters concerning the life and activity of the brain already belongs to this type of investigation, and all the explanations given in the essay *On Will in Nature* under the heading 'Plant Physiology' as well as a part of what is found under the heading 'Comparative Anatomy', are dedicated to it, the following general presentation of the results of these discussions will certainly not be superfluous.

309

We become most vividly aware of the glaring contrast between the two opposed ways of investigating the intellect when, taking things to the extreme, we realize that what the one view takes directly as reflective thinking and vivid intuiting and makes into its subject matter, is for the other nothing more than the physiological function of an organ, the brain; and indeed, that we are justified in claiming that the whole objective world, so boundless in space, so infinite in time, so unfathomable in perfection, is really only a certain movement or affection of the grey matter in the brainpan.<sup>b</sup> Then we ask in surprise: what is this brain whose function produces this phenomenon of all phenomena? What is the material that can be refined and potentiated into a grey matter such that the stimulus of several of its particles becomes the conditioning support of the existence of an objective world? The horror in the face of such questions led to the hypostasizing of the simple substance of an immaterial soul that merely lives in the brain. We say, undaunted, that this grey matter is, like every vegetable or animal part, an organic structure like all of its closer relatives in the inferior housing of the heads of our irrational brothers down to the lowliest, which barely has the power of apprehension. This organic grey matter is the final product of nature, and presupposes all of its other products. But in itself and outside of representation, the brain, like everything else, is *will*. For *being-for-another is being-represented, and being-in-itself is willing*. This is why we never get to the

<sup>a</sup> *kennt*<sup>b</sup> *Breimasse im Hirnschädel*

insides of things along the purely *objective* route; rather, when we try to get inside starting from the outside and empirically, the interior always becomes an exterior again before our very eyes – the pith of the tree as well as its bark, the heart of an animal as well as its hide, the white and yolk of the egg as well as its shell. Along the *subjective* route, on the other hand, the interior is accessible to us at every moment, since we find it first in ourselves as *the will* and, guided by an analogy with our own being,<sup>a</sup> must be able to decipher others as well through the insight that being in itself,<sup>b</sup> independent of being cognized, i.e. independent of being presented to itself in an intellect, is conceivable only as a *willing*. 310

Now if we go back as far as possible in the *objective* apprehension of the intellect, we will find that the necessity or the need for *cognition in general* arises from the plurality and the *separate* existence of beings,<sup>c</sup> i.e. from individuation. Imagine only *a single* being existed: it would not need cognition, because there would be nothing different from itself, nothing whose existence it would therefore need to take in indirectly, through cognition, i.e. image and concept. It would *itself* be all in all, and so there would be nothing left for it to have cognition of, i.e. nothing foreign that could be apprehended as an object. By contrast, given the plurality of beings, each individual finds itself in a state of isolation from all others, and the necessity of cognition stems from this. The animal individual first becomes conscious of itself by means of its nervous system, which is bounded by its skin: still, rising to the level of intellect in the brain, this boundary is transgressed by means of causation, one of the intellect's forms of cognition; and thus intuitions arise for it as a consciousness of *other* things, as an image of beings in space and time, which change<sup>d</sup> in accordance with causation. – In this sense, the saying 'the different is known only by the different' is more accurate than *Empedocles*' 'like is known only by like', which was a vague and ambiguous claim (although there are probably points of view from which it is true, such as, incidentally, that of *Helvétius*, when he remarked, as aptly as eloquently: 'only a mind can sense a mind: it is a chord that only sounds in unison',<sup>e</sup> which agrees with Xenophanes' 'One must be a wise man to recognize a wise man'<sup>f</sup> and is a bitter source of anguish). – But from the

<sup>a</sup> *Wesen*

<sup>b</sup> *ein Seyn an sich*

<sup>c</sup> *Wesen*

<sup>d</sup> *sich verändern*

<sup>e</sup> *Il n'y a que l'esprit qui sente l'esprit: c'est une corde qui ne frémit qu'à l'unison* [cf. *De l'esprit* (*On the Mind*), Discourse II, ch. 4. See p. 283, n. e]

<sup>f</sup> σοφὸν εἶναι δεῖ τὸν ἐπιγινώσκόμενον τὸν σοφόν (*sapientem esse oportet eum qui sapientem agniturus sit*) [from Diogenes Laertius, IX, 20]

311

other side we also know that conversely, the multitude of things the same in kind is possible only through time and space, i.e. though the forms of our cognition. Space first arises when the cognitive subject looks outward: it is the way in which the subject apprehends something as being distinct from itself. But we also saw that cognition in general is conditioned by plurality and difference. And so cognition and multiplicity, or individuation, rise and fall together since they are mutually conditioning. – From this we can conclude that beyond appearance, in the essence in itself of all things, to which time and space and therefore plurality as well must be foreign, there can be no cognition. Buddhism describes this as *Prajñāpāramitā*, i.e. what is beyond all cognition. (On this see I. J. Schmidt, *On the Maha-yana and Prajñā Paramita.*)<sup>a,58</sup> So a ‘cognition of things in themselves’ in the strictest sense of the term would be impossible because where the essence in itself of things begins, cognition falls away, and all cognition is fundamentally only cognition of appearances. For it arises from a limitation, and this limitation renders it necessary so as to extend the limits.

312

For the objective manner of investigation, the brain is the efflorescence of the organism; and so it is only where the organism has achieved its highest perfection and greatest complexity that the brain emerges in its highest development. But in the previous chapter we have gained some familiarity with the organism as the objectivation of the will: and so the brain, as part of the organism, must belong to this objectivation as well. I have further concluded from the fact that the organism is only the visibility of the will, and thus in itself will, that every affection of the *organism* must simultaneously and immediately affect the *will*, i.e. be perceived as pleasant or painful. Still higher developments of the nervous system increase the level of sensibility so that the possibility arises that the nobler, i.e. *objective* sense organs (sight, hearing) will perceive highly delicate affections tailored to them without affecting the will directly and in themselves, i.e. without being painful or pleasant, entering consciousness therefore as in themselves indifferent, merely as *perceived* sensations. In the brain, this increase of sensibility reaches such a high degree that a reaction arises from perceived sense impressions that does not stem directly from the will, but is initially a spontaneity of the function of understanding which makes a transition from the immediately perceived sense sensations to their *cause*, and since the brain produces the form of space at the same time, an intuition of an *external object* arises. There is a point where the understanding makes a transition from the sensation on the retina (which is still only an affection

<sup>a</sup> [Isaak Jacob Schmidt, *Über das Maha-Jana und Pradschna Paramita der Bauddhen* (*On the Buddhists' Mahāyāna und Prajñāpāramitā*) (St Petersburg Academy, 1836)]

of the body and to that extent of the will) to the *cause* of that sensation, which it projects by means of its form of space as something external and different from the person himself; this point can be viewed as the boundary between the world as will and the world as representation, or alternatively as the birthplace of the latter. With human beings, however, the spontaneity of the brain activity (which in the final instance of course stems from the will) goes still further than mere *intuition* and immediate apprehension of the causal relation; that is, it reaches the point of constructing abstract concepts from those intuitions, and to operating with these, i.e. it reaches the point of *thinking*, which makes up its *reason*. *Thoughts* are therefore at the opposite pole from affections of the body which, because the body is the objectivation of the will, can intensify to the point of pain, even in the sense organs. Given what we have said, representation and thought can also be seen as the efflorescence of the will to the extent that they stem from the highest perfection and intensification of the organism, while the organism, in itself and outside of representation, is *will*. Certainly in my explanation the existence of the body presupposes the world of representation, to the extent that it too, as physical body or real object, exists only in representation: but on the other hand, representation itself presupposes the body to the same extent, since representation only arises through the function of an organ. What is at the basis of the whole of appearance, the only thing in it that exists primordially and in itself, is the *will*: for the will is what takes the form of *representation* through this very process, i.e. enters into the secondary existence of a world of objects,<sup>a</sup> or into susceptibility to cognition.<sup>b</sup> – Philosophers prior to *Kant*, with few exceptions, tried to explain the process of our cognition from the wrong side. They started with a so-called soul, a being whose inner nature and characteristic function was supposed to consist in thinking and in fact specifically in abstract thinking with pure concepts that belonged to it all the more completely the more distant they were from all intuition. (Here I ask that you look back at the remark at the end of § 6 of my prize essay *On the Basis of Morals*.) This soul has supposedly wound up in the body, we know not how – where it experiences disturbances in its pure thinking from sense impressions and intuitions and still more the appetites these excite, and finally from affects, even passions into which these themselves develop, while the indigenous and original element of this soul is to be nothing but abstract thinking; left to this, it has only universals, innate concepts and eternal truths<sup>c</sup> for its objects, and

313

<sup>a</sup> *sekundäre Daseyn einer gegenständlichen Welt*

<sup>b</sup> *Erkennbarkeit*

<sup>c</sup> *aeternas veritates*



everything intuitive remains far beneath it. This is also the source of the contempt with which philosophy professors still mention 'sensibility' and the 'sensible', and indeed they are made the main source of immorality; whereas these very senses, being united with the a priori functions of the intellect to produce *intuition*, are the pure and innocent source of all our cognition, from which all thinking first derives its content. You would honestly think that those gentlemen think of sensibility as the supposed sixth sense of the French. – As we have said, the very last product of the process of cognition, abstract thinking, is made into the first and original thing which, as I said, tackles the problem from the wrong end. – And since, according to my analysis, the intellect comes from the organism and thus the will, and cannot exist without these; it would have no content or occupation without the will: for everything that can be cognized is only the objectivation of the will.

314 But the brain and its functions condition not only intuition of the external world and consciousness of other things, but also self-consciousness. The will in itself lacks consciousness and remains unconscious in the majority of its appearances. The secondary world of representation must emerge for it to become conscious of itself, just as light becomes visible only through the body that reflects it and is otherwise lost in the darkness without effect. When the will produces a brain in an animal individual so that it can apprehend its relations to the external world, then consciousness of one's own self first arises in this brain by means of the subject of cognition, which apprehends things as existing and the I as willing. Sensibility, which is most advanced in the brain but distributed across its different parts, must first of all combine all the rays of its activity, concentrating them in a focal point that is not outside of it as in a concave mirror, but inside as in a convex mirror: with this point sensibility first describes the time line on which everything that it represents must be presented, and which is the first and most essential form of all cognition, or the form of inner sense. This focal point of all brain activity is what *Kant* called the synthetic unity of apperception:<sup>\*59</sup> it is this that leads the will first to become conscious of itself, since this focus of brain activity (or that which cognizes)<sup>a</sup> apprehends itself as identical to its own foundation, the foundation from which it has emerged (that which wills)<sup>b</sup> and thus the I arises. Still, this focus of brain activity remains in the first instance a mere subject of cognition and as such capable

\* Compare p. 284 [i.e. p. 264 above]

<sup>a</sup> *das Erkennende*

<sup>b</sup> *das Wollende*

of being the cold and disinterested spectator, the mere guide and adviser to the will, and also of apprehending the external world in a purely objective manner without regard to the will's well-being or woe.<sup>a</sup> But as soon as it directs itself internally, it recognizes the will as the basis of its own appearance and blends with it into the consciousness of an I. That focal point of brain activity (or the subject of cognition) is, as an indivisible point, certainly simple, but not for that reason a substance (soul) but instead a mere state. That whose state it is can be cognized by it only indirectly, as it were through a reflex: but the cessation of the state cannot be seen as the destruction of that of which it is a state. This *cognitive* and conscious I is to the will (which is the basis of its appearance) what the image in the focus of a concave mirror is to the mirror itself, and as in the example, has only a conditional, indeed, strictly speaking, a merely apparent reality. Far from being simply first (as *Fichte* for instance taught) it is basically tertiary since it presupposes the organism which in turn presupposes the will. – I admit that everything we are saying here is only an image and simile and also in part hypothetical: but we are discussing a point hardly accessible to thought much less to proof. I ask therefore that it be compared to my detailed arguments on this topic in the twentieth chapter.<sup>60</sup>

315

Although the essence in itself of every existing thing consists in its will, and cognition, along with consciousness, emerges only as something secondary, on the higher level of appearance, still we find that the presence of consciousness and intellect, and the degree to which it varies from being to being, makes a very great and important difference. We must think of the subjective existence of the plant as a weak analogy, a mere shadow of comfort or discomfort; and even in this extremely weak degree, the plant only knows of itself, not of anything outside of it. By contrast, even the lowest animal, only one stage higher than a plant, is prompted by its increased and more precisely specified needs to broaden the sphere of its existence beyond the limits of its body. This takes place through cognition: this animal has a dull perception of its immediate environment that provides motives for its deeds, with the goal of its maintenance. Here is where the *medium of motives* comes in: and this is the world that exists objectively in time and space, the *world as representation*, however weak and dull these early glimmers of dawn might be in this first and lowest example of this world. But ever more clearly, broadly, deeply, it becomes more pronounced in proportion to the increasing perfection of the brain in the ascending series of animals. This enhancement of brain development,

<sup>a</sup> *Wohl oder Weh*

316

which is to say increase of intellect and clarity of representation on each of these increasingly elevated levels, is introduced by the heightened and increasingly complicated *needs* of these appearances of the will. These needs must always be the occasion for the increase in complexity: this is because nature (i.e. the will that objectifies itself in nature) creates nothing unless it is out of need, least of all the most difficult of its productions, a more perfect brain; this is the result of its principle of parsimony: nature does nothing in vain and creates nothing superfluous.<sup>a</sup> It has supplied every animal with the organs needed for its maintenance, the weapons necessary for its struggles, as I have shown in detail in the essay *On Will in Nature* under the heading ‘Comparative Anatomy’: in accordance with this same measure, it distributes a brain to each animal, that most important of the organs, oriented towards the outside with its intellectual function. The more complicated its organization becomes through higher development, the more manifold and specifically determined are its needs as well, and consequently the more difficult it is to satisfy them and the more dependent such satisfaction is on opportunity. Thus it needs a broader field of vision, a more precise apprehension, a more accurate differentiation of things in the external world, in all their circumstances and relations. This is why we see the forces of representation along with their organs – the brain, nerves and the instruments of the sense – emerging in increasing perfection the higher we ascend in the hierarchy of animals; and in the same measure as the cerebral system develops, the external world presents itself in consciousness with increasing clarity, complexity and perfection. It now takes an increasing amount of attention to apprehend this world, and finally, to the extent that apprehension sometimes momentarily loses sight of its relation to the will, it proceeds all the more purely and accurately. This first takes place definitively in human beings: only in human beings is there a *pure separation of cognition from willing*. Here I merely touch on this vital point so as to indicate its significance and enable myself to resume the discussion below. – But even this final stage in the extension and perfection of the brain and thus in the elevation of the forces of cognition is a step nature takes, as with all others, purely as a result of heightened *needs*, which is to say in the service of the *will*. What the will aims for and achieves in human beings is certainly essentially the same and nothing more than its

317 goal is in animals: nutrition and propagation. But given the organization of the human being, there are so many more requirements for achieving this goal, and these requirements are so much more intense and specific, that an

<sup>a</sup> *lex parsimoniae: natura nihil agit frustra et nihil facit supervacaneum*

incomparably greater increase in intellect than was present at previous levels is called for – or, at least, this proves to be the easiest method for achieving this goal. Now, since the intellect is by nature a hugely adaptable tool that can be employed for the greatest variety of goals, nature, true to its spirit of parsimony, can use it to meet single-handedly all the requirements of the needs that have become so diverse: this is why nature sends human beings out naked, without any natural defenses or means of attack, and indeed with relatively slight muscular strength, and in fact fragile, with few means of resisting deprivation and adverse influences. Nature provided human beings with this one great tool, in addition to hands, retained from the previous stage, the apes. But with the emergence of this predominant intellect, not only is the apprehension of motives, their variety and in general the horizon of goals infinitely expanded, but also the clarity with which the will becomes conscious *of itself* is greatly increased as a result of the clarity that appears in the whole of consciousness, which, supported by the capacity for abstract thought, now reaches the point of perfect clarity of mind.<sup>a</sup> But because of both this and the vehemence that must necessarily be presupposed in a will that supports such an expanded intellect, there appears a heightening of all the *affects*, and indeed the possibility of *passions*,<sup>b</sup> which are unknown to animals. For the forcefulness of the will keeps step with the increase in intelligence, because this always comes from the increased needs and more urgent requirements of the will: but these also support each other. Vehemence of character is connected with greater energy of the heartbeat and blood circulation, which physically enhances the activity of the brain. On the other hand, clarity of intelligence enhances the affects produced by external circumstances, because it allows these circumstances to be apprehended with greater vividness. This is why young calves, for instance, allow themselves to be packed peacefully onto a wagon and driven away: young lions however, if only separated from their mother, remain restless and roar constantly from morning to night; children in such a situation would be tormented and scream themselves almost to death. The liveliness and forcefulness of apes is directly proportional to their already very highly developed intelligence. It is due to this interconnectedness that human beings are in general capable of much greater suffering than animals, but also of much greater joyfulness<sup>c</sup> in satisfied and happy affects. Similarly, a heightened intellect makes boredom more palpable for people than for animals, but such an intellect also can be an inexhaustible source of

318

<sup>a</sup> *Besonnenheit*

<sup>b</sup> *Leidenschaften*

<sup>c</sup> *Freudigkeit*

amusement when it is highly perfected in an individual. Overall, this appearance of the will in people is to its appearance in higher animals what a musical note is to its fifth pitched two to three octaves lower. But even between the different species of animals the differences of intellect and thus of consciousness are huge and subject to infinite gradations. The mere analogue of consciousness that we must ascribe even to plants is to the much duller subjective being of an inorganic body approximately what consciousness in the lowest animal is to that quasi-consciousness of the plant. The countless gradations of consciousness can be visualized using the image of the different velocities of the various points located at different distances from the centre of a spinning disc. But the most accurate, and indeed as our Third Book teaches, the natural image of these gradations is supplied by the musical scale in its whole range, from the lowest audible note to the highest. It is, however, the degree of consciousness that determines the degree of existence of a being. For all immediate existence is subjective: objective existence is present in the consciousness of another and therefore only for this other, and is therefore entirely mediate. Beings are as differentiated by degree of consciousness as they are equalized by the will to the extent that this is what is common to them all.

319 But what we have seen occurring between plants and animals, and then between the different species of animals, we also find between people. Here too, what is secondary, the intellect, is, owing to the clarity of consciousness and cognition dependent on the intellect, the foundation for a fundamental and incalculably greater difference in the whole mode and thus degree of existence. The greater the level to which consciousness has risen, the more precise and coherent will be the thoughts, and the clearer the intuitions, and the more intimate the sensations. This gives everything more depth: emotions, sorrow, joy and pain. Common fools are not even capable of true joy: they live in a state of stupor. While one person's consciousness presents him with only his own existence along with the motives that must be apprehended for the sake of its sustenance and livelihood in an impoverished and inadequate apprehension of the external world, another person's consciousness might be a *camera obscura* in which the macrocosm unfolds:

He feels within his brain he holds  
A little world, that new unfolds,  
And that begins to act and live,  
That he to others gladly gives.<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> [Goethe, 'Hans Sachsens poetische Sendung' ('Hans Sachs' Poetical Mission') (1776), lines 11–14, in *Vermischte Gedichte (Assorted Poems)*]

The difference between people's whole mode of existence introduced by the extremes of the gradations of intellectual ability is so great that the difference between a king and a day labourer pales in comparison. And here too, as with the species of animals, a connection can be proven between the vehemence of the will and the development of the intellect. A condition for genius is a passionate temperament, and a phlegmatic genius is unthinkable; it seems that an extremely forceful, i.e. violently demanding, will must be present if nature is to create the abnormally superior intellect that is suited to such a will; at the same time, a merely physical account of the same phenomenon points to the greater energy with which the arteries of the head move the brain and increase its turgescence. But of course the other and incomparably rarer condition for genius is the quantity, quality and form of the brain itself. By contrast, phlegmatics usually have very mediocre mental powers: and likewise, the northern, cold-blooded and phlegmatic peoples are in general markedly mentally inferior to the southern, lively and passionate peoples; although, as Bacon\* very aptly remarked, if a northerner is naturally highly talented, the talent can reach a level not seen in southerners. This is why it is as wrong as it is common to measure the comparative mental powers of different nations using the greatest minds of each nation: because this would ground the rule in the exception. Rather, you must look at the great majority in each nation: a single swallow does not a summer make. — We must also note that the passion that conditions genius is connected with his lively apprehension of things in practical life where the will comes into play, especially in sudden events that arouse the affects to such a high degree that the intellect becomes disturbed and confused; while in this situation the phlegmatic still retains the use of his albeit much more limited mental abilities, and hence is capable of much more than the greatest genius. Thus, a passionate temperament is favourable to the original constitution of the intellect, a phlegmatic temperament to its employment. This is why you can only ever have a true genius for theoretical achievements, since the intellect can choose and await its moment, which will be one when the will is completely at rest and there is no ripple to darken the pure mirror of the worldview: by contrast, genius is unsuited to and useless for practical life, and is thus for the most part unhappy. This is the idea behind Goethe's *Tasso*.<sup>a</sup> Just as true genius rests on *absolute* strength of the intellect, which must be purchased

320

\* *De Augmentis Scientiarum* [Francis Bacon, *De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum* (*On the Dignity and Advancement of Learning*) (1623)], Book VI, ch. 3.

<sup>a</sup> [The play *Torquato Tasso* (1790)]

through a correspondingly excessive vehemence of spirit, so the great superiority in practical life enjoyed by generals and statesmen rests on the *relative* strength of the intellect, namely on the highest level of intellect that can be attained without too great an excitation of the affects, along with too great a vehemence of character, and that can therefore stand its ground throughout the storm. Here a very stable will and an imperturbable spirit, along with a

321 first-rate and subtle understanding, is sufficient; and anything in excess of this is harmful, because an over-developed intelligence gets directly in the way of a stable character and decisive will.<sup>61</sup> This is why this sort of distinction in practical life is not so unusual and is a hundred times more common than the other distinction in theoretical life: accordingly, we see great generals and ministers in every era, as soon as external circumstances favour their success; by contrast, we must wait centuries for great poets and philosophers: but it is also true that humanity can be satisfied with these rare appearances: for their works endure and do not exist merely for the present, like the achievements of those others. – It is also fully in keeping with the principle of nature's parsimony, mentioned above, that nature bestows intellectual distinction on very few, and genius only as the rarest of all exceptions, so that the great masses of the human race are equipped with no more mental ability than is required to sustain the individual and the species. For the great needs of the human race, needs that constantly increase by dint of their very satisfaction, make it necessary that the vast majority spend their lives in crude physical and entirely mechanical labour; what use do such people have for a lively mind, a vivid imagination, a subtle understanding, for deep perspicacity? Such things would only make them incompetent and unhappy. Thus nature is the least extravagant with the most precious of its creations. We should use this perspective to calibrate our expectations as to the intellectual achievements of people in general, so as not to judge unfairly. For instance, since people usually become scholars only due to external circumstances, they should be regarded primarily as men whom nature has really intended for agricultural labour: indeed even philosophy professors should be assessed by this measure, and then their accomplishments will meet all reasonable expectations. – It is worth noting that in the south, where the needs of life are less of a burden for the human race and allow for more leisure, the intellectual abilities even of the masses become both more active and more refined. – It is physiologically remarkable that the

322 preponderance of the brain mass over the mass of the spinal cord and nerves which, according to Sömmering's<sup>a</sup> sharp-sighted discovery, gives the truest

<sup>a</sup> [Samuel Thomas Sömmering, *Vom Hirn und Rückenmark* (*On the brain and spinal cord*) (1788)]

measure for the degree of intelligence (in animal species as well as in human individuals), also increases the direct mobility and agility of the limbs because, due to the great inequality of the relation, the dependence of all motor nerves on the brain becomes decisive; and in addition, the qualitative perfection of the cerebellum, the most proximal guide of motion, takes part in the qualitative perfection of the cerebrum.<sup>62</sup> All voluntary movement becomes lighter, faster, and more manageable through both, and by a concentration of the starting points of all activity there arises what *Lichtenberg* praises in *Garrick*, the fact 'that he seemed to be omnipresent in the muscles of his body'.<sup>a</sup> This is why heaviness in the movement of the body signifies heaviness in the movement of thoughts and is seen to be as much a symptom of insipidity as are indolent features or a dull gaze, both in individuals as well as in nations. Another symptom of a stimulated physiological state is the circumstance that many people have to stand still the moment their conversation with a companion becomes coherent; this is because as soon as their brain has knitted a couple of thoughts together, it no longer has enough energy for the motor nerves to keep the legs in motion: that is how close everything is cut with them.<sup>63</sup>

This completely objective way of investigating the intellect and its origin suggests that the intellect's purpose is to apprehend<sup>b</sup> the goals that must be achieved for the sake of the individual life and its propagation, and in no way to reproduce the essence in itself of things and the world as it exists independent of the cognizing being. What light-sensitivity is in plants, leading the plant to grow in the direction of the light, is qualitatively the same as what cognition is in animals, indeed in humans too, even if it is quantitatively much greater, since it is in proportion to what is required in each of these beings. In all of these cases, perception remains a mere awareness of the being's relation to other things, and its function is in no way the presentation of the true, absolutely real essence of things over again in the consciousness of the cognizing being. Rather the intellect, which originates in the will, is set up<sup>c</sup> only for its service, and thus for the apprehension of motives: it is directed to such apprehension, and therefore has a thoroughly practical tendency. This is also true insofar as we conceive the metaphysical meaning<sup>d</sup> of life as ethical: because in this sense too we find that people exercise their cognition only on behalf of their actions. Such a cognitive ability, existing exclusively for practical goals, will by nature only

323

<sup>a</sup> [*Briefe aus England (Letters from England)* (1775–6): to Heinrich Christian Boie, first letter]

<sup>b</sup> zur Auffassung . . . bestimmt ist

<sup>c</sup> bestimmt

<sup>d</sup> metaphysische Bedeutung



ever apprehend the relation of things to each other, not their own essence as it is in itself. But to take the complex of these relations for the essence of the world as it exists as such and in itself, and to take the way in which it necessarily presents itself according to the laws preformed in the brain for the eternal laws of the existence of all things, and then to construct an ontology, cosmology, theology out of them – this was truly the ancient and fundamental error that *Kant's* doctrine brought to an end. Our objective and therefore largely physiological investigation of the intellect fits in nicely with *his* transcendental investigation, indeed even appears in a certain sense as an a priori insight into his doctrine. The latter, from an external perspective, allows us to have a genetic, and hence *necessary*, understanding<sup>a</sup> of what our perspective, proceeding from the facts of consciousness, presents only as fact. For the result of our objective investigation of the intellect is that the world as representation – as it exists spread out over space and time and moving forwards in strict accordance with the rules of causality – is in the first instance only a physiological phenomenon, a function that the brain performs, albeit on the occasion of certain external stimuli, but yet according to its own laws. Accordingly, we must assume that what happens in this function itself, and thus through it and for it, should in no way be considered true for the constitution of *things in themselves*, as they exist independent of this brain function and completely distinct from it; but rather that what happens presents only the workings of this function itself, which can only

324 ever sustain a very subordinate modification by what exists in complete independence of it, and which puts it into motion as a stimulus. Just as *Locke* attributes everything that enters perception by means of *sensation* to the sense organs, so as to deny it to things in themselves; *Kant*, with the same intention but proceeding further along the same path, proved that everything that makes a genuine *intuition* possible – namely space, time and causality – is a function of the brain, although he shied away from this physiological expression to which we are nonetheless led necessarily by our present manner of investigation, proceeding from the opposite side, the real side. *Kant*, along his analytic path, came to the conclusion that what we cognize are mere *appearances*. What this mysterious expression really means becomes clear from our objective and genetic investigation of the intellect: appearances are the motives for the goals of an individual will as they present themselves in the intellect that is produced by the will for the sake of this (the intellect itself *appearing* objectively as the brain); when these motives are apprehended as far as the links in their chain can be traced back, their interconnection

<sup>a</sup> uns . . . erkennen läßt

delivers a world objectively extended in time and space, which I call the world as representation. From our point of view, the sticking point<sup>a</sup> that arises in the *Kantian* doctrine also disappears, namely that because the intellect has no cognition of things as they are in themselves but merely of appearances, and in fact this leads cognition into paralogisms and ungrounded hypostases by means of ‘sophistries’<sup>b</sup> not of human beings but of reason itself, and even the wisest cannot get free of them; perhaps after much effort he may guard himself from error, but he can never be rid of the illusion, which ceaselessly teases and mocks him’<sup>c</sup> – it comes to seem as if our intellect were intentionally determined to lead us into error. For the objective view of the intellect presented here, a view that includes its genesis, makes it clear that intellect, being determined exclusively for practical ends, is the mere *medium of motives*, and thus fulfills its destiny by accurately presenting these motives, and that, if we undertake to construct the essence of things in themselves from the complexity and law-likeness of the appearances presented objectively to us in these, the undertaking must proceed at our own risk and responsibility. We have realized that the original, inner force of nature, devoid of cognition and driving on in the darkness, when it works itself up into self-consciousness, reveals itself as *will*; it reaches this stage only by producing an animal brain, with cognition as a function of this brain, and the phenomenon of the intuitive world then arises in this brain. But now to declare this mere brain phenomenon (along with the conformity to law that invariably belongs to its functions) to be the objective essence in itself of both the world and the things in the world, an essence that is independent of the phenomenon and exists both before and after it, is clearly a leap that nothing justifies us in taking. All of our concepts are created from this phenomenal world,<sup>d</sup> from the intuition that arises under such multifarious conditions, and they acquire their content only from this world, or in fact only in reference to it. This is why, as Kant said, they can be used only immanently, not transcendently: i.e. these concepts of ours, these first materials of thinking, and consequently still more the judgments that arise by connecting them together, are not suited to the task of thinking the essence of things in themselves and the

325

<sup>a</sup> *das Anstößige*

<sup>b</sup> *Sophistikationen*

<sup>c</sup> [*Critique of Pure Reason* A339 / B397, adapted from the Cambridge translation. Schopenhauer’s version is not entirely accurate to the original, which reads ‘sophistries not of human beings but of pure reason itself, and even the wisest of all human beings cannot get free of them; perhaps after much effort he may guard himself from error, but he can never be wholly rid of the illusion (etc.)’]

<sup>d</sup> *mundus phaenomenon*

326 true connection of the world and existence: in fact, such an undertaking is analogous to expressing the cubical content of a body in square inches. For our intellect, originally destined only for the task of presenting petty goals to an individual will, apprehends only *relations* of things and does not penetrate to their interior, their own essence: it is therefore merely a superficial power, stuck on the surface of things and grasping merely transient appearances,<sup>a</sup> not their true essence. It follows from this that we cannot thoroughly understand or comprehend a single thing, not even the least and simplest of things; something absolutely inexplicable remains left over in each one. – Precisely because the intellect is a product of nature and therefore directed only to its own goals, the Christian mystics have very aptly termed it the ‘light of nature’ and have kept it within its limits, because nature is the object for which alone it is the subject. That expression is in fact the basis for the thought that gave rise to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The fact that we cannot comprehend the world directly, i.e. through the uncritical, direct use of the intellect and its data, but instead become more deeply entangled in insoluble mysteries when we think about it, is due to the fact that the intellect, which is to say cognition itself, is already something secondary, a mere product, introduced by the development of the essence of the world, which consequently preceded the intellect up to that point, with the intellect finally emerging as it breaks through into the light from out of the dark depths of a striving devoid of cognition, whose essence presents itself as *will* in the self-consciousness that arises at the same time. What precedes cognition as its condition, making it possible in the first place, and thus consciousness’s own foundation, cannot be immediately grasped by it, just as the eye cannot see itself. Rather, cognition is concerned only with relations between the beings that present themselves on the surface of things, and are such only by means of the operations of the intellect, namely its forms, space, time, and causality. Precisely because the world has made itself without the aid of cognition, its whole essence is foreign to cognition, but cognition already presupposes the existence of the world, which is why its origin does not lie within the purview of cognition. Cognition is therefore limited to the relations between existing things, and this is enough for the individual will, because it arises only in service to this will. For the intellect is, as was shown, conditioned by nature, lies *in* nature, belongs *to* nature, and therefore cannot be opposed to nature as something entirely foreign so as to appropriate its whole essence in a thorough and

<sup>a</sup> *species transitivas*

purely objective manner. It can, if it is lucky, understand everything *in* nature, but not nature itself, at least not directly.

However discouraging this essential limitation is for metaphysics, a limitation that springs from the constitution and origin of the intellect, there is nevertheless another and very consoling aspect to the situation. Specifically, it deprives the direct utterances of nature of their unconditional validity, claims that constitute a genuine *naturalism*. Thus, we can consider first that nature presents every living thing as coming from nothing and, after an ephemeral existence, always returning back to nothing, and indeed nature seems content to keep producing anew so as to be able to keep up this destruction, and is unable to bring to light anything that lasts; second, we must acknowledge that the only permanent thing is *matter* which, uncreated and intransient, brings forth everything from its womb, which is why its name seems to have come from the phrase ‘mother of things’<sup>a</sup> and along with this, as the father of things, the *form*, which – as fleeting as matter is permanent – really changes at every moment and can only sustain itself for as long as it clings parasitically to matter (now to one part of it, at another time to another), but is destroyed if it ever loses hold completely, as the paleotherians and ichthyosaurs attest. In sum, we must certainly acknowledge all this to be the direct and unadulterated utterance of nature; but due to the origin of the intellect (as explained above), and to the resulting *constitution of the intellect*, we cannot consider these utterances as the *unconditional truth*, but only as a thoroughly *conditional* one, which Kant aptly described by calling it *appearance* in contrast to the *thing in itself*. –

327

If, in spite of this essential limitation of the intellect, it becomes possible to gain a certain circuitous understanding of the world and the essence of things – namely, by reflecting at length and by carefully connecting the objective cognition of outward things with the data of self-consciousness – still, this will only be very limited, indirect and relative, a parabolic translation into the forms of cognition and thus a progress to a certain limit<sup>b</sup> which must still leave many problems unsolved. – By contrast, the basic error of all forms of ancient *dogmatism* (which were destroyed by *Kant*) was to proceed simply from *cognition*, i.e. from the *world as representation*, in order to derive and construct<sup>c</sup> existing things from its laws, which meant that it accepted the world of representation with its laws as something simply existing and absolutely real; while the whole existence of

<sup>a</sup> *mater rerum*

<sup>b</sup> *quadam prodire tenus* [Horace, *Epistles* I, I, 32]

<sup>c</sup> *abzuleiten und aufzubauen*

328

this world is fundamentally relative and a mere result or phenomenon of the essence in itself lying at its base, – or, in other words, its error was that it constructed<sup>a</sup> an ontology where it had material only for a dianoiology. Kant discovered the subjectively conditioned and therefore absolutely immanent nature of *cognition* (i.e. the fact that it is unsuitable for transcendent use) from its own conformity to law: which is why he very aptly called his doctrine *critique of reason*. He accomplished this critique in part by proving that a significant fraction of all cognition is a priori, and this, being thoroughly subjective, vitiates all objectivity; and in part by ostensibly showing that when we take the principles of cognition to be purely objective and follow them to their conclusion, they lead to contradictions. But he had too hastily assumed that, apart from *objective* cognition, i.e. apart from the world as *representation*, nothing is given to us other than something like our conscience, from which he constructed what little was left of metaphysics, namely moral theology, but which he accorded only practical and absolutely no theoretical validity. – He had overlooked the fact that even if objective cognition or the world as representation certainly provides nothing but appearances along with their phenomenal connections and regressions, still, our own essence necessarily belongs to the world of things in themselves too, since this is where it must be rooted: and even if the root cannot be directly brought to light, certain data must still be obtainable to explain the connection of the world of appearances to the essence in itself of things. Here then, we find the path along which I have overtaken Kant and the boundaries he drew, while always remaining on the soil of reflection and thus of honesty,<sup>b</sup> and so without the windbag pretext of an intellectual intuition or Absolute Thought that characterized the period of pseudo-philosophy between Kant and myself. In proving that rational cognition is inadequate for grounding the essence of the world, Kant proceeded from cognition as a *fact* provided by our consciousness, and so in this sense, proceeded *a posteriori*. But I have tried to show, both in this chapter, as well as in the essay *On Will in Nature*, what cognition is, given its *essence and origin*, namely something secondary, something established for individual goals: from which it follows that it *must be* inadequate for fathoming the essence of the world; to this extent, I have achieved the same aim a priori. But we cannot have cognition of anything wholly and completely until we have gone completely around it and have reached the starting point on the other side. This is why we must not, like Kant, proceed merely from the intellect to the cognition of the world, even with

329

<sup>a</sup> *konstruierte*

<sup>b</sup> *Redlichkeit*

the vital fundamental cognition under discussion, but also, as I have done here, proceed from the world, taken as existing, to the intellect. This investigation, which is physiological in the broader sense, then becomes the supplement to that ideological investigation, as the French call it, but which is more properly referred to as transcendental.

So as not to interrupt the thread of the discussion above, I delayed analysis of a point upon which I touched: it was the fact that, as the intellect becomes more developed and perfected in the ascending series of animals, *cognition* becomes proportionately more clearly separated from *willing* and thus more pure. The essential point here can be found in my essay *On Will in Nature* under the heading 'Plant Physiology' (pp. 68–72 in the second edition);<sup>a</sup> I refer the reader to this text so as not to repeat myself, and will merely add a few remarks here. Since plants possess neither irritability nor sensibility, and the will objectifies itself in them only as plasticity or the force of reproduction, plants have neither muscles nor nerves. On the lowest level of the animal kingdom, in the zoophytes and specifically the polyps, we cannot yet clearly recognize the division of these two components, but we assume that they are present, even if in an amalgamated state; for we perceive movements that do not stem from mere stimuli, as in plants, but rather from motives, i.e. they take place as a result of a certain perception; that is why we consider these beings to be animals. Now the nervous and muscular systems *separate* from each other with increasing clarity in the ascending series of animals, until the nervous system in the vertebrates, and most perfectly in humans, divides into an organic<sup>64</sup> and a cerebral nervous system, and this latter rises again into the extremely elaborate apparatus of cerebrum and cerebellum, spinal cord, cerebral and spinal nerves, sensible and motor nerve bundles. Of these, only the cerebrum, its associated sensory nerves, and the posterior spinal nerve bundles are there to *receive*<sup>b</sup> motives from the external world. All the other parts are there only to *transmit* motives to the muscles in which the will expresses itself directly. Now, in line with this separation of the nervous from the muscular systems, *motives* are separated more clearly in *consciousness* from the *acts of will* that they produce, i.e. *representations* are separated from the *will*, which increases the *objectivity* of consciousness since representations present themselves in consciousness with greater purity and clarity. Both *separations* however are really only one and the same thing viewed from two sides, namely the objective and the subjective, or first in the consciousness of other things, and then in self-consciousness. But the degree to which they are separated is what ultimately grounds all differences in, and gradations of,

330

<sup>a</sup> [See WN, 381–5 (Hübscher SW 4, 72–7)]

<sup>b</sup> zur Aufnahme . . . bestimmt sind

intellectual abilities, both between different species of animals but also between human individuals: this degree therefore provides the measure for the intellectual perfection of these beings. For clarity of consciousness of the external world, objectivity of intuition, depends on this. In the passages cited above I have shown that animals perceive things only as far as they are *motives* for the animals' will, and that even the most intelligent animals barely go beyond this limit, because their intellect is still too firmly anchored in the will from which it has arisen. On the other hand, even the most obtuse person apprehends things with some degree of *objectivity*, since he does not recognize in them merely what they are in relation to him, but recognizes some aspects of what they are in their own right as well as in relation to other things. Still, there are very few people in whom this reaches the point where they can examine and judge some issue with pure objectivity; instead, on any given occasion their thoughts cut to the quick of 'that's what I have to do, that's what I have to say, that's what I have to think' at which point their understanding finds a welcome rest. For thinking is as intolerable to a weak mind as lifting weights is to a weak arm: that is why both hurry to set it down. There are countless degrees of objectivity of cognition and above all intuitive cognition, based on the energy of the intellect and its separation from the will; the highest degree is *genius*, where the apprehension of the external world is so pure and objective that for it more is directly revealed in the particular things than these things themselves, namely the essence of their entire *species*,<sup>a</sup> i.e. their Platonic *Idea*; the condition for this state is that the will disappears entirely from consciousness. Here is the point where our present, physiologically grounded investigation touches upon the subject of our Third Book, that is to say, the metaphysics of beauty, where true aesthetic apprehension (which at its highest levels is particular only to genius) is described in detail as the state of pure, i.e. fully will-less and thereby perfectly objective cognition. Given what we have said, the increase in intelligence from the dullest animal consciousness up to that of humans is a progressive *detachment of intellect from the will*, which becomes complete, although only as an exceptional case, in *genius*: and thus genius can be defined as the highest degree of *objectivity* of cognition. The condition for this, which is so rarely present, is a decisively greater degree of intelligence than is required for the service to the will that constitutes its foundation: this excess that becomes free is therefore what first becomes truly aware of the world, i.e. apprehends it with perfect *objectivity* and then proceeds to create, write, think accordingly.

<sup>a</sup> *Gattung*

## *On the Objectivation of the Will in Nature Devoid of Cognition*

The fact that the *will* we find within us does not originally stem from cognition, as philosophy has so far assumed, as a mere modification of cognition, which is to say something secondary, derivative, and, like cognition itself, conditioned by the brain; but rather that it is what is prior<sup>a</sup> to consciousness, the kernel of our essence and the primal force that itself creates and maintains the animal body by carrying out its unconscious as well as conscious functions; – this is the first step towards a basic understanding of my metaphysics. As paradoxical as it now seems to many people that the will is in itself devoid of cognition, even the scholastics have realized and recognized this fact to some extent, since *Giulio Cesare Vanini*<sup>b</sup> (that well-known victim of fanaticism and priestly wrath), who was thoroughly versed in scholastic philosophy, said in his *Amphitheatre*,<sup>c</sup> p. 181: ‘the will is a blind power, in the view of the scholastics’<sup>d,65</sup> – The fact that this very same will is what puts the bud in the plant in order to develop it into a leaf or flower, indeed, that the regular form of the crystal is only the remaining trace of its momentary striving, that it underlies all the forces of inorganic nature too as the true and exclusive *automaton*<sup>e</sup> (in the proper sense of the term), playing and acting in all of its manifold appearances, empowering its laws, and making itself known in even the crudest mass as gravity – this insight is the second step in this fundamental understanding, and is introduced by a further reflection. It would be the crudest of misunderstandings to think that this is only a matter of a *word* for describing an unknown quantity: we are in fact articulating the realest

332

\* This chapter relates to § 23 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *das Prius derselben*

<sup>b</sup> *Jull[ius] Cäs[ar] Vaninus*

<sup>c</sup> [*Amphitheatrum aeternae Providentiae Divino-Magicum (Divine-magical amphitheatre of eternal providence)* (1615)]

<sup>d</sup> *Voluntas potentia coeca est, ex scholasticorum opinione* [Exercitatio XXXVIII]

<sup>e</sup> αὐτόματον [self-acting principle]



of all real knowledge.<sup>a</sup> For we are taking what is completely inaccessible to our immediate cognition, and hence what is essentially foreign and unfamiliar, which we describe as a *force of nature*, and reducing it to something with which we are most precisely and intimately acquainted, but which is immediately accessible to us only in our own being; this is why it needs to be transferred from this to other appearances. It is the insight that the inner and primordial element in everything is identical in essence, however different the alterations and movements of bodies may be, and therefore  
 333 that we have only *one* opportunity to get to know it better and directly, namely in the movements of our own body and, recognizing all this, we must call it the *will*. It is the insight that what acts and drives in nature and presents itself in increasingly perfected appearances, after working itself up to the point that the light of cognition falls directly on it – i.e. after it has reached the state of self-consciousness – now stands forth as that *will* with which we are most intimately familiar, and that therefore cannot be explained further by anything else but is instead the explanation for everything. It is accordingly the *thing in itself*, as far it can be reached by cognition. Consequently it is that which must express itself in some way in everything in the world: for it is the essence of the world and the kernel of all appearances.

Since my essay *On Will in Nature* is devoted specifically to the topic of this chapter and also brings in the testimony of unbiased empiricists for this major point of my doctrine, I wish only to add here a few supplemental remarks to what I have said there, and they will be linked together in a somewhat fragmentary fashion.

First of all, with respect to the life of plants, I call attention to the remarkable first two chapters of *Aristotle's* essay on plants.<sup>b</sup> What is interesting about it is, as is often the case with Aristotle, the opinions he quotes of earlier, more profoundly thoughtful philosophers. We see that *Anaxagoras* and *Empedocles* correctly taught that the motions of plant growth came from a *desire* (*epithumia*)<sup>c</sup> intrinsic to plants, indeed that they attribute to plants joy and pain and therefore sensation; *Plato* however acknowledged *only desire* in them, and in fact because of their strong nutritional drive (compare *Plato* in *Timaeus*, p. 403, Bipont).<sup>d</sup> *Aristotle* on the other hand, true to his usual method, skated on the surface of things, restricting himself to isolated characteristics, and claiming, using concepts fixed by current expressions,

<sup>a</sup> *die realste aller Realerkenntnisse*

<sup>b</sup> [*De plantis*: not considered a genuine work by Aristotle]

<sup>c</sup> ἐπιθυμία

<sup>d</sup> [*Timaeus*, 77b]

that there could be no desire without sensation, which plants do not have, and finding himself in an embarrassed position, as his confused language testifies, until here too 'where concepts are lacking, a word comes it at the right moment',<sup>a</sup> namely *to threptikon*,<sup>b</sup> the faculty of nutrition. Plants supposedly have this, and thus a part of the so-called soul, according to his favourite division into the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual soul.<sup>c</sup> This however is simply a scholastic quiddity<sup>d</sup> and amounts to the claim: 'plants nourish themselves because they have the faculty of nutrition';<sup>e</sup> this is therefore a poor substitute for the deeper investigations of the predecessors he criticizes. We also see in the second chapter that *Empedocles* even recognized sexuality in plants, which *Aristotle* then likewise censures, and hides his lack of knowledge about the subject behind universal principles such as the claim that plants could not have both sexes in union, since this would make them more perfect than animals. By an analogous procedure he dismisses the correct Pythagorean astronomical model of the world, and, through his absurd fundamental principles, as he presents them in the books *On the Heavens*<sup>f</sup> in particular, he ushered in the Ptolemaic system, whereby humanity was deprived once more for almost 2,000 years of an already discovered truth of the highest importance.

But I cannot refrain from bringing in the pronouncements of an excellent biologist of our time who is in precise agreement with my doctrine. *G. R. Treviranus*, in his work *On the Appearances and Laws of Organic Life*<sup>g</sup> (1832), vol. 2, section 1, p. 49, says the following: 'We can imagine a form of life in which the effect of the outer on the inner occasions merely the feelings of pleasure and pain, and in consequence of these, *desires*. This is the *life of plants*. In the higher forms of *animal* life, what is external will be sensed as something objective.' *Treviranus* speaks from a pure and unbiased apprehension of nature, and is as little conscious of the metaphysical significance of his pronouncements as he is of the contradiction in terms<sup>h</sup> inherent in the concept of being 'sensed as objective', which he even develops at great length. He does not know that all sensation is essentially subjective, while everything objective is intuition and thus a

<sup>a</sup> [After Goethe, *Faust* I, 1995–96]

<sup>b</sup> τὸ θρεπτικόν

<sup>c</sup> *anima vegetativa, sensitiva, et intellectiva*

<sup>d</sup> *Quidditas*

<sup>e</sup> *plantae nutriuntur, quia habent facultatem nutritivam*

<sup>f</sup> *De coelo*

<sup>g</sup> *Ueber die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des organischen Lebens* [Gottlieb Reinhold Treviranus; the true title lacks Schopenhauer's 'Ueber']

<sup>h</sup> *contradictio in adjecto*

product of the understanding. But this does no harm to what is true and important in his pronouncements.

335 In fact, the truth that the will can also exist even in the absence of cognition is evident, you might say palpable, in the life of plants. For here we see a decisive striving,<sup>a</sup> determined by needs, variously modified, and adapted to different circumstances – but clearly lacking cognition. – And precisely because the plant is devoid of cognition, it displays its genitalia for everyone to see, in complete innocence: it knows nothing of them. On the other hand, as soon as cognition appears in the series of beings, the genitals are removed to a hidden place. This is less the case in humans however, who cover themselves intentionally, being ashamed of their genitals. –

In the first place, the life force is identical to the will: but so are all the other forces of nature as well, although this is less apparent.<sup>66</sup> So although we find, in every era, the more or less clearly articulated acknowledgement that desire, i.e. the will, is the basis of *plant life*, the reduction of the forces of *inorganic* nature to the same foundation becomes less frequent as the distance increases between this and our own essence. – In fact the border between the organic and the inorganic is the most sharply drawn in the whole of nature and is perhaps the only one that cannot be crossed, so that the motto ‘nature makes no leaps’<sup>b</sup> seems to find an exception here. Even if many crystallizations exhibit an outer configuration similar to that of plants, there is still a fundamental difference between the smallest lichen, the lowliest mould, and everything inorganic. In the *inorganic* body what is essential and permanent, which is to say what its identity and integrity are based on, is *matter*; what is inessential and subject to change, on the other hand, is *form*. In *organic* bodies it is the other way around: for its life, i.e. its existence as something organic consists precisely in a constant change of *matter* given the endurance of *form*. The essence of the organic and its identity lies in *form* alone. This is why the *inorganic* body subsists through *rest* and the exclusion of external influences: this is the only way it maintains its existence, and  
 336 when this state is perfect, it can last indefinitely. The *organic* body on the other hand subsists precisely through continuous *movement* and by constantly receiving external influences: as soon as these stop and its movement comes to an end it is dead and thus ceases to be organic, even if the trace of the former organism still lasts for a while. – Accordingly, the talk so fashionable these days about the life of the inorganic, and even the earth, and that this, like the planetary system, is an organism, is completely untenable. Only the organic deserves the predicate life. But every organism is organic through

<sup>a</sup> *Streben*

<sup>b</sup> *natura non facit saltus*

and through, it is organic in all of its parts, and nowhere, not even in its smallest components, are these composed in an aggregated fashion of inorganic elements. If the earth were an organism then all its mountains and fields and the whole interior of its mass would have to be organic, and so nothing inorganic would exist and therefore the whole concept would make no sense.

On the other hand, the fact that the appearance of a *will* is as little tied to life and organic unity<sup>a</sup> as it is to cognition, and that therefore even inorganic things have a will that expresses itself in all of their fundamental qualities (ones that cannot be further explained), this is an essential point of my doctrine, even if traces of such a thought occur much less frequently in previous writers than the doctrine of the will in plants, where it is indeed also devoid of cognition.

In the development of a crystal we see a beginning, an attempt at life, but one that does not succeed because, although it consists of fluidity, like a living thing, this fluidity is not, at the moment of that movement, enclosed in a *skin* as a living thing is, and accordingly a crystal has neither *vesicles* in which that motion can continue, nor anything to divide it from the external world. Thus the momentary motion is instantly gripped by solidification, and only the trace of the motion remains, as the crystal. –

As the title already suggests, Goethe's *Elective Affinities*<sup>b</sup> is based on the idea (although perhaps even unbeknown to Goethe) that the will, the ground of our own essence, is the same thing that announces itself in the lowest inorganic appearances, which is why there is a perfect analogy in the lawlikeness of both appearances.

337

*Mechanics* and *astronomy* truly show us how this *will* behaves when it emerges on the lowest levels of its appearance, as mere gravity, rigidity, and inertia. *Hydraulics* shows us the same thing when rigidity falls away and the fluid matter of its governing passion is now abandoned without restraint to gravity. Hydraulics can, in this sense, be seen as a character sketch of water, since it gives us the expressions of will to which water is moved by gravity: since non-individuated beings have no individual character besides the general, these expressions are precisely fitted to the external influences; thus they can easily be reduced to fixed basic features called laws, which can be noted by experience, and which describe precisely how water, by virtue of its gravity, behaves under all different circumstances, given the unconditional flexibility of its parts and lack of elasticity. Hydrostatics describes how it comes to rest through gravity, hydrodynamics how it can be put into

<sup>a</sup> *die Organisation*

<sup>b</sup> [*Die*] *Wahlverwandschaften* [novel published in 1809]

338

motion, and also considers the obstacles to the will of the water posed by adhesion. The two together constitute *hydraulics*. – Likewise *chemistry* teaches us how the will behaves when the inner qualities of matter are put into free play by the introduction of a state of fluidity, and then we get that marvellous seeking and fleeing, separating and uniting, letting go of one thing so as to grasp another, as is testified by every precipitate,<sup>67</sup> all of which are described as *elective affinity*<sup>a</sup> (an expression borrowed entirely from conscious willing). – But *anatomy* and *physiology* let us see how the will behaves in producing the phenomenon of life and maintaining it for a while. – The *poet*, finally, shows us how the will behaves under the influence of motives and reflection. He presents this for the most part in the most perfect of its appearances, in rational beings whose characters are individual and whose actions and sufferings he portrays for us as drama, epic, novel, etc. The more regular, the more natural the portrayal of his characters comes across, the greater is his fame; and *Shakespeare* therefore is the greatest. – At a basic level, this point of view corresponds to the spirit in which *Goethe* practised and loved the natural sciences; although he was not aware of it in the abstract.<sup>b</sup> I am aware of this from his personal statements more than from his writings.<sup>c</sup>

When we look at the will where nobody denies it exists, which is to say in cognitive beings, we find its fundamental drive is always *self-preservation* of each being: ‘every nature strives to preserve itself’.<sup>d</sup> Every expression of this basic drive<sup>e</sup> can however always be reduced to a seeking or pursuing, and an avoiding or fleeing, as the occasion demands. The very same thing can be shown on even the lowest levels of nature, which is to say of the objectivation of the will, where bodies act only as bodies in general, and are therefore objects of *mechanics*, and only come into consideration through the expressions of impenetrability, cohesion, rigidity, elasticity, and gravity. Here as well, *seeking* shows itself as gravitation, *fleeing* as the reception of motion, and *mobility* of bodies through pressure or impact, which constitutes the basis of mechanics, is fundamentally an expression of the striving for *self-preservation* that is also inherent in them. Since they are impenetrable as bodies, this is the only means of preserving their cohesion, which is to say their existence at any given time. The pushed or pressed body would be crushed by the pushing or pressing if it did not escape the force<sup>f</sup> by fleeing in order to preserve its

<sup>a</sup> Wahlverwandschaft

<sup>b</sup> in abstracto

<sup>c</sup> [Schopenhauer knew Goethe personally in the period 1813–16, and collaborated with him on colour theory]

<sup>d</sup> omnis natura vult esse conservatrix sui

<sup>e</sup> Grundbestrebung

<sup>f</sup> Gewalt

cohesion, and where it is deprived of flight, this really happens. Indeed, you could consider the *elastic* body as the *braver* body that tries to drive back the enemy or at least deprive it of further pursuit. So we see in the only mystery that (along with gravity) remains to mechanics, clear as it is, namely the communication of motion, an expression of the basic striving of the will in all of its appearances, and thus the drive for self-preservation which can be recognized as what is essential, even on the lowest level. 339

In inorganic nature, the will objectifies itself above all in the universal forces, and in the causally produced phenomena<sup>a</sup> of individual things only by means of these forces. In § 26 of the First Volume I provided a sufficient explanation of the relation between cause, natural force, and will as thing in itself. It can be seen from this that metaphysics never interrupts the course of physics, but rather only takes up the threads where physics has left them lying, namely with the original forces that mark the boundary of all causal explanations. This is where the metaphysical explanation begins from the will as thing in itself. With each physical phenomenon, each *alteration* of material things, the *cause* must first be established, which is just another individual *alteration*, one appearing immediately prior to the first; but then the *will* can be recognized as the original *natural force* that enabled this cause to act, and above all as the essence in itself of this force, in contrast to its appearance. Yet this announces itself just as directly in the falling of a stone as in the deeds of a person: the difference is only that its individual expression is the result of a motive in the second case but of a mechanically acting cause in the first, for instance the removal of its support; in both cases however it operates with equal necessity, but in the latter case it is based on an individual character and in the former on a universal force of nature. This identity of the fundamental essence is even apparent to the senses when we look carefully at something like a body thrown off balance which, due to its shape, rolls back and forth for a long time until it finds its balance again, and we are struck by how alive it looks, and we feel immediately that something analogous to the foundation of life is at work here. This is of course the universal natural force which, being in itself identical with the *will*, becomes the soul, as it were, of a very short quasi-life. And so what is identical in the two extremes of the will's appearance announces itself softly even to direct intuition through the feeling it inspires in us that here too, something completely primordial, something that we are familiar with only from the acts of our own will, has come directly to appearance. 340

<sup>a</sup> *durch Ursachen hervorgerufenen Phänomenen*

One can achieve intuitive cognition of the existence and actions of the will in inorganic nature in another and marvellous way, by delving into the problem of the three bodies and thus getting to know the course of the moon around the earth in a more precise and specialized way. Through the different combinations created by the constant change of position of these three astronomical bodies with respect to each other, the course of the moon sometimes accelerates, sometimes slows down, sometimes comes closer to the earth, sometimes moves further away. And this, in turn, is different in the perihelion than in the aphelion of the earth; all of which together make its course so irregular that it looks positively capricious, since even Kepler's second law is no longer inalterably valid as the moon circumscribes unequal areas in equal times. The observation of this course is a small and separate chapter in celestial mechanics, which is sublimely different from terrestrial mechanics due to the absence of impact and pressure (which is to say the force from behind<sup>a</sup> that seems so easy for us to grasp) and even of the actually completed case, since along with the force of inertia,<sup>b</sup> celestial mechanics knows no other moving and directing force than mere gravitation, the longing for unification that comes from within the body itself. Now if we use this particular case to draw for ourselves a detailed picture of the action of gravitation, we recognize clearly and directly in the moving force precisely the same thing that is given in self-consciousness as will. The orbits of the earth and the moon are constantly being altered, since at any given time either one of them is more or less subject to the influence of the sun, given its position; and this is clearly analogous to the influence of newly emerging motives on our will and the consequent modifications of our actions.

341 An illuminating example of another sort is the following. *Liebig* (*Chemistry Applied to Agriculture*,<sup>c</sup> p. 501) says: 'if we bring damp copper into air containing carbonic acid, the affinity of the metal for the oxygen in the air is increased by contact with the acid to the point where they combine: its surface is covered with green carbonic copper oxide. – Now two bodies that are able to combine assume opposite electrical states the moment that they come into contact. Thus when copper is brought into contact with iron, the capacity of copper to bind with oxygen is destroyed through an excitation of a particular electrical state: even under the conditions mentioned above, it remains bright.' – These facts are familiar and of technical utility. I mention them to say that the will of the copper, which

<sup>a</sup> *vis a tergo*

<sup>b</sup> *vis inertiae*

<sup>c</sup> *Chemie in Anwendung auf Agrikultur* [Justus Liebig, *Die Chemie in ihrer Anwendung auf Agricultur und Physiologie* (*Chemistry in its application to agriculture and physiology*), first published in 1840]

is now taken over and preoccupied by the electrical opposition of iron, does not take advantage of the opportunity offered by its chemical affinity for oxygen and carbonic acid. This is precisely the same situation as when a person's will abstains from an action that it would otherwise be moved to perform in order to perform another action for which it has a stronger motive.<sup>68</sup>

In the First Volume I showed that forces of nature lie outside of the chain of causes and effects, since they constitute the universal condition, the metaphysical foundation for the chain, and thus prove eternal and omnipresent, i.e. independent of time and space. Everyone agrees that the essential aspect of a *cause* as such consists in the fact that it will produce the same effect as it does now in every future case as well; and even this uncontested truth entails that there is something in the cause that is independent of the passage of time, i.e. is outside of all time: this is the force of nature that expresses itself in the cause. By focusing on the powerlessness of *time* in the face of the forces of nature, you can to a certain extent empirically and factually convince yourself of the mere *ideality* of this form of our intuition. If for instance a planet is put into a rotating motion through some external cause, then this will last forever unless superseded by some new force. This could not be the case if time were something in itself and had an objective, real existence: for then it would have to effect something too. We see here on the one hand the forces of nature, which express themselves in each rotation and, once they have begun, continue on forever without growing tired or dying out, proving to be eternal or timeless, and therefore existing as simply real and in themselves; and on the other hand *time*, which exists only in the manner in which *we* apprehend that appearance, since it does not exert any power or influences over appearances themselves: because what has no *effect* also does not *exist*.

342

We have a natural tendency to explain every natural appearance *mechanically* if possible; doubtless this is because mechanics makes use of the least number of primitive and therefore inexplicable forces while at the same time including many things that we can cognize a priori, and therefore depends on the form of our own intellect which, as such, entails the highest degree of intelligibility and clarity. In the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*,<sup>a</sup> Kant even reduced mechanical causes to dynamic ones. On the other hand, the application of mechanical explanatory hypotheses beyond what can be proven to be mechanical, which includes for instance

<sup>a</sup> *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* [1786]



acoustics, is completely unjustified, and I will never believe that even the simplest chemical combination or the differences between the three states of aggregation will ever be explained mechanically, much less the properties of light, temperature, and electricity. These will only ever admit of dynamic explanation, i.e. an explanation of appearance from original forces that are completely different from those of impulse, pressure, gravity etc., and are therefore of a higher order, i.e. they are clearer objectifications of the will that becomes visible in all things. I therefore maintain that light is neither an emanation nor a vibration: both views are related to the view that explains transparency by pores, and whose obvious speciousness proves that light is not subject to any mechanical laws. To be immediately convinced on this point you need only look at the effects of a heavy gale, which throws and scatters everything about while a ray of light from a hole in the clouds shines down, completely unshaken and more steadfast than a rock, and we recognize immediately that it belongs to a different order of things than the mechanical: it stands there motionless like a ghost.<sup>69</sup> But even the French attempts to construct light from molecules and atoms are raving absurdities. You can think of the essay on light and heat by the otherwise so clever *Ampère* in the April edition of the *Annals of Chemistry and Physics*<sup>a</sup> (1835) as a blatant expression of this, and indeed the whole of atomism. There, solids, liquids, and elastics are all made up of the same atoms, and any distinctions come only from their aggregation: indeed, it is said that space is certainly infinitely divisible but not matter, because if the division can take place down to the atoms, any further division must take place in the interstices between atoms! There, light and temperature are vibrations of atoms, while sound is a vibration of the molecules made up of atoms. – In truth, atoms are a fixed idea of the French scholars, which is why they talk about them as if they have seen them. You have to wonder why such an empirically inclined nation, such a ‘matter of fact nation’<sup>b</sup> as France is so wedded to a completely transcendent hypothesis that goes well beyond any possibility of experience and feels comfortable enough with this hypothesis to jump to wild conclusions. This is a result of the backward state of the metaphysics they so determinately avoid, which has been poorly represented – with the best will in the world – by the shallow and judgmentally impaired Mr *Cousin*. They are still basically *Lockians*, due to the earlier influence of *Condillac*. This is why they consider the *thing in itself* to be really *matter*, and think that everything in the world must

<sup>a</sup> *Annales de chimie et [de] physique* [‘Note de Monsieur Ampère sur la Chaleur et sur le Lumière [etc.]’ (‘Note by M. [André-Marie] Ampère on heat and light’)]

<sup>b</sup> [Schopenhauer uses the English phrase]

ultimately be explained from its basic properties such as impenetrability, shape, hardness, and other *primary qualities*:<sup>a</sup> they cannot be dissuaded from this, and it is their implicit assumption that matter can only be moved by mechanical forces.<sup>70</sup> In Germany, *Kant's* doctrine permanently blocked the absurdities of the atomistic and completely mechanistic physics: although at the present moment these views prevail here too; which is a result of the shallowness, crudity, and ignorance introduced by Hegel.<sup>71</sup> – But we cannot deny that not only the clearly porous constitution of natural bodies but also two specific doctrines of the most recent physics seem to support the atomic monstrosities: namely Häüy's crystallography<sup>b</sup> which traces each crystal back to its primitive form, this then being a final thing although only *relatively* indivisible; and then *Berzelius's*<sup>c</sup> theory of the *chemical* atoms which are nonetheless merely expressions of relationships of connection, and thus only arithmetical quantities,<sup>72</sup> basically nothing more than counters. – By contrast, *Kant's* thesis in defence of atoms in the Second Antinomy<sup>d</sup> (which of course was only advanced for the sake of the dialectic) is, as I have proven in the critique of his philosophy,<sup>e</sup> a mere sophism, and in no way does our understanding necessarily lead us to the assumption of atoms. Nothing forces me to think of a body's slow but constant and uniform *movement* taking place before my eyes as composed of countless absolutely quick but independent moments interrupted by just as many absolutely short periods of rest. Indeed, I know full well that a thrown stone flies more slowly than a bullet shot, although it does not rest for a moment while it travels. Nor am I forced to think of the mass of a body as consisting of atoms and their intervening spaces, i.e. of absolute density and absolute vacuum: rather, I do not find it difficult to apprehend both phenomena<sup>f</sup> as continua, the one filling *time*, the other filling *space*, and in both cases doing so *uniformly*. But just as *one* motion is nevertheless *faster* than the other, i.e. can pass through more space in the same time, so one body can have more *specific gravity* than the other,<sup>g</sup> i.e. contain more matter in the same space: the difference in both cases rests on the intensity of the effective force; since *Kant* (following *Priestley's* example) correctly reduced matter to forces. – But even if you do not allow this analogy but instead insist that the difference in

344

<sup>a</sup> [Schopenhauer uses the English phrase]

<sup>b</sup> [René Juste Häüy, author of *Essai d'une théorie sur la structure des cristaux* (*Essay on a theory of the structure of crystals*) (1784) and *Traité de cristallographie* (*Treatise on crystallography*) (1822)]

<sup>c</sup> [Jöns Jacob Berzelius, a founder of modern chemistry]

<sup>d</sup> [*Critique of Pure Reason*, A434 / B462 – A436 / B464, the Thesis argument]

<sup>e</sup> [Appendix to WWR I]

<sup>f</sup> *Erscheinungen*

<sup>g</sup> *spezifisch schwerer als der andere seyn*

345 specific gravity can be grounded only in porousness, this assumption would still not lead to atoms but rather merely to a completely dense matter that is unequally distributed in different bodies, which certainly could not be further *compressed* where there are no more pores, but still, like the space that it fills, would always remain infinitely *divisible*; for the fact that it is without pores in no way entails that no possible force can cancel the continuity of its spatial parts. Because to say that this is only possible by extending already present pockets of space is a completely arbitrary assertion.

The assumption of atoms rests on the two phenomena we have mentioned, namely the difference in specific gravity of bodies, and on their compressibility, both of which can be easily explained through the assumption of atoms. But then both would always have to be present to the same degree – which is in no way the case. Water for instance has a much lower specific gravity than all true metals, and would therefore have to have fewer atoms spaced at greater intervals, and consequently be highly compressible: but it is almost completely incompressible.

Atoms could be defended by starting with porousness and saying something like: all bodies have pores, and thus all parts of a body do as well; now if we keep going with this, then all that would ultimately be left of a body would be pores. – The objection would be that what was left over would certainly be without pores and to that extent assumed to be absolutely dense; but not for that reason to consist of absolutely indivisible particles, or atoms: accordingly it would certainly be absolutely incompressible, but not absolutely indivisible; you would then want to claim that a body can only be divided through separations in its pores, which is completely unproven. But if we were to make this assumption anyway, we would indeed have atoms, i.e. absolutely indivisible bodies, which is to say bodies whose special parts are so strongly coherent that no possible force can separate them: such bodies however can be assumed to be large as well as small, and an atom could be as big as an ox, if only it could resist every possible assault.

346 Think of two very different bodies whose pores were all removed by compression, for instance with a hammer or by pulverization: would their specific gravity then be the same? – This would be the criterion of dynamics.<sup>73</sup>

*On Matter*

We already mentioned matter in the fourth chapter of the supplements to the First Book, while examining that aspect of our cognition of which we are a priori conscious. But there we could only examine it from a one-sided perspective, because we were focusing solely on its relation to the forms of the intellect and not to the thing in itself, and so we investigated it only from the subjective side, i.e. to the extent that it is our representation, and not from the objective side, i.e. according to what it might be in itself. In the first regard, our conclusion was that it is *efficacy*<sup>a</sup> in general, apprehended objectively but without more precise determination; this is why it occupies the place of *causality* in the table given there of our a priori cognition. For the material is *activity* (actuality) in general<sup>b</sup> and apart from the specific mode of its action.<sup>c</sup> So matter, merely as such, is not an object of *intuition* but only of *thought*, and therefore a genuine abstraction: in intuition on the other hand it occurs only in connection with form and quality, as a body, i.e. as a fully *determinate* mode of acting. Only by abstracting from these more precise determinations can we think of *matter* as such, i.e. divorced from form and quality: consequently we think of matter as *acting* as such and in general, which is to say, efficacy in the abstract.<sup>d</sup> Any more precisely *determined* action we apprehend as the *accident* of matter: but it is only in this way that matter becomes *intuitive*, i.e. presents itself as a body and object of experience. On the other hand, as I have shown in the critique of Kantian philosophy, pure *matter*, which is the only constituent of the actual and legitimate content of the concept of *substance*, is *causality* itself, conceived objectively and therefore spatially and thus as filling space. Accordingly, the whole essence of matter consists in *acting*: only by acting does it fill space and persist in time: it is nothing

347

<sup>a</sup> *Wirksamkeit*<sup>b</sup> *das Materielle ist das Wirkende (Wirkliche) überhaupt*<sup>c</sup> *seines Wirkens*<sup>d</sup> *die Wirksamkeit in abstracto*

but causality through and through. Thus where there is action, there is matter, and the material is activity in general. – But now causation itself is the form of our *understanding*: since we are as conscious of it a priori as we are of space and time. Thus matter, *to this extent* and this point, belongs to the *formal* part of our cognition, and is therefore causality itself, as the form of the understanding connected to space and time and therefore objectified i.e. apprehended as filling space. (The second edition of the essay *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, p. 77, has a more detailed argument for this doctrine.)<sup>a</sup> But to this extent matter is not really an *object* but rather a *condition* of experience, like pure understanding itself, whose function it is (to this extent). Thus there is only a concept of bare matter, not an intuition: it enters all external experience as one of its necessary components, but cannot be given in any experience; rather it is only *thought*, and indeed as absolutely inert, inactive, formless, and devoid of properties, but nonetheless supporting all forms, properties and activities. Matter is necessarily introduced by the forms of our intellect in which the world presents itself as *representation* and is accordingly the enduring *substrate* of all transitory appearances, and thus of all expressions of natural forces and of all living beings. As such, stemming from the forms of the intellect, it is thoroughly *indifferent* to those appearances, i.e. it is just as ready to bear the one force of nature as the other, as soon as the conditions for this force have come forward under the guidance of causation; while it itself, because its existence is really only *formal*, i.e. grounded in the *intellect* so that it must be thought throughout all that change as something that simply endures, and thus as without beginning or end in time. This is why we cannot relinquish the idea that anything can come from anything else, for instance gold from lead; for all that would be needed for this is to discover and introduce the intermediary states that the intrinsically indifferent matter would need to traverse along this path. We can never see a priori why the same matter that now bears the quality of lead could not at some point come to bear the quality of gold. – Matter, something merely *thought* and a priori, is distinct from true a priori *intuitions*: we can think matter entirely away, but never space and time. But this simply means that we can imagine space and time without matter. For if ever matter is put into space and time, and accordingly thought as *present*, it can no longer be simply thought away, i.e. thought as vanished and destroyed, but only ever as displaced to a different space: to this extent it is just as inseparably linked to our cognitive facilities as space and time themselves. Still, the difference

<sup>a</sup> [FR, 80 (Hübscher SW1, 82–3)]

that it must first be arbitrarily posited as present already indicates that it does not belong to the *formal* component of our cognition as completely and in every respect as space and time, but at the same time contains an element given only a posteriori. It is in fact the point on which the empirical component of our cognition links up with the pure and a priori component, and thus the true foundation stone of the world of experience.

It is only where all a priori pronouncements come to an end, and hence in the *wholly empirical* component of our cognition of the body, which is to say in the form, quality, and determinate manner of its actions, that the *will* manifests itself, something we have already recognized and established as the essence in itself of things. But these forms and qualities only ever appear as properties and expressions of precisely this *matter*, whose existence and essence is based on the subjective forms of our intellect: i.e. they are only visible in, which is to say by means of, these forms. For anything that presents itself to us is only ever *matter* acting in a specifically determined manner. All the determinate ways in which a given body will act come from the inner properties of such matter, properties that do not admit of further explanation; and in fact matter itself is never perceived, but only those effects and the determinate properties at their base; once these properties are separated out, we necessarily add matter in thought as what remains: for given the argument above, it is objectified *causality*<sup>a</sup> itself. — Accordingly, matter is what allows the *will*, which makes up the inner essence of things, to enter perceptibility, becoming intuitive, *visible*. In this sense, matter is the mere *visibility* of the will, or the bond between the world as will and the world as representation. It belongs to the *latter* to the extent that it is the product of the functions of the intellect, to the *former* to the extent that the *will* is what manifests itself in all material beings, i.e. appearances. Hence, every object is, as thing in itself, will; as appearance it is matter. If we could strip a given piece of matter of all the properties it has a priori, i.e. all the forms of our intuition and apprehension; we would be left with the thing in itself, namely what, by means of those forms, comes forth as the purely empirical aspect of matter, which however would no longer itself appear as something extended and active: i.e. we would no longer be faced with matter but with the will. It is precisely this thing in itself or will that emerges as *matter* by becoming appearance, i.e. entering into the forms of our intellect; matter itself is the invisible but necessarily presupposed bearer of properties that it alone makes visible: in this sense, matter is the visibility of the *will*. Accordingly, both *Plotinus* and *Giordano Bruno* were correct not only on

349

<sup>a</sup> *objektivirte Ursächlichkeit*

their own terms but in ours as well when, as already mentioned in Chapter 4, they made the paradoxical claim that matter is not itself extended, and is consequently incorporeal. For it is space, the form of our intuition, that lends matter extension, and corporeality consists in acting, which rests on causality,<sup>a</sup> and therefore on the form of our understanding. By contrast, all determinate properties, which is to say everything empirical in matter, even down to gravity, rest on something that becomes visible only *by means of* matter, on the thing in itself, the will. Gravity is the very lowest level of  
 350 objectivation of the will, which is why it shows itself in *all* matter, without exception, and is thus inseparable from matter in general. Yet because it is a manifestation of the will, it belongs to cognition *a posteriori*, not *a priori*. That is why we can still imagine matter without gravity, but not without extension, or the force of repulsion, or persistence; for then it would lack impenetrability, and hence would not fill space, i.e. would not be *efficacious*.<sup>b</sup> but the essence of matter as such consists precisely in *acting*,<sup>c</sup> i.e. in causality in general; and causality rests on the *a priori* form of our understanding, and cannot therefore be thought away.

Matter is, accordingly, the *will* itself – no longer *in* itself, but rather to the extent that it is *intuited*, i.e. to the extent that it assumes the form of objective representation: and so what is objectively matter is subjectively will.<sup>74</sup> Precisely corresponding to this, our body is only the visibility, objecthood, of our will, as was proven above, and likewise every body is the objecthood<sup>d</sup> of the will at one of its levels. As soon as the will presents itself to objective cognition it enters into the intellect's forms of intuition, into time, space, and causality: then, by virtue of these, it exists as a *material* object.<sup>e</sup> We can imagine form without matter, but not the other way around: for matter denuded of form would be the *will* itself, but this only becomes objective by entering into the mode of intuition of our intellect, and thus only by assuming *form*. Space is the form of intuition of matter,<sup>f</sup> because it is the material<sup>g</sup> of mere form, while matter<sup>h</sup> can only appear in form.

Since the will does become objective, i.e. does pass over into representation, matter is the universal substrate of this objectivation, or rather this

<sup>a</sup> *Kausalität*

<sup>b</sup> *ohne Wirksamkeit wäre*

<sup>c</sup> *Wirken*

<sup>d</sup> *Objektivität*

<sup>e</sup> *ein materielles Objekt*

<sup>f</sup> *Materie*

<sup>g</sup> *Stoff*

<sup>h</sup> *Materie*

objectivation itself in the abstract,<sup>a</sup> i.e. apart from all form. Matter is accordingly the *visibility* of the will in general, while the character of its determinate appearances is expressed in *form* and quality. What *matter* is in appearance, i.e. for representation, is in itself *will*. Thus what is true of it under the conditions of experience and intuition is what is true of the will in itself, and matter reproduces all of the will's relations and properties in a temporal image. Accordingly, it is the *material*<sup>b</sup> of the intuitive world, just as the *will* is the essence in itself of all things. The shapes it can assume are innumerable; but matter is one, just as the will is one in all of its objectivations. Just as the will never objectifies itself as something general, i.e. as the will as such, but only as something particular, i.e. under specific determinations and a given character; similarly, matter never appears as such, but only in connection with some form and quality. In appearance, or objectivation of the will, matter represents the entirety of the will, it itself, which is one in all, just as matter is one in all bodies. Just as the will is the innermost kernel of all appearing beings, matter is the substance that remains after all accidents have been removed. Just as the will is absolutely indestructible in everything that exists; so is matter imperishable in time and persists throughout all alterations. – The fact that matter cannot be intuited or represented for itself, which is to say separated from form, is due to the fact that it is, in itself and as the purely substantial element of bodies, truly the *will* itself; the will cannot be objectively perceived or intuited in itself but only under the conditions of *representation*, taken together, and thus only as *appearance*: under these conditions however it presents itself at once as body,<sup>c</sup> i.e. as matter wrapped in form and quality. The form however is conditioned by space, and the quality or efficacy by causation: both therefore are based on functions of the intellect. Matter without form would be the thing in itself, i.e. the will itself. As we have said, it is only in this way, along a completely objective path, that *Plotinus* and *Giordano Bruno* could claim that matter is in and of itself without extension, and therefore without spatiality, and therefore without corporeality.

So, because matter is the visibility of the will, while every force is will in itself, no force can emerge without a material substrate, and conversely, no body can exist without the forces that inhere in it, which are precisely what constitute its quality. This is what makes it the unification of matter and form that is called material.<sup>d</sup> Force and material are inseparable, because

<sup>a</sup> *in abstracto*

<sup>b</sup> *Stoff*

<sup>c</sup> *Körper* [i.e. physical body]

<sup>d</sup> *Stoff*



352 they are fundamentally the same thing; since, as *Kant* has shown, matter is itself given to us only as the unity of two forces, expansion and attraction. Hence there is no opposition between force and material; rather, they are exactly the same thing.<sup>75</sup>

Now that we have been led to this standpoint by the course of our investigations and have arrived at this metaphysical view of matter, we will readily admit that the temporal *origin* of forms, shapes, and species cannot reasonably be sought anywhere other than in matter. They must at some point have erupted from matter for it is precisely the mere *visibility* of the *will*, which constitutes the essence in itself of all appearances. By coming to appearance, i.e. presenting itself *objectively* to the intellect, matter, as the visibility of the will, takes on form by means of the functions of the intellect. This is why the scholastics said ‘matter strives for form’.<sup>a,76</sup> That all forms of life originated in this way cannot be doubted: it cannot even be thought of in any other way. But since there are now clear and open pathways for the propagation of these forms, and these are secured and maintained by nature with boundless concern and vigilance, the question of whether spontaneous generation<sup>b</sup> takes place can only be decided through experience; here in particular, the adage ‘nature does nothing in vain’,<sup>c</sup> can be argued against it with reference to the pathways to regular propagation. Yet I consider spontaneous generation to be highly probable on the very lowest levels, in spite of the most recent objections to the idea, and certainly mostly with entozoa and epizoa, particularly ones that emerge as a result of specific cachexias<sup>d</sup> of animal organisms; for their life conditions are found only as an exception, and so their type<sup>e</sup> cannot be propagated along the regular pathways, and so must always originate anew when the opportunity presents itself. As soon as the life conditions for the epizoa emerge, due to certain chronic illnesses or cachexias, head lice or crab lice or clothing lice<sup>f</sup> will come along, depending on the circumstances, and entirely on their own and without any eggs, regardless of how complicated the structure of these insects might be. For the decomposition of a

353 living animal body supplies material for higher productions than those generated by hay in water, which merely gives rise to infusoria. Or would you rather believe that epizoa eggs are always hovering around hopefully in the air? – (Horrible to think of!) Instead, let us remember phthiriasis

<sup>a</sup> *materia appetit formam* [after Thomas of Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Part 1, question 2, article II, 4]

<sup>b</sup> *generatio aequivoca* [throughout the passage, Schopenhauer uses the Latin term]

<sup>c</sup> *natura nihil facit frustra*

<sup>d</sup> *Kachexien* [cachexia: weakness or wasting away]

<sup>e</sup> *Gestalt*

<sup>f</sup> *pediculus capitis, oder pubis, oder corporis*

disease, which still occurs.<sup>77</sup> – An analogous case would be when a species finds it can live in conditions that were thus far alien to the place. This is what *Auguste St Hilaire*<sup>a</sup> saw in Brazil after a jungle was burned down: as soon as the ashes were cold, a number of plants of a type that could not be found anywhere around (either nearby or far away) starting growing out of them; and *Admiral Petit-Thouars*<sup>b</sup> has just recently reported to the *Académie des sciences* that a soil is gradually being deposited on the newly formed coral islands in Polynesia that is partly dry and partly submerged in water, and vegetation is gradually seizing control of it, producing trees that are absolutely unique to these islands (*Comptes rendus*,<sup>c</sup> 17 Jan. 1859, p. 147). Wherever decomposition sets in you see mould, fungus, and, in fluids, infusoria. The currently favoured assumption, that spores and eggs of countless species of all types hover in the air all over and wait for many years for a favourable opportunity, is more paradoxical than spontaneous generation. Decomposition is the decaying of an organic body, first into its more *immediate* chemical components, and because these are more or less the same in all living beings, the omnipresent will to life can in these moments gain control over them to beget new beings as circumstances permit; forming themselves purposively, i.e. objectifying their willing in any given situation, these quickly congeal from it like the chick from the liquid of the egg. But when this does not happen, the decomposing material will decay into its *ultimate* components, which are primary chemical elements, and pass into the great cycle of nature. The battle that has been waged against spontaneous generation over the past ten to fifteen years, with its premature declaration of victory, was a prelude to the denial of the life force, and related to this denial. Let us not be taken in by the dogmatic pronouncements and solemn assurances that the matter is decided, the case is closed and universally acknowledged as such. In fact, the whole mechanistic and atomistic view of nature is close to bankruptcy, and its defenders need to learn that there is something more to nature than force and counter-force.<sup>d</sup> The reality of spontaneous generation and the nullity of the bizarre assumption that billions of seeds of every possible fungus and eggs of every possible infusorium are floating around everywhere in the atmosphere at all times, until one or the other of them accidentally finds the medium appropriate to it – has recently (1859) been

354

<sup>a</sup> [Author of works on Brazilian plants (1820s)]

<sup>b</sup> [Abel Aubert Dupetit-Thouars gained territory for France in Polynesia]

<sup>c</sup> [*Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des séances de l'Académie des sciences* (Weekly reports of the sessions of the academy of science)]

<sup>d</sup> *Stoß und Gegenstoß*

thoroughly and successfully established by *Pouchet*<sup>a</sup> to the French Academy, to the great annoyance of the rest of its members.<sup>78</sup>

Our amazement at the thought of forms originating from matter is at base like the amazement of a savage who looks in the mirror for the first time and is astonished by the image of himself that confronts him. For our own essence is the *will*, and its mere *visibility* is matter, which however never emerges other than with *visible things*, i.e. under the cover of form and quality, and is therefore never immediately perceived but only ever added by thought as what is identical in all things throughout all differences in quality and form, and is what is truly substantial<sup>b</sup> in them all. This is precisely why it is more of a metaphysical than a merely physical explanatory principle of things, and to consider all beings as having come from it means explaining them from something very mysterious; only someone who mistakes assaulting for assessing<sup>c</sup> will fail to recognize this. In truth we never look to matter for the ultimate and exhaustive explanation of things, but rather only for the temporal origin of inorganic forms as well as organic beings. – Still it seems that the primal origin of organic forms, the production of species themselves, was almost as difficult for nature to carry out as it is for us to comprehend: this is indicated by the excessive concern nature takes to preserve the species that have come into existence. The will to life has played through the whole scale of its objectivation on three completely separate occasions over the present surface of the planet, in different modulations but also in very different degrees of perfection and completeness. To be specific, the Old World, America and Australia have each famously had its own characteristic, independent series of animals, each completely different from the other two series. The species on each of these great continents are completely different from each other, and yet, because all three belong to the same planet, they are completely analogous and run parallel to each other; thus the genera are for the most part the same. This analogy is very imperfect in Australia, because its fauna is very poor in mammals and has neither predatory animals nor apes: by contrast, the analogy between the Old World and America is striking, even though America is always the weaker partner when it comes to mammals but stronger in birds and reptiles. Thus it is has the advantage of the condor, the macaw, the humming bird, and the great batrachians and ophidians; but, for instance, instead of elephants

<sup>a</sup> [Félix Archimède Pouchet, author of *Hétérogénie ou traité de la génération spontanée* (*Heterogenesis, or treatise on spontaneous generation*) (1859)]

<sup>b</sup> *das eigentlich Substantielle*

<sup>c</sup> *welcher Angreifen mit Begreifen verwechselt*

it has only the tapir; instead of lions, the cougar; instead of tigers, the jaguar; instead of camels, the llama; and instead of true apes, only long-tailed monkeys. We can conclude from this last deficiency alone that nature could not have produced human beings in America, since even on the level immediately below the human level, the chimpanzee and the orangutan or pongo, the step to human beings was still incredibly great. Correspondingly, we find the three races of humans, which arose simultaneously (something that cannot be doubted as such either on physiological or on linguistic grounds), the Caucasian, Mongolian, and Ethiopian, are all at home only in the Old World, while America was inhabited by a mixed or climatically modified Mongolian race that must have come over from Asia. On the surface of the earth immediately prior to the present age there were apes in some places but not human beings.

From the standpoint of our investigation, which allows us to recognize matter as the immediate visibility of the will that appears in all things – and indeed even for merely physical research, following the guide of time and causality, which considers matter as the origin of things – you will easily be led to the question whether, even in philosophy, we could not just as well start from the objective as from the subjective side, and accordingly establish as the fundamental truth the claim: ‘There is absolutely nothing except matter and the forces inherent within it.’ – But with these so lightly inserted ‘forces inherent within it’, we must immediately remember that the presupposition of them leads every explanation back to a fully incomprehensible miracle and stops there, or rather that is where it begins: for any determinate and inexplicable natural force underlying the diverse effects of an inorganic body is no less miraculous than the life force expressing itself in every organic being. I have argued for this in detail in Chapter 17; there I have shown that physics can never be put on the throne of metaphysics, precisely because it leaves untouched both this presupposition and many more; as a result it abandons, from the start, any claim to give a final explanation of things. Further, I must recall the proof of the untenability of materialism given at the end of the first chapter, in that materialism is, as we said, the philosophy of the subject that forgets to account for the subject itself. All these truths however rest on the fact that everything *objective*, everything exterior, since it is only ever perceived and cognized, always remains indirect and secondary, and thus can absolutely never become the final ground of explanation of things or the beginning of philosophy. Philosophy must necessarily originate from something absolutely immediate: but clearly such a thing is only given in *self-consciousness*, in what is interior, in what is *subjective*. This is why *Descartes* performed

356

such a distinguished service by being the first to begin philosophy with self-consciousness. Since then, true philosophers, and most significantly *Locke*, *Berkeley*, and *Kant*, have gone even further down this path, each in his own way, and as a consequence of their research, I became aware of not *one* but *two* completely different data of immediate cognition in self-consciousness, representation and the will, and by using them together you can progress as much further in philosophy as you can in an algebraic task when you have two known quantities rather than only one.

Given what we have said, the inevitable falsity of *materialism* consists first, in the fact that it begins by begging the question,<sup>a</sup> and looked at more closely, this in fact proves to be a first false step.<sup>b</sup> Specifically, it proceeds from the assumption that matter is something simply and unconditionally given, namely something that exists independently of the subject's cognition, and is thus a thing in itself. It attributes to matter (together with its presuppositions, time and space) an *absolute* existence, i.e. one independent of the perceiving subject: this is its basic mistake.<sup>79</sup> If it goes to work honestly, it must leave unexplained (and yet start out from) the qualities inherent in a given matter (i.e. material) together with the natural forces that express themselves in these (including ultimately the life force) as unfathomable occult properties<sup>c</sup> of matter; physics and psychology actually do this too, but that is because they make no claim to providing the ultimate explanation of things. But precisely so as to avoid this, materialism, at least in the forms it has taken so far, has *not* proceeded honestly: it flatly denies all those original forces by seemingly and supposedly reducing them all, and ultimately even the life force, to the merely mechanical efficacy of matter, and thus to expressions of impenetrability, form, cohesion, impulsive force, inertia, gravity, etc., properties that in themselves are admittedly the least inexplicable, precisely because they rest in part on what is *a priori* certain,<sup>d</sup> and thus the forms of our own intellect, which are the principle of all intelligibility. However, materialism completely ignores the intellect, the condition of all objects, and thus of the whole of appearance. It prefers to reduce everything qualitative to something merely quantitative, since it treats the former as mere *form* in contrast to the true *matter*: of all the truly *empirical* qualities it leaves matter only gravity, because it appears in itself as something quantitative, namely as the only measure of the quantity of matter. This path necessarily leads materialism to the

<sup>a</sup> von einer *petitio principii* ausgeht

<sup>b</sup> πρῶτον ψεῦδος

<sup>c</sup> *qualitates occultas*

<sup>d</sup> *auf dem a priori Gewissen*

fiction of atoms, which now become the material from which it thinks it can build the mysterious expressions of all the original forces. But at this point it does not really have anything more to do with the empirically *given*, but rather with a matter that is not to be met with in the nature of things,<sup>a</sup> and is instead a mere abstraction of that true matter; this is a matter that has absolutely no properties other than *material* ones, which, with the exception of gravity, seem as if they can be constructed a priori simply because they rest on the forms of space, time, and causality, and thus on our intellect: materialism sees itself reduced to these impoverished materials for building its castle in the air.

358

At this point it inevitably becomes *atomism*; which was already the case in its childhood, with Leucippus and Democritus, and now, as it enters a second childhood in its old age, it is again the case: with the French because they never got to know Kantian philosophy; and with the Germans because they have forgotten it. And it is in fact even more motley in its second childhood than in its first: not only *solid* bodies are supposed to consist of atoms, but *fluid* ones as well, water, even air, gases and in fact light, which is supposed to be the undulation of a completely hypothetical and utterly unproven ether made up of atoms, the different velocities of which cause colours – a hypothesis that starts from a completely arbitrary and forced analogy with music, just as the Newtonian seven-colour hypothesis of yore did. You have to be incredibly gullible to be persuaded that the countless different tremors of the ether that come from the endless multitude of coloured surfaces in this multi-coloured world, can continually run past each other in every direction, each at a different tempo, without ever disturbing each other; and that such tumult and confusion produces the deeply peaceful spectre of illuminated nature and art. 'Let the Jew Apella believe that!'<sup>b</sup> Certainly the nature of light is a mystery to us: but it is better to admit this than to block the path to future knowledge<sup>c</sup> with bad theories. The fact that light is something completely different from a merely mechanical movement, undulation, or vibration and tremor, indeed, that it is a material in kind,<sup>d</sup> is already proved through its chemical effects, a fine series of which were recently presented at the Academy of Sciences by *Chevreul*, by allowing sunlight to act on differently coloured materials. And the best part of it is that a white roll of paper exposed to sunlight produces the same effects, indeed even after six months

359

<sup>a</sup> *in rerum natura*

<sup>b</sup> *Credat Judaeus Apella!* [Horace, *Satires* I, 5, 100]

<sup>c</sup> *Erkenntnis*

<sup>d</sup> *stoffartig*

during which it was put in a tightly closed metal tube: had the tremors somehow taken a six month break, and now resumed *a tempo*? (*Comptes rendus*<sup>a</sup> from 20 Dec. 1858). – This whole ether-atom-tremor-hypothesis is not only a figment of the imagination, it equals the most annoying aspects of the Democritean hypothesis in brazen boorishness, and these days it is shameless enough to present itself as a confirmed fact, as a result of which it is mechanically repeated as orthodoxy and is believed as gospel by a thousand idiotic scribblers of all disciplines who have no understanding of such things. – The atomic doctrine in general goes even further: soon people will say: ‘Sparta is where you belong, make it proud!’<sup>b</sup> All these atoms are given different perpetual motions, spinning, vibrating, etc., as befits their station: similarly, each atom has its atmosphere of ether, or whatever, and other fantasies of this sort. The fantasies of the Schellingean philosophers of nature and its adherents were usually imaginative, spirited, or at least clever: these on the other hand are clumsy, shallow, poor and awkward, the miscarriages of heads that, first, are really unable to imagine any reality other than a mythical matter without qualities, which would in addition be an absolute object, i.e. an object without subject, and second any activity other than motion and impulse: only these two are comprehensible to them, and they assume a priori that everything comes back to them: for these are their *thing in itself*. To achieve this goal, the life force is reduced to chemical forces (which are insidiously and unjustifiably called molecular forces) and all the processes of inorganic nature are reduced to mechanism, i.e. impulse and counter-impulse. And then in the end, the whole world with all the things in it would be only a mechanical magic trick, like the toys driven by levers, wheels, and sand that portray mining or agricultural work. – The source of the trouble<sup>c</sup> here is that given the quantity of manual labour involved in experimentation, the mental labour of thinking gets out of practice. Crucibles and voltaic piles are supposed to assume its functions: which explains the deep aversion to all philosophy.<sup>80</sup> –

360

We could however take this in a different direction and say that materialism, as seen so far, has failed only because it did not really *understand* the matter with which it wanted to construct the world; and so it used a property-less changeling in place of matter. If it had instead used actual and *empirically* given matter (i.e. material, or rather materials),<sup>81</sup> matter

<sup>a</sup> [See p. 323, n. c. Michel Eugène Chevreul is recorded as presenting results obtained by a M. Niepce de Saint-Victoire]

<sup>b</sup> *Spartam, quam nactus es, orna!* [Stobaeus, *Florilegium (Anthology)*, 39, 10]

<sup>c</sup> *des Uebels*

equipped as it is with all the physical, chemical, and electrical properties, as well as the properties that spontaneously produce life from matter, which is to say, matter as the true mother of things,<sup>a</sup> from whose dark womb crawl forth<sup>b</sup> all appearances and species,<sup>c</sup> only in the end to fall back into it; if only materialism had adopted *this* conception of matter, then it could have constructed a world from it, from matter fully and exhaustively comprehended, from a matter of which materialism need not be ashamed. Quite right: but the trick in this case would be that what we are seeking<sup>d</sup> has been inserted into the data, since we would supposedly be taking bare matter as given and starting our deductions from there, but in fact our given would be all the mysterious forces of nature that are lodged in matter, or more accurately that become visible through it – which would be something like using the word ‘dish’ to mean all the things that lie upon it. For our cognition, matter is really only the *vehicle* of the qualities and natural forces that emerge as its accidents: and precisely because I have traced these back to the will, I call matter the mere *visibility of the will*. But stripped of all these qualities, matter is left behind without properties, as the worthless remains<sup>e</sup> of nature from which nothing can honestly be made. If on the other hand it is *allowed* all of these properties in the way we have described, we will have tacitly begged the question<sup>f</sup> by giving in advance what is being sought<sup>g</sup> as the data. This would make it no longer a true *materialism*, but merely a *naturalism*, i.e. an absolute *physics* which, as was shown in Chapter 17, can never take the place of metaphysics because it starts with so many presuppositions and does not really try to give a fundamental explanation of things. Mere naturalism then is essentially based solely on occult properties;<sup>h</sup> these can only be left behind by appealing to the *subjective* source of cognition, as I have done, and this then of course takes a wide and troublesome detour through metaphysics, since it presupposes a finished analysis of self-consciousness, and of the intellect and will given in self-consciousness. – And since people find it so much more natural and self-evident to start from what is *objective*, which is grounded in clear and comprehensible *outer intuition*, speculative reason necessarily (and indeed initially) succumbs to *naturalism* and consequently *materialism* – this latter

361

<sup>a</sup> *mater rerum*<sup>b</sup> *hervorwinden*<sup>c</sup> *Gestalten*<sup>d</sup> *die Quaesita*<sup>e</sup> *caput mortuum*<sup>f</sup> *eine versteckte petitio principii* begangen<sup>g</sup> *die Quaesita*<sup>h</sup> *Qualitates occultae*



because naturalism, in failing to be exhaustive, fails to be satisfying. This is why we see naturalism at the very beginning of the history of philosophy, in the systems of the Ionian philosophers, after which materialism emerged in the doctrines of Leucippus and Democritus; even later, it keeps cropping up from time to time.

*Transcendent Considerations Concerning  
the Will as Thing in Itself*

Even the merely empirical consideration of nature recognizes a constant transition from the simplest and most necessary expression of some universal force of nature up to human life and consciousness, through steady gradations and boundaries that are merely relative – and indeed for the most part vague and ill-defined. Reflecting more deeply on this insight soon leads to the conviction that in all of these appearances the inner essence, what manifests itself, what appears, is one and the same thing, emerging with ever greater clarity; and that what presents itself in millions of configurations<sup>a</sup> of endless diversity so that it stages the most variegated and baroque theatre piece, one without beginning and end, is this single being,<sup>b</sup> hiding behind all these masks and so tightly wrapped that it does not recognize itself and as a result often treats itself badly. This is why the great doctrine of ‘one and all’<sup>c</sup> emerged early in both the Orient as well as the Occident, and has maintained and even renewed itself despite all opposition. But we are already more deeply initiated into the mystery because the foregoing has led us to the view that, when this being that underlies all appearances is adjoined to a *cognitive consciousness* in some one of these individual appearances, a consciousness that becomes *self-consciousness* by being directed inwards, then this being will present itself to self-consciousness as something both familiar and mysterious, something denoted by the word *will*. Accordingly, we have called that universal basic essence<sup>d</sup> of all appearances the *will* after the manifestation in which it allows itself to be recognized with a minimum of veiling. So the word *will* does not at all refer to some unknown *x*, but on the contrary refers to something more well-known and familiar to us, at least from *one* side, than anything else.

362

<sup>a</sup> *Gestalten*<sup>b</sup> *Wesen*<sup>c</sup> ἓν καὶ πᾶν<sup>d</sup> *Grundwesen*

Let us now recall a truth that is most thoroughly and comprehensively proven in my prize essay *On the Freedom of the Will*, namely that by dint of the law of causality, which holds without exception, the doing or acting of every being in this world always appears as strictly *necessitated* by the causes that elicit the same effects each time they occur. In this respect it makes no difference whether it is causes in the narrowest sense of the word, or stimuli, or finally motives that have called forth this action<sup>a</sup> since this distinction  
 363 refers only to the degree of receptivity of the different sorts of beings. Make no mistake: the law of causality knows no exceptions: everything from the movement of a speck of dust in a sunbeam up to the most considered human deeds is subject to this law with equal rigour. This is why, in the whole course of the world, there is not a speck of dust in a sunbeam that could have traced a different line of flight than the line it has traced, nor anyone who could have acted any differently than he did act: and no truth is more certain than this, that everything that happens, be it small or great, happens with complete *necessity*. Accordingly, at any given point in time, the entire state of all things is firmly and exactly determined by what has immediately preceded it; and so is the stream of time forwards to infinity, and backwards to infinity. Consequently, the course of the world is like that of a clock once it has been assembled and wound: thus, from this incontrovertible point of view, it is a mere machine, whose purpose we cannot guess. Even if someone were to assume a first beginning – and this assumption would be completely unjustified, indeed it would in fact fly in the face of all conceivability, which requires conformity to law – it would alter nothing in essentials. For, at its origin, the arbitrarily posited first state of things would have irrevocably determined and fixed the state to follow, both in general as well as down to the smallest detail, and this would have determined the next, and so on for all eternity,<sup>b</sup> since the causal chain, whose rigour brooks no exception – this iron bond of necessity and of fate – calls forth each appearance, irrevocably and inalterably, just as it is. The distinction merely amounts to the fact that the first case assumes a clockwork that has been wound up at some point, while the other assumes perpetual motion,<sup>c</sup> but the necessity of the progression remains the same. The fact that human behaviour is no exception is something that I have proven irrefutably in the previously mentioned prize essay, by showing how it always arises with strict necessity from two factors, character and the intervening motives: the former is innate and unalterable, the latter is

<sup>a</sup> *Aktion*

<sup>b</sup> *per secula seculorum*

<sup>c</sup> *perpetuum mobile*

necessarily introduced by the thread of causality through the strictly determined course of the world.

Thus, from a perspective that we simply cannot escape (because it is established by the objective and a priori valid laws of the world) the world and everything in it is an aimless<sup>a</sup> and hence incomprehensible game played by an eternal necessity, an unfathomable and inexorable fate.<sup>b</sup> What is shocking, even infuriating, about this unavoidable and irrefutable worldview can only be fully eliminated by the assumption that every being in the world is on the one hand appearance, and necessarily determined by the law of appearance, but on the other hand is in itself *will*, and in fact absolutely *free will*, since any necessity arises only through the forms that belong entirely to appearance, namely through the principle of sufficient reason in its different configurations: but such a will must also be accorded aseity,<sup>c</sup> since, being free, i.e. being the thing in itself and therefore not subject to the principle of sufficient reason, it can as little depend on anything else in its being and essence as it does in its deeds and actions. Only with this assumption is as much *freedom* posited as is needed to maintain the balance with the inescapably strict *necessity* that governs the course of the world. Therefore people really only have the choice either to see the world as a mere machine that necessarily runs down, or to recognize as its essence in itself a free will that does not express itself directly in the effects of things but, in the first instance in their *existence and essence*.<sup>d</sup> This freedom is therefore a transcendental freedom, and coexists with empirical necessity just as the transcendental ideality of appearances coexists with their empirical reality. The fact that only under this assumption are a person's deeds his *own*, in spite of the necessity with which they flow from his character and motives, is shown in my prize essay on the freedom of the will: but with this, *aseity* is ascribed to his essence. The same relation holds for everything in the world. – The strictest *necessity*, carried through honestly with unbending consistency, and the most perfect *freedom*, rising to the level of omnipotence – had to be introduced into philosophy together and at the same time: but this could only be done without injury to truth by locating the whole of *necessity* in *deeds and actions*<sup>e</sup> (*operari*), and the whole of *freedom* on the other hand in *being and essence* (*esse*).<sup>f</sup> In this way a riddle as old as the world is solved, a riddle that is so old only because people have always had the wrong end of

364

365

<sup>a</sup> *zwecklos*

<sup>b</sup> ἄνῳγκη

<sup>c</sup> *Aseitāt* [absolute independence of other things]

<sup>d</sup> *Daseyn und Wesen*

<sup>e</sup> *Wirken und Thun*

<sup>f</sup> [Schopenhauer frequently, as here, juxtaposes the Latin terms *operari* (acting) and *esse* (being)]

the stick, looking for freedom in *operari* and necessity in *esse*. I, on the other hand say: every being, without exception, *acts* with strict necessity, but *exists* and is what it is by virtue of its *freedom*. I include no more and no less freedom and necessity than is to be found in any earlier system, although sometimes the one and sometimes the other shines forth, depending on whether you take exception to attributing *will* to natural processes that have so far been explained by pure necessity, or to according motivation the same strict necessity as mechanical causality. The two have merely changed places: freedom is shifted to the *esse* and necessity limited to the *operari*.

In short, *determinism* stands firm: attempts to dislodge it have been made in vain for the past fifteen hundred years, driven by certain fanciful ideas that people are all too familiar with but dare not call by name. Because of this, however, the world has been turned into a puppet show, with puppets controlled by wires (motives), and we do not even know whose amusement it is for. If the play has a plan, then the director is *fate*; if it has none, then it is blind necessity. – There is no escape from this absurdity except through the recognition that the *being and essence* of all things is already the appearance of a truly *free will*, and one that recognizes itself in this very way, for its *deeds and actions* cannot be saved from this necessity. In order to preserve freedom from fate or chance, it must be displaced from action onto existence. –

Now just as *necessity* belongs only to appearance, not to the thing in itself, i.e. the true essence of the world; so too does *multiplicity*. This has been adequately explained in § 25 of the First Volume. Here I need only  
 366 add a few observations to confirm and illustrate this truth.

There is only *one* being that everyone has unmediated cognition of, and that is his own will in self-consciousness. We have cognition of everything else only indirectly, and we judge it by analogy to our will; an analogy that we carry further in proportion to our level of reflection. Even this self-consciousness arises fundamentally from the fact that there is really *only one being*: the illusion of multiplicity (*mâyâ*) resulting from the forms of external, objective apprehension could not reach into the inner simplicity of consciousness: and so consciousness discovers only a single being.

If we consider the perfection in the works of nature, which we can never sufficiently admire, and which is carried out with such infinite care, such inexhaustible labour even in the last and smallest of organisms, the reproductive parts of plants for instance, or the inner structure of insects, as if the one thing that lies before us were nature's only work, the one on which it was able therefore to expend all its art and power; and if we nonetheless find this one thing repeated infinitely often, in each one of the countless

individuals of each type, and no less carefully perfected in those that live on the most forlorn and negligible speck, one that no eye has ever yet beheld; and if we do now follow the organization of the parts of each organism as far as we can, but without ever running into anything completely simple and hence ultimate, still less into anything inorganic; if, finally, we end up getting lost in our evaluation of the purpose of each of those parts in the make-up of the whole, a purposiveness that makes each living thing, in and of itself, something complete;<sup>a</sup> and if we also think over the fact that each of these masterpieces, even if it is only fleeting, has already been produced anew countless times, and yet every instance of its type, every insect, every flower, every leaf seems to be just as carefully crafted as the first, so that nature never grows tired and starts to falter, but instead perfects the last with the same patient, masterful hand as the first: then we become aware first of all that all human art is quite different from the creation of nature not merely in degree but in kind; and then, that the fundamental active force, the *natura naturans*, is *completely and indivisibly directly present, complete and undivided*, in each of nature's countless works, in the smallest as in the largest, the last as much as the first; and from this it follows that nature, as such and in itself, recognizes neither space nor time. If we further reflect that the production of these hyperboles of all artworks<sup>b</sup> is nevertheless so utterly devoid of any cost on the part of nature, that – with incomprehensible extravagance – nature creates millions of organisms that never reach maturity, and that each living thing is mercilessly abandoned to thousands of accidents; if, conversely, we reflect that nature readily provides (when favoured by chance or guided by human intent) millions of instances of a type where it had previously only given one, so that millions cost it no more than one: all this as well leads us to the insight that the plurality of things is rooted in the subject's mode of cognition and is foreign to the thing in itself, i.e. to the inner fundamental force that announces itself within them; that therefore space and time, the basis of the possibility of all plurality, are merely forms of our intuition: and indeed that even that utterly incomprehensible intricacy of structure, joined to the most reckless wastefulness of the works to which it is applied, arises at base only from the manner in which we apprehend things, because, when the simple and indivisible original striving of the will, as thing in itself, presents itself as an object in our cerebral cognition, it must appear as an artificial concatenation of separated parts, serving as mutual means and ends and executed with supreme perfection.

367

<sup>a</sup> *ein Vollkommenes*

<sup>b</sup> *Kunstgebilde*

Here we are discussing the *unity of will*, which lies beyond appearance and in which we have recognized the essence in itself of the world of appearance. It is a metaphysical unity and thus transcends cognition, i.e. it is not based on the functions of our intellect and thus cannot really be grasped with these functions. Thus it opens an abyss for investigation whose depths do not allow for any completely clear or thoroughly coherent insight but afford only isolated glimpses that let us recognize the unity of the will in this or that relation of things, sometimes by way of subjectivity, sometimes by way of objectivity.<sup>a</sup> This in turn raises new problems, and I do not undertake to solve all of them but instead appeal here too to the idea of an 'advance to a certain limit',<sup>b</sup> and I am more concerned not to put forward anything false or arbitrarily devised than to give a thorough account of everything – even at the risk of providing only a fragmentary presentation.

If we picture to ourselves the brilliant theory of the origin of the solar system proposed first by *Kant* and later by *Laplace* (a theory whose accuracy can hardly be doubted) and think it through clearly, then we see the lowest, crudest, blindest, most rigidly law-bound forces of nature giving rise to the basic structure of the world (and of the future, purposively established dwelling place of countless living beings) by means of the conflict of these forces for one and the same given matter and the accidental results of this conflict – we see this as a system of order and harmony that only grows more astounding the more clearly and precisely we learn to understand it. So for instance, when we come to see that each planet, at its current velocity, can maintain itself only in the precise position where it in fact is, since, if it came nearer the sun it would fall into the sun, and if it were further it would fly away from the sun; and conversely, if we take its position as given, it can only remain at its current velocity and not any other, since if it went faster it would fly away, and if it went slower it would fall into the sun; and that therefore only *one* particular position works for each particular velocity of a planet; we then see that this problem is solved by the fact that the same physical, necessary, and blindly operating cause that assigned a planet to its position imparted to it at the same time and in this very way the only velocity appropriate for this position, as a result of the natural law that states that an orbiting body increases its velocity in proportion to the decrease in the size of its orbit;<sup>82</sup> and besides, if we finally understand that all the mutual disturbances that inevitably occur in the course of the planets must cancel each other out over time, and how this

<sup>a</sup> bald im Subjektiven, bald im Objektiven

<sup>b</sup> est quadam prodire tenus [cf. p. 301, n. b]

fact makes the whole system persist indefinitely; and how it is precisely the irregularity of Jupiter's and Saturn's orbital periods that prevents their mutual perturbations from repeating themselves in the same spot (which would render them dangerous) and how this results in the fact that, appearing rarely and always in a different position, they must cancel each other out, like dissonances in music that resolve themselves once more into harmony. By means of such observations we recognize a purposiveness and perfection such as could only have been brought about by the freest voluntariness<sup>a</sup> guided by the most thorough understanding and the sharpest calculation. And yet, guided by the clear thinking and precise calculations of Laplace's cosmogony, we cannot escape the idea that completely blind forces of nature, working according to unalterable natural laws, could not, through their conflict and in their pointless game with each other, produce anything other than precisely this basic structure of the world, which is like the work of a hyperbolically intensified combination. Instead of following *Anaxagoras* in calling upon the assistance of an *intelligence* that we know only from animal nature and only takes into account the goals of animal nature, and that, coming in from the outside, would have cunningly exploited the existing and given forces of nature and their laws for purposes that are actually foreign to them – if instead of this we recognize that same and single will in those lowest of natural forces themselves, first expressing itself in them and already using them to strive for its ends, working towards its final goal through their primordial laws, a goal that must necessarily serve and correspond to everything that takes place according to the blind laws of nature; we must then also recognize that this cannot take place in any other way, to the extent that everything material is nothing other than the appearance, the visibility, the objecthood, of the will to life,<sup>b</sup> which is one. And thus even the lowest forces of nature themselves are animated by that same will that then, in the individual equipped with an intelligence, is astonished at its own work, just as the sleepwalker is surprised in the morning by what he has done in his sleep, or more accurately like someone who is surprised by his own figure as he sees it in the mirror. The unity established here of the accidental and the intentional, of the necessary and the free, by virtue of which the blindest accidents, which are nevertheless based on universal forces of nature, are as it were the keys on which the world spirit plays its melodies, so imbued with significance – this unity is, as we have said, an abyss for investigation,

370

<sup>a</sup> *die freieste Willkür*

<sup>b</sup> *des Willens zum Leben*



an abyss into which not even philosophy is able to shed a full light but only a glimmer.

I turn now to a *subjective* observation since it belongs here, although I cannot bring as much clarity to this as was the case with the objective considerations just presented because I can only articulate it using image and metaphor. – Why does our consciousness become brighter and clearer the more external it is so that it is clearest in sensuous intuition, which already halfway belongs to things outside of us, – while it becomes more obscure when directed inwards, and when pursued to its innermost, leads into a darkness in which all cognition comes to an end? – I maintain that this is because consciousness presupposes *individuality*, but individuality belongs to mere appearance since, as a plurality of what is the same in kind, it is conditioned by the forms of appearance, time and space. Our interior on the other hand is rooted in what is no longer appearance but thing in itself, where the forms of appearance do not reach, which means that the principal conditions of individuality are lacking and as a result clear consciousness disappears. Here, where existence is rooted, the distinction between beings comes to an end just as the different radii of a sphere disappear in its centre point, and just as the surface of the sphere arises where the radii end and break off, consciousness is likewise possible only where the essence in itself runs out into appearance; consciousness is based on these forms of appearance, which make distinct individuality possible, and it is because of this that consciousness is limited to appearances. Thus all that consciousness finds clear and properly comprehensible lies only on the outside, on that surface of the sphere. On the other hand, as soon as we withdraw completely from this surface, consciousness leaves us too, in sleep, in death, and up to a point in magnetic or magical effects<sup>a</sup> as well, because all of these lead through the centre. But precisely because clear

371 consciousness is conditioned by the surface of the sphere and hence not directed to the centre, it recognizes other individuals as similar to it but not as identical, which they in fact are in themselves. The immortality of the individual would be comparable to a point on the surface running out into the tangent; but immortality due to the eternity of the essence in itself of the whole of appearance is comparable to the return of that point on the radius to the centre, the surface being nothing but the extension of this centre. The will as thing in itself is whole and undivided in every being, just as the centre is an integral part of any given radius: while the peripheral end of this radius is in the most rapid rotation on the surface (which represents

<sup>a</sup> *Wirken*

time and its contents), the other end, at the centre, where eternity lies, remains at the most complete rest because the centre is the point whose rising half is no different from its sinking half. Thus it is said in the *Bhagavadgītā*: ‘Undivided, and yet as if it were divided, it dwells within beings. One must know it as the sustainer, annihilator, and producer of being’<sup>a</sup> (Chapter 13, 16, trans. Schlegel) – Of course we have succumbed to mystical, metaphorical language here: but it is the only one in which anything at all can be said on this completely transcendent theme. So perhaps this simile might also work: let us picture the human race as a composite animal,<sup>b</sup> a life form of which examples are found in many polyps, particularly marine polyps like *Veretillum*, *Funiculina*, and others. Just as each individual animal of this type is distinguished by the head portion, while the lower portion, with the shared stomach, connects them all in the unity of a single life process, so similarly, human individuals are distinguished by the brain with its consciousness, while, by contrast, the unconscious portion, the vegetative life with its ganglion system into which brain consciousness vanishes in sleep like a lotus sinking every night into the waters, is a life shared by all, in virtue of which they can even communicate under exceptional circumstances, for instance, in the direct communication of dreams, or when the thoughts of the magnetist go directly into the somnambulist, or finally in the magnetic or even magical influences that come from intentional willing.<sup>c</sup> Such a thing, when it happens, is wholly different in kind<sup>d</sup> from every other physical influence<sup>e</sup> in being a true action at a distance<sup>f</sup> in which the will, although it certainly issues from the individual, nevertheless performs its actions in its metaphysical capacity as the omnipresent substrate of the whole of nature. It might also be said that sometimes and by way of an exception, a weak remnant of the primal *creative force*<sup>g</sup> that had already extinguished itself in the accomplishment of the present forms of nature,<sup>h</sup> emerges in the phenomenon of spontaneous generation;<sup>i</sup> similarly, there is a remnant of its primal

372

<sup>a</sup> *Haud distributum animantibus, et quasi distributum tamen insidens, animantiumque sustentaculum id cognoscendum, edax et rursus genitale* [Translation by August Wilhelm Schlegel (1823). For Schopenhauer’s copy, see *HN* 5, 320]

<sup>b</sup> *animal compositum*

<sup>c</sup> [For Schopenhauer’s views on such apparent phenomena see *PP* 1, ‘Essay on spirit-seeing and related issues’]

<sup>d</sup> *toto genere verschieden*

<sup>e</sup> *influxus physicus*

<sup>f</sup> *actio in distans*

<sup>g</sup> *Schöpferkraft*

<sup>h</sup> *Gestalten der Natur*

<sup>i</sup> *generatio aequivoca*

*omnipotence*, which accomplished its work (and thereby vanishes) in the presentation and preservation of the organism, and this under exceptional circumstances can become active as something like a *surplus* in such magical effects. In the *Will in Nature* I have spoken at length about these magical properties of the will, and here I will gladly forgo considerations that must call upon uncertain facts which, nonetheless, cannot be entirely ignored or denied.

*On Teleology*

The total purposiveness of organic nature with respect to the continued existence of every being, along with its conformity to the inorganic, cannot be easily accommodated by a philosophical system that does not postulate a *will* at the foundation of the existence of every natural being, a will that therefore expresses its being and striving not in the first instance only in actions but also in the *shape* of the organism that appears. In the previous chapter I merely hinted at the account of this topic that grows out of our train of thought, having already demonstrated it in the passage of the First Volume cited below, and with particular clarity and thoroughness in the *Will in Nature* under the heading 'Comparative Anatomy'. The following remarks will take up from that point.

373

The sense of wonder that threatens to overwhelm us when we consider the endless purposiveness of the structure of organic beings is due fundamentally to the natural but false presupposition that *this agreement* of the parts with each other, with the whole of the organism, and with its goals in the external world, as we apprehend and judge it by means of *cognition*, and thus along the path of *representation*, has also been produced in the same way; hence, that as it exists *for* the intellect, it was also brought about *by* an intellect. Of course, we can produce something that conforms to rule and law,<sup>a</sup> such as is the case with any crystal for instance, only under the guidance of laws and rules, and likewise we can make something purposive only when guided by a concept of the purpose: but there is no justification for transferring this limitation of ours to nature, which is itself something prior<sup>b</sup> to any intellect and whose workings, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, are utterly different in kind from our own. Nature produces things that look so purposive and so deliberate but does this

\* This as well as the following chapter relates to § 28 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> etwas Regelmäßiges und Gesetzmäßiges

<sup>b</sup> ein Prius

374

without deliberation and without a concept of any purpose because it lacks any representation, which has a completely secondary origin. Let us begin by considering things that are merely regular but not yet purposive. The six equal radii of a snowflake, which diverge from each other at equal angles, have not been measured out in advance by any cognition; rather, it is the simple striving of the primal will that presents itself in this way for cognition, once cognition enters the picture. Just as the will brings about this regular figure without mathematics, it can likewise bring about organic figures with a high degree of purposive organization without physiology. Regular spatial forms exist only for intuition, whose form of intuition is space; and similarly, the purposiveness of the organism exists merely for the cognitive rationality, whose deliberation is bound up with the concepts of means and end. If it were possible for us to have a direct insight into the workings of nature, we would have to recognize that the teleological sense of wonder mentioned above is analogous to that of the savage mentioned by *Kant* in his explanation of humour:<sup>a</sup> when the savage<sup>b</sup> saw foam keep bubbling out of a beer bottle and said that he was not surprised that it was coming out, but rather wondered how it had been put in in the first place: we too presuppose that the purposiveness of the products of nature is introduced into them along the same path on which it emerges out of them for us. Thus our teleological surprise can also be compared to the surprise that the first works of book printing excited in those who assumed upon seeing them that they were works of the pen, and thus seized on the assumption of diabolical assistance to explain them. – For, as we have said here many times, it is our intellect that – in using its own forms of space, time, and causality to apprehend the intrinsically metaphysical and indivisible act of will<sup>c</sup> that presents itself in the appearance of an animal as an object – first produces the multiplicity and differentiation of the parts and their functions, and then gets lost in wonder at the perfect agreement and concordance of these parts, which arises from their primal unity; in doing this, the intellect is, in a certain sense, wondering at its own work.

When we give ourselves over to the consideration of the inexpressibly and endlessly crafted<sup>d</sup> structure of any given animal, if only the commonest insect, when we are lost in wonder, then it occurs to us that every day nature recklessly abandons these highly crafted and extremely complex organisms by the thousands to destruction through accidents, animal

<sup>a</sup> [*Kritik der Urtheilskraft* (*Critique of the Power of Judgment*), Ak. 5: 333]

<sup>b</sup> *Wilde*

<sup>c</sup> *Willensakt*

<sup>d</sup> *künstlichen* [cognate with *Kunst*, art]

avarice and human depravity; and then we are amazed by this wanton extravagance. But this reaction is based on an amphiboly of concepts, since we are imagining a work of human art, which is produced by intellectual means, by subduing a foreign, resistant material, which consequently involves considerable effort. By contrast, however crafted the works of nature might be, they cost nature nothing at all because in nature the will to the work is already the work itself, since, as was already said, the organism is merely the visibility of the already present will, brought about in the brain.<sup>83</sup>

375

Given what we have described as the constitution of the organic being, teleology, as the presupposition of the purposiveness<sup>a</sup> of every part, is a perfectly secure guide for the examination of the whole of organic nature; by contrast, from a metaphysical perspective, when it comes to explaining nature beyond the possibility of experience, it can only be used as a secondary and subsidiary explanatory principle, to confirm what has been established by other means: for in this case teleology is one of the problems that must be resolved. – Accordingly, if we find a part of an animal whose purpose we cannot discern, we must never venture to guess that nature has produced it without purpose, perhaps on a whim or for sport. At most, we could think such a thing possible under Anaxagoras' assumption that nature had been arranged by an organizing understanding in the service of a foreign, arbitrary will;<sup>b</sup> but not under the assumption that the essence in itself (i.e. outside of our representation) of any given organism is *its own will* entirely: for then the existence of each part is conditioned by the fact that it serves some function for the will that underlies it, expressing and actualizing some striving of this will and consequently contributing in some way to the preservation of the organism. The will that appears in this organism freely undertakes to live under external conditions, and its whole shape and organization is directed towards its struggle with those conditions: but apart from these two things, nothing can have influenced or determined the organism's form and parts, hence no arbitrary will, no fanciful ideas. Thus everything in an organism must be purposive: and so final causes (*causae finales*) are the guiding thread for understanding organic nature, just as efficient causes<sup>c</sup> (*causae efficientes*) are for the understanding of inorganic nature. This is why, when in anatomy or zoology we cannot find the purpose of some existing part, our understanding takes offence, just as it does in physics when an effect is

<sup>a</sup> Zweckmäßigkeit

<sup>b</sup> fremden Willkür

<sup>c</sup> die wirkenden Ursachen

376 given whose cause remains hidden: and as with the hidden cause, we presuppose the necessity of the purpose and set out to find it, however often we search in vain. This is, for instance, the case with the spleen, whose purpose will be the subject of endless hypotheses until one is proved to be correct. It is the same with the large, spiral-shaped teeth of the babirusa, the horn-like growths on some caterpillars, and others like this. We can judge even negative cases according to the same rule, for instance how it is that in an order as homogeneous as the saurians generally are, a part as important as the bladder can be present in many species and absent in others. Or that dolphins and some related cetaceans have no olfactory nerves at all, while the rest of the cetaceans and even fish do have them.<sup>84</sup> There must be a reason<sup>a</sup> that determines why this is so.

Several actual exceptions to this universal law of purposiveness in organic nature have certainly and most surprisingly been found: still, because they can be accounted for in other ways, the saying 'the exception proves the rule'<sup>b</sup> applies to them. Among the exceptions is the fact that the tadpoles of the Surinam toad have tails and gills even though they do not swim like other tadpoles but await their metamorphosis on their mother's back; that the male kangaroo has a rudimentary form of the bone that in the female bears the pouch; that even male mammals have nipples; that *Mus typhlus*, a rat, has eyes, albeit tiny ones, without an opening for them in its hairy outer skin, which consequently covers them up, and that the Apennine mole as well as two fish, the *Murena caecilia* and *Gastrobranchus caecus* are in the same situation, and likewise the *Proteus anguinus*.<sup>85</sup> These rare and surprising exceptions to what is otherwise such a strict rule of nature, these contradictions into which nature falls with itself, must be explained by the inner connection that exists between the diverse appearances of nature by virtue of the unity of what appears in them, by virtue of  
 377 which it must hint at something in one appearance merely because another connected with it has it in reality. This is why the male animal has a rudimentary form of an organ that is actually present in the female. Just as the difference between the *sexes* cannot abolish the type of the *species* here, so the type of a completely different *order*, for instance the batrachians, asserts itself even where, in particular species (the Surinam toad) one of its characteristics becomes redundant. Even less can nature allow a characteristic that belongs to the type of an entire classification<sup>c</sup> (*Vertebrata*) – such as eyes – to disappear without a trace if it should atrophy, as something

<sup>a</sup> *Grund*

<sup>b</sup> *exceptio firmat regulam*

<sup>c</sup> *Grundabtheilung*

superfluous, in a particular species (*mus typhlus*); even here, there must be at least a rudimentary hint of what it undertakes in all the others.

From here we can even see to a certain extent the basis of that *homology* in the skeleton, in the first place in mammals but more broadly in all vertebrates, as described in such detail by *R. Owen* in particular, in his *Comparative Osteology*.<sup>a</sup> By virtue of this homology, all mammals, for instance, have seven cervical vertebrae, and each bone of the human hand and arm has an analogue in the fins of the whale, while the skull of the bird in the egg has as many bones as that of the human foetus, etc. All this points in fact to a principle independent of teleology, even though it builds on this principle as its foundation or as the material given in advance for it to work on, and is precisely what *Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire*<sup>b</sup> described as the ‘anatomical element’. It is the unity of plan,<sup>c</sup> the fundamental ground type<sup>d</sup> of the higher animal kingdom, the arbitrarily chosen key, as it were, in which nature plays.<sup>86</sup>

The difference between efficient cause (*causa efficiens*) and final cause (*causa finalis*) was correctly described by *Aristotle* (*On the Parts of Animals*,<sup>e</sup> I, 1) with these words ‘There are two types of cause: the final cause and the necessarily efficient cause; and we must account for both as much as possible.’<sup>f</sup> The *efficient* cause is that *through which* something exists, the final cause is that *for which* it exists: temporally, an appearance to be explained has the former *behind* it and the latter *in front* of it. Only in the voluntary<sup>g</sup> actions of animal beings do the two completely coincide, since in this case the final cause, the purpose, enters as a *motive*: but a motive is always the true and genuine *cause* of the action, is utterly and completely the cause that *activates* it, the alteration that precedes it, that calls it forth, and that makes the action come about *necessarily* so that the action could not take place without it (as I have demonstrated in my prize essay on freedom). For, whatever you might wish to insert physiologically between the act of will and the bodily movement, the *will* will always admittedly remain as the thing that moves, and what moves it is the *motive* that comes from the outside, and thus the final cause;<sup>h</sup> which consequently appears in this case as efficient

378

<sup>a</sup> *Ostéologie comparée* [see p. 37]

<sup>b</sup> Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, *Principes de philosophie zoologique* (*Principles of zoological philosophy*) (1830)]

<sup>c</sup> *unité de plan*

<sup>d</sup> *Ur-Grund-Typus*

<sup>e</sup> *De Partibus Animalium*

<sup>f</sup> Δύο τρόποι τῆς αἰτίας, τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ δεῖ λέγοντας τυγχάνειν μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοῖν (*Duo sunt causae modi: alter cujus gratia, et alter e necessitate; ac potissimum utrumque eruere oportet.*) [not an exact quotation, but see 642a14]

<sup>g</sup> *willkürlichen*

<sup>h</sup> *causa finalis*



cause.<sup>a</sup> Besides, we know from our previous remarks that the movement of the body is fundamentally one with the act of will, its mere appearance in cerebral intuition. We are well advised to hold fast to this coincidence of the final cause with the efficient cause<sup>b</sup> in the only appearance with which we are *intimately* familiar, and which therefore remains our primal phenomenon:<sup>c</sup> for it leads us straight to the fact that a *will* is what gives shape to things, at least in organic nature which we cognize only under the guidance of the final causes.<sup>d</sup> In fact, we cannot form a clear thought of a final cause other than as an intentional goal, i.e. a motive. Indeed, if we consider final causes in nature closely, in order to express their transcendent nature we must not shrink from contradiction, but boldly state: the final cause is a motive that acts on a being that is unaware of it. For the termite nests are certainly the motive that has brought forth the toothless jawbone of the anteater as well as the long, threadlike, adhesive tongue; the hard eggshell that holds the young bird captive is certainly the motive for the horny spike on its beak, which it uses to break through the shell, and then discards as no longer useful. And likewise the laws of reflection and refraction of light are the motive for that extraordinarily intricate optical instrument, the human eye, which has calculated exactly according to these laws the transparency of its cornea, the different thicknesses of its three aqueous humours, the shape of its lens, the blackness of its choroid membrane, the sensitivity of its retina, the constriction capacity of its pupil, as well as its musculature. But those motives were already at work before they were perceived: this is how it is, however contradictory it might sound. For this is the transition of the physical into the metaphysical. But we recognize the metaphysical as the *will*, and so we must realize that the same will that stretches the elephant's trunk towards an object is also what has formed it and driven it forward in anticipation of objects. –

This is in agreement with the fact that we appeal entirely to *final causes* when investigating *organic* nature, we look for *them* everywhere, and use *them* to explain everything; *efficient causes* on the other hand occupy a very subordinate position in such investigations, as the mere tools of final causes, and, as with the voluntary movement of the limbs that takes place independently of external motives, are presupposed more than proven. In the explanation of physiological *functions*, we certainly look about for efficient causes, although mostly in vain; in explaining the *origin*

<sup>a</sup> *causa efficiens*

<sup>b</sup> *wirkenden Ursache*

<sup>c</sup> *Urphänomen*

<sup>d</sup> *Endursachen*

of the parts<sup>a</sup> we no longer even try, but make do with the final causes alone: at most we have some universal principle such as the fact that the larger the part is supposed to be, the stronger must be the arteries that supply its blood; but we know absolutely nothing about the genuine *efficient* cause that brings about the eye, for instance, or the ear or brain. Indeed, even in the explanation of mere *functions*, the *final cause* is far more important and relevant than the *efficient*: and so if only the former is known,<sup>b</sup> we are instructed and satisfied as to the main point, whereas the *efficient* cause alone is of little use. For instance, if we were really to know the *efficient cause* of the circulation of blood, which we in fact do not but are still trying to find, this would do us little good without the *final cause*, that blood needs to flow to the lungs for oxidation and flow back for nutrition; on the other hand, if we have the final without the efficient cause, we are greatly enlightened. In addition, I am of the opinion stated above that there really is no efficient cause of the circulation of blood, but that the will is as directly active here as it is in muscular movement, where motives determine it through the mediation of the nervous system,<sup>87</sup> so that even in this case as well, the movement will be brought about directly by the final cause, that is by the need for oxidation of the lungs, which here acts on the blood as something like a motive, but in such a way that cognition no longer intervenes because everything is taking place inside the organism.<sup>88</sup> – The so-called metamorphosis of plants – an idea that was carelessly suggested by *Kaspar Wolff*<sup>c</sup> (and which, under this hyperbolic name,<sup>89</sup> *Goethe* presented as his own production in a pompous and heavy-handed fashion)<sup>d</sup> – is one way in which people try to explain the organic realm using efficient causes, although at bottom it merely claims that nature does not begin at the beginning with each production and create out of nothing, but instead continues writing in the same style, as it were, taking up from what is at hand, using and developing earlier forms and raising them to higher powers in order to further its work, just as it did in the development of the series of animals, entirely according to the rule: ‘nature makes no leaps and does everything in the simplest way’<sup>e</sup> (Aristotle, *Progression of Animals*,<sup>f</sup> chs. 2 and 8). Indeed, explaining the blossom by proving that the form of the leaf is present in all of its parts seems to me almost like explaining the structure of a house by showing that all its parts, stories, turrets, and attics

380

<sup>a</sup> *Theile*

<sup>b</sup> *bekannt*

<sup>c</sup> *Wolf* [see p. 267, n. d]

<sup>d</sup> [*Metamorphosis of Plants*: see p. 58, n. g]

<sup>e</sup> *natura non facit saltus, et quod commodissimum in omnibus suis operationibus sequitur*

<sup>f</sup> *De incessu animalium* [704b15, 708a9]

are made up only of bricks and are merely a repetition of the primal unity of the brick. And it does not seem to me much better, but only more problematic, to explain the skull by means of the vertebrae, although even in this case it is self-evident that the casing of the brain is not absolutely heterogeneous and entirely different from the casing of the spinal cord of which it is the continuation and terminal protrusion, but rather is carried on in the same manner. This whole way of viewing things is part of the homology of R. Owen, mentioned above.<sup>90</sup> – By contrast, the following explanation of the nature of a blossom from its *final cause*, based on that of an Italian (whose name escapes me), seems to me to provide a much more satisfactory account. The purpose of the corolla is (1) protection of the pistil and the stamen; (2) preparation of the refined sap, which is concentrated in the pollen and the germ; (3) separation of the essential oil from the glands at its base, so that this generally aromatic scent covers the anther and pistil, protecting them to some extent from the effects of damp air. – Among the advantages of final causes is also the fact that every *efficient* cause ultimately rests on something unfathomable, namely a natural force, i.e. an occult property,<sup>a</sup> and therefore can only supply a *relative* explanation, while the final cause provides a sufficient and complete explanation, within its sphere. We are of course completely satisfied only when we recognize both the efficient cause, which Aristotle also calls ‘the necessarily acting cause’<sup>b</sup> and the final cause, ‘the cause that aims at what is better’,<sup>c</sup> at the same time, and yet separately, at which point we are surprised by their confluence, the miraculous concordance of the two, by virtue of which the best appears as something entirely necessary and the necessary in turn as if it were merely the best and not necessary at all: for we then start to suspect that both causes, however different their origin, are connected at the root, in the essence of the thing in itself. But such twofold cognition is seldom attainable, in *organic* nature because we seldom know the *efficient* cause, in *inorganic* nature because the *final* cause remains problematic. In the meantime, I would like to illustrate this through a few examples that come within the sphere of my physiological expertise, examples that physiologists might wish to replace with others that are clearer and more relevant. The lice on a Negro are black. Final cause: for their safety. Efficient cause: because they feed on the Negro’s black *rete Malpighii*. – We explain the highly varied and flamingly vivid colours of the plumage of tropical birds, albeit only in general terms, from the strong effect of light in the tropics, as

<sup>a</sup> *qualitas occulta*

<sup>b</sup> ἡ αἰτία ἐξ ἀνάγκης

<sup>c</sup> ἡ χάριν τοῦ βελτίονος

their efficient cause. As final cause I would cite the fact that these colourful plumages are the magnificent uniforms by which individuals of the innumerable species (often belonging to the same genus) recognize each other, so that each male can find its female. The same holds of the butterflies in different zones and latitudes.<sup>91</sup> – It has been observed that consumptive women in the last stages of their illness easily become pregnant, that the illness comes to a standstill during pregnancy, but starts up again after delivery, with greater strength, and usually leads to death; that similarly, consumptive men in their last phase of life usually beget another child. The *final cause* is that nature, always so anxiously concerned with the preservation of the species, wishes quickly to make good the imminent loss of an individual in the prime of life with a new one; the *efficient cause* on the other hand is the unusual excitation of the nervous system during the final stages of consumption. The same final cause explains the analogous phenomenon whereby (according to Oken, *Generation*,<sup>a</sup> p. 65) a fly poisoned with arsenic carries on procreating, from an unexplained drive, and dies in the act of procreation.<sup>92</sup> – The final cause of the pubic hairs in both sexes and of the mound of venus<sup>b</sup> in females is that the pubic bone<sup>c</sup> is not supposed to be felt during copulation, even in very thin subjects, as it might arouse disgust; the *efficient cause* on the other hand is to be found in the fact that wherever a mucus membrane covers the outer skin, hair grows in the vicinity, and also because the head and genitals are to a certain extent opposing poles and thus there are many references and analogues between them, including a covering of hair. – The *same efficient cause* also applies in the case of men's beards: I suspect that their *final cause* is the fact that the pathognomy, that is, the rapid change of facial features that betrays inner changes of mood, is visible mostly in the mouth and its surrounding area, and since this pathognomy is often dangerous in negotiations or sudden accidents, nature (which knows that man is a wolf to man<sup>d</sup>) gave man a beard so that he might escape the prying gaze of his adversary. On the other hand, this could be dispensed with in the case of women, since self-mastery (continence)<sup>e</sup> and the power of disguise are innate in them. – As I have mentioned, I am sure that there are many more striking examples showing how the result of the completely blind workings of nature coincides with the appearance of intentionality, or as *Kant* described it, how the

382

<sup>a</sup> *die Zeugung* [Lorenz Oken, 1805]

<sup>b</sup> *mons veneris*

<sup>c</sup> *ossa pubis*

<sup>d</sup> *homo homini lupus*

<sup>e</sup> *contenance*

383 mechanism of nature coincides with its technique;<sup>a</sup> which indicates that, beyond this difference, the two have a common origin in the will as thing in itself. It would do much to clarify this point of view if you could find, for instance, the *efficient* cause that leads driftwood into the treeless polar regions, or the cause that has concentrated the dry land of the planet in the northern half; while we can see the final cause here is that the winter of this half turns out to be eight days shorter as well as milder because it occurs at the perihelion that accelerates the course of the earth. Still, in considering *inorganic* nature, the final cause is always ambiguous, and, even when the *efficient* cause is found, leaves us doubting whether it is not merely a subjective idea, an illusion that is a function of our perspective. This can be compared to many artworks, for instance great works of mosaic, the theatre decorations and the mosaic of the Apennine god at Pratolino in Florence, which is composed of large masses of rock: all of these are effective only from a distance but disappear at close range, where what becomes visible in their place is the *efficient* cause of the image: but the shapes are really still there and not merely imaginary. Final causes in inorganic nature behave in a similar manner when the *efficient* causes come into view. Indeed, someone with a broad view of things might cede the point when we add that the same thing happens with omens.<sup>b</sup>

If anyone wants to misuse *external* purposiveness (which, as I said, always remains ambiguous) for physico-theological proofs, as happens to this day – although hopefully only with Englishmen – then there are enough examples in this genre that prove the opposite,<sup>c</sup> that is, ateleologies, to discredit the concept for him. One of the strongest of these is offered by the fact that ocean water is undrinkable, as a result of which people are never more in danger of dying of thirst than in the very middle of the great masses of water on their planet. ‘Why does the sea need to be salty?’ you should ask your Englishman.<sup>93</sup>

384 The fact that final causes recede entirely in *inorganic* nature, so that an explanation appealing only to them is no longer legitimate, and *efficient* causes are required instead, is due to the fact that although the will objectifies itself even in inorganic nature, it no longer appears there in individuals that constitute a whole by themselves, but rather appears in natural forces and their operations, where purpose and means end up too far apart from each other for their relation to be clear and for anyone to recognize them as an expression of the will. Up to a point, this is the case

<sup>a</sup> [See *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, § 78 (Ak. 5: 410–15)]

<sup>b</sup> *Ominibus*

<sup>c</sup> *in contrarium*

even in *organic* nature, namely where purposiveness is *external*, i.e. where the end lies in *one* individual and the means in *another*. Nonetheless it cannot be doubted even here, so long as both individuals belong to the same species, indeed, it is then all the more striking. A primary instance of this is the mutually compatible organization of the genitals of the two sexes, but also many of the other things that assist with reproduction, for instance only the non-luminescent male *Lampyrus noctiluca* (glowworm) has wings, so that it can look for the female, while the wingless female, since it only emerges in the evening, possesses a phosphoric light, so that it can be found by the male. However, both sexes of *Lampyrus italica* emit light, which is typical of the luxuriousness of nature in the South.<sup>94</sup> But an example of the sort of purposiveness we are discussing that is striking because it is so specific is the wonderful discovery made by *Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire* in his final years, of the exact nature of the suckling apparatus of cetaceans. Since suckling always requires the activity of respiration, it can only take place in the respiratory medium itself, and not under the water, where, nevertheless, the suckling young of the whale hang from their mother's nipples: but to accomplish this, the entire mammary apparatus of the cetaceans is changed into an injection organ, and, when placed into the mouths of the young, the milk is sprayed in so that they do not need to suckle. — On the other hand, in cases where one individual provides essential aid to another that belongs to a completely different kind, even a different kingdom, we come to doubt this external purposiveness, just as we do with inorganic nature, unless the preservation of the species clearly depends on it. This however is the case with many plants, which can be fertilized only by insects that either carry the pollen to the stigma or bend the stamen to the pistil; the common barberry, many types of irises, and *Aristolochia Clematidis* cannot be fertilized without the help of insects. (*Christian Conrad Sprengel, Uncovered Secret* etc.,<sup>a</sup> 1793. — *Willdenow, Foundations of Herbology*,<sup>b</sup> 353.) Quite a few dioecia, monoecia, and polygamia, such as cucumbers and melons, are in the same situation. There is an excellent description of the mutual support between the plant and the insect world in *Burdach's* great *Physiology*,<sup>c</sup> vol. 1, § 263. He adds, very handsomely: 'This is no mechanical expedient, no stopgap measure, as if nature created plants yesterday and made a mistake that it tried to make good today with insects; it is rather a deeper sympathy between plant and

385

<sup>a</sup> *Entdecktes Geheimniß u.s.w.* [*Das entdeckte Geheimniß der Natur im Bau und in der Befruchtung der Blumen (Nature's uncovered secret in the structure and fertilization of flowers)*]

<sup>b</sup> *Grundriß der Kräuterkunde* [Karl Ludwig Willdenow (*sic*), 1792]

<sup>c</sup> [See p. 254, n. c]

animal kingdoms. It should reveal the identity of both: both of them, children of *one* mother, should exist with each other and through each other.' – And further on: 'But the inorganic world stands in just such a sympathetic relation with the organic,' etc. – A confirmation of this consensus of nature<sup>a</sup> is found in the observation recorded in the second volume of the *Introduction to Entomology*<sup>b</sup> by Kirby and Spence: insect eggs hibernating attached to the branches of the trees that serve as nourishment for their larvae hatch at the very same time the branch begins to bud; thus for instance the birch aphid hatches a month earlier than that of the ash; similarly, insects of perennial plants hibernate on them as eggs, while insects on annuals, since they cannot do this, hibernate in the pupal state. –

386 Three great men have completely rejected teleology, or explanation from final causes, and many petty men have imitated them. The greats are: *Lucretius*, *Bacon of Veralum*, and *Spinoza*. But with all three you can see clearly enough the source of their aversion: namely, that they considered teleology inseparable from speculative theology, and nurtured such an intense dislike for this (even though Bacon prudently sought to conceal it), that they were prepared to go far out of their way to avoid it. We find *Leibniz* too biased by this prejudice, since, in his *Letters to M. Nicause* (*Spinoza's Works*, edited by Paulus,<sup>c</sup> vol. 2, p. 692), he pronounced (with characteristic naïvety) as something self-evident: 'final causes or, what amounts to *the same thing*, the consideration of the divine wisdom in the order of things'.<sup>d</sup> (Like hell it's the 'same thing')<sup>e,95</sup> From the same perspective, we find that even the Englishmen of today, the *Bridgewater Treatise* men, Lord Brougham, etc.,<sup>f</sup> in fact even *R. Owen* in his *Comparative Osteology*,<sup>g,96</sup> think exactly as Leibniz does (which I have already criticized in the First Volume). For all of these people, teleology is at once theology as well, and given any purposiveness recognized in nature, they do not stop to think or try to understand nature, but instead break out at once into childish

<sup>a</sup> *consensus naturae*

<sup>b</sup> [William Kirby and William Spence, *An Introduction to Entomology, or Elements of the Natural History of Insects* (4 vols., London, 1815–26). Schopenhauer cites this work as 'Introduction into Entomology']

<sup>c</sup> *Lettres à M. Nicause (Spinozae Opera, ed. [Henrich Eberhard Gottlob] Paulus* [1802–3])

<sup>d</sup> *les causes finales, ou ce qui est la même chose, la considération de la sagesse divine dans l'ordre des choses* [Schopenhauer's emphasis]

<sup>e</sup> *Den Teufel auch, même chose!*

<sup>f</sup> [Eight treatises by different authors, on 'The power, wisdom, and goodness of God, as manifested in the Creation' (1822–40), commissioned by Francis Henry Egerton, Earl of Bridgewater; Henry Peter Lord Brougham, *A Discourse of Natural Theology* (1835)]

<sup>g</sup> [See p. 37, n.]

cries of ‘design! design!’,<sup>a</sup> and strike up a refrain of their old-maid’s philosophy and block their ears against all rational arguments, such as the great Hume advanced against them.<sup>\*97</sup> What is primarily to blame for this whole English calamity is ignorance of Kantian philosophy which now after 70<sup>98</sup> years has really reached the level of a scandal for English scholars, and this ignorance rests, in turn, at least largely on the terrible influence of the detestable English preacher class,<sup>b</sup> for whom stultification of every sort is their heart’s delight, so that they can keep the otherwise so intelligent English nation imprisoned in the most degrading bigotry: thus, animated by the most abject obscurantism, they opposed popular education, research into nature, and indeed the furtherance of human knowledge in general, with all their might; and through their connections as well as their scandalous and irresponsible mammon, which increases the misery of the people, their influence extends to university scholars and authors who have thus (e.g. Thomas Brown, *On Cause and Effect*)<sup>c</sup> resorted to reticence and prevarications of every sort, simply so as not to obstruct, even from a distance, that ‘cool superstition’ (as *Pückler*<sup>d</sup> very aptly describes their religion) or the current arguments in its favour. –

387

For the three men in question however, since they lived long before the dawn of Kantian philosophy, we must forgive any aversion to teleology, because of its origin; even *Voltaire* thought the physico-theological proof irrefutable. But to enter into more of the details here, first of all *Lucretius*’ polemic (IV, 824–58)<sup>e</sup> against teleology is so crass and crude that it refutes itself and convinces you of the opposite. – As far as *Bacon* is concerned (*De Augmentis Scientiarum* III, 4),<sup>f</sup> first of all he does not distinguish between organic and inorganic nature (which is primarily at issue) with respect to the use of the final cause, since he conflates the two in his examples. Then he banishes final causes from physics into metaphysics: but for him, metaphysics is the same as speculative theology, as it still is

\* Here we can remark in passing that, judging by the German literature since Kant, you would think that the whole of *Hume*’s wisdom consisted in his palpably false scepticism about the law of causality: that is the only thing that gets discussed everywhere. To get to know *Hume*, you must read his *Natural History of Religion* and the *Dialogues on Natural Religion*: it is there that his greatness is visible, and these, along with Essay 20, *On National Character* are the writings that lead him – I can think of no greater token of his fame – to be hated more than anything else by the English preacher class [*Pfaffenschaft*] down to the present day.

<sup>a</sup> [Schopenhauer uses the English term]

<sup>b</sup> *Pfaffenschaft* [*Pfaffen* is a disrespectful term for the clergy]

<sup>c</sup> [*Inquiry into the relation of cause and effect* (1835)]

<sup>d</sup> [Prince Pückler-Muskau, in *Briefe eines Verstorbenen* (*Letters of a deceased*) (1830–1)]

<sup>e</sup> [In *De rerum natura* (*On the nature of things*)]

<sup>f</sup> [See p. 295]



for many people these days. He considers final causes to be inseparable from theology, and goes so far as to criticize *Aristotle* for making much use of final causes (which is something I would straightaway single out for praise) without ever linking them to speculative theology. – Spinoza finally (*Ethics* I, prop. 36, appendix) makes abundantly clear that he identifies teleology with physico-theology, which he bitterly denounces; indeed this identification is so strong that he says of the maxim ‘nature does nothing in vain’<sup>a</sup> that: ‘this means, that is not useful for humans’;<sup>b</sup> and similarly: ‘they regard everything in nature as the means for their own use, and they believe that there is another who arranged these means’;<sup>c</sup> and ‘from this they concluded that the gods have created and directed everything for human use’.<sup>d</sup> This is how he supports his claim: ‘that nature has no goal in mind and that all final causes are nothing more than human inventions’.<sup>e</sup> His concern in all this was simply to bar the way to theism, and he quite correctly recognized theism’s strongest weapon to be the physico-theological proof. But it was reserved for Kant to actually refute it and for me to give the correct interpretation to the material:<sup>f</sup> in this way I have satisfied the maxim: ‘Because the true gives evidence for itself as well as for what is false.’<sup>g</sup> But *Spinoza* did not know how to advance his cause except by the desperate expedient of denying teleology itself, which is to say purposiveness in the workings of nature, a claim that will strike anyone with even a slightly better understanding of organic nature as a monstrosity.<sup>99</sup> Spinoza’s narrow point of view, along with his complete ignorance of nature, is proof enough of his complete incompetence in this matter and the idiocy of those who believe that they must judge final causes with disdain on his authority.

*Aristotle* compares very favourably to these modern philosophers, and really shows his brilliant side here. He approaches nature without bias, knows nothing of physico-theology, has never heard of such a thing and never asked if the world were a product<sup>h</sup> of some sort: in his heart he is free of all this, and he proposes hypotheses (*On the Generation of Animals*,<sup>i</sup> III, 11) concerning the origin of animals and people without falling into any

<sup>a</sup> *naturam nihil frustra agere*

<sup>b</sup> *hoc est, quod in usum hominum non sit*

<sup>c</sup> *omnia naturalia tanquam ad suum utile media considerant, et credunt aliquem alium esse, qui illa media paraverit*

<sup>d</sup> *hinc statuerunt, Deos omnia in usum hominum fecisse et dirigere*

<sup>e</sup> *naturam finem nullum sibi praefixum habere et omnes causas finales nihil, nisi humana esse fragmenta*

<sup>f</sup> *Stoff*

<sup>g</sup> *est enim verum index sui et falsi*

<sup>h</sup> *Machwerk*

<sup>i</sup> *De Generatione Animalium*

physico-theological train of thought. He always says: 'nature creates',<sup>a</sup> never 'nature is created'.<sup>b</sup> After having made a faithful and diligent study of nature, he finds that it always acts in a purposive manner and says: 'we see that nature does nothing in vain' (*On Respiration*,<sup>c</sup> ch. 10) – and in the books *On the Parts of Animals*<sup>d</sup> that contain a comparative anatomy: 'nature makes nothing superfluous nor in vain . . . Nature does everything for the sake of something . . . But we always say "the one is for the sake of the other", when there is plainly some end to which a motion tends; so that it is clear that there is something of the kind that we also call nature . . . Since the body is an instrument; for each of its parts is for the sake of something, and likewise the whole body.'<sup>e</sup> In greater detail on p. 645 and 663 of the Berlin quarto edition – as well as *On the Progression of Animals*,<sup>f</sup> ch. 2: 'Nature creates nothing in vain, but rather always that which is best out of all that is possible for each species of animals by reference to its special condition.'<sup>g</sup> But he explicitly recommends teleology at the end of the books *On the Generation of Animals*,<sup>h</sup> and criticizes *Democritus* for having denied it, which is precisely what *Bacon* in his blindness praises in *Democritus*. But particularly in *Physics*, II, 8, p. 198,<sup>i</sup> Aristotle talks explicitly<sup>j</sup> about final causes and proposes them as the true principle of research into nature. In fact, when considering organic nature, every sound and well-regulated mind not guided by pre-determined opinions must find its way to teleology, although by no means to either physico-theology or the anthropo-teleology criticized by *Spinoza*. –

389

<sup>a</sup> ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ (*natura facit*)

<sup>b</sup> ἡ φύσις πεποιήται (*natura facta est*)

<sup>c</sup> Μάτην ὁρώμεν οὐδὲν ποιούσαν τὴν φύσιν (*naturam nihil frustra facere cernimus*); *de respir[atione]* [476a12. Part of *De juventute et senectute, de vita et morte, de respiratione* (*On youth, old age, life and death, and respiration*), the last part of which was separated out by Becker in the edition Schopenhauer uses]

<sup>d</sup> *de partibus animalium*

<sup>e</sup> Οὐδὲ περιέργον οὐδὲν, οὔτε μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ. – Ἡ φύσις ἕνεκά του ποιεῖ πάντα. – Πανταχοῦ δὲ λέγομεν τόδε τοῦδε ἕνεκα, ὅπου ἀν φαίνεται τέλος τι, πρὸς δὲ ἡ κίνησις περαίνει· ὥστε εἶναι φανερόν, ὅτι ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον, ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν φύσιν – Ἐπεὶ τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον· ἕνεκά τινος γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅλον (*Nihil supervacaneum, nihil frustra natura facit. – Natura rei alicujus gratia facit omnia. – Rem autem hanc esse illius gratia asserere ubique solemus, quoties finem intelligimus aliquem, in quem motus terminetur: quocirca ejusmodi aliquid esse constat, quod Naturam vocamus. – Est enim corpus instrumentum: nam membrum unumquodque rei alicujus gratia est, tum vero totum ipsum.*) [*On the Generation of Animals*, II, 6 (744a36); *On the Soul*, II, 4 (415b16); *On the Parts of Animals*, I, 1 (641b23, 642a11)]

<sup>f</sup> *De incessu animalium*

<sup>g</sup> Ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν ποιεῖ μάτην, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ, ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τῇ οὐσίᾳ, περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ζώου, τὸ ἄριστον (*Natura nihil frustra facit, sed semper ex iis, quae cuique animalium generis essentiae contingunt, id quod optimum est*) [704b15]

<sup>h</sup> *de generatione animalium*

<sup>i</sup> [198b10]

<sup>j</sup> *ex professo*

With respect to *Aristotle* in general, I would like to call attention here to the fact that his teachings are highly inaccurate and of no use with respect to inorganic nature since he incorporates the crudest errors into his fundamental principles of mechanics and physics, something that is all the more unforgivable since the Pythagoreans and Empedocles before him were already on the correct path and had superior teachings. *Empedocles* had already grasped the concept of a tangential force that arises through rotation and counteracts gravity, as we see in Aristotle's second book *On the Heavens*<sup>a</sup> (ch. I, p. 284), even though *Aristotle* then rejects it. But things are quite different when it comes to *Aristotle's* views of *organic* nature: this is his field; here we are amazed at his rich expertise, his sharp observations, and indeed his deep insights. To give only a single example, he already recognized the antagonism between the horns and the teeth of the upper jaw in ruminants, by virtue of which the latter are missing wherever the former are present and vice versa (*Parts of Animals*,<sup>b</sup> III, 2). – Thus also his correct estimation of final causes.

<sup>a</sup> *de coelo* [Book II, I, 284a23]

<sup>b</sup> *De partib[us] anim[alium]*

*On Instinct and Creative Drive<sup>a</sup>*

With the creative drives of animals, it is as if nature wanted to hand the researcher on a plate an explanatory commentary on its operation according to final causes and on the amazing purposiveness of its organic productions that results. For these show us as clearly as possible that beings can work with the greatest decisiveness and determination towards an end they do not recognize, indeed, of which they have no idea.<sup>b</sup> Examples include the bird's nest, the spider's web, the ant-lion hole, the well-crafted<sup>c</sup> beehive, the wonderful termite hill, etc., at least for those individual animals that construct them for the first time, for they would not have been familiar with either the design of the work to be done, or its use. But *organizing nature* works in the very same way, which is why in the previous chapter I paradoxically explained the final cause as a motive that works<sup>d</sup> without cognition. And just as it is the *will* that is obviously and admittedly active<sup>e</sup> in the working<sup>f</sup> of the creative drives, it is in truth the will that is active in the workings of organizing nature too.

One could say that there are two different ways of setting the will of animal beings in motion: either through motivation or through instinct, which is to say from the outside or from the inside, through an external occasion or through an inner drive: the former is explicable because it is external, the latter inexplicable because it is purely internal. Only, looked at more closely, the contrast between the two is not so sharp, indeed at base it turns into a difference of degree. For a motive works only under the assumption of an inner drive, i.e. of a particular constitution of the will, which is termed its *character*: the motive merely gives it a decisive direction on any given occasion – individualizing it for the concrete case at hand.

391

<sup>a</sup> *Vom Instinkt und Kunsttrieb*

<sup>b</sup> *Vorstellung*

<sup>c</sup> *künstliche*

<sup>d</sup> *wirkt*

<sup>e</sup> *das darin Thätige*

<sup>f</sup> *im Wirken*

Likewise instinct, although it is a decisive drive of the will, does not operate only from the inside like an elastic spring, but rather also waits for an external circumstance that it necessarily requires, and determines at least the time when it is expressed: for the migratory bird, it is the time of year; for the nesting bird, it is the occurrence of fertilization and the appearance of material for the nest; for the bee to begin its construction, it is the hive or the hollow tree; and for performance that follows, it is the appearance of many particular circumstances; for the spider, it is a suitable corner; for the caterpillar, it is an appropriate leaf; for the egg-laying insect, it is the location, which is usually very specific and often rare, where the hatching larvae can immediately find food, etc. It follows from this that the instinct is what is primarily active in the operations of the creative drive, although the intellect of these animals is active too in a subordinate way: instinct gives the universal, the rule; intellect gives the particular, the application, by presiding over the details of how the animal carries out its work, which is clearly adapted to the circumstances at hand.<sup>100</sup> Given all this, we can distinguish between instinct and mere character in that an instinct is a character that can only be put in motion by a *very specifically determined* motive, which is why it always leads to the same type of action; whereas the character that is possessed by every species of animal and every human individual, though it is likewise a lasting and immutable constitution of the will,<sup>a</sup> can be set in motion by very different motives and adapts itself to these, which is why the action that proceeds from it can turn out very differently according to its material constitution,<sup>b</sup> although they all bear the mark of the same character, which they therefore express and make manifest; thus the material constitution of the action that expresses the character makes no essential difference to its recognition; *instinct* could therefore be described as an excessively *one-sided* and *strictly determined character*. It follows from this account that determination through mere *motivation* presupposes a certain breadth in the sphere of cognition, and thus a more completely developed intellect; hence motivation is distinctive of the higher animals, and most of all of human beings, while determination through *instinct* requires only as much intellect as is needed to perceive the specifically determined single motive which alone and exclusively provides the occasion for the expression of the instinct – this is why instinct is associated with an extremely limited cognitive sphere and thus as a rule, and to the highest degree,<sup>101</sup> occurs only in animals in the lower classes, particularly insects. Accordingly, since the actions of these animals require

<sup>a</sup> Willensbeschaffenheit

<sup>b</sup> materiellen Beschaffenheit

only an extremely simple and slight external motivation, the medium of motivation, which is to say the intellect or the brain, is only very weakly developed in them, and their external actions are guided largely by the same thing that guides their inner, physiological functions that run on mere stimuli, which is to say the ganglion system. This system is therefore highly developed in them: their main nerve trunk runs under the stomach in the form of two cords which, at each segment of the body, form a ganglion that is often little inferior in size to the brain and is, according to *Cuvier*, an analogue not so much of the spinal cord as of the large sympathetic nerves. Given all this, instinct stands in a certain antagonism to guidance by motives alone, as a result of which the former reaches its maximum in insects while the latter reaches a maximum in human beings; all other animals are put into action by something in between with many levels of gradation according to whether the cerebral or the ganglion system is more predominantly developed. Precisely because the instinctive deeds and artifices executed<sup>a</sup> by insects are largely directed by the ganglion system, we encounter absurdities if we want to regard these as coming from the brain alone, and to explain them accordingly, since we are then using the wrong key.<sup>b</sup> But the same circumstance makes their deeds remarkably similar to those of the somnambulist which are indeed also explained by the fact that the sympathetic nerve rather than the brain has assumed direction of even external actions: hence insects are to a certain extent natural somnambulists. Things that cannot be approached directly must be made clear by an analogy: the analogy just mentioned will do this admirably, if we also bring in as an aid a case mentioned in *Kieser's Tellurism* (vol. 2, p. 250),<sup>c</sup> 'where the command of the magnetizer to the somnambulist to perform a particular action when awake was carried out by the somnambulist as she woke up, without her having any clear memory of the command'. So she felt as if she needed to perform that action, but without really knowing why. This is certainly very similar to what happens with creative drives in insects: the young spider acts as if it has to weave its web, although it has no awareness or understanding of the web's purpose. We can also recall Socrates' daemon, which gave him the feeling that he needed not to do some action expected of him or near at hand without his really knowing why – he forgot the prophetic dream he had about it.<sup>d</sup> There are analogous, very well authenticated cases like this in our day: I will

393

<sup>a</sup> *Kunstverrichtungen*

<sup>b</sup> *einen falschen Schlüssel anlegt*

<sup>c</sup> [See p. 143, n. a]

<sup>d</sup> [cf. Plato, *Apology of Socrates*, 31d, 40a–b]

only recall them briefly. Someone booked a place on a ship: but as it was supposed to sail he simply did not want to be on board, without being conscious of a reason: it sank. Another person goes with his companions to a powder magazine: when he gets close, he absolutely will not go any further, and quickly turns around, seized with fear, without knowing why: the magazine blows up. A third, at sea, feels moved not to get undressed one night, without any reason, but instead lies down on his bed in clothes and boots, and even his glasses: in the night, the ship catches fire and he is one of the few to save themselves in the lifeboat. All this is based on the dull aftereffects of forgotten prophetic dreams and gives us the key to an analogical understanding of instinct and the creative drives.<sup>102</sup>

394 On the other hand, as we have said, the creative drives of insects throw a good deal of light on the workings of the will in the absence of cognition, both in the inner mechanism and in the formation of the organism. For we can easily see, in the anthill or beehive, the image of an organism that has been taken apart and brought into the light of cognition. This is the sense in which *Burdach* says (*Physiology*, vol. 2, p. 22):<sup>a</sup> ‘the forming and giving birth to the eggs is the job of the queen, insemination and care for their development is the job of the workers: in the former, the ovary has become something like an individual, in the latter, the uterus has done the same’. In insect society as in animal organisms the characteristic vitality<sup>b</sup> of each part is subordinated to the life of the whole, and concern for the whole comes before concern for individual existence; indeed, the latter is willed only conditionally, the whole unconditionally: thus individuals are sometimes even sacrificed for the whole, just as we might remove a limb to save the whole body. So for instance if the path of a line of ants is blocked off by water, the ones in front will bravely throw themselves in until their corpses have created a dam for the ants that follow. When the drones become useless they are stung to death. Two queens in a hive are encircled and have to fight each other until one of them loses its life. The mother ant, after the business of fertilization is over, bites off her wings, as they would only interfere with her duty from this point on to care for her newly founded family underground. (*Kirby and Spence*, vol. 1.)<sup>c</sup> Just as the liver wants to do nothing more than secrete gall in the service of digestion, indeed exists only for this purpose, and likewise all other organs, so the worker bee wants nothing more than to collect honey, secrete wax, and build cells for the brood of the queen; the drones want nothing more than to fertilize; the

<sup>a</sup> [See p. 254, n. c]

<sup>b</sup> *vita propria*

<sup>c</sup> [See p. 352, n. b]

queen only wants to lay eggs: thus all the parts work merely for the continued existence of the whole, which alone is the unconditional goal, just as with the parts of the organism. The difference is merely that in the organism the will works completely blindly, in its primordiality;<sup>a</sup> while in insect society the business goes ahead simply by the light of cognition, which, however, can decisively participate or even exercise its own choice only in the accidents of detail, where it helps out and adapts what is to be done to the circumstances. But insects will the overall goal without any cognition of it, just as in the case of organic nature that operates according to final causes: nor is their cognition allowed any choice of means overall, but rather merely the details of how these are to be precisely arranged. But this is precisely why their actions are not at all mechanical; this can be seen most clearly when obstacles are placed in the way of their activity.<sup>b</sup> For instance, the caterpillar spins itself in leaves without an understanding<sup>c</sup> of the goal; but if the cocoon is disturbed, the caterpillar patches it up skillfully. Bees adapt their construction from the very beginning to the circumstances they find themselves in, and they repair subsequent accidents and intentional disruptions in the way most suitable for the particular case<sup>d</sup> (Kirby and Spence, *Introduction to Entomology* – Huber, *Bees*.<sup>e</sup>) Things such as this surprise us because perception of circumstances and adaptation to them are clearly the business of cognition and yet we credit them with the most intricate<sup>f</sup> concern for the coming generation and the distant future, knowing full well that they have not been guided by cognition here because this degree of concern requires brain activity that rises to the level of reason. On the other hand, even the intellect of the lower animals is equal to the task of modifying and arranging details according to given or emergent circumstances because, guided by instinct, it has only to make good any gaps instinct has left. As a result, we see ants taking their larvae away as soon as the location becomes too damp, and again as soon as it becomes too dry: they do not see<sup>g</sup> the goal, and hence are not guided by cognition; but the choice of the moment in time when the location is no longer viable for the larvae, as well as the new location to which they now bring them, are left to their cognition. – Here I want to mention another fact that someone told me from personal experience

395

<sup>a</sup> *Ursprünglichkeit*

<sup>b</sup> *ihrem Treiben* [cf. *Trieb*, drive]

<sup>c</sup> *Kenntniß*

<sup>d</sup> *das für den besondern Fall Zweckmäßigste*

<sup>e</sup> *Des abeilles* [Franz Huber, *Nouvelles observations sur les abeilles* (*New observations on bees*) (1792)]

<sup>f</sup> *künstlichste*

<sup>g</sup> *kennen*



396

(although I have since found that *Burdach* quotes it as coming from *Gleditsch*).<sup>a</sup> To test the burying beetle (*Necrophorus vespillo*), this person had placed a dead frog on the ground and tied it to a string, which was also tied to the top of a rod stuck obliquely into the ground. After several burying beetles dug under the frog, as is their custom, the frog could not sink into the ground, as they expected. After a lot of running back and forth in a state of confusion, they then dug under the rod. – This assistance rendered to instinct and that improvement on the work of the creative drive is what we find, in organisms, as the analogue of the *healing power*<sup>b</sup> of nature, which not only heals wounds, replacing bone and nerve mass in doing so, but also, when a connection is interrupted due to the loss of a branch of a vein or nerve, opens up a new connection by enlarging another vein or nerve, or even by creating new branches; this healing power further assumes the function of a diseased part or function: sharpening one eye after the loss of the other, or sharpening all the other senses after the loss of one, and sometimes even closing an intestinal wound which would in itself be fatal, by augmenting the mesentery or peritoneum;<sup>c</sup> in short, trying to deal with every harm and every disruption in the most sensible manner possible. If on the other hand the harm is completely incurable, this healing power hastens to accelerate death, and all the more so, the higher the type, which is to say the more sensitive the organism. Even this has its analogue in the instinct of insects: wasps that have fed their larvae all summer long with great care and labour from their stolen booty now, in October, seeing the last generation faced with starvation, sting them to death. (Kirby and Spence, vol. 1, p. 374.) Indeed, odder and more specific analogies can be found, for instance these: when the female bumble bee (*Apis terrestris*, *bombylus*) lays eggs, the worker bees are seized with an urge to devour them; this lasts six to eight hours and would be satisfied if the mother did not ward them off and keep careful watch over the eggs. But once this time has elapsed, the worker bees show absolutely no desire to eat the eggs, even if they are offered to them; instead, they now become the avid caregivers and nurturers of the hatching larvae. This can be clearly interpreted as an analogue of childhood diseases, particularly of the teeth, in which it is precisely what will nourish the future organism that now attacks it, frequently costing it its life. – Examination of all these analogies between organic life and instinct, along with the creative drives of lower animals, serves to fortify our conviction that the one like the other is grounded in

<sup>a</sup> [See below, p. 368, n. a]

<sup>b</sup> *Heilkraft*

<sup>c</sup> *Mesenterii* oder *Peritonaei*

the *will*, since it demonstrates, even here, the subordinate role of cognition which, in the operation of the will, is sometimes more and sometimes less restricted, and sometimes falls out of the picture entirely.

397

But the instincts and the organization of animals are mutually illuminating in another respect as well, namely the *anticipation of the future* that emerges in both of them. Instincts and creative drives enable animals to provide for the satisfaction of needs that they do not yet feel, and indeed to do this not only for their own needs but even for those of their future young: they work towards a goal of which they are still unaware. In the case of the silkworm,<sup>a</sup> this can even reach the point of finding and killing in advance the enemies of the future eggs, as I have described in the *Will in Nature* (p. 45 of the second edition, p. 47 of the third).<sup>b</sup> Equally, an animal's future needs and goals are anticipated in its entire embodiment, in the organic tools that will achieve these goals and satisfy these needs; this gives rise to that perfect adaptation of the structure of each animal to its way of life, to the fact that it is equipped with the weapons it needs to attack its prey and repel its enemies, and to that calibration of its entire form<sup>c</sup> to the element and environment that it must enter in its pursuits, all of which I have described in length in the essay *On Will in Nature*, under the heading 'Comparative Anatomy'. – We could refer all of these anticipations, as much in instinct as in the organization of the animal, to the concept of a priori cognition, if they were grounded in *cognition* at all. But as we have shown, this is not the case: their origin is deeper than the realm of cognition, namely in the will as the thing in itself, which as such also remains free of the *forms* of cognition: thus *time* has no significance with respect to it, and it is as close to what will come in the future as it is to what exists in the present.

<sup>a</sup> *Bombex*

<sup>b</sup> [WN, 362 (Hübscher SW 4, 47–8)]

<sup>c</sup> *Gestalt*

## *Characterization of the Will to Life*

Our Second Book concludes with the question of the aim and goal<sup>a</sup> of that will that has proven to be the essence in itself of all things in the world. The following remarks will serve to supplement the broader answer we gave there, by describing the general character of that will.

This sort of characterization is possible because we have recognized the inner essence of the world to be something thoroughly actual<sup>b</sup> and empirically given. By contrast, even the name 'World-Soul' which is used by some to describe that inner essence, gives a mere entity of reason<sup>c</sup> instead: for 'soul' means an individual unity of consciousness that obviously does not accrue to that essence, and quite generally the concept of 'soul' is unjustified and therefore useless, because it hypostasizes cognition and willing into an inseparable connection that is thereby independent of the animal organism. The word should only ever be used figuratively because it is by no means as innocent as *psuché*<sup>d</sup> or *anima*, which mean 'breath'. –

The so-called pantheists however use even less appropriate forms of expression: their whole philosophy consists primarily in calling the inner essence of the world, of which they have no understanding, 'God'; and they think of this as a great achievement. According to this view, the world would then be a theophany. But cast only one single glance at this world of beings in constant need, continuing to existing for some stretch of time only by eating each other, passing their existence in fear and want and often enduring horrible suffering until finally flinging themselves into the arms of death: whoever keeps this clearly in view will allow that Aristotle is right when he says 'nature is demonic, not

\* This chapter relates to § 29 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *Ziel und Zweck*

<sup>b</sup> *Wirkliches*

<sup>c</sup> *ens rationis*

<sup>d</sup> ψυχή

divine' (*On Divination in Sleep*,<sup>a</sup> ch. 2, p. 463); indeed, he must admit that a god who would presume to be transformed into such a world really must have been plagued by the devil. – I know full well that supposed philosophers of this century<sup>103</sup> emulate *Spinoza* and think they are justified in doing so. But *Spinoza* had special reasons for calling his unitary substance 'God' so as to salvage at least the word if not the thing. The memory of Giordano Bruno and Vanini being burnt to death at the stake was still fresh: these men too had been sacrificed for this God who has had incomparably more human sacrifices than on the altars of all the heathen gods of both hemispheres put together. If therefore *Spinoza* calls the world 'God', he is doing the same thing as *Rousseau*, in the *Social Contract*,<sup>b</sup> who continues to describe the populace as *the sovereign*.<sup>c</sup> we could also compare it with the situation of a prince who planned to abolish the nobility in his country and who struck upon the thought of ennobling all of his subjects in order not to deprive anyone of his title. The sages of our day certainly have another but no more cogent reason for using the name in question. In their philosophies, none of them start with the world or our consciousness of the world, but with God as something given and familiar: he is not what they are seeking,<sup>d</sup> but rather their given datum.<sup>e</sup> If they were boys, I would show them that this begs the question:<sup>f</sup> but they know this as well as I do. However, after *Kant* proved that the path taken by earlier, honest dogmatism from the world to God does not in fact lead to God, these gentlemen now think they have found a subtle way out, which they slyly take. Readers in future times must forgive me for talking about people with whom they are not familiar.

The philosopher's task is to explain the world, and every view of the world confirms and proves that the *will to life*, far from being an arbitrary hypostasis or even an empty phrase, is the only true expression of the world's innermost essence. Everything strains and drives towards *existence*, towards *organic* existence if possible, i.e. towards *life*, and then towards the highest possible level of this: in animal nature it is obvious that *will to life* is the tonic note of its essence, its only immutable and unconditional property. Just consider this universal straining for life,<sup>g</sup> look at the infinite zeal,

399

400

<sup>a</sup> ἡ φύσις δαιμονία, ἀλλ' οὐ θεία ἐστὶ (*natura daemonia est, non divina*); *De divinat[ione per somnum]*, 463b14

<sup>b</sup> *Contrat social* [Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique* (*Of the social contract, or Principles of political right*) (1762)]

<sup>c</sup> *le souverain*

<sup>d</sup> *ih̄r quaesitum*

<sup>e</sup> *ih̄r datum*

<sup>f</sup> *eine petitio principii ist*

<sup>g</sup> *Lebensdrang*

ease and wantonness with which the will to life everywhere and at every moment strains wildly to exist in millions of forms, through fertility and seeds or even, where these are lacking, spontaneous generation,<sup>a</sup> seizing every opportunity, grabbing greedily at every material capable of life; and then cast a glance at the terrified alarm and wild uproar when the will to life gives way in any individual appearance and slips out of existence, particularly where this takes place in the clarity of consciousness. It is no different than if the whole world were destroyed forever in this one existence; the whole being of a living thing threatened in this way is transformed immediately into the most desperate defiance and struggle against death. Just look for instance at the unbelievable anxiety of a person in mortal danger, the rapid and serious sympathy of every witness, and the boundless joy upon rescue. Look at the rigid horror that greets a death sentence, the deep dread we feel when we behold the preparations for the execution, and the heart-rending compassion that seizes us when it is carried out. Then you would think that it is all about something other than a few years less of an empty, sorrowful, always uncertain existence, embittered by troubles of every sort; the great wonder is that it would matter at all whether someone arrives a few years earlier at a place where, after an ephemeral existence, he will spend billions of years. – In phenomena<sup>b</sup> such as these it becomes obvious that I am quite right in positing the *will to life* as that which is incapable of further explanation, but is rather the ground for every explanation, and that this, far from being an empty phrase, like the Absolute, the Infinite, the Idea or other similar expressions, is the most real thing we know,<sup>c</sup> and indeed the kernel of reality itself.

401 But if we temporarily abstract away from this interpretation, which is drawn from our innermost self, and look at nature as something foreign so as to grasp it objectively, then we find that, from the level of organic life onwards, it has only *one* intention: the *preservation of all species*. It works towards this through the immeasurable excess of seed, through the urgent vehemence of the sex drive and its zealous adaptation to all circumstances and opportunities, to the point of begetting bastards, and through instinctive maternal love, whose strength is so great that it overpowers self-love in many types of animals and the mother sacrifices her life to save that of her young. The individual on the other hand is of only indirect value for nature, namely only to the extent that it is the means of preserving the species. Otherwise nature is indifferent to its existence, indeed, nature itself

<sup>a</sup> *generatio aequivoca*

<sup>b</sup> *Erscheinungen*

<sup>c</sup> *kennen*

leads the individual into destruction as soon as it stops being serviceable for its goal. So it is clear why the individual exists: but why does the species? This is a question that cannot be answered through a merely objective consideration of nature. For in looking at nature, we try in vain to discover a goal<sup>a</sup> for these restless drives, for this wild straining to exist, for this anguished concern for the preservation of the species. An individual's time and energies<sup>b</sup> are consumed by its efforts to provide for itself and its young, and for this they only just suffice and sometimes even fall short. If now and then there is a surplus of energy and thereby of comfort, and in the *one* rational species, a surplus of cognition, then this is much too insignificant to pass for the goal of all the striving in nature. – Viewing the entire affair in a purely objective way, as a stranger, it looks very much as if nature's only concern is that none of its (Platonic) *Ideas*, i.e. permanent forms, should be lost: along the same lines, it seems as if nature was so completely satisfied in the happy invention and combination of these Ideas (for which the three prior populations of animals on the surface of the earth were a practice) that its sole concern is now that some one of these beautiful inventions might be lost, i.e. some one of these forms could disappear from time and the causal nexus. For individuals are fleeting, like water in a stream, while Ideas persist, like its eddies: only the ebbing of the water would destroy them too. – We would have to remain with this mysterious view if nature were given to us only from outside, hence merely *objectively*, and if, just as we apprehend it *by* cognition, we were to also assume that it arose *from* cognition, i.e. in the sphere of representation, and therefore, in solving the mystery, that we would have to keep to this sphere. But it is otherwise, and a glance into the *interior of nature* is granted to us insofar as this interior of nature is nothing other than *our own interior*, the very place where nature arrives on the highest level that its drives were able to take it, and it is now to be found immediately in self-consciousness by the light of cognition. Here the *will* reveals itself to us as something quite different in kind<sup>c</sup> from the *representation* in which nature stood forth, fully developed in all its Ideas. In a single stroke, it offers us the insight that could never be found along the merely *objective* path of *representation*. And so the subjective provides the key to the interpretation of the objective.

402

Above we described as the characteristic of subjectivity, or of the will, the overwhelmingly strong tendency of all animals and people to preserve life and continue it as long as possible; in order to recognize it as something

<sup>a</sup> *Zweck*

<sup>b</sup> *Kräfte*

<sup>c</sup> *toto genere Verschiedenes*

primordial and unconditioned we must still make clear to ourselves that it is in no way the result of any sort of objective *cognition* of the value of life, but is independent of all cognition; or, in other words, that beings do not present themselves as pulled from the front but as driven from behind.

403 With this in mind, if we begin by surveying the immeasurable series of animals, the endless multiplicity of their shapes, as they present themselves, always modified according to their element and way of life, and at the same time ponder the unattainable perfection of the way in which the structure and inner workings of each individual have been realized, and finally take into consideration the unbelievable and yet ceaseless expenditure of force, dexterity, cleverness, and activity that we find in every animal throughout its entire life; if we enter more deeply into this point, turning our eyes for instance to the restless industry of miserable little ants, the amazing and artful industriousness of bees, or look at how a single burying beetle (*Necrophorus vespillo*) can bury a mole forty times its size in two days, in order to lay its eggs in it and secure food for the future young (*Gleditsch, Physical, Botanical, Economic Treatises*,<sup>a</sup> discourse III, 220), becoming vividly aware that the lives of most insects are nothing but a restless labour to provide food and shelter for the young that will come from the eggs, which then, once they have consumed the food and pupated, will come to life only to begin the same labour all over again from the beginning; and then how in similar fashion, the lives of birds are for the most part spent in their distant and arduous migration, and then in building the nest and bringing in food for their young, which themselves will have to play the same role the next year, and so everything is always at work for the future, which then goes bankrupt – then we cannot help looking around for the reward for all this art and effort, for the goal that animals have in view in striving so restlessly, and in short asking: what do they get out of all this? What is achieved by this animal existence that requires such immense preparation? – And yet nothing shows itself but the satisfaction of hunger and the procreative drive and at most a little momentary comfort, if and when it falls to any animal individual between its endless need and efforts. If we look at both the indescribable artfulness of the preparations, the inexpressible wealth of means, and the paltriness of what was aimed at and what was achieved side by side, then we are forced to realize that life is a business<sup>b</sup> whose revenues fail by a long way to cover its costs. This is most apparent in many animals with particularly simple ways of life. Look for

<sup>a</sup> *Physik. Bot. Oekon. Abhandl.* [Johann Gottlieb Gleditsch, *Vermischte physikalisch-botanisch-oeconomische Abhandlungen* (Miscellaneous physical-botanical-economic treatises) (1765–7)]

<sup>b</sup> *Geschäft*

instance at the mole, that indefatigable worker. To expend considerable effort in digging with its huge shovel-foot – is its whole life's occupation: it is surrounded by a permanent night, its embryonic eye is there only so that it can avoid light. Only the mole is a truly nocturnal animal;<sup>a</sup> not cats, owls or bats, which do see at night. But what does the mole achieve through the difficult and joyless course of its life? Food and procreation: which is to say only the means to continue on the same sad course and to begin it again in new individuals. Such examples make it clear that there is no proportion between the exertions and vexations of life and its revenues or profits. Consciousness of the intuitive world gives the lives of sighted animals at least a semblance of objective value to existence, although their intuitive world is thoroughly subjective and restricted to the effects of motives. But the *blind* mole, with its perfect organization and its restless activity, limited to the alternation between insect larvae and hunger, makes manifest the unsuitability of the means to the end.<sup>b</sup> – It is, in this respect, particularly instructive also to consider the animal world when left to itself, in countries uninhabited by humans. In his *Views of Nature*<sup>c</sup> (2nd edition, p. 30ff.), *Humboldt* gives an excellent image of this, and of the suffering nature causes itself without any human assistance; nor does he neglect to cast a glance (p. 44) on the similar suffering of the human race, that has been at variance with itself at all times and places. Still, the nullity and futility of the striving of the whole of appearance becomes easier to grasp in the simple lives of animals, which are easily surveyed. The variety of ways they are organized in this case, the artfulness of the means by which each adapts to its element and its prey, is in clear contrast with the lack of any sort of lasting final goal;<sup>d</sup> instead of this only momentary comfort, fleeting pleasure conditioned by lack, much and lengthy suffering, constant struggle, the war of all,<sup>e</sup> each a hunter and each hunted, distress, lack, need, and anguish, cries and howls are presented: and this continuing throughout all eternity,<sup>f</sup> or until the crust of the planet breaks apart once more. *Junghuhn*<sup>g</sup> describes seeing in Java an immense field completely covered with skeletons, which he took to be a battlefield: but these were only skeletons of tortoises, huge ones, five feet long, three feet wide, and equally tall, which

<sup>a</sup> *animal nocturnum*

<sup>b</sup> *Zweck*

<sup>c</sup> *Ansichten der Natur* [Alexander von Humboldt (first edition, 1808; second edition, 1826)]

<sup>d</sup> *Endzweckes*

<sup>e</sup> *bellum omnium* [more fully *bellum omnium contra omnes* (war of all against all), first used by Thomas Hobbes, Preface to *De cive* (1642)]

<sup>f</sup> *in secula seculorum*

<sup>g</sup> [Franz Wilhelm Junghuhn, *Topographische und Naturwissenschaftliche Reisen durch Java* (*Topographical and scientific travels through Java*) (1845)]



405 follow this path from the ocean to lay their eggs, and then are attacked by  
 wild dogs (*Canis rutilans*) which work together to lay them on their backs  
 so they can tear off the bottom breast-plate, the small shield on the  
 stomach, and devour them alive. But a tiger will frequently fall on the  
 dogs. The whole misery has repeated itself thousands upon thousands of  
 times, year in, year out. This is what these tortoises are born to. What have  
 they done wrong to deserve this torture? What is the point of this whole  
 scene of abomination? The only answer is: this is how the *will to life*  
 406 objectifies itself.\*<sup>104</sup> Look upon it well and grasp it in all its objectifications:

\* In the *Siècle*, 10 April 1859, there is a very good description of a squirrel that was *magically* induced by a snake to jump into its mouth: 'Un voyageur qui vient de parcourir plusieurs provinces de l'île de Java cite un exemple remarquable du pouvoir fascinateur des serpents. Le voyageur dont il est question commençait à gravir le Junjind, un des monts appelés par les Hollandais Pepergebergte. Après avoir pénétré dans une épaisse forêt, il aperçut sur les branches d'un kijatite un écureuil de Java à tête blanche, folâtrant avec la grâce et l'agilité qui distinguent cette charmante espèce de rongeurs. Un nid sphérique, formé de brins flexibles et de mousse, placé dans les parties les plus élevées de l'arbre, à l'enfourchure de deux branches, et une cavité dans le tronc, semblaient les points de mire de ses yeux. A peine s'en était-il éloigné qu'il y revenait avec une ardeur extrême. On était dans le mois de juillet, et probablement l'écureuil avait en haut ses petits, et dans le bas le magasin à fruits. Bientôt il fut comme saisi d'effroi, ses mouvements devinrent désordonnés, on eut dit qu'il cherchait toujours à mettre un obstacle entre lui et certaines parties de l'arbre: puis il se tapit et resta immobile entre deux branches. Le voyageur eut le sentiment d'un danger pour l'innocente bête, mais il ne pouvait deviner lequel. Il approcha, et un examen attentif lui fit découvrir dans un creux du tronc une couleuvre lien, dardant ses yeux fixes dans la direction de l'écureuil . . . Notre voyageur trembla pour le pauvre écureuil. – L'appareil destiné à la perception des sons est peu parfait chez les serpents et ils ne paraissent pas avoir l'ouïe très fine. La couleuvre était d'ailleurs si attentive à sa proie qu'elle ne semblait nullement remarquer la présence d'un homme. Notre voyageur, qui était armé, aurait donc pu venir en aide à l'infortuné rongeur en tuant le serpent. Mais la science l'emporta sur la pitié, et il voulut voir quelle issue aurait le drame. Le dénoûment fut tragique. L'écureuil ne tarda point à pousser un cri plaintif qui, pour tous ceux qui le connaissent, dénote le voisinage d'un serpent. Il avança un peu, essaya de reculer, revint encore en avant, tâcha de retourner en arrière, mais s'approcha toujours plus du reptile. La couleuvre, roulée en spirale, la tête au-dessus des anneaux, et immobile comme un morceau de bois, ne le quittait pas du regard. L'écureuil, de branche en branche, et descendant toujours plus bas, arriva jusqu'à la partie nue du tronc. Alors le pauvre animal ne tenta même plus de fuir le danger. Attiré par une puissance invincible, et comme poussé par le vertige, il se précipita dans la gueule du serpent, qui s'ouvrit tout à coup démesurément pour le recevoir. Autant la couleuvre avait été inerte jusque là, autant elle devint active dès qu'elle fut en possession de sa proie. Déroulant ses anneaux et prenant sa course de bas en haut avec une agilité inconcevable, sa reptation la porta en un clin d'oeil au sommet de l'arbre, où elle alla sans doute digérer et dormir.' ['A traveller who recently wandered across several provinces on the island of Java mentioned a noteworthy example of the magical power of snakes. The traveller in question began climbing the Junjind, one of the mountains that the Dutch call the Pepergebergte. After coming into a thick forest, he noticed, on one of the branches of a kajitile, a white-headed Javanese squirrel that leapt about bravely with the grace and agility characteristic of this charming type of rodent. A round nest made of flexible twigs and moss on the highest bough of the tree in the fork between two branches, as well as a cavity in the trunk seemed to be the two points on which its attention was focused during its play. However frequently it came away from them, it turned back to them with great zeal. It was in the month of July, and the squirrel probably had its young above and its cache of fruits in the hole below. Suddenly it was seized as if by horror, its movements became disordered, it seemed to be trying to put an obstacle between itself and certain parts of the tree: finally it crouched down and remained sitting motionlessly between two branches. The traveller had the impression that the innocent little animal was threatened by danger, but could not guess what it might be. He approached, and a close examination revealed to him a ribbon snake with its eyes fixed

then you will come to understand your essence and the world; but this will not happen by constructing general concepts and using them to build houses of cards.<sup>105</sup> Of course, to apprehend the great drama of the objectivation of the *will to life*<sup>106</sup> and to characterize its nature requires somewhat closer observation and greater thoroughness than simply dispensing with the world by calling it 'God' or by explaining (with a *niaiserie* that only the German fatherland can offer and know how to enjoy) that it is the 'Idea in its Otherness',<sup>a</sup> – a formula that has given the simpletons of my age unutterable gratification for twenty years. Of course these systems of our century are mere travesties of pantheism or Spinozism, but according to the latter, everything in fact runs on without end, throughout all eternity. This is because for them the world is a God, a perfect being;<sup>b</sup> i.e. nothing better can exist, or even be conceived. Thus there is no need for redemption from it, and so there is none. But as to why this whole tragicomedy exists, nobody has the remotest idea because it has no spectators and the actors themselves go through endless troubles with little, and merely negative, pleasure.<sup>107</sup>

407

Let us now bring the human race into consideration as well; the issue certainly becomes more complicated and takes on a more serious tone: and

on the squirrel, lying in a cavity of the trunk. Our traveller trembled for the poor squirrel. – The mechanism that enables sounds to be perceived is not well developed in snakes, and they do not seem to have a very subtle sense of hearing. In addition, the snake was focused so attentively on its prey that it did not seem to have noticed the presence of a man. Our traveller, who was armed, could have come to the aid of the unlucky rodent and killed the snake. But science won out over pity, and he wanted to see how the drama would play out. The denouement was tragic. The squirrel did not at all fail to raise a doleful cry that, for all who know it, indicates the presence of a snake. It came forwards a bit, tried to retreat, went forwards again, tried to go backwards again, but kept coming closer to the reptile. The snake was curled up, its head above the coils and as unmoving as a piece of wood, and did not take its eyes off the squirrel. The squirrel scrambled down from branch to branch, and came to the place on the trunk where the branches stopped. Then the poor animal no longer tried to flee from the danger. Drawn by an irresistible force, and in the grips of something like dizziness, it rushed into the mouth of the snake, which suddenly opened exceedingly wide to take it in. As motionless as the snake had been to that point, it became just as active now, as soon as it had taken possession of its prey. It uncoiled itself and made its way upwards with unbelievable agility, reaching the top of the tree in an instant, doubtless to digest and sleep there.']

This example allows us to experience the spirit that animates nature since it reveals itself here, and how very true is the saying of Aristotle, quoted above (p. 398 [364–5]). This story is significant not only from the perspective of magic, but also as an argument for *pessimism*. That one animal will be attacked and eaten by another is bad, yet we can reconcile ourselves to this: but that a poor, innocent squirrel, next to the nest in which its young are sitting, is compelled, step by step, trembling, struggling against itself and calling out in sorrow, to approach the wide open jaws of the snake and consciously to throw itself in – this is so outrageous and atrocious that we feel the justice of Aristotle's remark: ἡ φύσις δαιμονία, ἀλλ' οὐ θεία ἐστὶ [Nature is demonic, not divine]. How terrible is this nature to which we belong!

<sup>a</sup> die 'Idee in ihrem Anderseyn' [Hegel, *Encyclopedia* II, § 247]

<sup>b</sup> ens perfectissimum

yet the fundamental character remains unaltered. In this case too, life in no way presents itself as a gift to enjoy, but as a task, a lesson to be worked through, and accordingly we see – in things both great and small – universal need, restless toil, constant stress, endless struggle, forced activity with the uttermost exertion of all mental and physical powers. Many millions of people, united into peoples, strive for the common good, each individual for his own sake; but many thousands are sacrificed for this. Sometimes senseless delusions, sometimes political intrigues lead them to fight each other: then the sweat and blood of the great masses must flow in order to impose the ideas of the few or atone for their errors. In peace there is industry and trade, inventions work wonders, oceans are crossed, delicacies gathered from all ends of the world, and the waves consume thousands. All strive,<sup>a</sup> some intellectually, others through actions, the tumult is indescribable. – But the ultimate goal of all this, what is it? To maintain ephemeral and tormented individuals through a short span of time, in the best case with tolerable needs and in comparative painlessness (although boredom is at once aware of it); then the propagation of this race and its driving activity.<sup>b</sup> – Given this clear disproportion between effort and reward, the will to life, from this perspective, seems objectively to be foolish, and subjectively a delusion that grips all living things, exerting all its forces to the utmost for something that has no value. Although, upon closer consideration, we will find here too, that it is only a blind urge, a completely groundless, unmotivated drive.

408 As I explained in § 29 of the First Volume, the law of motivation extends only to particular actions, not to willing *overall and in general*. That is why, when we think of the human race and its drives *overall and universally*, it does not look to us like a typical puppet show where puppets are pulled on strings, as it does when we focus on individual actions; rather, from this point of view, it looks like those puppets that are made to move by an inner clock-work. This is because if, as before, we compare people's restless, serious, and laborious strivings with what they get from it, or even what they could get, then the disproportion we have indicated becomes apparent, since we know that what is to be attained is utterly inadequate as an animating force<sup>c</sup> for explaining that movement and that restless drive. What, after all, is a brief deferral of death, a slight alleviation of need, a postponement of pain, a momentary silencing of desire, given the frequent victory of all these and the certain victory of death? What could such advantages achieve, taken as actual

<sup>a</sup> *Alles treibt*

<sup>b</sup> *seines Treibens*

<sup>c</sup> *bewegende Kraft*

causes of animation<sup>a</sup> of the human race, which is being constantly renewed and hence is innumerable, and which ceaselessly stirs itself, strives, drives, suffers, struggles, and performs the whole tragicomedy of world history – in fact, what says more than anything, *perseveres* in such a mockery of existence as long as it is even possible for anyone to do so? – Clearly none of this can be explained if we look for the animating causes outside the figures and think of the human race as rationally deciding to strive after those goods it was offered, which when attained would be a suitable reward for the restless trouble and worry (or if we think of something analogous to this that is pulling the strings). Looked at this way, everyone would have long ago said, ‘the game is not worth the candle’<sup>b</sup> and given it up. But on the contrary, amid the endless care and frequent needs of life as it passes by, everyone guards and protects this life like a precious pledge that was entrusted to him with heavy responsibility. Admittedly, he fails to see the ‘why’ and ‘what for’, the reward for all this, and has instead accepted the value of the charge in faith and trust, sight unseen, and does not know what it is. This is why I said that these puppets are not pulled from the outside but instead each one carries in itself the clockwork that dictates its movements. This is the *will to life*, which proves to be an inexhaustible driving-mechanism,<sup>c</sup> an irrational drive that does not have its sufficient ground<sup>d</sup> in the external world. It holds individuals firmly on the scene, and is the prime mover<sup>e</sup> of their motions, while external objects, motives, determine merely the particular direction of these movements: otherwise the cause would be completely disproportionate to the effect. For, just as every expression of a natural force has a cause, while the natural force itself has none, so each individual act of will has a motive, while the will in general has none: indeed, these two are at base one and the same. As the metaphysical element, the will is always the boundary marker that no investigation can go beyond. Given the primordial and unconditional nature of the will as we have described it, we can understand that a human being can love above all else an existence full of need, trouble, pain, anguish, and then again full of boredom, an existence that, upon reflection and objective consideration, ought to be detested, and can fear above all the end of it, which is however his only certainty.<sup>\*.108</sup> – Accordingly, we often see a miserable figure,

409

\* Augustine’s *de civit[ate] Dei* [*City of God*], Book XI, ch. 27 deserves to be compared with this, as an interesting commentary on what I say here.

<sup>a</sup> *Bewegungsursachen*

<sup>b</sup> *le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle*

<sup>c</sup> *Triebwerk*

<sup>d</sup> *zureichenden Grund* [elsewhere translated as ‘sufficient reason’]

<sup>e</sup> *das primum mobile*

deformed and bent double with age, want, and illness, who appeals to us from the heart for our assistance in prolonging an existence whose end<sup>a</sup> must seem wholly desirable if an objective judgment were the determining factor here. But instead blind will comes forward as the drive to life, love of life, courage to face life: the same thing that makes plants grow. We can compare this courage in face of life to a rope spread out over the puppet show of the human world from which the puppets hang by invisible threads, while they only *seem* to be supported by the ground beneath them (by the objective value of life). But if this rope becomes weak, the puppets will sink down; if it rips, they will fall, because the ground beneath them only seems to support them: this means that the weakening of the love of life shows itself as hypochondria, spleen,<sup>b</sup>

410 melancholy, and its complete defeat shows itself as a tendency to suicide that expresses itself at the slightest chance, even at a merely invented pretext, as if someone is picking an argument with himself in order to shoot himself to death, just as many do with another person to the same purpose: – when needs must be, someone will even commit suicide without any particular provocation. (Examples of this can be found in Esquirol, *Mental Illnesses*,<sup>c</sup> 1838.) It is the same with the drives and movements of life as it is with perseverance in life. This is not something freely chosen: rather, while everyone would in fact gladly rest in peace, need and boredom are the whips that keep the spinning top in motion. This is why the whole and every individual bears the mark of a state of affairs that has been coerced, and everyone, being inwardly lazy, longs for rest, but must go on anyway, like his planet, which only resists falling into the sun because a force drives it forward and does not allow it to fall. Similarly, everything is in constant tension and movement is wrung from it, and the drives of the world keep going, to use an expression of Aristotle (*On the Heavens*, II, 13), ‘not by nature, but by force’.<sup>d</sup> People only seem to be pulled from the front, in fact they are pushed from behind: it is not that life attracts them, but rather that they are urged forward by need. The law of motivation, like all causality, is a mere form of appearance. – Incidentally, this is the origin of comedy, of the burlesque, the grotesque, the antic side of life: for, driven forwards against his will, everyone does what he can and the consequent embarrassment often looks comical, however serious the trouble that underlies it.

<sup>a</sup> *Ende* [i.e. termination]

<sup>b</sup> [in English in the original]

<sup>c</sup> *Des maladies mentales* [Jean-Etienne-Dominique Esquirol, *Des maladies mentales, considérées sous les rapports médical, hygiénique et médico-legal* (*Mental illnesses, considered in medical, hygienic and medico-legal connections*) (1838)]

<sup>d</sup> οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ βίᾳ (*motu, non naturali, sed violento*)

With these considerations it becomes clear to us that the will to life is not a consequence of our knowledge<sup>a</sup> of life, it is nothing like a conclusion from premises<sup>b</sup> and is in general nothing secondary; rather it is primary and unconditioned, the premise of all premises and for that very reason it is where philosophy must *start from*, since the will to life does not appear in consequence of the world, but the world in consequence of the will to life.

I hardly need to call attention to the fact that the considerations with which we now conclude this Second Book already clearly suggest the serious theme of the Fourth Book, and would lead straight into this if my architectonic did not require that our Third Book, with its lighter content, should intervene first, as a second consideration of *the world as representation*. The conclusion of the Third Book, however, points in this same direction once again.

411

<sup>a</sup> Erkenntniß

<sup>b</sup> conclusio ex praemissis







## *On the Cognition of the Ideas*

The intellect, which we have so far considered only in its original and natural condition of servitude<sup>a</sup> to the will, emerges in the Third Book free from this servitude; although we must note at once that this is not a permanent emancipation<sup>b</sup> but rather merely a brief respite, an exceptional and indeed only momentary disengagement<sup>c</sup> from its servitude to the will. – Since this topic was treated in sufficient detail in the First Volume, I have only a few further points to add here.

As I explained in the First Volume (§ 33), the intellect in the service of the will,<sup>d</sup> which is to say active in its natural function, cognizes only *relations* between things, and above all their relations to that will to which the intellect belongs, through which those things become motives for the will – but also, for the sake of the completeness of this cognition, it cognizes the relations things bear to each other. This latter cognition only appears to any extent and with any significance in the human intellect; with animals, by contrast, even where it is already considerably developed, it appears only within very narrow limits. A grasp of the relations things have *to each other* is clearly only *indirectly* in the service of the will. As such, it constitutes the transition to a purely objective cognition that is entirely independent of the will: the former is scientific where the latter is artistic. The object's own essence emerges with increasing clarity when we directly grasp its multiple and diverse relations, and this essence gradually establishes itself from these relations alone, even though it is itself entirely different from these relations. When things are grasped in this manner, the intellect's servitude to the will becomes more and more indirect and limited. If the intellect is strong enough to gain the upper hand and to

\* This chapter relates to §§ 30–32 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *Dienstbarkeit*

<sup>b</sup> *Freilassung*

<sup>c</sup> *Losmachung*

<sup>d</sup> *im Dienste des Willens*

ignore completely the relation of things to the will so as to grasp instead the purely objective essence of an appearance as it expresses itself through all relations, then just as it leaves behind its servitude to the will, it also leaves behind the grasp of mere relations; and with that, it also leaves behind the grasp of particular things as such. It then floats free, no longer belonging to any will: it recognizes only *what is essential* in the particular thing and thus the entire *species*<sup>a</sup> of the thing, and its object accordingly is now the *Ideas* in my sense of this crudely misused term, which corresponds to the original Platonic meaning; which is to say the enduring, unchangeable *forms*<sup>b</sup> that are independent of the temporal existence of particular things, the species of things,<sup>c</sup> which really constitute what is purely objective in appearances. An *Idea* grasped in this way is, of course, still not the essence of the thing in itself, precisely because it has emerged from cognition of mere relations; nevertheless, as the result of the sum of all relations, it is the true *character* of the thing, and so it is the complete expression of the essence as it presents itself to intuition as an object; it is not grasped in relation to an individual will but rather as it expresses itself spontaneously,<sup>d</sup> so that it determines its complete set of relations, which is all that had been cognized thus far. The Idea is the root point of all these relations, and hence the most perfect and complete *appearance*, or, as I expressed it in the text, the adequate objecthood<sup>e</sup> of the will on this level of its appearance. Even form and colour, which are directly grasped in the intuition of the Idea, are not fundamentally a part of it, but are merely its medium of expression since, strictly speaking, space is as foreign to the Idea as time. In this sense the Neoplatonist Olympiodorus already said in his commentary to Plato's *Alcibiades* (Kreuzer's edition of Proclus and Olympiodorus,<sup>f</sup> vol. 2, p. 82): τὸ εἶδος μεταδέδωκε μὲν τῆς μορφῆς τῇ ὕλη· ἀμερὲς δὲ ὃν μετελάβεν ἐξ αὐτῆς τοῦ διαστάτου, i.e. the Idea, unextended in itself, although it confers shape on matter, nevertheless first acquires extension from that matter. – So as mentioned, the Ideas do not reveal the essence in itself of things but only their objective character, and hence they only ever reveal appearance; and we would not understand even this character if we were not acquainted with the inner essence of things in some other way, at least obscurely and as a feeling. This essence itself cannot be understood from the Ideas, and certainly not from any sort of purely

417

<sup>a</sup> *Gattung*<sup>b</sup> *Gestalten*<sup>c</sup> *species rerum*<sup>d</sup> *aus sich selbst*<sup>e</sup> *adäquate Objektität*<sup>f</sup> [Georg Friedrich Kreuzer, *Olympiodori in Platonis Alciadem Priorem Commentarii* (*Commentaries on Plato's First Alcibiades by Olympiodorus* [sixth century]) (1821)]

*objective* cognition; and this is why it would remain an eternal mystery if we did not have access to it from a completely different side. Only to the extent that every knower is at the same time an individual and hence a part of nature does access to the innermost part of nature stand open to him through his own self-consciousness, which is where it announces itself most directly, as we have found, as *will*.

Now what is a Platonic *Idea* when considered as a purely objective image, as pure form and thus lifted out of time and out of any relation, this same thing, taken empirically and temporally, is the *species*, or *kind*:<sup>a</sup> this then is the empirical correlate of the *Idea*. The *Idea* is genuinely eternal while the *kind* is of infinite duration, even if its appearance on a planet can be extinguished. Even the words we use to designate the two run together: *idea*, *eidos*,<sup>b</sup> *species*, *kind*. The *Idea* is *species*, but not *genus*: this is why *species* are the work of nature, *genera* the work of human beings: genera are in fact pure concepts. There are natural species,<sup>c</sup> but only logical genera.<sup>d</sup> There are no *Ideas* of artifacts, only concepts and thus logical genera, and their subspecies are logical species.<sup>e</sup> I want to add to what I have already said in this respect in the First Volume, § 41, that *Aristotle* too (*Metaphysics* I, 9 and XII, 5) says that the Platonists did not allow there to be *Ideas* of artifacts, ‘as with, for instance, a house and a ring, for which, as they say, there are no *Ideas*’.<sup>f</sup> This can be compared to the scholiast, pp. 562, 563 in the Berlin quarto edition. Moreover, in *Metaphysics* XI, 3, *Aristotle* claims: ‘Rather if *Ideas* are accepted at all, then only of natural things; therefore Plato was not wrong to say that there are as many *Ideas* as species in nature’,<sup>g</sup> to which the scholiast remarks (p. 800): ‘and those who accepted the *Ideas* taught this as well; because they said that there are no *Ideas* of artificial things but only of natural things’.<sup>h</sup> Incidentally, the doctrine of the *Ideas* originated with Pythagoras, at least if we believe Plutarch’s claims in the book *On the Opinions of the Philosophers*<sup>i</sup> (Book I, ch. 3).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Species, oder Art

<sup>b</sup> ἰδέα, εἶδος

<sup>c</sup> species naturales

<sup>d</sup> genera logica

<sup>e</sup> species logicae

<sup>f</sup> οἷον οἰκία, καὶ δακτύλιος, ὧν οὐ φασιν εἶναι εἶδη (ut domus et annulus, quorum ideas dari negant) [*Met.* XIII (M), 5 (1080a5)]

<sup>g</sup> ἀλλ’ εἴπερ (supple εἶδη ἐστί) ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει (ἐστί)· διὸ δὴ οὐ κακῶς ὁ Πλάτων ἔφη, ὅτι εἶδη ἐστὶν ὅποσα φύσει (si quidem ideae sunt, in iis sunt, quae natura fiunt: propter quod non male Plato dixit, quod species eorum sunt, quae natura sunt) [*Met.* XII (Λ), 3 (1070a17)]

<sup>h</sup> καὶ τοῦτο ἀρέσκει καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς τὰς ἰδέας θεμένοις· τῶν γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνης γινομένων ἰδέας εἶναι οὐκ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπὸ φύσεως (hoc etiam ipsi ideas statuentibus placet: non enim arte factorum ideas dari aiebant, sed natura procreatorum).

<sup>i</sup> de Placitis Philosophorum

The individual is rooted in the species,<sup>a</sup> and time is rooted in eternity: and as any given individual exists as such only by possessing in itself the essence of its species; so too it has temporal duration only by being simultaneously in eternity. In the following Book there is a chapter devoted to the life of the species.<sup>b</sup>

I already discussed the *difference* between the Idea and the concept in sufficient depth in § 49 of the First Volume. By contrast, their *similarity* rests on the following. The original and essential unity of an Idea is shattered into the plurality of particular things through the sensuously and cerebrally determined intuition of the cognizing individual. But that unity is re-established through rational reflection, although only in the abstract,<sup>c</sup> as a concept, universal,<sup>d</sup> which indeed is equivalent to the Idea in *range*, although it assumes a completely different *form*, and hence can no longer be intuited or thoroughly determined. In this sense (although in no other) one could, in the language of the scholastics, call the Ideas *universalia ante rem*<sup>e</sup> and concepts *universalia post rem*.<sup>f</sup> between the two are particular things, which even animals can cognize. – It is certain that the realism of the scholastics developed from a confusion of the Platonic Ideas (which can certainly be attributed an objective, real being since they are at the same time species) with mere concepts. The realists wished to confer the same objective, real being on these concepts, and thereby brought about the triumphant opposition of nominalism.

419

<sup>a</sup> *Gattung*

<sup>b</sup> [Chapter 42]

<sup>c</sup> *in abstracto*

<sup>d</sup> *universale*

<sup>e</sup> [literally, 'universals before the thing']

<sup>f</sup> [literally, 'universals after the thing']

*On the Pure Subject of Cognition*

We can grasp an Idea, it can enter our consciousness, only by means of an alteration within us, an alteration that could be viewed as an act of self-denial<sup>a</sup> to the extent that it consists of cognition turning entirely away from its own will, completely losing sight of the precious charge that had been entrusted to it, and regarding things as if they could never have anything to do with the will. This is the only way that cognition could become a pure mirror of the objective essence of things. Cognition that is conditioned in this way must lie at the basis of every true work of art as its origin. The requisite alteration in the subject cannot proceed from the will precisely because it consists of the elimination of all willing and thus cannot be an act of free choice,<sup>b</sup> i.e. it cannot be up to us. Instead, it can come only from a temporary preponderance of intellect over the will, or, viewed physiologically, from a strong excitation of the intuitive activity of the brain in the absence of any excitation of the inclinations or affects. To make this more clear, we might recall that our consciousness has two sides: it is in part consciousness of *one's own self*, which is the *will*; in part it is consciousness of *other things*, and as such it is chiefly an *intuitive* cognition of the external world, a grasp of objects. But the more that one side of consciousness comes to the fore, the further the other recedes. Accordingly, consciousness of *other things*, that is, intuitive cognition, becomes more complete, i.e. more objective, the less we are conscious of our own self in the process. There is a real antagonism here. The more we are conscious of the object, the less we are of the subject; on the other hand, the more consciousness is absorbed in the subject, the weaker and more incomplete is our intuition of the external world.<sup>2</sup> Some of the conditions necessary for pure objectivity in intuition are permanent, such as the perfection of the brain and the

\* This chapter relates to §§ 33, 34 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *Selbstverleugnung*

<sup>b</sup> *Akt der Willkür*

overall physiological constitution conducive to its activity; and some are temporary, to the extent that they are made possible by everything that enhances the tension and receptivity of the cerebral nervous system without exciting any passion. Do not think of alcohol or opium in this context, but rather of a full and undisturbed night's sleep, a cold bath and everything that gives cerebral activity an unforced preponderance by calming the passions and the circulatory system. It is primarily these natural stimulants of cerebral neurological activity that have the effect of detaching the object progressively from the subject, and<sup>3</sup> (admittedly the more readily accomplished the more developed and energetic the brain is in general) ultimately lead to that state of pure objectivity of intuition that eliminates the will from consciousness; in this state everything stands before us with heightened clarity and distinctness so that our knowledge is occupied almost exclusively with *things* and hardly at all with *ourselves*; in this way our entire consciousness is almost nothing more than the medium through which the intuited object enters into the world as representation. When consciousness of other things is so highly potentialized that consciousness of our own self disappears, then pure will-less cognition has been achieved.<sup>4</sup> One grasps the world in a purely objective manner only when one no longer knows that one belongs to it; and the more we are conscious only of things, and the less we are conscious of ourselves, then the more beautifully everything presents itself. – Now, since all suffering arises from the will that is the true self, when this side of consciousness retreats all possibility of suffering is at the same time removed, making the state of pure objectivity of intuition a thoroughly happy one;<sup>a</sup> this is why I have shown it to be one of the two components of aesthetic pleasure. By contrast, as soon as consciousness of a person's own self, which is to say subjectivity, i.e. the will, regains preponderance, a corresponding degree of discontent or unrest<sup>b</sup> comes about as well: of discontent to the extent that the corporeality (of the organism, which is in itself will) becomes palpable again; of unrest to the extent that the will once again fills the mental paths of consciousness with desires, affects, passions, cares. For, as the principle of subjectivity, the will is always the opposite, indeed the antagonist, of cognition. The greatest concentration of subjectivity consists in the genuine *act of will*, in which we therefore have the clearest consciousness of our self. All other excitations of the will are only preparations for this act: it is for subjectivity what the jumping of the spark is for the electrical apparatus. – Every corporeal sensation is in

421

<sup>a</sup> ein durchaus beglückender

<sup>b</sup> Unbehagen oder Unruhe

itself already an excitation of the will and in fact more frequently of not-willing<sup>a</sup> than of willing.<sup>b</sup> The excitation of the will through mental channels occurs by means of motives: here even subjectivity is awakened and put into play through objectivity. This happens as soon as some object is no longer grasped in a purely objective (i.e. disinterested) manner, but rather either directly or indirectly excites a desire or disinclination, even if only by way of a memory: for, even in this case, it is already acting as a motive in the broadest sense of the term.

I will note here that both reading and abstract thinking, which involve words, also belong to consciousness of *other things* (in the broadest sense, of course) and thus to the objective occupation of the mind, although only indirectly, by means of concepts: but these are themselves the artificial product of reason, and thus already a work of intentionality. Even in abstract mental occupation, the will is always the guide that holds its attention and directs it according to its (the will's) intentions; this is why  
 422 mental occupation is always linked with some exertion: but this exertion presupposes activity of the will. So we do not find in this sort of mental activity the perfect objectivity of consciousness that accompanies aesthetic apprehension, i.e. cognition of the Ideas, as its condition.

From what we have said, the pure objectivity of intuition that enables cognition, not of the individual thing as such, but rather of the Idea of its genus, takes place when someone stops being conscious of himself and is conscious of only the intuited object so that his own consciousness remains merely as the support of the objective existence of that object. What makes this state difficult to attain and hence rare is that in it, as it were, the accident (the intellect) dominates and annuls the substance (the will), even if only for a short time. This is also the basis of the analogy – and even the relation – between this state and the negation of the will that will be presented at the end of the following Book. – Even though, as was shown in the previous Book, cognition grows out of the will and is rooted in the will's appearance, the organism, it is still tainted by the will, as the flame is by its fuel and the smoke the fuel gives off. This is why we can grasp the pure, objective essence of things, the *Ideas* that arise in them, only when we do not have any interest in them for themselves, since then they do not bear any relation to our will. This is in turn why Ideas of essences speak to us more easily from the work of art than from reality. For what we glimpse only in a picture or a poem has no possibility of any relation to our will; because it exists in itself only for *cognition* and it addresses itself directly to

<sup>a</sup> *noluntas*

<sup>b</sup> *volutas*

this alone. By contrast, grasping the Ideas from *actual reality*<sup>a</sup> presupposes some degree of abstraction from one's own will and an elevation above one's own interest, and this demands a particular intellectual elasticity. At a higher level and for any length of time, this is the province of genius alone, which consists precisely in the existence of a greater amount of cognitive power than is required to serve an individual will, and an excess that is liberated and then grasps the world without reference to the will. That the *artwork* facilitates so well an apprehension of the Ideas that constitutes aesthetic pleasure rests not only the fact that art presents things more clearly and more in accordance with their characters, by emphasizing what is essential while omitting what is inessential; but just as much on the fact that in art the intuited object is not actual but only an image, hence it does not lie in the domain of things that can have a relation to the will, and this is the surest way to achieve the silence of the will required for a purely objective apprehension of the essence of things. This is not only true of the effects of visual art but just as much of poetry: poetic effects are also conditioned by an apprehension that is disinterested, will-less, and therefore purely objective. This kind of apprehension is exactly what makes an intuited object appear *picturesque*,<sup>b</sup> or a scene from real life appear *poetic*, since it alone spreads that magical sheen over the objects of reality, a sheen that we term 'picturesque' with sensuously intuited objects and 'poetic' with objects intuited only in imagination.<sup>c</sup> When poets sing of the cheerful morning, the lovely evening, the still and moonlit night and such things, then unbeknownst to them, the true object of their glorification is the pure subject of cognition that is called forth through these natural beauties, and whose emergence banishes the will from consciousness and ushers in that peace of heart which is not to be gained in any other way on earth. How otherwise, for instance, could the verse:

423

It was night, and the moon shone in the cheerful sky,  
Ringed by smaller stars<sup>d</sup>

have such a salutary, indeed magical effect on us? – Further,<sup>5</sup> the fact that the novelty or utterly foreign nature of an object promotes such a disinterested, purely objective grasp explains why a foreigner or even passing traveller derives a picturesque or poetic effect from objects that cannot produce the same effect in the native inhabitants: so, for instance, the sight

<sup>a</sup> *Wirklichkeit*

<sup>b</sup> *malerisch*

<sup>c</sup> *Phantasie*

<sup>d</sup> *Nox erat, et coelo fulgebat luna sereno, / Inter minora sidera* [Horace, *Epodes* 15,1]



424 of a completely foreign city often makes a strangely pleasant impression on the foreigner that it never makes on the inhabitants themselves: this stems from the fact that the foreigner has no relation to the city and its inhabitants and so intuits them in a purely objective manner. This is part of the pleasure of travelling. And it also seems to be the reason why people try to accentuate the effect of narrative or dramatic works by setting the scene in distant times or countries: in Germany they are set in Italy or Spain; in Italy they are set in Germany, Poland or even Holland. – Now if wholly objective, intuitive apprehension, cleansed of all willing, is the condition of the *pleasure* of aesthetic objects, it is even more a condition of their *production*. Every good painting, every genuine poem bears the marks of the state of mind we have described. This is because only what has arisen from intuition and indeed from purely objective intuition, or what has been directly excited by it, contains the living seed from which true and original accomplishments can grow: not only in the visual arts but in poetry as well, and in fact in philosophy. The jumping-off point<sup>a</sup> for every beautiful work, for every great or profound thought, is a completely objective intuition. But this is conditioned entirely by the complete silence of the will, after which what remains is the human being as the pure subject of cognition. The occasion that promotes this state is genius.

With the disappearance of the will from consciousness, individuality is in fact annulled, along with all its attendant sufferings and needs. This is why I have described the pure subject of cognition that remains as the eternal eye of the world: this looks out from all living beings, albeit with very different degrees of lucidity, untouched by their coming to be and passing away and so, as identical with itself, as always one and the same, is the support of the world of permanent Ideas, i.e. the adequate objecthood of the will; by contrast, the individual subject, clouded in its cognition by the individuality that stems from the will, has only particular things as its objects, and, like these, it is ephemeral. – Everybody can be attributed a twofold existence, in the sense described here. As will, and thus as individual, he is only one, and this one exclusively, which gives him plenty to do  
 425 as well as to suffer. As something that represents purely objectively,<sup>b</sup> he is the pure subject of cognition and the objective world possesses its existence only in his consciousness: as such he is *all things* to the extent that he intuits them, and their existence in him is neither a trouble nor a burden. For it is *his* being insofar as it exists in *his* representation: but it is there in the absence of will. By contrast, insofar as it is will, it is not in him. All is well

<sup>a</sup> *punctum saliens*

<sup>b</sup> *rein objektiv Vorstellendes*

with someone who is in that state where he is all things; but all is ill where he is only one. – To appear interesting, delightful, enviable, any state, person or scene of life need only be grasped in a purely objective way and made into the object of a portrayal, whether in brushstrokes or in words – but if you are stuck within it, if you yourself are it, then (it is often said) it is hell.<sup>a</sup> Thus *Goethe* says:

What in life we must revile,  
In a painting makes us smile.<sup>b</sup>

When I was young I went through a phase where I constantly tried to view myself and my actions from the outside and portray them to myself; probably to make them possible for me to enjoy.

Since these considerations have never been expressed before me, I wish to add a few psychological illustrations.

When directly intuiting the world and life, we usually consider things only in their relations, and consequently in accordance with their relative rather than absolute essence and existence. We look, for instance, at houses, ships, machines and such with the thought of their purpose and their suitability for that purpose. We look at human beings with the thought of their relation to us, if they have one; next we look at them with the thought of their relation to each other, whether in their present comings and goings, or given their social rank and business, judging their qualifications, etc. We can pursue such a consideration of relations as far as we wish, to the most distant links of the chain: this makes our consideration more precise and wide-ranging, but it is still of the same quality and kind. This is the consideration of things in their relations, indeed, *by means* 426 *of* these relations, according to the principle of sufficient reason. People are usually and for the most part given over to this type of consideration: in fact, I think most people are entirely incapable of any other sort. – But if, by way of exception, we experience a momentary increase in the intensity of our intuitive intelligence, then all at once we see things with completely different eyes: we no longer grasp them according to their relations but rather grasp what they are in and of themselves, and, besides their relative existence, we suddenly perceive their absolute existence as well. Then each particular thing is the representative of<sup>c</sup> its species: accordingly, we now grasp the universal in each essence. What we recognize in this way are the *Ideas* of things: but a wisdom now speaks from them that is higher than

<sup>a</sup> *mag es der Teufel aushalten*

<sup>b</sup> *Was im Leben uns verdrießt, / Man im Bilde gern genießt.* [motto of 'Parabolisch' (1810)]

<sup>c</sup> *vertritt*

that which knows mere relations. We ourselves have also left relations behind in the process, thereby becoming the pure subject of cognition. – But what (in exceptional cases) leads to this state must be internal physiological processes that cleanse and intensify brain activity to the extent that a sudden spring tide occurs. The external conditions for this are that we remain completely remote and separate from the scene we are contemplating, and are in no way actively involved with it.<sup>6</sup>

427 To see that a purely objective and therefore correct grasp of things is possible only when we regard them without any personal interest, and thus in the complete silence of the will, imagine how much every affect and passion tarnishes and falsifies cognition; in fact, every inclination or disinclination deforms, colours, and distorts not only our judgment, no, but even our original intuition of things. Recall that when we are made happy by a fortunate outcome, the whole world instantly assumes a cheerful colour and a smiling aspect; but on the other hand looks dismal and gloomy when we are weighed down with cares; so even an inanimate thing that is nevertheless supposed to be the instrument to some event that is hateful to us seems to bear a hideous physiognomy: the scaffold, for instance, or the fortress to which we are consigned, the surgeon's instrument case, the travelling coach of our loved one, etc., indeed, numbers, letters, and seals can grimace at us horribly and affect us like terrible monsters. By contrast, the things that grant our wishes suddenly look pleasant and amiable, such as the hunchbacked old woman with our love letter, the Jew with the *louis d'ors*,<sup>a</sup> the rope ladder for our escape, etc. Now just as the falsification of representation through the will is unmistakable in cases of definite hatred or love, it is there at a lower level in those objects that possess only a distant relation to our will, i.e. to our inclination or disinclination. Only when the will, along with its interests, has quit the intellect, and the intellect freely follows its own laws, and as the pure subject mirrors the objective world and, though not spurred on by any willing, is in the highest state of tension and activity from its own drive<sup>b</sup> – only then do the colours and shapes of things emerge in their true and full meaning. Genuine works of art can proceed only from such a grasp of things; the enduring value and ever-renewed acclaim such artworks enjoy is due to the fact that they alone present what is purely objective, which provides the basis for all the different subjective and hence distorted intuitions, acting as what is shared and enduring in all of them, shining through as the common theme of all those subjective variations. For the

<sup>a</sup> [a former gold coin of France]

<sup>b</sup> *aus eigenem Triebe*

nature that spreads before our eyes certainly presents itself very differently in different minds: and each person can reproduce it only in the way he sees it, whether with the brush, the chisel, or words, or in gestures on the stage. Only objectivity qualifies one as an artist: but this is possible only when the intellect tears loose from its roots, from the will, hovering freely, and yet active with a high degree of energy.

Nature often presents itself with perfect objectivity, and thus in full beauty, to a young person, whose intuitive intellect still operates with fresh energy. But the pleasure of such a perspective is sometimes disrupted by the sobering reflection that the objects that are at present laid out in such a lovely manner do not have any personal relation to him so as to be able to interest and delight him: he awaits his life in the form of an interesting novel.<sup>7</sup> 'Behind that protruding rock there must wait a well-mounted group of my friends, my beloved rests by that waterfall, that beautifully lit building must be her dwelling and that ivy-clad window is hers – but this beautiful world is a wasteland for me!' and so forth. Such melancholy phantasies of youth really crave the exact opposite, because the beauty that each object displays is due precisely to the pure objectivity, i.e. disinterestedness, of its intuition, and would therefore be instantly annulled by the sort of relation to his own will that the young person is so pained not to discover; all the magic that now affords him such pleasure, albeit with an admixture of pain, would cease to exist. – The same thing, incidentally, is true of every age and in every situation: if we entertained a personal relation to objects in a beautiful landscape and were always conscious of this relation, the enchantment of such beauty would vanish. Everything is beautiful only for as long as we have nothing to do with it. (Here we are not talking about amorous passion but rather aesthetic pleasure.) Life is *never* beautiful, only images of life, namely in the transfiguring mirror of art or poetry; this is true even in youth, when we do not yet recognize it. Many young people would have their hearts set at ease if they could be made to understand this.<sup>8</sup>

Why does the sight of the full moon have such a salutary, pacifying, elevating effect? Because the moon is an object of intuition but never of willing:

'The stars, we do not desire them,  
We enjoy their splendour.' – G<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> [Goethe, 'Trost in Tränen' ['Comfort in tears'], stanza 7]

The moon, moreover, is *sublime*, i.e. it produces a sublime effect on us because it moves along without any relation to us, eternally foreign to earthly activity,<sup>a</sup> and sees everything but takes no interest in anything. This is why, at the sight of it, the will with its constant needs disappears from consciousness, leaving it behind as a consciousness of pure cognition.<sup>b</sup>

429 Perhaps this is mixed with the feeling that we share this sight with millions of people whose individual differences are thereby extinguished so that they are united in this intuition, something that likewise heightens the impression of the sublime. Finally, this impression is further supported by the fact that the moon illuminates without warming – certainly the reason why it is called chaste and identified with Diana. – Because of this wholly salutary impression on our minds, the moon gradually becomes our bosom friend, which never happens with the sun which, like an overly zealous benefactor, we are unable to look in the face.

The following remark should also be placed here to supplement what I have said in § 38 of the First Volume about the aesthetic pleasure afforded by light, mirroring and colours. The direct, unreflective,<sup>c</sup> but also inexpressible joy excited in us by an impression of colours, intensified by a metallic lustre and even more through transparency, such as with stained glass windows and still more through clouds and the way they reflect light when the sun sets – all this is based on the fact that here, in the easiest manner, in almost a physically necessary manner, our entire interest is won over to cognition without any excitation of our will, putting us into a state of pure cognition even if here too this consists predominantly of a mere sensation of the retina's being affected; nonetheless, because it is wholly free of pain or pleasure, it does not directly excite the will at all and hence belongs to pure cognition.

<sup>a</sup> *Treiben*

<sup>b</sup> *und läßt es als ein rein erkennendes zurück*

<sup>c</sup> *gedankenlose*

*On Genius*

The predominant capacity for the mode of cognition described in the two preceding chapters, which gives rise to all true works of art, poetry, and even philosophy, is what we properly call by the name of genius. Since this form of cognition has the (Platonic) *Ideas* as its object, grasping these not abstractly<sup>a</sup> but only *intuitively*, then the essence of genius must lie in the perfection and energy of *intuitive* cognition. Accordingly, the works we most decisively hear described as works of genius are those that proceed immediately from intuition and appeal to intuition, which is to say those from the visual arts, and then from poetry, where intuitions are mediated by the imagination.<sup>b</sup> – The difference between genius and mere talent is already noticeable at this point since talent is a privilege that lies more in the greater skill and acuity of discursive cognition than in intuitive cognition. Someone gifted with talent thinks more quickly and correctly than most people; genius on the other hand sees a different world from all of them, although only insofar as it looks more deeply into the world shared by everyone, because this world presents itself in the head of the genius more objectively and hence more purely and more clearly.

430

The intellect is by its nature<sup>c</sup> merely the medium of motives: accordingly, it does not, in the first instance, grasp things beyond their relation to the will, whether the relation is direct, indirect or possible. This is most striking in animals, where the relation to the will is almost always direct, thus: nothing exists for animals unless it stands in some relation to their will. That is why we are sometimes amazed to see that even clever animals utterly fail to notice something quite obvious, for instance they do not register any lack of familiarity given obvious changes to our person or surroundings. In normal people there are in addition indirect and even possible relations to the will,

\* This chapter relates to § 36 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *in abstracto*

<sup>b</sup> *Phantasie*

<sup>c</sup> *seiner Bestimmung nach*

which together constitute the sum of all useful knowledge;<sup>a</sup> but here too, cognition remains at the level of *relations*. This is why the normal mind will not achieve a completely pure and objective image of things; as soon as its intuitive force is no longer spurred on and set in motion by the will, it immediately becomes tired and inactive because it does not have energy enough to grasp the world in a purely objective manner using its own elasticity and *in the absence of a goal*.<sup>b</sup> On the other hand, where this does  
 431 take place, where the representational power of the brain<sup>c</sup> has this surplus, and a pure, clear, objective image of the external world is presented *in the absence of a goal*, an image that is useless, at higher levels even disruptive, to the intentions of the will, and can in fact become downright harmful to them – then we find at least the foundation of that abnormality known as *genius*,<sup>d</sup> which signifies that here something foreign to the will, i.e. to the real I, seems to become active, a genial influence<sup>e</sup> coming in from outside, as it were. But, to describe it without imagery, genius<sup>f</sup> consists in a significantly more strongly developed cognitive faculty than is required for *servitude to the will*, for which alone it originally arose. Thus, strictly speaking, the physiology of such a surplus of cerebral activity together with the physiology of the brain itself could to a certain extent be counted among abnormalities of excess<sup>g</sup> which obviously belong together with abnormalities of lack<sup>h</sup> and those of false position.<sup>i</sup> Thus genius consists in an abnormal surplus of the intellect whose sole use is its application to the universal in existence so that it serves the entire human race, just as the normal intellect serves the individual. To make this easy to understand, one can say: if the normal person consists of  $\frac{2}{3}$  will and  $\frac{1}{3}$  intellect, the genius on the other hand possesses  $\frac{2}{3}$  intellect and  $\frac{1}{3}$  will. This can in turn be explained using a metaphor from chemistry: the base and the acid of a neutral salt are distinct from each other in that their radicals have inverse ratios to oxygen. The base or the alkali is such because its radical prevails over the oxygen, while the acid is an acid because in it oxygen prevails. The same holds true for the normal human being and the genius with respect to will and intellect. This gives rise to a decisive difference between them, that is already evident in the entire being, all the doings and dealings of each, but really comes to light with their achievements. Another

<sup>a</sup> *Kenntnisse*

<sup>b</sup> *zwecklos*

<sup>c</sup> *die vorstellende Kraft des Gehirns*

<sup>d</sup> *Genie*

<sup>e</sup> *Genius*

<sup>f</sup> *Genie*

<sup>g</sup> *monstris per excessum*

<sup>h</sup> *monstris per defectum*

<sup>i</sup> *per situm mutatum*

difference could be added: while that total opposition between the chemical elements is the basis of the strongest elective affinity<sup>a</sup> and attraction to one another, we find rather the reverse tendency in the human race.<sup>9</sup>

432

The most immediate manifestation<sup>b</sup> of this sort of surplus of cognitive power<sup>c</sup> shows itself in the most original and fundamental cognition, i.e. *intuitive* cognition, and enables the repetition of this cognition in an image: this is the origin of the painter and sculptor. Accordingly, the path from genial apprehension to artistic production is the shortest with them: and this is why the form in which the genius and his activity exhibit themselves is the simplest in the case of painting and sculpture, and its description is the easiest. Yet we see here the specific source from which all true productions in every form of art, even in poetry and, indeed, philosophy, originate; although in these other cases the process is not so simple.

Recall the result contained in the First Book, that all intuition is intellectual and not merely sensual. Now if one adds to it the present argument and pays due attention to the fact that philosophy in the previous century called the faculty of intuitive cognition the 'lower powers of the soul',<sup>d</sup> then one will not find *Adelung*<sup>e</sup> so absurd when, constrained to speak the language of the time, he posited genius as 'a notable strength of the lower forces of the soul', nor will we find this worthy of the bitter contempt with which *Jean Paul* introduced it in his 'Introduction to Aesthetics'.<sup>f</sup> However great the merits of this remarkable man's work, I must say that overall, when it aims at theoretical discussion or edification in general, the constantly joking exposition, prancing along with mere metaphors, is not particularly apt.

Now the true and genuine essence of things discloses and reveals itself first and foremost to *intuition*, even if it does so only in a conditioned manner. All concepts, all thoughts are indeed nothing but abstractions, and thus partial representations<sup>g</sup> derived from the former and arising merely when something is thought away. All profound cognition, even genuine wisdom, is rooted in the *intuitive* grasp of things; which we have examined in detail in the supplements to the First Book. An *intuitive* grasp has always been the generative process in which every true artwork, every immortal thought has received the spark of life. All primordial thought<sup>h</sup>

433

<sup>a</sup> *Wahlverwandschaft*

<sup>b</sup> *die zunächst liegende Aeußerung*

<sup>c</sup> *Erkenntnißkraft*

<sup>d</sup> *untern Seelenkräfte*

<sup>e</sup> [Johann Christoph Adelung, *Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der hochdeutschen Mundart* (*Grammatical-Critical Dictionary of High German Speech*) (1793–1801)]

<sup>f</sup> *Vorschule der Aesthetik* [first published in 1804]

<sup>g</sup> *Theilvorstellungen*

<sup>h</sup> *Urdenken*



takes place in images.<sup>10</sup> *Concepts*, on the other hand, give rise to works of mere talent, to merely rational thoughts, to imitations and in general everything directed to present need and to one's contemporaries.

Now if our intuition were always tied to the real presence of things, then its material would be completely dominated by chance, which seldom brings things forward at the right time, seldom arranges them in a purposive way, and usually provides us with very poor examples. This is why it needs *imagination*<sup>a</sup> in order to complete, arrange, depict, retain and reproduce all the meaningful images of life at will,<sup>b</sup> according to what is required by the aims of a deeply penetrating cognition and the meaningful work through which it is to be communicated. This is why the imagination is valued so highly as an indispensable tool for the genius. Only by virtue of imagination can genius conjure up every object or event in a vivid image, according to the requirements of the context of fashioning, composing or thinking, and so constantly draw fresh nourishment from the fountain of all cognition, i.e. intuition. Someone with the gift of imagination can, as it were, conjure up spirits that promptly reveal to him truths that in the naked reality of things are exhibited only weakly, infrequently, and then mostly in an untimely manner. He is to a person lacking imagination what mobile or indeed winged animals are to mussels cemented to a rock that have to wait for anything chance might bring their way. This is because such a person is familiar only with actual sense intuition: until this comes his way he nibbles at concepts and abstractions, which are merely the shells and husks of cognition and not its central core. He will never achieve anything great, unless it is in calculation and mathematics.<sup>11</sup> – Works of visual art and poetry as well as the achievements of mimicry can be regarded as ways to enable people without imagination to compensate for this deficiency as much as possible while making it easier for those gifted with imagination to use this gift.

- 434 Accordingly, although the distinctive and essential cognitive mode of genius is *intuitive*, the true objects of this cognition are not particular things at all, but rather the (Platonic) Ideas that express themselves in them, the apprehension of which we analysed in Chapter 29. The basic feature of the genius is always to see the universal in the particular, while the normal person only ever recognizes in the particular the particular itself, since only as a particular does it belong to reality, which alone is of interest to him, i.e. it is the only thing that relates to his *will*. The degree to which any given person, in the face of a particular thing, can not simply

<sup>a</sup> *Phantasie*

<sup>b</sup> *beliebig*

*think* but in fact *catch immediate sight*, not of the particular alone, but of something more or less universal, up to the most universal aspect of the species – this is the measure of how close that person is to genius. Accordingly, the essence of things in general, what is universal in them, the whole, is the only true object of the genius: an investigation of particular phenomena is the province of talent in the sciences of the real, whose object is in fact only ever the relations between things.

Let us now recall what was shown in detail in the previous chapter, namely that the condition for the apprehension of the *Ideas* is that what cognizes<sup>a</sup> be the *pure subject* of cognition, i.e. that the will disappear entirely from consciousness. – The delight we feel in many of the songs in which *Goethe* brings the landscape before our eyes, or in *Jean Paul's* portrayals of nature, is due to the fact that they allow us to share in the objectivity of these minds, i.e. in the purity with which the world as representation had, in them, separated itself from the world as will and, as it were, broken entirely free of it. – It follows from the fact that the genius's mode of cognition is essentially purified from all willing and its relations that works of genius do not stem from intention or choice;<sup>b</sup> genius is instead guided by an instinctive sort of necessity. – What is termed the rousing of genius, the hour of consecration, the moment of inspiration, is nothing other than the emancipation of the intellect that does not sink into inactivity or languor when released from its service to the will, but is instead briefly active by itself and of its own accord. It is then of the utmost purity and becomes the clear mirror of the world; completely divorced from its origin, the will, it is now the world as representation itself, concentrated into a *single* consciousness. The soul of immortal works is begotten in such moments. By contrast the intellect is never free in any act of intentional deliberation since the will leads it around and prescribes its theme to it.

435

In point of fact, the stamp of commonness, the expression of vulgarity imprinted on the vast majority of faces consists in the fact that the rigorous subordination of their cognition to their willing, the solid chains that bind the two together, and the consequent impossibility of grasping things other than in relation to the will and its aims, is visible in their very faces. By contrast, the expression of the genius that makes for the striking family resemblance of all highly gifted people, lies in the fact that one can clearly read in it the liberation, the emancipation of the intellect from the service of the will, the dominance of cognition over willing: and because all agony<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *das Erkennende*

<sup>b</sup> *Willkür*

<sup>c</sup> *Pein*

comes from willing while cognition in and of itself is cheerful and without pain, this results in their high forehead and clear and contemplative gaze, which are not subordinate to the service of the will and its needs; it results in that air of great and even preternatural cheerfulness<sup>a</sup> which sometimes breaks through and nicely sets off the melancholy of their habitual facial features, particularly of their mouth. Such cheerfulness is aptly expressed in this context by the motto of *Giordano Bruno*, ‘cheerful in sadness, sad in cheerfulness’.<sup>b</sup>

436 The will is the root of the intellect, and it opposes any activity of the intellect directed to any goal besides its own. This is why the intellect can grasp the external world in a purely objective and profound manner only when it at least occasionally frees itself of these roots. As long as it remains bound, it is entirely incapable of activity on its own and is dulled with sleep until the will (interest) wakes it up and sets it in motion. But when this happens, it is certainly quite capable of cognizing the relations between things in accordance with the interests of the will, just as the clever mind<sup>c</sup> will do, a mind that must always be a wakeful one, i.e. vividly aroused by willing; but this is precisely why it is not able to grasp the purely objective essence of things. For willing and goals render it so one-sided that it sees in things only what relates to this, and the rest either disappears or comes to consciousness in a falsified form. So for instance someone travelling in fear and haste will see the Rhine and its banks only as a line, and the bridge over it only as a second line intersecting that first. In the mind of a person preoccupied with his own goals, the world looks just as a place of beauty would look on a battlefield map. These are of course extremes, chosen for their clarity: but even a very small excitation of the will always results in a small, but always analogous falsification of cognition. The world can emerge in its true colours and shapes, in its full and proper meaning, only when the intellect hovers over objects freely and on its own, and is energetically active<sup>d</sup> without being driven by the will. This of course conflicts with the nature and function of the intellect, and is to this extent unnatural and hence exceedingly rare: but it is also precisely the essence of the *genius*; only in the genius does this state exist continuously and at a high degree, while in most other people it occurs only as an approximation and as an exception. – It is in this sense that I understand *Jean Paul’s* description of the essence of genius (‘Introduction to Aesthetics’, § 12) as *clarity of*

<sup>a</sup> *überirdischer Heiterkeit*

<sup>b</sup> *In tristitia hilaris, in hilaritate tristis* [from the comedy *Il Calendaio* (*The candle bearer*) (1582)]

<sup>c</sup> *der kluge Kopf*

<sup>d</sup> *energisch tätig ist*

*mind*.<sup>a</sup> Normal people are sunk in the maelstrom and turmoil of life, where they belong by virtue of their wills: their intellects are filled by the things and events of life: but they are not remotely aware of the objective meaning of these things, or even of life itself; just as the businessman in the Amsterdam stock exchange hears perfectly what the man next to him says without taking in the constant booming of the exchange, even though it is a sound like the roar of the ocean and shocking to a distant observer. On the other hand, for the genius whose intellect has broken free from the will which is to say from the person,<sup>b</sup> what concerns the will and the person do not conceal from him the world and the things themselves; rather he becomes distinctly aware of them, he perceives them in and for themselves in objective intuition: he has in this sense *clarity of mind*.

437

This *clarity of mind* is what enables the painter to faithfully reproduce nature on canvas as it appears before his eyes, and enables the poet to accurately evoke the intuitive present in abstract concepts by expressing it and thus bringing it to clear consciousness, putting into words all the things that other people merely feel. – An animal lives without any clarity of mind. It has consciousness, i.e. it has cognition of itself, of its own weal and woes, and also of the objects that bring these about. But its cognition is only ever subjective and never becomes objective: everything that comes before it seems self-evident and can therefore never become a theme<sup>c</sup> (object of presentation)<sup>d</sup> or a problem (object of meditation). Its consciousness is therefore completely *immanent*. The consciousness of human beings of the common variety, while clearly not the same as an animal's, is nonetheless constitutionally related, since its perception of things and the world remains overwhelmingly subjective and predominantly immanent. It perceives things in the world, but not the world itself; it perceives its own action and suffering, but not itself. Just as clarity of consciousness increases by infinite gradations, clarity of mind becomes increasingly evident, and thus it gradually comes about that sometimes, though rarely, and in highly diverse grades of clarity, the mind is struck as if by lightning with the question 'what is everything?' or even 'how is it really constituted?'<sup>e</sup> The first question, when it achieves great clarity and is sustained in the present, produces a philosopher and the second question, in a similar way, makes for an artist or poet. This is why these high callings are grounded in clarity

<sup>a</sup> *Besonnenheit*

<sup>b</sup> *von der Person*

<sup>c</sup> *Vorwurf*

<sup>d</sup> *Darstellung*

<sup>e</sup> *beschaffen*

of mind, which comes first from the distinctness of their awareness of the world and themselves, by means of which they achieve clarity about the world and about themselves.<sup>a</sup> But the whole process arises from the intellect occasionally and by its own preponderance breaking free from the will that it originally serves.<sup>12</sup>

438

Our present discussion of genius supplements the presentation, in Chapter 22, of the *increasing separation of the will and the intellect* that can be perceived in the whole order of beings. This separation reaches its highest degree in the genius, where it culminates in the complete detachment of the intellect from its root, the will, so that the intellect becomes completely free, at which point the *world as representation* first achieves its complete objectivation. –

Now several remarks concerning the individuality of genius. – According to Cicero (*Tusculan Disputations* I, 33), Aristotle had already noted that ‘all geniuses are melancholy’,<sup>b</sup> which is doubtless a reference to the passage in Aristotle’s *Problems*,<sup>c</sup> 30, 1.<sup>13</sup> Goethe too says:

My poetic flames were very slight,  
As long as I encountered good;  
However they burned strong and bright  
When from the threat of ill I fled. –  
Like rainbows too, the tender poem  
Is sketched upon a darker ground,  
So poet’s genius finds its home  
Where melancholia too is found.<sup>d</sup>

This can be explained by the fact that, since the will always enforces its primal dominance over the intellect, the intellect withdraws from it more readily under unpropitious personal circumstances. This is because it is happy to turn away<sup>e</sup> from disagreeable situations so as to distract itself to a certain extent, and directs itself towards the alien external world with that much more personal energy, making it easier for it to become purely objective. Propitious personal circumstances have the opposite effect. In general, however, the melancholy accompanying genius is due to the fact that the will to life perceives the misery of its condition more clearly, the brighter the intellect it finds itself illuminated by.<sup>14</sup> – The troubled disposition so frequently noted in highly gifted minds can be symbolized by *Mount Blanc*, whose peak is usually clouded over: but on

<sup>a</sup> zur Besinnung darüber kommen

<sup>b</sup> omnes ingeniosos melancholicos esse

<sup>c</sup> *Problemata* [953a10. The work’s attribution to Aristotle is disputed]

<sup>d</sup> [from *Sprüche in Reimen* (*Sayings in rhymes*), ‘Sprichwörtlich’ (‘Proverbial’)]

<sup>e</sup> sich gern abwendet

the occasions, usually early in the morning, when the veil of clouds is rent and the mountain is red with sunlight, looking down from its celestial heights over the clouds at *Chamouni*; then this is a sight to touch anyone to the depths of his heart. In the same way, the mostly melancholy genius occasionally shows the distinctive cheerfulness that we have described above, one possible for him alone, emerging from the most perfect objectivity of the mind, hovering like a burst of light above his high forehead: 'cheerful in sadness, sad in cheerfulness'.<sup>a</sup> –

What makes people blunderers<sup>b</sup> is always the fact that their intellect (still tied too solidly to the will) needs to be spurred on by the will in order to become active, and thus remains entirely in its service. Such people are therefore incapable of goals other than personal ones. In line with these they produce bad paintings, spiritless poems, superficial, absurd, and very often even dishonest philosophemes, namely when they try to recommend themselves to higher authorities through pious dishonesty. All their deeds and thoughts are personal. Thus they are at best able to approximate those external, incidental and arbitrary elements of true works by way of mannerism, where they grasp onto the shell instead of the kernel, nevertheless claiming to have achieved everything, and even claiming to have surpassed the true works. If the failure nonetheless becomes obvious, many of them still hope that they will succeed in the end by dint of their good will. But it is precisely this good will that makes success impossible, because such a will can only be directed to personal goals, and this prevents art, poetry, and philosophy from ever achieving seriousness. The saying is quite apt here: such people put themselves in the spotlight. They have no idea that only an intellect that has broken free of the dominance of the will and all of its projects, one that has thereby become freely active, is capable of genuine productions (because only such an intellect brings with it true seriousness): and this is good for them, because they would otherwise go and drown themselves. – In *morality*, *good will* is everything; but in *art* it is nothing: there, as the word already implies, only *ability* matters.<sup>c</sup> – Everything depends ultimately on what a person is truly *serious* about. Almost all are serious only about their own well-being<sup>d</sup> and that of the people closest to them so that they can promote this and nothing else; no resolution, no voluntary and intentional effort can create profound and genuine seriousness or replace it when it is lacking or, more accurately, transfer it from

<sup>a</sup> *in tristitia hilaris, in hilaritate tristis* [see p. 398, n. b]

<sup>b</sup> *Pfuscher*

<sup>c</sup> [art is *Kunst*, and ability *Können*, cognate words in German]

<sup>d</sup> *Wohl*

- 440 something else. It always remains where nature has put it; but all endeavours are half-hearted without it. This also explains why people of genius often do not take very good care of their own welfare.<sup>a</sup> Just as a leaden pendulum always brings a body back to the position determined by the pendulum's centre of gravity, what a person is truly serious about always pulls the strength and attention of his intellect back *to where it is*: everything else that person does is *lacking in true seriousness*. That is why only exceedingly rare, abnormal people, who are truly serious not about personal and practical matters but objective and theoretical ones, are able to grasp the essential nature of things and the world, which is to say the highest truths, and to reproduce them in some way or another. For this kind of seriousness about things that lie outside the individual, about what is *objective*, is something foreign to human nature, something unnatural, genuinely preternatural: yet this is the only thing that makes a human being *great*, and what he does is then ascribed to a genial influence<sup>b</sup> distinct from himself that takes possession of him. For such a human being, his pictures, poems, or thoughts are the *goal*, everything else is the *means*. Those of the first type pursue *their own interests*, and usually know how to advance them since they curry favour with their contemporaries and are ready to serve their needs and moods: this is why they usually live in happy circumstances; the second type often lives in a great deal of misery, because he sacrifices his personal welfare to the *objective* goal; he can do nothing else, because this is what he is serious about. With the first type, it is the other way around. This is why such people are *petty*, while he is *great*. Accordingly, his work is for all time, but it is usually only recognized by posterity: *they* live and die with their epoch. The person who is *great does not pursue his own interests* in what he does,<sup>c</sup> whether practically or theoretically; but instead only pursues an *objective* goal. He is great in practical matters even if this goal is misunderstood, and even if he is called a criminal for it. It is the fact that *he does not look out for himself and his own interests* that makes him *great* in whatever circumstances he finds himself. By contrast, all endeavours directed to personal goals are *petty*; because someone set in motion in this way recognizes
- 441 and finds himself only in his own, vanishingly petty person. On the other hand, someone *great* recognizes himself in everything and thus in the whole: he does not live exclusively in the microcosm as those others do, but much more in the macrocosm. This is why he is suited to the whole, and this he tries to grasp in order to represent it, or to explain it, or to affect it in a practical way. For it is not alien to him; he feels that it concerns him. He is called *great*

<sup>a</sup> *Wohlfahrt*

<sup>b</sup> *Genius*

<sup>c</sup> *bei seinem Wirken . . . nicht seine Sache sucht*

because of this expansion of his sphere. Thus it is only the true hero, in any sense, and the genius, who deserve this noble predicate: it signifies that in defiance of human nature they have not pursued their own interest, they have not lived for themselves but for everyone. – Just as the vast majority of people must obviously *always* be petty and can *never* be great; the opposite is not possible, namely for someone to be entirely, i.e. always and in every moment, great:

For man is made from common things,  
And calls custom his nursemaid.<sup>a</sup>

Every great man must nonetheless often be a mere individual with only *himself* in view, and that means being *petty*. This is the reason for that most accurate saying that no man remains a hero to his valet; not that the valet does not know how to value the hero – which Goethe serves up as Otilie's idea in *Elective Affinities*<sup>b</sup> (vol. 2, ch. 5).<sup>15</sup> –

Genius is its own reward: because the best of what a man is, he must necessarily be for himself. 'Someone *with* talent, born *to* a talent, will find it to be the excellence of his existence,' says Goethe.<sup>c</sup> When we look back at a great man from the past, we do not think: 'how lucky he is that even now we all still admire him' but rather: 'how lucky he must have been to take immediate pleasure in a mind whose vestigial traces have invigorated people for centuries'. Value lies not in fame itself, but in what secures the fame, and pleasure is to be found in begetting immortal children. So those who try to prove the nothingness of posthumous fame on the grounds that the person who achieves it does not experience it are similar to the subtle wit who with great sagacity pointed out the utter uselessness of the pile of oyster shells to the man gazing enviously at them in his neighbour's yard.

442

Given what we have said about the essence of genius, genius is contrary to nature<sup>d</sup> to the extent that it consists in the intellect (whose true function is to serve the will) emancipating itself from this service to be active in its own right. Genius therefore is an intellect untrue to its function.<sup>16</sup> This is the basis of its attendant *disadvantages*, and we will now introduce this theme by comparing genius with a less decisive preponderance of the intellect.

<sup>a</sup> [Schiller, *Wallensteins Tod* (*Wallenstein's Death*) (1799), I, 4]

<sup>b</sup> *Wahlverwandschaften* [see p. 309, n. b]

<sup>c</sup> [*Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* (*Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*) (1795–6), Book I, ch. 14]

<sup>d</sup> *naturwidrig*



443

The intellect in a normal person is tightly bound in the service of his will and is therefore concerned only with receiving motives. It can, accordingly, be seen as a system of strings that put each of these marionettes into motion on the world stage. This is the source of the dry, grave seriousness found in most people, a seriousness surpassed only by that of animals, which never laugh. We could, by way of contrast, compare genius with its unfettered intellect to one of the living human beings who play alongside the huge marionettes of the famous Milan puppet theatre: they are the only ones in the group to perceive everything and therefore gladly exit the stage for a while so they can enjoy the play from the boxes – this is the clarity of mind of the genius. – But even someone with an enormous capacity for understanding and reason, who could almost be called wise, is utterly and completely distinct from genius in that his intellect retains a *practical* bent, concerned with choosing out the very best means and ends, and hence it remains in the service of the will, possessed of a thoroughly natural<sup>a</sup> set of concerns and projects. The solid and practical attitude of taking life seriously (called *gravitas* by the Romans) presupposes that the intellect does *not* leave the service of the will to launch forth towards things of no concern to the will. So it does not allow for that separation between will and intellect that is the condition for the *genius*. The clever, even eminent mind, well equipped for great achievements in the practical sphere, is clever because objects provide a lively stimulation for its will and inspire it to a restless examination of their conditions and relations. Its intellect has therefore always grown closely in tandem with the will. In the mind of a genius, by contrast, given his objective manner of apprehension, the appearance of the world always hovers before his eyes as something foreign to him, an object of contemplation, that pushes willing out of its consciousness. The distinction between the capacity for *deeds* and the capacity for *works* revolves around this point. The latter requires objectivity and depth of cognition, which presupposes a complete separation<sup>b</sup> of the intellect and the will; the former, on the other hand, requires the use of cognition, presence of mind, and decisiveness, and these require the intellect to be ceaselessly engaged in service to the will. Where the bond between intellect and will is broken, intellect will neglect its service of the will to which it is devoted as its natural function: for example, even in the need of the moment, it will insist on its emancipation and will not be able to stop itself from grasping the picturesque aspect of an environment in which the individual is threatened with present danger. By contrast, the intellect belonging to the man of reason and understanding is always at its post, it is directed to the situation and its exigencies: it will always determine

<sup>a</sup> *naturgemäß*

<sup>b</sup> *Sonderung*

and execute what is required by the occasion, and will never succumb to those eccentricities, personal faux pas, even stupidities that the genius is exposed to because his intellect does not remain the guide and guardian of his will but is rather absorbed in pure objectivity, sometimes more so and sometimes less so. Goethe, in the opposition between Tasso and Antonio,<sup>a</sup> gives us a vivid portrayal of the contrast we are presenting in abstract terms, the contrast between the two completely different types of faculty. The frequently noted relationship between genius and madness is due mainly to the division between intellect and will, a division that is essential to genius but contrary to nature. But this can in no way be accounted for by claiming that genius's will is less intense – indeed, a condition of genius is a vehement and passionate character: rather, it can be explained by the fact that someone who excels in practical matters, the man of action, has no more than the full measure of intellect needed by an energetic will, while in most people even this is lacking; but genius consists in a completely abnormal, really excessive amount of intellect of the kind that is not required by any service to the will. This is precisely why men of true works are a thousand times rarer than men of action. It is precisely that abnormal excess that enables intellect to gain the decisive advantage, tearing itself free from the will and then, forgetful of its origin, becoming freely active from its own energy and elasticity; and it is out of this that the creations of genius come to be produced.

444

Further, the fact that genius consists in the operation of the free intellect, i.e. the intellect emancipated from the will, means that the productions of genius do not serve a useful goal. Music gets made, or philosophy, a painting, or a poem – a work of genius is not a useful thing. It belongs to the character of a work of genius that it has no use:<sup>b</sup> this is its title of nobility. All other human works exist either to maintain or alleviate our existence; only the ones of which we are speaking do not: they alone exist for their own sake and in this sense should be looked upon as the flower or the pure profit of existence.<sup>17</sup> That is why the pleasure we feel in them gladdens our hearts: then we rise above earth's heavy atmosphere of neediness and distress. – Analogously, even apart from this we rarely see the beautiful united with the useful. Tall and beautiful trees do not bear fruit; fruit trees are small and ugly cripples.<sup>c</sup> The plump and swollen garden rose is not fruitful, only the small, wild, almost scentless one is. The most beautiful buildings are not useful ones: a temple is not a dwelling place. Someone with rare and lofty mental gifts<sup>d</sup> who

<sup>a</sup> [in the play *Torquato Tasso* (1790)]

<sup>b</sup> unnütz zu sein

<sup>c</sup> Krüppel

<sup>d</sup> Geistesgaben

is compelled to pursue a merely useful profession to which the most ordinary of people would be suited, is like a precious vase decorated with the most beautiful designs that is used as a cooking pot; and to compare useful people to people of genius is like comparing building stones to diamonds.<sup>18</sup>

The merely practical person therefore uses his intellect in accordance with its natural function, namely for grasping the relations of things, in part  
 445 each other and in part to the will of the cognizing individual. The genius on the other hand uses it in a way contrary to its destined function, to grasp the objective essence of things. Thus his mind belongs not to himself but to the world, a world that he is in some sense instrumental in illuminating. Many *disadvantages* must accrue to the individual thus favoured. For his intellect will exhibit the same errors to which every instrument tends when used in a manner for which it was not constructed. First, it will<sup>19</sup> be like the servant of two masters, since it will take every opportunity to break free from the service to which it is destined, in order to follow its own ends, whereby it very often leaves its will in the lurch at the wrong moment, and so the individual thus gifted is more or less useless for life and in fact in his behaviour is sometimes reminiscent of madness. Then, because of his heightened powers of cognition, he will see things more in terms of the universal than the particular; while service to the will predominantly requires cognition of particulars. But if occasionally the full brunt of that abnormally heightened cognitive power is suddenly directed to the affairs and miseries of the will, it will easily grasp these in too vivid a manner, it will view everything in colours that are too harsh, a light that is too bright, and magnified to a hideous extent, driving the individual to extremes. The following will serve to explain this more precisely. All great theoretical achievements, whatever they may be, come about when the author directs all his mental energies towards a single point, and then unites and concentrates them so strongly, solidly and exclusively in this point that all the rest of the world now vanishes for him and his object fills out all reality. This great and powerful concentration is one of the privileges of genius who sometimes applies it to objects of reality and the affairs of daily life which then, brought into such focus, are so hideously magnified that they look like a flea in a solar microscope that has assumed elephantine proportions. This is why highly gifted individuals will sometimes fall prey to  
 446 the most diverse assortment of violent affects over trivialities, in a way incomprehensible to other people, seeing them transformed into sorrow, joy, concern, fear, rage, etc. by things that leave ordinary people entirely unperturbed.<sup>20</sup> Genius therefore lacks *sobriety*,<sup>a</sup> which consists in not seeing more in

<sup>a</sup> *Nüchternheit*

things than is really there, particularly with respect to our possible goals: that is why no sober person can be a genius. Allied to these disadvantages of genius is the excessive sensibility that comes with an abnormally heightened neural and cerebral life; these are in fact combined with the cheerfulness and passion of willing that are always conditions for genius and that present themselves physically as the energy of the heartbeat. All of this easily gives rise to that high-strung disposition, that violence of affects, that rapid change of mood, with melancholy predominating, that Goethe has brought before our eyes with Tasso. What rationality, what a peaceful constitution, perfect overview, complete assurance and measured conduct we see in a well-constituted normal person, in contrast to the genius with his sometimes dreamlike absorption, sometime passionate excitement, but whose inner sufferings are the maternal womb of immortal works. – To all this we might add that it is essential that the life of a genius be lonely. Genius is too rare to easily meet with another, and too different from everyone else for companionship with them. With other people willing predominates, with the genius cognition predominates: this is why the joys of others are not his, and his are not theirs. They are merely moral beings and have merely personal relations: he is at the same time pure intellect, which as such belongs to the whole of humanity. His intellectual train of thought which has broken free of the will, its maternal ground, returning to it only periodically, will soon become radically different from the train of thought of a normal intellect, which clings to its stem. For this reason, and due to the inequality of the pace of his thoughts, the genius is not suited for common thought, i.e. for conversation with those others: they will take as little pleasure from him and his oppressive superiority as he will from them. They will therefore feel more comfortable with their equals, and he will prefer conversation with his equals, although this is usually only possible through the works they have left behind. Thus *Chamfort* was quite right to say: ‘not many vices hinder a man from having many friends as the vice of having too many great qualities’.<sup>a</sup> The happiest lot that can fall to genius is a release from ordinary hustle and bustle,<sup>b</sup> which is not his element, with plenty of leisure for productivity. – All this suggests that although the gift of genius might make the person thus gifted very happy during the hours when he can devote himself to it and revel in its pleasures without hindrance, the same gift of genius is absolutely unfit to prepare him for a happy course through life, quite the opposite. This is also confirmed by the experiences set down in biographies.

447

<sup>a</sup> *Il y a peu de vices qui empêchent un homme d'avoir beaucoup d'amis, autant que peuvent le faire de trop grandes qualités* [Sébastien-Roch Nicolas de Chamfort, *Maximes et pensées (Maxims and thoughts)* (1795), ch. 2]

<sup>b</sup> *Thun und Lassen*

We can add to this an external incongruity, in that a genius is, in his very activities and accomplishments,<sup>a</sup> for the most part at odds and at war with his age. Merely talented men are always timely: because, just as they are stimulated by the spirit of their age and called forth by its needs, so they are capable of satisfying only exactly these needs. They go along with the advancing course of development of their contemporaries, or with the gradual advancement of a special science: for which they reap rewards and approbation. But their works are no longer enjoyable for the next generation: they must be replaced by others, which do not last either. Genius on the other hand enters its age as a comet enters the orbit of the planets: its own eccentric course is completely foreign to their well-regulated and predictable arrangement. This is why it cannot go along with the pre-given, regular course of development of the age, but rather throws its works far ahead onto the course before it (just as the emperor throws his spear to the enemies while consecrating himself to death), and the age must catch up with them there. Its relation to the men of talent who reach their prime during that age can be expressed in the words of the evangelist: 'My time has not yet come; your time is always there'<sup>b</sup> (John 7:6). – *Talent* is able to accomplish what most people cannot do, but not what they cannot apprehend: thus it can always be valued. By contrast, the achievement of *genius* exceeds not only what others can do, but what they can apprehend: that is why others are not immediately aware of it. Talent is like a marksman who hits a target others cannot reach; genius is like a marksman who hits a target too far for others even to see; that is why it is appreciated only indirectly, and therefore late, and even this appreciation is a matter of trust and faith. Accordingly, Goethe says in his didactic letter, 'imitation is innate in us; what is to be imitated is not easily recognized. Excellence is rarely found and more rarely valued'.<sup>c</sup> And Chamfort says: 'The value of human beings is like the value of diamonds whose size, purity, and perfection have a set and determined price up to a certain point, but beyond this point are priceless and cannot find any purchasers.'<sup>d</sup> Bacon of Verulam also said this: 'the lowest virtues are praised by the vulgar, the middle ones are admired, and the highest are not remotely understood'<sup>e</sup> (*De Augmentis Scientiarum*,<sup>f</sup> Book VI, ch. 3). Indeed, one might retort: by the vulgar!<sup>g</sup> But I must come to his aid with *Machiavelli's* assurance:

<sup>a</sup> *Treiben und Leisten*

<sup>b</sup> Ὁ καιρὸς ὁ ἐμὸς οὕτω παρέστιν· ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὁ ὑμέτερος πάντοτε ἔστιν ἔτοιμος

<sup>c</sup> [*Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*, Book 7, ch. 9 (see p. 403, n. c)]

<sup>d</sup> Il en est de la valeur des hommes comme de celle des diamans, qui, à une certaine mesure de grosseur, de pureté, de perfection, ont un prix fixe et marqué, mais qui, par-delà cette mesure, restent sans prix, et ne trouvent point d'acheteurs [*Maxims and thoughts*, ch. 1. See p. 407, n. a]

<sup>e</sup> *Infimarum virtutum, apud vulgus, laus est, mediarum admiratio, supremarum sensus nullus.*

<sup>f</sup> [See p. 295, n.]

<sup>g</sup> *apud vulgus!*

‘There is nothing in the world but the vulgar’;<sup>a</sup> and as *Thilo (On Fame)*<sup>b</sup> remarked, there is usually one more member of the great masses than each of us believes there to be. – A result of this late recognition of the works of genius is that they are seldom enjoyed by their contemporaries, and therefore seldom enjoyed in the freshness of colour that comes from the present and the timely, but rather, like figs and dates, are much more often enjoyed in the dried state than in the fresh.<sup>21</sup> –

Now when we investigate genius from the somatic side, we find that it is conditioned by several anatomical and physiological qualities which, even separately, are rarely present in their most perfect forms, and are even more rarely to be found complete and together, but are all nonetheless indispensable, which explains why genius only occurs as a completely isolated, almost supernatural<sup>c</sup> exception. The fundamental condition for genius is an abnormal preponderance of sensibility over irritability and reproductive force, and in fact in a male body, which complicates matters. (Females can have significant talent but not genius, because they always remain subjective.) At the same time, the cerebral system must be completely separate and isolated from the ganglion system so that the two are completely opposed, so that the brain leads its parasitical life on the organism in a most decisive, isolated, forceful, and independent manner. Naturally this will lead it to have a somewhat hostile effect on the rest of the organism and, through its high level of vitality and restless activity, to wear it out at an early age unless the organism is also well-constituted and possesses an energetic life force: and so this last item is another condition of genius. Indeed, even a good stomach is a condition, because of the special and narrow co-operation of this organ with the brain. But the main point is that the brain must be unusually large and developed, and in particular wide and high: on the other hand it will have less depth, and the cerebrum will be abnormally large in proportion to the cerebellum. Without a doubt, much depends on the brain’s shape, as a whole and in its parts: but we do not yet know enough<sup>d</sup> to determine how much exactly, although we easily recognize the form of a skull that signifies noble, heightened intelligence. The texture of the brain mass must be extremely fine and complete, and made of the purest, most select, tender, and excitable nervous matter: the quantitative proportion of the white matter to the grey matter certainly has

449

<sup>a</sup> *Nel mondo non è se non volgo* [*Il principe (The prince)* (1532), ch. XVIII: Schopenhauer gives his own translation in a footnote]

<sup>b</sup> *Ueber den Ruhm* [Ludwig Thilo, 1803]

<sup>c</sup> *portentose*

<sup>d</sup> *reichen unsere Kenntnisse noch nicht aus*

a decisive influence, but again we are not yet in a position to state what it might be. The report from the postmortem examination of *Byron's*\* corpse showed that the quantity of white matter was unusually great in proportion to the grey; similarly, that his brain weighed 6 pounds. *Cuvier's* brain weighed 5 pounds: the normal weight is 3 pounds.<sup>22</sup> – In contrast to the excess of brain, the spinal cord and nerves must be unusually thin. A well-rounded, elevated, wide skull with thin bone mass must protect the brain, without constricting it in any way. The whole constitution of the brain and nervous system comes from the mother's side; something we will return to in the next Book. But this is not nearly sufficient to produce the phenomenon of genius unless it is combined with a lively, passionate temperament, which comes from the father's side, and appears somatically as an unusual energy of the heart and consequently of the circulatory system, particularly in the direction of the head. First of all, this is what increases the turgidity particular to the brain, which presses against its walls; this is why the brain oozes from any opening caused by injury to the walls: second, the force of the heart communicates an inner motion to the brain that is distinct from the brain's constant rising and falling with every breath; this inner motion shakes the entire mass of the brain with every pulsation of the four cerebral arteries,<sup>23</sup> and with an energy that must correspond to the increased quantity of the brain, just as this movement is in general an indispensable condition of the brain's activity. A small stature and in particular a short neck is favourable for this, because this lets the blood get to the brain along the shortest path and with more energy: this is why great minds rarely have great bodies. Still, it is not an indispensable condition that this path be short: *Goethe* for instance was taller than average. But if the whole condition concerning the circulatory system (and thus coming from the father's side) is missing, then the favourable constitution of the brain that comes from the mother will produce at most a talent, a subtle understanding supported by the phlegmatic temperament that then ensues: but a phlegmatic genius is not possible. This condition of genius from the father's side explains many of its temperamental flaws as described above. But on the other hand, if this condition is present without the first, which is to say with a normal or even poorly constituted brain, then the result is vitality without spirit, heat without light; then madmen are produced, people with unbearable restlessness and petulance. The fact that among two brothers only one will have genius and that one is usually the elder, as for instance was the case with *Kant* – this can be explained primarily by the fact that

\* In *Medwin's Conversations of Lord Byron*, p. 333. [Thomas Medwin, *Journal of the Conversations of Lord Byron* (1824)]

only in begetting *him* was the father at an age of strength and passion, although the other condition that comes from the mother can also be ruined by unfavourable circumstances.

I still need to insert a special remark here concerning the *childlike* character of genius, i.e. concerning a certain similarity to be found between genius and childhood. – In childhood, as with genius, the cerebral and nervous system has a decisive preponderance, because its development far outstrips that of the rest of the organism; so that the brain has already reached its full extent and mass by the seventh year. This is why *Bichat* says: ‘In childhood, the nervous system is proportionately much more considerable in comparison to the muscular system than in all later stages of life, while later on most other systems are more prominent than it. It is well known that one always chooses children to make a thorough study of the nerves’ (*Of Life and Death*, article 8, § 6).<sup>a</sup> The genital system on the other hand develops last, and it is not until the beginning of manhood that irritability, reproduction and the genital function are in full force, but then they are usually more prominent than the cerebral function. This explains why children are in general so clever, rational, eager to know, apt to learn and on the whole better suited for theoretical employment than adults: because of this course of development, they have more intellect than will, i.e. than inclination, desire, passion. For intellect and brain are one, and likewise the genital system is the same as the most vehement of all desires: which is why I have dubbed it the focal point of the will.<sup>b</sup> Precisely because the depraved activity of the genital system is still dormant while the activity of the brain is already fully stimulated, childhood is the age of innocence and happiness, the paradise of life, the lost Eden to which we look back with longing for the rest of our lives. The basis of this happiness, however, is that in childhood our entire existence lies much more in cognition than in willing, and this circumstance is also given external support by the novelty of all objects. Thus the world lies before us in the morning splendour of life, so fresh, so attractive, shimmering with such enchantment. The petty desires, vacillating inclinations and trifling cares of childhood offer only a weak counterweight to the prevalence of cognizing activity. The clear and innocent look of children, which gives us strength and which in a few individuals sometimes achieves the sublime,

451

452

<sup>a</sup> *Dans l'enfance le système nerveux, comparé au musculaire, est proportionnellement plus considérable que dans tous les âges suivans, tandis que, par la suite, la plupart des autres systèmes prédominent sur celui-ci. On sait que, pour bien voir les nerfs, on choisit toujours les enfans* ([*Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort*, Art. 8, §.6] [See p. 260, n. b])

<sup>b</sup> *Brennpunkt des Willens*



contemplative expression with which *Raphael* dignified his angels, can be explained by what we said. Accordingly, the mental powers develop much earlier than the needs they are destined to serve: and here as everywhere, nature acts in a most purposive manner. For in this age of prevailing intelligence, the human being assembles a great store of cognitions for future needs that are at this time still foreign to him. This is why his intellect is tirelessly active, grasping greedily on all appearances, mulling them over and storing them up carefully for times to come – like a bee that gathers much more honey than it can digest, in anticipation of future needs. It is certain that a human being acquires overall more ideas and knowledge before the onset of puberty than he will learn subsequently, however learned he might become: because this is the foundation for all human cognition. – Up until the same time, plasticity predominates in the child's body, but later, after it has completed its work, its forces are applied by means of a metastasis to the reproductive system so that the sex drive is introduced at puberty and now the will gradually comes to predominate. Childhood, in which a bent for theory and a desire to learn are dominant, is followed by the unruly, sometimes stormy, sometimes depressive adolescence, which then turns into ardent and serious manhood. It is precisely because children do not have that drive, so pregnant with disaster, that their willing is so moderate and subordinate to cognition, and it is this that gives rise to that character of innocence, intelligence and rationality that is typical of childhood. – So I hardly need to describe the basis of the similarity between childhood and genius: it lies in the excess of the forces of cognition over the needs of the will, and in the resultant predominance of the activity of cognition. Every child is really to a certain extent a genius, and every genius to a certain extent a child. The relation between the two is shown primarily in the naïvety and sublime simplicity<sup>a</sup> which is a basic feature of the true genius; it also comes to light in many features besides these; so that a certain childishness definitely belongs to the character of the genius. In *Riemer's Reports on Goethe*<sup>b</sup> (vol. 1, p. 184) he mentions that Herder and others criticized Goethe for being forever a big child: they were certainly correct in saying this, but incorrect in criticizing. It was said of *Mozart* as well that he remained a child his whole life (Nissen's biography of Mozart: pp. 2 and 529).<sup>c</sup> Schlichtegroll's *Necrology*<sup>d</sup> (of 1791, vol. II, p. 109) says of him: 'artistically he became a man early on, but in all other respects he remained a child'.<sup>24</sup> Every genius is a big child in that he peers into

<sup>a</sup> *erhabenen Einfalt*

<sup>b</sup> *Mittheilungen über Goethe* [Friedrich Wilhelm Riemer, 1841]

<sup>c</sup> [Georg Nicolaus von Nissen, 1829]

<sup>d</sup> *Nekrolog [auf das Jahr 1791]* (Adolph Heinrich Friedrich von Schlichtegroll, 1793)]

the world as if it were something foreign, a theatrical performance, and therefore does so with a purely objective interest. This is why he, like a child, has none of that dry seriousness we see in most people who, incapable of only subjective interest, only ever see in things motives for their deeds. Someone who does not to some extent remain a big child his whole life long but instead becomes a serious, sober, completely staid and rational man can be a very useful and competent citizen of this world, but never a genius. Someone is a genius by virtue of the fact that the preponderance of the sensible system and cognitive activity, natural in childhood, remains with him, atypically, throughout his whole life and is thus perennial. A trace of this can of course be seen even in many ordinary people up until adolescence; thus for instance many students still unmistakably demonstrate a purely intellectual striving as well as the eccentricity of genius. But nature returns to its tracks: they withdraw into a sort of pupal state and come back again in manhood as the incarnations of philistines who we are horrified to reencounter in later years. – The whole process described here is also the basis of Goethe's wonderful remark 'Children do not do what they promise: young people very seldom, and when they keep their word the world doesn't keep its word to them' (*Elective Affinities*,<sup>a</sup> Part I, ch. 10). Namely, the world that afterwards bestows the crowns for service that it holds on high, on those who have become tools of its base intentions, or who know how to deceive it. – Given what we have said, just as there is a beauty exclusive to youth that almost everyone possesses at some point (a diabolical beauty),<sup>b</sup> there is also an intellectuality exclusive to youth, a certain intellectual essence that is inclined towards and suited for comprehension, understanding, and learning, and which everyone has in their childhood, which several retain in their youth, but which is subsequently lost, just as that beauty is lost. Only in extremely few people, the elect, does the one remain, like the other, throughout the whole of life; so that even in advanced age a trace of it is still visible: these people are truly beautiful, and truly geniuses.<sup>25</sup>

454

Our remarks concerning the predominance of the cerebral nervous system and intelligence in childhood and its retreat in ripe old age are significantly clarified and confirmed by the fact that, in the animal species closest to humans, the apes, the same relation can be found in a striking degree. It has gradually become certain that the highly intelligent orangutan is a young pongo<sup>c</sup> which, when it grows up, loses the marked facial

<sup>a</sup> *Wahlverwandschaften* see p. 309, n. b

<sup>b</sup> *beauté du diable*

<sup>c</sup> [According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, this is a large anthropoid African ape, now known to be mistakenly identified with the orangutan]

similarity to humanity along with its astonishing intelligence because the lower, animal part of the face increases in size, causing the forehead to recede; the great *cristae* for muscular development give the skull an animal shape, the activity of the nervous system declines and in its place an extraordinary muscular strength develops that now suffices for its maintenance and renders its enormous intelligence superfluous. Of particular importance is what Frédéric<sup>a</sup> Cuvier said in this respect and Flourens explained in a review of the former's *Histoire naturelle*, which is found in the September 1839 issue of the *Journal des Savans* and also, with several additions, is separately printed under the heading: *Analytic Review of the Observations of Fr. Cuvier on the Instinct and Intelligence of Animals*,<sup>b</sup> by Flourens, 1841. There, on page 50, it says: 'the intelligence of the orangutan, an intelligence that is so highly developed, and developed so early, diminishes with age. When the orangutan is young, it astonishes us with its acuity, its cunning and its artfulness, but when the orangutan becomes an adult it is nothing more than a coarse, brutal, untrainable animal, and it is the same with all the other apes as it is with the orangutan. In all of them, intelligence diminishes in proportion as their strength grows. The animal with the most intelligence only possesses this intelligence at a young age.'<sup>c</sup> – Further, p. 87: 'Apes of all kinds present the same inverse ratio of age to intelligence. Thus for example the entelle (a species of guenon, of the subspecies *semnopithecus*, one of the apes that is venerated in the religion of the Brahmins) has, when it is young, a large forehead, an only slightly protruding muzzle, an elevated and rounded skull, etc. With age, the forehead recedes and the muzzle becomes more prominent and its behaviour changes no less than its physique, apathy, violence and the need for solitude replace acuity, docility and trust. These differences are so great, according to Mr Frédéric Cuvier, that if we adopt our usual habit of judging the actions of animals in the same way as our own, we would take the juvenile animal for a mature individual, when all the moral qualities of the species have been acquired, and the adult entelle for something that possesses nothing but its physical strength. But nature does not proceed in the same way with these animals: they must not leave

<sup>a</sup> Friedrich [brother of the more famous Georges Cuvier]

<sup>b</sup> *Résumé analytique des observations de Fr. Cuvier sur l'instinct et l'intelligence des animaux*

<sup>c</sup> *L'intelligence de l'orang-outang, cette intelligence si développée, et développée de si bonne heure, décroît avec l'âge. L'orang-outang, lorsqu'il est jeune, nous étonne par sa pénétration, par sa ruse, par son adresse; l'orang-outang, devenu adulte, n'est plus qu'un animal grossier, brutal, intraitable. Et il en est de tous les singes comme de l'orang-outang. Dans tous, l'intelligence décroît à mesure que les forces s'accroissent. L'animal qui a le plus d'intelligence, n'a toute cette intelligence que dans le jeune âge.*

the narrow sphere accorded to them and which suffices, so to speak, to oversee their survival. When they had no strength, they needed intelligence to do this, but once strength is acquired, every other capacity loses its utility.’<sup>a</sup> – And p. 118: ‘The preservation of the species does not depend less on the intellectual qualities of the animals than on their organic qualities.’<sup>b</sup> This last confirms my claim that the intellect, like claws and teeth, is nothing other than an instrument in the service of the will.

<sup>a</sup> *Les singes de tous les genres offrent ce rapport inverse de l'âge et de l'intelligence. Ainsi, par exemple, l'Entelle (espèce de guenon du sous-genre des Semno-pithèques et l'un des singes vénérés dans la religion des Brame) a, dans le jeune âge, le front large, le museau peu saillant, le crâne élevé, arrondi, etc. Avec l'âge le front disparaît, recule, le museau proémine; et le moral ne change pas moins que le physique: l'apathie, la violence, le besoin de solitude, remplacent la pénétration, la docilité, la confiance. Ces différences sont si grandes, dit Mr. Fréd. Cuvier, que dans l'habitude où nous sommes de juger des actions des animaux par les nôtres, nous prendrions le jeune animal pour un individu de l'âge, où toutes les qualités morales de l'espèce sont acquises, et l'Entelle adulte pour un individu qui n'aurait encore que ses forces physiques. Mais la nature n'en agit pas ainsi avec ces animaux, qui ne doivent pas sortir de la sphère étroite, qui leur est fixée, et à qui il suffit en quelque sorte de pouvoir veiller à leur conservation. Pour cela l'intelligence était nécessaire, quand la force n'existait pas, et quand celle-ci est acquise, toute autre puissance perd de son utilité.*

<sup>b</sup> *La conservation des espèces ne repose pas moins sur les qualités intellectuelles des animaux, que sur leurs qualités organiques.*

*On Madness*

True mental health<sup>a</sup> consists in a perfect recollection of the past.<sup>b</sup> Of course this should not be understood as our memory's retaining everything: the path we have already traversed through life dwindles away in time, just as a wanderer who glances behind him sees his path dwindle away in space, so that we sometimes have difficulty distinguishing particular years, and days become for the most part indiscernible. But in fact only events that are exactly the same and endlessly repeated, whose images cover each other over, as it were, only these events run together in memory to the point where they become indiscernible: on the other hand, every event that is somehow distinctive or meaningful can be relocated in memory, provided the intellect is normal, strong and completely healthy. – In the text I presented *madness* as the *torn* thread of memory that runs steadily ahead, though with constantly diminishing fullness and clarity. The following remarks will serve to confirm this.

A healthy person's memory possesses certainty concerning an event he witnessed, and this certainty is regarded as equally settled and secure as his present perception of a thing; and so his sworn testimony to the event will establish it before a court of law. By contrast, the mere suspicion of madness<sup>c</sup> will weaken a witness's testimony at once. This then is the criterion that distinguishes mental health from insanity.<sup>d</sup> As soon as I doubt whether an event I remember actually took place, I cast the suspicion of madness on myself, unless I am uncertain whether it was merely a dream. If another person doubts the actuality of an event I have recounted as an eye witness without impugning my honesty, then he thinks I am insane. If, through constant retelling of some originally concocted event,

\* This chapter relates to the second half of § 36 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *Gesundheit des Geistes*

<sup>b</sup> *Rück Erinnerung*

<sup>c</sup> *des Wahnsinns*

<sup>d</sup> *Verrücktheit*

someone eventually comes to believe it himself, then he really is, on this one point, already insane.<sup>26</sup> We can attribute witty ideas, isolated, shrewd thoughts and even accurate judgments to the insane, but no one will give credence to their testimony concerning past events. In the *Lalitavistara*, the well-known life story of the Buddha Shakyamuni, it is said that at the moment of his birth, the sick throughout the world became healthy, the blind began to see, the deaf began to hear, and the mad 'recovered their memory'. This latter is even mentioned in two passages.\*,<sup>27</sup>

457

My own experience over many years has led me to suspect that madness emerges most frequently in actors. And how these people abuse their memories! Every day they have to learn a new role or refresh an old one: and these roles have no connection to each other; in fact they conflict and oppose each other, and every evening the actor needs to forget himself entirely to become someone completely different. This leads straight to madness.

The presentation of the origin of madness in the text will be easier to grasp if we bear in mind how loath we are to think of things that are detrimental to our interests, pride, or desires, how hard it is for us to decide to lay them before our intellect for a precise and serious examination, how readily we unconsciously break off or slink away from this study instead, and how by contrast pleasant thoughts enter our minds entirely on their own, and, if driven off, always manage to return so that we dwell on them for hours. In that resistance of the will<sup>a</sup> to allowing the intellect to illuminate what is hostile to itself lies the place where madness can steal upon the mind. Every contrary new event must be assimilated by the intellect, i.e. it must be given a place in the system of truths that relate to our will and its interests, whatever more satisfying reflections it might have to displace. As soon as this takes place, it is much less painful: but this operation is itself often very painful, and typically takes place only slowly and with resistance. Meanwhile the mind can remain healthy only if it is done properly each time. But if the will's resistance and refusal to assimilate some cognition<sup>b</sup> reaches the point where the operation simply cannot be carried out; if, therefore, certain events or circumstances are fully repressed<sup>c</sup> from the intellect because the will cannot bear the sight of them, and if the gap that then arises is patched up with some invention due to the need for

458

\* Rgya Tcher Rol Pa, *Histoire de Bouddha Chakya Mouni* translated from the Tibetan by Foucaux, 1848, p. 91 and 99. [*History of the Buddha Shakyamuni*. Philippe-Eduoard Foucaux, *Rgya Tch'er Rol Pa, ou Développement des jeux, concernant l'histoire du Bouddha Çakya-Mouni* (Paris, 1848)]

<sup>a</sup> *Widerstreben des Willens*

<sup>b</sup> *wider die Aufnahme einer Erkenntniß*

<sup>c</sup> *unterschlagen*

coherence – then there is madness. For the intellect has abandoned its nature in order to please the will: the person imagines what does not exist. Still, the madness that results is the Lethe of intolerable suffering: it was the last resort of tormented nature, i.e. of the will.

I might mention in passing a noteworthy confirmation of my view. *Carlo Gozzi*, in *Mostro turchino*,<sup>a</sup> act 1, scene 2, introduces us to a character who drank a magic potion that caused forgetfulness, and as a result behaves exactly like a madman.

Given what we have been saying, madness can be seen to originate from violently ‘casting something out of one’s mind’,<sup>b</sup> and this is possible only by the ‘putting into one’s head’<sup>c</sup> of something else. The reverse process is rarer, where the ‘putting into one’s head’ is first and the ‘casting out from the mind’ comes next. But it does happen in cases where someone remains constantly in the presence of the cause that triggered his insanity and cannot get away from it: for instance in many of the cases where people have gone mad with love, erotomania, where they continue to indulge the occasioning passion, but the same thing also takes place in the madness that comes from being terrified by a sudden and horrible event. People sick in this way cling with suffocating tightness to the thought they have grasped on to, so that no other thought can take hold, least of all one that could oppose the first. But  
 459 with both processes, the essential feature of the madness remains the same, namely the impossibility of a uniformly coherent recollection, which lies at the base of our healthy, rational soundness of mind. – If the contrast we have presented between the two ways in which madness can arise were applied with judgment, it might perhaps be able to provide a precise and fundamental ground for distinguishing between types of delusion proper.

Incidentally, I have taken into consideration only the psychic origin of madness, that is to say, that which is occasioned by external, objective causes. Still, madness more often rests on purely somatic causes, on malformations or partial disorganizations of the brain or its membranes, and also on the influence that other pathologically affected parts exercise on the brain. False sensory impressions and hallucinations are most likely to occur with the latter form of madness. Nevertheless, each of the causes of madness will for the most part involve the participation of the other, and in particular the psychic will involve the somatic. It is the same as with suicide, which is rarely caused by external factors alone; instead, it is grounded in a certain bodily distress, and an external cause is required in proportion to the level of such

<sup>a</sup> [II] *Mostro Turchino* [*The Blue Monster*, a play of 1764]

<sup>b</sup> *sich aus dem Sinn schlagen*

<sup>c</sup> *sich in den Kopf setzen*

distress; only at the highest level is none required. Thus, there is no unhappiness so great that it would move everyone to suicide, and none so small that something similar to it has not already done so. I have presented the psychic origin of madness due to a great unhappiness as it affects someone who, to all appearances, is healthy. With someone already strongly disposed to madness on somatic grounds, a very slight aggravation<sup>a</sup> will be enough: so for instance I remember a person in a madhouse who had been a soldier and went mad because his officer addressed him in the third person.<sup>b</sup> In people with the critical bodily predisposition, as soon as it reaches maturity, no occasion at all is needed. Madness that arises entirely from psychic causes can, perhaps, through the violent transformation of the thought process that produces it, instigate a sort of paralysis or other type of depravation of some parts of the brain which, if not quickly removed, becomes permanent; thus madness is curable at first but not after any length of time.<sup>28</sup>

Pinel<sup>c</sup> taught that there can be a frenzy without insanity;<sup>d</sup> Esquirol<sup>e</sup> contested this, and much has been said both for and against the idea since then. The question can be decided only empirically. But if such a condition really occurs, it can be explained by the fact that the will periodically withdraws entirely from the dominance and direction of the intellect and therefore from motives, at which point it appears as a blind, unruly, destructive force of nature, and therefore expresses itself as the compulsion to destroy everything in its way. A will that has been let loose in this manner is like a current that has broken from a dam, a horse that has thrown off its rider, or a clock whose containing screws have come undone. Still, it is only reason, which is to say *reflective* cognition, that is affected by this suspension, not *intuitive* cognition; because then the will would be left without any guidance, and the human being would be consequently immobilized. Rather, someone in a frenzy perceives objects, because he breaks loose upon them; he also is conscious of his deeds and remembers them afterwards. But he is entirely without reflection, and is consequently not guided by reason, and is therefore entirely incapable of thinking about or taking into account anything absent, past, or future. When the fit is over and reason has regained the upper hand, it functions perfectly correctly, since its own activity has not been deranged or impaired; rather, the will has simply found a temporary means of evading it entirely.

460

<sup>a</sup> *Widerwärtigkeit*

<sup>b</sup> *weil sein Offizier ihn mit Er angeredet hatte* [*Er* is a form used to address inferiors, especially servants]

<sup>c</sup> [Philippe Pinel, eighteenth- to nineteenth-century asylum reformer]

<sup>d</sup> *mania sine delirio, Raserei ohne Verrücktheit*

<sup>e</sup> [See above, p. 374, n. c]



*Isolated Remarks Concerning Natural Beauty*

461 What contributes to making the sight of a beautiful landscape so utterly delightful is, among other things, the thoroughgoing *truth* and *consistency*<sup>a</sup> of nature. Of course, nature does not follow the guidance of logic in the sequence of grounds of cognition, antecedent and consequent clauses, premises and conclusions; but it does follow the analogous guidance of the law of causality in the visible connection of causes and effects. Every time an object is modified, however slightly, with respect to position, diminution, concealment, distancing, lighting, or linear or atmospheric perspective, etc., this modification is infallibly registered and taken into account quite precisely through its effect on the eye: this bears out the Indian saying ‘every kernel of rice has a shadow’. Everything here displays itself with such complete conviction, such strict adherence to law, such consistent and scrupulous accuracy: there are no dodgy tricks here.<sup>29</sup> Now if we consider the sight of a beautiful view merely as a *phenomenon of the brain*, then it alone, of all the complicated brain phenomena, is completely regular, flawless and perfect, and all others, and in particular our own operations of thought, are more or less afflicted, either formally or materially, with defects and flaws. This advantage accruing to the sight of natural beauty<sup>b</sup> explains both its impression of harmony and complete satisfaction, as well as the positive effect it has on the whole of our thinking which, in its formal aspect, becomes disposed to greater accuracy and becomes to a certain extent clarified, because that one completely flawless brain phenomenon puts the brain in general into a fully normal action, and, now that nature has given it the proper impetus, thought itself attempts to follow that method of nature in the consistency,

\* This chapter relates to § 38 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *Konsequenz*

<sup>b</sup> *der schönen Natur*

coherence, regularity and harmony of all its processes. A beautiful view is therefore a catharsis of the spirit,<sup>a</sup> in the same way that music, according to Aristotle is a catharsis of the feelings,<sup>b</sup> and in its presence we think with the greatest accuracy. –

The sudden sight of a *mountain range* quickly puts us into a serious, even sublime mood, an experience which may in part be due to the fact that the form of the mountains and the contour of the mountain range it helps define is the only *permanent* line of landscape, since only mountains defy the decay that quickly sweeps away everything else, and in particular our own ephemeral person. It is not that we are clearly conscious of these things when we look at a mountain range, rather an obscure sense of this becomes the ground bass of our mood. –

462

I would like to know why it is most flattering for the human form and countenance to be lit from above and least flattering to be lit from below, while precisely the opposite is true for natural landscapes. –

And how aesthetic nature is! Every completely wild and undeveloped little spot, i.e. one left to be free, however small it might be, if only it is kept from human claws, is immediately decorated by nature in the most tasteful manner, clothed in plants, flowers and shrubs whose unforced essence, natural gracefulness<sup>c</sup> and delightful arrangement show that they did not grow up under the whipping stick of the great egoist, but that nature freely holds sway. Every neglected little plot quickly becomes beautiful. This is the principle of the English garden which tries to conceal art as much as possible so that it looks as if nature freely holds sway. Only then is nature perfectly beautiful, i.e. demonstrates with greatest clarity the objectivation of the still non-cognizant will to life, which unfolds itself here with the greatest naïvety, because in this case the forms are determined not by outside goals, as they are in the animal kingdom, but only and immediately by the soil, climate and a mysterious third factor that gives so many plants from the same soil and climate such different shapes and characters.<sup>30</sup>

The huge difference between the English, or more properly Chinese garden and the traditional French garden (which has become rarer, but of which there still exist several superb examples) is ultimately grounded in the fact that the former are laid out in an objective and the latter in a subjective manner. Specifically, in the former, the will of nature, as it objectifies itself in trees, shrubs, mountains, and bodies of water, is

<sup>a</sup> *ein Kathartikon des Geistes* [see *Politics* VIII, 6 (1341b32–1342b17)]

<sup>b</sup> *des Gemüthes*

<sup>c</sup> *Grazie*

- 463 allowed the purest possible expression of these Ideas of its own, which is to say of its own being. The French garden on the other hand reflects only the will of the owner, who has subjugated nature so that instead of its own Ideas, nature bears the forms that suit him but have been forced upon it, as tokens of its slavery: clipped hedges, trees cut into all sorts of shapes, straight avenues, archways, etc.

*On the Inner Essence of Art*

Not only philosophy but also the fine arts work at a fundamental level towards a solution to the problem of existence. In every mind that has ever devoted itself to the pure contemplation of the world there stirs a striving, however hidden and unconscious it may be, to grasp the true essence of things, of life, of existence. For this alone is of interest to the intellect as such, i.e. to the subject of cognition freed from the goals of the will and hence pure; in just the same way, the goals of the will are the only things of interest to the subject that cognizes as a mere individual. – This is why the result of every purely objective, and therefore every artistic grasp of things is one more expression of the essence of life and existence, one more answer to the question: ‘what is life?’ – Every true and successful work of art answers this question in its own way, with complete calm. But the arts speak only in the naïve and childish language of *intuition*, not in the abstract and serious language of *reflection*: their answer is therefore a fleeting image: not a lasting, universal cognition. And thus every artwork answers that question for *intuition*, every painting, every statue, every poem, every scene on stage: even music answers it; and in fact more profoundly than all the others since it expresses the innermost essence of life and existence in a language that is directly comprehensible even though it cannot be translated into the language of reason. All the other arts hold an intuitive image before the questioner and say: ‘look here, this is life!’ – Their answer, as correct as it might be, still only ever grants a temporary, not a total and final, satisfaction. Because they only ever offer a fragment, an example, instead of the rule, not the whole, which can only be given in the universality of the *concept*. To give a permanent and eternally satisfying answer to that question in the abstract,<sup>a</sup> for the concept, and hence for reflection – this is the task of philosophy. Here we see the ground of the

464

\* This chapter relates to § 49 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *in abstracto*

relationship between philosophy and the fine arts, and from this we can deduce the extent to which the capacity for each, although very different in its direction and secondary aspects, is at root the same.

Every work of art is therefore really an attempt to show us life and things as they are in truth. Not everyone can directly grasp these things through the haze of objective and subjective contingencies. Art removes this haze.

The works of the poets, visual and representational artists<sup>a</sup> in general are known to contain a treasure trove of profound wisdom precisely because the wisdom of the nature of things themselves speaks from out of them, and the works interpret these pronouncements of nature only by clarifying and repeating them in a purer form. But it follows that anyone who reads the poem or views the artwork must draw upon his own resources to bring that wisdom to light: and so he only grasps as much as his abilities and education allow, just as every seafarer will drop his plumb line into deep waters as far as its length will reach. Everyone must place himself before a picture as he does before a prince, waiting to see whether and what it will say to him; and not addressing the former any more than the latter, because then he would only hear himself. – Given all this, works of visual art do indeed contain all wisdom but only virtually or implicitly:<sup>b</sup> on the other hand, philosophy tries to render this wisdom actually and explicitly,<sup>c</sup> so that in this sense philosophy is to the visual arts what wine is to grapes. What philosophy promises to provide would be an already realized cash profit, as it were, a solid and lasting possession; while what comes from the achievements and works of art is only something that always has to be created anew. But this is why philosophy makes terrible demands, hard to fulfil, not only on those who create works of philosophy, but on those who enjoy them. Thus its public remains small, while the public for the arts is broad. –

465

Thus, the co-operation required on the part of the spectator to produce the pleasure of a work of art is due in part to the fact that every work of art can operate only through the medium of the imagination;<sup>d</sup> it must therefore stimulate the imagination and can never leave it inactive or out of play. This is a condition of the aesthetic effect and therefore a basic principle for all the fine arts. But it follows that not everything can be given directly to the senses through the artwork, rather only as much is given as is needed to guide the imagination in the right direction: there must always be

<sup>a</sup> *darstellenden Künstler*

<sup>b</sup> *virtualiter oder implicite*

<sup>c</sup> *actualiter und explicite*

<sup>d</sup> *Phantasie*

something left for the imagination to do, and indeed the final thing. Even the author must always leave the reader with something to think about, as *Voltaire* very rightly said: ‘the secret of being boring is to say everything’.<sup>a</sup> Moreover, the very best aspect of art is too intellectual to be given directly to the senses: it must be born in the imagination of the spectator, although begotten by the work of art. This is why the sketches by the great masters are often more effective than their finished paintings; although of course this effect is enhanced by that other advantage of a sketch, that it is completed in one fell swoop, in the moment of conception, while the finished painting comes about only with constant effort using clever deliberations and premeditations, since the inspiration cannot be sustained right up until its completion. – The fundamental aesthetic principle under consideration explains further why *wax figures* can never produce an aesthetic effect and thus are not true works of fine art, even though these very figures imitate nature to the highest degree. They do not leave anything for the imagination to do. Sculpture gives the mere form without colours; painting gives colours but the mere appearance of form: both therefore appeal to the imagination of the spectator. Wax figures on the other hand give everything, form and colours alike: which gives the appearance of reality and leaves the imagination out of play. – *Poetry*, by contrast, appeals to the imagination alone, which it puts into action using only words. –

466

The basic feature of botched work,<sup>b</sup> in all the arts, is playing arbitrarily with the means of art without any real knowledge<sup>c</sup> of its ends. Non-load-bearing supports, aimless ornamentation, prominences and mouldings in bad architecture show this, as do runs and figures that go nowhere as well as pointless noise in bad music, and also the doggerel rhymes of senseless poems, etc. –

The conclusion of the previous chapter and my whole view of art is that its goal is to facilitate cognition of the *Ideas* of the world (in the Platonic sense, which is the only meaning I acknowledge for the word *Idea*<sup>d</sup>). The *Ideas* however are essentially intuitive and thus, when determined more closely, inexhaustible. Such a thing can only be communicated by way of intuition, which is the way of art. Thus, someone filled with the grasp of an *Idea* is justified in choosing art as his medium of communication. – The

<sup>a</sup> *Le secret d'être ennuyeux, c'est de tout dire* [more accurately, *Le secret d'ennuyer est celui de tout dire* (*Discours en vers sur l'homme* [*Essay in verse on man*] (1734)), VI, line 172]

<sup>b</sup> *Pfuscherei*

<sup>c</sup> *Kenntniß*

<sup>d</sup> *Idee*

mere *concept* on the other hand can be perfectly determined and thus can be thought exhaustively and clearly, and its entire content can be communicated coolly and soberly through words. But wanting to communicate something like this in a *work of art* is a very unhelpful detour, and is in fact what we have just criticized as a game using the means of art without knowing its ends. This is why an artwork thought up merely out of clear concepts is always inauthentic. Now if, when contemplating a work of visual art or reading literature or listening to music (which aims to portray something determinate), we see ultimately rise to the surface, shining through all the wealth of artistic means, the clear, cold, delimited, sober concept that formed the kernel of the work; and if the entire conception of this work consists only in clear thinking and is therefore fundamentally exhausted once it has communicated this concept, then we feel disgust and repulsion<sup>a</sup> because we see we have been deceived and cheated of our interest and attention. We are only entirely satisfied by the impression of an artwork when it leaves something behind that we cannot reduce to the clarity of a concept however much we think about it. The mark of this hybrid origin from mere concepts is that the author of an artwork was able to explain in clear words what he intended to present before he went to execute it: because then his entire goal could have been reached through these words themselves. That is why it is such an unworthy, even idiotic undertaking when people these days often try to reduce a work of Shakespeare or Goethe to some abstract truth that it was supposedly trying to communicate.<sup>31</sup> Naturally the artist needs to think when composing his work, but only something thought that was *intuited* before it was thought will subsequently, when communicated, have animating power that makes it imperishable. – We do not want to lose sight of the remark that the works that come on in *one fell swoop*,<sup>b</sup> like the painter's sketch mentioned above, that it is perfected in the enthusiasm of the first conception and drawn as if unconsciously, like the melody that arises completely and without any reflection as if inspired, and finally also the genuinely lyrical poem, the plain song in which the deeply felt mood of the present and the impression of the surroundings flow out in words whose metre and rhyme come on their own, as if unintentionally – that all these, I say, enjoy the great merit of being works entirely of the enthusiasm of the moment, of inspiration, of the free impulse of genius without any admixture of intentionality or reflection; and thus they are thoroughly enjoyable, without shell or kernel, and their effect is much more certain than that of the greatest works of art

<sup>a</sup> *Unwillen*

<sup>b</sup> *aus einem Guß*

which have been completed slowly and deliberately. With all such art, which is to say the great historical paintings, the long epic poems, the great operas, etc., reflection, intention, and deliberate choice play a significant role: understanding, technique, routine must fill in the gaps left by genial inspiration and enthusiasm, and all kinds of necessary secondary projects must run through the only truly brilliant parts like cement. This explains why all such works, with the sole exception of the most perfect masterpieces of the very greatest masters (like for instance *Hamlet*, *Faust*, the opera *Don Giovanni*<sup>a</sup>), unavoidably contain elements that are insipid and tedious, and which somewhat spoil the pleasure they give. Examples include the *Messiah*, the *Gerusalemme liberata*,<sup>b</sup> even *Paradise Lost* and the *Aeneid*: Horace bravely remarked: ‘when the great Homer nods off’.<sup>c</sup> But this is the result of the limitations of human powers in general. –

468

Necessity is the mother of the useful arts: abundance is the mother of the fine arts. Understanding is the father of the former, the father of the latter is genius, which is itself a type of abundance, namely that of the power of cognition over and above the amount needed for service to the will.

<sup>a</sup> *Don Juan*

<sup>b</sup> [epic poems by Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock (1773) and Torquato Tasso (1581)]

<sup>c</sup> *Quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus* [*Ars poetica*, 359. The words are preceded there by *et enim indignor* (‘I am also indignant’)]



*On the Aesthetics of Architecture*

In conformity with the derivation we gave in the text of the purely aesthetic aspects of architecture from the lowest levels of the objectivation of the will or of nature, whose Ideas it wants to make more clearly intuitive, the single and constant theme of architecture, is *supports and loads*, and its fundamental principle is that there should be no load without sufficient support, and no support without a proportionate load, and thus the relation between the two must be precisely the appropriate one. The theme is put into operation most purely in columns<sup>a</sup> and entablature:<sup>b</sup> and thus the arrangement of columns has become the thorough-bass, as it were, of the whole of architecture. In columns and entablature, supports and loads are *completely separate*; so that the effect they have on each other and their relation to each other becomes obvious. Any simple wall will already make use of supports and loads, only here the two are still blended together: everything is both support and load, and hence there is not an aesthetic effect. This only appears when they are *separated*, and is proportional to the degree of separation. There are many intermediary stages between a row of columns and a plain wall. Even when the wall of a house is broken simply by windows and doors, one can at least try to present this separation through flat, protruding pilasters (antes) with capitals instead of moulding, even painting the capitals on if need be: this will indicate, in at least some way, the entablature and arrangement of pillars. Actual pillars, as well as consoles and supports of different sorts give an even greater reality to the pure separation of support and load to which architecture aspires. In this respect, the vaulted ceiling<sup>c</sup> with pillars stands next to the column with entablature, but as a distinctive construction in its own right that does not merely imitate this latter. The aesthetic effect of the vaulted ceiling does

\* This chapter relates to § 43 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *Säule*

<sup>b</sup> *Gebälk*

<sup>c</sup> *Gewölbe*

not of course come close to that of the column and entablature, because in the former case the support and load are not *purely separated* but rather merge together. In vaulted ceilings, every brick is both load and support and even the pillars are (at least apparently) held in place by the pressure of the opposing arches, especially in cross vaulting; just as, precisely because of this lateral pressure, not only the vaulted ceiling but even simple arches are not supposed to rest on columns but require massive, square pillars. The separation is complete only in the row of columns, since here the entablature appears purely as load and the column purely as support. This is why the relation of the colonnade to the simple wall can be compared to that between a scale rising at regular intervals and a note that gradually goes from the same low note to the same high note but without intervals, which would sound like a mere howl. In the one as in the other, the content is the same, and the power of the difference comes solely from the *pure separation*.

The support is not *proportionate* to the load when it is only just enough to hold it up, but becomes adequate only when the support carries the load so comfortably and with such ease that we are thoroughly reassured on this point from the first glance. Still, this abundance of support should not go beyond a certain point, otherwise we will see a support without a load which is contrary to the aesthetic aim. The ancients devised the *line of equilibrium* as a regulative principle for determining the proper point by continuing the tapering that you see in the column's thickness when going from bottom to top until it runs out into an acute angle; in this way the column becomes conical, and then any cross-section will leave the lower part strong enough to carry the cut above. People usually build with a stability factor of twenty, i.e. each support is given only  $1/20$  of the maximum that it could bear. – An illuminating example of load without support is offered by the protruding jetty on the corner of many houses built in the tasteful style of 'the time of now'.<sup>a</sup> We cannot see what supports them: they look suspended, and we find this unsettling.<sup>b,32</sup>

470

In Italy even the simplest and most tasteless buildings have an aesthetic effect, which is not the case in Germany, and this is primarily due to the fact that the roofs are very flat there. A high roof is neither support nor load, because its two halves support each other, and the whole does not have a weight that corresponds to its extension. Thus it offers the eye an extended mass that is completely foreign to aesthetic goals and exclusively utilitarian, thus disrupting the aesthetic goal which is only ever concerned with support and load.

<sup>a</sup> *der 'Jetztzeit'* [see p. 109, n. a]

<sup>b</sup> *sie ... beunruhigen das Gemüth*

The form of the column is based only on the fact that it provides support in the simplest and most expedient fashion. The winding column displays inexpedience in a way that looks intentionally perverse and therefore brazen: for this reason, good taste condemns it at first glance.<sup>33</sup> Since the diagonal exceeds the sides, the square pillar has unequal dimensions of thickness that are not motivated by any goal, but come about because it happens to be easier to construct: this is precisely why we like it so much less than the column. We prefer even the six- or eight-sided pillar because it is more like the round column, the only one whose form is determined exclusively by the goal. It is the same with the rest of its proportions as well: primarily in the relation of thickness to height, within the limits permitted by the diversity of the three orders of columns. And so its tapering, starting a third of the way up, as well as a slight swelling at just this spot (*entasis*, Vitruvius),<sup>a</sup> is due to the fact that the pressure of the load is strongest there: until now it was thought that this swelling was only found in the Ionian and Corinthian columns; but more recent measurements have shown that they are present in Doric columns as well, even at Paestum. And thus everything about the column, the thorough determination of its form, the relation of its height to thickness, the relation of both to the spaces between columns, and the relation of the whole series to the entablature and the load that rests on them, is the precisely calculated result of the relation of the necessary support to the given load. And since this is uniformly distributed, the supports must be as well: this is why it is tasteless to group columns together. By contrast, in the best Doric temples, the corner column is somewhat closer to the next one over, because the presence of the entablatures together in the corner increases the load: in this way the principle of architecture is expressed, that the structural relations, i.e. between support and load, are the essential ones here, and those of symmetry, being subordinate, must immediately give way. According to the weight of the entire load, one chooses between the Doric or the two lighter arrangements of columns, since the first is calculated for heavier loads, not only through the greater thickness but also through the closer placement of columns that is essential for it, a goal for which the almost primitive simplicity of its capital is suited. The capitals in general have the goal of making visible the fact that the columns bear the entablature and are not stuck in like pegs: at the same time they enlarge the carrying surface with their abacus. Now all the laws for the arrangement of columns (and thus the form and proportion of the columns in all their parts and dimensions down to the slightest detail) follow from the well-understood and

<sup>a</sup> [See Vitruvius, *De architectura* (*On architecture*, first published in 1486), III, 3, 13]

consistently applied concept of amply proportionate support for a given load, and hence to this extent are determined a priori; this therefore reveals the falsity of the often-repeated idea that tree trunks or even (as unfortunately even Vitruvius,<sup>a</sup> IV, 1 taught) the human figure, is the prototype of the column. The form of the column would then be something purely contingent to architecture and externally imposed; if it were like that, it could not speak to us so harmoniously and in such a satisfactory manner whenever we see it in its proper symmetry, nor, on the other hand, could it be the case that any disproportion in the column, no matter how slight, would be perceived at once by the subtle and cultivated mind as both unpleasant and disturbing, like a wrong note in music. Rather, this is only possible because, given an end and a means, everything else is determined a priori in its essentials, just as with music, where the entire harmony is determined in its essentials given a melody and key. And like music, architecture in general is not an imitative art – although both are often falsely considered as such.<sup>34</sup>

472

As was described in detail in the text, aesthetic enjoyment always rests on grasping a (Platonic) Idea. The true theme of architecture, viewed purely as a *fine* art, are the Ideas of the lowest stages of nature, which is to say gravity, rigidity, cohesion; the theme is not, as people used to think, mere regular form, proportion and symmetry, which, being purely geometrical, properties of space, are not Ideas and therefore cannot be the theme of a fine art. Even in architecture they have a secondary origin and a subordinate meaning, to which I now turn. If they were the only things that architecture, as a fine art, was charged with presenting, then a model would necessarily have the same effect as a finished work. But this is by no means the case. Rather, if works of architecture are to have an aesthetic effect, they absolutely must be of a considerable size: indeed, they can never be too large although they can easily be too small. In fact, all things being equal,<sup>b</sup> the aesthetic effect is in direct proportion to the size of the building; because only huge masses can give efficacy to gravity at a high level<sup>c</sup> in an obvious and urgent manner.<sup>35</sup> This again confirms my view that it is the striving and antagonism of those basic natural forces that constitute the true aesthetic material of architecture, which by its very nature requires great masses to become visible, indeed palpable. – The forms in architecture, as was shown above with columns, are determined primarily by the immediate, structural goal of each part. But insofar as this leaves anything undetermined, what steps in is the law that things be most perfectly

<sup>a</sup> [See above, p. 430 n. a]

<sup>b</sup> *ceteris paribus*

<sup>c</sup> *Grade*

473 intuited,<sup>a</sup> and thus the law that they be grasped as easily as possible,<sup>b</sup> since architecture exists primarily in our spatial intuition and therefore appeals to our a priori faculty for spatial intuition. But this always arises through the greatest regularity of forms and the rationality of their proportions. This is why architecture as a fine art<sup>c</sup> chooses only regular shapes made from straight lines or law-like curves, as well as bodies that are made from them, like cubes, square prisms, cylinders, spheres, pyramids and cones; and as openings sometimes circles or ellipses, but usually squares and especially rectangles, these last having a completely rational and easily comprehensible relation of their sides (not something like 6:7 but rather 1:2, 2:3), and finally also regularly and comprehensibly proportioned niches or alcoves. For the same reasons, it prefers to lend the buildings themselves and the large sections of the buildings a rational and easily comprehensible relation of height to width, e.g. letting the height of a façade be half of the width, and positioning the columns so that every 3 or 4 of them with the spaces in between measure out a line equal to the height, thus making a square. The same principle that things be intuited and easy to grasp also requires that architectural structures be easy to survey: this produces *symmetry*, which is in addition necessary to lay out the work as a whole and to distinguish its essential boundary from its accidental one, as, for instance, when we sometimes need this guidance to tell whether we are looking at three buildings next to each other or only *one*. Only by means of symmetry does the architectural work register itself as an individual unity and as the development of a central thought.

474 Now although, as we mentioned above, architecture should in no way imitate *forms* of nature like tree trunks or human figures, it should still create in the *spirit* of nature, namely by adopting the law that ‘nature does nothing in vain, nothing superfluous, and always takes the shortest path in everything it does’,<sup>d</sup> and it should therefore avoid everything that is purposeless, even apparently so, and realize every intention it possesses along the shortest and most natural path so that the work itself presents each intention explicitly, whether it be purely architectural (i.e. structural) or whether it involves the aim of utility. This lends architecture a certain gracefulness analogous to the grace possessed by living creatures in the lightness and suitability of each motion and position to their intention. Accordingly, we see in the high

<sup>a</sup> *Gesetz der vollkommendsten Anschaulichkeit*

<sup>b</sup> *der leichtesten Faßlichkeit*

<sup>c</sup> *die schöne Architektur*

<sup>d</sup> *natura nihil agit frustra, nihilque supervacaneum, et quod commodissimum in omnibus suis operationibus sequitur* [cf. Aristotle, *On the Progression of Animals*, 704b15 and 708a9]

antique style of architecture<sup>a</sup> that each part, be it a pillar, column, arch, entablature, or door, window, stairway, balcony, reaches its goal in the simplest and most straightforward manner and thus lies open, naïvely and without disguise, just as organic nature does in its works as well. The tasteless style of architecture on the other hand is always looking for useless detours, taking pleasure in arbitrary elements,<sup>36</sup> and so ends up with aimless, broken entablatures shifting this way and that, clumped up columns, chopped up cornices on arched doorways and gables, senseless volutes, convoluted ornamentation, and the like: in keeping with the characteristic of botched art given above, it plays with the means of art without understanding its ends, as children play with an adult's tool. Every interruption of a straight line, every change in the arch of a curve without a clear goal in sight, is of this sort.<sup>37</sup> By contrast, that naïve simplicity in the presentation and the achievement of the goal that corresponds to the spirit in which nature creates and forms is precisely what gives antique pottery a beauty and gracefulness of form that we always admire afresh, because it looks so noble in its original taste compared to the marked vulgarity of our modern vessels, irrespective of whether they are made of porcelain or crude earthenware. When we look at the vessels and tools of the ancients we feel that if nature had wanted to make such things, it would have done so in these forms. – Since we have seen that the beauty of architecture comes primarily from the unconcealed presentation of the goal and its achievement by means of the shortest and most natural path, my theory ends up contradicting Kant's, which posits the essence of all beauty in an apparent purposiveness without purpose.<sup>b,38</sup>

The sole theme of architecture as we have presented it here – namely support and load – is so very simple that, just for this reason, architecture, to the extent that it is a *fine* art (but not to the extent that it serves some utility) has, in its essential features, been perfected and finished since the high point of Greece, or at least it is no longer open to any significant enrichment. On the other hand, the modern architect cannot distance himself appreciably from the rules and examples of the ancients without putting himself on the path of deterioration. There is nothing for him to do but to apply the art provided by the ancients and to execute their rules as far as is possible, bearing in mind the constraints forced upon him by needs, climate, epoch, and country. The art of architecture is in this respect like sculpture: in both cases, to strive for the ideal is tantamount to imitating the ancients.

I hardly need to recall that throughout these remarks on architecture I have been looking at only the antique style of architecture and not at the

<sup>a</sup> *im guten antiken Baustil*

<sup>b</sup> *Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck* [Cf. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, § 17 (Ak. 5: 236)]

so-called Gothic style, which is Saracen in origin, and was introduced to the rest of Europe by the Spanish Goths.<sup>39</sup> Perhaps we should not go so far as to categorically deny that Gothic architecture has a certain beauty in its own way, but when it tries to set itself on equal footing with antique architecture, this betrays a barbaric presumptuousness that cannot be allowed to stand. What a salutary effect it has on our minds to see a properly regular building in the antique style after looking at these Gothic splendours! We feel at once that only the antique style is right and true. If we could set an ancient Greek in front of our most famous Gothic cathedrals, what would he have to say? – Barbarians!<sup>a,40</sup> – The pleasure we take in Gothic works is certainly due in large part to association of ideas and historical memories, and hence to a feeling alien to art. When it comes to these works, nothing that I have said about the actual aesthetic goal of architecture, about its meaning and its theme, holds true. The freely laid entablature is gone, and with it the column: support and load, arranged and divided to make visible the struggle between rigidity and gravity, are no longer the theme in this case. Nor can we find that thorough and pure rationality that allows everything to be strictly accounted for – a rationality, in fact, that confronts the thoughtful spectator on its own and that belongs to the character of the antique style of architecture: we quickly become aware that a design guided by alien concepts prevails in its place; and hence much is left unexplained. Only the antique style of architecture is thought in the purely *objective* sense, the Gothic is thought in a more subjective sense. – If we still want to find a fundamental thought in the Gothic analogous to the actual, fundamental aesthetic thought of antique architecture (which we recognized as the unfolding of the struggle between rigidity and gravity) it must be this, that what is portrayed in this case is the whole process by which rigidity overpowers and vanquishes gravity. Accordingly, the horizontal line, the line of the load, has disappeared almost entirely, and the operation of gravity appears indirectly, that is to say, disguised in arches and vaulted ceilings, while the vertical line, the line of the support, is the only one to prevail, and it makes visible the victorious effect of rigidity through excessively high buttresses, towers, turrets, and endless spires rising to the heights without encumbrance. While in antique architecture the striving and urging is just as well represented and portrayed from above as it is from below, in this architecture it is the latter that has decisive mastery: and this gives rise to the frequently noted analogy with crystals, since crystallization always occurs through the overpowering of

<sup>a</sup> Βάρβαροι!

gravity. Now if we wanted to ascribe this meaning and this fundamental idea to Gothic architecture and wanted thereby to consider it as justified as the opposing principle of antiquity, we would need to call to mind that the struggle between rigidity and gravity that antique architecture portrays so openly and naïvely is more real and true and solidly grounded in nature. The complete overpowering of gravity by rigidity on the other hand remains a mere illusion, a fiction established through deception. – Everyone will clearly and readily see that the fundamental idea of Gothic architecture, as we have presented it here, and the distinctive characteristics of this architecture, as we have remarked above, confer upon it that mysterious and hyperphysical character usually attributed to it. This arises primarily, as we have already mentioned, through the fact that the arbitrary takes the place of the purely rational as what registers the thoroughgoing suitability of the means to the end. The presence of so many actually aimless elements that are nonetheless so painstakingly perfected makes us suspect the existence of unknown, inscrutable, secret aims, i.e. the appearance of mystery. By contrast the brilliant side of Gothic churches is the interior side, because it is here that the mind is suffused by the effect of the cross-vaulting supported by slim pillars striving upwards in crystalline fashion, lifted high into the air and promising eternal safety with their vanishing loads, while most of the drawbacks mentioned are on the exterior. In antique buildings the exterior is superior, because one can more easily survey the supports and loads there, while in the interior there is always something oppressive and prosaic about the flat roof. In the temples of the ancients with their many and massive exterior workings, the true interior was for the most part small. There is one touch of the sublime: in the spherical vault of a dome, as in the Pantheon, which the Italians too, building in this style, therefore used most extensively. This corresponds to the fact that the ancients, as southern peoples, lived more in the open air than the Nordic nations who preferred the Gothic architecture.<sup>41</sup> – But anyone who insists on regarding Gothic architecture as essential and justifiable might, if he also likes analogies, call it the negative pole of architecture, or its minor key. – In the interest of good taste I would wish that substantial funding<sup>a</sup> be applied to what is objectively, i.e. actually, good and correct, what is beautiful in itself, and not to something whose value rests merely on associations of ideas.<sup>b</sup> But when I see how this faithless age is so diligent in completing the Gothic churches left unfinished by the faithful Middle Ages, it seems to me as if people are trying to embalm a Christianity that has died off.

477

<sup>a</sup> *große Geldmittel*<sup>b</sup> *Ideenassoziationen*



*Isolated Remarks on the Aesthetics of the Visual Arts*

Beauty and grace are of the greatest importance in sculpture, while in painting, expression, passion and character predominate, and to this extent must not be included among the required elements of beauty. A complete beauty of all forms, such as sculpture requires, would curtail what is characteristic and tire us with its monotony. This is why painting can also depict ugly faces and emaciated figures: sculpture on the other hand demands beauty, even if it does not always demand perfect beauty, although certainly force and fullness of the figures. Consequently, an emaciated Christ on the cross, a dying St Hieronymus consumed by age and infirmity, as in Domenichino's masterpiece, are suitable subjects for painting: by contrast, Donatello's marble John the Baptist in the Florence gallery is repulsive in spite of its masterly execution because fasting has reduced him to skin and bones. From this point of view, sculpture seems suited for affirming the will to life and painting for negating it, which could explain why sculpture was the art of the ancients and painting the art of the Christian age. –

In conjunction with the argument in § 45 of the First Volume that the discovery, recognition, and determination of the types of human beauty is based on a certain anticipation of beauty, and thus has partially a priori grounds, I find I should add that this anticipation still requires experience as a stimulus; this is analogous to animal instincts which, although guiding behaviour a priori, still need to be determined in their particulars by motives. Experience and reality place before the artist's intellect human figures in which nature has succeeded more or less in one or another part, asking him, as it were, for his judgment on them, and thus uses the Socratic method to invoke clear and determined cognition of the ideal from that obscure anticipation. This is why it was an immense advantage to Greek sculptors that the climate and customs of their country afforded them

\* This chapter relates to §§ 44–50 of the First Volume.

opportunities to see half-naked figures all day long, and even fully naked ones in the gymnasium. In this way, every limb demanded to be judged with respect to its plastic meaning and compared to the ideal lying undeveloped in the sculptors' consciousness. And so they continually exercised their judgment on all forms and parts, down to the most subtle nuances; and this gradually raised their originally dull anticipation of the ideal of human beauty to such clarity of consciousness that they were able to objectify it in a work of art. – In a completely analogous way, the poet's own experience is useful and necessary for portraying characters. Because even if he does not work according to experience and empirical observation but rather according to the clear consciousness of the essence of humanity as he finds it in his own innermost self,<sup>a</sup> experience still serves as a schema for this consciousness and provides it with stimulation and practice. And so his knowledge<sup>b</sup> of human nature and its differences, although its operation is primarily a priori and anticipatory, only acquires life, determinacy, and breadth with experience. – But the amazing Greek sense for beauty that enabled them alone, of all people on earth, to discover the true norm of the human figure and accordingly to establish the archetypes of beauty and grace for all ages to imitate, is something we can take further, supported by our previous Book and Chapter 44 of the following one, and say: the same thing that, when undivided from the *will*, gives the sex drive<sup>c</sup> with its subtle and acute selectivity, i.e. *sexual love*<sup>d</sup> (where the Greeks were famously subject to great aberrations) – precisely this, when it breaks loose from the will through the presence of an abnormally dominant intellect, while remaining active, becomes the *objective sense of beauty* for the human figure, which appears primarily as the judging sense of art,<sup>e</sup> but can rise to the point of being able to discover and present the norm of all parts and proportions; as was the case with Phidias, Praxiteles, Scopas, etc. – Then we have the fulfillment of what Goethe has the artist say:

480

That I, with a divine mind  
 And human hand  
 May be able to make  
 What with my wife  
 As animal I can and must.<sup>f</sup>

<sup>a</sup> in seinem eigenen Innern

<sup>b</sup> Erkenntniß

<sup>c</sup> Geschlechtstrieb

<sup>d</sup> Geschlechtsliebe

<sup>e</sup> urtheilende Kunstsin

<sup>f</sup> [Kenner und Künstler (Connoisseur and Artist) (1827)]

And once again there is an analogy: in the *poet*, what would provide mere *worldly wisdom* when still joined with the *will*, becomes, when separated from the will by the abnormal preponderance of intellect, the capacity for objective, dramatic *presentation*. –

Whatever modern sculpture might achieve, it is analogous to modern Latin poetry and similarly a child of imitation, arising from reminiscences. If it presumes to want to be original, it goes quickly astray, namely along the wrong path of creating in accordance with nature as it is found, rather than in accordance with the proportions of the ancients. *Canova*, *Thorwaldsen* and others can be compared to *Johannes Secundus* and *Owenus*.<sup>a</sup> It is just the same with architecture: only there it is grounded in the art itself, because its aesthetic part has a small scope and was already exhausted by the ancients; thus the modern architect can only proceed by wise application of the principles of the ancients; and he should know that he distances himself from good taste to the extent that he distances himself from the style and standard of the Greeks.<sup>42</sup>

481 The art of the *painter*, considered merely to the extent that it aims to produce the illusion of reality, ultimately derives from the painter's ability to take what in vision is mere sensation, which is to say the affecting of the retina, i.e., the only directly given effect, and to understand how to *separate* this from its *cause*, i.e. the objects of the external world whose intuition first originates in the understanding; and then, if aided by technique, he is able to produce the same effect in the eye using a completely different cause, namely applied patches of colour which then cause the same intuition to arise in the understanding of the spectator, because the effect is inevitably referred back to its usual cause. –

If we consider how there is something so entirely original in every *human face* and how this reveals a wholeness that can only come from a unity consisting of completely necessary parts, something that enables us to recognize an acquaintance from among many thousands of people, even after many years, and this even though the possible differences between human facial features are extremely closely constrained (especially within a single race), then we must doubt whether something that is so essentially unified and entirely original could ever come from a source other than the mysterious depths of the innermost heart of nature: but it would follow from this that no artist could be capable of really inventing a human face or even of piecing one together from memories in a way that would look natural. The

<sup>a</sup> [Johannes Secundus (Jan Nicolai Everaerts) and Owenus (John Owen, or Ioannes Audoenus) were neo-Latin poets of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and Canova and Thorwaldsen prominent modern sculptors]

only thing he could accomplish in this way would be a half-true or maybe even an impossible compilation: because how could he put together an actual physiognomic unity when he is not aware of the principle of this unity? And so with every face invented by an artist, we must doubt whether it is a real possibility, and whether nature, as master of all masters, would not rather declare it a botched job by showing that it is full of contradictions. This would certainly lead to the rule<sup>a</sup> that only portraits can figure in historical pictures, portraits that have of course been carefully selected and somewhat idealized.<sup>43</sup> It is well known that great artists have always wanted to paint from live models and produce many portraits. –

Although, as was described in the text, the true goal of painting, and art in general, is to facilitate our grasp of the (Platonic) Ideas of the essence of this world, which puts us at once in the state of pure, i.e. will-less cognition, painting also has an independent beauty that has nothing to do with this and which is produced by the simple harmony of colours, the agreeable arrangements of figures, the favourable distribution of light and shade, as well as the tone of the entire picture. This accompanying and subordinate type of beauty promotes the state of pure cognition and is to painting what diction, metre, and rhyme are to poetry: both are not what is essential, but what has the first and immediate effect. –

482

I will provide another pair of examples to support the opinion I gave in § 50 of the First Volume that *allegory* has no place in painting. In the Borghese palace in Rome there is a picture by Michael Angelo Caravaggio of Jesus, as a child of about 10 years old, treading fearlessly and quite complacently on the head of a snake, while his equally indifferent mother is depicted alongside him: next to them is St Elisabeth, looking solemnly and tragically towards heaven. What would someone think of this pictorial<sup>b</sup> hieroglyph if he had never heard anything about the seed of the woman, who was to bruise the head of the serpent?<sup>c</sup> – On the ceiling of the reading room of the Riccardi palace in Florence there is an allegorical painting by Luca Giordano that is supposed to signify that Science has freed the Understanding from the bondage of Ignorance: the Understanding is a strong man bound with cords that are loosening; a nymph holds a mirror up to him, another offers him a large, detached wing; above this sits Wisdom on a globe, and next to her the naked Truth holding another globe. – In Ludwigsburg near Stuttgart there is a picture showing us Time, as Saturn, cutting off Cupid's wings with shears: if this is

<sup>a</sup> *Grundsatz*

<sup>b</sup> *kyriologischen*

<sup>c</sup> [Genesis 3:15]

supposed to mean that love becomes unstable as we get older, well then there is something right about it. –

483 The following will strengthen the force of my solution to the problem of why *Laocoön* does not cry out.<sup>a</sup> We can convince ourselves factually of the unsuccessful effect of the portrayal of screaming in works of visual art (which are essentially mute) by looking at a picture of the Bethlehem Slaughter of the Innocents by Guido Reni in the Academy of Art in Bologna, in which this great artist made the mistake of painting six gaping mouths in the process of crying out. – Anyone wanting even greater clarity need only think of a pantomime presentation on stage and any scene where someone has an urgent reason to cry out: now if the performing dancer wanted to express this scream by standing there for a while with a wide open mouth, the loud laughter from the whole house would attest to the absurdity of this. – So *Laocoön* cannot cry out, not because of anything in the object depicted, but because of the nature of depiction itself; this presents the artist with the task of motivating this failure to cry out, of making it plausible to us that someone in this situation would not cry out. He carries out this task by portraying the snake bite not as already accomplished, nor as still threatening, but rather as occurring at precisely this moment and in fact in the side, and this draws in the abdomen and thus makes it impossible to cry out. The more proximate but in fact only secondary and subordinate reason was correctly identified and put forward by *Goethe* at the end of the eleventh book of his autobiography, as well as in the essay on the *Laocoön* from the first issue of the *Propyläen*; while the more distant but primary cause of this is the one I have put forward. I cannot help remarking that this places me once again in the same relation to *Goethe* as I was in the case of the theory of colours. – In the collection of the Duke of Aremberg in Brussels there is an ancient head of *Laocoön* that was discovered more recently. But the head in the world famous statue group was not a restoration, as follows from *Goethe's* special table of all restorations of this group, which is to be found at the end of the first volume of the *Propyläen*;<sup>b</sup> this, moreover is confirmed by the fact that the head discovered later is very similar to that in the statue group. We must thus assume that there was another ancient repetition of the group to which the Aremberg head belonged. In my opinion, this head surpasses the one in the group both in beauty and expression: the mouth is significantly wider open than the one in the group, but not to the point of an actual scream.

<sup>a</sup> [The problem is discussed in the famous work *Laocoön* by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1766)]

<sup>b</sup> [On the autobiography see p. 248, n. a. *Propyläen* (first issue 1798) was a journal founded by *Goethe* and *Heinrich Mayer*]

## *On the Aesthetics of Literature*

I would like to propose as the simplest and most accurate definition of poetry<sup>a</sup> that it is the art of putting the imagination<sup>b</sup> into play through words. I have discussed how it does this in the First Volume, § 51. A particular confirmation of what I said there is to be found in a letter published since then by *Wieland* to *Merck*: 'I have spent two and a half days on a single stanza, where it is essentially just a matter of a single word that I needed and could not find. I have twisted and turned the thing and my brain in every direction; because where it is a matter of a likeness, I naturally want my reader to see the same particular vision that hovers before my own eyes, and for that, as you know,<sup>c</sup> everything so frequently depends on a single stroke or stress or reflex.' (*Letters to Merck*, edited by Wagner, 1835, p. 193.) – Because literature presents its images in the reader's imagination,<sup>d</sup> it has the advantage that the more detailed execution and subtler features play out in each person's imagination in the manner best suited to his individuality, the reach of his knowledge,<sup>e</sup> and mood, and therefore stir him most vividly. By contrast, the visual arts are not so accommodating; in their case, a *single* image, a *single* form must be enough for all: but this image will always bear, in something, the mark of the individuality of the artist or his model, as a subjective or accidental supplement, not as an effective one; although this becomes less true the more objective the artist is, i.e. the more of a genius he is. From this alone we can partially explain why works of literature<sup>f</sup> have a much stronger, deeper, and more universal effect than pictures and statues do: for the most

\* This chapter relates to § 51 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *Poesie*

<sup>b</sup> *Einbildungskraft*

<sup>c</sup> *ut nosti*

<sup>d</sup> *Phantasie*

<sup>e</sup> *Erkenntnißsphäre*

<sup>f</sup> *Dichtkunst*

485 part, pictures and statues leave the ordinary people<sup>a</sup> cold, and in general the visual arts have the weakest effects. An odd illustration of this is the frequent discovery of pictures by great masters in private houses and all manner of locations where, over the course of so many years, they have not been hidden or concealed but have simply hung there unnoticed and thus without effect. In my time in Florence (1823) a Raphael Madonna was even discovered, which had hung for many long years on the wall of the servants' quarters in a palace (in the *Quartiere di S. Spirito*): and this was in Italy, a nation gifted above all others with a sense for beauty. This proves that works of visual art have little direct and immediate effect, and that it takes far more education and erudition to know their worth than with any other art. By contrast, a beautiful heart-warming melody will always spread around the world, and a superior poem will always pass from nation to nation.<sup>44</sup> It is indeed true that the great and the rich will devote their patronage most specifically to the visual arts and spend considerable sums on *these* works alone; indeed today there is idolatry in the true sense that will sacrifice the value of a great estate for a picture by a famous old master.<sup>45</sup> This fact rests primarily on the rarity of masterpieces, possession of which therefore gratifies the pride, but also on the fact that enjoyment of them takes so little time and effort and is ready at any moment, in a moment; while poetry and even music impose incomparably more demanding conditions. Accordingly, we can do without the visual arts; entire peoples, the Mohammedans for instance, do without them: but no people is without music and poetry.

The intention of the poet in putting our imagination into motion is to reveal the Ideas, i.e. to show in an example what life, what the world is. And so the first condition is that he has recognized this himself: the success of his poems will correspond to how deeply or superficially he has done so. And hence, just as there are countless gradations in how deeply and clearly the nature of things can be grasped, so too with poets. Each must consider himself superior to the extent that he correctly portrays what *he* has recognized and to the extent that his image corresponds to *his* original: he must compare himself to the best because he does not recognize more in 486 the images of the best than he does in his own, namely as much as there is in nature itself; since his gaze goes no deeper. But the best recognizes himself as such by seeing how superficial the gaze of others is, how much is still left behind that they could not reproduce because they did not see it, and how much further his gaze and his image extends. If he understood the shallow

<sup>a</sup> *das Volk*

and superficial as little as they understand him, then he would have to despair; precisely because it takes an extraordinary man to do him justice, and bad poets are as little able to esteem him as he is them, he too has to live for a long time on his own self-appreciation before that of the world follows on afterwards. – But he will also find that appreciation stunted since he will be told to display proper modesty. Yet it is just as impossible for someone who has merits and knows their worth to be blind to them as it is for a man who is six foot high not to notice that he towers above others. If it is 300 feet from the bottom of the tower to the top, then it is certain to be just as far from the top to the bottom. Horace, Lucretius, Ovid and almost all the ancients spoke proudly of themselves, and likewise Dante, Shakespeare,<sup>46</sup> Bacon of Verulam, and many more. That one could be a great mind without noticing is an absurdity which only hopeless incompetence can persuade itself to believe, so that it can consider its sense of its own nothingness to be modesty. An Englishman made the witty and accurate observation that *merit* and *modesty*<sup>a</sup> have nothing more in common than the first letter.<sup>\*47</sup> I am always suspicious that modest celebrities may be right about themselves; and *Corneille* says directly:

False humility never does one credit  
I know what I am worth and believe it when I'm told.<sup>b</sup>

Finally Goethe candidly remarked: 'Only good-for-nothings are modest.'<sup>c</sup> But still more accurate is the remark that people who are eager to demand modesty in others, who insist on modesty and keep shouting: 'just be modest! For God's sake, just be modest!' *are true good-for-nothings*, i.e. completely useless beings, manufactured products of nature, ordinary members of the human pack. For anyone with merit will acknowledge merit too – real and true merit, of course. But someone who is himself without any merit or advantages does not want there to be any at all: he is tortured by the sight of it in others; he is eaten up with pale green-yellow envy: he wants to annihilate and exterminate anyone with personal advantages: but if he needs to let such people live, it can only be on condition that they hide their merits, deny them completely, or indeed renounce them.

487

\* Lichtenberg says (*Vermischte Schriften* [*Assorted Writings*], new edition, Göttingen 1844, vol. 3, p. 19) that Stanislaus Leszczyński said '*La modestie devrait être la vertu de ceux, à qui les autres manquent*' ['Modesty should be the virtue of those who have no others']

<sup>a</sup> [Schopenhauer uses the English terms]

<sup>b</sup> *La fausse humilité ne met plus en crédit. / Je sçais ce que je vauz, et crois ce qu'on m'en dit.* [From the poem *Excuse à Ariste* (1637)]

<sup>c</sup> *Nur die Lumpen sind bescheiden* [From *Gesellige Lieder* (1815): 'Rechenschaft' (*Convivial Songs*: 'The Reckoning')]



This then is the root of the frequent encomiums we hear to modesty. And when such praise-givers have the chance to strangle a merit when it arises, or at least to delay its appearance, its recognition – who will doubt that they do so? This is the practice for their theory. –

Even though the poet, like every other artist, only ever shows us the particular, the individual, what *he* recognizes and wants us to help us recognize too is the (Platonic) Idea, the entire species:<sup>a</sup> thus his pictures are strongly marked by typical human characters and situations. The narrative poet and even the dramatic poet draws something completely particular from life and portrays it precisely in its individuality, but reveals in it the whole of human existence; while he seems to be concerned with particularity, he is in truth concerned with what exists everywhere and in all ages.<sup>48</sup> This is why maxims<sup>b</sup> written by dramatic poets in particular, even without being general sayings, are frequently used in real life. – Poetry is to philosophy what experience is to the empirical sciences. Experience acquaints us with appearances in their particularity and as examples: science encompasses the whole by means of universal concepts. Thus, poetry wants to acquaint us with the (Platonic) Ideas of essences by means of particulars and examples: philosophy wants to teach us to recognize the inner essence of things as a whole and in general as it expresses itself in the particulars. – It is already apparent from this that

488 poetry has more of the character of youth, philosophy that of age. In fact, the gift of poetry only really blossoms in youth: and the susceptibility to poetry is often passionate in youth: young people take pleasure in verses as such and are often satisfied with modest wares. This predilection gradually fades with time, and in later years people prefer prose.<sup>49</sup> This poetic tendency of youth can easily ruin the sense of reality because poetry is distinguished from real life by the fact that in poetry, the flow of life is interesting but painless, whereas in reality, if life is painless it remains uninteresting, but as soon as it becomes interesting it is no longer painless. Young people who have been initiated into poetry before reality demand from reality what only poetry can provide: this is a major source of the discontent that oppresses the most gifted young people. –

Metre and rhyme are a fetter but also<sup>50</sup> a cloak that the poet wraps around himself and from beneath this the poet can speak in a way that he would not otherwise be permitted to: and this is what gives us pleasure. – He is only half responsible for everything he says: metre and rhyme must answer for the other half.<sup>51</sup> – The essence of metre, or the measure of time,

<sup>a</sup> *Gattung*

<sup>b</sup> *Sentenzen*

exists, as mere rhythm, only in *time*, which is a pure intuition a priori, and thus belongs (to use the language of *Kant*) to *pure* sensibility alone; on the other hand rhyme concerns aural sensation, and thus *empirical* sensibility. This is why rhythm is a much nobler and more worthy assistant than rhyme, which the ancients accordingly held in disdain; it originated in the imperfect languages that arose through the corruption of the earlier languages from the barbarian age. The poverty of French poetry is due mainly to the fact that, lacking metre, it is restricted to rhyme alone; this poverty is intensified by the fact that, in order to conceal its lack of means, it has burdened its rhyming with a number of pedantic dogmas: for instance, that only syllables written the same way can rhyme, as if rhyme were for the eye, not the ear; that hiatus is forbidden, a large number of words are not be used, and the like, all of which the new French school of poetry is trying to bring to an end. – For me at least, there is no language in which rhyme makes as pleasing and powerful an impression as Latin: the rhymed Latin poems of the Middle Ages have a distinctive magic. This must be explained by the fact that Latin is incomparably more perfect, beautiful, and noble than any of the more modern languages, and now moves so gracefully in the finery and ornaments that belong to these others and that it itself originally disdained.<sup>52</sup>

489

To serious reflection, it might seem almost like high treason against reason when even the slightest violence is done to a thought or its accurate and pure expression with the childish intent that the words might sound the same a few syllables later or that these syllables themselves would have a certain tra-la-la. But very few verses come about without this sort of violence, and it is because of this that verses in foreign languages are much harder to understand than prose. If we could look into the secret workshop of the poet, we would find that it is ten times more common to look for a thought to match the rhyme than it is to look for a rhyme to match the thought: and even in the latter case it is not easily done without some flexibility on the part of the thought. – But the art of the verse defies these considerations and has the support of all ages and peoples in doing this, so great is the power that metre and rhyme exercise on the mind and so effective is their distinctive secret *lenocinium*.<sup>a</sup> I could explain this by the fact that a well-rhymed verse stimulates sensation through its indescribably emphatic effect, as if the thought it expresses was already predestined, indeed preformed in the language and the poet had only to discover it. Even trivial thoughts gain a measure of significance through rhythm and rhyme, and can cut a figure in

<sup>a</sup> [allure]

this decoration just as with girls an ordinary face can grab one's eye with its finery. In fact, even distorted or false thoughts gain a certain semblance of truth when put into verse. And conversely, even famous passages of famous poets shrivel up and lose their appeal when reproduced accurately in prose. If  
 490 only the truth is beautiful, and if the favourite attire of truth is nakedness, then an idea that appears great and beautiful in prose will have more true value than one that needs verse to have the same effect. – The fact that such trivial, even apparently childish means as metre and rhyme can have such a powerful effect is very striking and well worth investigation: I explain it in the following manner. What is directly given in hearing, the mere sound of words, acquires a certain inherent perfection and significance through rhythm and rhyme, since these make it into a sort of music: thus it now seems to exist for its own sake and no longer as a mere means, as a mere sign to signify something, namely the sense of the words. Its entire function seems to be to delight the ear with its sound, and with this it has achieved everything and satisfied all claims. The fact that at the same time it still has a meaning and still expresses a thought, this now presents itself as an unexpected addition, like words to music; as an unexpected gift, it gives us a pleasant surprise and thus, since we made no demands of this sort, we are very easily satisfied: but if this idea is one that is significant on its own, i.e. even when expressed in prose, then we are charmed. I remember from early childhood that I was delighted for a long time by the pleasant sounds of verse before I discovered that it made sense and contained thoughts as well. Accordingly, probably every language contains a poetry of mere cling-clang that is almost entirely devoid of sense. The sinologist *Davis*, in the preface to his translation of the *Laou-sang-urh* or *An Heir in Old Age* (London, 1817) remarked that Chinese dramas consist partly of sung verses and added: 'the meaning of these is often obscure and according to statements of the Chinese themselves, the purpose of these verses is mostly to flatter the ear, and in doing so meaning is neglected and sacrificed entirely to harmony'. Can anybody fail to be reminded here of the choruses of many Greek tragedies, which are so difficult to decipher?

491 The sign that most directly betokens the true poet of both the higher and lower genres is the unaffectedness of his rhymes: they appear out of nowhere, as if sent by the gods: his thoughts come to him already in rhymes. The secret prose-writer, on the other hand, looks for rhymes to fit the thoughts: the bungler looks for thoughts to fit the rhymes. Very frequently you can tell in a rhyming couplet which of the two was conceived by the thought and which by the rhyme. The art is to conceal

the latter so that such verses do not seem like merely filled in *bouts-rimés*.<sup>a,53</sup>

What I feel (there is no proof here) is that rhyme is by nature merely binary: its effectiveness is limited to one recurrence of the same sound and is not strengthened by frequent repetition. As soon as one end syllable is distinguished from another that sounds the same, the effect is exhausted: a third repetition of the sound simply has the effect of a new rhyme that happens to have the same sound, but fails to heighten the effect: it lines up after the existing rhyme, but does not join with it to make a stronger impression. This is because the first note does not resonate past the second up to the third; the third is therefore an aesthetic pleonasm, a doubling of the mood<sup>b</sup> that does not help anything. Such accumulations of rhymes certainly do not deserve the heavy sacrifices they require in the *ottava rima*, *terza rima*, and sonnets, and which are the causes of the mental torture one sometimes feels when reading such productions: because poetic pleasure is impossible if you need to beat your brains. The fact that the great poetic mind occasionally overcomes even these forms and their difficulties and can manoeuvre around in them with ease and grace is not enough of a recommendation: because intrinsically they are as ineffective as they are cumbersome. And even when good poets make use of these forms, one often sees the struggle between the rhyme and the thought, with victory going sometimes to the one and sometimes to the other, and thus either the thought is stunted for the sake of the rhyme or the rhyme is bought off with a weak *à peu près*.<sup>c</sup> Because of this, I do not consider it a proof of ignorance but rather of good taste that in his sonnets Shakespeare gave each of the quatrains a different rhyme. At any rate, their acoustic effect is not diminished by this in the least, and the thought comes into its own right much better than if it had been forcibly restricted by the traditional Spanish boots.<sup>54</sup>

492

It is a disadvantage for the poetry of a language if it contains many words that are not commonly used in its prose, and on the other hand if certain words of prose are not permitted. The former is probably mostly the case in Latin and Italian, the latter in French where it was recently very aptly called *la bégueulerie de la langue française*.<sup>d</sup> Both are found less frequently in English and least of all in German. Words belonging exclusively to poetry are foreign to our hearts and do not speak to us directly and therefore leave

<sup>a</sup> [Literally, 'rhymed ends': verses made to fit a predetermined set of rhyming words]

<sup>b</sup> *eine doppelte Courage*

<sup>c</sup> [nearly]

<sup>d</sup> [the foolish airs of the French language]

us cold. They form a conventional language of poetry and merely painted sensations, as it were, rather than real ones: they rule out inwardness.<sup>a</sup> –

The distinction between *classical* and *romantic* poetry that is so often invoked these days seems to me to rest essentially on the fact that the former is acquainted only with purely human, real and natural motives, while the latter considers artificial, conventional and imaginary motives to be effective as well: including those that come from Christian mythology as well as those of the fanciful and whimsical chivalric code of honour, and even those of the absurd and ridiculous Christo-Germanic veneration of women,<sup>b</sup> and in addition, finally, those of a hallucinatory and lunatic hyperphysical love. Even in the best poets of the romantic genre, e.g. Calderón, we can see the grotesque distortions of human relations and human nature to which these motives can lead. Not even mentioning the *Autos*,<sup>c</sup> I can refer merely to pieces like *No siempre el peor es cierto* (*The Worst is Not Always Certain*) and *El postrero duelo en España* (*The Last Duel in Spain*) and similar comedies of cloak and sword;<sup>d</sup> joined to these elements is the frequent appearance of a scholastic over-subtlety in conversation, which was part of the intellectual culture of the higher classes at that time.<sup>55</sup> By contrast, how decisively superior is the poetry of the ancients, which always remains true to nature, and this shows that classical poetry has an unconditional truth and validity while romantic poetry possesses a merely conditional truth and validity: analogously to Greek and Gothic architecture.<sup>56</sup> – On the other hand we must note here that all dramatic or narrative poems set in ancient Greece or Rome have the disadvantage of relying upon our insufficient and fragmentary knowledge<sup>e</sup> of antiquity, particularly as concerns the details of life, a knowledge that is not drawn from intuition. This requires the poet to avoid many things and make do with generalities that end up in abstractions, and his work will lack that intuitiveness and individualization essential to poetry. This is what gives all such works their characteristic sense of emptiness and tedium. Only Shakespeare's portrayals are free from this, and this is because he did not hesitate to portray Englishmen of his own age under the names of Greeks and Romans. –

Many masterpieces of *lyric* poetry, in particular several of Horace's odes (see for instance the second ode in Book Three) and many of Goethe's

<sup>a</sup> *Innigkeit*

<sup>b</sup> *Weiberverehrung*

<sup>c</sup> [*Autos sentimentales*, numerous plays by Calderón]

<sup>d</sup> *en capa y espada* [In the titles Schopenhauer makes small mistakes: *el peor* for *lo peor*, *postrero* for *postrer*]

<sup>e</sup> *Kenntniß*

poems (for instance the *Shepherd's Lament*<sup>a</sup>) are accused of a lack of cohesion and of skipping from thought to thought. But the neglect of logical connection is intentional in these poems – it has been replaced by unity of the fundamental sensation and mood expressed in the poems, which appears all the more clearly since it strings a thread through the separate pearls and leads to the rapid change of subjects of contemplation in the same way that the transition from one key to another in music is brought about by the seventh, through which the still audible ground note of the dominant becomes the new key. But the quality described here is found most clearly, and indeed to the point of exaggeration, in the canzona of Petrarch that begins 'I never want to sing again as I once did.'<sup>b</sup>

Just as the subjective element is dominant in lyrical poetry, the objective is the one and only element in drama. The wide middle ground between the two is occupied by epic poetry in all its forms and variants, from the narrative romance to the genuine epic. Although primarily objective, epic poetry contains a more or less apparent subjective element expressed in the tone, the form of address, as well as in scattered reflections. We do not lose sight of the poet as much as we do with drama.

494

The goal of drama in general is to show us by example the essence and existence of the human being. Here we may face the sad or the cheerful side of the human being or the transition between the two. But even the expression 'essence and existence of the human being' contains the seeds of a controversy over whether the focus should be on the essence (i.e. the characters) or the existence (i.e. the fate, the events, the action). Both are so closely intertwined that while their concepts can be distinguished, their portrayals cannot. The situations, fates, and events make the characters express their essence while it is only from the characters that the action arises from which the events proceed. Certainly one or the other can be more visible in the portrayal, and the extremes of each are the character sketch and the intrigue.<sup>57</sup>

Drama has a common goal with epic, namely to portray the extraordinary actions that significant characters perform in significant situations, and this will be achieved most perfectly if the poet introduces the characters in a state of calm in which only their general colouring is visible, but then introduces a motive that leads to an action from which a new and stronger motive arises, which in turn leads to a more significant action which once more offers new and increasingly powerful motives through which, in the

<sup>a</sup> *Schäfers Klagelied* [1802]

<sup>b</sup> *Mai non vo' più cantar, com' io soleva* [Canzoniere, or *Rerum vulgarium fragmenta* (Songbook, or *Fragments in the vernacular*, 1336–74), 105]

space of time appropriate to the form, a passionate uproar takes the place of the initial calm, an uproar in which significant actions occur that throw a bright light both on qualities previously dormant in the characters as well as on the way of the world. –

Great poets transform themselves entirely into each of the characters portrayed and speak from each of them like ventriloquists; now from the  
 495 hero and then straight afterwards from the young and innocent maiden, with the same truth and naturalness:<sup>58</sup> thus *Shakespeare* and *Goethe*. Second rate poets transform the main character into themselves: thus *Byron*, and this often leaves the secondary characters without life, as are even the main characters in the works of mediocre poets.

Our pleasure in *tragedy*<sup>a</sup> does not belong to the feeling of beauty but rather to the feeling of the sublime; indeed, it is the highest pitch of this feeling. Just as the sight of the sublime in nature turns us away from the interests of the will so that we can maintain ourselves in a state of pure intuiting, so in the tragic catastrophe we turn away from the will to life itself. In tragedy we are shown the terrible side of life, the misery of humanity, the rule of chance and error, the fall of the just, the triumph of the evil: in other words, we see before our eyes the state of the world diametrically opposed to our will. At the sight of this we feel called upon to turn our will away from life, to stop wanting and loving it. Precisely this, however, makes us aware that something else remains in us that cannot be recognized positively but only negatively as that which does *not* will life. Just as the seventh chord demands the tonic and the colour red demands green and even brings it to our eye, so every tragedy demands an entirely different existence, another world, one we can only ever recognize indirectly, exactly as in this case, through these demands.<sup>59</sup> At the moment of the tragic catastrophe, the conviction becomes clearer to us than ever that life is a difficult dream from which we need to awaken. To this extent the effect of tragedy is analogous to the effect of the dynamic sublime, since like this, it elevates us above the will and its interests and then brings us around to the point where we take pleasure in the sight of something precisely repugnant to our will. What gives everything tragic, in whatever form it might appear, the characteristic impetus to sublimity, is the dawning of the recognition that the world, that life cannot afford us true satisfaction, and is therefore not worth attachment<sup>b</sup> to it: this is the spirit of tragedy:<sup>c</sup> and this is why it leads to resignation.

<sup>a</sup> *Trauerspiel*

<sup>b</sup> *Anhänglichkeit*

<sup>c</sup> *der tragische Geist*

I grant that in ancient tragedy this spirit of resignation rarely appears directly and explicitly. Certainly Oedipus at Colonus dies in a resigned and willing manner;<sup>a</sup> but he is comforted by revenge against his fatherland. Iphigenia in Aulis is very willing to die; but it is the thought of the well-being of Greece that comforts her and leads her to change her mind so that she willingly undertakes a death that she at first wanted to flee at all costs. Cassandra, in *Agamemnon*, by the great Aeschylus, dies willingly, 'enough of life!'<sup>b</sup> (1306); but she too is comforted by the thought of revenge. Hercules, in the *Trachiniae* bows to necessity, dying calmly but not with resignation. Likewise Euripides' *Hippolytus*, where we are surprised by the fact that the comforting appearance of Artemis promises him temples and posthumous fame but in no way suggests an existence beyond life, and leaves him to die just as all the gods forsake someone who is dying – they come to him in Christianity and likewise in Brahmanism and Buddhism, even if in the latter the gods are truly exotic. So Hippolytus, like almost all tragic heroes of the ancients, acquiesces in an unalterable fate and the inflexible will of the gods but does not abandon the will to life itself. Just as Stoic equanimity is fundamentally different from Christian resignation in that it teaches only calm endurance and composed waiting for the inevitable and necessary evil while Christianity teaches renunciation, abandonment of willing; likewise the tragic hero of the ancients demonstrates unwavering subjugation to the inevitable stroke of fate while the Christian tragedy demonstrates the abandonment of the entire will to life, a joyful forsaking of the world, conscious of its worthlessness and nothingness. – But I am also entirely of the opinion that the tragedy of the moderns stands higher than that of the ancients. Shakespeare is much greater than Sophocles: compared to Goethe's *Iphigenia*, Euripides' version looks almost crude and common. Euripides' *Bacchae* is an infuriating piece of work on behalf of the heathen priests. Many ancient works have no tragic tendency at all; like Euripides' *Alcestis* and *Iphigenia in Tauris*: several have perverse or even disgusting motives, like *Antigone* and *Philoctetes*. Almost all show the human race under the horrible governance of chance and error, but without the resultant resignation that redeems us from these. All of this is due to the fact that the ancients had not yet achieved the pinnacle and aim of tragedy, or indeed of a view of life in general.<sup>c</sup>

Accordingly, if the ancients rarely portrayed the spirit of resignation, the turning away from the will to life, in their tragic heroes themselves, as the

<sup>a</sup> *willing*

<sup>b</sup> ὀρκέλω βίος [in fact line 1314]

<sup>c</sup> *der Lebensansicht überhaupt*



disposition of these heroes, it is nonetheless the genuine tendency and effect of tragedy to awaken that spirit in the spectator and to call up that attitude, even if only temporarily. The horrors on the stage confront him with the bitterness and worthlessness of life and hence with the nothingness<sup>a</sup> of all his striving; the effect of this impression must be that he becomes aware, if only in an obscure feeling, that it would be better to tear his heart free from life, to turn his willing away, not to love the world and life; at which point, deep inside of him, the consciousness is born that there must be another kind of existence for a different kind of willing. – Because if this were not the case, if this elevation above all goals and goods of life, this turning away from life and its temptations and the already implied turning towards a different kind of existence, albeit one completely incomprehensible to us, if this were not the tendency of tragedy, how would it be possible that the presentation of the horrible side of life, brought before our eyes in the harshest light, could have a beneficial effect on us and be a higher pleasure? Aristotle considered the final end of tragedy to be the arousal of fear and pity,<sup>b</sup> but these are not in point of fact pleasant sensations: they can therefore not be an end but only a means. – And thus the true tendency of tragedy, the final goal of the intentional portrayal of human suffering, remains the appeal for the will to turn away from life, and this appeal is still there even when such a resigned elevation of the spirit is not shown in the hero himself but is only aroused in the spectator by the sight of great, undeserved, or in fact even deserved, suffering. – As with the

498 ancients, many moderns are also content merely to place the spectator in the mood described through the objective portrayal of human unhappiness on a large scale; while others portray this through the reversal of attitude in some hero due to suffering: the former give only the premises as it were, and leave the conclusion to the spectator; while the latter also give the conclusion or the moral of the fable as the hero's reversal of attitude, and also most likely as an observation from the mouths of the chorus, as for instance Schiller, in *The Bride of Messina*:<sup>c</sup> 'Life is not the greatest good.' We should mention here that the truly tragic effect of the catastrophe, and thus the hero's consequent resignation and elevation of spirit is rarely as purely motivated and clearly expressed as in the opera *Norma*, where it appears in the duet *Qual cor tradisti, qual cor perdesti*<sup>d</sup> in which the turning

<sup>a</sup> *Nichtigkeit*

<sup>b</sup> [See *Poetics*, ch. 13]

<sup>c</sup> [Act IV, penultimate line]

<sup>d</sup> ['What a heart you have betrayed, what a heart you have lost', from Vincenzo Bellini's *Norma*, Act II, finale]

of the will is clearly described by the sudden appearance of tranquillity in the music. In general, this piece – entirely apart from its superb music, as well as the diction, which can only be that of a libretto – and looking only at its motives and inner economy, is a highly perfected tragedy, a true model of the tragic arrangement of motives, tragic progression of action, and tragic development together with the effect these have on the attitude of the hero of raising him above the world, which is then transferred over to the spectator as well: in fact, the effect achieved here is all the more artless and captivating and characteristic of the true essence of tragedy given that there are neither Christians nor Christian sentiments in it. –

The accusation so often brought against the moderns that they neglect the unities of time and place is only accurate if they go so far as to abolish unity of action, leaving only unity of the main character, as in for instance Shakespeare's *Henry VIII*. But unity of action need not be taken to the extent that only one thing is discussed, as is the case with French tragedies which hold to it so strictly that the dramatic development is like a geometric line without width: they are always calling out 'Keep going forward! Focus on what you're doing!'<sup>a</sup> and the action is expedited and dispatched in a businesslike manner without spending time on unrelated foolishness or looking left or right. The Shakespearian tragedy on the other hand is like a line that has width as well: it leaves itself time, it expatiates:<sup>b</sup> there are speeches and even entire scenes that do not advance the action or even really concern it, but in which we nevertheless get to know more about the acting characters or their situations, and this lets us understand even the action more thoroughly. The action certainly remains the focus, but not so exclusively that we forget that in the last instance its intention is to portray the human essence and existence in general.<sup>60</sup> –

499

The dramatic or epic poet should know that *he* is fate, and hence, like fate, be inexorable – and also that he is the mirror of the human race and so should allow a great many bad and occasionally ruthless characters to appear, as well as many fools, crooked minds and idiots, but now and again someone reasonable, someone clever, someone honest, or someone good, and only as the rarest exception, someone magnanimous. By my reckoning, there are no truly magnanimous characters in all of *Homer*, although there are many good and honest ones: in the whole of *Shakespeare* there might be a couple of noble characters, although by no means excessively noble ones, perhaps Cordelia and Coriolanus and hardly anyone else; on the other hand they are teeming with the types mentioned

<sup>a</sup> *Nur vorwärts! Pensez à votre affaire!*

<sup>b</sup> *expatiatur*

above. But plays by *Iffland* and *Kotzebue* have many magnanimous characters; while *Goldoni* has done as I recommended above, showing his superiority. By contrast, Lessing's *Minna von Barnhelm*<sup>a</sup> really labours under too much and too universal a sense of magnanimity:<sup>61</sup> and even the amount of magnanimity shown in Marquis Posa<sup>b</sup> alone cannot be found in all of Goethe's works taken together: although there is a short German play called 'Duties concerning Duties'<sup>c</sup> (a title that could have been taken from the *Critique of Practical Reason*) that has only three characters and all three are excessively magnanimous. –

500 The Greeks made only royalty into tragic heroes; moderns usually do the same. This is certainly not due to the fact that rank gives more dignity to the one who acts or suffers; and since it is merely a matter of putting human passions into play, the relative value of the objects through which this takes place does not matter, and farmhouses will do as well as kingdoms. Nor should bourgeois tragedy<sup>d</sup> be dismissed without question. Nonetheless, characters with great power and status are the best suited for tragedy because the misfortune in which we should recognize the fate of human life must have sufficient grandeur in order to appear terrible to the spectator, whoever he might be. Euripides himself said: 'Woe, woe, the great must also suffer great troubles!'<sup>e</sup> (Stobaeus, *Anthology*,<sup>f</sup> vol. 2, p. 299).<sup>62</sup> But the circumstances that leave a bourgeois family in need and despair are mostly quite trivial in the eyes of the great or wealthy, and can be resolved with human help, and indeed sometimes in quite a trivial manner: so wealthy spectators could not be affected tragically by these circumstances. On the other hand, the misfortunes of the great and mighty are unconditionally terrible, and cannot be helped by outside assistance; kings must help themselves through their own power or perish. In addition, the fall from high places is greater. Bourgeois characters lack the heights from which to fall.<sup>63</sup> –

Now if we have discovered the tendency and ultimate intention of *tragedy* to be a turning towards resignation, towards a negation of the will to life; then we will easily recognize its opposite, *comedy*,<sup>g</sup> to be an appeal to the continued affirmation of this will. Of course like every portrayal of human life, comedy too must inevitably place suffering and

<sup>a</sup> [a play of 1767]

<sup>b</sup> [a character in Schiller's play *Don Carlos*]

<sup>c</sup> *Pflicht um Pflicht* [by Pius Alexander Wolff (1817)]

<sup>d</sup> *das bürgerliche Trauerspiel*

<sup>e</sup> φεῦ, φεῦ, τὰ μεγάλα, μεγάλα καὶ πάσχει κακά

<sup>f</sup> *Florilegium*

<sup>g</sup> *Lustspiel*

obstacles before our eyes: but it shows them as temporary, resolving into joy, and in general mixed with success, victory, and hope, all of which ultimately prevail; and in so doing it showcases the inexhaustible material for laughter that fills life and even its adversities, and that should keep us in a good mood through every circumstance. As a result, it also declares that life as a whole is a good thing and indeed rather amusing. Of course it must hurry to bring down the curtain while things are still happy so that we do not see what follows; while tragedy generally ends so that nothing can follow. And besides, if we ever look seriously at that burlesque side of life as it appears in the naïve expressions and gestures that petty setbacks, personal fears, momentary rage, secret jealousy and many similar affects imprint on figures that deviate noticeably from the type of the beautiful – the thoughtful observer can be convinced from even this burlesque perspective (and hence unexpectedly) that the existence and activities<sup>a</sup> of such beings cannot themselves be the goal, that on the contrary, they were able to arrive at existence only by a wrong path and that what is portrayed in this way is something that would in fact have been better not existing.

501

<sup>a</sup> *Treiben*

*On History*

In the passage from the First Volume mentioned below, I have shown in detail that literature is superior to history when it comes to an understanding<sup>a</sup> of human nature and why this is so: to this extent we can expect to learn more from the former than from the latter. *Aristotle* had this insight too when he said: ‘and poetry is more philosophical and valuable than history’.<sup>b,\*\*</sup> (*Poetics*, ch. 9.) So as not to occasion any misunderstandings about the value of history, I will now give my thoughts on the matter.

502 In every kind and species<sup>c</sup> of things, the facts are countless, the individuals infinite, and the multiplicity of their differences inexhaustible. One glance at this will cause a curious mind to reel: it sees itself condemned to ignorance, however far it investigates. – But then in comes *science*: it separates the countless multitude, collects it under kind concepts,<sup>d</sup> and these in turn under species concepts, opening a path to cognition of the universal and the particular which also includes the countless individuals, since it is true of everything without having to consider each thing on its own. In this way, it offers solace to the mind engaged in research. Then all the sciences line up alongside each other and above the real world of particular things that they have divided among themselves. Philosophy soars above them all as the most universal and therefore most important knowledge, promising information for which the others have merely prepared the way. – Only *history* is not permitted to enter into this sequence since it cannot boast the same advantage as the others: it lacks

\* This chapter relates to § 51 of the First Volume.

\*\* We can note here in passing that the contrast between *poiësis* [ποίησις] and *historia* [ιστορία] brings the origin and thus the true meaning of the first of these terms to the fore with uncommon clarity: it means, in short, what is produced, thought up, in contrast to what is ascertained.

<sup>a</sup> *Erkenntniß*

<sup>b</sup> καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστὶν (*et res magis philosophica, et melior poësis est, quam historia*) [451b5]

<sup>c</sup> *Art und Gattung*

<sup>d</sup> *Artbegriffe*

the basic character of science, the subordination of what is known, instead merely coordinating the known. Thus there is no system of history, as there is with every other science. It is accordingly a field of knowledge, but not for that matter a science.<sup>a</sup> It never achieves cognition of the particular by means of the universal but must grasp the particular immediately and thus, as it were, creep forward on the field of experience.<sup>b</sup> Meanwhile, real sciences soar above it, since they have won for themselves comprehensive concepts which they can use to master the particular and hence understand the possibility of things within their purview, at least within certain limits, so that they can also be confident about what is yet to come. Since sciences are systems of concepts, they always speak of species;<sup>c</sup> history speaks of individuals. History would then be a science of individuals, which is a contradiction. If sciences are systems of concepts, it follows that they collectively talk about what always exists; history on the other hand talks about what existed at one point and then no longer.<sup>64</sup> Moreover, since history concerns only the particular and individual, which is by nature inexhaustible, it knows things only imperfectly and partially. At the same time, it must allow each new day, in all its ordinariness, to teach it what it did not know at all. – If one were to object that the subordination of the particular to the universal can be found in history too, since the time periods, governments and other principal and national changes, in short, everything that belongs on historical tables, is the universal that subordinates the particular, this would rest on a false construal of the concept of the universal. The proposed conception of the historical universal is merely *subjective*, i.e. its universality comes only from the inadequacy of individual *knowledge*<sup>d</sup> of things; it is not an *objective* universal, i.e. a concept in which things are really thought together. Even what is most universal in history is in itself only singular and individual, namely a longer stretch of time or a major event: the particular is to this what the part is to the whole, but not what the case is to the rule, which is what we find in all genuine sciences, since they provide concepts, not mere facts. Thus in these sciences, correct *knowledge*<sup>e</sup> of the universal can be used to determine with certainty what particulars will occur. If for instance I am familiar with the laws of the triangle in general, I can accordingly state what must be true of the triangle before me: and what holds true of all mammals, for instance that they have

503

<sup>a</sup> zwar ein Wissen, jedoch keine Wissenschaft

<sup>b</sup> auf dem Boden der Erfahrung fortzukriechen

<sup>c</sup> Gattungen

<sup>d</sup> Kenntniß

<sup>e</sup> Kenntniß

504

a double heart chamber, exactly seven cervical vertebrae, lungs, a diaphragm, bladder, five senses, etc., I can claim all this of an unfamiliar, newly captured bat, prior to dissection. But this is not the case with history, where the universal is not an objective universal of concepts but rather merely a subjective one tied to my familiarity with the subject, something that can only be called universal<sup>a</sup> to the extent that it is superficial: thus I might know of the Thirty Years War in general<sup>b</sup> that it was a 17th-century war of religion, but this general familiarity does not allow me to say anything more specific about its course. – The same contrast is also apparent in the real sciences where it is the particular and singular that is the most certain (being based on immediate perception) while universal truths are only derived from it by abstraction, and so we would sooner suspect these to contain some erroneous assumption. In history, however, it is the other way around, and the most universal is the most certain, for instance the time periods, the succession of kings, the revolutions, wars, and peace treaties, while on the other hand the particularities of events and their connections are less certain, and become even less so the more we become involved with the details. History is therefore more interesting the more specific it is, but also that much less reliable, and more like a novel in every respect. – As for the much lauded pragmatism of history, this is best measured by someone who remembers that oftentimes he has only understood the true interconnections of events in his own life twenty years later, even though he has had all the information right in front of him, because this is how difficult it is to link the effects of motives, given the constant assault of chance and the disguise of intentions. – To the extent that the subject matter of history is really only ever the particular, the individual fact, and to the extent that it views only these things as real, it is the exact counterpart and opposite of philosophy, which looks at things from the most universal standpoint and is explicitly concerned with the universal that remains identical across all individuals; thus philosophy always sees only the universal in the particular and recognizes the change in individual appearances as inessential: ‘for the philosopher is a friend of the universal’.<sup>c</sup> While history teaches us that things were different in every age, philosophy is concerned to bring us the insight that things have been, are, and will be entirely the same in all ages. In truth, the essence of human life, as of nature in general, is completely present in every present moment and requires only a depth of comprehension to be exhaustively recognized. But history hopes to

<sup>a</sup> *allgemein*

<sup>b</sup> *im Allgemeinen*

<sup>c</sup> φιλοκαθόλου γὰρ ὁ φιλόσοφος (*generalium amator philosophus*) [after Olympiodorus in *Platonis Alcibiadem Priorem Commentarii* (*Commentaries on Plato's First Alcibiades*): see p. 381, n. f]

replace depth with length and breadth: for it, the present is only ever a fragment that needs to be completed by the past, the length of which is infinite and which in turn gives way to an infinite future. This is the basis of the opposition of philosophical and historical minds: the former want to give grounds, the latter want to narrate to the very end. History shows the same thing on every side, only in different forms: but someone who does not recognize it in one or a few forms will not find it any easier to recognize by running through all of its forms. Books on the histories of peoples are basically only different in names and dates: the true and essential content is everywhere the same.

505

Insofar as the material of art is the *Idea*, while the material of science is the *concept*, we see both of them occupied with what exists eternally and in the same way, not with what now is and now is not, what is now in one way and now in another: this is why they are both concerned with what *Plato* established to be the unique subject matter of true knowledge.<sup>a</sup> The material of history on the other hand is the particular in its particularity and contingency, what is at one time and is never again to be, the transient complications of a human world that moves like a cloud in the wind, and which is often completely rearranged by the most trivial happenstance. From this standpoint, the material of history hardly looks like a subject worthy of the earnest and painstaking investigation of the human spirit which, precisely because it is itself so perishable, should choose to investigate what is imperishable.

Finally, as regards the attempt to grasp world history as an overall design, particularly as it appears in the Hegelian pseudo-philosophy<sup>b</sup> that everywhere induces idiocy and ruins minds, an attempt this pseudo-philosophy calls 'constructing world history organically'; this is in fact based on a crude and shallow *realism* that considers *appearance* to be the *essence in itself* of the world and claims that what matters is only this appearance and its forms and processes. In this it is still tacitly supported by certain basic mythological insights that it silently presupposes; otherwise we might ask what spectator this comedy is really being performed for? – It is only the individual, not the human race that has a real and immediate unity of consciousness, and so the unity of the life of the human race is a mere fiction. Moreover, just as it is only the species that are real in nature while genera are mere abstractions, it is the same in the human race: only the individuals and their life courses are real, while peoples and the lives of peoples are mere abstractions. And finally, constructive histories guided by a shallow optimism always ultimately lead to

506

<sup>a</sup> *Wissen*

<sup>b</sup> *Afterphilosophie*



a fat, comfortable and substantial state with a well-regulated constitution, good police and a good system of justice, technology, industry and at its peak, intellectual perfection; because this is in fact the only possible one, since morality<sup>a</sup> remains unchanged in essentials. But morality is what everything depends on, according to the testimony of our innermost consciousness: and morality lies only in the individual, as the direction of his will. In truth only the life course of each individual has unity, coherence, and true significance:<sup>b</sup> life should be viewed as teaching us a lesson and the meaning<sup>c</sup> of the lesson is a moral one. Only *inner* processes, to the extent that they concern the *will*, have true reality and are actual events; because only the will is the thing in itself. The entire macrocosm lies in every microcosm, and the former contains no more than the latter. Multiplicity is appearance and outer events are mere configurations of the world of appearances, and accordingly have neither reality nor meaning, at least not directly but only indirectly, through their relation to the will of the individual. Attempts to interpret and render them directly meaningful are like attempts to see groupings of people and animals in the shapes of clouds. – What history recounts is in fact only the long, difficult, and confused dream of humanity.

507 Hegelians, who go so far as to view the philosophy of history as the main purpose of all philosophy, should be referred to Plato, who tirelessly repeats that the subject matter of philosophy is that which does not change but always remains the same, not what is sometimes one way and sometimes another. Everyone who establishes such constructions of the course of the world, or, as they call it, history, has failed to understand the principal truth of all philosophy, namely that the same thing exists throughout all of time, that all becoming and coming to be is only an appearance, that the Ideas alone are permanent and time is ideal. This according to Plato, this according to Kant. We should therefore try to understand what *is* there,<sup>d</sup> really *is*, today and forever – i.e. to cognize the *Ideas* (in Plato's sense). By contrast, fools believe that there should first be coming into being and becoming. This is why they give history a place of honour in their philosophy and construct it according to a preset plan of the world which holds that everything is for the best, and this best is supposed ultimately<sup>e</sup> to appear and be a supreme excellence. Thus, they take the world as perfectly real and posit its goal in paltry earthly happiness<sup>f</sup> which, however cherished it might be by humanity

<sup>a</sup> *das Moralische*

<sup>b</sup> *Bedeutsamkeit*

<sup>c</sup> *Sinn*

<sup>d</sup> *da ist* [from *dasein*, to exist]

<sup>e</sup> *finaliter*

<sup>f</sup> *Erdenglück*

and favoured by fate, is still a hollow, deceptive, frail and sorry thing that neither constitutions and legislation nor steam-engines and telegraphs can ever improve in essentials. The aforementioned philosophers and glorifiers of history are therefore simple realists, and even optimists and eudaemonists, and thus shallow fellows and philistines incarnate, and moreover bad Christians, since the true spirit and inner core of Christianity, as with Brahmanism and Buddhism, is an understanding<sup>a</sup> of the nothingness<sup>b</sup> of earthly happiness, a complete disdain for such happiness and a turn in the direction of a completely different, even opposite existence: this, I say, is the spirit and aim of Christianity, the true 'humour of the matter';<sup>c</sup> but it is not, as they think, monotheism; this is why even atheistic Buddhism is much more closely related to Christianity than is optimistic Judaism and its variant, Islam.

So an actual philosophy of history should not, like this, investigate what (to speak with Plato) always *becomes* and never *is*, and take this for the true essence of things; rather, it should fix its eye on what always is and never becomes or passes away. Accordingly, it does not consist in elevating the temporal goal of humanity into an eternal and absolute one, and giving an artificial and imaginary construction of its progress towards this goal through all setbacks; rather, it consists in the insight that history is deceptive, not only in practice but also in its essence, since, while speaking of mere individuals and particular events, it always pretends to be recounting something else; while, from beginning to end, it only ever repeats the same thing under different names and in different clothes. The true philosophy of history consists in the insight that throughout all these endless alterations with their chaotic noise,<sup>d</sup> we are only ever faced with the same, identical, unchangeable essence that behaves the same today as yesterday and always: the true philosophy should therefore recognize what is identical in all events, in ancient as well as in modern times, in the Orient as well as the Occident; and in spite of all differences in particular circumstances, in costumes and customs, it should always look out upon the same humanity. This permanent and identical element abiding under all change consists of the basic qualities of the human heart and head – many bad ones, few good. The motto of history in general would have to read: 'the same, but in different form'.<sup>e</sup> If you have read Herodotus,<sup>f</sup> then

508

<sup>a</sup> *Erkenntniß*

<sup>b</sup> *Nichtigkeit*

<sup>c</sup> [cf. Shakespeare's 'there's the humour of it', e.g. in *Henry V*, Act II, sc. 1]

<sup>d</sup> *Wirrwarr*

<sup>e</sup> *Eadem, sed aliter*

<sup>f</sup> [*Histories* (fifth century BC)]

from a philosophical perspective you have already studied enough history. Because there you find all the ingredients of subsequent world history: the activities, deeds, sufferings and fate of the human race as it develops from the qualities mentioned as well as from the physical, earthly lot.<sup>65</sup> –

If in what has been said we have recognized that history is inferior to literature as a method of cognizing the essence of humanity, and further, that it is not a science in the true sense, and finally, that the attempt to construct it as a whole with a beginning, middle, and end, together with a meaningful coherence, is a fruitless enterprise, resting on a misunderstanding, then it would seem that we were denying it had any worth at all, unless we were to demonstrate what its worth consists in. In fact, although history is defeated by art and rejected by science, it still retains a characteristic province of its own that is distinct from either of these, and it exists most honourably within this province.

*What reason is to the individual, history is to the human race.* It is by virtue of reason that human beings are not, like the animals, restricted to the narrow, intuitive present, but also cognize the incomparably more extended past to which they are connected and from which they proceed: only in this way do human beings have a genuine understanding of the present itself such that they can even make decisions concerning the future. By contrast, animals (whose unreflective cognition is limited to intuition and therefore the present) wander among human beings ignorant, dull, artless, helpless, and dependent, even when tame. – This is analogous to a people that is unaware of its own history and is restricted to the generation alive at present and that therefore does not understand itself and its own present, because it cannot relate the present to, or explain it from, the past; even less is it able to anticipate the future. It is only through history that a people becomes fully conscious of itself. This is why history should be seen as the rational self-consciousness of the human race, and is to the human race what the reflective, coherent, rationally conditioned consciousness is to the individual, the absence of which imprisons animals in the narrow, intuitive present. This is why every gap in history is like a gap in the recollecting self-consciousness of a human being; and we stand before a memorial of prehistoric antiquity that has outlived information about itself, such as, e.g., the pyramids, temples, and palaces in Yucatan,<sup>66</sup> just as insensibly and naïvely as an animal in the presence of a human action in which it is involved as a servant, or just as a person before his own old secret code to which he has forgotten the key, or indeed just as a sleepwalker who discovers in the morning what he has done during the night. In this sense, history is to be regarded as the reason or the enlightened self-consciousness of the human race, and occupies the place of

an immediate collective self-consciousness of the entire race, so that it is only through history that the human race is really made into a whole, into one humanity.<sup>a</sup> This is the true value of history; and accordingly the chief basis for the universal and excessive interest we take in it is that it is of personal concern to the human race.<sup>67</sup> – Now *language* is the indispensable condition for an individual's use of reason, and so *writing* is similarly the condition for what we have shown here to be the reason of the entire race: because only with writing does the collective reason of the human race really come into existence, just as individual reason only comes into existence with language. Writing serves to restore unity to the consciousness of the human race that is fragmented by the ceaseless interruptions of death, so that the thoughts arising in an ancestor can be completed in a distant descendent: it rectifies the disintegration of the human race and its consciousness into countless ephemeral individuals and defies the inexorable passage of time with its attendant forgetfulness. All this is accomplished not only by written memorials but by *stone* ones as well, some of which are older than written ones. Who would believe that those people who, at immeasurable expense, set in motion the manpower of many thousands of people over many years in order to construct the pyramids, monoliths, rock tombs, obelisks, temples and palaces that have endured for millennia – who would believe that they had only themselves in view, the short span of their lives which did not last to see the end of the construction, or even to see the ostensible goal that the crude masses demanded as a pretext? – Clearly their real goal was to speak to the most distant posterity, to enter into a relationship with it, and in this way to bring unity to the consciousness of humanity. The buildings of the Hindus, Egyptians and even the Greeks and Romans were calculated to last for many millennia, because their range of vision, brought about by culture, was broader; while the buildings of the Middle Ages and modern times were intended for a couple of centuries at most, which was also due to the fact that people were more reliant on writing once it came into more general use, and even more once it gave birth to the printing press. Yet we still see in the buildings of more recent ages the impulse to speak to posterity, and it is therefore shameful when they are destroyed or rebuilt to serve lower, utilitarian functions. Written monuments have less to fear from the elements than stone monuments, but more to fear from barbarism: they accomplish much more. The Egyptians wanted to unite both types of monuments by covering the stone monuments with hieroglyphics; in fact they added paintings in case the hieroglyphics could no longer be understood.

510

<sup>a</sup> zu einer Menschheit

## *On the Metaphysics of Music*

In my explanation of the true significance of the wonderful art of music in the passage cited below from the First Volume, a passage which the reader should bear in mind here, I had concluded that although there need be no similarity between its achievements and the world as representation, i.e. nature, there must be a clear *parallelism*, which I then demonstrated. I will now add some more precise and noteworthy descriptions to that discussion. – The four voices of all harmony, that is bass, tenor, alto, and soprano, or ground note, third, fifth, and octave, correspond to the four levels in the series of beings, which is to say the mineral world, plant kingdom, animal kingdom and human beings. This view receives a striking confirmation in the fundamental musical rule that the bass is supposed to remain at a much greater distance from the three higher voices than these are from each other, so that it is never supposed to get any closer to these than the distance of an octave, and usually remains further, and the proper triad has its place in the third octave above the bass note. Accordingly, the effect of *extended* harmony, where the bass remains further away, is much more powerful and beautiful than that of close harmony, where it is brought into greater proximity; close harmony is introduced only due to limited instrumental range. This entire rule is however in no way arbitrary but is rooted in the natural origin of the tonal system, insofar as the nearest harmonic intervals are the octave and its fifth, which sound simultaneously by means of the harmonics. In this rule, we recognize the musical analogue of the basic constitution of nature by virtue of which organic creatures are much more closely related to each other than to the lifeless, inorganic masses of the mineral world; between it and them the most decided boundaries and the widest gaps in the whole of nature can be found. –

512 The fact that the high voice singing the melody is at the same time an integral part of the harmony, and joins together with even the deepest

\* This chapter relates to § 52 of the First Volume.

ground bass, can be regarded as analogous to the fact that *the same* matter that supports the Idea of humanity in a human organism must at the same time present and support the Ideas of gravity and chemical properties, that is to say the lowest levels of the objectivation of the will.

Unlike all the other arts, music does not present the *Ideas* or the levels of objectivation of the will, but rather directly presents the will *itself*; and because of this we can also explain the fact that it has immediate effects on the will, i.e. the feelings, passions and affects of the listener, such that it can very rapidly elevate these feelings, or even change them.

Just as certainly as music, far from being a mere assistant to poetry, is a self-sufficient art, indeed the most powerful of them all, reaching its goal entirely through its own means – just as certainly it does not need the words of a song or the action of an opera. Music as such knows only the notes, not the causes that bring them about. Accordingly, for it too, the human voice<sup>a</sup> is originally and essentially nothing other than a modified tone,<sup>b</sup> just like that of an instrument, and, like any other instrument, has characteristic advantages and disadvantages as a result of the instrument that produces it. As the tool of speech, this instrument can be used differently, namely to communicate concepts; still, this is an accidental circumstance, one that music can certainly use incidentally in order to forge a relation with poetry, but that should never be exploited to make poetry the focal point, wholly concerned with the expression of what are mostly or even (as Diderot claims in *Rameau's Nephew*)<sup>c</sup> essentially, insipid verses. Words are and remain a foreign accessory to music and of subordinate value, since the effect of notes is incomparably faster and more powerful and unfailing than that of words: these must therefore assume a completely subordinate position when they are annexed to music, and adapt themselves to it entirely. But the converse relation holds when we begin with poetry such as a song or libretto, and music is then added to it. The music quickly reveals its power and higher capability, since it now provides the final, secret and most profound disclosures<sup>d</sup> concerning the feelings expressed in the words or the actions portrayed in the opera; it expresses their genuine and true essence and acquaints us with the innermost soul of the processes and events, while what is portrayed on the stage is mere shell and body. With respect to this dominant role played by music,

513

<sup>a</sup> *vox humana*

<sup>b</sup> *ein modificirter Ton*

<sup>c</sup> *im 'Neffen Rameau's'* [Denis Diderot, *Le Neveu de Rameau*, written between 1761 and 1774 but published only posthumously. Schopenhauer possibly refers to Goethe's translation (1805)]

<sup>d</sup> *Aufschlüsse*

which stands to the text and action in the same relation as the universal to the particular or the rule to the example, it might perhaps seem more fitting that the text be written for the music than that music be composed to the text. In the meantime, with the usual methods, the words and actions of the text lead the composer to the underlying affections of the will and call forth from him the sensations to be expressed, thus acting as stimulants of his musical imagination. – We find poetry to be such a welcome addition to music, and are so pleased by a song with comprehensible words, because it excites both our most direct and our most indirect mode of cognition<sup>a</sup> at the same time and in unison: music expresses the excitation of the will itself to the most direct mode, whereas the most indirect involves concepts denoted by words. Reason does not like to remain entirely idle in the language of feelings. Music can express (by its own means, of course) every movement of the will, every sensation, but when words are added we also have objects of the will, the motives that occasion its movements. – The music of an opera, as presented in the score, has a completely independent, separate, and, as it were abstract, existence of its own, foreign to the actions and characters of the piece, and which follows its own, unalterable rules, and hence is completely effective, even without the text. But since this music was composed with an eye to the drama, it is, as it were, the soul of the drama since, in connection with the events, characters and words, it expresses the inner meaning<sup>b</sup> of all the events and the secret and ultimate necessity that rests on this meaning. Unless he is simply gaping at the action, the spectator derives his pleasure from a vague sense of this. In opera, however, music shows its heterogeneous nature and higher essence through its complete indifference to everything material in the events, as a result of which it expresses the storm of passions and the pathos of sensations in the same way everywhere, and the material for a piece can be drawn from Agamemnon and Achilles or from a quarrel in a bourgeois family, while accompanied by the same pomp of tone. This is because it is only passions, movements of the will that exist for music, and, like God, it sees only the heart. It never assimilates itself to the content:<sup>68</sup> and even when it accompanies the most ludicrous and extravagant pranks of comic opera, it still remains in its essential beauty, purity and sublimity: the fact that it is joined with those events does not allow it to descend from its heights, which are genuinely foreign to everything ludicrous. And so the deep and serious meaning of our existence hovers above the farce and the endless miseries of human life, never leaving it for a second.

<sup>a</sup> *Erkenntnisweise*

<sup>b</sup> *Bedeutung*

Looking at purely instrumental music, a Beethoven symphony shows us the greatest confusion, yet resting on the most perfect order, the most violent struggle that in the next moment turns into the most beautiful accord: it is 'the discordant concord of the world',<sup>a,69</sup> a true and perfect copy of the essence of the world, which rolls on in the immeasurable confusion of countless shapes and maintains itself amid constant destruction. At the same time, all the passions and affects of humanity speak from out of this symphony: joy, sorrow, love, hate, fear, hope, etc., in countless nuances, but all only abstractly,<sup>b</sup> as it were, and without any specificity: it is only their form without content, like a world of mere spirits without matter. When listening to it, we certainly tend to imagine it as real, as clothed in flesh and blood, and to see in it all sorts of scenes from life and nature. But taken as a whole, this does not help us either understand or enjoy the symphony; it is an alien and arbitrary accessory: thus it is better to grasp the symphony purely and in its immediacy.<sup>70</sup>

515

In the remarks so far, as well as the text, I have considered music from the purely metaphysical side, and hence as regards the inner meaning of its achievements; but now it is appropriate for me also to consider in general the means by which music, acting on our minds, brings this about, and thus to demonstrate the connection between this metaphysical side of music and its well-known and thoroughly investigated physical side. — I will start with the theory that everyone knows and that has not been touched in the least by recent objections, the theory that all tonal harmony rests on the coincidence of vibrations. When two notes sound at the same time, this can occur at every second, third, or fourth vibration, which separates them from each other by an octave, a fifth, or a fourth, etc. As long as the vibrations of two notes are in a relation that is both rational and can be expressed in small numbers, they can, if they frequently recur together, be combined in our apprehension: the notes blend together and are thereby in consonance.<sup>c</sup> If on the other hand the relation is irrational or is only expressible in large numbers, then the vibrations do not coincide in a way we can grasp, but 'incessantly clamour against each other'<sup>d</sup> and resist being combined in our apprehension, and are thus called a dissonance. According to this theory, music is a means of making rational and irrational numerical relations graspable, not by means of concepts as is the case with arithmetic, but by bringing them to a completely immediate

<sup>a</sup> *rerum concordia discors* [Horace, *Epistles*, 1, 12, 19]

<sup>b</sup> *in abstracto*

<sup>c</sup> *Einklang*

<sup>d</sup> *obstreperunt sibi perpetuo*



516

and simultaneously sensible cognition. The connection between the meta-physical meaning of music and its physical and arithmetical foundation is due to the fact that what resists our *apprehension*,<sup>a</sup> the irrational or the dissonant, is a natural image for something that resists our *will*; and conversely, consonance, or the rational, since it easily facilitates our *comprehension*,<sup>b</sup> is the image for the satisfaction of the *will*. Now further, since there are innumerable grades, nuances, consequences and variations of what is rational and irrational in the numerical relations of vibrations, then by their means music becomes the material in which all the movements of the human heart, i.e. of the will (which essentially always amounts to satisfaction and dissatisfaction, although in countless degrees) can be faithfully reconstructed and reproduced in all of their most subtly nuanced shades and modifications, and this takes place by means of the invention of melody. Thus, we see here the movements of the will mirrored across to the territory of pure *representation*, which is the only stage for all performances of the fine arts, since these absolutely require that the *will itself* remain out of play and that we act as pure *cognizing beings*.<sup>c</sup> Thus the affections of the will itself, which is to say actual pain and actual pleasure, are not to be excited but only their substitute, what is suitable to the *intellect*, as the *image* of the satisfaction of the will, and what offers it more or less resistance, as the *image* of the greater or lesser pain. It is only in this way that music never causes us actual pain but remains enjoyable even in its most painful harmonies, and we gladly perceive in its language the secret history of our will and all of its excitations and strivings, with their most varied prolongations, obstacles and agonies, even in the most melancholy melodies. When on the other hand, in reality with its horrors, our *will itself* is excited and pained, we are not dealing with notes and their numerical relations but are now ourselves the vibrating string that is stretched and plucked.

A further consequence of the underlying physical theory is that the truly musical element of the note lies in the proportional rapidity of its vibrations, not in their relative strength. Thus, someone listening to harmony in music will always prefer to follow the highest rather than the strongest note. This is why the soprano stands out amid even the strongest orchestral accompaniment, and has something like a natural right to carry the melody; this right is further reinforced by the soprano's great mobility, a quality that is also due to the rapidity of the vibrations, and is displayed in

<sup>a</sup> *Apprehension*

<sup>b</sup> *Auffassung*

<sup>c</sup> *als rein Erkennende*

ornate passages. It is this rapidity that makes the soprano the appropriate representative of the heightened sensibility that is receptive to the slightest impression and can be determined by it, and consequently of the most highly increased consciousness that stands at the highest level on the ladder of beings.<sup>a</sup> Its opposite, arising from contrary causes, is the heavily moving bass, which rises and falls only in great intervals, thirds, fourths, and fifths, and is therefore guided at each step by set rules; accordingly, this bass is the natural representative of the realm of inorganic nature that is devoid of feeling, not susceptible to subtle impressions, and determined only by universal laws. It is never permitted to rise by only a *single* note, for instance from the fourth to the fifth, since this leads to an incorrect fifth or octave sequence in the higher voices, and thus, originally and by its own nature, the bass cannot carry the melody. If the melody nonetheless falls to it, then this is only by means of counterpoint, i.e. it is a *transposed* bass, and one of the upper voices is lowered and disguised as the bass: and in fact it then requires a second ground bass for its accompaniment. It is because of this unnaturalness of a melody in the bass that bass arias with full accompaniment can never give us the pure, undiluted pleasure of a soprano aria, since only the soprano is natural in the coherence of the harmony. We can add that this sort of bass, that has been compelled by transposition to carry the melody, can, in the terms of our metaphysics of music, be compared to a block of marble on which has been imposed the figure of a human being: the stone guest in *Don Giovanni*<sup>b</sup> is for that reason wonderfully appropriate.

517

But now we want to approach the *genesis* of melody more closely, and this can be accomplished by breaking it down into its component parts, a procedure that will afford us the pleasure that comes from taking things everyone is conscious of concretely<sup>c</sup> and bringing them to abstract and clear consciousness, which lends them the appearance of novelty.

Melody has two elements, one rhythmic and one harmonic: the former can be described as the quantitative element and the latter the qualitative, since the first concerns the length of the note and the second its height and depth. In musical notation, the first is associated with the vertical and the second the horizontal lines.<sup>71</sup> Both have purely arithmetical ratios, and thus time, as their basis: the one is based on the relative length of the notes, the other on the relative rapidity of their vibrations. The rhythmic element is the most essential, since it, alone and without the other, can present a kind of melody that, for instance, occurs on the drum: still, a complete melody

518

<sup>a</sup> *Wesenleiter*

<sup>b</sup> *Don Juan*

<sup>c</sup> *in concreto*

requires both. It consists in an alternating *division and reconciliation* of the two as I will soon show; but first, since we have already been talking about the harmonic element, we will look more closely at the element of rhythm.

*Rhythm* is in time what *symmetry* is in space, namely the separation into equal and mutually corresponding parts, and in fact into larger parts that then break into smaller, subordinate ones. *Architecture* and *music* are at either end of the series of arts, as I have presented them. They are also the most different in terms of their significance, power, inner essence, and the extent of their domains, in fact they are true antipodes: this contrast extends even to the form of their appearances, since *architecture* exists only in space without any reference to time, and music exists only in time without any reference to space.\* This is the source of the only analogy between them: just as in architecture, *symmetry* is what arranges things and holds them together, in music it is *rhythm* that does this, which proves that here too, 'extremes meet'.<sup>a</sup> Just as a building is ultimately made up of completely identical stones, a musical piece is made up of completely identical measures: but these are separated into equal parts through arsis and thesis,<sup>b</sup> or in general through the numerical fraction that signifies the time signature, and these equal parts can in any event be compared to the dimensions of stones. A musical phrase consists of several measures which also have two equal halves, one rising, striving, usually approaching the dominant, and one falling, resting, finding the tonic again. Two (or usually more) phrases create a section,<sup>c</sup> that is usually also doubled symmetrically by the repetition sign: a smaller piece of music, or even one movement of a larger piece, tends to be made of two sections, just as a concerto or sonata generally consists of three movements, a symphony of four, and a mass of five. We therefore see the musical piece made whole and finished off by symmetrical division and repeated separation, down to the measures and their breaks, by the thoroughgoing subordination, super-ordination and coordination of its components, just as is the case with architecture through its symmetry; only with the exception that what is exclusively spatial in the latter is exclusively temporal in the former. The mere feeling of this analogy has

519

\* It would be false to object that sculpture and painting are purely spatial as well: their works are indirectly if not directly connected to time, since they portray life, motion, and action. It would be equally false to say that poetry, as speech, belongs solely in time: this is only directly true of the words: the content of poetry is everything that exists, that is, what is spatial.

<sup>a</sup> *les extrêmes se touchent*

<sup>b</sup> *Auf- und Niederschlag*

<sup>c</sup> *Theil*

led to the bold witticism, frequently repeated these past thirty years, that architecture is frozen music. This phrase can be traced back to *Goethe*, since, according to the *Conversations with Eckermann*,<sup>a</sup> vol. II, p. 88, he said: 'I have found among my papers a page in which I call architecture a rigidified music: and there is really something to this: the mood that comes from architecture is close to the effect of music.' He probably dropped this witticism in conversation much earlier, and it is well known that there were always people to pick up what he dropped so they could go about adorned with it later. Whatever else Goethe might have said, the analogy between music and architecture, which I have traced to its unique ground (the analogy between rhythm and symmetry) extends only to the outer form, and certainly not to the inner essence of the two arts, which are worlds apart: it would in fact be ridiculous to want to equate the most limited and weakest of all arts with the most extensive and effective as far as essentials are concerned. As an amplification of the analogy we have established we could add that when music, seizing the opportunity of a fermata to push for independence, tears itself away from the compulsion of rhythm to indulge in the free fantasy of a florid cadenza, this sort of music stripped of rhythm is analogous to a ruin stripped of symmetry and one might, in the bold language of that witticism, call such a ruin a frozen cadenza.

520

After this discussion of *rhythm*, I now have to show how the essence of melody consists in the constantly repeated *division and reconciliation* of its rhythmic and harmonic elements. Its harmonic element presupposes the tonic, just as the rhythmic element presupposes the time signature, and consists in a deviation from the tonic through all the notes of the scale until, by a shorter or longer detour, it reaches a harmonic level, usually the dominant or the subdominant, that produces a sort of incomplete tranquillity, followed (along just as long a route) by the return to the tonic which produces a complete tranquillity. Both must take place in such a way that the achievement of the level described as well as the rediscovery of the tonic coincide with certain preferred moments in the *rhythm*, or else it does not have an effect. Thus, just as the harmonic tonal sequence requires certain *notes*, chiefly the tonic, followed by the dominant, etc., rhythm for its part requires certain *moments in time*, certain numbered measures and certain parts of these measures which are called the heavy or good beats, or the accented parts of the measure, as opposed to the light or bad beats, or the unaccented parts of the measure. Now the *division* of the two basic elements consists in the fact that satisfying the demands of the one leaves the other

<sup>a</sup> [Johann Peter Eckermann, *Gespräche mit Goethe in den letzten Jahren seines Lebens* (*Conversations with Goethe in the last years of his life*) (1836–48)]

unsatisfied, while the *reconciliation* consists in both being satisfied simultaneously and at once. That wandering about of the tonal sequence until it reaches a more or less harmonic level must not take place before there have been a certain number of measures, and then it must encounter a *good* beat in the measure, which becomes a certain point of rest for it, and likewise with the return to the tonic it must be rediscovered after an equal number of bars and also on a *good* beat, leading to complete satisfaction. As long as the required coincidence of the satisfaction of both elements is not achieved, the rhythm for its part can go on its regular way, and the required notes can keep  
 521 coming back, but they will still entirely lack the effect that gives rise to melody: the following exceedingly simple example will serve to explain this:



Here the harmonic tonal sequence strikes the tonic at the very end of the first measure: but this does not give it satisfaction, because the rhythm is conceived in the worst part of the measure. Immediately after, in the second measure, the rhythm has the good part of the measure, but the tonal sequence has arrived at the seventh. Thus, the two elements of melody are completely *divided* here; and we feel disquieted. In the second half of the phrase everything is the other way around, and they are *reconciled* in the final note. This procedure can be demonstrated in every melody, although usually at much greater length. The constant *division and reconciliation* of the two elements that takes place here is, viewed metaphysically, an image of the arising of new desires<sup>a</sup> and then their satisfaction. Music worms its way into our hearts precisely by always showing an image of the perfect satisfaction of our hearts' desires. Looked at more closely, we see in these events a certain sort of *inner* condition (the harmonic) coinciding with an *outer* condition (the rhythmic) as if by *chance* – which of course is brought about by the composer and is in this respect comparable to rhyme in poetry. But precisely this is the image of the coincidence between our desires and favourable external circumstances that are independent of them, and hence it is the picture of happiness.<sup>b</sup> – The effect of *suspension* also deserves consideration here. It is a dissonance that defers the final consonance that is expected with

<sup>a</sup> *Wünsche*

<sup>b</sup> *des Glücks*

certainty, strengthening the longing for this consonance and making its arrival that much more satisfying; clearly an analogy to the satisfaction of the will that is heightened through deferral. A perfect cadence requires a previous seventh chord on the dominant, because the most deeply felt satisfaction and complete tranquillity can only come after the most urgent longing. Thus, music as a whole consists in a constant changing between chords with a more or less disquieting effect, which is to say chords that excite longing, and chords whose effect is more or less comforting and satisfying; just as the life of the heart (the will) is a constant changing between a state of greater or lesser discomfort, through desire or fear, and an equally variable degree of tranquillity. Accordingly, harmonic progression consists in the artistic alternation of dissonance and consonance. A progression of merely consonant chords would be cloying, wearisome, and have an empty effect, like the languor that comes from the satisfaction of all desires. So dissonances must be introduced, despite their disquieting and almost painful effect, but only so that they can be resolved into consonances with an appropriate preparation. In the whole of music there are really only two basic chords, the dissonant seventh and the harmonic third, and all others can be reduced to these. This corresponds precisely to the fact that for the will there is basically only dissatisfaction and satisfaction, however many forms they might present themselves under. And just as there are two basic frames of mind, cheerfulness (or at least vigour) and sorrow (or at any rate unease), music also has two basic and corresponding modes, the major and the minor, and must always find itself in one of the two. But it is in fact highly remarkable that there is a sign for pain that is neither psychically painful nor even conventional and yet immediately engaging and unmistakable: the minor. This lets us gauge how deeply music is grounded in the essence of things and of the human being. – In Northern peoples whose lives are subject to difficult conditions, namely with the Russians, the minor is predominant, even in church music. – Allegro in a minor key is very common in French music and is characteristic of it: it is as if someone is dancing with his shoe pinching his foot.

522

I will add a couple of incidental remarks. – Given the change in the tonic and along with it the change of value of all the intervals, which results in the same note appearing as the second, third, fourth, etc., the notes of the scale are analogous to actors who must sometimes assume one role and sometimes another, while remaining the same person. The fact that the person is often not exactly right for the role can be compared to the unavoidable impurity of every harmonic system (mentioned at the end

523

of § 52 of the First Volume), an impurity that was introduced by the establishment of the tempered tonal system. –

Perhaps one or two people might take offence at the fact that according to the metaphysics we are presenting, music, which indeed often has such an elevating effect on our minds and seems to talk to us of worlds that are other and better than our own, serves to flatter only the will to life since it presents its essence, portrays its successes, and ends up expressing its satisfaction and contentment. The following passage from the Vedas might serve to put such thoughts to rest: ‘And blissfulness, which is a sort of joy, is called the highest *ātman* because everywhere that joy might be, this is a part of its joy.’<sup>a</sup> (*Oupnek’hat*, vol. I, p. 405, and again at vol. II, p. 215.)<sup>72</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Et Anand sroup, *quod forma gaudii est*, τὸν πρᾶμ Atma ex hoc dicunt, *quod quocunque loco gaudium est, particula e gaudio ejus est*. [*Oupnek’hat*: a translation of the Upanishads into Latin (from Persian), by the orientalist Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron, published 1801. Schopenhauer owned a copy from 1814 (see *HN* 5, 338–9) and frequently quotes from it. This passage does not occur verbatim in the original Upanishads. On the sources see Deussen’s commentary, *Arthur Schopenhauers Sämtliche Werke* (Munich, 1911), vol. 2, 793]

*On the Third Book*



*Preface*

The supplements to this Fourth Book would be considerable indeed if I had not, on the occasion of the prize questions set by two Scandinavian Academies, already written detailed monographs on two of its most vital and principal topics, namely freedom of the will and the foundations of morality. These were published in 1841 under the title *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. It is therefore just as vitally necessary that my readers be familiar with this work as was the case with the supplement to the Second Book, which presupposed a familiarity with *On Will in Nature*. In general I require that anyone who wants to be acquainted with my philosophy must read every line I have written. I am not prolific, I do not strive to earn honoraria, nor am I in the business of churning out compendia. My goal is not to meet with ministerial approval – in short, I am not the sort of person whose pen is swayed by personal ambition: I strive only for truth, and I write as the ancients wrote, with the sole intention of preserving my thoughts so that they can someday benefit those who understand how to think about them and to value them. This is why I have not written very much, but this little with care and over long intervals. I have also confined to a minimum the sometimes unavoidable repetitions one finds in philosophical works due to their interconnections (not a single philosopher can avoid these entirely), so that the vast majority is found in only one place. This is why anyone who wishes to learn from me and understand me should not leave anything that I have written unread. Of course people can judge and criticize me without having done this, as experience has shown; and I wish them every happiness.

Meanwhile, we welcome the extra space won for this fourth supplementary Book through the elimination of two main topics. For since the insights that lie closest to everyone's heart and are thus the tip of the pyramid of any system, its final results, are concentrated in *my* final Book as well, we will be glad to allow greater scope for any more solid grounding or precise explanation of them. In addition we will be able to discuss a topic

that belongs to the doctrine of the 'affirmation of the will to life' but that we neglected to mention in our Fourth Book, just as it had been entirely neglected by all philosophers before me: it is the inner meaning and the essence in itself of sexual love, which can sometimes rise to the most vehement passion; a topic that it would not be paradoxical to include in the ethical part of philosophy if its importance had been recognized. –

*On Death and its Relation to the Indestructibility  
of our Essence in Itself*

529 Death is the truly inspiring genius or the Musagetes of philosophy, which Socrates accordingly defined as 'preparation for death'.<sup>a</sup> It would be difficult to philosophize in the absence of death. Thus it is entirely appropriate to grant it special consideration here at the pinnacle of the final, most serious, and most important of our Books.

Animals live without any real conception<sup>b</sup> of death: this is why the individual animal enjoys the permanence of the species directly, since it is conscious of itself only as endless. With human beings and the faculty of reason came the horrifying certainty of death. But throughout nature there is a remedy or at least a compensation for every ailment, and so the same reflection that introduces our cognition of death also procures *metaphysical* ideas to console us on its account, ideas that animals neither need nor are capable of entertaining. All religions and philosophical systems are directed primarily to this end and are therefore in the first instance the antidote that reflecting reason has produced by its own means to the certainty of death. Still, they achieve this goal to very different degrees, and *one* religion or philosophy will certainly enable people to look death calmly in the eye much more than the other. Brahmanism and Buddhism will achieve much more by teaching people to think of themselves as the primordial being itself, the Brahman, to which all coming to be and passing away is essentially alien, than will those religions that have people coming from nothing and truly beginning an existence received from others at birth. Accordingly, in India we find a confidence and a contempt for death that is different from anything you would find in Europe. It is in fact a dubious business, forcing weak and untenable ideas about this important issue on people by imprinting them early so as to render people permanently insusceptible to more accurate and

\* This chapter relates to § 54 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> θανάτου μελέτη [in Plato's *Phaedo*, 81a]

<sup>b</sup> *Kennntniß*

tenable ones. For instance, to teach people that they have only recently come into being out of nothing, and consequently have been nothing for an eternity and yet will be imperishable in the future, is just like teaching them that, although they are through and through the work of another, nevertheless, they are eternally responsible for everything they do or allow to happen. Now if, with maturity of mind and the onset of reflection, people realize the untenable nature of such doctrines, they have nothing better to put in their place and are in fact no longer able to understand anything else, and so go without the consolation intended for them by nature to compensate for the certainty of death. As a result of such a development, we are just now (1844) seeing socialists among the ruined factory workers in England and Young Hegelians among the ruined students in Germany all sinking down to the absolutely physical view that leads to the result 'let us eat and drink; for tomorrow we die'<sup>a</sup> and which can hence be described as bestiality.

530

After everything that has been said about death, it cannot be denied that at least in Europe, people's opinions, and even the opinions of a single individual, very often vacillate between the view of death as an absolute annihilation and the assumption that we are immortal, flesh, blood and all. Both are equally false: and we do not need to find a correct middle ground but rather a higher perspective from which both ideas fall away of their own accord.

I want to begin these remarks by adopting the entirely empirical point of view. – We are confronted most obviously with the undeniable fact that, according to natural consciousness, not only does a human being fear his own death more than that of anyone else, he also weeps violently over that of a family member – not selfishly, for his own loss, but out of compassion for the great misfortune that that other has met with; and accordingly he reproaches people who do not weep or show sorrow in such cases as hard-hearted and unloving. Parallel to this is the fact that revenge at its highest levels seeks the death of the enemy as the greatest evil that can befall him.<sup>1</sup> – Opinions change according to time and place: but the voice of nature is always and everywhere the same, and is therefore to be heeded before anything else. It seems to say clearly here that death is a great evil. In the language of nature, *death* means annihilation. Everyone knows that life is no joke, and this already shows that death is a serious business. Indeed, we must not deserve anything better than these two things.

In fact, fear of death is independent of all cognition: animals have this fear even though they are not aware<sup>b</sup> of death. Everything that is born

531

<sup>a</sup> *edite, bibite, post mortem nulla voluptas* [1 Corinthians 15:32]

<sup>b</sup> *nicht kennt*

brings this fear into the world. But this a priori fear of death is only the converse of the will to life, which we in fact all are. Just as an interest in self-preservation is innate in every animal, so is a fear of destruction: hence it is this and not simply the avoidance of pain that shows itself in the anxious concern with which the animal tries to protect itself and even more, its young, against anything that could be dangerous. Why does the animal flee, tremble, and try to hide itself? Because it is nothing but will to life, but as such is liable to death and would like to gain time. The human being is by nature just the same. The greatest of evils, the worst thing that could ever be threatened, is death, the greatest anxiety the anxiety of death. Nothing attracts our lively attention so irresistibly as someone in mortal danger: nothing is more horrible than an execution. The boundless attachment to life that appears here cannot have come from cognition and deliberation: to these, it rather seems foolish; since the objective value of life is very uncertain, and it remains at least doubtful whether life is to be preferred to non-being; in fact if experience and deliberation had their say, non-being would certainly be the victor. If we were to knock on grave-stones and ask the dead whether they would like to rise again they would shake their heads. This was *Socrates*' opinion too, in Plato's *Apology*, and even the cheerful and amiable *Voltaire* cannot avoid saying 'one loves life, but nothingness is not without its merits':<sup>a</sup> and again: 'I do not know what eternal life is like, but the one at present is a bad joke.'<sup>b</sup> In addition, life must in any case certainly end soon; so that the few years one might still have to exist disappear entirely in the face of the endless time in which one will no longer exist. And so, upon reflection, it seems even ludicrous to get so worried about this span of time, to tremble so violently when your own or someone else's life is in danger, and to compose tragedies whose horror has its nerve centre only in the fear of death. This powerful attachment to life is therefore irrational and blind: it is explicable only by the fact that our entire essence in itself<sup>c</sup> is will to life,<sup>d</sup> for which therefore life must be valued as the highest good, however bitter, brief and uncertain it may also be; and that this will, in itself and originally, is devoid of cognition and blind. Cognition, by contrast, far from being the origin of that attachment to life, is in fact opposed to it, since it discloses life's worthlessness and uses this to combat the fear of death. – Now when it is triumphant and enables

532

<sup>a</sup> *On aime la vie; mais le néant ne laisse pas d'avoir du bon* [This and the following quotation are from Voltaire's letters: *Lettre à Mme la Marquise du Deffand*, 1 November 1769]

<sup>b</sup> *Je ne sais pas ce que c'est que la vie éternelle, mais celle-ci est une mauvaise plaisanterie* [*Lettre à M. le Comte d'Argental*, 27 July 1768]

<sup>c</sup> *Wesen an sich*

<sup>d</sup> *Wille zum Leben*

the person to face death with courage and resignation, it is venerated as great and noble: we celebrate the triumph of cognition over the blind will to life that is in fact the kernel of our own being. Similarly, we despise someone whose cognition is vanquished in this struggle and who therefore clings unreservedly to life, fighting for all he is worth against the approach of death and meeting it with despair:<sup>\*2</sup> and yet it is only the original essence of our self and of nature that is expressing itself in him. How, we might ask incidentally, could the boundless love of life and the efforts to maintain it by any means for as long as possible be regarded as base and despicable, and similarly be regarded by the followers of every religion as unworthy of that religion, if life were a gift of good gods, and thanks were due for it? And how could it seem great and noble to depreciate it? – These considerations confirm for us: (1) that the will to life is the innermost essence of the human being; (2) that in itself the will to life is blind and devoid of cognition; (3) that cognition is a principle that was originally alien to the will to life and only added on later; (4) that cognition is in conflict with the will to life and our judgment applauds the victory of cognition over the will.

If it were the thought of *non-being* that made death seem so horrible to us, then we would have to be equally horrified by the thought of the time when we did not yet exist. It is irrefutably certain that non-being after death can be no different from non-being prior to birth, and therefore no more lamentable. An entire infinity has passed when we did *not yet* exist: but this does not upset us in the least. By contrast, what we find difficult, or even intolerable, is the fact that, after the momentary intermezzo of an ephemeral existence, there should be a second infinity in which we will *no longer* exist. Now has this thirst for existence arisen because we have tasted existence and found it so entirely wonderful? Certainly not, as was briefly mentioned above; it is much more likely that our experiences would awaken in us a longing for the lost paradise of non-being. Not only that, but hope for a ‘better world’ is always added on to hope for the immortality of the soul – a sign that the present world is not worth much. – Regardless of all this, the question of our state after death is certainly posed ten thousand times more often, in books as well as by mouth, than the question of our state prior to birth. But theoretically the one is just as pressing and justified a problem as the other: and anyone who answers the one would have to be equally clear

533

\* *In gladiatoris pugnis timidos et supplices, et, ut vivere liceat, obsecrantes etiam odisse solemus; fortes et animosos, et se acriter ipsos morti offerentes servare cupimus.* [In the gladiator contests, we usually detest cowards who beg and implore us to let them live; the brave and bold ones who greet death with wild abandon are the ones we want to keep alive.] Cicero, *Pro Milone*, ch. 34 [*Defence of Milo*, ch. 34, 92, with some omissions]

about the other. We have fine declamations about how scandalous it would be to think that the human spirit,<sup>a</sup> which has encompassed the world and entertained so many highly splendid thoughts, would sink into the grave: but we hear nothing about the fact that this spirit has allowed an entire infinity to elapse before it arose with these fine qualities, and during that time the world had to get along without it. Yet to cognition uncorrupted by the will, no question presents itself more naturally than this: an infinite time has elapsed prior to my birth; what *was* I throughout that time? – Metaphysically we could perhaps answer: ‘I was always I: that is, all who said I during that time were precisely I.’ But let us disregard this, taking up the still entirely empirical standpoint we have before us, and assume that I did not exist at all. Then I can console myself about the infinite time after my death when I will no longer exist, with the infinite time when I did not yet exist, as a familiar and truly very comfortable<sup>3</sup> state. Because infinity afterwards<sup>b</sup> without me cannot be more frightening than the infinity before<sup>c</sup> without me; since the two are different only by virtue of the intervention of an ephemeral life-dream. Also, all proofs for continuance after death are just as applicable to the part before,<sup>d</sup> where they demonstrate existence prior to life: Hindus and Buddhists have shown themselves to be very consistent in making this assumption. Only *Kant*’s ideality of time solves all these riddles – although this is as yet not what we are discussing. But it is clear from what has been said that it is just as absurd to be upset about the time when we will no longer exist as it would to be upset about the time when we did not yet exist, because it is a matter of indifference whether the time that is not filled with our existence is that of the future or that of the past.

But even apart from these temporal considerations, it is in and of itself absurd to consider non-being an evil<sup>e</sup> since every evil, like every good, presupposes existence and indeed consciousness; and consciousness comes to an end when life ends, as it does in sleep or in a faint; and so the absence of consciousness is no evil but something well known and trusted, and in any case its onset is the work of a moment. *Epicurus* considered death from this perspective and thus said quite rightly ὁ θάνατος μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς (death is nothing to us); with the explanation that when we are, death is not, and when death is, we are not (*Diogenes Laertius*, X, 27).<sup>f</sup> It is clearly no evil to lose what we cannot miss: and so passing into non-existence

<sup>a</sup> *Geist*

<sup>b</sup> *a parte post*

<sup>c</sup> *a parte ante*

<sup>d</sup> *in partem ante*

<sup>e</sup> *Uebel*

<sup>f</sup> [*Lives of Ancient Philosophers* (third century): the original has οὐδὲν for ‘nothing’]

ought to trouble us no more than not having been. So from the standpoint of cognition there does not appear to be any reason at all to fear death: but consciousness consists in cognition;<sup>a</sup> and so death is no evil for cognition. And in fact it is not this *cognitive* part of our I<sup>b</sup> that fears death – rather, the flight from death<sup>c</sup> that fills all living things comes only from the blind *will*. But, as mentioned above, this flight is essential to the will, just because it is the will to life, and its entire essence consists in the urge to life and existence, and cognition is not original to it but rather comes to it only as a result of its objectivation in animal individuals. If the will, by means of objectivation, views death as the end of the appearance with which it has identified and to which it sees itself limited, its whole being struggles with all its might against it. Whether the will really has anything to fear in death we will investigate below, recalling the true source of the fear of death, shown here by our apposite distinction between the willing and the cognitive parts of our being.

535

Correspondingly, another thing that makes death so fearful is not so much the end of life (since this cannot strike anyone as particularly regrettable) but rather the destruction of the organism, and in fact because the organism is the will itself, presenting itself as the body. But we really only experience this destruction in the evils of sickness or age, whereas death itself, by contrast, exists for the *subject* only at the moment when consciousness dwindles away to the point where brain activity ceases. The subsequent diffusion of this cessation to the other parts of the organism is in fact an event already after the death. Viewed subjectively, death concerns only consciousness. To a certain extent, anyone can judge what this dwindling away might be from the example of falling asleep: and anyone who has fallen into a true faint will be more familiar still with it, since in this case the transition is neither so gradual, nor is it interspersed with dreams. Instead, the ability to see disappears first, while one is still fully conscious, and this is immediately followed by the deepest state of unconsciousness; as far as it goes, the sensation is anything but unpleasant, and if sleep is the brother of death, then a deep faint is certainly its twin brother. Even a violent death cannot be painful; because even bad injuries are usually not felt and are noticed only after a while by their outer signs: if they are imminently fatal, then consciousness will fade away before this is discovered: if they will only be fatal in time, then it is the same as with other illnesses. Everyone who has lost consciousness in water, in the vapours from coal, or through hanging has

<sup>a</sup> *Erkennen*

<sup>b</sup> *erkennende Theil unsers Ichs*

<sup>c</sup> *fuga mortis*



536 famously declared that it takes place painlessly. And even a truly natural death through age – euthanasia<sup>a</sup> – is a gradual fading away and vanishing from being in an unremarkable manner. Little by little, the passions and desires dry up in age along with the susceptibility for their objects; the affects no longer have anything to excite them, as the ability to represent grows increasingly weak, the images represented grow duller, impressions no longer take hold but pass by without a trace, days roll by faster, events lose their significance, everything grows paler. People of advanced old age totter about or rest in a corner, only shadows, ghosts of their former being. What is left in them for death to destroy? One day a slumber is the last, and his dreams are . . . These are what Hamlet asked about in the famous monologue.<sup>b</sup> I believe we are dreaming them even now.

We should remark here that although the maintenance of the life process is, as it were, metaphysically grounded, it does not take place without resistance and hence it does not take place effortlessly. This is what the organism succumbs to each night, this is why it then suspends brain function and reduces some secretions, respiration, the pulse and production of heat. From this we can conclude that a complete cessation of the life process must be a wonderful relief for its driving force: perhaps this is a factor in the expression of sweet contentment<sup>c</sup> on the faces of most dead people. In general, the moment of death might be similar to awaking from a profound nightmare.

The result so far has been that, much as it is feared, death cannot really be an evil. It often even appears as a good, something we desire, as Friend Death.<sup>d</sup> Everything that runs up against an insurmountable obstacle in its existence or its endeavours, anything that suffers from incurable diseases or inconsolable grief, has as its last resort (one that usually appears of its own accord) a return to the womb of nature from which it, like everything else, emerged only shortly before, tempted by the hope for more favourable conditions of existence than it has come by, and away from which the same path always lies open. That return is the surrender of goods<sup>e</sup> by the living.

537 Yet even then, it comes to this only after a physical or moral struggle: this is the extent to which every being struggles desperately against returning to a place it left so readily and willingly to go to an existence that can offer so much suffering and so little joy. – The Hindus give two faces to *Yama*, the

<sup>a</sup> *Euthanasie* ['dying well' in Greek]

<sup>b</sup> [*Hamlet*, Act III, sc. 1]

<sup>c</sup> *Zufriedenheit*

<sup>d</sup> *Freund Hain* [a designation of death used, e.g., by Matthias Claudius (Asmus)]

<sup>e</sup> *cessio bonorum*

god of death: one very fearful and horrible, and one very friendly and joyful. This is explained in part by what we have said.

The following consideration naturally arises from the empirical perspective that we continue to adopt, and thus deserves to be clarified and established within its boundaries. The sight of a corpse shows me that sensibility, irritability, circulation of blood, reproduction, etc. have come to an end here. From this I can conclude with certainty that whatever actuated them, although wholly unknown to me, does not do so anymore, and has thus vanished from them. – If I were now to add that this actuating element must have been precisely what I have understood<sup>a</sup> only as consciousness and thus as intelligence (soul), I would not merely be unjustified but obviously incorrect in doing so. This is because consciousness has never revealed itself to me as a cause but rather as a product and result of organic life, since it rose and fell as a result of this life, namely throughout its different ages, in health and sickness, in sleep, faints, awakening, etc., and thus has always appeared as an effect, never as a cause of organic life, always revealing itself as something that comes to be and passes away and comes to be again so long as the conditions still exist, but otherwise not. Indeed, I can also have seen that madness, the complete derangement of consciousness, far from inhibiting and depressing the other forces or even endangering life, instead greatly enhances irritability or muscular force and extends life rather than shortening it, in the absence of other competing causes. – Then I recognized individuality as a property of everything organic, and therefore, if the organism is self-conscious, of consciousness as well. But there is no reason now to conclude that individuality inheres in that vanished, life-bringing principle, wholly unknown<sup>b</sup> to me ; all the less reason because I see everywhere in nature that each individual appearance is the work of a general force that is active in thousands of similar appearances. – But there is just as little occasion to conclude that, because organic life has ceased here, the force that actuated it up to this point has become nothing – just as little occasion as if we were to infer the death of the spinner from the cessation of the spinning wheel. When a pendulum regains its centre of gravity and finally comes to rest, and its illusory individual life<sup>c</sup> has thus ended, nobody imagines that gravity has now been annihilated; on the contrary, everyone realizes that it is active in countless appearances, just as it was before. Of course one can object to this comparison by saying that gravity has not stopped being active in this

538

<sup>a</sup> *gekannt*

<sup>b</sup> *unbekannt*

<sup>c</sup> *individuelle Scheinleben*

pendulum either, but has only stopped the visible expression of its activity: anyone who insists on this can instead think of an electric body in which the electricity really has stopped being active after it has been discharged. I only wanted to show that we directly attribute an eternity and ubiquity even to the lowest natural forces; and the transience of their fleeting appearances does not confuse us for a second. Even less should it occur to us to take the cessation of life for the annihilation of the animating principle, and hence death for the complete perishing<sup>a</sup> of a human being. No thoughtful and well-governed mind will think that, because the powerful arm that bent the bow of Odysseus three thousand years ago no longer exists, the force that worked so energetically in the bow is completely annihilated as well; but, after further consideration, neither would they assume that the force that bends the bow today only comes into existence with this arm. It is more accurate to claim that the force actuating an earlier, now extinguished, life is the same force active in a now blooming life: in fact, this is almost irrefutable. But we certainly know that only transient things are caught up in the causal chain, as was proved in the Second Book; and transient things are merely states and forms. What is, on the contrary, untouched by the alterations of states and forms introduced by causes is, on the one hand, the matter, and on the other

539 hand, the forces of nature: for both are presupposed by all those alterations. But we must (at least initially) think of the animating principle<sup>b</sup> as a natural force, until some deeper investigation allows us to recognize what it is in itself. Taken in this way, as a force of nature, the life force<sup>c</sup> therefore already remains entirely untouched by the changes of form and state introduced and then dismissed by the chain of causes and effects and which are the only things subject to the arising and passing away that takes place in experience. To this extent then the imperishability<sup>d</sup> of our true essence can certainly be proven. But clearly this will not support the claims people tend to make concerning our continued existence after death, nor will it supply the solace that people expect from such proofs. But still it is something, and anyone who fears death as an absolute annihilation should not disdain this complete certainty that the innermost principle of his life is untouched by it. – Indeed, this lets us propose the paradox that even matter (which, along with the forces of nature, remains untouched by the continued changes of state guided by causality) assures us of indestructibility through its absolute permanence, and could even provide the consolation of a certain imperishability to someone

<sup>a</sup> *Untergang*

<sup>b</sup> *belebendes Prinzip*

<sup>c</sup> *Lebenskraft*

<sup>d</sup> *Unvergänglichkeit*

incapable of grasping any other. ‘What?’ people will say, ‘the permanence of mere dust, of crude matter, is to be regarded as a continuation of our being?’ – But oh! Are you acquainted with<sup>a</sup> this dust? Do you know what it is and what it can do? Get to know it before you despise it. This matter that lies there now as dust and ashes will, when dissolved in water, sprout into a crystal, glisten as a metal, and then electric sparks will fly from it; by means of its galvanic tension it will express a force that dissolves the most solid ties and reduces earth to metal: in fact, it will form itself into plants and animals and from its mysterious womb develop the very life that you, in your narrow-mindedness, are so worried about losing. Is it really so meaningless to continue to exist as this kind of matter? I am serious when I say that even this permanence of matter bears witness to the indestructibility of our true being, even if only in images and metaphors, or rather only in silhouette. To see this, we need only recall the discussion of matter in Chapter 24 which concluded that pure, formless matter – the basis for the world of experience that is never perceived in itself or on its own even though it must always be presupposed – is the immediate reflection, the general manifestation of the thing in itself, which is to say of the will; and thus, under the conditions of experience, what is the case for the will in itself as such holds true for matter as well, and matter reflects<sup>b</sup> the true eternity of the will in the image of temporal imperishability. This is because, as already mentioned, nature does not lie; and so, no idea that arises from a purely objective apprehension of nature and is thought through to its logical conclusion can be entirely false, but is rather, in the worst case, merely very one-sided and incomplete. Consistent materialism like that of *Epicurus* is doubtless such a view, and so is its opposite, absolute idealism, like that of *Berkeley*, and in general so is every basic philosophical idea that comes from a correct *aperçu*<sup>c</sup> and has been developed with honesty. Nevertheless, these approaches are all highly one-sided and thus, in spite of their differences, they are all *equally* true, each from a particular point of view: but as soon as we raise ourselves above this standpoint, they appear only as relatively and conditionally true. The highest standpoint, the one that surveys them all and recognizes their merely relative truth and beyond this their falsity, only this standpoint can be that of absolute truth, insofar as this is even achievable. Accordingly, as we have just demonstrated, we see the indestructibility of our true essence in itself still visible in even the very crude and therefore very old basic materialist point of view, represented as if by a mere shadow of itself, namely by the imperishability of matter; just as, in the already superior

540

<sup>a</sup> *kennt ihr*<sup>b</sup> *wiedergiebt*<sup>c</sup> *aperçu*

standpoint of the naturalism of an absolute physics, it is represented by the ubiquity and eternity of the forces of nature, which must include at least the life force. And thus even these crude and basic views contain the assertion that the living being does not suffer an absolute annihilation through death but persists in and with the whole of nature. –

541 The considerations that have brought us this far and which served as the point of departure for further discussions were inspired by the evident fear of death that fills all living beings. But now we want to change our standpoint and observe how the *whole* of nature, as opposed to individual beings, relates to death; in doing so, however, we will still retain our empirical footing.

We of course know of no greater throw of the dice than that of life and death: we look upon every decision concerning these with the keenest anxiety, interest, and fear, because it counts, in our eyes, as all in all. – *Nature*, on the other hand, which never lies but is frank and sincere, speaks very differently on this theme, namely as Krishna does in the *Bhagavadgītā*. What nature says is: the life or death of the individual does not matter at all. Nature expresses this by abandoning the life of every animal and even of the human being to the most insignificant of accidents without stepping in to help. – Look at the insect on your path: a tiny, unconscious turn of your footsteps is enough to decide whether it will live or die. Look at the wood slug with no means of flight, defense, deception, or concealment, a ready prey for anyone. Look at the fish playing without a care in the open net; the frog pausing lazily in the flight that could save it: the bird unaware of the hawk circling above it; the sheep in the appraising eye of the wolf in the bush. All these wander guilelessly, armed with little foresight, among the dangers that threaten their existence at every moment. Nature ruthlessly abandons her inexpressibly intricate organisms not only to the predatory instincts of the stronger but also to the blindest chance, the whim of every fool and the wantonness of every child, thus telling us that she is indifferent to and unharmed by the annihilation of these individuals, which mean nothing to her; that in these cases the effect is as insignificant as the cause. Nature says this very clearly and she never lies: nor does she comment on

542 these pronouncements; rather she speaks in the laconic style of the oracle. Now if the mother of us all carelessly throws her unprotected children in the way of a thousand threats and dangers, it can only be because she knows that when they fall, they fall back into her womb where they are safe, and thus their fall is not to be taken seriously. She treats humans no differently than animals. Her pronouncements extend to human beings too: the life or death of an individual is a matter of indifference to her. Accordingly, humans too should, in a certain sense, be indifferent to them: because we are nature too.

If we could only see deeply enough, we would certainly agree with nature and look upon death or life as indifferently as she does. In the meantime we must use reflection to explain the carelessness and indifference that nature has with respect to the lives of individuals by means of the fact that the destruction of such appearances does not affect their true and genuine essence in the least.

Let us consider further that not only are life and death dependent on the slightest chance, as we have just seen, but the existence of organic beings in general is ephemeral. Animals and plants arise today and pass away tomorrow, and birth and death follow in rapid succession, whereas the much lowlier inorganic realm is assured an incomparably longer duration, while only absolutely formless matter endures infinitely, something we even acknowledge a priori – then, I think, the thought will naturally occur even to an empirical apprehension, if it is objective and unbiased, that such an order of things is only a superficial phenomenon, that such a constant coming to be and passing away cannot in any way reach the root of things, but rather can only be relative, indeed only apparent, and that the genuine inner essence of every thing, which everywhere evades our gaze and is thoroughly mysterious, must be left untouched by it and instead continue undisturbed – even if we cannot perceive or comprehend the manner in which this occurs, and must therefore think of it only in general, as a type of conjuring trick<sup>a</sup> that takes place here. For, while the most imperfect of things, the lowest, the inorganic, persists untouched, precisely the most perfect of beings, living beings, with their endlessly complicated and incomprehensibly intricate organizations are supposed to keep arising completely anew<sup>b</sup> and, after a space of time, become absolutely nothing, in order to make way for similar things to arise again from nothingness into being – this is so obviously absurd that it can never be the true order of things but is rather merely a shell concealing this true order, or better, a phenomenon conditioned by the constitution of our intellect. Indeed, the whole existence and non-existence of these individual beings for whom death and life are opposites can only be relative: the language of nature, in which the individual is given as something absolute, can therefore not be the true and final expression of the constitution of things and the order of the world, but is in all honesty nothing but a provincial dialect,<sup>c</sup> i.e. something merely relatively true, a ‘so-called’, to be understood with a pinch of salt,<sup>d</sup> or, to speak truly, something conditioned by our intellect. – I say that

543

<sup>a</sup> *eine Art von tour de passe-passe*

<sup>b</sup> *von Grund aus*

<sup>c</sup> *patois du pays*

<sup>d</sup> *cum grano salis*

544

an immediate, intuitive conviction of the sort I have tried here to describe in words will force itself on everyone: that is, of course, everyone whose mind is not of the completely vulgar type, able only to cognize the particular as such, strictly limited to cognition of individuals, like the intellect of an animal. Anyone, on the other hand, who has even a somewhat higher potential and can just begin to see in the individual beings what is universal in them, their Ideas, will also share that conviction to a certain degree, and indeed see it as immediate and therefore certain. In fact it is only small and limited minds who seriously fear death as their annihilation: such horrors are entirely remote from those with specially favoured capacities. Plato was quite right to ground the whole of philosophy in a recognition of the doctrine of Ideas, i.e. on seeing the universal in the particular. But the conviction described here that comes directly from the apprehension of nature must have been excessively lively in those sublime authors of the Upanishads of the *Vedas*, who we can hardly imagine as mere men; for the conviction speaks to us so urgently from countless utterances of theirs that we must attribute this immediate illumination of their minds to the fact that these sages, standing nearer in time to the origin of their race, saw the essence of things more clearly and deeply than could ever be accomplished by the already weakened race 'as mortals now are'.<sup>a</sup> Of course their grasp is also assisted by the living nature of India, which is of a completely different order than that of our Northern regions. – But thorough reflection, as pursued by *Kant's* great mind, leads in another direction, teaching us in fact that our intellect, in which that rapidly changing world of appearance presents itself, does not grasp the true and ultimate essence of things, but rather only its appearance, and indeed, I would add, because its original function is to provide motives for our will, i.e. to be of service to the will in its pursuit of its petty goals.

Let us pursue our objective and unbiased consideration of nature still further. – When I kill an animal, whether it is a dog, a bird, a frog, or even only an insect, it is unthinkable that the essence, or better the primordial force<sup>b,4</sup> that was able to present such a remarkable appearance just a moment before, full of energy and vitality, could turn to nothingness by means of my action, whether malevolent or thoughtless. – And again, on the other hand, the millions of animals of every sort which at each moment come into existence in endless variety, full of force and striving, could never have been nothing at all before the act of their procreation, and so come to the point of an absolute beginning from out of nothing. – If, in this way, I see one such creature escaping my gaze without ever learning where it goes,

<sup>a</sup> οἱοὶ νῦν βροτοὶ εἰσιν [*Iliad*, V, 304]

<sup>b</sup> *Urkraft*

and another emerging without learning where it comes from, if they both have the same shape, the same essence,<sup>a</sup> the same character, and it is only their matter that is different, constantly wearing away and being renewed for the duration of their existence, then the assumption that what disappears and what takes its place are one and the same essence, which has only experienced a small alteration, a renewal of the form of its being, and therefore that death is for the species what sleep is for the individual – this assumption, I say, is so near at hand that it is impossible to avoid it unless your mind has been corrupted in early youth by the impressions of basic outlooks that are falsely conceived, and chase it out of the way, even from afar, with superstitious fear. The opposite assumption, however, that the birth of an animal arises out of nothingness, and that correspondingly, its death is an absolute annihilation, with the further additional belief that the human being has similarly come out of nothing, and will nonetheless enjoy an individual, endless continuation and indeed, with consciousness, while dogs, apes, elephants will be annihilated at death – this is certainly something that a sound mind must rebel against and declare to be absurd. – Now if, as has been repeated often enough, the touchstone of a system's truth lies in comparing its conclusions with the pronouncements of common sense, then I wish that the followers of the basic outlook that has been passed down by Descartes to the pre-Kantian eclectics, and that even now is prevalent among the great majority of scholars in Europe, would apply this touchstone for once.

545

The true symbol of nature is always and everywhere the circle, because this is the schema of return: this is in fact the most universal form of nature, which it follows everywhere, from the course of the stars to death and the origin of organic beings, and it is only in the circle that a continuous existence, i.e. a nature, becomes possible in the restless stream of time and its contents.

If you look at the small world of the insects in the autumn and see how the one prepares its nest to sleep through its long, freezing period of hibernation while the other spins itself a cocoon to survive the winter as a pupa and awaken only in springtime, rejuvenated and perfected; and finally how most of them, intending to rest in the arms of death, carefully find a suitable place to put their eggs so that they can emerge from them anew – this is nature's great doctrine of immortality, which would teach us that there is no radical difference between sleep and death, and that the one poses as little danger to existence as the other. The care with which the insect prepares a cell or a pit or a nest in order to lay its egg near food for the larva that will hatch in the

546

<sup>a</sup> *Wesen*



coming spring, and then peacefully dies, this is just like the care with which a person lays out his clothes and breakfast in the evening to be ready in the morning and then goes peacefully to sleep, and at bottom this could not take place unless in itself and in its true essence, the insect dying in the autumn is just as identical with the one hatching in the spring as the person lying down to sleep is with the one who will wake up.

If now, after these observations, we return to ourselves and our species, and then look forwards, far into the future, to the generations to come, with their millions of individuals, trying to imagine to ourselves the strange form<sup>a</sup> of their customs and styles, and then pose the question: 'Where will all this have come from? Where are they now? – Where is the rich womb of nothingness, pregnant with worlds, in which they are hiding, the generations to come?' Would not the smiling, truthful answer to this be: 'Where else should they be than where real things always were and always will be, in the present and its contents, which is to say with you, the confounded questioner who, in this failure to recognize your own being, are like the leaf on the tree which, wilting in autumn and about to fall, grieves over its fall and will not be consoled by the sight of the fresh green that will clothe the tree in the spring, but complains, "That isn't me! Those are completely different leaves!" – Oh foolish leaf! Where do you want to go? And where are the others supposed to come from? Where is the nothingness whose gaping maw you fear? – Recognize your own being, the very thing that is so consumed with a thirst for existence, recognize it again in the inner, secret, driving force of the tree which, forever *one* and the same in all generations of leaves, is not affected by coming to be and passing away.' And now

Like the leaves on the tree, so too are the generations of men.<sup>b</sup>

547 Whether the fly buzzing around me now goes to sleep in the night and buzzes again tomorrow, or whether it dies in the evening and another fly comes buzzing from its egg in the spring, in itself this is the same thing; and so the cognition that presents this as two fundamentally different things is not an unconditioned but only a relative cognition, cognition of appearance, not of the thing in itself. The fly is there again in the morning; it is also there again in the spring. What distinguishes winter from night for the fly? – In Burdach's *Physiology*,<sup>c</sup> Vol. I, § 275 we read: 'Until 10:00 in the morning there is still no *Cercaria ephemera* (an infusion animal) to be seen (in the

<sup>a</sup> *Gestalt*

<sup>b</sup> οἷη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν (*Qualis foliorum generatio, talis et hominum.*) [*Iliad*, VI, 146]

<sup>c</sup> [See p. 254, n. c]

infusion); and by 12:00 the whole water is swarming with it. They die in the night and the next morning they arise again anew. This is what *Nitzsch* observed for six consecutive days.<sup>7</sup>

Thus everything lasts for only a moment and hurries on to death. The plant and insect die at the end of the summer, the animal and the human being after a few years: death's harvest is inexhaustible. But in spite of this, indeed, as if it were not the case at all, everything is always in existence and in its place, just as if it were all imperishable. Plants are always green and blooming, insects always buzz, animals and humans stand in an irrepressible youth, and every summer we find once more the cherries we have enjoyed a thousand times before.<sup>5</sup> Peoples too stand there like immortal individuals, although they occasionally change their names; even their actions, what they do and undergo, are always the same, although history always has a different story to tell, for history is like the kaleidoscope that displays a new pattern at every turn, while in reality it is only ever the same thing before our eyes.<sup>6</sup> What then is more insistent than the thought that this coming to be and passing away does not affect the true essence of things, but rather this essence remains untouched by them, and is therefore imperishable, and thus everything and everyone that *wills* to exist really exists continuously and without end. Accordingly, at any given point in time all species of animals, from the flea to the elephant, are numerically complete and together. They have already regenerated themselves many thousands of times and have remained the same throughout. They do not know about others like them that have lived before them, or that will live after them: it is the species that always lives, and individuals exist and are cheerful<sup>a</sup> in the consciousness that the species is imperishable and that they are identical with it. The will to life appears in an endless present, because this is the form of the life of the species, which therefore does not age, but remains forever young. Death is to it what sleep is to the individual, or what a blink is to the eye (it is the absence of blinking that enables the Indian gods to be recognized when they appear in human form). Just as the world disappears at nightfall without for one moment ceasing to exist, so the passing away of humans and animals in death is equally illusory,<sup>b</sup> and their true being persists throughout, just as unshaken. Think of the alternation of death and birth in infinitely fast vibrations, and you have imagined the persistent objectivation of the will, the enduring Ideas of essences standing fast like the rainbow in the waterfall. This is temporal

548

<sup>a</sup> *wohlgemuth*

<sup>b</sup> *scheinbar*

immortality. As a result of this, despite millennia of death and decay, nothing is lost, not a single atom of matter, much less anything of the inner essence which presents itself as nature. This is why we can at any moment cheerfully call out: 'In spite of time, death and decay, we are still all together!'

Perhaps we would have to make an exception for someone who, from the bottom of his heart, at some time may have said to this game: 'I do not want any more.' But this is not yet the place to discuss that.

But it should definitely be noted that the pains of birth and the bitterness of death are the two constant conditions under which the will to life maintains itself in its objectivation, i.e. our essence in itself, untouched by the flow of time and the dying out of species, exists in a constant present and enjoys the fruit of the affirmation of the will to life. This is analogous to the fact that we can remain awake in the day only if we sleep all night; this last is even the commentary that nature provides for understanding that difficult passage. For the suspension of the animal functions is sleep; the suspension of organic functions is death.<sup>7</sup>

549 The substrate or the filling, *plêrôma*,<sup>a</sup> or the material<sup>b</sup> of the *present* is in fact the same through all time. The impossibility of recognizing this identity directly is precisely *time*, a form and limitation of our intellect. The fact that, by virtue of time, e.g. the future does not yet exist, rests on a deception we become aware of when it happens. The fact that the essential form of our intellect introduces a deception such as this is explained and justified by the fact that the intellect is in no way produced by the hands of nature in order to apprehend the essence of things, but only to apprehend motives, which is to say it is produced in the service of an individual and temporal appearance of the will.<sup>\*,8</sup>

Anyone who comprehends the discussion that has occupied us here will also understand the true sense of the paradoxical doctrine of the *Eleatics*, that there is absolutely no coming to be or passing away, but rather that the

\* There is only *one present*, and this is forever: because it is the only form of actual existence. We must come to see that the *past* is not *in itself* different from the present, only our apprehension of it differs because it has *time* as its form, and it is only by this means that the present shows itself different from the past. To grasp this idea, we must think of all the events and scenes of human life, bad and good, happy and unhappy, joyful and horrible, as they present themselves to us successively in the course of time and different places in the most multi-coloured variety and exchange, as *simultaneous and together*, and always there, in the *nunc stans* [permanent now], while it is only an appearance that now this, and now that, exists – then we will understand what the objectivation of the will to life really means. – Even our pleasure in genre paintings rests principally on this, that they fix the fleeting scenes of life. – The dogma of metempsychosis comes from the feeling that this is true.

<sup>a</sup> πλήρωμα

<sup>b</sup> Stoff

whole stands immovably fast: ‘Parmenides and Melissus denied all coming to be and passing away because they considered everything as immovable’,<sup>a</sup> Stobaeus, *Eclogues*, I, 21. Similarly, we have the fine passage of Empedocles preserved by Plutarch in the book *Against Colotes*,<sup>b</sup> ch. 12:

They are fools, devoid of the world-seeing thought,  
Since they imagine something could arise that was not already there,  
Or it could pass away and come completely to nothing.  
Never do the wise men say anything like that,  
That, so long as they live – what they call life –  
Only this long are they burdened with bad and with good,  
And that they are before their birth and after death, nothing.<sup>c</sup>

550

No less worthy of mention here is that remarkable passage (surprising given its location) in Diderot’s *Jacques the Fatalist*:<sup>d</sup> ‘An immense castle and over the entryway it read: “I do not belong to anyone, and I belong to everyone: you were inside before you entered, you remain inside after you have left.”’<sup>e,9</sup>

Of course, in the sense in which human beings arise from nothing through procreation, they will become nothing in death. But it would be very interesting to get to know this nothing much better since even a moderate intelligence can see that this empirical nothing is in no way an absolute nothing, i.e. one that would be nothing in every sense. We are already led to this insight by the empirical observation that the parents’ qualities can always be found in their offspring, and thus have withstood death. I will say more about this in the appropriate chapter.

There is no greater contrast than between the unstoppable flight of time that sweeps its entire content away with it, and the rigid immobility of what is actually present,<sup>f</sup> which is one and the same in all times. And if, from this perspective, you look objectively at the immediate events of life,

<sup>a</sup> Παρμενίδης καὶ Μελίσσος ἀνήρουν γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν διὰ τὸ νομίζειν τὸ πᾶν ἀκίνητον (*Parmenides et Melissus ortum et interitum tollebant, quoniam nihil moveri putabant*)

<sup>b</sup> *Adversus Coloten*

<sup>c</sup> Νήπιοι· οὐ γὰρ σφιν δολιχόφρονές εἰσι μέριμναι, / Οἱ δὲ γίνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἔδον ἐλπίζουσι, / Ἦ τι καταθνήσκειν καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀπάντη. / Οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιοτο, / Ὡς ὄφρα μὲν τε βιώσι (τὸ δὲ βίοντον καλέουσι), / Τόφρα μὲν οὖν εἰσιν καὶ σφιν πάρα δεινὰ καὶ ἐσθλά, Πρὶν δὲ πᾶγεν τε βροτοί, καὶ ἔπει λύθεν, οὐδὲν ἄρ’ εἰσίν. (*Stulta, et proluxas non admittentia curas / Pectora: qui sperant, existere posse, quod ante / Non fuit, aut ullam rem pessum protinus ire; – / Non animo prudens homo quod praesentiat ullus, / Dum vivunt (namque hoc vitae nomine signant), / Sunt, et fortunatum conflictantur utraque: / Ante ortum nihil est homo, nec post funera quidquam.*) [Empedocles, fragments B11, B15; Plutarch, *Against Colotes*, 1113c–d]

<sup>d</sup> *Jacques le fataliste [et son maître (Jacques the Fatalist and his Master)*, first published in French in 1796]

<sup>e</sup> *Un château immense, au frontispice duquel on lisait: ‘Je n’appartiens à personne, et j’appartiens à tout le monde: vous y étiez avant que d’y entrer, vous y serez encore, quand vous en sortirez.’*

<sup>f</sup> *des wirklich Vorhandenen*

551 the 'permanent now'<sup>a</sup> becomes clear and visible in the very centre of the wheel of time.<sup>10</sup> – To an incomparably longer living eye, which grasps the human race in its whole duration in a single glance, the steady change of birth and death would look like a constant vibration and it would therefore not occur to such an eye to see in it a constant arising from nothing and returning into nothing, but rather, just as our eye sees the rapidly turning spark as a steady circle, the rapidly vibrating spring as a permanent triangle, the vibrating cord as a spindle, so this eye would see the species as what is and remains, and death and birth as vibrations.

We will continue to have false beliefs about the indestructibility of our true essence through death until we decide to study it first in animals rather than claiming it for ourselves alone, as a breed apart, under the fancy name of immortality. This claim of privilege and the limitation of the view it stems from is the only reason why most people struggle so hard not to acknowledge the obvious truth that we, in all essentials and in the main, are the same as animals; and indeed they recoil at any suggestion of our relationship with animals. More than anything else it is this denial of the truth that bars the path to a real understanding<sup>b</sup> of the indestructibility of our being. For if we pursue something along the wrong track, we have, for this very reason, left the right track and will in the end never achieve anything but eventual disappointment. So follow the truth along a new track, guided not by preconceived whims but rather by the hand of nature!<sup>11</sup> First of all, let the sight of every young animal teach you to recognize the never-aging existence of the species, which bestows a temporal youth on every new individual as a reflection of the species' eternal youth, and lets this individual arise as new and as fresh as if the world were created today. Ask yourself honestly whether this spring's swallow is so entirely different from that of the first spring, and whether between the two the miracle of a creation from nothing has really happened over and again millions of times, simply in order to play just as often into the hands of absolute annihilation. – I know full well that if I were seriously to assure someone that the cat that is playing in the courtyard right now is the very same as the one that performed the same  
 552 leaps and tricks three hundred years ago, he would think I was mad: but I also know that it is madder still to believe that today's cat is thoroughly and fundamentally different from the one three hundred years ago. – We only need to immerse ourselves truly and deeply in the sight of one of these higher vertebrates to become clearly aware that it would be impossible for this fathomless being, taken as an existing whole, to become nothing: and yet

<sup>a</sup> *nunc stans*

<sup>b</sup> *Erkenntniß*

on the other hand, we are fully aware that it is transitory. This is due to the fact that in this animal, the eternity of its *Idea* (species) is imprinted in the finitude of the individual. For there is of course a sense in which it is true that we are always faced with a different being in the individual, namely the sense that rests on the principle of sufficient reason, in which space and time are included, since these constitute the principle of individuation.<sup>a</sup> In another sense however it is not true, namely in the sense in which reality adheres only to the enduring forms of things, the *Ideas*; the sense that Plato explained so clearly that it became his fundamental thought, the centre of his philosophy, and understanding it was his criterion for an ability to do philosophy in general.<sup>12</sup>

Just as the spraying drops of the roaring waterfall change with lightning speed while the rainbow they support remains steadfast in immobile rest, entirely untouched by the restless change of the drops, so too every *Idea*, i.e. every *species*<sup>b</sup> of living being, remains completely untouched by the constant change of its individuals. But it is the *Idea* or the species in which the will to life is genuinely rooted and in which it manifests itself: thus the will is only truly concerned with the continuation of the species. For instance, lions that are born and die are like the drops of the waterfall; but the *leonitas*, the *Idea* or form<sup>c,13</sup> of the lion, is like the unmoving rainbow above. This is why *Plato* attributed true being only to the *Ideas*, i.e. the *species*,<sup>d</sup> and to the individuals only a restless coming to be and passing away. In fact, an innermost consciousness of their imperishable nature gives rise to the security and peace of mind that every animal, and even the human individual, possesses as it wanders carelessly through a sea of accidents that could annihilate it at any moment, and moreover heads straight to death: the peace of the species gazes from its eyes, as something that this destruction does not either affect or concern. This peace could not come to humans from uncertain and changing dogmas. But, as we have said, the sight of every animal teaches us that death is no obstacle to the kernel of life, the will and its manifestations. And what an unfathomable mystery lies in every animal!<sup>14</sup> Look at the closest one, look at your dog: how cheerfully and peacefully he stands there! Many thousands of dogs must have died before this one came to live. But the destruction of those thousands did not trouble the *Idea* of the dog: it is not the least disturbed by all this dying. And so the dog stands there as fresh and full of primal energy as if this day were its first and it will never experience a

553

<sup>a</sup> *principium individuationis*

<sup>b</sup> *Gattung*

<sup>c</sup> *Gestalt*

<sup>d</sup> *den species, den Gattungen*

last, and from his eyes shines the indestructible principle in him, the *archaeus*. So what has been dying for all these millennia? – Not the dog, he stands before us unscathed; only his shadow, his image in our time-bound mode of cognition. How can we believe that something that is always and forever there, and fills the whole of time, could pass away? – Of course the matter is empirically explicable: namely to the extent that death annihilates individuals, procreation produces new ones. But this empirical explanation is only an apparent one: it puts one riddle in the place of the other. Although the metaphysical understanding of this matter is not so easy to obtain, it is still the only true and satisfactory one.

Using his subjective procedure, *Kant* brought to light the great, albeit negative, truth that the thing in itself cannot be subject to time, because time lies preformed in our apprehension. Now death is the temporal end of temporal appearance: but as soon as we take away time, there is no longer any end at all and this word is quite bereft of significance.<sup>15</sup> But now, by taking the objective path, I am attempting to demonstrate the positive aspect of this topic, namely that the thing in itself is untouched by time and by what is possible only in time, coming to be and passing away, and that appearances in time could not have even this restless transient existence that is so close to nothingness if they did not have within them a kernel from out of eternity. *Eternity*<sup>a</sup> is of course a concept that is not based in an intuition: so it has a merely negative content, signifying a timeless existence. *Time* is nonetheless a mere image of eternity, ‘time is the image of eternity’<sup>b</sup> as Plotinus said: and likewise our temporal existence is the mere image of our essence in itself. This must lie in eternity, just because time is only the form of our cognition: only by virtue of this do we have any cognition of our essence, and the essence of all things, as transient, finite, and subject to annihilation.

In the Second Book I explained that the (Platonic) *Idea* is the adequate objecthood of the will as thing in itself on each of its levels; similarly, in the Third Book, I explained that the Ideas of the essences have as their correlate the pure subject of cognition, and consequently cognition of the Ideas emerges as something temporary and exceptional only under particularly favourable conditions. For individual cognition on the other hand, which is to say cognition within *time*, the *Idea* presents itself in the form of the *species*, which is the *Idea* that has been pulled asunder by entering into time. And thus the *species* is the most immediate objectivation of the thing in itself, i.e. of the will to life. Accordingly, the innermost essence of each animal and even of a human being lies in the *species*: it is in the species,

<sup>a</sup> *Ewigkeit*

<sup>b</sup> ὁ χρόνος εἰκὼν τοῦ αἰῶνος [*Enneads*, III, 7, 11]

not in the individual, that the powerfully raging will to life takes root. On the other hand, immediate consciousness is in the individual alone: this is why it thinks itself different from the species and why it is afraid of death. The will to life manifests itself in relation to the individual as hunger and fear of death, and in relation to the species as the sex drive and passionate concern for the young. In concordance with this we find that nature, which is free from that delusion of the individual, is as careful to preserve the species as it is indifferent to the destruction of the individuals: individuals for it are only ever the means, the species is its end. This is why there is a glaring contrast between nature's stinginess in equipping the individual and its extravagance where the species is concerned. A *single* individual will often supply a hundred thousand seeds a year, as is the case for instance with trees, fishes, crabs, termites, etc. By contrast each one has so little strength and so few organs that it can only maintain its life by ceaseless exertion; which is why an animal, when it is crippled or weakened, will usually starve to death. And if economy is sometimes possible and a part may be relinquished if necessary, then it is dispensed with, even out of order:<sup>a</sup> and thus for instance many caterpillars lack eyes: the poor animals fumble around in the dark from leaf to leaf, and in the absence of antennae they do this by moving three-quarters of their body back and forth in the air until they come across an object; as a result they often miss food that could be found right next to them. But this happens because of the law of parsimony in nature,<sup>b</sup> which is expressed as 'nature does nothing in vain',<sup>c</sup> to which we can add 'and gives nothing'.<sup>d</sup> – The same tendency in nature is also shown in the fact that the more fit an individual is for reproduction (by virtue of age), the more forcefully the 'healing power of nature'<sup>e</sup> expresses itself in him, and so his wounds heal easily and he recovers readily from illnesses. This diminishes with the ability to procreate, and sinks deeply once this ability is gone: because then the individual has become worthless in the eyes of nature.

555

If we take another look at the hierarchy of beings from polyps to humans, together with its associated gradations of consciousness, we see this wonderful pyramid maintained in ceaseless oscillation by the constant death of the individuals, and yet persisting throughout the infinity of time

<sup>a</sup> *selbst außer der Ordnung*

<sup>b</sup> *lex parsimoniae naturae*

<sup>c</sup> *natura nihil facit supervacaneum*

<sup>d</sup> *et nihil largitur*

<sup>e</sup> *vis naturae medicatrix*



by means of the bonds of procreation within the species. Now as mentioned above, the species, which is *objective*, presents itself as indestructible, while the *subjective*, consisting merely in the self-consciousness of these beings, seems to have the briefest duration and to be endlessly destroyed so as, incomprehensibly, to arise again just as often from nothingness. But you would have to be truly near-sighted to be deceived by this illusion and not realize that even if the form of temporal permanence only applies to the

556 objective, the subjective – i.e. the *will* that lives and appears in all of this, along with the subject of *cognition* in which it presents itself – cannot be any less indestructible; for the permanence of the objective, or the external aspect, can only be the appearance of the indestructibility of the subjective or internal, since the former cannot possess anything that it did not receive in fee from the latter; it cannot be originally and essentially objective, an appearance, and then secondarily and accidentally subjective, a thing in itself, something self-conscious. For clearly the former, as appearance, presupposes something that appears, just as being for another presupposes being for itself, and an object presupposes a subject; but not the other way around, because everywhere the root of things must lie in what they are for themselves, which is to say in the subjective, and not in the objective, i.e. in what they are only for another, in someone else's consciousness. Accordingly, in the First Book we found that the proper point of departure for philosophy is essentially and necessarily subjective, i.e. idealistic, and also that the opposite point of departure, which begins from the objective, leads to materialism. – Fundamentally however we are much more at one with the world than we normally think: its inner essence is our will; its appearance is our representation. Anyone who could bring this oneness of being to clear consciousness would find that the difference between the continuation of the external world after he has died and his own continuation after death disappears: the two would seem like the same thing to him, and in fact he would laugh over the delusion that could separate them. For an understanding of the indestructibility of our being stands or falls with an understanding of the identity of the macrocosm and microcosm. In the meantime, we can clarify what has been said here by a distinctive thought experiment, what could be termed a metaphysical experiment. Try to imagine vividly a time not far from now when you are dead. You are thinking yourself away while letting the world continue on: but you will soon find, to your amazement, that you were nevertheless still there. You

557 had intended to represent the world without yourself: but in consciousness, the I is the immediate through which the world is first mediated, the only thing for which the world exists. You are supposed to abolish this centre of

all existence, this kernel of all reality, while letting the world remain: this thought can certainly be entertained in the abstract<sup>a</sup> but cannot be made real.<sup>16</sup> The effort to do so, the attempt to think the secondary without the primary, the conditioned without the condition, the supported without the supporter, will always fail, in much the same way as the thought of an equilateral but right-angled triangle or a passing away or coming to be of matter, or similar other impossibilities. Instead of what is intended, we cannot get rid of the feeling that the world is no less in us than we are in it,<sup>17</sup> and that the source of all reality lies within ourselves. The result is really this: the time in which I do not exist will come objectively: but it can never come subjectively. – We can even ask if anyone can, in his heart of hearts, believe something that he is not in fact able to think; or whether in fact our own death is not basically the most fictitious<sup>b</sup> thing in the world for us, because associated with that purely intellectual experiment, which everyone carries out more or less clearly, comes also the deeply interior consciousness of the indestructibility of our being.

The deep conviction that we are not eradicated through death, a conviction everyone carries in the bottom of his heart, as the qualms of conscience that inevitably accompany the approach of death also bear witness, depends entirely on the consciousness of our primordially<sup>c</sup> and eternity; this is why *Spinoza* says: ‘we feel and we experience ourselves to be eternal’.<sup>d</sup> A rational person can think of himself as imperishable only by thinking of himself as without beginning, as eternal, in fact as timeless. On the other hand, anyone who thinks that he has come from nothing must also think he will return to nothing; because it is monstrous to think that one eternity has elapsed prior to his existence, while a second eternity will begin during which he will never cease to be. The most solid ground for our imperishability is in fact the old claim: ‘nothing comes from nothing, and nothing can return to nothing’.<sup>e</sup> So it is perfectly appropriate that *Theophrastus Paracelsus* says (*Works*, Strasburg 1603, vol. 2, p. 6)<sup>f</sup> ‘The soul within me has come from something; this is why it cannot become nothing; because it came from something.’ He gives the true reason. But anyone who considers a person’s birth to be his absolute beginning must consider his death to be his absolute end. For both are what they are in the same sense: consequently we can only think of ourselves as *immortal* to the extent that we

558

<sup>a</sup> *in abstracto*

<sup>b</sup> *fabelhafteste*

<sup>c</sup> *Ursprünglichkeit*

<sup>d</sup> *sentimus, experimurque, nos aeternos esse* [*Ethics*, V, prop. 23, schol.]

<sup>e</sup> *Ex nihilo nihil fit, et in nihilum nihil potest reverti*

<sup>f</sup> [From the work *Philosophia ad Athenienses* (*Philosophy for the Athenians*), of dubious authenticity]

think of ourselves as *unborn*, and in the same sense. What birth is, death as is well, in essence and significance; it is the same line drawn in two directions. If the former is an actual origin out of nothing, then the latter is similarly an actual annihilation.<sup>18</sup> In truth, however, it is only by virtue of the *eternity* of our own genuine being that we can think of it as imperishable and thus not as temporal. The assumption that a human being is created out of nothing leads necessarily to the idea that death is his absolute end. The Old Testament is absolutely consistent here, because there is no doctrine of immortality appropriate for a creation out of nothing. The Christianity of the New Testament has such a doctrine because it is Indian in spirit and therefore, more than likely, Indian in origin too, even if only via Egypt. But this is as little suited to the Jewish stem onto which that Indian wisdom had to be grafted in the Holy Land as the freedom of the will is to the will's being created, or

As if the painter wanted to put a human head  
Onto a horse's neck.<sup>a</sup>

It is always bad when we cannot be thoroughly original, or cannot cut from a single piece of wood. – On the other hand, Brahmanism and Buddhism are very consistent in having an existence prior to birth along with a continuation after death, so that this life exists to atone for the guilt of that previous existence. The following passage from Colebrooke's *History of the Indian Philosophy* in the *Transactions of the Asiatic London Society*, vol. 1, p. 577,<sup>b</sup> shows how clearly conscious they were of the necessary consistency of this: 'Against the system of the Bhagavatas, which is but partially heretical, the objection upon which the chief stress is laid by Vyasa is, that that soul would not be eternal, if it were a production, and consequently had a beginning.' Further, in Upham's *Doctrine of Buddhism*, p. 110, it says: 'The lot in hell of impious persons call'd Deitty is the most severe: these are they, who discrediting the evidence of Buddha, adhere to the heretical doctrine, that all living beings had their beginning in the mother's womb, and will have their end in death.'<sup>c</sup>

Anyone who regards his existence as merely accidental must surely fear that he will lose it through death. By contrast, anyone who sees, if only in a

<sup>a</sup> *Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam / Jungere si velit.* [Horace, *Arts poetica*, 1]

<sup>b</sup> [Published in Henry Thomas Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays* (1837)]

<sup>c</sup> [Edward Upham, *The history and doctrine of Buddhism, popularly illustrated [etc.]*, 1829; original spelling. Schopenhauer quotes this and the passage from Colebrooke in English, and provides German translations in footnotes]

general way, that it rests on some original necessity will not believe that this necessity, which has produced something so wonderful, is limited to such a brief space of time, but will rather believe that it is active all the time. Anyone who ponders the fact that an infinite amount of time, and therefore an infinite number of alterations have taken place up to the point at which he exists, and yet that he still exists, in spite of this, will recognize his existence as necessary: the full possibility of all states has already been exhausted without being able to abolish his existence. *If he could ever not have been, then he would already be nothing now.* The infinity of the time that has already elapsed, and that has exhausted all the possible events within it, guarantees that what *exists, exists necessarily*. Therefore everyone has to conceive of himself as a necessary being, i.e. as a being whose existence follows from its true and complete definition, if only this could be had. In fact, this line of thinking contains the only immanent proof for the imperishability of our true essence, i.e., the only proof that remains within the realm of experiential data. Existence must inhere in our essence because it shows itself to be independent of all the states that can possibly be produced by the chain of causality: for these have already done what they can, and our existence still remains as unshaken by them as the stream of light is by the storm wind that it cuts through. If time could, by its own power, lead us to a blissful state, then we would have already been there long ago: for an infinite stretch of time lies behind us. But likewise: if it could lead us to destruction then we would have long ago ceased to be. And so, if we consider the case carefully, it follows that, because we now exist, we must have existed at all times. For we ourselves are the essence that time has taken into itself to fill its void: so this essence fills the *whole* of time, present, past and future in the same way, and it is as impossible for us to fall out of existence as it is for us to fall out of space. – To be precise, it is unthinkable that anything that ever exists with the full force of reality could ever become nothing and then spend an infinite amount of time not existing. This is the source of the Christian doctrine of the restitution of all things, the Hindu doctrine of the ever-renewed creation of the world through Brahmā, and the similar dogmas of the Greek philosophers. – These and other similar dogmas try to solve the great mystery of our being and non-being, but this mystery rests ultimately on the fact that what objectively constitutes an infinite stretch of time is subjectively a point, an undividable, ever-present present: but who comprehends this? *Kant* set it out most clearly in his immortal doctrine of the ideality of time and the claim that only the thing in itself is real. For it follows from this that what is truly essential to things, to humans, to the world, lies enduringly and

560

persistently in the 'permanent now',<sup>a</sup> solid and immobile; and that the changing appearances and events are merely a consequence of our grasp of this by means of time as the form of our intuition.<sup>19</sup> – Accordingly, instead of telling people: 'you arose with birth but are immortal'; we should say: 'you are not nothing', and teach them to understand this in the sense of the claim attributed to Hermes Trismegistus: 'because what is will always be'<sup>b</sup> – Stobaeus, *Eclogues* I, 43, 6.<sup>20</sup> Yet if this does not work, and the anxious heart sings its old song of woe: 'I see all beings arising from nothing  
 561 at birth and falling back into nothing after a brief time: even my existence, present now, will soon lie in the distant past, and I will be nothing!' – then the proper response is: 'Do you not exist? Do you not possess it, the precious present that all you children of time long for so eagerly, is it not yours, really yours? And do you understand how you have achieved it? Do you know the paths that led you to it, so that you could see that they would be barred to you by death? Even the possibility of an existence of your own self after the destruction of your body is incomprehensible to you: but could it be more incomprehensible to you than your present existence and how you attained that? Why should you doubt that the secret paths that opened you to this present will not also stand open to every future present for you as well?'

If observations of this type are at all suitable for rousing the conviction that there is something in us that cannot be destroyed in death, this nevertheless takes place only by rising to a standpoint from which birth is not the beginning of our existence. But it follows from this that what is shown to be indestructible through death is not truly the individual: the individual comes into existence through procreation and bears the qualities of the father and mother, presenting itself merely as a difference within the species and, as such, can only be finite. Accordingly, just as the individual has no memory of his existence before birth, neither will he be able to remember his present existence after death. But everyone posits his I in *consciousness*: this therefore seems to him to be bound up with that individuality without which everything that is particular to him and distinguishes him from the others is destroyed. In the absence of individuality he cannot distinguish his own continuation from the continuation of the rest of existence, and he sees his I being drowned out. But anyone who ties his existence to the identity of *consciousness* in this way, demanding that it continue endlessly after death, should bear in mind that he can only obtain this at the cost of an equally endless past prior to birth. And

<sup>a</sup> *nunc stans*

<sup>b</sup> Τὸ γὰρ ὄν ἀεὶ ἔσται (*Quod enim est, erit semper*)

since he has no memory of existing prior to his birth, and thus his consciousness begins with birth, he must treat this birth as the emergence of his existence out of nothing. But then he purchases the endless time of his existence after death with a period just as long before his birth: and this settles the account without any profit for himself. On the other hand, if the existence left untouched by death is distinct from the existence of an individual consciousness, then it must be as independent of birth as it is of death, and so it would be equally true to maintain in this regard that: 'I will always be' as to say that 'I have always been'; and this then gives two infinities for one. – But in fact the word 'I' contains a huge equivocation, one that will be immediately obvious to anyone bearing in mind the content of our Second Book, with its explanation of the separation of the willing part of our being from the cognitive part. Depending on how I understand this word, I can say: 'death is my total end', but also: 'my personal appearance is just as small a part of my true being as I am an infinitely small part of the world'. But the I is the dark point in consciousness, just as on the retina, it is precisely the entryway to the optic nerves that is blind, just as the brain itself is completely insensible, the body of the sun is dark, and the eye sees everything except itself. Our cognitive faculty is directed entirely to the *outside*, in accordance with the fact that it is the product of a brain function that has arisen solely for the purpose of self-preservation, that is to say looking for food and capturing prey. Thus everyone knows himself only as this individual, just as it presents itself in outer intuition. If on the other hand he could become conscious of what he is, otherwise and besides this, he would willingly leave his individuality behind, smile at the tenacity of his attachment to it and say: 'why do I care about the loss of this individuality since I carry in myself the possibility of countless individualities?' He would realize that even if he cannot expect this individuality to continue on, it is just as good as if this were to happen; because he carries in himself a perfect compensation for it. – Besides this, we can also take into consideration the fact that the individuality of most people is so miserable and worthless that they really do not lose anything and that the aspect of them that might still have some value is what is human in general:<sup>a</sup> but to this we can promise imperishability. In fact, even if an individual were to have endless endurance, the rigid inalterability and essential limitations found in every individuality as such would ultimately prove so boring that they would inevitably give rise to such enormous *ennui* that we would prefer to become nothing just to be rid of it. To demand

<sup>a</sup> *das allgemein Menschliche*

immortality for an individuality really just means wanting to eternalize a mistake. For at bottom every individuality is only a special error, a misstep, something that would be better off not being, and in fact the true purpose of life is to retrieve us from it. This is also confirmed by the fact that the vast majority of people, in fact all people are constituted in such a way that they cannot be happy, no matter what world they might be placed in. Insofar as such a world would exclude needs and annoyances, they would fall prey to boredom, and insofar as this is prevented, they would end up in misery, torment, and suffering. We would not be made happy by simply being transported to a 'better world', on the contrary, we would also need to be fundamentally altered so that we would no longer be what we are and would instead become what we are not. But for this, we would first have to stop being what we are: provisionally it is death that meets this requirement, and its moral necessity can already be seen from this perspective. To be transported into a different world and to have one's whole essence altered – these are fundamentally one and the same. This is ultimately why the objective is dependent on the subjective, as was explained by the idealism of our First Book: accordingly, we find here the point of contact between transcendental philosophy and ethics. If you keep this in mind you will find that you can wake up from the dream of life only when both it and its whole fabric have melted away: but this is its organ itself, the intellect, together with its forms. The intellect would continue to spin the dream to infinity, so closely they have grown together. But what really dreams is distinct even from this, and remains over and above. On the other hand, the worry that death might really be the end of everything can be compared to someone thinking in a dream that there are only dreams and no dreamers. – But after an individual consciousness has come to an end with death, would it be even desirable for it to be rekindled so that it could continue endlessly? Its content is, by and large, and indeed usually, nothing more than a stream of petty, mundane, miserable ideas and endless worries: let them finally be quieted! – This is why the ancients were quite right to put on their gravestones: 'to eternal security'<sup>a</sup> or 'to a good rest'.<sup>b,21</sup> If even here you demand the continuation of the individual consciousness, as so often happens, in order to tie it to reward or punishment in the beyond, this is fundamentally only an attempt to unite virtue and egoism. But these two will never embrace: they are fundamentally opposed. By contrast, what *is* well grounded is the immediate conviction that the sight of noble actions inspires; that the spirit of love that would lead

<sup>a</sup> *securitati perpetuae*

<sup>b</sup> *bonae quieti*

someone to spare his enemy or someone else to risk his life to befriend a person he has never seen, can never pass away and come to nothing. –

The most thorough response to the question of the continued existence of the individual after death lies in *Kant's* great doctrine of the *ideality of time*, which precisely here proves particularly consequential and fruitful, since, through a completely theoretical but nevertheless well-founded insight, it replaces dogmas that lead to absurdities one way or another, thus dispensing with the most exciting of all metaphysical questions in a single stroke. Beginning, ending, and continuation are concepts that are meaningful solely and exclusively with reference to time and that consequently hold true only if time is presupposed. But time does not exist absolutely, it is not the way in which the being of things is in itself, but is merely the form of our *cognition* of the existence and essence of ourselves and all things, which is for this reason very imperfect and confined to mere appearances. The concepts of ceasing to be and continuing on can be applied only to appearances, and not to what is presented in them, to the essence in itself of things; if they are applied to the latter, they therefore lose all true meaning. This is also shown by the fact that an answer to the question that arises from these temporal concepts is impossible, and every claim to such a thing, whatever side it comes from, is open to forceful objections. We might for instance claim that our essence in itself continues after death, because it is false to say that it is perishes; but we could equally say that it perishes, because it is false to say that it continues: the one is fundamentally as true as the other.<sup>22</sup> Here we could certainly establish something like an antinomy. But it would rest exclusively on negations. We would deny two contradictory, opposed predicates to the subject of judgment, but only because the whole category of these predicates is not applicable to the subject. But if we deny each predicate individually rather than both predicates together, then it would appear as if the contradictory opposite of the predicate that is denied to it was thereby proven of it. This however is due to the fact that in this case incommensurable quantities are being compared, insofar as the problem removes us to a scene<sup>a</sup> in which time is abolished, and yet poses questions about time-determinations, which are therefore as falsely attributed to the subject as they are denied of it. And this means: the problem is transcendent. In this sense, death remains a mystery.<sup>23</sup>

565

On the other hand, maintaining precisely that distinction between appearance and thing in itself, one can establish the claim that the human being is certainly transient as an appearance, but its essence in itself

<sup>a</sup> *Schauplatz*



is nonetheless not affected by this, and thus although (due to the resulting elimination of temporal concepts) we cannot attribute continuance to it, it is nonetheless indestructible. Accordingly, in this case we would find ourselves with a concept of indestructibility, but one that does not involve continuation. This is the sort of concept that comes from abstraction, and can certainly be thought in the abstract,<sup>a</sup> but is not verified by an intuition, and thus cannot become truly clear. On the other hand, we must still insist that we have not, like *Kant*, simply given up on our ability to have any cognition of the thing in itself, but rather know that this cognition is to be found in the will. We have, of course, never claimed to have an absolute and exhaustive cognition<sup>b</sup> of the thing in itself, but have rather seen quite clearly that it is impossible to cognize something as it is in and for itself. This is because as soon as I *cognize*, I have a representation: but precisely because this is *my* representation, it cannot be identical with what is cognized; rather, since it makes out of a being for itself<sup>c</sup> a being for others,<sup>d</sup> it is reproduced in an entirely different form, and is therefore only ever to be regarded as an *appearance* of this being. And so for a *cognizing* consciousness, however such a thing might be constituted, there can only ever be appearances. This difficulty is not even completely resolved by the fact that it is my own being that is cognized: to the extent that this being falls within my *cognizing* consciousness, it is already a reflection<sup>e</sup> of my being, something different from it, and thus already, to some degree, an appearance. So to the extent that I am a cognizer, I possess only an appearance of my own being; to the extent, on the other hand, that I immediately am this essence itself, I am not cognizing. For the fact that cognition is only a secondary quality of our being and is produced by its animal nature has been sufficiently established in the Second Book. Strictly speaking, even our will is only ever cognized as an appearance and not as what it might be absolutely in and for itself. We argued and demonstrated at length in the Second Book, as well as in *On Will in Nature*, that if, to get to the inner side of things, we leave behind what is given to us only indirectly and from the outside, and remain with the only appearance whose essence gives us access to an immediate insight from within, what we definitively find in this appearance is the will as something ultimate and as the kernel of reality, and so we have cognition of the thing in itself in the will to the extent that

<sup>a</sup> *in abstracto*

<sup>b</sup> *eine absolute und erschöpfende Erkenntniß*

<sup>c</sup> *Seyn für sich*

<sup>d</sup> *Seyn für Andere*

<sup>e</sup> *Reflexion*

the will is in fact the most immediate manifestation of the thing in itself, still possessing the form of time but no longer that of space, so that this cognition of the thing in itself is qualified in that it is still not exhaustive or completely adequate. This is the sense in which we maintain the concept of the will as the thing in itself fixed here as well.

The concept of cessation<sup>a</sup> is certainly applicable to a human being as an appearance in time, and empirical cognition presents death plainly as the end of temporal existence. The end of the person is just as real as its beginning, and in the same sense that we did not exist prior to birth, we will no longer exist after death. And yet no more can be abolished in death than was posited at birth; and in particular, what made birth possible in the first place cannot be abolished. In this sense 'born and unborn'<sup>b</sup> is an apt expression. – But the whole of empirical cognition yields only appearances, and so it is only appearances that are affected by the temporal processes of coming to be and passing away, while that which appears, the being in itself, is not. The opposition between coming to be and passing away is conditioned by the brain, and so it does not exist at all for being in itself, and has lost all meaning and significance in this context.<sup>24</sup> Being in itself remains untouched by the temporal end of a temporal appearance, and always maintains the same existence, an existence to which the concepts of beginning, end, and continuation are inapplicable. But, as far as we can follow, this being in itself is the will of every appearing being, including human beings. Consciousness on the other hand consists in cognition: and cognition, as an activity of the brain and thus as a function of the organism, belongs (as we have already conclusively demonstrated) to mere appearance, and hence comes to an end with mere appearance: the will alone, whose work – or rather image<sup>c</sup> – was the body, is indestructible. The strict distinction between the will and cognition, along with the primacy of the will, a distinction that constitutes the basic character of my philosophy, is therefore the only key to the contradiction that registers itself in many ways and arises anew in even the crudest consciousness, the contradiction between the fact that death is our end and the fact that we must still be eternal and indestructible, Spinoza's 'we feel and we experience ourselves to be eternal'.<sup>d</sup> All philosophers have wrongly placed the metaphysical, indestructible, eternal element of human beings in the *intellect*: it lies exclusively in the *will*, which is completely different from intellect, and only the will is

567

<sup>a</sup> *des Aufhörens*

<sup>b</sup> *natus et denatus*

<sup>c</sup> *Abbild*

<sup>d</sup> *sentimus, experimurque nos aeternos esse* [see p. 503, n. d]

568

primordial. The intellect, as we have shown most thoroughly in the Second Book, is a secondary phenomenon, conditioned by the brain and hence beginning and ending with it. The will alone is what conditions, it is the kernel of the whole of appearance, and is thus free of the forms of appearances (including time), and is therefore indestructible as well. So, although consciousness is certainly lost with death, what produced and maintained consciousness is not: life is extinguished but the principle of life, which manifested itself therein, is not extinguished along with it. Thus a feeling of assurance tells everyone that something within him is absolutely imperishable and indestructible. Even the freshness and vitality of memories from the most distant times, from the beginnings of childhood, testify to the fact that there is something in us that does not move forward with time, does not age, but remains unaltered. We were not however able to say clearly what this imperishable element is. It is not consciousness, any more than it is the body in which consciousness clearly rests. It is rather what the body together with consciousness rests upon. But this is precisely what presents itself as *will*, to the extent that it enters consciousness. We can of course not go beyond this, the will's most immediate appearance; for we cannot go beyond consciousness: and so the question as to what this could be insofar as it does *not* come into consciousness, i.e. what it might be simply and as such in itself, remains unanswerable.

Within appearance and by means of its forms (time and space, the principle of individuation<sup>a</sup>), the human individual is presented as undergoing destruction while the human race continues to live on. But in the essence in itself of things, which is free of these forms, the whole difference between individual and race falls away and both are immediately the same. The whole will to life is in the individual as it is in the race, and so the continuation of the species is merely the image of the indestructibility of the individual.<sup>25</sup>

569

Now since an understanding, infinitely important as it is, of the indestructibility of our true being by death rests entirely on the distinction between appearance and thing in itself, I want to present this distinction in the clearest light by explaining it by means of the origin of the animal being, i.e. *procreation*, rather than by means of its opposite, death. The process of procreation, which is just as mysterious as that of death, puts before our eyes in the most immediate way the fundamental opposition between appearance and the essence in itself of things, i.e. between the world as representation and the world as will, as well as the total incompatibility

<sup>a</sup> *principium individuationis*

between the laws of both. The act of procreation presents itself to us in two ways: first for self-consciousness, whose sole object (as I have often shown) is the will with all its affections; and then for the consciousness of other things, i.e. of the world as representation or the empirical reality of things. Now from the side of the will, hence internally, subjectively and for self-consciousness, that act presents itself as the most immediate and perfect satisfaction of the will, i.e. as sensual pleasure.<sup>a</sup> On the other hand, from the side of representation, hence externally, objectively, and for consciousness of other things, this very act is the woof of the most intricate fabric of all, the foundation of the inexpressibly complicated animal organism that needs only then to develop in order to become visible to our astonished eyes. From the point of view of representation, this organism, whose infinite complications and perfections are recognized only by someone who has studied anatomy, is to be conceived and thought in no other way than as a system that has been devised with the most carefully planned combinations and carried out with consummate artistry and precision, as the most laborious work of the deepest deliberation – but now from the side of the will we are acquainted, through self-consciousness, with its production as the work of an act that is precisely the opposite of any deliberation, the act of an unruly, blind urge, an excessively voluptuous sensation. This opposition is precisely related to the infinite contrast demonstrated above between the absolute ease with which nature brings forth its works, along with the correspondingly boundless lack of concern with which she abandons these to annihilation, and the incalculable artistry and thoughtfulness with which precisely these works are constructed. Judging by this, they would of necessity be infinitely difficult to create and hence their maintenance would need to be watched over with every conceivable care; but we have before our eyes the opposite. – If now, through these admittedly very unusual considerations, we have brought together the two quite different sides of the world in a very rough manner and, as it were, clutched them in *one* fist; then we must now hold firmly on to them to convince ourselves that the laws of appearance or the world as representation are in no way valid for the world of the will or of the things in themselves: then it will be more intelligible to us that, while on the side of representation, i.e. in the world of appearance, we first see a coming into existence out of nothing and then see the complete annihilation of these things that have come into existence, yet on other side, or in itself, a being lies before us to which the concepts of coming into existence and passing out of existence cannot even remotely be meaningfully applied. By returning to the

570

<sup>a</sup> *Wollust*

root where appearance and essence come together by means of self-consciousness, we have almost made palpable the extent to which the two are utterly incommensurable and the whole mode of being of the one, along with all the fundamental laws of this being, mean nothing, less than nothing, in the other. – I believe this final remark can only really be understood by a few people and that it will be unpleasant and even repulsive to everyone who does not understand it: but I will never on this account omit something that could serve to clarify my fundamental thought.<sup>a</sup> –

At the beginning of this chapter I argued that the great attachment to life or rather fear of death in no way comes from *cognition*, in which case it would be the result of the value we recognize in life; rather, this fear of death is rooted directly in the *will*, from whose primordial being it proceeds, devoid of any cognition and thus as the blind will to life. Just as we are seduced into life through the completely illusory drive for sensual pleasure, we are sustained in it through a fear of death that is without a doubt equally illusory. Both come directly from the will, which is in itself devoid of cognition.<sup>26</sup> By contrast, if the human being were a merely *cognizing* being then death for him would necessarily be not only a matter of indifference but even welcome. Now the view that we have achieved here teaches that what is affected by death is merely the *cognizing* consciousness, while on the other hand the *will*, to the extent that it is the thing in itself that is the basis for every individual appearance, is free of everything that relies on temporal determinations, and thus imperishable. The will's striving for existence and manifestation, which creates the world, is always fulfilled: for the world accompanies it as a shadow accompanies its body, inasmuch as the world is merely the visibility of its essence. That the will within us nonetheless fears death is due to the fact that in this situation cognition shows the will its essence purely in the individual appearance, which gives it the illusion that it is destroyed along with this appearance, just as my image in the mirror seems to be annihilated along with the mirror when it is shattered: and so this fills the will with horror, since it is contrary to its primordial essence, a blind urge for existence. From this it follows that the only thing in us that is capable of fearing death, and the only thing that fears death, namely the *will*, is not affected by it; and on the other hand that what is affected and really does get destroyed is something that is by nature incapable of fear or in fact of willing or affect in general, and is thus indifferent to existence or non-existence, namely the mere subject of cognition,<sup>b</sup> the intellect, whose existence consists in its relation

<sup>a</sup> *Grundgedanken*

<sup>b</sup> *das bloße Subjekt der Erkenntniß*

to the world of representation, i.e. to the objective world, whose correlate it is and whose existence is fundamentally the same as its own. And so although the individual consciousness does not survive death, what does survive is the only thing that struggles against it: the will. This explains the contradictory fact that while philosophers, from the standpoint of cognition, have always provided strong arguments to show that death is no evil, the fear of death nonetheless remains impervious to them all: for fear of death is not rooted in cognition but only in the will. It is precisely because the will and not the intellect is indestructible that all religions and philosophies grant a reward in eternity only to the virtues of the will or of the heart, not to those of intellect or of the mind.<sup>27</sup>

The following remarks will serve to clarify this discussion. The will, which constitutes our essence in itself, is simple in nature: it merely wills and does not cognize. The subject of cognition on the other hand is a secondary appearance, arising from the objectivation of the will: it is the point of unity of the sensibility of the nervous system, the focus, as it were, in which the rays of activity of all parts of the brain converge. It must therefore be destroyed with the brain. In self-consciousness, the subject of cognition, as the only source of cognition, confronts the will as a spectator and, although it arose from the will, it cognizes the will as something different from it and foreign; thus, it cognizes the will only empirically, in time, and piecemeal in its successive acts and affects, and so experiences the will's decisions only a posteriori and often very indirectly. This is why our own being<sup>a</sup> is a riddle to us (i.e. to our intellect) and the individual views itself as newly created and transient although its being in itself is timeless and hence eternal. Now just as the will does not *cognize*, so conversely the intellect or the subject of cognition is the only thing that does, but it does not will. This can even be proven physically by a fact already mentioned in the Second Book, namely that, according to *Bichat*, the different affects immediately agitate all the parts of the organism and disturb their functions, with the exception of the brain, which can at best be indirectly affected by it, i.e. as a result of those very disturbances (*On Life and On Death*,<sup>b</sup> article 6, § 2). But it follows from this that the subject of cognition for itself and as such cannot participate or take an interest in anything and is indifferent to the existence or non-existence of any given thing, and indeed of itself. Now why should this indifferent being be immortal? It comes to an end along with the temporal appearance of the will, i.e. the individual, just as it arose with this. It is the lantern that is extinguished

572

<sup>a</sup> *Wesen* [also translated as 'essence']

<sup>b</sup> *De la vie et de la mort* [see p. 260, n. b]

573

after it has performed its service. The intellect, like the intuitive world that exists only in the intellect, is mere appearance: but the finitude of both does not affect what they are the appearance of. The intellect is a function of the cerebral nervous system: but this, like the rest of the body, is the objecthood of the *will*. Thus the intellect depends on the somatic life of the organism: but this depends itself on the will. In a certain sense therefore, the organic body can be seen as the middle link between the will and the intellect; although it is in fact only the spatial presentation of the will itself in the intuition of the intellect.<sup>28</sup> Death and birth are the constant renewal of the consciousness of the will which is in itself without beginning or end, the sole substance, as it were, of existence (although every such renewal offers a new possibility for negation of the will to life). Consciousness is the life of the subject of cognition, or the brain, and death is its end. Thus consciousness is finite, always new, always beginning over again. The *will* alone persists; but equally, persistence matters only to the will: because it is the will to life. Nothing matters to the cognizing subject on its own. Still, both are joined in the I. – In every animal being the will has acquired an intellect, and this intellect is the light by means of which it pursues its goals here. – Incidentally, fear of death might be due in part to the fact that the individual will is so reluctant to part from the intellect that has come to it in the course of nature, from its leader and guard, without which it knows it will be helpless and blind.

Finally, this argument is also in agreement with that daily moral experience that teaches us that the will alone is real, while the objects of the will, being conditioned by cognition, are only appearances, only foam and vapour, like the wine that Mephistopheles tasted in Auerbach's cellar: for after every sensual pleasure we too say: 'And yet it felt as if I were drinking wine.'<sup>a</sup>

The terror of death is for the most part due to the false illusion that the I vanishes and the world remains. But the opposite is true: the world disappears while the innermost kernel of the I persists, the bearer and creator of that subject in whose representation alone the world has its existence. The intellect perishes along with the brain, and with this the objective world, its mere representation. The fact that a similar world lives and holds sway in other brains, now as before, is a matter of indifference to the intellect that is perishing. – So if the true reality did not lie in the *will*, and if it were not our *moral* existence that extended beyond death, then, since the intellect is extinguished along with its world, the essence of things

<sup>a</sup> [Goethe, *Faust* I, 2334]

in general would be nothing more than an endless series of short, troubled, and mutually incoherent dreams: for the persistence of nature that is without cognition consists only in the temporal representation of nature that has cognition. Thus a world spirit, dreaming mostly very troubled and difficult dreams without goal or end, would be all that existed.

574

Now when an individual fears death, we get the odd, indeed ludicrous drama of the lord and master of worlds, who fills everything with his being and who lends existence to everything that is, despairing and fearing destruction, being afraid of sinking down into the abyss of eternal nothingness – while in truth, everything is filled with him and there is no place where he does not exist, no being in which he does not live; for existence does not support him, he supports existence. Yet it is he who despairs in the individual fearing death, since he is labouring under the deception caused by the principle of individuation<sup>a</sup> that his existence is limited to the existence of the being now dying; this illusion is part of the difficult dream to which he, as will to life, has succumbed. But one could say to the dying man: ‘you are ceasing to be something that it would have been better for you never to have become’.<sup>29</sup>

So long as the negation of that will has not appeared, what is left of us by death is the seed and kernel of a completely different existence in which a new individual rediscovers itself, so fresh and new that it ponders itself in amazement. Hence the enthusiastic and dreamlike tendency of noble youths, at the age when this fresh consciousness has only just fully developed. What sleep is for the individual, death is for the will as thing in itself. If it could retain its memory and individuality, the will could not bear to continue on forever with the same activities and sufferings<sup>b</sup> but without gaining any advantage. It throws these away (this is Lethe) and arises from its sleep of death refreshed and equipped with another intellect,<sup>30</sup> as a new being: ‘a new day beckons to new shores!’<sup>c</sup>

As self-affirming will to life, the human being has the root of its existence in the species. Accordingly, death is the loss of one individuality and the attainment of another, and consequently an alteration of individuality under the exclusive guidance of the individual’s own will. For here alone is the eternal force that was able to produce his existence along with his I, but which, because of his constitution, is not capable of maintaining it in existence. Death is the *démenti* that the essence (*essentia*) of any given

575

<sup>a</sup> *principium individuationis*

<sup>b</sup> *Treiben und Leiden*

<sup>c</sup> [Goethe, *Faust* I, 701]



person receives in its claim to existence (*existentia*), the emergence of the contradiction that lies in every individual existence:

for all things that arise,  
Are worthy of their own demise.<sup>a</sup>

Yet an infinite number of existences<sup>b</sup> precisely like this, each with its I, stand at the disposal of the same force, the will, and all of these existences will be equally null<sup>c</sup> and transient. Now since each I has its separate consciousness, then with respect to such a consciousness that infinite number of them is no different from a single one. — From this perspective it seems to me not accidental that *aevum*, *aiôn*,<sup>d</sup> means both the individual lifespan and the endlessness of time: this shows, however obscurely, that the two are in themselves ultimately the same; accordingly, there would in fact be no difference whether I existed only throughout my own lifespan or throughout an infinite time.

Of course we cannot form a representation of what we have been discussing in the complete absence of all temporal concepts: but these should be excluded when it is a matter of the thing in itself. Still, it is an unalterable limitation of our intellect that it can never entirely do away with this first and most immediate form of all its representations and operate without it. This naturally leads to a type of metempsychosis: although with the significant difference that it does not involve the entire *psuchē*<sup>e</sup> but only the *will*, and thus specifically excludes the *cognitive* aspect; and this does away with much of the nonsense that accompanies the doctrine of metempsychosis. We are, in addition, conscious of the fact that the form of time appears here only as an unavoidable accommodation to the limitations of our intellect. Now if we seek assistance from the fact (to be discussed in Chapter 43) that the character, i.e. the will, is inherited from the father, while the intellect comes from the mother, then this agrees very well with our view that death separates a person's will, in itself individual, from the intellect (which was received from the mother in procreation) and now according to its modified constitution receives a new intellect through a new act of procreation guided by the thoroughly necessary course of events in the world, a course of events that harmonizes with this constitution. Through this new intellect it would become a new being, one with no memory of an earlier existence, since

<sup>a</sup> [Goethe, *Faust* I, 1339–40]

<sup>b</sup> *Existenzen*

<sup>c</sup> *nichtig*

<sup>d</sup> αἰών

<sup>e</sup> ψυχή [soul]

only the intellect is capable of memory and is the mortal part or the form, while the will is the eternal part, the substance: accordingly, this doctrine is more accurately described by the term palingenesis than by metempsychosis.<sup>31</sup> These constant rebirths would then make up the succession of life dreams of a will that is in itself indestructible until, informed and improved by traversing so many and various successive cognitions, always in a new form, it abolished itself.

This view also agrees with the genuine and, as it were, esoteric doctrine of Buddhism as we have come to know it through the most recent research, since it teaches not metempsychosis but rather a distinctive palingenesis that rests on moral grounds, which it describes and demonstrates with great profundity: this can be seen in the highly readable and remarkable presentation of the topic given in Spence Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, pp. 394–96 (which can be compared to pp. 429, 440 and 445 of the same book);<sup>a</sup> and this is confirmed in Taylor's *Prabodha Chandrodaya* (London 1812), p. 35;<sup>b</sup> similarly in Sangermano's *Burmese Empire*, p. 6;<sup>c</sup> as well as in *Asiatic Researches*, vol. 6, p. 179 and vol. 9, p. 256.<sup>d</sup> The very usable German compendium of Buddhism by Köppen<sup>e</sup> is also accurate on this point. Still, this doctrine is too subtle for the majority of Buddhists; this is why they preach metempsychosis, as an easily comprehensible surrogate.<sup>32</sup>

Nor should we overlook the fact that there are even empirical grounds to support this kind of palingenesis.<sup>33</sup> In fact, there is a connection between the birth of the newly emerging being and the death of the deceased one: this connection is manifest in the great fertility of the human race that arises as the result of devastating epidemics. When the Black Death depopulated the greater part of the Old World in the 14th century, the human race became unusually fertile, and twin births were very common: what was most peculiar about this was that none of the children born at that time acquired a complete set of teeth: and so when nature exerted itself, it was niggardly in the details. This was told by F. Schnurrer, in *Chronicle of Epidemics*<sup>f</sup> (1825). In *The Probable Lifespan of Humans*<sup>g</sup> (1835),

577

<sup>a</sup> [Robert Spence Hardy, *A Manual of Buddhism* [sic.], in its modern development; translated from *Sinhalese* (1853)]

<sup>b</sup> [*Prabodh Chandro'daya, or the moon of Intellect; an allegorical Drama*, translated from the Sanskrit and Prakrit by J. Taylor (1812)]

<sup>c</sup> [P. Vincentius Sangermano, *A description of the Burmese Empire, compiled chiefly from native documents* [etc.], trans. William Tandy (1833)]

<sup>d</sup> [volumes from 1806 and 1809]

<sup>e</sup> Carl Friedrich Köppen, *Die Religion des Buddha und ihre Entstehung* (*The Religion of the Buddha and its origins*), 2 vols. (1857–9)]

<sup>f</sup> *Chronik der Seuchen* [Friedrich Schnurrer]

<sup>g</sup> *Die wahrscheinliche Lebensdauer des Menschen* [Johann Ludwig Casper]

Casper also confirms the principle that the birth rate has the most decisive influence on lifespan and mortality in a given population; the birth rate always keeps pace with mortality; so that at all times and places, the number of deaths and births increases or diminishes in the same proportion, which he renders indubitable by accumulating evidence from many countries and their different provinces.<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless, there can be no *physical* causal connection between my earlier death and the fertility of someone else's marriage bed, or vice versa. And so in this case the metaphysical steps forward, undeniably and astoundingly, as the immediate explanatory ground for the physical. – Every newborn being enters into new existence fresh and joyful and enjoys it as a gift: but nothing is or can be a gift. Its fresh existence is paid for by the age and death of some deceased person who has perished, but who contained the indestructible seed from which this new existence has arisen:<sup>35</sup> they are a *single* being. We would naturally solve a great riddle if we could establish a link between them.

578 The great truth expressed here has never gone completely unrecognized, although it could not be traced back to its precise and proper meaning, something that becomes possible only through the doctrine of the primacy and the metaphysical essence of the will, and the secondary, merely organic, nature of the intellect. In fact, we find the doctrine of metempsychosis arising in the oldest and noblest ages of the human race, always spread over the earth as the belief of the great majority of the human race, indeed as the doctrine of all religions with the exception of Judaism and the two religions that came from it; but, as we have mentioned, it displays the greatest subtlety and comes closest to the truth in Buddhism. Accordingly, while Christians console themselves with the thought of a reunion in another world in which they rediscover and instantly recognize each other as whole and complete persons, in all other religions the reunion is already in progress, albeit incognito: that is to say, in the cycle of births and by means of metempsychosis or palingenesis, the people who are now closely connected with us or in contact with us will also be born at the same time as us in the next birth, and will entertain the same (or analogous) relations and dispositions toward us as they do now, whether they are friendly or hostile. (See for instance Spence Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 162.)<sup>a</sup> In this case of course, the recognition is limited to an obscure presentiment, a memory that cannot be made clearly conscious and that suggests an infinite remoteness – with the exception of the Buddha himself, who has the privilege of clearly recognizing his own earlier births and those of other people – as is described in the *Jatakas*. But in fact there are

<sup>a</sup> [See p. 519, n. a]

favourable moments when we obtain a purely objective view of the doings and dealings of people in reality, and then we are struck by the intuitive conviction not only that it is and remains the same, in accordance with the (Platonic) Ideas, but also that the present generation is, in its true kernel, substantially identical to the previous one. The question is only, what is this kernel? And the answer given by my teaching is well known. The intuitive conviction just mentioned can be understood as arising from a momentary interruption in the effectiveness of the multiplying glasses of time and space. – In his superb book, *On the Indian Nirvana*,<sup>a</sup> p. 13, Obry correctly describes the universality of the belief in metempsychosis: ‘This ancient belief has gone around the world and was so widely disseminated in high antiquity that a learned member of the Anglican church judged it to be without father, without mother, and without genealogy.’<sup>b</sup> (Thomas Burnet, in Beausobre, *History of Manichæism*,<sup>c</sup> II, p. 391.)<sup>36</sup> Metempsychosis was already taught in the *Vedas*, as it was in all the sacred books of India, and it is well known to be the kernel of Brahmanism and Buddhism, and so it still prevails throughout the whole of non-Islamicized Asia, which is to say, throughout more than half of the entire human race, as the most solid conviction and with an incredibly strong practical influence. It was also the belief of the Egyptians (Herodotus, II, 123),<sup>d</sup> from whom Orpheus, Pythagoras and Plato adopted it with enthusiasm: but the Pythagoreans in particular held it strongly. The fact that it was also taught in the mysteries of the Greeks follows undeniably from the ninth book of Plato’s *Laws* (p. 38 and 42, Bipont edition).<sup>e</sup> *Nemesius* (*On Human Nature*,<sup>f</sup> ch. 2) even says: ‘Common to all the Greeks who considered the soul immortal was the doctrine of transmigration from one body into another.’<sup>g,37</sup> Even the *Edda*, particularly in the *Völuspá*,<sup>h</sup> taught metempsychosis. It was equally the basis of the religion of the Druids (Caesar, *The Gallic Wars*,<sup>i</sup> VI. – A. Pictet, *The Mystery of the Bards of the British Isles*,<sup>j</sup> 1856). Even the Bohrahs,

579

<sup>a</sup> *Du Nirvana Indien* [Jean-Baptiste-François Obry, *Proceedings of the Academy of Sciences of Amiens* (1856)]

<sup>b</sup> *Cette vieille croyance a fait le tour du monde, et était tellement répandue dans la haute antiquité, qu’un docte Anglican l’avait jugée sans père, sans mère, et sans généalogie.*

<sup>c</sup> *Histoire du Manichéisme* [Isaac de Beausobre, *Histoire Critique de Manichée et du Manichéisme* (1739)]

<sup>d</sup> [Histories]

<sup>e</sup> [870d–e; 872d–873a]

<sup>f</sup> *De Nat[ura] Hom[inis]*

<sup>g</sup> Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν πάντες Ἕλληνες, οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον ἀποφηνάμενοι, τὴν μετενσωμάτωσιν δογματίζουσι (*Communitur igitur omnes Graeci, qui animam immortalem statuerunt, eam de uno corpore in aliud transferri censuerunt.*)

<sup>h</sup> [‘Prophecy of the Sybil’, in Norse mythology]

<sup>i</sup> *de Bello Gallico* [VI, 14]

<sup>j</sup> *Le Mystère des Bardes de l’île de Bretagne* [Translation by Adolphe Pictet (not a reliable source for Druidism)]

a Mohammedan sect in Hindustan, believe in metempsychosis and accordingly do not eat meat, as reported at great length by Colebrooke in *Asiatic Researches*, vol. 7, p. 336ff.<sup>a,38</sup> Even among Americans, Negro peoples, and indeed Australians as well, we find traces of this belief, as is evident from a precise description given in the English newspaper *The Times*, from Jan. 29, 1841, of the execution of two Australian savages on charges of arson and murder. The story reads: 'the younger of the two met his fate with a dogged and determined spirit that showed itself to be directed to revenge: for in the only intelligible expression that he used he claimed that he would rise up again as "a white man" and this gave him resolution.' Also, a book by Ungewitter, *The Australian Continent*,<sup>b</sup> 1853, tells the story that the Papuans in New Holland took the whites to be their own relatives returning to the world.<sup>39</sup> Given all this, the belief in metempsychosis appears as the natural conviction of anyone who as reflected at all in an unbiased way. As such, it would really be what *Kant* falsely claims of his three supposed Ideas of reason, namely a philosopheme natural to human reason and stemming from reason's own forms; and where it is not found, it would have been suppressed by positive religious doctrines of another sort. I have also noted that it is immediately intelligible to everyone who hears it for the first time. Just look at how seriously even Lessing discusses it in the last seven paragraphs of his *Education of the Human Race*.<sup>c</sup> Even Lichtenberg said in his self-characterization: 'I cannot rid myself of the thought that I died before I was born.'<sup>d</sup> Even the excessively empiricist *Hume* said in his sceptical essay on immortality, p. 23: 'The metempsychosis is therefore the only system of this kind that philosophy can hearken to.'<sup>e,40</sup> This belief, which is spread over the whole human race and is obvious to both wise and common people, is opposed by Judaism along with the two religions that have sprung from it, to the extent that they teach a creation of human beings out of nothing, to which people then have the difficult task of linking the belief in an endless continuation afterwards.<sup>e</sup> They have certainly succeeded, by fire and sword,

\* This posthumous essay is found in the *Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul*, by the late David Hume (Basil 1799), sold by James Decker. This printing in Basel has rescued both of these works of England's greatest thinker and author from destruction after they had been suppressed in their fatherland, to England's eternal shame, as a result of the stupid and entirely despicable bigotry that prevailed there through the influence of a powerful and presumptuous clergy. They are completely dispassionate, coldly rational investigations of both of the topics named. [Schopenhauer quotes from Hume in English and prefaces his footnote with a German translation]

<sup>a</sup> [issue of 1803]

<sup>b</sup> *Der Weltteil Australien* [Franz H. Ungewitter, 1853]

<sup>c</sup> *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* [1780]

<sup>d</sup> [From *Vermischte Schriften* (*Assorted Writings*) (1844), vol. 1, p. 32]

<sup>e</sup> *a parte post*

in driving this consoling, primitive belief of humanity out of Europe and a part of Asia: for how long is still uncertain. The difficulty of this task is shown in the most ancient church history: most heretics, e.g. the Simonians, Basilidians, Valentinians, Marcionites, Gnostics and Manicheans held this very belief. The Jews themselves have subscribed to it in part, as reported by Tertullian and Justin (in his dialogues). In the Talmud it is told that Abel's soul transmigrated into the body of Seth and then into that of Moses. Even the biblical passage in Matthew 16:13–14 only makes sense if it is understood as maintained on the supposition of the dogma of metempsychosis. Of course Luke 9:18–20, which also has this passage, adds 'that one of the ancient prophets has risen from the dead',<sup>a</sup> thus attributing to the Jews the assumption that this ancient prophet could be resurrected in flesh and blood which, since they certainly knew that he had already lain in the grave for six or seven hundred years, and consequently had long been reduced to dust, is a palpable absurdity.<sup>41</sup> In Christianity moreover, the doctrine of original sin (which is to say atonement for the sins of another individual) has taken the place of transmigration of the soul and the expiation of all sins committed in an earlier life through transmigration. Specifically, both identify (and indeed with a moral intent) the existing person with one who lived earlier: transmigration of the soul does so directly, original sin indirectly. –

581

Death is the great reproof that the will to life (and more directly the egoism essential to it) receives through the course of nature; and it can be thought of as a punishment for our existence.<sup>\*,42</sup> It is the painful loosening of the knot that procreation tied with sensual pleasure, and the violent destruction of the basic error of our being that comes to us from without: it is the great disillusionment. At bottom, we are something that should not have been: therefore we cease to be. – In fact, egoism consists in the human being restricting all reality to his own person, since he deludes himself that he exists in this alone, not the others. Death teaches him better by abolishing this person so that the essence of the human being, which is his will, now lives only in other individuals, while his intellect, which belonged only to appearance, i.e. the world as representation, and was merely the form of the external world, continues on in the being of representation<sup>b</sup> too, i.e. in the *objective* being of things as *such*, and thus only in the existence of what to this point has been the external world. From this point on, his whole I lives only in what he had previously regarded as not-I: for the difference between outer and inner

582

\* Death says: You are the product of an act that should not have been: therefore you must die to obliterate it.

<sup>a</sup> ὅτι προφήτης τις τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀνέστη

<sup>b</sup> *im Vorstellungseyn*

comes to an end.<sup>43</sup> Let us here recall that the better human being is the one who draws the least distinction between himself and others, and does not regard them as absolutely not-I; for the bad one, on the other hand, this distinction is great, indeed absolute – as I demonstrated in the prize essay on the foundations of morality.<sup>a</sup> Given what we have just said, this distinction determines the degree to which death can be viewed as the annihilation of the human being. – But if we think of the difference between what is outside myself and what is inside as spatial, grounded in appearance and not in the things in themselves and thus not absolutely real, then we will view the loss of our own individuality merely as the loss of an appearance, which is to say merely an apparent loss. However much reality that difference has in empirical consciousness, from the metaphysical standpoint the claims: ‘I perish but the world continues’ and ‘the world perishes but I continue’ are not at bottom truly distinct.

But beyond all this, death is the great opportunity not to be I any longer – an opportunity, to be sure, for the one who takes advantage of it. During his life, a human being’s will is not free: his actions take place with necessity on the basis of his inalterable character, along the chain of motives. Now everyone remembers many things that he has done but is unhappy with himself for having done them. If he were to keep living, then he would also keep acting the same way because of the inalterability of character. And so he must stop being what he is so as to be able to emerge as new and different from the seed of his being.<sup>44</sup> Thus death unties those bonds: the will becomes free again, because freedom lies in the being, not in the works:<sup>b</sup> ‘the knot of the heart will be cut, all doubts resolved, and his works will come to nothing’<sup>c</sup> is a very famous saying of the *Veda*, frequently repeated by all Vedantics.\* Dying is the moment of that liberation from the one-sidedness of an individuality that does not constitute the innermost kernel of our essence, but should rather be viewed as a kind of straying from our essence: it is at this moment that true, primordial freedom returns and so it is this moment that can be regarded, in the sense described, as a ‘restitution of wholeness’.<sup>d,45</sup> The peace and tranquillity on the face of most of the dead appear to stem from this. The death of every good person is usually tranquil

583

\* *Sancara, seu de theologumenis Vedanticorum* (Sankara, or on Vedantic theological doctrines), ed. F. H. H. [Friedrich Heinrich Hugo] Windischmann [1833], p. 37. – *Oupnek’hat*, vol. 1, p. 387 and p. 78 [On *Oupnek’hat* see p. 474, n. a]. – Colebrooke’s *Miscellaneous Essays* [1837] vol. 1, p. 363.

<sup>a</sup> *über das Fundament der Moral*

<sup>b</sup> *im Esse, nicht im Operari*

<sup>c</sup> *Finditur nodus cordis, dissolvuntur omnes dubitationes, ejusque opera evanescent* [from *Munḍaka Upanishad*, 2, 2, 8]

<sup>d</sup> *restitutio in integrum*

and mild: but to die willingly, gladly, joyfully is the prerogative of someone who is resigned, who has relinquished and negated the will to life. For he alone wills to die *actually* and not merely *apparently*, and so he neither needs nor longs for the continuation of his person. He willingly relinquishes our familiar existence: what there is for him besides this is, for our eyes, *nothing*, because our existence, compared to this, is *nothing*. The Buddhist faith calls this *nirvana*, i.e. extinction.<sup>\*a,46</sup>

\* The etymology of the word *nirvana* is variously described. According to Colebrooke (*Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. 1 [1826], p. 566), it comes from *va*, to blow, like the wind, with a prefixed negation *nir*, and so means the stilling of the wind, but as an adjective 'extinguished'. – Obry also, in *Du Nirvana Indien* [see p. 521, n. a] says on p. 3: *Nirvanam en sanscrit signifie à la lettre extinction, telle que celle d'un feu* [*Nirvanam* in Sanskrit means *extinction*, as that of a fire]. – According to the *Asiatic Journal*, vol. 24, p. 753, it is really *neravana*, from *nera*, without, and *vana*, life, and the meaning would be *annihilatio* [annihilation]. – In *Eastern Monachism* by Spence Hardy [see p. 519, n. a], p. 295, *nirvana* is derived from *vana*, sinful desires, with the negation *nir*. I. J. Schmidt in his translation of the *History of the Eastern Mongolians* [1829], p. 307, says that the Sanskrit word *nirvana* is translated into Mongolian by the phrase 'departed from sorrow', 'escaped from sorrow'. – According to the same scholar's lectures at the Petersburg Academy [1829], *nirvana* is the opposite of *sansara*, which is the world of perpetual rebirths, of craving and longing, of the illusion of the senses and changeable forms, of being born, aging, sickening and dying. – In the *Burmese* language the word *nirvana*, by analogy with other Sanskrit words, is transformed to *nieban* and translated as 'complete disappearance'. See Sangermano's *Description of the Burmese Empire*, translated by Tandy, Rome 1833, § 77 [see p. 519, n. c]. In the First Edition [of *WWR*] of 1819 I also wrote *nieban*, because at that time we were acquainted with Buddhism only from the meagre reports of the Birmans.

<sup>a</sup> *Erloschen*



## *Life of the Species*

In the previous chapter we recalled that the (Platonic) *Ideas* of the different levels of beings<sup>a</sup> comprising the adequate objectivation of the will to life present themselves in individual cognition (which is bound to the form of *time*) as the *species*,<sup>b</sup> i.e. as successive, similar individuals connected through the bonds of procreation, and that the species is therefore the Idea (*eidos*,<sup>c</sup> *species*) that has been pulled apart by time. Accordingly, the essence in itself<sup>d</sup> of every living thing lies primarily in its species: but the species, for its part, exists only in individuals. Although the will only achieves self-consciousness in the individual, and therefore cognizes itself immediately only in the individual, we nevertheless become conscious deep down that it is really the species in which its essence<sup>e</sup> objectifies itself, since the affairs of the species as such, which is to say sexual relations, the procreation and nourishment of the young, are incomparably more important and urgent to the individual than any others. This explains rutting in animals (the vehemence of this is superbly described in Burdach's *Physiology*,<sup>f</sup> vol. 1, §§ 247, 257), and in humans, the painstaking and capricious choice of another individual for the satisfaction of the sex drive, which can rise to the level of passionate love, and which I will describe more precisely in its own chapter:<sup>g</sup> and finally, this explains the excessive love that parents have for their young.

In the supplements to the Second Book, the will was compared to the root and the intellect to the top of the tree: this is the case internally or psychologically. But externally or physiologically, the genitals are the root and the head is the crown. The intestinal villi of course are the nutritive

<sup>a</sup> *Stufen der Wesen*

<sup>b</sup> *Gattungen*

<sup>c</sup> εἶδος

<sup>d</sup> *Wesen an sich*

<sup>e</sup> *Wesen*

<sup>f</sup> [See p. 254, n. c]

<sup>g</sup> [Chapter 44 below]

principle, not the genitals: and it is not the villi but the genitals that are the root because they connect the individual to the species in which it is rooted. This is because the individual is physically a creation of the species, and metaphysically a more or less imperfect image of the *Idea* that presents itself under the form of time as the species. In agreement with the relation discussed here, the greatest vitality as well as decrepitude of the brain is simultaneous with that of the genitals and the two are connected. The sex drive should be viewed as the inner impulse of the tree (the species) from which the life of the individual sprouts, like a leaf that is nourished by the tree while contributing to the tree's nourishment: this is why the sex drive is so strong and why it comes from the depths of our nature. To castrate an individual means to sever it from the tree of the species from which it sprang, and to leave it to wither away in this separated state: this is why its mental and bodily forces deteriorate. – Consider first that the service of the species, i.e. fertilization, is followed in every animal individual by a momentary exhaustion and inactivity of all forces, and with most insects it is quickly followed even by death, which is why *Celsus* said: 'the ejaculation of the semen means the loss of part of the soul';<sup>a</sup> consider also the fact that the extinction of the forces of procreation in human beings signals the individual's approaching death; consider the fact that excessive use of that force at any age shortens life, while abstinence enhances all forces, particularly muscular force, which is why it was part of the training of Greek athletes; and finally, consider the fact that this same abstinence extends the life of an insect even as far as the following spring – all this indicates that the life of the individual is fundamentally only borrowed from the species, and that all life force<sup>b</sup> is, as it were, species force<sup>c</sup> that is dammed up and hence inhibited. But this should be explained by the fact that the metaphysical substrate of life reveals itself immediately in the species, and in the individual only by means of this. Accordingly, in India the lingam and the yoni are revered as the symbols of the species and of its immortality and, as the counterweight to death, they are ascribed as attributes to Shiva, the very divinity presiding over death.

But even without myths and symbols, the vehemence of the sex drive, the burning ardour and deep seriousness with which every animal (and equally the human being) pursues the business of that drive, prove, through the function that serves it, that the animal belongs to the *species*

<sup>a</sup> *seminis emissio est partis animae jactura* [Aulus Cornelius Celsus (first century), *De medicina* (On medicine), first published in 1478 (but this passage is not located)]

<sup>b</sup> *Lebenskraft*

<sup>c</sup> *Gattungskraft*

586 and that this is where its true essence genuinely and principally lies, while all other functions and organs directly serve the individual alone, whose existence is fundamentally only secondary. Further, the vehemence of that drive, which is the concentration of the entire animal essence, expresses a consciousness that the individual does not continue and that everything therefore depends on the maintenance of the *species*, in which its true existence lies.

To elucidate what we have said, let us now imagine an animal in heat and in the act of procreation. It has a seriousness and ardour that we never see in it otherwise. What is happening to it? – Does it know that it must die and that its current activity will create a new individual in its place, albeit one completely similar to itself? – It knows none of this, because it does not think. But it cares for the temporal continuation of its species as keenly as if it knew all this. For it is conscious that it wills to live and exist and it expresses the highest level of this willing through the act of procreation: this is all that occurs in its consciousness. And this is all that needs to occur for the existence of the being; precisely because the will is the root<sup>a</sup> to which cognition is the thing added.<sup>b</sup> This is the very reason why the will has absolutely no need to be guided by cognition; rather, as soon as it has reached a decision in its primordially, this willing is automatically objectified in the world of representation. Now if in this way the particular animal form we are thinking of is what wills life and existence, it does not will life and existence in general, it wills them in this very form. This is why it is the sight of its form in the female of its type that excites the will of the animal to procreation. Seen from the outside and under the form of time, its willing presents itself in an animal form preserved throughout an endless time by the constantly repeated replacement of one individual by another, and thus through the alternation of death and procreation which, looked at in this way, still only appears as the pulse-beat of that form (*idea*, *eidos*,<sup>c</sup> *species*) persisting throughout all of time. They can be compared to the forces of attraction and repulsion whose antagonism gives rise to matter. –

587 What we have proven here concerning animals is also true of human beings: for even if their act of procreation is accompanied by the most perfect cognition of its final cause, the act is guided not by this cognition but directly by the will to life, as its concentrated form. It should therefore be accounted an instinctive act because the animal is no more guided by cognition of the goal during the act of procreation than it is with the

<sup>a</sup> *das Radikale*

<sup>b</sup> *das Adventitium*

<sup>c</sup> ἰδέα, εἶδος

creative drives:<sup>a</sup> in the creative drives too, the will expresses itself without the intervention of cognition which, in the one case as in the other, is left with only the details. To a certain extent procreation is the most remarkable of the creative drives and its work is the most astonishing.

These considerations explain why sexual desire<sup>b</sup> has a very different character from every other form of desire; not only is it the strongest desire, but it is also specifically of a more powerful sort than all the others. It is always tacitly assumed to be necessary and irresistible, and is not subject to taste or moods like other wishes. This is because it is the wish<sup>c</sup> that itself constitutes the essence of the human being. No motive is strong enough to be assured of a victory if it were to come into conflict with sexual desire. It is such that no other pleasure can compensate for the deprivation of its satisfaction: both animals and human beings will undertake any danger, any struggle for its sake. An utterly naïve expression of this natural mode of thought is the well-known inscription above the phallically ornamented doors of the fornix in Pompeii: 'Here is the home of happiness.'<sup>d</sup> This was naïve for those going in, ironic for those coming out, and humorous in itself. – By contrast, the excessive power of the procreative drive is expressed in a serious and dignified manner in the inscription which (according to *Theon* of Smyrna, *On music*,<sup>e</sup> ch. 47) Osiris erected a column to the eternal gods with an inscription saying: 'To Eros, the spirit, the heavens, the sun, the moon, the earth, the night, the day, and the father of everything that is and will be'; similarly in the beautiful apostrophe with which *Lucretius* begins his work:

Mother of Aeneas' race, desire of humans and of the gods,  
Alma Venus etc.<sup>f</sup>

All this corresponds to the vital role played by sexual relations in the human world; they are the invisible focal point of all our doings and dealings, and they peep through in spite of all the veils thrown over them. They are the cause of wars and the goal of peace, the grounds for seriousness and the aim of jokes, an inexhaustible source of witticisms, the key to all insinuations, and the meaning of all secret hints, unspoken propositions and stolen glances; they are the daily meditation and pursuit

588

<sup>a</sup> *Kunsttrieben*

<sup>b</sup> *die Begierde des Geschlechts*

<sup>c</sup> *Wunsch*

<sup>d</sup> *Heic habitat felicitas*

<sup>e</sup> *De musica*

<sup>f</sup> *Aeneadum genetrix, hominum divòmque voluptas, / Alma Venus etc.* [*De rerum natura* (*On the nature of things*), lines 1–2]

of the young and often of the old as well, the hourly thought of the unchaste and the recurring daydream of the chaste, constantly returning against the latter's will; they are always ready as material for jokes, precisely because they are based on the most serious considerations. But this is what adds spice to the world and makes it fun, the fact that everyone's main business is carried out in secret and people pretend to ignore it whenever possible. In fact however, we behold it all the time, sitting on its ancestral throne, full of its own power, as the true and hereditary master of the world, and casting scornful glances down at the arrangements people have made to subdue or imprison it, or at least to keep it within bounds and completely concealed if possible, or to master it so that it appears only as a completely subordinate and secondary concern of life. – All this corresponds to the fact that sex drive is the kernel of the will to life, and thus all willing itself in concentrated form; this is why in the text I termed the genitals the focal point of the will. Indeed, one can say that the human being is the sex drive made concrete, since he arose from an act of copulation, the wish of all his wishes is to engage in copulation, and this drive alone perpetuates and holds together the whole of his appearance. It is true that the will to life expresses itself mainly as the striving to preserve the individual; but this is only a stage in the effort to preserve the species, and this latter effort must be the more vehement in proportion to the extent that the life of the species surpasses that of the individual in length, extension, and value. So the sex drive is the most complete expression of the will to life, the clearest expression of its type: and the origin of individuals from it as well as its primacy over all the other desires of humans in their natural state corresponds to this completely.

589

This is the place for a physiological observation that in retrospect throws light on the basic doctrine I presented in the Second Book. The sex drive is the most vehement of the desires, the wish of wishes, our willing as a whole in concentrated form; so the corresponding satisfaction of the individual desire of any given person, which is to say the wish directed to a particular individual, is the peak and crown of his happiness, the final goal of his natural endeavours, and success here seems to mean success at everything, while failure seems to mean failure at everything – and so we find that the physiological correlate of this in objectified will and hence in the human organism is sperm as the secretion of secretions, the quintessence of humours, the ultimate result of all organic functions, and we have with this a new piece of evidence to show that the body is merely the objecthood of the will, i.e. the will itself under the form of representation.

Preservation of the young is linked to procreation, and parental love is tied to the sex drive, which promotes the life of the species. Accordingly, the love of an animal for its young, like the sex drive, has a strength that far exceeds the efforts directed to the individual self. This is shown in the fact that even the gentlest animals are ready to undertake the most unequal mortal struggle on behalf of their young, and that in almost all species of animals, the mother will confront any danger for the protection of the young, including, in many cases, certain death. In human beings this instinctive parental love is guided, mediated, and sometimes even inhibited by reason, i.e. deliberation, which can, in bad characters, go to the point of a complete denial of love: as a result, we can observe its effects most clearly in animals. In itself however it is no less strong in humans, and in particular cases we see parental love completely overcoming self-love, even to the point of sacrificing one's own life. So for instance the newspapers from Frankfurt have just reported that in *Cahors*, in the department of *Lot*, a father took his own life so that his son, who had been drafted into military service, could be the eldest child of a widow and therefore exempt from service (*Galignani's Messenger* from 22 June, 1843). But since animals are incapable of deliberation, the instinct of maternal love (the male is usually not conscious of his paternity) shows itself directly and without admixture, and hence with full clarity and in its full strength. It is fundamentally the expression in the animal of the consciousness that its true being lies more directly in the species than in the individual, and it therefore necessarily sacrifices its life so that the species will be preserved in the young. And thus here, as with the sex drive as well, the will to life is to a certain extent transcendent since its consciousness reaches beyond the individual in which it inheres to the species. So as not to discuss this expression of species life in a merely abstract manner but instead to make it vivid to the reader in its magnitude and reality, I want to add some examples of the excessive strength of instinctive maternal love.

590

When pursued, the sea otter grabs hold of her young and plunges under with it: when she resurfaces for breath, she covers her young with her body and takes the force of the hunter's harpoon while it escapes. – People will kill a young whale simply to lure the mother, who hurries to its side and will rarely leave it as long as it lives, even if she is struck by multiple harpoons. (Scoresby's *Diary of a Trip to a Whale Hunt*; translated from the English by Kries,<sup>a</sup> p. 196.) – On Three King's Island near New Zealand there live colossal seals called

<sup>a</sup> [William Scoresby, *Journal of a Voyage to the Northern Whale-fishery* (1823), trans. Friedrich Kries (1825)]

sea-elephants<sup>a</sup> (*phoca proboscidea*). They swim around the island in an orderly herd eating fish, but have certain gruesome enemies, unknown to us, which often inflict very heavy wounds on them: as a result, their communal swims require a distinctive tactic. The females throw themselves ashore: while they are nursing their young, which lasts for seven to eight weeks, the males all encircle them to prevent them from being driven by hunger into the sea, and when they try to do so the males prevent them by biting. And so they all starve together for  
 591 seven to eight weeks and all become very thin, just so that the young do not go into the sea until they are able to swim and to observe the proper tactics, which are then taught to them by pushing and biting. (Freycinet, *Voyage to the Southern Lands*,<sup>b</sup> 1826.) This case also shows how parental love, like every strong effort of the will, enhances intelligence (see ch. 19, 6). – When a hunter approaches, wild ducks, hedge sparrows, and many other birds fly at his feet with loud cries and flutter this way and that as if their wings were broken, in order to draw his attention from the young on to themselves. – Larks try to tempt a dog away from their nest by sacrificing themselves. Likewise hinds and does offer themselves to hunters so that their young are not attacked. – Swallows have flown into burning houses to rescue their young or to die along with them. In Delft a nesting stork let itself burn in a large fire rather than leave its frail young, which were not yet able to fly (Hadrianus Junius, *History of Holland*).<sup>c,47</sup> Mountain cocks and wood cocks allow themselves to be caught in nets when brooding. *Muscicapa tyrannus* defends her nest with particular courage and will even defend it against eagles. – When an ant was cut in two, the front half was seen to bring its pupa to safety. – A bitch whose litter had been cut from her body crept up to them while dying, caressed them lovingly and began to whine loudly only when they were taken from her. (Burdach, *Physiology as Experimental Science*,<sup>d</sup> vol. 2 and 3.)

<sup>a</sup> See-*Elephanten* [elephant seals]

<sup>b</sup> *Voyage [de découverte] aux terres australes* [*Voyage of discovery to the Southern lands*, Louis-Claude de Saulces de Freycinet]

<sup>c</sup> *Descriptio Hollandiae* [sixteenth century]

<sup>d</sup> *Physiologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft* [see p. 254, n. c]

*The Heritability of Traits*<sup>a</sup>

Daily experience teaches us that, with respect to bodily (objective, external) traits, the parents' seeds brought together in procreation transmit not only the distinctive qualities of the species but also those of the individual, and in fact this has always been recognized: 592

Everyone follows the seeds of his own nature.<sup>b</sup>  
*Catullus*<sup>c,48</sup>

Now whether this holds equally true of mental (subjective, internal) traits, so that these are also passed down from parents to children, is a frequently posed question and one that is almost always answered in the affirmative. A more difficult problem is whether we can separate the traits that come from the mother from those that come from the father, and hence what the mental inheritance from each parent might be. Now we can shed light on this problem with our fundamental recognition that the *will* is the essence in itself, the kernel, the root element of a human being; the *intellect* on the other hand is secondary, the thing added on, the accident to that substance; so before consulting experience, we would consider it at least probable that in procreation, the father, as the stronger sex<sup>d</sup> and procreative principle, would provide the basis, the root element of the new life, which is to say the *will*, and the mother, as the inferior sex<sup>e</sup> and merely receptive principle, would provide what is secondary, the *intellect*; and that therefore the human being inherits all moral features, character, inclinations, heart, from the father, while getting the degree, structure and direction of his intelligence from his mother. This assumption is actually confirmed by experience, only this cannot be decided by a physical

<sup>a</sup> *Eigenschaften*

<sup>b</sup> *Naturae sequitur semina quisque suae.*

<sup>c</sup> [The passage is actually not from Catullus but from Propertius, *Elegies* III, 8, 20]

<sup>d</sup> *sexus potior*

<sup>e</sup> *sexus sequior* [cf. Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* VII, ch. 8]



experiment in a laboratory, but comes in part from many years of careful and subtle observation, and in part from history.

593 Personal experience has the advantage of complete certainty and specificity, and these outweigh the associated disadvantages of having a restricted sphere and using examples that are not generally familiar. In the first instance therefore I refer everyone to his own experience. To begin with, let him consider himself, admit his own inclinations and passions, his character flaws and weaknesses, his vices as well as his merits and virtues, if he has any: and then let him think back on his father, and no one will ever fail to notice those same personality features in his father as well. By contrast, he will often find that his mother has an entirely different character, and there is very rarely any moral agreement with her, except in the special case where the parents have a similar character. Let him test this for instance with respect to irascibility or patience, ambition or extravagance, lasciviousness, debauchery, or a tendency to gamble, callousness or kindness, honesty or duplicity, pride or affability, courage or cowardice, considering whether he is peaceable or quarrelsome, conciliatory or spiteful etc. Then let him make the same investigation in any case where he has a detailed acquaintance both with someone's character and with his parents. If he is attentive and honest and uses proper judgment, he will not fail to confirm my claim. So for instance he will find the specific tendency toward lying (which is shared by many people) to the same extent in two brothers; because they have inherited it from their father: this is why the comedy *The Liar and his Son*<sup>a</sup> is psychologically accurate.<sup>49</sup> – But we must take note of two unavoidable qualifications that it would be clearly unjust to interpret as evasions. The first being: 'paternity is always uncertain'.<sup>b</sup> Only a decisive physical resemblance to the father removes this qualification: on the other hand, a superficial resemblance is not enough: for there is an after-effect of earlier fertilization that means that sometimes the children of a second marriage still bear some resemblance to the first spouse, and children conceived through an adulterous relationship are similar to the legitimate father.<sup>50</sup> This type of after-effect can be seen still more clearly in animals. The second qualification is that although the moral character of the father certainly appears clearly in the son, it is nevertheless modified by another, often very different *intellect* (the maternal inheritance), and the observation must be corrected for this. The modification can be more or less significant, depending on the extent of this difference of intellects, but it is never so great that the basic features of the paternal character would not be

<sup>a</sup> [by Jean François Collin d'Harville, in *Théâtre fugitif* (1805)]

<sup>b</sup> *pater semper incertus*

sufficiently discernible; somewhat like a person who appears in completely different clothes, wig and beard. For instance, if the maternal legacy renders a person extremely rational, which is to say endows him an unusual ability for reflection and deliberation, then the passions inherited from the father will be partly held in check and partly hidden and hence only expressed in a methodical and systematic or even hidden manner, which produce a very different appearance from the father, who might have had a very limited intellect: and the converse can happen in just the same way. – The inclinations and passions of the mother by contrast are completely unrecognizable in the children, indeed children often have quite opposed inclinations and passions.

594

Historical examples have the advantage over those drawn from private life of being widely known; on the other hand of course, they are liable to the uncertainty and frequent falsification of all testimony, and are also impaired by the fact that they usually only concern public and not private life and therefore only affairs of state and not the more subtle expressions of character. However I will support the truth under discussion with a few historical examples; doubtless those who have made history a focus of their studies will be able to add a much greater number of equally relevant cases.

It is widely known that *P. Decius Mus* sacrificed his life for his country with heroic nobility by solemnly consecrating himself and his enemies to the gods of the underworld and leaping with covered head into the Latin spears. About forty years later his son of the same name did precisely the same in the war against the Gauls (Livy, VIII, 6; X, 28).<sup>a</sup> This is then a true example of the Horatian ‘strong are born of the strong and good’;<sup>b</sup> Shakespeare provides the converse case:

Cowards father cowards, and base things sire base<sup>c</sup>  
*Cymbeline*, iv, 2

Ancient Roman history presents us with entire families whose members over a long stretch of time distinguished themselves through self-sacrificial patriotism and courage: thus the *gens Fabia* and the *gens Fabricia*.<sup>51</sup> – On the other hand, *Alexander the Great* was tyrannical and greedy for conquest like his father *Philip*. – It is well worth looking at the family tree of *Nero*, since *Suetonius* (chs. 4 and 5),<sup>d</sup> with a view to morality, cites this lineage at the beginning of his description of this monster. It is the *gens Claudia* that he

595

<sup>a</sup> [*History of Rome*]

<sup>b</sup> *fortes creantur fortibus et bonis* [*Odes* IV, 4, 29]

<sup>c</sup> [Schopenhauer quotes the English and provides a German translation in a footnote]

<sup>d</sup> [*Life of Nero*, in *The Lives of the Twelve Caesars*]

describes, which flowered for six hundred years in Rome, producing men who were active but also wanton and cruel. Tiberius, Caligula and finally Nero came from this lineage.<sup>52</sup> All the horrific traits were already visible in his grandfather and even more strongly in his father, traits that were only fully developed in Nero, in part because his higher rank gave them free rein and in part because he had in addition the irrational Maenad Agrippina for a mother, and she could not provide him with an intellect to rein in his passions. It is therefore quite in keeping with what we are claiming when *Suetonius* tells us that at Nero's birth 'the announcement of the father, Domitius, was to prophesy, in response to the congratulations of friends, that the product of himself and Agrippina could only be an abomination and public evil'.<sup>a</sup> – On the other hand, *Cimon* was the son of *Miltiades*, and *Hannibal* of *Hamilcar*, and the *Scipios* formed a whole family of heroes and noble defenders of the fatherland. – But Pope *Alexander IV*'s son was his terrible likeness, *Cesare Borgia*. The son of the notorious Duke of *Alba* was just as cruel and evil as his father.<sup>53</sup> – The treacherous, unjust *Philip IV* of France, known for his gruesome torture and execution of the Templars, had as his daughter *Isabella*, wife of *Edward II* of England. She rose up against Edward, took him prisoner, and after he had signed his abdication and her attempts to kill him through abusive treatment were unsuccessful, had him put to death in prison in a manner that is too horrible for me to repeat. – Queen Mary was the daughter by first marriage of the bloodthirsty tyrant and defender of faith<sup>b</sup> *Henry VIII* of England, and she was distinguished equally by bigotry and cruelty, and earned the title *Bloody Mary*<sup>c</sup> as a result of the number of heretics she had burned. *Elisabeth*,<sup>d</sup> the daughter of his second marriage, inherited an excellent understanding from her mother, Anne Boleyn, which blocked the bigotry and reined in the paternal character but did not abolish it: it would occasionally shine through, and it emerged clearly in the cruel treatment of Mary of Scotland.<sup>e</sup> – Following Marcus Donatus, *Van Geuns*\* tells us of a Scottish girl whose father was burned as a highwayman and cannibal when she was only a year old: although she grew up among completely different people, the same craving for human flesh

596

\* *Disputatio [philosophica] de corporum habitudine, animae, huiusque virium indice*. Harderov. 1789, § 9 [Steven Jan van Geuns (*Philosophical disputation concerning the disposition of bodies, soul, and the indication of its powers*), Harderwyck, 1789]

<sup>a</sup> *praesagio fuit etiam Domitii, patris, vox, inter gratulationes amicorum, negantis, quidquam ex se et Agrippina, nisi detestabile et malo publico nasci potuisse* [Suetonius, *Life of Nero*, ch. 6]

<sup>b</sup> *defensor fidei*

<sup>c</sup> [in English in the original]

<sup>d</sup> [Elizabeth I]

<sup>e</sup> [Mary, Queen of Scots]

developed in her as she grew older, and caught in the act of satisfying it, she was buried alive. – In *Der Freimütige*<sup>a</sup> from 13 July 1821, we read the news that the police in the department of Aube pursued a girl because she had murdered two children (whom she was supposed to bring to a foundling hospital) for the sake of the small amount of money the children were carrying. The police finally found the girl on the road to Paris, drowned near Romilly, and her own father gave himself up as her murderer.<sup>54</sup> – Finally, I will mention a couple of more recent cases, which accordingly have only newspaper reports to vouch for them. In October of 1836 in Hungary, a Count *Belecznai* was sentenced to death because he murdered a civil servant and severely injured his own relatives: previously his older brother had been executed for parricide and his father too had been a murderer. (*Frankfurter Postzeitung*, 26 October 1836). A year later the youngest brother of that count shot (but missed) the steward of his estate with a pistol on the very same street where his brother had murdered the public servant. (*Frankfurter Journal*, 16 September, 1837.) In the *Frankfurter Postzeitung* of 19 November, 1857 an article from Paris reports that a very dangerous street thief, *Lemaire*, was sentenced to death along with his gang, adding: ‘the criminal tendency seems to be hereditary in his family as well as his companions’ families, since many of their ilk have died on the gallows’.<sup>55</sup> – The fact that the Greeks were already familiar with similar cases is clear from a passage in Plato’s *Laws*. (*Stobaeus, Anthology*,<sup>b</sup> vol. 2, p. 213). – The annals of criminality will certainly exhibit many similar lineages. – Most heritable of all is the tendency to suicide.

If on the other hand we look at the excellent Marcus Aurelius who had the wicked Commodus for a son, we should not be lead astray, since we know that the divine Faustina<sup>c</sup> was a disreputable wife.<sup>d</sup> On the contrary, we should take note of this example and expect analogous cases to have an analogous rationale: for instance, I will never believe that Domitian was the full brother of Titus, but think on the contrary that Vespasian too was a cuckold.<sup>56</sup> –

597

Now as concerns the second part of the principle we are advancing, the heritability of intellect from the mother, this is much more generally acknowledged than the first, which stands opposed to the *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae*,<sup>e</sup> and which also stands opposed in its specific conception to the simplicity and indivisibility of the soul. Even the old and

<sup>a</sup> [‘The Candid One’ or ‘Free Spirit’: Berlin magazine edited by August Kotzebue and Garlieb Helwig Merkel]

<sup>b</sup> *Florilegium* [*Laws*, 856c–d]

<sup>c</sup> *Diva Faustina*

<sup>d</sup> *uxor infamis*

<sup>e</sup> [free choice of indifference: Schopenhauer’s essay *FR* argues against the existence of such free choice]

popular expression ‘mother wit’ bears witness to the long-standing recognition of this second truth, which is based on experience of intellectual merit both great and small: the mothers of people with such gifts were comparatively well distinguished by their own intelligence. On the other hand, the fact that the father’s intellectual traits are not passed down to the sons is demonstrated in both the fathers and the sons of men who are distinguished by the most eminent abilities, since they usually have very ordinary minds and no trace of the intellectual endowments of their fathers. Now if there is an occasional exception to this well-confirmed experience, as is the case for instance with *Pitt* and his father Lord *Chatham*, then we are entitled, indeed required, to ascribe this to chance, although it is certainly a chance of the most unusual kind, due to the extreme rarity of great talent. Yet the rule holds true here that it is improbable that the improbable *never* happens. In addition, great statesmen (as mentioned in Chapter 22) become great just as much through their character traits (and so through paternal inheritance) as through any intellectual merit. By contrast, I am not familiar with any analogous case among artists, poets, or philosophers, whose achievements are the only ones to be attributed to true *genius*. True, *Raphael*’s father was a painter, but not a great one; *Mozart*’s father was a musician like his son, but not a great one. But we can only be astonished by the fact that fate, allotting such a very short life to both of these men, the greatest in their fields, took care, as a kind of compensation, that they should be born into their fathers’ workshops so that their fathers’ examples and supervision could give them the necessary introduction into the arts for which they were exclusively intended, and so would not have to suffer any loss of time in their youth, something that often happens with other geniuses. This secret and mysterious power that seems to guide the life of the individual was the topic of a special discussion in my essay ‘On the Apparent Deliberateness in the Fate of the Individual’ (*Parerga*, vol. 1). – We should also note here that there are certain scientific occupations that clearly presuppose innate abilities, and good ones, but not ones that are genuinely rare and extraordinary, while diligent effort, hard work, patience, early supervision, constant study and much practice are the main requirements. Since sons everywhere gladly follow the paths of their fathers, and in certain families almost all businesses are passed through inheritance, it is this and not the heritability of the paternal intellect that explains why there are even some sciences, above all sciences requiring hard work and persistence, where individual families have had a succession of worthy men: these include the Scaligers, the Bernoullis, the Cassinis, and the Herschels.

The list of examples of the actual inheritance of the intellect from the mother would be much longer than it in fact is if the character and qualities of the female sex did not mean that women rarely publicly demonstrate their mental abilities so that these abilities do not become historical and win the acclaim of posterity. Moreover, because of the much weaker constitution of the female sex, these abilities never reach the level in women that they later reach in the son, at least under propitious circumstances: as to the woman herself, we should estimate her accomplishments the more highly in precisely this regard. Accordingly, I have only the following examples to offer as evidence for our truth. Joseph II was the son of Maria Theresa.<sup>57</sup> – In the third chapter of *On my own life*,<sup>a</sup> Cardanus

599 says: ‘my mother distinguished herself quite powerfully by her memory and mind’.<sup>b</sup> – In the first book of the *Confessions*, J.J. Rousseau says: ‘my mother’s beauty, her spirit, her talents – they were all too brilliant for her rank’<sup>c</sup> etc., and he then includes the most wonderful couplet by her. – D’Alembert was the illegitimate son of Claudine von Tencin, a woman of superior mind and the author of many novels and similar writings that were warmly received in her day and are still supposed to be enjoyable today. (See her biography in the *Blätter für literarische Unterhaltung*,<sup>d</sup> March 1845, no. 71–73.) – That Buffon’s mother was a distinguished woman is shown in the following passage from Hérault de Séchelles’ *Voyage to Montbar*,<sup>e</sup> which Flourens includes in his *History of the Works of Buffon*,<sup>f</sup> p. 288: ‘Buffon maintained the principle that in general children inherit mental and moral qualities from their mother: and when he developed this theme in conversation, he applied the principle straight away to himself, going into an extravagant encomium to his mother who in fact had considerable spirit, a vast array of knowledge, and a very well-ordered mind.’<sup>g</sup> The fact that he also cited moral traits is an error, stemming either from the writer of the report or from the fact that his mother happened to have the same character as he and his father. We have countless cases of the

<sup>a</sup> *De vita propria* [Hieronymus Cardanus (Gerolamo Cardano), 1576]

<sup>b</sup> *mater mea fuit memoria et ingenio pollens*

<sup>c</sup> *la beauté de ma mère, son esprit, ses talents, – elle en avait de trop brillants pour son état* [Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1782]

<sup>d</sup> [Literally, ‘pages for literary entertainment’]

<sup>e</sup> *Voyage à Montbar* [1785]

<sup>f</sup> *Histoire des travaux [et des Idées] de Buffon* [Marie-Jean Pierre Flourens, second edition, 1847; in fact p. 286, n. 3]

<sup>g</sup> *Buffon avait ce principe qu’en général les enfants tenaient de leur mère leurs qualités intellectuelles et morales: et lorsqu’il l’avait développé dans la conversation, il en faisait sur-le-champ l’application à lui-même, en faisant un éloge pompeux de sa mère, qui avait en effet, beaucoup d’esprit, des connaissances étendues, et une tête très bien organisée.*

contrary, where mother and son have conflicting characters: thus the greatest dramatists could present mothers and sons in antagonistic conflict, as with Orestes and Hamlet, where the son appears as the agent of both morality and the father's revenge. By contrast, the converse case, where the son opposes the father as the agent of morality and the mother's revenge, would be infuriating and at the same time almost ludicrous. This is due to the fact that there is a true identity of essence between father and son (this essence is the will), while between mother and son there is merely an identity of intellect, and even this is only conditional. There can be the greatest moral opposition between mother and son, but only an intellectual  
 600 opposition between father and son. From this perspective we can also recognize the necessity of the Salic law: the woman cannot carry on the lineage.<sup>58</sup> – In his brief autobiography, *Hume* says: 'our mother was a woman of singular merit'.<sup>a</sup> – The most recent biography of Kant by *F. W. Schubert*,<sup>b</sup> describes Kant's mother like this: 'According to her son's own judgment, she was a woman of great natural understanding. Given the fact that there were so few opportunities at that time for the education of girls, she was unusually well instructed and after this too she took care to further her own education . . . On walks she alerted her son to many different types of natural phenomena and tried to explain them through the power of God.' – Everyone now knows what an uncommonly clever, quick-witted, and superior woman *Goethe's* mother was. How frequently she is discussed in the literature! Of his father however, there is nothing; he himself describes his father as a man of inferior abilities.<sup>59</sup> – *Schiller's* mother was susceptible to poetry and composed verses herself, a fragment of which can be found in his biography by *Schwab*.<sup>c</sup> – *Bürger*, this true poetic genius who may perhaps deserve first place after Goethe among German poets, since his ballads make Schiller's seem cold and contrived in comparison,<sup>60</sup> has left an account of his parents that is significant for us and is recorded by his friend and doctor *Althof* in his 1798 biography<sup>d</sup> with these words: 'Bürger's father certainly knew many things, as was the customary approach to studying at that time, and he was in addition a good and honest man. But he loved his peace, comfort and his tobacco pipe so much that, as my friend used to say, he always needed to prepare himself in order to spend a quarter of an hour instructing his son. His wife was a

<sup>a</sup> [Schopenhauer quotes the English and gives a German translation in a footnote]

<sup>b</sup> [Friedrich Wilhelm Schubert, *Immanuel Kants Biographie* (1842), pp. 14f.]

<sup>c</sup> [Gustav Schwab, *Schillers Leben* (1840)]

<sup>d</sup> [Ludwig Christoph Althof, *Einige Nachrichten von den vornehmsten Lebensumständen G. A. Bürgers* (Some reports of the most distinguished events in the life of G. A. Bürger) (1798)]

woman of extraordinary mental abilities, but these were so underdeveloped that she had hardly learned to write legibly. Bürger claimed that in the right culture his mother would have been the most famous of her sex; although he frequently expressed strong misgivings about various tendencies of her moral character. He believed he had inherited several mental talents from his mother and from his father a harmony with his moral character.’ – *Walter Scott’s* mother was a poet and was associated with the fine minds of her time, as W. Scott’s obituary in the *English Globe* on 24 September, 1832 tells us. I learned that her poems were published in 1789 from an essay entitled ‘Mother Wit’ published by *Brockhaus* on 4 October 1841 in the *Blätter für literarische Unterhaltung*. This essay gives a long list of the brilliant mothers of famous men, from which I will take only two: ‘*Bacon’s* mother was a distinguished linguist, and wrote and translated several works, demonstrating in each her learning, acuity and taste. – *Boerhaave’s* mother was distinguished by her medical knowledge.’ – On the other hand, *Haller* has provided a strong proof of the heritability of mental weakness from the mother, writing: ‘We know that it is from two sisters of a patrician family who found spouses because of their wealth, although they were almost imbeciles, that the seed of this illness entered the noblest families for a century, so that among their descendents even into the fourth, indeed fifth generations, several are still imbeciles.’<sup>a</sup> (*Physiological Elements of the Human Body*,<sup>b</sup> Book XXIX, § 8.) – Also, according to *Esquirol*,<sup>c</sup> madness is inherited more frequently from the mother than from the father. When it is in fact inherited from the father, I attribute this to his emotional disposition, for the effects of this can give rise to madness.

It seems to follow from our principle that sons of the same mother would have the same mental strengths, and when one is highly gifted the other would have to be as well. Sometimes this is true: examples are the *Carracci*, Joseph and Michael *Haydn*, Bernhard and Andreas *Romberg*, Georges and Frédéric *Cuvier*.<sup>61</sup> I would include the brothers *Schlegel* except that the younger brother, Friedrich, has in the last quarter of his life, together with Adam Müller, trafficked in ignominious obscurantism, and thus made himself unworthy of the honour of being cited alongside his excellent, irrefragable, and highly distinguished brother, August

<sup>a</sup> *E duabus patriciis sororibus, ob divitias maritos nactis, quum tamen fatuis essent proximae, novimus in nobilissimas gentes nunc a seculo retro ejus morbi manasse semina, ut etiam in quarta generatione, quintave, omnium posterorum aliqui fatui supersint.*

<sup>b</sup> *Elementa physiol[ogiae corporis humani]* [Albrecht von Haller, 1757–66]

<sup>c</sup> [See p. 374, n. c]



602 Wilhelm. For obscurantism is a sin against not perhaps the Holy but certainly the human spirit, and is consequently unforgiveable so that we must bear an eternal grudge against anyone guilty of it and take every opportunity to register our contempt for as long as he lives, and indeed even after death. – But just as frequently the above consequence does not result; for instance, Kant's brother was a completely ordinary man. We can explain this by recalling what I said about the physiological conditions of genius in Chapter 31. This requires not only an extraordinarily well-developed, perfectly adapted brain (the contribution of the mother), but also a very energetic heartbeat to animate it – i.e., in subjective terms, a passionate will, a lively temperament: this is the inheritance from the father. But this is just what reaches its highest point in the father's most vigorous years, and the mother ages even more quickly. Accordingly, highly gifted sons will usually be eldest, conceived when both parents were at the peak of their powers: and Kant's brother was eleven years younger than he was. Even with two distinguished brothers the older will usually be superior. But not only the age, but every temporary ebb of the life force or other disturbance of the parents' health at the time of conception could spoil the contribution of one parent or the other and prevent the appearance of an eminent talent which is, for precisely this reason, so rare. – It might be noted in passing that the absence of all such differences in twins is the cause of the quasi-identity of their being.

Even if there were particular cases of highly gifted sons without intellectually distinguished mothers, this would be due to the mother herself having had a phlegmatic father, and as a result, her unusually developed brain would not have been sufficiently stimulated by a corresponding energy from the blood circulation – a requirement that I discussed above in Chapter 31. She would nonetheless have passed on her highly developed nervous and cerebral system to her son, and only if he were to have a lively and passionate father with an energetic heartbeat would the other somatic condition of great mental power then be present. This may have been the case with *Byron*, since we never find any mention of intellectual merit in his  
 603 mother. – The same explanation also holds in the case of the intellectually gifted mother of an ingenious son who did not herself have a clever mother; in this case her father would have been phlegmatic.<sup>62</sup>

The discordant, variable and unsettled elements in the character of most people may derive from the fact that the individual does not have a simple origin, but rather receives his will from his father and intellect from his mother. The more different from and unsuited to each other the parents were, the greater that discord and inner cleft will be. While some people

excel in the heart and others in the head, there are still others whose merit lies purely in a certain harmony and unity of the whole being, and this is a result of the heart and the head being so completely suited to each other that they support and promote each other, leading us to suspect that their parents had a particular suitability to and harmony with each other.

With respect to the physiological aspects of the theory I am presenting, I would like merely to add that *Burdach*, who erroneously assumes that the same mental traits could come sometimes from the mother and sometimes from the father, nonetheless adds (*Physiology as Science of Experience*,<sup>a</sup> vol. 1, § 306): ‘On the whole, the masculine element has more influence on the determination of irritability, while the feminine element has more influence on sensibility.’ – *Linnaeus*’ remarks are also relevant here, in *System of Nature*,<sup>b</sup> vol. 1, p. 8: ‘Prior to conception a fertile mother produces a living, medullary sketch of the new animal, which is completely identical to the mother and called *carina Malpighiana*, like the plumula of plants: the heart attaches to this after procreation in order to spread it into the body. From the very beginning, the focal point of the egg brooded by the bird demonstrates a beating heart and a brain along with the medulla: this small heart stops under the influence of cold, but is stimulated to movement by a warm breath, and presses the fluids along the ducts by means of a vesicle that gradually expands. The point where life can occur in the living being is, as it were, a medullary ramification of life continued on from the first procreation; because the egg is a *medullary bud in the mother* that is alive from the beginning, even though its own life only begins *with the heart that comes from the father*.’<sup>c</sup>

If we combine our present conclusions concerning the heritability of the character from the father and of the intellect from the mother with our earlier observations of the great disparity that nature has set between one human being and another, both morally and intellectually, as well as with our recognition of the complete inalterability both of character and of mental abilities; then we will be led to the idea that a real and fundamental improvement of the human race may be possible, but not so much from

604

<sup>a</sup> *Physiologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft* [see p. 254, n. c]

<sup>b</sup> *Systema Naturae* [sive regna tria naturae systematice proposita per classes, ordines, genera, et species (System of nature, presented systematically by classes, orders, genera and species) (1735)]

<sup>c</sup> *Mater prolifera promit, ante generationem, vivum compendium medullare novi animalis, suique simillimi, carinam Malpighianam dictum, tanquam plumulam vegetabilium: hoc ex genitura Cor adsociat ramificandum in corpus. Punctum enim saliens ovi incubantis avis ostendit primum cor micans, cerebrumque cum medulla: corculum hoc, cessans a frigore, excitatur calido halitu, premitque bulla aërea, sensim dilatata, liquores, secundum canales fluxiles. Punctum vitalitatis itaque in viventibus est tanquam a prima creatione continuata medullaris vitae ramificatio, cum ovum sit gemma medullaris matris a primordio viva, licet non sua ante proprium cor paternum.*

without as from within, and thus not through teaching and education but through the generations. Plato already had something like this in mind when, in the Fifth Book of the *Republic*, he presented his strange plan for propagating and improving his warrior caste.<sup>63</sup> If we could castrate all the scoundrels, stick all the stupid geese in a convent, give an entire harem to each man of noble character and men (intact ones) to all the girls of spirit and understanding, then a generation would soon arise that would constitute an age superior to that of Pericles. – But without going into plans for such a utopia, we might consider that if castration were made the most severe punishment short of the death penalty (as, if I am not mistaken, several ancient peoples actually have done), then the world would be freed of entire lineages of scoundrels, all the more certainly since it is a well-known fact that most crimes are committed by people between the ages of twenty and thirty.<sup>\*,64</sup> In the same way, it is worth considering whether it might not be more profitable to distribute public dowries (as is done on certain occasions), not, as is now customary, to the girls who are supposed to be the most virtuous, but instead to the girls with the most understanding and intelligence; particularly since it is very difficult to make judgments about virtue – only God, as they say, sees into the heart; and the opportunities to display a noble character are rare, and subject to chance; and in addition, the virtue of many girls gets a powerful support from their ugliness. By contrast, after a short investigation, people of understanding can be quite certain as to the presence of understanding in others. – Another practical application is the following. In many counties, including southern Germany, the bad practice is common of women carrying burdens, even very considerable ones, on their heads. This must have a detrimental effect on the brain, causing it to gradually deteriorate in the female sex of a people, and because the male sex inherits it from the female, the entire population becomes increasingly stupid; which in many cases is quite unnecessary. By eliminating this practice, the quantity of intelligence would be increased overall in the population; and this would reliably produce the greatest increase in national wealth.<sup>65</sup>

But if we now leave such practical applications to others and return to our distinctive, ethical–metaphysical standpoint, then (by relating our present discussion to the content of Chapter 41) we reach the following

\* In his *Vermischte Schriften* [Assorted Writings] (Göttingen 1801, vol. 2, p. 447), Lichtenberg says: 'In England it was proposed to castrate thieves. The proposal is not a bad one: the punishment is severe, it makes people contemptible but they are still able to work; and if stealing is hereditary, then it will no longer be inherited. Courage also ceases, and since the sex drive so often leads to thievery, this cause will also be removed. The claim that women would be more eager to prevent men from stealing is frivolous, since as things now stand, they risk losing them entirely.'

result that, for all its transcendence, has direct empirical support. – It is the same character, that is, the same individually determined will, which lives on in all descendents of a lineage, from the distant ancestor to the present son and heir. But each of these has been assigned a different intellect, that is, a different level and a different manner of cognition. In this way, life presents itself in each of them from a different side and in another light; each individual gives the will a new fundamental view<sup>a</sup> of life, teaches it a new lesson. Of course that will cannot add directly to the insight gained over the course of a single life through the addition of those of others, since the intellect is extinguished along with the individual. But as a result of the new fundamental views on life that only a renewed personality can lend the will, its willing is given an entirely new direction; it experiences a modification, and most important, it must either affirm life anew or negate it. As such, the natural institution of the ever changing combination of a will and an intellect, which arises from the necessity of two sexes for procreation, becomes the basis for a way to salvation.<sup>b</sup> For this natural institution allows life to constantly present new sides to the will (whose image and mirror it is), spinning ceaselessly under its gaze, as it were, allowing it to try new and different ways of intuiting so that each time it can decide between affirmation and negation, both of which are always open to it; except that if ever negation is embraced, then with death<sup>66</sup> the whole phenomenon will cease for it. Now since, according to this, it is the constant renewal and complete alteration of the intellect that holds open a way to salvation for the same will, by providing it with new world views, and the intellect comes from the mother, this may be the real reason why all peoples (with very few, and in fact tenuous exceptions) abhor and forbid sibling marriage, and indeed why sexual love does not arise between siblings, with very rare exceptions due to an unnatural perversity of drives, if not to the illegitimacy of one of the siblings. For all that could be produced in a marriage between siblings is the same will together with the same intellect as are already united in the two parents, and thus the hopeless repetition of the appearance already present.<sup>67</sup>

606

But now if we look closely, carefully, and individually at the unbelievably large and yet so strikingly different variety of characters, and find that one is so good and friendly, the other so malicious and even cruel, or see yet another that is just, honest and upright while a fourth is utterly deceptive, slippery, perfidious, treacherous, an incorrigible villain, then an abyss opens within our inquiry since to ponder the origin of such difference is

<sup>a</sup> *Grundansicht*

<sup>b</sup> *Heilsordnung*

607

to ponder in vain. Hindus and Buddhists solve the problem by saying: 'it is the consequence of deeds in a previous life'. This solution is indeed the most ancient, as well as the most comprehensible and the one proposed by the wisest of human beings: but it only pushes back the question. But a better solution is hardly to be found. It only remains for me to say that, from the standpoint of my entire doctrine, when the will is discussed as thing in itself, the principle of sufficient reason, as mere form of appearance, can no longer apply, and all Why and Whence fall away along with it. Absolute freedom consists precisely in the fact that something is not subject to the principle of sufficient reason, as the principle of all necessity: so absolute freedom belongs exclusively to the thing in itself, but this is precisely the will. It is therefore subordinate to necessity in its appearance, and hence in the *operari*:<sup>a</sup> in the *esse*<sup>b</sup> however, where it has decided itself as thing in itself, it is *free*. Thus, as soon as we come to this, as we have here, all explanations in terms of grounds and consequents must come to an end, and there is nothing left except for us to say: here the true freedom of the will is expressing itself, a freedom that belongs to the will to the extent that it is the thing in itself, which is, just as such, groundless, i.e. it knows no Why. But it is here that all our understanding comes to an end precisely because all our understanding is based on the principle of sufficient reason insofar as it consists in the mere application of this principle.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>a</sup> [acting]

<sup>b</sup> [being]

*Metaphysics of Sexual Love*

You wisest of men, your learning is rare,  
 And so you must know even this,  
 How where and when does everyone pair?  
 Why do they love and they kiss?  
 You wisest of men, please tell me this now,  
 Your wisdom allows you to see  
 All that I seek, which is what where and how  
 And why this has happened to me

Bürger<sup>a</sup>

This is the last of four chapters that are interconnected through so many cross-references that they form something of a subordinate whole, and the attentive reader will recognize this without requiring me to interrupt my discussion by explicitly recalling and referring to them.

608

We are accustomed to seeing poets concerned mainly with the description of sexual love.<sup>b</sup> For the most part this is the principal theme of all dramatic works, tragic as well as comic, romantic as well as classical, Indian as well as European: it is no less the material for the vast majority of lyrical poetry, and likewise epic poetry, particularly if we want to include the great piles of novels that have been generated every year for centuries, as regularly as the fruits of the ground, in all the civilized countries of Europe. The principal concern of all these works is nothing other than many-sided descriptions, whether brief or extensive, of the passion under discussion. And the most successful descriptions of this passion, such as *Romeo and Juliet*, the *New Heloise*, *Werther*, have gained immortal fame.<sup>c</sup> But when *La Rochefoucauld* claims<sup>69</sup> that passionate love is like ghosts: everyone talks about them but no one has seen them:<sup>d</sup> and if likewise *Lichtenberg*, in his

<sup>a</sup> [Gottfried August Bürger 'Schön Suschen' (1778), stanza 5]

<sup>b</sup> *Geschlechtsliebe*

<sup>c</sup> [Works respectively by Shakespeare, Rousseau (*Julie, ou La Nouvelle Héloïse*) (1761), and Goethe (*Die Lieden des jungen Werthers*) (1774)]

<sup>d</sup> [*Reflexions, ou Sentences et Maximes Morales (Reflections; or Moral Sentences and Maxims)* (1665–78), Maxim 76]

essay 'On the Power of Love'<sup>a</sup> challenges the reality of this passion and denies it, then this is a huge mistake. For it is not possible that something alien to human nature and inconsistent with it, a bit of nonsense simply plucked out of thin air could be tirelessly portrayed in all ages by poets of genius, and received by humanity with unwavering interest – because there can be no artistic beauty without truth:

Nothing but the truth is beautiful; the truth alone can be loved.  
Boileau<sup>b</sup>

In any event, experience, if not exactly day-to-day experience, certainly confirms that what usually occurs only as a lively but still controllable inclination can under certain circumstances grow into a passion that is more intense than any other and that then throws all caution to the winds, overcomes all obstacles with unbelievable energy and persistence, so that people will not hesitate to risk their lives just to satisfy the passion, or even sacrifice life altogether if that satisfaction is denied. Werther and Jacopo Ortis<sup>c</sup> do not exist only in novels; Europe produces at least a half dozen of them every year: 'yet there were no reports of the deaths that they died'<sup>d</sup> because their sufferings have no other chronicler than civic record keepers or newspaper reporters. But those who read the police reports in the English and French daily news will be able to vouch for the accuracy of my claim. An even greater number of people are sent into madhouses by the same passion. Finally, every year there are one or two cases of joint suicide by a pair of lovers who have been thwarted by external circumstances; although it remains unclear to me how those who are assured of mutual love and can look forward to the supreme bliss of its enjoyment, would not sooner take the most extreme measures to renounce all relations and endure every hardship rather than relinquish along with their lives a happiness greater than any conceivable other. – But as concerns the lower degrees and mere traces of that passion, everyone can see these daily with his eyes, and unless he is old, feels them in his heart.

After what we have here brought to mind, we can therefore doubt neither the reality nor the importance of the subject matter, and instead of being surprised that a philosopher has for once taken up this perpetual theme of all poets, should rather be surprised that an issue playing such a

<sup>a</sup> [*Vermischte Schriften (Assorted Writings)* (1844), II, 234f.]

<sup>b</sup> *Rien n'est beau que le vrai; le vrai seul est aimable* [Nicolas Boileau, *Épîtres (Epistles)* (1670–98), IX, 23]

<sup>c</sup> [On Werther, see p. 547, n. c; Ugo Foscolo, *Ultime lettere di Jacopo Ortis (The Last Letters of Jacopo Ortis)* (1802)]

<sup>d</sup> *Sed ignotis perierunt mortibus illi* [Horace, *Sermones (Satires)*, I, 3, 108]

thoroughly significant role in human life has been almost entirely ignored by philosophers until now, and lies before us like unfinished fabric. *Plato* is the one who has done the most with this subject, particularly in *The Symposium*<sup>a</sup> and the *Phaedrus*: but what he brings to the subject remains mainly in the realm of myths, fables and jokes, and in addition is for the most part concerned only with the Greek love of boys. The little that *Rousseau* says about our theme in *Discourse on Inequality*<sup>b</sup> (p. 96, Bipont edition) is false and inadequate. *Kant*'s discussion of the subject in the third section of the essay *On the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (p. 435ff. of the Rosenkranz edition)<sup>c</sup> is very superficial and lacks familiarity with the subject matter, and is therefore also only partially accurate. Finally, everyone will find *Platner*'s treatment of the subject in his *Anthropology*,<sup>d</sup> §§ 1347ff. trite and shallow. On the other hand, *Spinoza*'s definition deserves a mention because its excessive naïveté makes it amusing: 'love is a titillation accompanied by an idea of an outer cause'.<sup>e</sup> (*Ethics*, IV, prop. 44, demonstration.)<sup>70</sup> So I have no predecessors either to draw from or to refute: the topic has forced itself on me objectively, and has come into connection with my consideration of the world of its own accord. – Moreover, I have the least hope of approval from those who are themselves governed by this passion and therefore seek to express their excessive feelings in the most sublime and ethereal images: they will find my perspective too physical, too materialistic, however metaphysical, indeed transcendent, it might at base be. In the meantime, they might consider that, born 18 years earlier, the object inspiring their madrigals and sonnets today would scarcely be worth a second glance.

610

All instances of being in love,<sup>f</sup> however ethereal they might pretend to be, are rooted solely in the sex drive, and are in fact nothing but more precisely determined, specialized, and (in the strongest sense) individualized instances of sex drive.<sup>g</sup> This should be born strongly in mind when looking at the important role played by sexual love in all its gradations and nuances, not simply in plays and novels but also in the real world where (next to love of life) it proves to be the strongest and most active of all incentives; it constantly lays claim to half the energy and thoughts of the

<sup>a</sup> *Gastmahl*

<sup>b</sup> *Discours sur l'inégalité* [*Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (*Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men*) (1755)]

<sup>c</sup> [Ak. 2: 228–43]

<sup>d</sup> [See p. 98, n. d]

<sup>e</sup> *Amor est titillatio, concomitante idea causae externae*

<sup>f</sup> *Verliebtheit*

<sup>g</sup> *Geschlechtstrieb*



younger part of humanity, it acts as the final goal of almost every human endeavour, it exercises a detrimental influence on the most important affairs, it interrupts the most serious occupations at every hour, it befuddles sometimes even the greatest minds for a time, it is not afraid to introduce its disturbing trivialities<sup>a</sup> into the negotiations of state ministers and the research of scholars, it understands how to slip love letters and locks of hair even into ministerial portfolios and philosophical manuscripts, it brews up the most confused and wicked actions at least once a day, it dissolves the most valuable relations, it tears the strongest bonds apart, it makes a sacrifice now of lives or health, now of wealth, rank and happiness, it even robs otherwise honest people of all conscience, turns the true and loyal into traitors, and hence, taken as a whole, it makes its entrance like a malevolent demon, intent on turning everything upside down, bringing it into chaos and confusion. This makes us shout out: ‘What is all this racket for? What is the point of this urgency, uproar, anxiety and distress? It’s all so that every John can find his Mary:’<sup>\*</sup> why should such a trifle play such a vital role and introduce endless destruction and chaos into a well-ordered human life? – But the spirit of truth gradually reveals the answer to the earnest researcher: this is no trifling matter; its importance is completely proportionate to the seriousness and zeal of the activity. The final goal of all love affairs,<sup>b</sup> whether played out in socks or buskins,<sup>c</sup> is really more important than all other goals of human life, and therefore fully worthy of the deep seriousness with which everyone pursues it. Specifically, it decides nothing less than the *composition of the next generation*. The existence and constitution of the *dramatis personae* who will step forward when we have stepped down are determined here by means of these frivolous love affairs. Just as the being,<sup>d</sup> the *existentia* of those future persons is thoroughly determined by our sex drive in general, the essence,<sup>e</sup> the *essentia* of these people is likewise determined through the individual choice of its satisfaction, i.e. by sexual love, and this fixes it irrevocably in every respect. This is the key to the problem: we will familiarize ourselves with it in the application when we examine the degrees of amorousness,<sup>f</sup> from the most fleeting inclination to the most ardent passion; this will

\* I do not dare express myself precisely here: the sympathetic reader needs to translate this phrase into an Aristophanic language.

<sup>a</sup> *Plunder*

<sup>b</sup> *Liebeshändel*

<sup>c</sup> [representing comedy and tragedy]

<sup>d</sup> *Seyn*

<sup>e</sup> *Wesen*

<sup>f</sup> *Verliebtheit*

allow us to recognize that these differences stem from the degree of individualization of the choice.

The totality of the *love affairs* of the present generation is therefore the human race's serious 'meditation on the composition of the future generation, on which in turn countless generations depend'.<sup>a</sup> This is a matter of supreme importance and does not concern *individual* weals and woes (as all other affairs do) but rather the existence and specific composition of the human race in future ages, which is why the will of the individual appears in a higher potency, as will of the species. The importance of this matter explains all that is pathetic and sublime about matters of love, the transcendent character of its ecstasies and pains which poets have portrayed tirelessly for millennia in countless examples; for there can be no topic as interesting as this one, since its concern for the weals and woes of the *species* is related to the well-being of the individual just as a body is related to a surface. This is precisely why it is so difficult to make a drama interesting if it has no love affairs, and why on the other hand this theme never gets old, even with daily use.

What registers itself in the individual consciousness as sex drive in general, without being directed towards a particular individual of the other sex, is simply will to life in itself and outside of appearance. But what appears in consciousness as sex drive directed to a particular individual is in itself the will to live as a precisely determined individual. Although in this case the sex drive is in itself a subjective need, it is nevertheless very clever in knowing how to assume the mask of objective admiration in order to deceive: nature needs this stratagem for its ends. But however objective and tinged with sublimity this admiration might seem, the sole intent of every case of being in love<sup>b</sup> is the procreation of a specifically constituted individual, and this is confirmed primarily by the fact that the essential thing is not the reciprocation of love, but possession, i.e. physical pleasure. The assurance that love is reciprocated can therefore offer no solace for the lack of the possession, quite the reverse: many people in this situation have shot themselves. On the other hand, people who are strongly in love make do with possession, i.e. physical pleasure, when the love is not reciprocated. This is seen in all forced marriages, as well as the frequent purchase of a woman's favour with large gifts or other sacrifices, in spite of her disinclination; or in fact even in the case of rape. The procreation of a particular child is the true goal of a love story, even if that remains unknown to the participants: how this goal is achieved is of secondary

<sup>a</sup> *meditatio compositionis generationis futurae, e qua iterum pendent innumerae generationes*

<sup>b</sup> *Verliebtseyn*

importance. – However loudly sensitive and lofty souls, and particularly souls in love, might decry the blunt realism of my views, they are still mistaken. Isn't the precise determination of the individualities<sup>a</sup> in the next generation a much loftier and worthier goal than their extravagant feelings and supersensible soap bubbles? Indeed, could there be a greater or more important goal on earth? It alone corresponds to the profundity with which passionate love is filled, the seriousness with which it appears, and the importance that it accords to even the minutiae of its sphere and its causes. Only to the extent that one admits *this* to be the true goal do the intricacies, the tireless efforts and tortures for the attaining of the beloved object seem to measure up to the matter. For it is the future generation in its entire, individual specificity that presses for existence through these drives and efforts. In fact, it itself is already stirring in the farsighted, determined and obstinate choice in the satisfaction of the sex drive that people call love. The growing attraction of two lovers is in fact already the life-will<sup>b</sup> of the new individual who they can and want to conceive; indeed, its new life is already kindled when the lovers' eyes meet in looks of longing, and it announces itself as a future, harmonious, well-composed individuality. They feel the longing for a real unification and fusion into a single being, so as then to continue living only as this; and this longing is fulfilled in the child they conceive, for in this child the traits inherited from both live on, fused and unified into a single being.<sup>71</sup> On the other hand, the mutual, decided and enduring dislike between a man and a girl is a sign that the child they could conceive could only be a poorly organized, intrinsically disharmonious, unhappy being. This is why there is a profound meaning to the fact that although Calderón called the horrible Semiramis the daughter of the air, he nevertheless introduces her as the daughter of a rape followed by the husband's murder.<sup>c,72</sup>

614

Now in the end what attracts two individuals of the opposite sex with such vehemence exclusively to each other is the will to life that presents itself in the whole species; in this case the will to life anticipates an objectivation of its being that corresponds to its goals in the individual that the two can conceive. This child would get the will or character from the father, the intellect from the mother, and the embodiment<sup>d</sup> from both: although usually the figure will be determined more by the father and the size by the mother – this according to the laws that have been revealed

<sup>a</sup> *Individualitäten*

<sup>b</sup> *Lebenswille*

<sup>c</sup> [Pedro Calderón de la Barca, *La hija del aire* (*The daughter of the air*) (1653)]

<sup>d</sup> *Korporisation*

through the breeding of animal hybrids, and that rest mainly on the fact that the size of the foetus must be governed by the size of the uterus. The absolutely distinctive and individual passion between two lovers is just as inexplicable as the absolutely distinctive individuality exclusive to every person; – in fact, at the most profound level the two are one and the same thing: the latter is explicitly<sup>a</sup> what the first was only implicitly.<sup>b</sup> The very first beginnings of a new individual and the true starting point<sup>c</sup> of its life must really be regarded as the moment when his parents begin to fall in love – ‘to fancy each other’, in the very apt English expression – and, as we have said, the first seed of the new being arises when the parents’ eyes meet and fasten on each other in looks of longing, although of course, like all seeds, it will usually be crushed under foot. This new individual is to a certain extent a new (Platonic) Idea, and just as all Ideas strive with the greatest vehemence to enter into appearance, seizing greedily on to the matter that the law of causality doles out among them, likewise this particular Idea of a human individual also strives as avidly and vehemently as possible to be realized in appearance. This avidity and vehemence is precisely the passion of the future parents for each other. It has numerous gradations that, at the extremes, may be termed *Aphroditê pandêmos* and *ourania*:<sup>d</sup> – but essentially it is all the same. On the other hand it is the more powerful in degree the more *individualized* it is, i.e. the more the beloved individual is exclusively suited, by virtue of his parts and traits, to satisfy the lover’s wishes and the need established through the lover’s own individuality. What is at issue here will become clear in what follows. The amorous inclination is primarily and essentially directed towards health, strength, and beauty, and consequently towards youth as well; because in the first instance the will tries to present the species character of humanity which is the basis for all individuality: everyday flirtation<sup>e</sup> (vulgar Aphrodite<sup>f</sup>) does not go much further than this. Specific demands are then added to this, requirements that we will soon look at in detail, and passion increases when these demands see their way clear to satisfaction. The highest grades of passion, however, arise from the kind of suitability of the two individuals to each other by virtue of which the will, i.e. the character, of the father, and the intellect of the mother, combine to perfect precisely the individual for which the will to life in general, which presents

615

<sup>a</sup> *explicite*

<sup>b</sup> *implicite*

<sup>c</sup> *punctum saliens*

<sup>d</sup> Ἀφροδίτη πάνδημος und οὐρανία [vulgar and heavenly Aphrodite; cf. Plato, *Symposium*, 180d–e]

<sup>e</sup> *Liebelei*

<sup>f</sup> Ἀφροδίτη πάνδημος

itself in the whole species, feels a longing appropriate to its grandeur, and hence a longing that exceeds the measure of a mortal heart and whose motive lies similarly beyond the realm of the individual intellect. This then is the soul of a genuine and great passion. – The more perfect the mutual suitability of two people for each other in all of its many aspects (to be discussed below), the stronger their mutual passion will turn out to be. Because no two individuals are exactly alike, every particular woman must correspond most completely to a particular man, always with respect to the child they are to conceive. Genuinely passionate love is as rare as the chance of their encounter. But because the possibility of such an encounter exists in each of us, we can understand why it is portrayed in poetic works. – Precisely because amorous passion in fact turns on the child to be conceived and its traits, and because these are at its core, a friendship can arise between two young and well-constituted young people of the opposite sex, a friendship based on an agreement of temperament, character, and the tendency of their minds, without the admixture of sexual love; there might even be a distinct aversion between them in this respect. The reason can be found in the fact that a child they conceive together would have physically or mentally disharmonious traits, in short, its existence and constitution would not correspond to the goal of the will to life as it presents itself in the species. In the opposite case, sexual love can indeed arise and exist where there are great differences in temperament, character, and intellectual tendency, even when these give rise to aversion or even hostility, and then sexual love blinds the couple to all these problems; if it tempts them into marriage, the marriage will be a very unhappy one. –

Now for a more thorough investigation of the matter. – Egoism is such a deeply rooted trait of all individuality in general that egoistic goals are the only ones that can be relied upon to arouse an individual being into action. It is true that the species has a prior, more immediate and greater right to the individual than its frail individualization itself: still, when the individual is acting, or even sacrificing itself on behalf of the existence and composition of the species, the importance of this cannot be made comprehensible enough to the intellect (directed as it is purely to individual goals) for it to be able to operate in accordance with this importance. And so in such a case, nature can only achieve its aim by implanting a certain *delusion*<sup>a</sup> in the individual that makes what in truth is good only for the species appear to be good for the individual, so that the individual serves the species when he thinks he is serving himself; in this process a reality is

<sup>a</sup> *Wahn*

replaced as motive by a pure chimera that hovers before him and instantly disappears. This *delusion* is *instinct*. In the vast majority of cases, instinct should be regarded as a species sense that presents the *species'* pieties to the will. But because the will has become individual here, it must be deceived into thinking that what the species sense holds before it is actually perceived by the individual sense, and that accordingly it imagines itself to be pursuing individual goals when in fact it is following purely general<sup>a</sup> ones (general taken here in the true sense of the term). We observe the external appearance of instinct best in animals, where its role is most significant: but the internal process that accompanies it is, like everything internal, something we can come to know only in ourselves. People certainly claim that human beings have almost no instincts at all, or in any case only the instinct that allows a newborn to seek out and grasp its mother's breast. But in point of fact we have a very determinate, clear, and even complicated instinct, namely the subtle, serious, and obstinate choice of another individual for sexual satisfaction. The beauty or ugliness of the other individual has nothing at all to do with this satisfaction in itself, i.e. to the extent that it is a sensual pleasure based on the individual's urgent need. The keen attention nevertheless devoted to these factors, along with the painstaking choice it gives rise to, clearly has no reference to the one who makes the choice, despite what he imagines, but refers instead to the true goal, the child to be conceived, in which the type of the species is to be preserved as pure and accurate as possible. A great many degenerations of the human form arise through a thousand physical accidents and moral misfortunes: yet the true human type in all its parts is always produced anew; something that takes place under the guidance of the sense of beauty, presiding as it does so thoroughly over the sex drive that without it the sex drive would sink into a disgusting need.<sup>73</sup> Accordingly, everyone will, first of all, decisively prefer and ardently desire the most beautiful individuals, i.e. the ones in which the species character is most cleanly imprinted; secondly however, he will particularly require in the other individual just *those* perfections that he himself lacks, he will indeed even find beauty in the imperfections that are the opposites of his own: this is why for instance short men look for tall women, people with blond hair love people with black, etc. – The dizzying rapture that seizes a man upon seeing a woman whose beauty is suitable to him and that deludes him into thinking that unity with her is the highest good, is precisely the *species sense* that, recognizing the clearly imprinted stamp of the species, wants to perpetuate

617

<sup>a</sup> *generelle*

- 618 itself with this. The preservation of the species type is based on this decisive preference for beauty: that is why this preference exerts such strong power. Later we will look specifically at the considerations that govern it. What therefore guides people here is really an instinct oriented towards the best for the species, while people themselves imagine they are seeking simply to heighten their own pleasure. – In fact, this is an instructive lesson concerning the inner essence of *all* instincts, which almost always act like this in putting the individual to work for the good of the species. Clearly, the painstaking care with which an insect seeks out a particular flower, or fruit, or dung, or flesh, or, as with the *Ichneumonia*, another insect's larva, in order to lay its eggs there and *there alone*, sparing no pains and heeding no danger to reach it, is very similar to the careful attention with which a man chooses a woman with specific qualities that appeal to him individually, and the eagerness with which he pursues her to the point where, against all reason, he often sacrifices his own happiness to gain this end, through a foolish marriage, through a love affair that costs him property, honour and life, even through crimes such as adultery or rape – all this merely in order to serve the species in the most expedient manner, in keeping with the universally sovereign will of nature, and even at the cost of the individual. Everywhere, instinct works as if by a concept of a goal, and yet lacks one entirely. Nature implants instinct there where the acting individual would be unable to understand the goal or unwilling to pursue it: thus it is typically assigned only to animals, and in fact especially to the lowest ones with the least understanding, so that the case at hand is almost the only instance of instinct being given to humans as well, who could certainly understand the goal, but would not pursue it with the requisite zeal, namely at the cost of even their individual well-being. And so, as with all instincts, the truth here takes the form of a delusion in order to operate on the will. It is a sensual delusion that makes a man believe he will find a greater pleasure in the arms of a woman whose beauty matches his needs than in the arms of any other; or that, directed exclusively at a *single*
- 619 individual, has him entirely convinced that the possession of this individual will guarantee him excessive happiness. Thus he is deluded into believing that he is expending his effort and making his sacrifices on behalf of his own pleasure, when it is merely for the preservation of the most regular<sup>a</sup> type of the species, or even because a certain individual who could only come from these parents is clamouring for existence. The mark of instinct, which is to say an action that takes place completely in the absence

<sup>a</sup> *regelmäßig*

of a concept of a goal, but as if it had one, is so fully present here that someone driven by this delusion often even detests and tries to hinder the one goal that drives him, procreation; this is the case, to be precise, with almost all illicit love affairs. Given the nature of the case as we have presented it, each lover will, after finally achieving pleasure, experience an incredible disappointment and be amazed that such a longed-for desire provides nothing more than every other sexual satisfaction; so that he does not see that it helps him much. This desire is to all his other desires what the species is to the individual, or what an infinite is to the finite. The satisfaction on the other hand really only benefits the species and therefore does not take place in individual consciousness, which is in this case animated by the will of the species and sacrifices itself for a goal that was never its own. Thus, after the consummation of the great enterprise, every lover will find he has been fooled: because the delusion that made the individual the dupe of the species has vanished. Thus *Plato's* very apt comment: 'pleasure is the greatest impostor of all', *Philebus*, 319.<sup>a</sup>

But all of this throws more light on the instincts and creative drives<sup>b</sup> of animals. Doubtless animals too are caught up in a type of delusion that makes them believe they are pursuing their own pleasure while they are working so industriously and with such self-denial for the species, the bird building its nest, the insect looking for the only suitable place for its eggs, or even hunting for prey it does not itself like but that must be laid beside the eggs as food for the future larvae; the bee, the wasp, the ant with their intricate constructions and their economy of the highest complexity. They are all certainly being guided by a delusion that hides service to the species under the mask of an egoistic goal. This is probably the only way to render intelligible the *internal* or subjective process that underlies expressions of instinct. But externally or objectively, animals strongly governed by instincts (i.e. namely insects) exhibit a dominance of the ganglion system, which is to say the *subjective* nervous system, over the *objective* or cerebral system; from this we can conclude that they are driven not so much by objective, accurate conceptions as by a certain delusion, by subjective representations that stimulate desires, representations that arise through the influence of the ganglion system on the brain: and this will be the *physiological* process in all instincts. – For clarification I will mention another, albeit weaker example of instinct in human beings, the capricious appetite of pregnant women: it seems to stem from the fact that the nutrition of the embryo sometimes requires a special or specific modification

620

<sup>a</sup> ἡδονὴ ἀπάντων ἀλαζονέστατον (*voluptas omnium maxime vaniloqua*) [*Philebus* 65c]

<sup>b</sup> *Kunsttriebe*



of the blood flowing to it; at this point food that has this effect immediately presents itself to the pregnant woman as an object of intense longing, and so a *delusion* arises in this case too. Accordingly, women have one more instinct than men: and the ganglion system is much more developed in them as well. – The excessive size of the human brain explains the fact that humans have fewer instincts than animals, and that even these few can be easily led astray. For instance, the sense of beauty that instinctively directs the choice of the object of sexual satisfaction is easily misled when it degenerates into a pederastic tendency; similarly, the blow-fly (*musca vomitoria*), which instinctively lays its eggs in rotting flesh, is misled by the cadaverous stench of the *arum dracunculius* to lay its eggs in the blossom of these plants.

621 A more precise analysis will establish with complete certainty the fact that all sexual love is based solely on instinct directed towards the child to be produced; and so we cannot forego such an analysis. – First we should mention here that the man is naturally inclined to inconstancy in love while the woman is inclined to constancy. A man's love diminishes noticeably from the moment it is satisfied: almost every other woman attracts him more than the one he already possesses: he longs for change. A woman's love on the other hand increases from that very moment. This is a consequence of the goal of nature, which is directed to the preservation of the species and thus to the greatest possible increase in its numbers. The man can easily beget over a hundred children a year if he has that many women at his disposal; by contrast, no matter how many men a woman might have, she can bring only *one* child a year into the world (apart from twin births). Thus *he* is always looking around at other women; *she* on the other hand holds tightly to the one: for nature drives her, instinctively and unreflectively, to hold on to the one who will feed and protect the future offspring. Thus marital fidelity is artificial in man and natural in women, and female infidelity is much less forgivable in a woman than in a man both objectively, because of the consequences, as well as subjectively, because of its unnaturalness.

But to be thorough and to convince ourselves completely that pleasure in the opposite sex, however objective it might seem to us, is merely instinct in disguise, i.e. a species sense that strives to stay true to type, we must investigate more closely the specific considerations that guide us in even this pleasure, however odd it might seem to mention these in a philosophical work. These considerations divide into those that directly concern the species type (i.e. beauty), those directed to mental traits, and finally the merely relative ones that emerge from the necessary measures

adopted to correct and neutralize one-sidedness and abnormalities in both individuals. We will take these in turn.

The supreme consideration guiding our choice and inclination is *age*. Overall the acceptable ages range from the onset to the cessation of menstruation, but there is a definite preference for the period from eighteen to twenty-eight. Outside these years, no woman can attract us: an old, i.e. post-menopausal woman disgusts us. Youth without beauty still has its charm; beauty without youth has none. – Clearly the intention unconsciously guiding us here is the possibility of procreation in general: so individuals becomes less attractive to the opposite sex the more distant they are from the most suitable periods for procreation or conception. – The second consideration is *health*: acute illnesses are only temporarily disruptive, but we lose courage in the face of chronic illness or especially cachexia, because they are passed on to the child. – The third consideration is the *skeleton*, because it is the foundation of the species type. Apart from age and illness, nothing repels us as much as a deformed figure: even the prettiest face cannot make up for this; instead we will unconditionally prefer even the ugliest person, as long as they have a straight stature. More, we are most acutely aware of a badly proportioned *skeleton*, for instance, a dwarfish, thick-set, short-legged figure, and similar things, and also a limp, if this is not the result of an external accident. On the other hand, a strikingly beautifully developed body can make up for any defects: it enchants us. This touches upon the high value everyone places on small feet: it is because this is an essential characteristic of the species, since no animal has such a small tarsus and metatarsus taken together as human beings, something associated with our upright gait: the human being is a plantigrade.<sup>74</sup> This is why *Jesus ben Sirach* (26:23, in *Kraus's* improved translation) says: 'a woman with straight stature and beautiful feet is like columns of gold on a silver base'.<sup>a</sup> Even teeth are important to us because they are essential for nutrition and are particularly heritable. – The fourth consideration is a certain *fullness of the flesh*, and thus a predominance of the vegetative function, of plasticity, for this promises ample nourishment for the foetus: thus we are strongly repulsed by great thinness. A full, feminine bosom has an uncommon charm for the male sex: because it is directly connected with women's propagation functions and promises ample nourishment for the newborn. On the other hand, we feel repulsed by *excessively* heavy women: this is because such a constitution signals atrophy of the uterus and hence infertility; something we know by instinct, not with our

622

623

<sup>a</sup> [Schopenhauer is citing Ecclesiasticus 26:18 which the King James Bible renders as: 'As the golden pillars are upon the sockets of silver; so are the fair feet with a constant heart.']

heads. – *Facial beauty* is the last thing to come into consideration. Here too, our first concern is with the bone structure;<sup>a</sup> we look primarily for a beautiful nose, and a short, snub nose mars everything. A slight curvature of the nose up or down has determined the happiness of innumerable girls for life, and rightly so, for the species type is at stake. As a characteristic specific to the human face, in contrast to an animal's snout, a small mouth (the result of small maxillae) is vitally important. A chin that is set back and looks as if it had been cut off is particularly repulsive, because a prominent chin<sup>b</sup> is a character trait exclusive to our species. Finally we take into consideration beautiful eyes and a beautiful forehead: they are associated with mental traits, particularly the intellectual ones that are inherited from the mother.

Naturally we cannot specify with equal precision the unconscious considerations that determine a woman's inclination. Overall we may state the following. They prefer men between the ages of 30 to 35, even in comparison to youths, who really do exhibit the highest human beauty. This is because they are not directed by taste but rather by instinct, and instinct recognizes the ages specified as the acme of procreative ability.<sup>75</sup> In general they lay little importance on beauty, particularly of the face: it is as if they take it upon themselves alone to give this to the child. What wins a woman is mainly strength of a man and the courage that goes along with it: for these hold out the promise of the procreation of strong children and at the same time a brave protector for these children. When it comes to conceiving a child, the woman can annul every flaw in the man's body and every deviation from the type by being herself irreproachable in those respects, or even by going too far in the other direction. The only exceptions are those traits of the man that are distinctive to his sex and that the mother cannot give the child: these include the masculine build of the skeleton, wide shoulders, narrow hips, straight legs, muscular strength, courage, a beard, etc. This is why women will often love ugly men but never an unmanly man, because this is a deficiency they are not able to neutralize.

The second type of consideration underlying sexual love concerns mental qualities. Here we will find that the woman is thoroughly attracted to the qualities of the heart or the character in a man, those inherited from the father. Chief among the qualities that will win a woman are firmness of will, resolution and courage, perhaps even integrity and goodness of heart. On the other hand, intellectual merits do not exercise any direct or instinctive power over her; precisely because they are *not* inherited from

<sup>a</sup> *Knochentheile*

<sup>b</sup> *mentum prominulum*

the father.<sup>76</sup> Women are not bothered by a lack of understanding: in fact excessive mental abilities or even genius can work against a man, as an abnormality. This is why we often see an ugly, stupid, vulgar man eclipse a well-educated, clever and amiable man when it comes to women. In addition, marriages of love will sometimes take place between two creatures who are intellectually very different: for instance *he* is crude, strong and limited, *she* is very sensitive, a subtle thinker, educated, aesthetic, etc.; or *he* is genial and educated, *she* is a goose:

Venus makes it so! Precisely what does not work,  
in neither soul nor body, she brings under the same yoke  
and laughs about it.<sup>a,77</sup>

The reason is that entirely different considerations from intellectual ones prevail in this case – namely, considerations of instinct. We do not marry with an eye to intellectual conversation, but to the procreation of children: marriage is a bond of hearts, not heads. It is a vain and ludicrous pretence when women claim to be in love with a man's mind, or else it is an exaggeration of a degenerate being. – The instinctive love of a man on the other hand is not determined by the *character traits* of a woman; this is why so many Socrateses have found their Xanthippes, for instance Shakespeare, Albrecht Dürer, Byron,<sup>78</sup> etc. But *intellectual* traits certainly do have an influence here because they are inherited from the mother: still, their influence is easily outweighed by considerations of physical beauty, which bear on more essential points and have an immediate effect. But it does happen that mothers have their daughters learn the fine arts, languages, etc. so as to be attractive to men, either out of a feeling of this influence, or experience with it; in this way, they want to artificially boost the intellect, just as they do with the hips and the bust when the occasion arises. – We must note that we are talking only about the absolutely immediate, instinctive attraction, the only kind that gives rise to truly *being in love*. The fact that a woman of understanding and education values understanding and spirit in a man, the fact that a man deliberately and rationally examines and considers the character of his bride, is irrelevant to the present case: these are the grounds for a rational choice in marriage, but not for passionate love, and it is passionate love that is our subject.

Up to now I have only taken into account the *absolute* considerations, i.e. considerations that hold for everyone: I come now to the *relative* considerations; these are individual, because the aim with them is to rectify the

<sup>a</sup> *Sic visum Veneri; cui placet impares / Formas atque animos sub iuga aënea / Saevo mittere cum joco*  
[Horace, Odes I, 33, 10]

deficient appearance of the species type, to correct the deviations from the type that are already present in the person of the one choosing a partner, and so to lead back to the pure presentation of the type. In this case, then, everyone loves what he lacks. A choice based on such *relative* considerations, proceeding from an individual constitution, and directed towards an individual constitution, is much more determinate, decided and exclusive than a choice arising purely from absolute considerations; this is why truly passionate love usually originates from these relative considerations, and only the ordinary, less ardent inclination arises from absolute considerations. Accordingly, conventional, perfect beauties tend not to excite grand passions. In order for a truly passionate inclination to arise, something is required that can only be expressed with a chemical metaphor: both people need to neutralize each other, like acids and bases into a neutral salt. The qualities needed for this are in essence the following. First: all sexuality is one-sidedness.<sup>a</sup> This one-sidedness is expressed more decisively and is present at a higher level in one individual than in the other: thus it can be complemented<sup>b</sup> and neutralized more effectively in each individual by one person of the opposite sex than by another; this is because the individual requires a one-sidedness that is the opposite of its own individual one-sidedness in order to complete the type of humanity in the new individual being procreated, since everything revolves around the constitution of this new individual. Physiologists know that masculinity and femininity allow for innumerable gradations, and masculinity can sink into repulsive gynandry and hypospadias, while femininity can rise to a charming androgyny: both sides can attain a complete hermaphroditism, where individuals remain precisely between both sexes, cannot be included in either, and are therefore unsuited to propagation. In order for two individuals to neutralize each other as we are discussing, it is therefore necessary that the particular degree of *his* masculinity correspond precisely to the particular degree of *her* femininity; in this way the one-sidedness of each person will annul the other's one-sidedness exactly. This is why the most masculine man will look for the most feminine woman and *vice versa*, and likewise every individual will look for someone whose degree of sexuality corresponds to his own. Two people will have an instinctive sense of the extent to which there is this necessary relation between them, and, along with other *relative* considerations, this relation forms the basis for the higher degrees of love. Therefore while lovers speak with pathos of the harmony of their souls, the heart of the matter is mostly the concurrence we have established here as regards the

<sup>a</sup> *Einseitigkeit*

<sup>b</sup> *ergänzt*

child to be procreated and its degree of perfection, something that is clearly of much greater import than any harmony of their souls, which will often devolve into a shrieking disharmony not long after the wedding. This brings in the more distant relative considerations, which are based on the fact that through the other person everyone aspires to annul his weaknesses, deficiencies, and deviations from the type so that they are not perpetuated in the child to be procreated and especially so that they do not grow into complete abnormalities. The weaker a man is in relation to muscular strength, the more he will look for strong women: and the woman, for her part, will do the same. Now since women's muscles are, as a rule, naturally and ordinarily less strong, women will usually prefer stronger men. – Another important consideration is size. Short men have decisive preference for tall women and *vice versa*: and indeed the preference of a short man for tall women will be all the more passionate if he was himself conceived by a tall father and remained short through his mother's influence; this is because he will have inherited his father's vascular system, and its energy to supply blood for a tall body: if on the other hand his father and grandfather were short, then this preference will make itself less obvious. The aversion of a tall woman for tall men is due to nature's intention to avoid too tall a race, in case, with the forces at *this* woman's disposal, the race would be too weak to live long. If nonetheless a tall woman chooses a tall partner, perhaps so as to be more presentable in society, the offspring will usually pay for this folly. – Considerations of complexion are, moreover, strongly decisive. Blonds always demand people with black or brown hair; but only rarely the other way around. The reason for this is that blond hair and blue eyes already constitute a variant,<sup>a</sup> almost an abnormality, analogous to white mice or at least horses. They are not native to any continent other than Europe, not even the polar regions, and clearly came from Scandinavia. In passing, I would like to express my view that human beings do not naturally have white skin, and that by nature they have black or brown skin, like our ancestors<sup>b</sup> the Hindus; as a result, no white person has ever emerged from the womb of nature, and so there is no white race,<sup>c</sup> however much has been said about it; instead every white person is bleached.<sup>79</sup> Human beings have been driven into a north quite alien to them and where they survive only like exotic plants that need to spend the winter in a hothouse, and over the course of the millennia they have become white. The gypsies, an Indian tribe<sup>d</sup> that first immigrated four hundred years ago, show the transition from

627

<sup>a</sup> *Spielart*<sup>b</sup> *Stammväter*<sup>c</sup> *Rasse*<sup>d</sup> *Stamm*

628 the Hindu complexion to our own.\* In sexual love, nature therefore is trying to revert to dark hair and brown eyes, as the fundamental human type:<sup>a</sup> but white skin has become second nature, although not so that the brown of the Hindus repels us. – Finally, everyone also looks for the individual body parts that would correct his own deficiencies and deviations, and all the more determinately the more important that part is. This is why snub-nosed individuals take such inexpressible pleasure in aquiline noses or parrot faces: and it is the same for all the other parts as well. Those with excessively tall and slender bodies and limbs could even find an unduly short and stumpy body beautiful. – These considerations apply analogously to temperament: everyone will prefer the opposite temperament; but only to the extent that his own temperament is a distinctive one. – Someone who is himself quite perfect in some respect will not actually seek out and love imperfection in this respect, but will reconcile himself more easily to it than others will do because he himself safeguards the children from great imperfection in this respect. For instance, someone who is himself very pale will not be repelled by a jaundiced complexion: but someone with this latter colouring will find a brilliantly white face to be of divine beauty. – The rare case of a man falling in love with a decidedly ugly woman takes place when, given the precise harmony of the degree of sexuality mentioned above, all of her abnormalities are the precise opposites, i.e. correctives, of his. Then the love promises to reach a very high level.

The profound sense of earnest with which we examine each of a woman's body parts, and with which she does the same to us, the critical scrupulousness with which we scrutinize a woman who starts to please us, the obstinacy of our choice, the intensity of the attention with which the bridegroom observes the bride, his anxious concern not to be deceived about any traits, and the great value that he puts on every excess or deficiency in the essential traits – all this is entirely in keeping with the importance of the goal. For the child who is about to be conceived will have to bear a similar trait throughout his whole life: for instance, if the woman is only a little crooked, this could easily give her son a humpback, and so  
629 with everything else. – Of course we are not conscious of all this, and everyone imagines himself to be making this difficult choice in pursuit of nothing but his own sensual pleasure (which at a fundamental level cannot play any role in it at all): nevertheless, he makes exactly the decision that corresponds to the interest of the species, on the assumption of his own

\* There is a more complete discussion of this in the first edition of *Parerga*, vol. 2, § 92.

<sup>a</sup> *Urtypus*

bodily constitution, the secret task of the species being preservation of the species type with as much purity as possible. The individual unknowingly acts in the service of a higher calling, the species: hence the necessity he accords to things that could, indeed must, be a matter of indifference to him as such. – There is something entirely distinctive about the profound and unconscious seriousness with which two young people of the opposite sex consider each other when they first meet; the inquiring and penetrating glance they cast each other; the painstaking scrutiny that all the features and traits of each them must undergo. This research and examination is the *meditation of the genius of the species* on the individual that the two of them make possible and the combination of this individual's traits. The result of this meditation determines the degree of pleasure they will have in each other and the intensity of their desire for each other. Even after this desire has reached a significant level, it can be extinguished again suddenly through the discovery of something that had remained previously unnoticed. – This is how the genius of the species meditates on the generation to come within everyone capable of procreation. The composition of this future generation is the great work that occupies *Cupid* with ceaseless speculations and ruminations. Given the importance of his great affair, given that it concerns the species and every generation to come, the affairs of the individuals in all their ephemeral glory are very insignificant: this is why he is always prepared to sacrifice these individuals quite ruthlessly. For to them he is what an immortal is to mortals, and his interests are to the interests of these individuals as infinite ones are to finite. And so, fully conscious that he is presiding over affairs of a higher nature than those that only concern individual weal and woe, he pursues these with sublime implacability in the tumult of war, or in the flurry of the business world, or while a plague rages, following them even into the seclusion of a cloister.

We established above that the intensity of love grows with its individualization by proving that the bodily constitution of two individuals can be such that the reproduction of the species type is best served when one individual is the very specific and precise complement of the other, and therefore desires only that other. This gives rise to a significant passion which acquires the air of something both more noble and more sublime, because it is directed towards one single object and hence appears to be acting by special order of the species. For the contrary reason, mere sex drive is base because it is directed to everyone and not individualized, aiming to maintain merely the quantity of the species with little consideration for quality. But individualization, and with it the intensity of being in

630



love, can reach such a high pitch that if it is not satisfied, then everything good in the world, indeed life itself, loses its value. It grows in intensity in a way unmatched by any other desire, making one ready to sacrifice anything, and, if its fulfillment is irrevocably denied, it can lead to madness or suicide. There must be other unconscious considerations underlying such an excessive passion than the ones we have established, but they are not so evident. Here we must therefore assume that not only the corporization but also the *will* of the man and the *intellect* of the women have a particular mutual compatibility and as a result they alone can conceive a completely determinate individual that the genius of the species intends to bring into being for reasons that are inaccessible to us because they lie in the essence of the thing in itself. Or more strictly speaking: here the will to life yearns to be objectified in a particular and determinate individual that can only be conceived by this father with this mother. This metaphysical desire on the part of the will in itself has no other sphere of activity in the order of beings than the hearts of the future parents, and they are therefore seized with this urge and now imagine they are desiring something for their own sakes when its sole aim lies for now with purely metaphysical things, i.e. with things outside of the order of what actually exists. And so, the urge of the future individual (who has only just become possible) to enter into being presents itself within appearances as the lofty passion of the future parents for one another, a passion that takes little heed of anything but itself, and that is in fact an unparalleled delusion, one that makes a man in love sacrifice everything good in the world to sleep with this woman, who in truth will not do anything more for him than any other. Still, we can deduce that this is its only aim from the fact that this lofty passion is, like every other passion, extinguished in its enjoyment – to the great amazement of those involved. It is also extinguished if the woman's eventual infertility (which, according to Hufeland,<sup>a</sup> can come from any of nineteen accidental constitutional defects) thwarts the true metaphysical goal; just as happens every day with millions of scattered sperm in which the same metaphysical principle of life nevertheless strives for existence as well; there is no solace for this other than the fact that the will to life has access to an infinity of space, time and matter and consequently inexhaustible opportunities to return.<sup>b</sup>

The view I have been presenting must, if briefly, have occurred to *Theophrastus Paracelsus* (even though he does not discuss this topic and my entire way of thinking is foreign to him) since, in a completely

<sup>a</sup> [Christoph Wilhelm Friedrich Hufeland, eighteenth- to nineteenth-century physician]

<sup>b</sup> *unerschöpfliche Gelegenheit zur Wiederkehr*

different context, and in his desultory manner, he set down the following remarkable opinion: 'These are the ones the gods brought together, as for instance David and the woman belonging to Uriah; although this relation (or at least this is what the human mind was persuaded it believed) was diametrically opposed to a just and legitimate marriage . . . But for the sake of Solomon, *who could not have been born from anyone else* than Bathsheba and the seed of David, God nonetheless brought them together, although in adultery'<sup>a</sup> (*On long life*,<sup>b</sup> I, 5).

Love's longing, the *himeros*<sup>c</sup> that poets of all ages have expressed tirelessly and in countless ways without being able to exhaust the subject, or even do it justice, this longing that connects the possession of a particular woman with the thought of infinite bliss, and with an inexpressible pain at the idea that this possession is not to be achieved – this longing and this pain of love cannot derive their content from the needs of an ephemeral individual; they are instead the sighs of the spirit of the species which sees here an irreplaceable means of gaining or losing its goal, and thus groans deeply. Only the species lives forever and is capable therefore of infinite desires, infinite satisfaction and infinite pain. But in this case these are locked up in the narrow breast of a mortal: so it is no wonder that one of these mortals seems to want to burst and cannot find any means of expressing the intimation<sup>d</sup> of infinite rapture or infinite pain that suffuses it. This then provides the material for all erotic poetry of the sublime genre,<sup>e</sup> which accordingly rises to transcendent metaphors that soar above all earthly matters. This is the theme of *Petrarch*, the material for the St Preuxs, Werthers, and Jacopo Ortis,<sup>f</sup> a theme that would otherwise be both incomprehensible and inexplicable. For the infinite esteem in which the beloved is held cannot be based in anything like intellectual or, in general, objective or real merits since the lover often does not know her well enough for this, as was the case with Petrarch. Only the spirit of the species can see in a glance her value for *it*, for its own goals. Accordingly, great passions usually arise at first sight:

Who ever lov'd, that lov'd not at first sight?<sup>g</sup>  
Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, III, 5

<sup>a</sup> *Hi sunt, quos Deus copulavit, ut eam, quae fuit Uriae et David; quamvis ex diametro (sic enim sibi humana mens persuadebat) cum justo et legitimo matrimonio pugnaret hoc. — sed propter Salomonem, qui aliunde nasci non potuit, nisi ex Bathseba, conjuncto David semine, quamvis meretrice, conjunxit eos Deus* [Schopenhauer's emphasis, and small amendments to the text]

<sup>b</sup> *De vita longa* [1560]

<sup>c</sup> ἡμερος

<sup>d</sup> *Ahnung*

<sup>e</sup> *Gattung*

<sup>f</sup> [Characters in the works cited above: p. 548]

<sup>g</sup> [Schopenhauer quotes the English and provides his own translation in a footnote]

There is a passage that is remarkable in this respect from a novel that has been famous for 250 years, *Guzmán de Alfarache* by Mateo Alemán:<sup>a</sup> *No es necesario, para que uno ame, que pase distancia de tiempo, que siga discurso, ni haga eleccion, sino que con aquella primera y sola vista, concurran juntamente cierta correspondencia ó consonancia, ó lo que acá solemos vulgarmente decir, una confrontacion de sangre, à que por particular influxo suelen mover las estrellas.* ('For someone to love, it is not necessary for much time to have passed for him to deliberate and reach a decision, but only that the first and only sight meets with a certain mutual compatibility and agreement, or what we tend in ordinary life to call a *sympathy of the blood*, prompted by a certain influence of the stars.') (Part II, Book III, ch. 5).<sup>80</sup> Accordingly, the loss of the beloved to a rival or to death is for the passionate lover a pain that exceeds all others; this is precisely because it is transcendent in nature and does not concern him as a mere individual but attacks him in his eternal essence,<sup>b</sup> in the life of the species, into whose special will and commission he was summoned. This is why jealousy is so painful and horrible, and why the surrender of the beloved is the greatest of all sacrifices. – A hero is ashamed of all lamentation except for the lamentations of love, because in lamentations of love it is not him but the species that groans. – In the second act of *Calderon's Great Zenobia*,<sup>c</sup> there is a scene with Zenobia and Decius where he says:

Cielos, luego tu me quieres?  
 Perdiera cien mil victorias,  
 Volviérame, etc.\*

Here, honour, which had overridden every interest so far, is run off the field as soon as sexual love, i.e. the interest of the species comes into play and sees before it a decisive advantage; for it is infinitely more important than any interest of the mere individual, however important it might be. Honour, duty and loyalty yield only to sexual love, after they have withstood every other temptation, even the threat of death. – Likewise in private life we find that conscientiousness is nowhere as rare as in

\* Heavens! So you love me?! For this I would give up a hundred thousand victories, would reform myself, etc. [This translates Schopenhauer's German prose version given in a footnote]

<sup>a</sup> [Picaresque novel published in 1599–1604]

<sup>b</sup> *essentia aeterna*

<sup>c</sup> [*La gran Zenobia*, 1628]

sexual love: sometimes even otherwise honest and upright people throw conscience to the side and caution to the winds and heedlessly commit adultery when passionate love, i.e. the interest of the species, has overpowered their own interest. They even seem to believe they are conscious of a higher justification than the interest of the individual could ever provide, precisely because they are acting in the interest of the species. *Chamfort's* observation is notable in this regard: 'When a man and a woman are violently in love with each other, it always seems to me as if the lovers, whatever obstacles may divide them, a spouse, parents, etc., belong to each other by *nature* and with *divine right*, whatever the laws and human conventions might say in the matter.'<sup>a</sup> Anyone who claims to be upset by this should look at the striking indulgence that the Saviour in the Gospels shows to the adulteress: he presupposes the same guilt in everyone present. – From this point of view, most of the *Decameron*<sup>b</sup> seems like an exercise in mockery and contempt on the part of the genius of the species at the rights and interests of the individuals that it tramples underfoot. – Distinctions of rank and all similar relations are put to the side with equal ease when they conflict with the bonds of passionate lovers and are declared null and void by the genius of the species as it follows its own goals for endless generations and blows away such human conventions and scruples like straw. For the same deeply grounded reason, every danger is willingly undertaken and even the otherwise faint of heart grow brave when it comes to the goals of amorous passion. – In plays and novels we look on with joyful sympathy when the young people who pursue their love affairs, i.e. the interest of the species, win out over the older people who think only of the well-being of the individuals. For the efforts of lovers seem to us so much more important, noble, and therefore more just than anything that might oppose them, just as the species is more significant than the individual. Accordingly, the basic plot of almost all comedies involves the entrance of the genius of the species with its aims that stand opposed to the personal interests of the individuals portrayed, and therefore threaten to undermine the happiness of those individuals. Usually the genius of the species prevails, which pleases the spectator since it corresponds to poetic justice; because the spectator feels that the goals of the species far surpass those of individuals. Thus it is with a sense of security that he leaves the

634

635

<sup>a</sup> *Quand un homme et une femme ont l'un pour l'autre une passion violente, il me semble toujours que, quelque soient les obstacles qui les séparent, un mari, des parens etc., les deux amans sont l'un à l'autre, de par la Nature, qu'ils s'appartiennent de droit divin, malgré les lois et les conventions humaines* [*Maximes et Pensées* (*Maxims and Thoughts*), ch. 6: see p. 407, n. a]

<sup>b</sup> [Collection of novellas by Giovanni Boccaccio (1533)]

victorious lovers at the end, since he shares their delusion that they have brought about their own happiness, while they have instead sacrificed it for the well-being of the species against the wills of concerned elders. Certain atypical comedies attempt to reverse the matter and to establish the happiness of the individual at the expense of the goals of the species: but then the spectator feels the pain that the genius of the species suffers, and is not consoled by the individual advantage that this secures. As examples of this sort I can think of a couple of very famous short plays: *The Sixteen-year-old Queen*<sup>a</sup> and *The Marriage of Reason*.<sup>b</sup> In most tragedies concerning affairs of love, when the goal of the species is frustrated, the lovers who were its instrument perish too: for instance *Romeo and Juliet*, *Tancred*, *Don Carlos*, *Wallenstein*, *The Bride of Messina*, and many others.<sup>c</sup>

When a person is in love, it often furnishes a comic as well as a tragic spectacle, in both cases because he is taken into the possession of the spirit of the species and is now governed by it and no longer belongs to himself: thus his conduct is inappropriate for the individual. At the higher levels of love, his thoughts assume such a poetic and sublime aspect, even a transcendent and hyperphysical tendency, that he seems to lose all sight of his own, very physical goals – and this is fundamentally due to the fact that he is now animated by the spirit of the species, whose affairs are infinitely more important than any merely individual concerns, this spirit specifically commissioning him to lay the foundation for the existence of a whole indefinitely long line of progeny derived from *this* particular, individually and precisely determined constitution that comes only from *him* as the father and from his beloved as mother, and which would otherwise never come into existence as *this* line, while the objectivation of the will to life expressly requires it. The feeling of acting in affairs of such transcendent importance is what raises the lover so high above everything earthly, indeed above himself, giving his very physical desires such a hyperphysical garb so that love becomes a poetic episode even in the life of the most prosaic person; in which case it can sometimes acquire a comic aspect. – That commission of the will objectifying itself in the species presents itself to the consciousness of the lover in the guise of an anticipation of an endless bliss that he would find if united with this female individual. At the highest levels of love, this chimera becomes so radiant that if it cannot be

636

<sup>a</sup> *La reine de seize ans* [*Christine, ou la reine de seize ans*, a two-act comedy by Jean-François-Alfred Bayard (1828)]

<sup>b</sup> *Le mariage de raison* [*Bertrand et Suzette; ou Le Mariage de raison* (*Bertrand and Suzette: or the marriage of reason*), a comedy by Eugène Scribe (1826)]

<sup>c</sup> [The last three are plays by Schiller; *Tancred* features in a number of plays and operas]

attained, life itself loses all charm and seems so joyless, shallow and unpleasant that horror in the face of this prospect overcomes even the fear of death; and sometimes life is voluntarily cut short. Such a person's will has fallen into the maelstrom of the will of the species, or the latter has overpowered the individual will to such a great extent that if the person cannot be effective in the former capacity, then he disdains activity in the latter capacity. The individual here is too weak a vessel to be able to contain the infinite longing of the will of the species concentrated upon a determinate object. In this case the way out is suicide, sometimes the double suicide of the two lovers; unless nature saves the life by allowing madness to enter, which then wraps its veil around the consciousness of that hopeless state. – Not a year goes by without illustrating the reality of what we have said through several cases of all these types.

But it is not only unsuccessful passionate love that sometimes comes to a tragic conclusion, even the successful variety leads to unhappiness more often than happiness. For its demands collide so squarely with the personal welfare of the person involved as to undermine it, because they are incompatible with his relations to other things and destroy the plan of life built upon these other relations. Indeed, love is often in conflict not only with external relations, but even with a person's own individuality, since it throws itself on to people who, apart from sexual relations, the lover hates, despises, and even finds disgusting. But the will of the species is so much more powerful than that of the individual that the lover closes his eyes to all the qualities that disgust him, overlooks and misrecognises everything, binding himself forever to the object of his passion: this delusion deceives him completely, and as soon as the will of the species is appeased, the delusion vanishes and leaves behind a hated life partner. This is the only way to explain how it is that we often see very reasonable, even distinguished men bound to dragons and marital devils, and cannot comprehend how they could have made such a choice. This is why the ancients portrayed Eros as blind. Indeed, a lover can even clearly recognize and regret the intolerable flaws of temperament and character in his wife, promising a life of misery, and yet not be put off:

637

I ask not, I care not,  
If guilt's in thy heart;  
I know that I love thee,  
Whatever thou art.<sup>a,81</sup>

<sup>a</sup> [From Thomas Moore, 'Come, rest in this bosom', *Irish Melodies* (1808–34). Schopenhauer quotes in English and provides a German translation in a footnote: likewise with the quotation from Shakespeare below]

For he is fundamentally tending not to *his* own business but to that of a third party who must first come into existence; although he is deluded into thinking that he is tending to his own business. But it is precisely this not-tending-his-*own*-business that is everywhere the mark of greatness, and this is what gives passionate love its sublime aspect, making it a worthy topic for literature. – Finally, sexual love is compatible with even the most extreme hatred of its object, which is why Plato compared it to the love of the wolf for the sheep. This happens when a passionate lover, despite all efforts and entreaties, cannot find any answer:

I love and hate her.

Shakespeare, *Cymbeline*, III, 5<sup>82</sup>

638 The hatred of the beloved that is then kindled sometimes goes to the point of killing her and then oneself. There are usually a few examples of this sort every year: they can be found in the English and French newspapers. Goethe's verse is therefore completely accurate:

By all unrequited love! By all that one finds in hell!

I wish I knew something worse so I could curse with that as well!<sup>a,83</sup>

It is really no hyperbole when a lover describes the coldness of his beloved and the joy her vanity derives from his suffering as *cruelty*. For he is under the influence of a drive which, like the instinct of insects, forces him to follow his goal unconditionally, setting everything else aside and scorning any rational grounds: he cannot let it go. There have not been one but many *Petrarchs* who have had to spend their lives bearing the burden of unfulfilled love like a shackle, like an iron block on the foot, and who have had to breathe their sighs in lonely woods: but the gift of poetry came to dwell in only the *one* Petrarch, so that Goethe's lovely verse held true of him:

And when man fell silent in his pains,  
A god gifted me to speak of how I suffer.<sup>b</sup>

In truth the genius of the species wages total war against the individual's protective geniuses, the genius of the species is their enemy and harasses them, always ready to destroy personal happiness without any mercy to realize its ends: indeed, the well-being of whole nations sometimes falls victim to its moods: Shakespeare shows us an example of this type in *Henry*

<sup>a</sup> [*Faust* I, 2805–6]

<sup>b</sup> [*Torquato Tasso*, Act V, sc. 5]

VI, part 3, act 3, scenes 2 and 3.<sup>84</sup> All this is due to the fact that the species in which our being has its root, has a prior and more proximal claim on us than the individual does, and its affairs therefore take precedence. It is in this spirit that the ancients personified the genius of the species in *Cupid*, a god who, despite his childlike appearance, is hostile, cruel, and therefore held in low esteem, a capricious, despotic demon and yet master of gods and men:

You, Eros, tyrannically rule over gods and men!<sup>a</sup>

Murderous darts, blindness and wings are his attributes. The latter signifies instability: this usually only appears with the disappointment that is the result of satisfaction.

639

Now since passion is based on a delusion that makes something whose only value is for the species look as if it is valuable for the individual, so the deception must vanish after the goal of the species is gained. The spirit of the species, which had taken possession of the individual, sets it free again. Released from this, the individual falls back into his original limitation and poverty, and is amazed that after such lofty, heroic and infinite striving, there is nothing left to savour than what all sexual satisfaction provides: against all expectation, he finds himself no happier than he was before. He sees that he was the dupe of the will of the species. So, as a rule, a successful Theseus will leave his Ariadne.<sup>85</sup> If *Petrarch's* passion had been satisfied, then his song would henceforth have been silent, like that of the bird as soon as the eggs are laid.

We might note in passing at this point that however much my metaphysics of love will upset those ensnared by passion, yet if rational considerations can do anything against this, the principles I have discovered will be able to overpower the passions more than any other ones. Except that it will be as the ancient comedian says: 'what has neither reason nor moderation in itself cannot be governed by reason'.<sup>b</sup>

Marriages of love are entered into in the interest of the species, not the individuals. Of course those involved imagine they are furthering their own happiness: but their real goal is something foreign to their own selves since it lies in the production of an individual that is possible only through them. Driven together by this goal they should try to get along with each other as well as possible. But very often this couple, brought together by the

<sup>a</sup> σὺ δ' ὦ θεῶν τύραννε κ' ἀνθρώπων, Ἔρως! (*Tu, deorum hominumque tyranne, Amor!*) [fragment of Euripides, *Andromeda*]

<sup>b</sup> quae res in se neque consilium, neque modum habet ullum, eam consilio regere non potes [Terence, *Eunuchus* (*The Eunuch*), lines 57–8]



640

instinctive delusion that is the essence of passionate love, will be very different in other respects. This becomes clear when the delusion vanishes, as it must. Accordingly, marriages of love usually turn out to be unhappy: for they care for the future generation at the expense of the present one. *Quien se casa por amores, ha de vivir con dolores* (Who marries for love, must live in sorrow) as the Spanish saying goes. – It is the other way around with marriages of convenience, which are usually based on parental choice. Whatever the governing considerations may be in this case, they are at least real, and cannot vanish of themselves. These considerations provide for the happiness of people who exist, but of course at the cost of those yet to come; and even in the former, happiness still remains problematic. The man who marries for money rather than the satisfaction of his inclinations lives more in the individual than in the species, which is in direct conflict with the truth, and therefore presents itself as unnatural and excites a certain scorn. A girl who, against the advice of her parents, refuses the proposal of a man who is rich and not old so as to choose according to her instinctual tendency and in defiance of all prudential considerations – such a girl sacrifices her individual well-being for that of the species. But for precisely this reason one cannot help but approve in a certain way because she has chosen what is more important and acted in line with nature (or better, the species); while the parents' advice is in line with individual egoism. – Given all this it would seem as if in marriage either the individual or the interest of the species must be given short shrift. And this is usually the case: for it is the rarest piece of luck for prudence and passionate love to go hand in hand. Most people have a miserable physical, moral or intellectual constitution, and this might be due in part to the fact that marriages are usually not based purely on choice and inclination but on all sorts of external considerations and accidental circumstances. But if, along with prudence, inclination is taken into consideration to some extent, this is as it were an accommodation to the genius of the species. Happy marriages are famously rare precisely because it is the essence of a marriage that its principal goal is not the present generation but the one to come. But we

641 can comfort tender and loving minds by adding that passionate sexual love is sometimes accompanied by a feeling that is of a completely different origin, a feeling that is actually friendship grounded in harmony of temperament, although this usually only comes to the fore when genuine sexual love has been extinguished by its satisfaction. This friendship will stem mostly from the fact that the mutually corresponding and complementing physical, moral and intellectual qualities of the two individuals from which sexual love arises (with regard to the child to be conceived) also

act in a complementary fashion with respect to the individuals themselves, as contrasting temperamental qualities and intellectual merits, and in so doing they lay the foundation for a harmony of minds. –

The whole of this discussion of the metaphysics of love ties in closely with my overall metaphysics, and the light it throws on the latter may be summarized as follows.

We have seen that the painstaking choice in the satisfaction of the sex drive, a choice that rises through countless levels to the point of passionate love, is based on the supremely serious interest that human beings take in the specific and personal constitution of the coming generation. This quite remarkable interest confirms two truths that were presented in the preceding chapters: (1) the indestructibility of the essence in itself of humanity, as something that lives on in the next generation. For this extremely lively and eager interest, one that comes not from reflection and precepts but from the innermost pulls and drives<sup>a</sup> of our being, could not be so ineradicable or exercise such enormous power over the human being if he were absolutely transient, and were succeeded in time by a completely different generation. (2) The fact that the human essence in itself lies more in the species than in the individual. For this interest in the particular constitution of the species, which constitutes the root of all amorous behaviour from the most fleeting inclination to the most serious passion, is actually everybody's first matter of business, and its success or failure touches us most feelingly; thus it is better referred to as an *affair of the heart*, and when this interest expresses itself strongly and decisively, every interest that concerns merely one's own person is subordinated and necessarily sacrificed to it. In this way, the human being demonstrates that the species is closer to him than the individual, and that he lives more directly in the former than the latter. – Why then does the lover hang with complete abandonment on the eyes of his chosen one, ready to sacrifice anything for her? – Because it is his *immortal* part that longs for her; the mortal part only ever longs for other things. – That lively or even ardent longing directed to a particular woman is a direct pledge of the indestructibility of the kernel of our being and its continuation in the species. Now to consider this continuation as something trifling and insufficient is an error that stems from people thinking of the persistence of the species as nothing more than the future existence of beings similar to us but in no way identical to us, and this in turn is because people assume a form of cognition directed to outer things, and hence directed only to the outer form of the species as we

642

<sup>a</sup> *Zuge und Triebe*

grasp it in intuition without taking its inner essence into account. But this inner essence is precisely what lies at the basis of our own consciousness as its kernel, and is therefore even more direct than this is itself and, as thing in itself, is free from the principle of individuation<sup>a</sup> and is in fact the same identical thing in all individuals, whether they exist together or consecutively. Now this is the will to life, i.e. that which so urgently demands life and continued existence. And this therefore is spared and untouched by death. But at the same time it cannot bring about a better state than its present one: therefore it is certain both of life and of the constant suffering and deaths of individuals. To free it from this requires the *negation* of the will to life, which tears the individual will free from the stem of the species and gives up its existence in the species. We have no concepts or even information for what it then is. We can describe it only as that which is free to be or not to be the will to life. For this last case Buddhism describes it with the word *nirvana* (the etymology of this word was given in the note at the end of Chapter 41). It is the point forever inaccessible to all human cognition precisely as such. –

643

If we now look into the bustle of life from the point of view discussed above, we see everyone occupied with its cares and troubles, striving with all their might to satisfy life's endless needs and to ward off suffering in its many forms without anything to hope for other than to sustain this tortured individual existence through a short span of time. But in the middle of this turmoil we see the gaze of two lovers looking with longing at each other – but why so secretively, furtively, nervously? – Because these lovers are traitors, secretly plotting to perpetuate all this need and vexation, which would otherwise quickly come to an end, an end they try to frustrate, as their like have frustrated it before. – This discussion brings us into the next chapter.

### *Appendix to the Previous Chapter*<sup>86</sup>

'Are you so shameless that you dare to express  
Such a word, and think you will escape punishment?'  
– 'I have escaped, for truth is my witness.'<sup>b</sup>

Sophocles

On page 620<sup>c</sup> I mentioned pederasty in passing and described it as a misguided instinct. This seemed sufficient to me when editing the second

<sup>a</sup> *principio individuationis*

<sup>b</sup> Οὕτως ἀναιδῶς ἐχέκίνησας τόδε / τὸ ῥῆμα· καὶ ποῦ τοῦτο φεύξεσθαι δοκεῖς; / – Πέφρυγα· τάληθές γάρ ἰσχυρόν τρέφω [from *Oedipus Rex*, lines 354–6]

<sup>c</sup> [See p. 558 above]

edition. Since then I have given more thought to this aberration and found it to be a noteworthy problem for which I have nonetheless discovered a solution. This presupposes the previous chapter, but also throws light on it in retrospect, and therefore helps supplement and support the view presented there.

Viewed in itself, pederasty presents itself not merely as an unnatural monstrosity but also as disgusting and repulsive to the highest degree, an act to which only a completely perverse, distorted, and degenerate form of human nature could ever have descended, and that could recur in completely isolated cases at most. But if we now turn to experience, we find the opposite to be the case: we see that this vice, in spite of its repulsiveness, has been in vogue and frequently practised at all times and in all countries of the world. It was famously widespread among Greeks and Romans, and publicly practised and tolerated without shame or disgust. We have more than ample testimony on this score by all ancient authors. The poets in particular are all full of this topic: not even the chaste Virgil excepted (*Eclogues* 2).<sup>a</sup> It is attributed even to the poets of distant antiquity, Orpheus (who was torn to pieces for this reason by the Maenads) and Thamyris, indeed the gods themselves. The philosophers talk about it far more than about love of women: Plato in particular seems almost unfamiliar with any other sort of love, and the Stoics are the same, mentioning it as something worthy of the wise (Stobaeus, *Ethical Eclogues*, Book II, ch. 7). In the *Symposium*, Plato even praises Socrates for an unexampled act of heroism in scorning Alcibiades, who offered himself for the purpose. In Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Socrates speaks of pederasty as an irreproachable, even praiseworthy affair. (Stobaeus, *Anthology*,<sup>b</sup> vol. I, p. 57). Also in the *Memorabilia* (Book I, ch. 3, § 8), when Socrates warns of the dangers of love, he speaks exclusively of the love of boys, as if women did not even exist.<sup>87</sup> Even Aristotle (*Politics* II, 9)<sup>c</sup> speaks of pederasty as something commonplace, without criticizing it, suggesting that it was held in public esteem by the Celts and that the Cretans promoted it legally as a means of population control, recalling (ch. 10) the male homosexuality<sup>d</sup> of the legislator Philolaus, etc. Cicero even said: 'With the Greeks, it was considered shameful for a young man not to have lovers.'<sup>e</sup> Educated readers will not need any evidence here: they will recall hundreds of examples, because with the ancients

644

<sup>a</sup> [See lines 1–2]

<sup>b</sup> *Florilegium* [p. 57 of the Gaisford edition (1823); Xenophon, *Memorabilia* I, 6, 13]

<sup>c</sup> [1269b20; the ch. 10 reference below is at 1272a22]

<sup>d</sup> *Männerliebschaft*

<sup>e</sup> *Apud Graecos opprobrio fuit adolescentibus, si amatores non haberent* [*De Republica* (*On the Republic*) IV, 3, fragment 3]

645 everything is full of it. But even with cruder peoples, particularly the Gauls, this vice was all the rage. If we look at Asia, we see all countries of the continent, and in fact from the earliest times right through to the present, filled with the vice and also making no effort to conceal it: Hindus and Chinese no less than the Islamic peoples whose poets we find similarly much more concerned with love of boys than with love of women; for instance, the book 'On Love' in Sadi's *Gulistan*<sup>a</sup> speaks exclusively of this. Nor was this vice unknown to the Hebrews: both Old and New Testaments mention it as punishable. Ultimately in Christian Europe, religion, legislation, and public opinion had to oppose it with all their might: everywhere in the Middle Ages it was a capital offence; people were still burned for it in 16th-century France, and in England the death penalty was consistently used for it in the first third of the present century; now they use deportation for life. Such were the violent measures needed to contain the vice and they were largely successful although they certainly did not exterminate it entirely; it always creeps around everywhere under the veil of the deepest secrecy, in all countries and in all classes, and often comes to light suddenly, when it is least expected. Nor was it different in past centuries, in spite of all the death penalties: we see this in the discussions and references to the practice in the writings throughout all these periods of time. – If we see all this clearly and think about it carefully, we see pederasty appearing in every age and every country, something vastly different from what we had initially presupposed when we had considered it in its own right and thus a priori. The complete universality and persistent ineradicability of the practice prove that it stems in some way from human nature itself; this is the only reason why it can keep appearing at all times and places, as an example of the adage:

Expel nature with a pitchfork – it keeps coming back.<sup>b</sup>

646 If we want to proceed honestly, then this conclusion is absolutely inescapable. It would of course be easy to pass over this fact and simply revile the vice and rebuke it, but this is not my way of dealing with problems; instead I will remain true even in this case to my inborn vocation to investigate the truth everywhere and get to the bottom of things, and so I acknowledge the phenomenon to be explained as it presents itself, along with the inevitable conclusion. But that something so fundamentally unnatural, something indeed that opposes nature in precisely its most important and consequential

<sup>a</sup> [See p. 108, n. f]

<sup>b</sup> *Naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret* [Horace, *Epistles*, 1, 10, 24]

goal, could come from nature itself, is such an unheard-of paradox that its explanation poses a difficult problem that I shall nevertheless now solve by disclosing the secret of nature that lies at its ground.

I will take a passage from Aristotle in *Politics* VII, 16 as a starting point. – There he argues, first, that parents who are too young will conceive children who are inferior, weak, defective and who remain undersized; and further that the same holds true of children conceived by those who are too old: ‘Because children of parents who are too old, like those of parents who are too young, will turn out to be incomplete in body and mind, and children of the elderly are weaklings.’<sup>a</sup> Now, what Aristotle sets out as a rule for the individual, Stobaeus, at the end of his discussion of peripatetic philosophy, sets out as a rule for the community (*Ethical Eclogues*, Book II, ch. 7, at the end):<sup>b</sup> ‘To achieve strength and perfection of the body, people should not marry when they are too young or too old, because at both times of life they will conceive only imperfect children, and consequently only weaklings will be born.’<sup>c</sup> Aristotle therefore suggests that people should stop having children when they are 54 years old; although they may still continue to sleep together for health or some other reason. How this is supposed to be arranged, he does not say: but he clearly believes that children conceived at such an age should be aborted, since he had suggested it a few lines earlier. – Now nature, for its part, cannot deny the facts that Aristotle’s recommendation is based on, nor can it abolish them. For, in accordance with its fundamental principle ‘nature makes no leaps’<sup>d</sup> it could not suddenly stop the secretion of sperm in the male; rather, as with any extinction, there would first have to be a gradual deterioration. Procreation during this time would put weak, stunted, dried up, miserable, short-lived people into the world. In fact, it all too often does so: children conceived in older age usually die early and never reach a ripe old age; they are (to a greater or lesser extent) frail, sickly, and weak, and the children that they conceive will possess similar constitutions. What we are saying here about procreation in the declining years is just as true for procreation at an immature age. But nothing lies as close to the heart of nature as the preservation of the species and of its true

647

<sup>a</sup> τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔκγονα, καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, ἀτελῆ γίγνεται, καὶ τοῖς σώμασι, καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις, τὰ δὲ τῶν γεγηρακότων ἀσθενῆ (*nam, ut juniorum, ita et grandiorum natu foetus inchoatis atque imperfectis corporibus mentibusque nascuntur: eorum vero, qui senio confecti sunt, suboles infirma et imbecilla est*) [1335b29–30]

<sup>b</sup> in fine

<sup>c</sup> πρὸς τὴν ῥώμην τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τελειότατα δεῖν μῆτε νεωτέρων ἄγαν, μῆτε πρεσβυτέρων τοὺς γάμους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀτελῆ γὰρ γίγνεσθαι, κατ’ ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ἡλικίας, καὶ τελείως ἀσθενῆ τὰ ἔκγονα (*oportet, corporum roboris et perfectionis causa, nec juniores justo, nec seniores matrimonio jungi, quia circa utramque aetatem proles fieret imbecillis et imperfecta*)

<sup>d</sup> *natura non facit saltus*

type, for which well-constituted, strong and vigorous individuals are the means: nature wants only these individuals. Indeed, nature fundamentally regards and treats (as was shown in Chapter 41) individuals only as a means; only the species is an end. This is why we see nature coming to a critical situation and getting into dire straits as a result of its own laws and goals. Given its essence, it cannot possibly count on a violent expedient such as Aristotle suggests, one that relies on someone else's say-so, nor can it rely on people to learn by experience to recognize the disadvantages of procreating too early or too late and to rein in their lusts accordingly, as a result of cold, rational deliberations. Neither of these could be relied upon by nature in a matter of such vital importance. There was nothing for it to do but to choose the lesser of two evils. To this end, nature had to use its favourite tool to further its interests, instinct, which, as was shown in the previous chapter, always directs the vitally important business of procreation and with it creates such strange illusions; but this could only happen by leading instinct  
 648 astray (it gave it the slip).<sup>a</sup> Nature is acquainted only with physicality, not with morality:<sup>b</sup> indeed, there is a decisive antagonism between nature and morality. Nature's only goal is to preserve the individual and particularly the species in as perfect a state as possible. Of course pederasty is also physically detrimental to the youths who have been seduced into it; but not to the extent that it stops being the lesser evil, and so nature chooses it to avoid the much greater evil of the depravation of the species by a wide margin, and thereby averts a lasting and increasing misfortune.

In accordance with this precaution on the part of nature, a pederastic tendency usually settles in quietly and gradually at approximately the age given by Aristotle, and becomes increasingly clear and decisive as the ability to conceive strong and healthy children diminishes. This is how nature has arranged it. But it is important to note that it is a very long way from the onset of this tendency to the vice itself. Of course, if no dam is set up to contain it, it can easily lead by example to the vice becoming very widespread, as happened in ancient Greece and Rome and in Asia across the ages. In Europe, on the other hand, religion, morality, the law, and honour act as such overwhelmingly powerful counter-motives that almost everyone recoils from the very thought and we can therefore assume that for every three hundred people who feel this tendency, at most one is weak and idiotic enough to give in to it; this is all the more certain since this tendency appears only at an age when the blood has cooled and the sex drive in general has diminished, but also the tendency finds such strong enemies in mature reason, in the insight

<sup>a</sup> *lui donna le change*

<sup>b</sup> *das Physische, nicht das Moralische*

gained by experience, as well as in the steady practice of stability, that only a thoroughly wicked nature will succumb to it.

Meanwhile, nature's goal is achieved if this inclination leads to an increasing indifference to women that gradually becomes an aversion and finally grows into repulsion. Nature achieves its true goal with all the more certainty since the more a man's powers of procreation go into decline, the more decisive their unnatural direction becomes. – This is why we typically view pederasty as an old man's vice. They are the only ones who are caught in the act whenever there is a public scandal. It is foreign to anyone of a genuinely manly age, even inconceivable. If there is ever an exception to this rule, I believe it can only be a result of an accidental and untimely depravation of the procreative powers, which could produce only inferior offspring, and that nature avoids this by diverting these powers. That is why the homosexuals<sup>a</sup> in large cities (where they are unfortunately not rare) always direct their winks and proposals to older gentlemen, never those in the age of strength and certainly not to young people. Even with the Greeks, where example and habit might have introduced an occasional exception to this rule, we usually find authors, particularly philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, explicitly portraying lovers as older. A passage from Plutarch's *Dialogue on Love*<sup>b</sup> (ch. 5) is particularly worth noting in this respect: 'Love of boys begins late, after the bloom of life, an untrue and dark love that drives out the true and original love.'<sup>c</sup> Even among the gods we find only the older ones, Zeus and Hercules, supplied with male lovers, not Mars, Apollo, Bacchus or Mercury. – In the Orient, the shortage of women due to polygamy can sometimes force exceptions to this rule: the same is true in new colonies that lack women, such as California, etc. – Immature sperm, like the sperm depraved by age, can correspondingly also beget only weak, inferior and unfortunate off-spring, and so, in youth as in age, an erotic inclination of this type often exists between young people, although it only very rarely leads to real vice since it is opposed not only by the motives cited above, but also by the innocence, purity, conscientiousness and the bashfulness of the age of youth.

It follows from this discussion that while the vice under discussion seems directly opposed to the goals of nature, and indeed to the most important and urgent of them all, it must in truth serve precisely these goals, albeit only

<sup>a</sup> Kinäden

<sup>b</sup> *Liber amatorius*

<sup>c</sup> 'Ο παιδικὸς ἔρως, ὃς ἐν γέγονός, καὶ παρ' ὥραν τῷ βίῳ, νόθος καὶ σκότιος ἐξελαύνει τὸν γνήσιον ἔρωτα καὶ πρεσβύτερον (*Puerorum amor, qui, quum tarde in vita et intempestive, quasi spurius et occultus, exstittisset, germanum et natu majorem amorem expellit*) (751 F)

649

650



indirectly, as a means of avoiding a greater evil.<sup>a</sup> So it is a phenomenon of the declining or alternatively immature powers of procreation that endanger the species: and although both should cease on moral grounds, this could not be relied on, since natural drives do not take account of genuine morality. This is why nature, driven into a corner by its own laws, seized upon the makeshift stratagem of perverting the instincts; indeed one might say it built itself an asses' bridge in order to escape the greater of two evils, as we explained above. So nature keeps the important goal in mind, the avoidance of ill-fated offspring that could gradually deprave the whole species, and as we have seen, nature is not scrupulous in its choice of means. It proceeds in the same spirit here as in the case of the wasps that are driven to sting their young (this was mentioned above in Chapter 27): for in both cases nature chooses the bad in order to escape the worse: it misleads the sex drive to frustrate its harmful consequences.

My intention in this discussion has been primarily to solve the striking problem mentioned above; but also to confirm the doctrine presented in the preceding chapter, that in all sexual love instinct holds the reins and creates illusions because nature puts the interest of the species before all others, and that this is true even in the case of the repulsive perversion and degeneration of the sex drive that we have been discussing, since the aims of the species prove to be the underlying ground in that case too, even though they are merely negative because there nature is acting in a prophylactic manner. This view throws light retrospectively on my entire metaphysics of sexual love. In fact, this discussion brings to the surface a truth that has been hidden until now and that, for all its strangeness, throws new light on nature's inner essence, spirit, and workings.<sup>b</sup> As such, this has not been a moral caution against the vice but an attempt to understand the essence of the matter. The true, final, and profound metaphysical reason why pederasty is reprehensible is that while the will to life affirms itself in it, the result of this affirmation, which is to say the renewal of life, is completely omitted, and it is this result that opens the path to redemption.<sup>c</sup> – Finally, in presenting these paradoxical ideas I also wanted to do a small favour for the philosophy professors who are now very disconcerted by the increasingly wide popularity of my philosophy, which they have so studiously ignored: I have given them the opportunity to slander me by saying that I have defended and recommended pederasty.

<sup>a</sup> *Uebel*

<sup>b</sup> *Treiben*

<sup>c</sup> *Erlösung*

*On the Affirmation of the Will to Life*

If the will to life presented itself merely as a drive for self-preservation, it would be only an affirmation of the individual appearance for the span of its natural duration. The worries and cares of such a life would not be great, and so existence would prove easy and cheerful. On the other hand, because the will wills life absolutely and for all time, it presents itself at the same time as the sex drive, which has an endless series of generations in view. This drive abolishes the carefree attitude, the cheerfulness and innocence that would accompany a merely individual existence by bringing disquiet and melancholy into consciousness, and misfortune, trouble and misery into the course of a life. – If however it is voluntarily repressed, as we see in rare exceptions, then this is the turning<sup>a</sup> of the will, which reverses itself. It then goes *out* in the individual, instead of going *beyond* him. But this can only take place through a painful violence that the individual inflicts on himself. But if it does happen, then the consciousness recoups that carefree cheerfulness of the merely individual existence and, indeed, is raised to a higher power. – On the other hand, when that most vehement of all drives and desires is satisfied, then a new being comes into existence, and thus a continuation of life with all its burdens, cares, needs and pains, admittedly in *another* individual – but, if the two who are distinct in appearance were distinct absolutely and in themselves, then where would eternal justice be? – Life presents itself as a task, a lesson to be worked out, and thus typically as a constant struggle against need. This is why everyone tries to get through it as well as he can: he gets through life like bonded labour to pay off a debt.<sup>b</sup> But who has contracted this debt? – The one who begot him, in the enjoyment of sensuous pleasure. And so, for the pleasure of the one, the other must live, suffer, and die. We know

652

\* This chapter relates to § 60 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> *Wendung*

<sup>b</sup> *wie einen Frohndienst, welchen er schuldig war*

and should recall in this context that space and time are the condition under which similar things are differentiated, a condition that I have in this sense termed the principle of individuation.<sup>a</sup> Without this, eternal justice could not be saved. Paternal love is based on the fact that the begetter recognizes himself in the begotten, and this love is what makes the father ready to do more for his child, to suffer more, to hazard more, than for himself, and at the same time recognize this as his debt of guilt.<sup>b</sup>

653 A human life with its endless sorrows, needs, and suffering is to be seen as the explanation and paraphrase of the act of procreation, i.e. the decisive affirmation of the will to life: part of this affirmation is also the fact that the human being is in debt, owing nature a death<sup>c</sup> and is oppressed by the thought of this debt of guilt.<sup>d</sup> – Does this not show that our existence is a guilty one?<sup>e</sup> – But of course we continue to exist, at least upon periodic remittance of the tax, birth and death, and we enjoy in turn all the sufferings and joys of life; so that not one can escape us; and just this is the fruit of the affirmation of the will to life. And this is why the fear of death, which makes us hold firmly onto life despite all its troubles, is in fact illusory: but equally illusory is the drive that has seduced<sup>f</sup> us into life. This seduction itself can be seen objectively in the looks of longing exchanged by two lovers: they are the purest expression of the will to life in its affirmation. How sweet and tender the will is here! It wills well-being, tranquil pleasure, and sweet joy for itself, for others, for everyone. This is the theme of Anacreon. And so, it seduces and coaxes itself into life. But once it is there, then misery brings in crime and crime brings in misery: abomination and devastation take over the scene. This is the theme of Aeschylus.

Now the act through which the will affirms itself and creates human beings is an action that everyone is ashamed of, in their heart of hearts, and that they therefore take great care to conceal; indeed, if they are caught in the act, they are as horrified as if they had been caught in a crime. When people deliberate coolly about it, they usually regard the act with repulsion, and in an elevated mood, with disgust. *Montaigne* looked more closely into this matter in Chapter 5 of the third book under the marginal heading: *what love is*.<sup>g</sup> The act is followed closely by a characteristic depression and regret,

<sup>a</sup> *principium individuationis*

<sup>b</sup> *Schuldigkeit*

<sup>c</sup> *einen Tod schuldig ist*

<sup>d</sup> *Schuld*

<sup>e</sup> *eine Verschuldung enthält*

<sup>f</sup> *hineingelockt*

<sup>g</sup> *ce que c'est que l'amour* [Michel de Montaigne, *Essays (Essays)* (1580–8)]

which is most palpable after the very first time it is accomplished, but in general is the more distinct, the more noble the character. Even the heathen *Pliny* said: 'Only human beings experience regret after the first coitus: an omen about life, that it has a regrettable origin' (*Natural History*<sup>a</sup> X, 83). Conversely, what do the devils and witches practise and sing about on their Sabbath, in Goethe's *Faust*? Fornication and obscenities. What, in the same work (in the superb *Paralipomena to Faust*),<sup>b</sup> does the incarnate Satan preach to the assembled crowd? Fornication and obscenities; nothing more.<sup>88</sup> – But the human race remains in existence solely and exclusively by means of the continued practice of an act of this sort. – Now if optimism were correct, if our existence were a gift to be gratefully acknowledged, given by a supreme good governed by wisdom and therefore intrinsically praiseworthy, laudable and joyful, then the act that perpetuates it would have to bear a completely different physiognomy. If on the other hand, this existence is a kind of mistake or false path, if it is the work of an originally blind will whose most fortunate development is to come to itself in order to abolish itself, then the act that perpetuates this existence must look precisely as it does.

654

With respect to the first basic truth of my doctrine, the following remark deserves a place here: the above-mentioned shame at the act of procreation extends even to the parts that are in its service, although these, like all others, are innate. This offers yet more striking proof of the fact that it is not only human actions but even the human body that is the appearance, the objectivation of the human *will* and is to be regarded as the work of this will. For human beings could not be ashamed of something that existed without their will.

Moreover, the act of procreation is to the world as a solution is to a riddle. That is: the world is broad in space and old in time and has an inexhaustible multitude of forms. Still, all this is only the appearance of the will to life, and the concentration, the focal point of this will is the act of generation. The inner essence of the world expresses itself most clearly in this act. In this respect it is remarkable that the act itself is simply called 'the will' in the very telling expression: 'he expected her to serve his will'.<sup>c</sup> As the clearest expression of the will, that act is the kernel, the compendium, the quintessence of the world. And a light rises up through this act and illuminates the world's essence and its workings:<sup>d</sup> it is the solution to the

<sup>a</sup> *Homini tantum primi coitus poenitentia: augurium scilicet vitae, a poenitenda origine* (*Hist[oria] nat[uralis]* X, 83 [173])

<sup>b</sup> [1842]

<sup>c</sup> *Er verlangte von ihr, sie sollte ihm zu Willen seyn*

<sup>d</sup> *Treiben*

riddle. It is accordingly what is meant by the 'tree of knowledge', since acquaintance with it opens everyone's eyes to life, as Byron said:

The tree of knowledge has been pluck'd, – all's known.  
*Don Juan*, I, 128.<sup>a</sup>

655 It is no less in keeping with this quality that it is the great Unmentionable,<sup>b</sup> the open secret that can never be clearly mentioned anywhere, but is always and everywhere taken for granted as the central concern,<sup>c</sup> and therefore always vividly present in everyone's thoughts, which is why even the vaguest of references to it is immediately intelligible. The part that this act plays in the world is a major one since the love affairs that depend on it are both conducted and also assumed to be everywhere; this part is therefore wholly in keeping with the importance of this starting point of the world egg.<sup>d</sup> The amusing aspect lies only in the constant attempt to keep this central concern a secret.

But now see how the young and innocent human intellect is terrified by the enormity of the thing, when it is first made acquainted with that great mystery of the world! The reason for this is that along the lengthy path that the will has followed from its origin without cognition, before it rose to the level of intellect, and particularly the human, rational intellect, it became so alienated from itself that it no longer recognized its first source,<sup>e</sup> that regrettable origin,<sup>f</sup> and is now horrified at this from the standpoint of pure and therefore innocent cognition.

Now since the focal point of the will, i.e. its concentration and its highest expression, is the sex drive and its satisfaction, it is very telling, and naïvely expressed in the symbolic language of nature, that the individualized will, which is to say the human being and the animal, enters into the world through the portal of the sexual organs. –

The *affirmation of the will to life*, which is therefore centred around the act of generation, is inevitable in animals. For it is only in human beings that the will that is *natura naturans*<sup>g</sup> comes to *conscious awareness*.<sup>h</sup> Attaining conscious awareness means: not restricting cognition simply to the momentary needs of the individual will, to its service in the urgency of

<sup>a</sup> [Schopenhauer quotes the English and provides a German translation in a footnote]

<sup>b</sup> ἄρρητον

<sup>c</sup> *Hauptsache*

<sup>d</sup> *punctum saliens des Welteies*

<sup>e</sup> *Ursprung*

<sup>f</sup> *poenitenda origo*

<sup>g</sup> [Literally, 'nature naturing']

<sup>h</sup> *Besinnung*

the present – which is what happens with animals, according to their degree of perfection and the extent of their needs, which go hand in hand. Rather, it means achieving a greater breadth of cognition by virtue of a clear memory of the past, an approximate anticipation of the future, and by means of these a panoramic overview of the individual life, of one's own existence, of that of others, and indeed of existence in general. The life of every animal species throughout the millennia of its existence is really to a certain degree akin to a single moment: for it is mere consciousness of the *present* without that of the past or the future or, therefore, of death. In this sense it should be seen as an enduring moment, a 'permanent now'.<sup>a</sup> – Here, incidentally, we see most clearly that overall, the form of life, or the appearance of the will with consciousness, is immediately and in the first instance purely the *present*: past and future are introduced only with humans, and in fact only conceptually; we have cognition of them in the abstract<sup>b</sup> and in any case elucidated by means of pictures in the imagination. – And so after the will to life, i.e. the inner essence of nature, has run through the whole series of animals in its restless striving for a more perfect objectivation and perfect pleasure (a process that often takes place many times in successive series of animals that arise anew on the same planet), in the end, the will to life comes to *conscious awareness* in a being equipped with reason, in a human being. And then the whole situation becomes a thorny problem for it and it is forced to ask where everything came from and where it is all going, and most importantly, whether the troubles and needs that fill its life and striving really pay off – 'is the game worth the candle?'<sup>c</sup> – And so this is the point where, in the light of clear cognition, it decides whether to affirm or deny the will to life; although it can usually only become conscious of the latter option in a mythological guise. – We therefore have no grounds for assuming that there will ever be higher objectivations of the will; because the will has already reached its turning point here.

656

<sup>a</sup> *nunc stans*

<sup>b</sup> *in abstracto*

<sup>c</sup> *le jeu vaut-il bien la chandelle?*

## *On the Nothingness and Suffering of Life*

Awoken to life from the night of unconsciousness,<sup>a</sup> the will finds itself as an individual in a world without end or limit, among countless individuals who are all striving, suffering, going astray; and it hurries back to the old unconsciousness, as if through a bad dream. – But until then its desires are unlimited, its claims inexhaustible, and every satisfied desire gives birth to a new one. No possible worldly satisfaction could be enough to quiet its longing, give its desires a final goal, and fill the bottomless pit of its heart. Moreover, we can see what usually becomes of a human being with any sort of satisfaction: it is for the most part nothing more than the meagre daily preservation of this existence itself, amid endless trouble and constant care, in the struggle with need and with death in view. – Everything in life proclaims that earthly happiness is ordained to be in vain or recognized as an illusion. The basis for this lies deep in the essence of things. Accordingly, life for most human beings turns out to be miserable and short. For the most part, the comparatively happy only appear so, or else, like the long-lived, they are rare exceptions for whom the possibility had to remain open – as a decoy.<sup>b</sup> Life presents itself as an ongoing deception, in matters both small and large. What is promised is not delivered, unless it is to show how undesirable the thing desired was: and so we are deceived now by the hope and now by what we had hoped for. What is given is given only so that it can be taken away. The magic of distance shows us paradises that vanish like optical illusions after we have allowed ourselves to be taken in. And so happiness always lies in the future, or in the past, and the present is like a small dark cloud driven by the wind over the sunlit plains: both in front of it and behind it everything is bright, it alone casts a constant shadow. The present is therefore always unsatisfying, but the future is uncertain, and the

658

\* This chapter relates to §§ 56–59 of the First Volume. It is also to be compared with Chapters 11 and 12 of the Second Volume of *Parerga and Paralipomena*.

<sup>a</sup> *Bewußtlosigkeit*

<sup>b</sup> *Lockvogel*

past cannot be recovered. Life, with its hourly, daily, weekly and yearly vexations, small, greater or great, its disappointed hopes, its accidents that frustrate all calculation, is so clearly marked as something that should be distasteful to us that it is difficult to conceive how anyone could have failed to recognize this and convince themselves that life is there to be gratefully enjoyed, and that human beings exist to be happy. It is much rather the case that this ongoing deception and disappointment, as well as everything about the nature of life, presents itself as intended and calculated to awaken in us the conviction that absolutely nothing is worth our strivings, efforts and struggles, that all goods are null,<sup>a</sup> that the world is bankrupt in every way, and that life is a business that does not cover its costs – so that our will might turn away from it.

*Time* is the way in which this *nothingness*<sup>b</sup> of all objects of the will announces itself and makes itself graspable in the intellect that is rooted in the individual. Time is the form in which the nothingness of things appears as their perishability, in that by virtue of it all our pleasures and joys turn to nothing in our hands and we then ask in amazement where they had been. This nothingness itself is therefore the only thing *objective* about time, i.e. that aspect of the essence in itself of things that corresponds to time, and so that of which time is the expression.<sup>89</sup> This is why time is the a priori necessary form of all our intuitions: everything must present itself in time, even we ourselves. As such, our life is, in the first instance, like a payment made to us only in copper pennies and for which we must nevertheless then provide a receipt; the pennies are the days, the receipt is death. Ultimately time pronounces nature's judgement on the value of all of the beings appearing in it, by annihilating them:

And rightly so: for all things that arise,  
Are worthy of their own demise  
It would be better if nothing ever were.<sup>c</sup>

And so age and death, to which every life necessarily hastens, are the condemnation of the will to life from the hands of nature itself – pronouncing that this will is a striving that must frustrate itself. 'What you have willed' it says, 'ends *like this*: will something better.' – And thus the lesson everyone learns from his life consists wholly in the fact that the objects of our desires keep deceiving him, faltering, and collapsing, and so bring more agony than joy, until at last the whole ground and soil on which they all

659

<sup>a</sup> *nichtig*

<sup>b</sup> *Nichtigkeit*

<sup>c</sup> [Goethe, *Faust* I, 1339–41]



stand collapses with the destruction of his life itself, and he has the final confirmation of the fact that all his striving and willing was wrong-headed, a false path:

Then old age and experience, hand in hand,  
Lead him to death, and make him understand,  
After a search so painful and so long,  
That all his life he has been in the wrong.<sup>a</sup>

We will now go into the specifics of this matter, since these views of mine are the ones that have met with the most disagreement. – First I must substantiate the proof I gave in the text for the negativity of all satisfaction, which is to say all pleasure and happiness, in contrast to the positivity of the pain. I shall do so in what follows.

660 We feel pain, but not painlessness; we feel worry, but not freedom from worry; we feel fear but not security. We feel a desire<sup>b</sup> as we feel hunger and thirst; but as soon as it is fulfilled, it is like a bite of food we have enjoyed, which stops existing for our feeling the moment it is swallowed. We feel the painful loss of pleasures and joys as soon as they are gone: but pains, even if they are present for a long time before departing, are not immediately missed; if we think of them at all it is intentionally, by means of reflection. For only pain and lack can be felt positively and therefore register their presence: well-being<sup>c</sup> on the other hand is merely negative. And this is why we do not become aware of the three greatest goods in life as such – that is, health, youth and freedom – so long as we possess them, but only after we have lost them: for they too are negations. We only notice that days in our life were happy after they have given way to unhappy ones. – Susceptibility to pleasure decreases as the pleasures themselves increase; we stop taking pleasure in familiar things. But susceptibility to suffering increases precisely because we feel pain at the loss of the familiar. Thus the level of what is necessary increases through possession, and with it the ability to feel pain. – Hours pass more quickly the more pleasantly they are spent, and more slowly the more painfully, because pain, not pleasure, is the positive thing whose presence is felt. Likewise, we become aware of time when we are bored, not when are amused. Both facts show that our existence is happiest when we are least able to feel it: from which it follows that it would be better not to exist at all. – Great, vivid joy can only be conceived as the result of a

<sup>a</sup> [From 'A Satyr against Mankind', by John Wilmot (2nd Earl of Rochester), seventeenth century. Schopenhauer quotes the English original, and provides a German translation in a footnote]

<sup>b</sup> *Wunsch*

<sup>c</sup> *Wohlkēyn*

great preceding misery: for nothing can be added to a state of lasting satisfaction except some amusement or the satisfaction of a vanity. This is why all poets need to put their heroes into an anxious and painful state in order to free them again: drama and epic never describe anything but struggling, suffering, tormented people and every novel is a peep-show<sup>a</sup> in which we view the spasms and convulsions of the tormented human heart. *Walter Scott* naïvely portrayed this aesthetic necessity in the Conclusion to his novella, *Old Mortality*.<sup>b</sup> – In full agreement with the truth I have proven, *Voltaire*, who was favoured by both nature and fortune, said: ‘happiness is only a dream and sadness is real’;<sup>c</sup> and adds: ‘I have experienced this for eighty years. I don’t know what to do except to resign myself and say to myself that flies are born to be eaten by spiders and people to be eaten up by cares.’<sup>d</sup>

Before confidently stating that life is a good that we should desire or one for which we should be grateful, just stop and compare the sum of all possible joys that a human being can have in his life with the sum of all possible sufferings that can afflict him in his life. I think that the balance<sup>e</sup> will not be hard to determine. But it is fundamentally beside the point to argue whether there is more good or evil in the world: for the very existence of evil<sup>f</sup> already decides the matter since it can never be cancelled out by any good that might exist alongside or after it, and cannot therefore be counterbalanced:

661

*Mille piacer’ non vagliono un tormento.\**  
*Petrarch*<sup>90</sup>

For even if thousands had lived in happiness and delight, this would never annul the anxiety and tortured death of a single person; and my present well-being does just as little to undo my earlier suffering. If therefore the evil were a hundred times less in the world than is the case, then the mere existence of evil would still be sufficient to ground a truth that can be expressed in different ways although only ever somewhat indirectly, namely that we should be sorry rather than glad about the existence of the world; that its non-existence would

\* A thousand pleasures are not worth a single sorrow. [*Il Canzoniere*, Sonnet 195. See p. 449, n. b]

<sup>a</sup> *Guckkasten*

<sup>b</sup> [‘Conclusion’ to vol. 2 (1816)]

<sup>c</sup> *le bonheur n’est qu’un rêve, et la douleur est réelle*

<sup>d</sup> *il y a quatre-vingts ans que je l’éprouve. Je n’y sais autre chose que me résigner, et me dire que les mouches sont nées pour être mangées par les araignées, et les hommes pour être dévorés par les chagrins* [letter to M. le Marquis de Florian, Ferney, 16 March, 1774]

<sup>e</sup> *Bilanz*

<sup>f</sup> *des Uebels*

be preferable to its existence; that it is something that fundamentally should not be, etc. Byron expresses this situation extremely well:

*Our life is a false nature, – 'tis not in  
The harmony of things, this hard decree,  
This uneradicable taint of sin,  
This boundless Upas, this all-blasting tree  
Whose root is earth, whose leaves and branches be  
The skies, which rain their plagues on men like dew –  
Disease, death, bondage – all the woes we see –  
And worse, the woes we see not – which throb through  
The immedicable soul, with heart-aches ever new.<sup>a</sup>*

662

If the world and life were an end in themselves<sup>b</sup> and therefore did not need theoretical justification or practical compensation or reparation, but rather existed, as *Spinoza* and the contemporary *Spinozists* would have it, as the only manifestation of a God who undertook this evolution for amusement<sup>c</sup> or to reflect itself, so that as a result their existence needed neither to be justified through reasons nor redeemed by consequences, then in that case, the suffering and plagues of life would not need to be fully balanced against its pleasures and well-being (since this, as I have said, is impossible, because my present pain can never be annulled by future joys: these occupy their time as pain occupies its own), instead, there would have to be absolutely no suffering at all, and death would have either not to be or not to hold any terrors for us. Only in this way would life pay for itself.

But because it would be better for our situation not to exist, everything around us bears the trace of this – just as everything in hell reeks of sulphur – since everything is always imperfect and deceptive, every pleasure is mixed with something unpleasant, every delight is only half a pleasure, every enjoyment upsets itself, every relief brings new worries, anything that helps us with our daily and hourly needs leaves us in the lurch at every moment and abandons its post, so often the steps we climb collapse beneath us, indeed accidents large and small are the element in which we live our lives,<sup>91</sup> and, in a word, we are like *Phineus*, when the Harpies ruined all of his food and rendered it inedible. Everything that we set about puts up opposition, because it has its own will that must be overcome.<sup>92</sup> Two remedies are tried for this: first *eulabeia*,<sup>d</sup> i.e. prudence, foresight, cunning; this is something

<sup>a</sup> [Schopenhauer gives a prose translation in German. The verse is from *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, IV, 126]

<sup>b</sup> [*Selbstzweck*]

<sup>c</sup> *animi causa*

<sup>d</sup> εὐλάβεια

that we cannot master and it is insufficient, amounting to nothing. Second, Stoic equanimity, which wants to disarm every misfortune by being prepared for and contemptuous of everything: in practice it becomes cynical renunciation<sup>a</sup> which prefers to reject all assistance and relief once and for all: it makes us into dogs, like Diogenes in the barrel. The truth is: we should be miserable and we are miserable. And the main source of the serious evils that afflict human beings are human beings themselves: man is a wolf to man.<sup>b</sup> Whoever looks this straight in the eye sees the world as a hell, worse than that of Dante because the one person must play the role of devil to the other: of course, some people are more suited to this than others, and above them all an arch-demon appearing in the form of a conqueror, who pits several hundred thousand men against each other and calls to them: 'suffering and death are your fate: now start shooting cannons and flint at each other!' and they do it. – But overall,<sup>93</sup> as a rule, the behaviour of humans to each other is marked by injustice, gross unfairness, hardness, even cruelty: the converse appears only in exceptional cases. The necessity of the state and its legislation rests on this, not on your whims.<sup>c</sup> But everywhere the law fails to reach, we immediately see a ruthlessness against our own that is distinctive to humans and that comes from our boundless egoism as well as from malice.<sup>d</sup> How human beings treat other human beings can be seen, for example, in the case of Negro slavery, whose final purpose is sugar and coffee. But we do not need to go so far: to enter the spinning factory or some other industry at age five and from then on to spend first 10 and then 12 and finally 14 hours a day sitting there doing the same mechanical work, is a high price to pay for the pleasure of drawing breath. But this is the fate of millions and many other millions have a similar fate.<sup>94</sup>

The rest of us meanwhile can be made perfectly miserable by minor events, while nothing in the world makes us perfectly happy. – Whatever people say, the happiest moment for a happy person is when he goes to sleep, just as the unhappiest moment of the unhappiest person is when he wakes up. – An indirect but certain, albeit superfluous proof of the fact that people feel unhappy and therefore are, is provided in spades by the fierce envy that dwells in all and which, in all occasions in life, is aroused by any merit, whatever it might be, and cannot contain its poison. Because people feel unhappy, they cannot stand the sight of someone who claims to be

<sup>a</sup> *Entsagung*

<sup>b</sup> *homo homini lupus* [Plautus, *Asinaria* (*Comedy of asses*) II, 495]

<sup>c</sup> *Flausen*

<sup>d</sup> *Bosheit*

happy: anyone who feels momentarily happy wants to make everyone around him happy too, and says:

Let everyone here be made happy by my joy.<sup>a,95</sup>

If life were in itself a valuable good to be definitively preferred to non-being, then the exit gates would not need to be guarded by watchmen as terrible as death with all its horrors. But who would persevere in life as it is, if death were less terrible? – And who could bear even the thought of death if life were a joy! But death always has its good side, in being the end of life, and we console ourselves over the sufferings of life with death, and over death with the sufferings of life. The truth is that the two belong inseparably together, since they constitute a wrong turning from which it is as difficult as it is desirable to return.

665 If the world were not something that, expressed *practically*, should not be, then it would not be a problem *theoretically* either: instead its existence would either need no explanation at all, since it would be so completely self-evident that it would never occur to anyone to be surprised by it or to question it, or its purpose would be unmistakable. But instead of this, the world is in fact an insoluble problem, since even the most perfect philosophy must always contain an unexplained element, like an insoluble precipitate, or the remainder always left by the irrational relation of two quantities. Thus, if someone dares to raise the question why there should not be nothing at all, rather than this world, then the world cannot be justified by itself; no reason, no final cause of its existence can be found in it and it cannot be shown that it exists for its own sake, i.e. for its own advantage. – Of course given my theory, this can be explained by the fact that the principle of its existence is explicitly a groundless principle, namely blind will to life which, *as thing in itself*, cannot be subject to the principle of sufficient reason, which is merely the form of appearances and which is the only thing through which any Why is justified. This is also in agreement with the constitution of the world: for only a blind, not a seeing will could put itself in the situation we find ourselves in. A seeing will would have quickly estimated that the business does not cover its costs, since such a violent striving and struggling, exerting all its powers, in a constant state of worry, anxiety, and need, with the unavoidable destruction of every individual life, could not find compensation in the ephemeral existence that takes such an effort and comes to nothing in our hands. This is why

<sup>a</sup> *Que tout le monde ici soit heureux de ma joie* [Claude-Adrien Helvétius, *De l'Esprit* (*On the Mind*) (1758), Discourse III, ch. 12, remark]

the explanation of the world from an Anaxagorean *nous*,<sup>a</sup> i.e. from a will guided by *cognition*, necessarily requires optimism as a palliative, which is then established and maintained in spite of the loudly screaming testimony of an entire world filled with misery. On this view, life is given out to be a gift, while it is clear as day that anyone who could have first seen and looked the gift over would have said 'no thank you very much'; just as *Lessing* was amazed by the understanding of his son who had not wanted to come into the world at all, needed to be violently pulled out with forceps, and hardly was he there before he hurried out again. It will be objected that life should only be a lesson from one end to the other, to which however anyone can reply: 'And this is exactly why I wanted to be left in the peace of the all-sufficient nothing where I had no need of lessons or anything else.' But if it is added that he would one day have to account for every hour of his life, then he would be even more justified in demanding that someone account to him for the fact that he was taken from that peace and put into such a precarious, dark, fearful and painful state. – This, then, is where fundamentally incorrect views lead. For human existence, far from having the character of a *gift*, has the completely opposite character of *guilty indebtedness*.<sup>b</sup> The collection of this debt appears in the form of the urgent requirements, tortured desires, and endless need, all introduced by human existence itself. Usually the whole span of life is spent paying off this debt:<sup>c</sup> but this only pays off the interest. The capital is paid back in death. – And when was this debt contracted? – In procreation. –

666

Accordingly if we view people as beings whose existence is a punishment and atonement, – we already have a more accurate view. The myth of original sin (although probably, like the whole of Judaism, borrowed from the Zend Avesta:<sup>d</sup> *Bundahishn*,<sup>e</sup> 15) is the only thing in the Old Testament to which I can assign a metaphysical truth, if only an allegorical one; in fact this is the only thing that reconciles me to the Old Testament. Our existence looks like nothing so much as the result of a false move, of a craving that deserves punishment.<sup>f</sup> The Christianity of the New Testament (whose ethical spirit is that of Brahmanism and Buddhism and is therefore quite foreign to the otherwise optimistic spirit of the Old Testament) also very wisely attached itself directly to that very myth: indeed, without this it would not have found any point of contact with Judaism. – If we want to

<sup>a</sup> νοῦς [mind, intellect]

<sup>b</sup> *Schuld*

<sup>c</sup> *Schuld*

<sup>d</sup> [See below, p. 639, n. c]

<sup>e</sup> *Bun-Dehesch* ['original creation']

<sup>f</sup> *eines strafbaren Gelüstens*

measure the degree of guilty indebtedness with which our existence itself is burdened, just look at the suffering linked to it. Every great pain, whether physical or mental, tells us what we deserve, because it could not befall us unless we deserved it. That Christianity sees our existence in this light is confirmed by a passage from Luther's *Commentary on Galatians*, ch. 3, that I have before me only in Latin: 'We all are subjected to the devil with our bodies and our things and are foreigners in the world whose prince and god he is. This is why everything is under his control, the bread we eat, the things we drink, the clothes we wear, even the air and everything through which we live in flesh.'<sup>a</sup> – People have complained loudly that my philosophy is melancholy and comfortless: but this is only due to the fact that instead of making up a future hell as the equivalent of sin, I proved that there is already something hellish where the guilty indebtedness lies, in the world: anyone who wants to deny this – can find out the truth easily enough.

667 And this world, this battleground of tormented and anxious beings who survive only by devouring one another, where every predatory animal is the living grave of thousands of others and its self-preservation is a chain of excruciating deaths, where the capacity to feel pain increases with cognition so that it reaches its highest level in humans and is greater the more intelligent one is, – this is the world people have wanted to adapt to the system of *optimism*, this is the world people have wanted to show to be the best of all possible worlds. The absurdity here is glaring. – Meanwhile an optimist might want me to open my eyes and look at how beautiful the world is in the sunshine, with its mountains, valleys, streams, plants, animals, etc. – But is the world a peep-show?<sup>b</sup> These things are certainly lovely to *look* at; but *to be* them is a completely different matter. – Then along comes a teleologist and gives me a glowing account of the wise guidance that has taken care that the planets do not run headlong into each other, that land and sea are not mixed in a paste but are kept nicely separate, how everything is not hardened into a constant frost or roasted by heat, nor does the angle of the ecliptic result in an eternal spring where nothing can mature, and so on. – But these, and everything similar, are merely necessary conditions.<sup>c</sup> If there is to be a world at all, if its planets are to exist at least long enough for the light rays from a remote fixed star to reach

<sup>a</sup> *Sumus autem nos omnes corporibus et rebus subjecti Diabolo, et hospites sumus in mundo, cujus ipse princeps et Deus est. Ideo panis, quem edimus, potus, quem bibimus, vestes, quibus utimur, imo aër et totum quo vivimus in carne, sub ipsius imperio est* [1535]

<sup>b</sup> *Guckkasten*

<sup>c</sup> *conditiones sine quibus non*

them, and not, like Lessing's son, depart again immediately after birth – then of course it cannot be so poorly furnished that its basic structure threatens to collapse. But if you move on to the *results* of the lauded works, and look at the *players* who act on this lasting and well-furnished stage, and now see how sensibility introduces pain and how pain rises proportionally as sensibility develops into intelligence, and then, keeping step with this, greed and suffering become stronger and rise to the point where finally human life does not offer material for anything except tragedies and comedies, – then anyone who is not a hypocrite will hardly be disposed to break out in hallelujahs. The true but hidden origin of these latter has been revealed mercilessly and with truth victorious by *David Hume* in his *Natural History of Religion*,<sup>a</sup> Sections 6, 7, 8 and 13. In the tenth and eleventh books of his *Dialogues on Natural Religion*,<sup>b</sup> he openly lays out the sorry constitution of this world and the untenable nature of all optimism, using arguments that are very cogent and yet very different from mine; and in doing so, he attacks optimism at its source. Both works of Hume are as worth reading as they are unknown in Germany today, where, on the contrary, people patriotically take incredible pleasure in the disgusting drivel of native-born, strutting mediocrities and build them up to be great men. But *Hamann* translated those *Dialogues*, *Kant* looked through the translation, and in later years wanted Hamann's son to publish an edition of them, because he did not think the Platner edition was satisfactory (see *Kant's* biography by F. W. Schubert,<sup>c</sup> pp. 81 and 165). – There is more to learn on any given page of *David Hume* than there is in all of *Hegel's*, *Herbart's*, and *Schleiermacher's* philosophical works put together.

668

The founder of the system of *optimism*, however, is *Leibniz*, and I have no intention of denying his service to philosophy, although I cannot claim to have really succeeded in thinking through the *Monadology*, pre-established harmony, and the identity of indiscernibles.<sup>d</sup> His *New Essays on the Understanding*<sup>e</sup> are merely an excerpt with detailed yet weak criticism and a view to correcting the justly world-famous work of *Locke*; *Leibniz* opposes *Locke's* work in this case with just as little success as he opposed *Newton* and the system of gravity in his *Essay on the Causes of Celestial Motions*.<sup>f,96</sup> The *Critique of Pure Reason* is specifically directed against this *Leibniz*–

<sup>a</sup> [1757]

<sup>b</sup> [published posthumously, in 1779]

<sup>c</sup> [See p. 540, n. b. The translation *Kant* read was unfinished and never published]

<sup>d</sup> *identitas indiscernibilium*

<sup>e</sup> *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement [humain* (1704)]

<sup>f</sup> *Tentamen de motuum coelestium causis* [1689]



669 Wolffian philosophy and has a polemical, indeed destructive<sup>97</sup> relation to it; just as its relation to *Locke* and *Hume* is that of further development. The fact that philosophy professors everywhere these days try to resurrect *Leibniz* with his nonsense, in fact honour him, and on the other hand value *Kant* as little as possible and marginalize him, can be justified by the doctrine of 'live first':<sup>a</sup> the *Critique of Pure Reason* does not allow Jewish mythology to be given out for philosophy, nor does it allow for the 'soul' to be spoken of as a given reality, as a well-known and respected person, without offering justification for how this concept has been arrived at and whether it can be rightfully used in a scientific manner. But 'live first, then philosophize!'<sup>b</sup> Down with Kant, long live<sup>c</sup> our *Leibniz*! – But returning to Leibniz,<sup>98</sup> I can assign no other merit to the *Theodicy*,<sup>d</sup> in its capacity as a methodical and broad development of optimism, than its subsequently providing an occasion for the immortal *Candide* of the great *Voltaire*,<sup>e</sup> in which Leibniz's oft-repeated, lame excuse for the evils of the world, namely that the bad sometimes leads to the good, is confirmed in a way he did not expect. Even with the name of his hero Voltaire signifies that you only need candour<sup>f</sup> to recognize the opposite of optimism. But really, optimism cuts such a strange figure in this scene of sin, of suffering, and of death, that one would have to consider it ironic if Hume had not adequately explained its origin (as mentioned above) in a way that delightfully discloses its secret source (namely hypocritical flattery accompanied by an offensive confidence in its success).<sup>99</sup>

670 But against these palpably sophistical *Leibnizian* proofs that this is the best of all possible worlds, we can earnestly and honestly prove that it is in fact the *worst* of all possible worlds. For possible does not mean what someone can dream up, but what really can exist and persist.<sup>100</sup> Now this world is constituted as it has to be in order to persist with great difficulty: if it were slightly worse, it could no longer persist. Consequently a worse world would be completely impossible, since it could not persist, and this world is therefore itself the worst one possible. For the world would soon come to an end not only if the planets ran headlong into each other, but even if any one of the actually occurring perturbations of their course continued to increase instead of gradually being balanced out by others: astronomers know that this depends on accidental circumstances, most

<sup>a</sup> *primum vivere* [see next note]

<sup>b</sup> *primum vivere, deinde philosophari!*

<sup>c</sup> *vivat*

<sup>d</sup> *Theodicee* [1709]

<sup>e</sup> [*Candide, ou l'Optimisme* (*Candide, or Optimism*) (1759)]

<sup>f</sup> *Aufrichtigkeit*

importantly on the irrational relation that the periods of revolution have to each other, and they have carefully calculated that it will continue to go well and therefore the world can continue on as it has done. We would like to hope (although *Newton* was of the opposite opinion) that they have not miscalculated and that a mechanical perpetual motion<sup>a</sup> actualized in such a planetary system does not, like others, come ultimately to a standstill.<sup>101</sup> – Similarly, powerful natural forces live under the solid crust of the planet, and, as soon as some chance gives them room to manoeuvre they must destroy the planetary surface along with everything living on top of it, as has happened on our planet at least three times already, and will probably happen more often. An earthquake in Lisbon, in Haiti, the covering of ashes in Pompeii, these give only slight, mischievous hints of this possibility. – An alteration of the atmosphere so small that it cannot be detected chemically causes cholera, yellow fever, Black Death, etc., which carry away millions of people; a somewhat larger alteration would extinguish all life. A very moderate increase in temperature would dry up all rivers and springs.<sup>102</sup> – Animals have received no more than precisely the number of organs and abilities<sup>b</sup> needed to sustain their lives and feed their young with the most extreme exertions; so if an animal loses a limb, or even loses only some of the use of this limb, it must usually die. Even with such powerful tools as understanding and reason, nine-tenths of the human race live in a constant struggle with want, always on the verge of destruction and keeping themselves there only with trouble and effort. And so it is just the same for the existence of the whole as it is for the existence of the individual, the conditions are made out sparingly and scantily, with no extras; thus the individual life is spent in ceaseless struggle for existence while threatened with destruction at every step. But precisely because this threat is so often carried through, the incredibly huge surplus of seed must be used to ensure that the destruction of an individual does not lead to the destruction of the race, which is nature's only serious concern. – The world is consequently as bad as it can possibly be, if it is to exist at all. Q.E.D. – Fossils of the completely different types of animals that used to inhabit the planet help prove our calculations, providing us documents of worlds whose existence was no longer possible, and which therefore must have been still somewhat worse than the worst of those that are possible.

671

Optimism is basically unjustified self-praise on the part of the true author of the world, the will to life, which views itself complacently in the mirror of its works. It is therefore<sup>103</sup> not only a false, but even a

<sup>a</sup> *perpetuum mobile*

<sup>b</sup> *Kräften*

pernicious doctrine. For it presents life to us as a desirable state, and the goal of life as human happiness. On that supposition, everyone believes himself to have the most rightful claim<sup>a</sup> to happiness and pleasure: and if, as tends to happen, this does not come about, he feels he has been wronged, indeed that he has missed out on the point of his existence – while it is much more accurate to regard work, deprivation, misery and suffering, all crowned by death, as the goal of our lives (as Brahmanism, Buddhism, and genuine Christianity do); for it is these that lead to the negation of the will to life. In the New Testament the world is portrayed as a vale of tears, life as a process of purification, and the symbol of Christianity is an instrument of torture. Thus, when *Leibniz*, *Shaftesbury*, *Bolingbroke*, and *Pope* came forward with *optimism*, the offence that it generally gave was due chiefly to the fact that it is irreconcilable with Christianity, as *Voltaire* reports and explains in the preface to his excellent poem *The Disaster in Lisbon*,<sup>b</sup> which is also directed explicitly against optimism. What makes this great man (whom I gladly praise in the face of the slanders of German ink-slingers) decisively superior to *Rousseau*, are three great insights that he achieved and that prove the greater profundity of his thought. These insights are: (1) that of the preponderance of evils and the misery of existence, which he has entered into most deeply; (2) that of the strict necessitation of acts of will; 672 (3) that of the truth of the *Lockean* claim that that which thinks<sup>c</sup> could also possibly be material. *Rousseau* contested all these claims through declamations in his *Profession of Faith of the Vicar of Savoyard*,<sup>d</sup> a trite, Protestant, pastor's philosophy; and in a long letter to *Voltaire* from 18 August 1756 he polemicized against *Voltaire's* excellent poem (that we have already mentioned) with skewed, shallow and logically false reasoning in favour of optimism. Indeed, the basic tendency and first false step<sup>e</sup> of *Rousseau's* entire philosophy is this: that in the place of the Christian doctrine of original sin and the primordial corruption of the human race, he substitutes an original goodness and unlimited perfectibility that is led astray simply by civilization and its consequences: this is the foundation of his optimism and humanism.<sup>104</sup>

Just as *Voltaire* waged a humorous war against optimism in *Candide*, *Byron* did the same thing, seriously and tragically, in his immortal masterpiece, *Cain*,<sup>f</sup> for which he was also honoured by the invective of the

<sup>a</sup> *Anspruch*

<sup>b</sup> *Le désastre de Lisbonne* [1756]

<sup>c</sup> *das Denkende*

<sup>d</sup> *Profession de foi du vicaire Savoyard* [from *Rousseau's Émile*, Book IV (1762)]

<sup>e</sup> πρῶτον ψεῦδος

<sup>f</sup> [The play *Cain, A Mystery* (1821)]

obscurantist F. Schlegel. – Finally, if I wanted to corroborate my view by citing passages written by the great minds of every age in opposition to optimism, then there would be no end to it since almost all of them have expressly recognized the sorrows of this world, and in strong language. And so I will make room at the end of this chapter for several passages of this sort, not for confirmation but simply for embellishment.

First of all, the Greeks should be mentioned: however distant they might have been from the Christian and High Asian world-view, and however decisively they might have occupied the perspective of the affirmation of the will, they were nonetheless deeply affected by the misery of existence. This is confirmed by the invention of tragedy, which belongs to them. Another example of this is the Thracian custom, first reported by *Herodotus* (V, 4<sup>a</sup>) and mentioned frequently thereafter, of welcoming newborns with lamentations and enumerating to them all the evils that they will now encounter, while, on the other hand burying the dead with joy and humour, because they have now escaped so many and such great sufferings: this is stated in a nice verse preserved by Plutarch (*How to Study Poetry*, at the end)<sup>b</sup> as:

673

To lament the newly born, because of all the bad things  
They will encounter, but to treat the dead  
With joy and with blessings  
Because they have now escaped so much suffering.<sup>c,105</sup>

It should be attributed to the moral identity between the cases, rather than to historical connection, that the Mexicans welcome newborns with the words: ‘my child, you are born to endure: and so endure, suffer and be silent’. And, guided by the same feeling, *Swift* (as Walter Scott reports in his *Life*)<sup>d</sup> formed the early habit of treating his birthday not as a time of joy but of sorrow, and on that day reading the biblical passage<sup>e</sup> in which Job lamented and cursed the day on which it was said in his father’s house: a son is born.<sup>106</sup>

In Socrates’ *Apology* there is a famous passage<sup>f</sup> that is too long to transcribe, where Plato had this wisest of mortals say that death, even if it robbed us of consciousness forever, would be a wonderful gain, since a deep and dreamless sleep is preferable to any day of a life, even the happiest life.

<sup>a</sup> [*Histories*]

<sup>b</sup> *De audiend[is] poet[is] in fine* [or *How a youth should listen to poetry*, 36f.]

<sup>c</sup> Τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν, εἰς ὃς ἔρχεται κακά· / Τὸν δ’ αὖ θανόντα καὶ πόνων πεπαιμένω / Χαίροντας εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμῳ. (*Lugere genitum, tanta qui intrarit mala: / At morte si quis finiisset miseras, / Hunc laude amicos atque laetitia exsequi.*) [from Euripides, *Cresphontes*, 449]

<sup>d</sup> [In *The works of Jonathan Swift*, vol. 1 (1814)]

<sup>e</sup> [Job 3:3]

<sup>f</sup> [See *Apology* 40b–e]

A saying of *Heraclitus* runs:

The name of life is indeed life, but its work is death.

(*Etymologicum magnum* under the heading 'life' as well as in  
*Eustathius, On the Iliad*, I, p. 31.)<sup>a</sup>

This beautiful verse of *Theognis* is famous:

It would be best for people never to have been born,  
Never to see the beaming rays of the sun god;  
But if one is born the best thing is to get to Hades' gates  
As soon as possible, and to rest there, under much earth.<sup>b,107</sup>

674 *Sophocles*, in *Oedipus at Colonus* (1225) abbreviated this in the following way:

Never to be born, that is  
By far the best; but if one lives,  
The second is to turn back  
Whence one came as quickly as possible.<sup>c</sup>

*Euripides* says:

The human life is full of misery  
And there is no end to the suffering.<sup>d</sup>  
*Hippolytus*, 189

And even *Homer* had already said:

There is no more miserable being in the world  
Than man, among all that breathe and crawl over the earth.<sup>e</sup>  
*Iliad* XVII, 446.

<sup>a</sup> Τῷ οὖν βίῳ ὄνομα μὲν βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος (*Vitae nomen quidem est vita, opus autem mors.*) *Etymologicum magnum*, voce βίος; auch *Eustath. ad Iliad.*, I, p. 31. [Cf. *Heraclitus* fragment B48; in fact βίος (*bios*) means 'life', and the similar word βίος means 'bow' (the weapon): so something used to kill seems to be called 'life']

<sup>b</sup> Ἀρχὴν μὲν μὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον, / Μηδ' ἐσιδεῖν αὐγὰς ὀξέος ἡελίου. / Φύντα δ' ὅπως ὤκιστα πύλας Αἰδῶο περῆσαι, / Καὶ κείσθαι πολλὴν γῆν ἐπαμειβόμενον (*Optima sors homini natum non esse, nec unquam / Adspexisse diem, flammiferumque jubar. / Altera jam genitum demitti protinus Orco, / Et pressum multa mergere corpus humo.*) [*Elegiac Poems*, lines 425–8]

<sup>c</sup> Μὴ φῦναι τὸν ἅπαντα νι- / καὶ λόγον· τὸ δ' ἐπεὶ φανῇ, / βῆναι κείθεν, ὅθεν περ ἦκει πολὺ δεύτερον, / ὥς τάχιστα (*Natum non esse sortes vincit alias omnes: proxima autem est, ubi quis in lucem editus fuerit, eodem redire, unde venit, quam ocissime.*)

<sup>d</sup> Πᾶς δ' ὀδυνηρὸς βίος ἀνθρώπων, / Κ' οὐκ ἔστι πόνων ἀνάπαυσις (*Omnis hominum vita est plena dolore, / Nec datur laborum remissio.*)

<sup>e</sup> Οὐ μὲν γάρ τί πού ἐστιν οἰζυρώτερον ἀνδρὸς / Πάντων, ὅσσα τε γαῖαν ἔπι πνεῖει τε καὶ ἔρπει (*Non enim quidquam alicubi est calamitosius homine / Omnium, quotquot super terram spirantque et moventur.*)

*Shakespeare* put these words into the mouth of old King Henry IV:

675

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*On Ethics*

Now there is a large gap in these supplements because I already dealt with morality in the narrower sense in the two prize essays published under the title *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, and, as I have already mentioned, I am assuming that the reader is familiar with these essays so as to avoid needless repetition. Thus what remains to be presented is simply a small epilogue of isolated remarks that could not be articulated in the earlier essays, where the principal theme of the contents was prescribed by the Academies;<sup>a</sup> least of all was I able to include any remarks that would require any standpoint higher than the one shared by all, and so this is where I was forced to remain. Thus it will not surprise the reader to find these remarks in a very fragmentary arrangement. These in turn are continued in the eighth and ninth chapters of the Second Volume of the *Parerga*. —<sup>110</sup>

That moral investigations are incomparably more important than physical ones, indeed than all others, follows from the fact they concern the thing in itself almost directly, that is, they concern the appearance in which, immediately touched by the light of cognition, the thing in itself reveals its essence as *will*. Physical truths on the other hand remain entirely within the purview of representation, i.e. of appearance, and show merely how the lowest appearances of the will present themselves in representation in a lawful manner. — Further, the results gathered from considering the world from the *physical* side will offer us no solace, however broadly and cheerfully such an investigation is pursued: solace<sup>b</sup> comes from the *moral* side alone, since here the depths of our own inner being<sup>c</sup> come into consideration.

\* This chapter relates to §§ 55, 62, 67 of the First Volume.

<sup>a</sup> [Both the essays on ethics were written for prize competitions set by Royal Academies, in Norway in the case of *FR*, and Denmark in the case of *BM*]

<sup>b</sup> *Trost*

<sup>c</sup> *unseres eigenen Innern*

My philosophy is however the only one that grants morality its full and complete rights: for a human being's deeds really only belong to and are attributable to him if his essence is his own *will*, which makes him, in the strictest sense, his own work. On the other hand, as soon as he has a different origin or is the work of a being other than himself, all of his guilt falls back onto this origin or author. Because 'acting follows from being'.<sup>a</sup>

677

To take the force<sup>b</sup> that produces the phenomenon of the world and determines the composition of this phenomenon, and to connect it to the morality of character,<sup>c</sup> thereby establishing a *moral* world order as the foundation for the *physical* world order – this has been the problem of philosophy since *Socrates*. *Theism* did this in a childish way that cannot satisfy humanity in its mature phase. Thus *pantheism* opposed it, as soon as it dared to do so, and established that nature carries within itself the forces that cause it to emerge. But with this, *ethics* had been lost. *Spinoza* certainly tries at times to rescue it through sophistries, but for the most part he gives it up altogether and, with an audacity that both astonishes and repulses, declares that the difference between right and wrong and in general between good and evil is merely conventional and therefore inherently null (e.g. *Ethics*, IV, prop. 37, schol. 2). For more than a hundred years *Spinoza* was greeted with an undeserved underestimation, but through another swing of the pendulum of opinion, this has been followed in our century by a period of overestimation.<sup>iii</sup> – Any pantheism must ultimately founder on the unavoidable demands of ethics, and then on the evils and sufferings of the world. If the world is a theophany then everything that human beings (and in fact even animals) do is both divine and excellent; there can be nothing to complain about and nothing to praise more than anything else: and thus no ethics. It is as a result of the renewed *Spinozism* of our day, i.e. pantheism, that ethics has sunk so low and become so shallow that people have turned it into a mere introduction to a proper life in the state or the family, and it is this life, a complete, methodical, smug, and comfortable philistinism, that is supposed to be the final goal of human existence. Of course, pantheism only led to these platitudes when (grossly misusing the claim that 'from any piece of wood a god can be carved')<sup>d,ii2</sup> people used well-known methods to falsely recast a common mind, *Hegel*, into a great philosopher, and a herd of disciples, at first

678

<sup>a</sup> *operari sequitur esse* [Pomponatius, *Tractatus de animi immortalitate* (*Treatise on the immortality of the soul*) (1534), p. 76]

<sup>b</sup> *Kraft*

<sup>c</sup> *Moralität der Gesinnung*

<sup>d</sup> *e quovis ligno fit Mercurius* [Apuleius, *Apologia* (*Pro se de magia*) (*Defence of himself against a charge of magic*), sect. 43, attributes a similar saying to Pythagoras]



suborned but then merely stupid,<sup>a</sup> received the great word. This sort of attempt to assassinate the human spirit does not go unpunished: the seed has sprouted. In the same way, it was then claimed that the content of ethics should not be the deeds of individuals but rather those of folk-masses,<sup>b</sup> that only this is a theme worthy of ethics. Nothing can be more wrong-headed than this view, which is based on the shallowest realism.<sup>113</sup> For the will to life, the essence in itself, appears whole and undivided in every individual, and the microcosm is the same as the macrocosm. The masses have no more content than can be found in each individual. Ethics is not about deeds and consequences, but about *willing*, and willing itself occurs only in the individual. What is decided *morally* is not the fate of peoples, which only exists in appearance, but that of the individual. Peoples are in fact only abstractions: the individual alone really exists. – This is the relation of pantheism to ethics. – But the evils and miseries of the world were already out of tune with *theism*: which is why it tried to use all sorts of evasions and theodicies, which were, however, irretrievably undermined by the arguments of *Hume* and *Voltaire*. But *pantheism* is completely unviable in the face of the world's terrible aspect. It is only if we look at the world from the *outside* and the *physical* side alone, and keep in view only the constantly self-reestablishing order and thus the comparative imperishability of the whole – it is only then feasible to declare the world to be a god, although only ever symbolically. But if we go into the interior and include the *subjective* and *moral* aspects, with their preponderance of need, suffering and misery, of dissention, evil, insanity, and perversity; then we will soon become horribly aware that we have anything but a theophany before us. – But now I have shown and have also established in the text *On Will in Nature* that the driving and effective forces of nature are identical with the *will* in us. This brings the *moral* world order into direct connection with the forces that produce the phenomena of the world. For the *appearance* of the *will* must correspond precisely to its constitution: this is the basis for the discussion of *eternal justice* in §§ 63, 64 of the First Volume, and although the world exists by means of its own force, it has a thoroughly *moral* tendency. And so for the very first time the problem that has troubled people since Socrates has really been solved, and the demands of morally-oriented thinking reason have been satisfied. – But I have never been rash enough to claim that my philosophy leaves no questions unanswered. Philosophy in this sense is really impossible: it would be a doctrine of omniscience. But 'it is right to go to the limit if

<sup>a</sup> *subornirter, dann bloß bornirter*

<sup>b</sup> *Volksmassen*

there is no further path':<sup>a</sup> and there is a limit; reflection presses on to it, and can illuminate the night of our existence *this far*, even though the horizon always remains dark. I reach this limit with my doctrine of the will to life that affirms or negates itself in its own appearance. But to want to go further than this is, in my view, like wanting to fly out of the atmosphere. We must stay within the atmosphere, although new problems arise from ones that have been solved. We must moreover refer to the fact that the validity of the principle of sufficient reason is restricted to appearance: this was the theme of my first treatment of this principle, published in 1813. –<sup>b,114</sup>

I will now expand on some individual remarks, beginning with a few examples from classical poetry that support the explanation of *weeping* I gave in § 67 of the First Volume, namely that it comes from compassion directed at oneself. – At the end of the eighth book of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus, who is never portrayed as weeping throughout his many sufferings, bursts into tears while with the Phaeacian king and still unrecognized,<sup>115</sup> when he hears the bard Demodocus singing of his earlier heroic life and deeds, since this memory of his brilliant life stands in contrast to his current misery. And so it is not his misery directly but instead the objective consideration of this misery, the image of his present brought into relief by the past that summons his tears: he feels compassion for himself. – *Euripides* has the innocent but condemned Hippolytus express the same sensation when weeping over his own fate:

680

Woe! If I were only allowed to see myself,  
As I stand here and weep over my distress!<sup>c</sup>  
(1084)

Finally, I might include an anecdote from the English paper, the *Herald*, of 16 July, 1836, that supports my explanation. A client, upon hearing his lawyer present his case to the court, burst into tears and cried out: 'I did not know I suffered half so much until I heard it here today!' –

In § 55 of the First Volume I discussed how true moral *regret* is possible despite the inalterability of character, i.e. of the true basic will of a person; but I want to expand upon this discussion, and must begin with a few definitions. – *Inclination*<sup>d</sup> is any stronger susceptibility of the will for a

<sup>a</sup> *est quadam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra* [Horace, *Epistles*, I, 1, 32]

<sup>b</sup> [i.e. in *FR*, first edition]

<sup>c</sup> Φεῦ· εἴθ' ἦν ἐμαυτὸν προσβλέπειν ἐναντίον / στάνθ', ὥς ἐδάκρυς' οἷα πάσχομεν κακά (*Heu, si liceret mihi, me ipsum extrinsecus spectare, quantopere deflerem mala, quae patior.*) [from the play *Hippolytus*, lines 1078–9]

<sup>d</sup> *Neigung*

certain sort of motive. *Passion*<sup>a</sup> is an inclination so strong that the motive exciting it exerts more control<sup>b</sup> over the will than any counter-motive that might oppose it, and so it achieves absolute dominance<sup>c</sup> over the will, which consequently behaves *passively* with respect to it and *suffers* from it.<sup>d</sup> Yet we must note here that passions seldom reach the level that corresponds completely to the definition, instead they bear the name only as an approximation; and so there are still counter-motives that are able to inhibit their effects, if only we become clearly conscious of them. The *affect*<sup>e</sup> is an equally irresistible but only temporary excitation of the will by means of a motive that gets its force not from a deeply rooted inclination, but only because it arises suddenly and thus momentarily excludes the counter-effects of all other motives; this is due to the fact that it consists of a representation which, through its excessive liveliness, leaves the others completely in the dark or hidden (through being, as it were, too close), so that they do not enter consciousness and cannot act on the will, and so the ability to deliberate, and with it<sup>f</sup> *intellectual freedom*,\* is annulled to a certain degree. Accordingly, the affect is to the passion as febrile hallucinations are to madness.

681

Moral *regret* comes about when, prior to the deed, the inclination for the deed failed to give the intellect free room for manoeuvre, not permitting it to focus clearly and completely on the motives opposing it, and instead kept directing the intellect to motives that promoted the inclination. But once the deed was done it itself neutralized these motives and rendered them ineffective. Now reality brings the opposing motives before the intellect in the form of the already-achieved consequences of the deed, and now the intellect recognizes that these motives would have been stronger if only it had looked at them closely and weighed them. The person then becomes aware that he did something that was not really appropriate for his will: this cognition is regret. For he did not act with complete intellectual freedom, since not all motives were effective.<sup>f</sup> The motives that opposed the deed were excluded by an affect (in the case of hastiness) and by passion (in the case of deliberation). It is frequently also a

\* This is explained in the Appendix to my prize essay *On the Freedom of the Will* [see *FR*, 110–12 (Hübscher *SW* 4, 98–102)]

<sup>a</sup> *Leidenschaft*

<sup>b</sup> *Gewalt*

<sup>c</sup> *Herrschaft*

<sup>d</sup> *sich passiv, leidend verhält* [While the English word *passion* corresponds to the notion of *passivity*, the German term *Leidenschaft* corresponds to the German term *leiden*, meaning 'to suffer']

<sup>e</sup> *Affekt*

<sup>f</sup> *zur Wirksamkeit gelangen*

matter of his reason offering him the counter-motive in the abstract<sup>a</sup> but not supporting it by means of a sufficiently vivid imagination that could offer him images conveying the full content and true significance of these counter-motives. Examples of what we have been saying can be found in cases when vengeance, jealousy, or greed lead to murder: after the murder has been committed, these motives are extinguished and now considerations of justice and compassion, as well as memories of earlier friendship raise their voices and say everything that they would have said before if they had been allowed to speak. Then bitter regret steps in and says: 'if it hadn't happened, it would never happen'. An incomparable portrayal of this is found in the famous old Scottish ballad, also translated by Herder: 682  
'Edward! Edward!' –<sup>b</sup> Analogously, neglect of one's own well-being can lead to an egoistic regret: for instance, if an otherwise unadvisable marriage takes place as a result of passionate love that is extinguished by this very marriage, then this allows the counter-motives of personal interest, lost independence, etc., to enter consciousness and say what they would have said before if they had been allowed to speak. – All actions like these therefore arise fundamentally from a relative weakness of an intellect that allows itself to be overpowered by the will in the very place where it should have been uncompromisingly carrying out its function of presenting motives. The vehemence of the will is then only *indirectly* the cause, to the extent that it inhibits the intellect, thereby preparing the ground for regret. – The *reasonableness*<sup>c</sup> of character, *sôphrosune*,<sup>d</sup> which opposes its passionateness, really consists in the fact that the will never overpowers intellect to such an extent that it prevents the intellect from properly exercising its function of the presentation of clear, complete, and distinct motives, in the abstract<sup>e</sup> for reason, and concretely<sup>f</sup> for the imagination. This can be due as much to the moderation and mildness of the will as to the strength of the intellect. It is only required that the latter be strong enough *relative* to the will present, and thus that they stand in a suitable relation to each other. –

The following remarks are to be added to the presentation of the basic features of the *doctrine of right* from § 62 of the First Volume as well as § 17 of the prize essay, *On the Basis of Morals*.

<sup>a</sup> *in abstracto*

<sup>b</sup> [In *Stimmen der Völker in Liedern* (*Folk Voices in Songs*), ed. Johann von Müller (1807)]

<sup>c</sup> *Vernünftigkeit*

<sup>d</sup> σωφροσύνη

<sup>e</sup> *in abstracto*

<sup>f</sup> *in concreto*

People who deny, with *Spinoza*,<sup>117</sup> that *rights* exist outside of the state are confusing the means of enforcing rights with rights themselves. Of course *protection* of rights is only assured within the state, but rights themselves exist independent of the state. For they can only be suppressed, never abolished, by violence. Accordingly, the *state* is nothing more than a *protective institution*, made necessary by the many attacks to which people are subject and that they cannot fend off individually but only in concert with others. Accordingly, the goals of the state are:

683 (1) First of all external protection, which can be necessary against the inanimate forces of nature or even against wild animals as much as against humans, and thus against other peoples; although this latter is the most common and most important case, because man's worst enemy is man: 'man is a wolf to man'.<sup>a</sup> When this goal leads peoples to establish the principle (in words if not in deeds) of only ever acting defensively against each other, never aggressively, they are recognizing *the law of nations*.<sup>b</sup> Fundamentally this is nothing other than natural right, in the only sphere of practical effectiveness left to it, namely between peoples; it must reign there alone, because its stronger son, positive right, needs a judge and executive and so cannot establish its validity there. Accordingly, there arises a certain degree of morality in the interaction between peoples, and maintaining it is a matter of honour for humanity. Public opinion is the tribunal of cases based on honour.<sup>118</sup>

(2) Internal protection, which is to say the protection of members of a state from each other, and thus the security of *private right* through the maintenance of a *just state of affairs*, itself comprising the concentration of the forces of all for the protection of each individual, giving rise to a phenomenon in which it looks as if everyone is lawful, i.e. just, and that nobody wants to hurt another person.

But just as with all human matters, where the removal of an ill tends to open a path for a new one, the guarantee of this twofold protection makes necessary a third, namely:

(3) Protection against the protector, i.e. against the one or ones whom society has put in control of protection, which is to say securing *public right*. This seems to be achieved most perfectly by the triumvirate of protective powers, which is to say the legislative, judicial, and the executive powers, being divided and kept separate from each other, so that each is controlled by the others and separate from the others. – The great value, indeed the basic idea of monarchy seems to me to be that, because humans

<sup>a</sup> *homo homini lupus* [see p. 593, n. b]

<sup>b</sup> *Völkerrecht*

will be humans, one person must occupy such an elevated position, and so much power, wealth, security and absolute invulnerability must be given to him that he has nothing to want, hope for, and fear<sup>119</sup> *for himself*; by this means the egoism inherent in him, as in everyone, is negated through something like a neutralization process and now it is as if he were no longer a human being, and has the capacity to be just and to no longer have a good of his own but the public good. This is the origin of the (as it were) super-human being<sup>a</sup> that always accompanies regal dignity and makes it so enormously distinct from mere presidency. This is why it must be hereditary, not elected: so that nobody could view the king as his equal; but also so that he can provide for his descendents only by caring for the good of the state, which is completely identified with his family.<sup>120</sup>

684

If we assign other aims to the state besides that of protection as described here, this can easily endanger its true aim.

On my account, the *right to property* arises only through *working on* things. This often-cited truth receives a notable confirmation in the fact that it is upheld even in practice, in a remark by the North American ex-President *Quincy Adams* from the *Quarterly Review* of 1840, number 130, as well as in French in the *Bibliothèque universelle de Genève* 1840, July, no. 55. I will state it here in German:<sup>b</sup> ‘There are moralists who have questioned the right of the Europeans to intrude upon the possessions of the aboriginals in any case, and under any limitations whatsoever; but have they maturely considered the whole subject? The Indian right of possession itself stands, with regard to the greatest part of the country, upon a questionable foundation. Their cultivated fields, their constructed habitations, a space of ample sufficiency for their subsistence, and whatever they had annexed of themselves by personal labour, was undoubtedly, by the laws of nature, theirs. But what is the right of a huntsman to the forest of a thousand miles, over which he has accidentally ranged in quest of prey?’ etc. – Likewise those who in our days had occasion to give reasons against communism (for instance the Archbishop of Paris, in a pastoral letter from July 1851) have always advanced the argument that property is the result of labour, and is only embodied labour. – This proves however that the right to property can be grounded only in labour applied to things, since it is only in this respect that it is freely recognized and makes itself morally valid.<sup>121</sup>

685

A completely different illustration of the same truth is found in the moral fact that while the law punishes poaching just as harshly, or in many

<sup>a</sup> *des gleichsam übermenschlichen Wesens*

<sup>b</sup> [Schopenhauer quotes the passage in German. What is given here is the original text, not a translation from Schopenhauer’s German]

countries even more harshly, than the theft of money, it is nevertheless true that civil honour, which is irretrievably lost in theft, is not really forfeited by poaching; the poacher is certainly stigmatized, but if not guilty of anything else, he is not regarded as dishonest and universally shunned, as the thief is. This is because the principles of civil honour rest on moral and not on merely positive right: game is not an object that has been worked on, and so is not morally valid property: the right to game is therefore an entirely positive one, and is not recognized as a moral right.

*Criminal justice*, in my view, should be based on the principle that it is actually not the *person* but only the *deed* that is punished, in order to prevent it from happening again: the criminal is merely the material *through which* the deed is punished; so that the deterrent force remains with the law, which determines the punishment. This is what is meant by the expression: 'he has fallen afoul of the law'.<sup>122</sup> On *Kant's* account, which amounts to a right of retaliation,<sup>a</sup> it is not the deed but the person who is punished. – Even the penitentiary system aims to punish the person rather than the deed, in order precisely to improve him: it thus sets aside the true aim of punishment, deterring people from the deed, in order to attain the very problematic goal of improvement. But in general it is a very dubious undertaking to try to achieve two different ends with a single means; how much more so when the two are in any way opposed. Education is a benefit, punishment is supposed to be an ill: the penitentiary prison is supposed to do both at once. – Further, however great a role crudeness and ignorance (in addition to external distress) are supposed to play in many crimes, still these must not be viewed as the principal cause of the crime since countless people living in the same crude conditions and in precisely the same circumstances do not commit crimes. The main cause therefore reverts to the personal, moral character: but this, as I have shown in the prize essay *On Freedom of the Will*, is absolutely unalterable. Hence, true moral improvement is simply not possible, only deterrence from the deed. But cognition can certainly be corrected as well, and the desire to work can certainly be awoken: it remains to be seen how great an effect these will have. Given the aim of punishment as I presented it in the text, it is also clear that the apparent suffering a punishment involves should, where possible, exceed its actual suffering: solitary confinement does the opposite. There are no witnesses to the enormous suffering it involves, and those who have not experienced it do not anticipate it, so it is not a deterrent. It threatens those

<sup>a</sup> *jus talionis*

tempted into crime by deprivation and need with the opposite pole of human misery, boredom: but, as *Goethe* rightly remarked:

Once we've had a taste of proper pain,  
We're desperate to be bored again.<sup>a</sup>

The prospect of boredom will be as poor a deterrent in this case as the sight of the palatial prisons that honest people have built for villains. But if we want to regard these penitentiary prisons as educational institutions, it is regrettable that entrance to them is gained only by crime, when they should rather have come before the crime.

That the punishment, as *Beccaria*<sup>b</sup> taught, should fit the crime, rests not on the fact that it is an atonement for the crime, but on the fact that the pledge must fit the value of the item it guarantees. Thus anyone is justified in demanding another's life as a pledge to guarantee the security of his own; but not so for the security of his property, for which another's freedom etc. is enough of a pledge. The death penalty is therefore absolutely necessary to guarantee the life of the citizen. Those who want to abolish it should be told: 'first rid the world of murder, then the death penalty will follow'. In addition, decided attempts at murder should be treated like murder itself: for the law should punish the deed, not avenge the results.<sup>123</sup> In general the damage to be prevented provides the proper measure for the punishment that should be threatened, but not for the moral<sup>124</sup> unworthiness of the forbidden action. Thus the law can rightly punish someone with penal servitude for dropping a flowerpot from a window, or it can punish someone with hard labour for smoking in the forest in the summer, while permitting it in the winter. But to set the death penalty for shooting an aurochs, as in Poland, is going too far, because the preservation of the aurochs species should not be purchased with a human life. When determining the degree of punishment, we should consider first the magnitude of the damages to be prevented, but then the strength of the motive leading to the forbidden action.<sup>125</sup> A completely different standard for punishment would apply if the true reason for punishment were atonement, redemption, right of retaliation.<sup>c</sup> But the criminal code should be nothing other than a list of counter-motives to the possible criminal actions: that is why each of the counter-motives must decisively outweigh the motives for the criminal acts, and the more so, the greater the disadvantage that would arise from the act to be prevented, the stronger the temptation to commit

687

<sup>a</sup> [*Sprichwörtlich*]

<sup>b</sup> [Marchese Cesare Beccaria di Bonesana, *Dei delitti e delle pene* (*On crimes and punishments*) (1764)]

<sup>c</sup> *jus talionis*



the act, and the more difficult it is to convict the perpetrator – always under the correct assumption that the will is not free but rather determinable through motives – otherwise there would be no hold on it at all.<sup>126</sup> – So much for the doctrine of right. –

688 In my prize essay *On the Freedom of the Human Will*, I established the original and unalterable nature of the innate character from which the moral content of a course of life arises. This is a firm fact. But in order to grasp the scale of the problem it is sometimes necessary to juxtapose opposites sharply. This enables us to realize how unbelievably huge the innate difference between one human being and another really is, with respect to both moral and intellectual qualities. Here there is nobility and wisdom, there evil and stupidity. The one has goodness of heart shining from his eyes, or the mark of genius enthroned on his countenance. The vile physiognomy of the other is the unmistakable and indelible expression of moral worthlessness and intellectual idiocy, imprinted by the hands of nature itself: he looks as though he ought to be ashamed of his own existence. But the interior really does correspond to this exterior. We cannot possibly assume that such differences, which inform the whole essence of the person and are incapable of being abolished, and which moreover determine the course of his life in conflict with circumstances, could be present without the guilt or merit of the person affected, and could be the work of mere chance. It is evident from this alone that a person must in a certain sense be his own work. On the other hand, we can demonstrate the origin of those differences empirically in terms of the constitution of the parents; and in addition, the meeting and coming together of these parents is clearly the result of a highly contingent set of circumstances. – Such observations point us clearly towards the difference between the appearance and the essence in itself of things as the only solution to the problem. The thing in itself reveals itself only by means of the forms of appearance: and therefore what emerges from this must nevertheless appear in those forms, and thus in the bonds of causation: accordingly the thing in itself will present itself to us here as the work of a secret incomprehensible governance<sup>a</sup> of things, and the outer, empirical order of things, where everything that takes place happens by means of causes and therefore necessarily and with external determination, will present itself to us as the mere instrument of this secret order while the true ground lies in the interior of the thereby appearing essence. Of course we can only look at this solution to the problem from a great distance, and

<sup>a</sup> *Leitung*

when we think about it we end up in an abyss of thought, ‘thoughts beyond the reaches of our souls’,<sup>a</sup> as Hamlet says. I have set down my thoughts about this secret governance of things, a governance that can in fact only be conceived metaphorically, in the essay ‘On the apparent intentionality in the fate of the individual’ in the First Volume of the *Parerga*. –

In § 14 of my prize essay, *On the Basis of Morals*, there is a discussion of the essence of *egoism*, and the following attempt to reveal its root should be regarded as a supplement to that discussion. – Nature actually contradicts itself, depending on whether it speaks from the individual or from the universal, from the inside or from the outside, from the centre or from the periphery. It has its centre in every individual: for each one is the whole will to life. And thus, nature itself speaks from the individual, even if it is only an insect or a worm: ‘I alone am all in all: everything is bound up with my preservation, the rest may perish, it is truly nothing.’ Thus speaks nature from the *particular* standpoint, and hence from the standpoint of self-consciousness; and this is the basis of the *egoism* of every living thing. By contrast, from the *universal* standpoint – which is that of the *consciousness of other things* (and thus that of objective cognition as it averts its gaze for a moment from the individual that cognition is fastened to) – and thus from the exterior, from the periphery, nature speaks like this: ‘The individual is nothing and less than nothing. I destroy millions of individuals every single day, as a game, to kill time: I abandon their destiny to the most amusing and wilful of my children, to chance, which hunts them down at its pleasure. I create millions of new individuals every day, without diminishing my productive power; just as little as the power of a mirror is exhausted through the number of patches of sunlight that it casts successively on the wall. The individual is nothing.’ – Only someone who really knows how to unify and reconcile this glaring contradiction on the part of nature has a true answer to the question of the perishability or imperishability of his own self.<sup>b</sup> I believe I have given a serviceable introduction to such cognition in the first four chapters of this Fourth Book of the supplementary materials. But what has been said above can also be clarified in the following way. Insofar as he looks inward, every individual recognizes in his essence (which is his will) the thing in itself, and thus the only thing that is real everywhere. Accordingly, he grasps himself as the kernel and middle point of the world, and finds himself endlessly important. If on the other hand he looks to the outside, then he is in the province of representation, of mere appearance, where he sees himself as an individual among innumerable many individuals, hence as something

689

690

<sup>a</sup> [Hamlet, Act 1, sc. 4]

<sup>b</sup> *des eigenen Selbst*

insignificant in the highest degree, indeed as in the process of vanishing completely. Consequently every individual, even the most insignificant, every I, seen from within, is all in all; on the other hand, seen from without, he is nothing, or as good as nothing. This then accounts for the great difference between what everyone necessarily is in his own eyes and what he is in everyone else's eyes, and thus accounts for the *egoism* with which everyone reproaches everyone else. –

As a consequence of this egoism, everyone's fundamental mistake is this: that we are not-I to each other. On the other hand, to be just, noble, and humane<sup>a</sup> is simply to translate my metaphysics into action. – Saying that time and space are mere forms of our cognition, not determinations of the things in themselves, is the same as saying that the doctrine of metempsychosis ('one day you will be reborn as the one you are now harming, and you will suffer the same harm') is identical with the frequently cited Brahmanic formula *tat tvam asi*, 'you are that'. – As I have often said, particularly in § 22 of the prize essay, *On the Basis of Morals*, all true virtue stems from direct, *intuitive* cognition of the metaphysical identity of all beings. But this means that it is not the result of any particular superiority of intellect; rather even the weakest intellect will be able to see through the principle of individuation,<sup>b</sup> which is what matters here. Accordingly, even those with a weak understanding may possess the most excellent character, and furthermore, the excitation of our compassion is not accompanied by any particular effort of our intellect. It seems rather that everyone would be able to perform the necessary act of seeing through the principle of individuation,<sup>c</sup> if it were not for the opposition of his *will*, which does not usually allow this to happen due to the will's unmediated, secret, and despotic influence on the intellect; and so all guilt ultimately falls back on the will, which is fitting.

691 The above-mentioned doctrine of metempsychosis deviates from the truth only in that it puts off into the future what is the case in the present. To be precise, it holds that my inner essence in itself exists in another person only after my death, while in truth, it already lives in this other even now, and death merely abolishes the illusion that prevents me from becoming aware of this, just as the countless host of stars always shines above our heads but only becomes visible to us when the *one* nearby earth's sun has set. From this perspective, however much my individual existence outshines everything else, as the sun does, it appears at base only as an

<sup>a</sup> *menschenfreundlich*

<sup>b</sup> *principium individuationis*

<sup>c</sup> *principii individuationis*

obstacle that stands between me and cognition of the true extent of my being.<sup>a</sup> Every individual is subject to this obstacle within his cognition, and so it is individuation that keeps the will to life in error concerning its own nature:<sup>b</sup> it is the *māyā* of Brahmanism. Death is a refutation of this error and abolishes it. I believe that at the moment of death we become aware that a mere illusion had limited our existence to our person. Empirical traces of this can even be demonstrated in several states related to death in that they abolish the concentration of consciousness in the brain, magnetic sleep being the most prominent of these; in the highest levels of magnetic sleep, various symptoms demonstrate our existence beyond our person and in other beings, the most striking of these being direct participation in the thoughts of another individual and ultimately even the ability to recognize things that are absent, distant, or even in the future, which is a kind of omnipresence.

Three phenomena are based on this metaphysical identity of the will as thing in itself amid the countless multiplicity of the appearances of the will. These phenomena can be brought under the common concept of *sympathy*:<sup>c</sup> (1) *compassion*,<sup>d</sup> which, as I have shown, is the basis of justice and loving kindness, *caritas*; (2) *sexual love*, with its obstinate selectivity, *amor*, which is the life of the species and maintains its precedence over the individual; (3) *magic*, which also includes animal magnetism and sympathetic cures. Thus *sympathy* is to be defined as the empirical emergence of the metaphysical identity of the will through the physical multiplicity of its appearances, which manifests a connectedness that is entirely different from the connections mediated by the forms of appearance, which we conceive under the principle of sufficient reason.

692

<sup>a</sup> *Wesen*

<sup>b</sup> *Wesen*

<sup>c</sup> *Sympathie*

<sup>d</sup> *Mitleid*

*On the Doctrine of the Negation of the Will to Life*

Someone has his existence and essence either *with* his will, i.e. his consent, or *without* it; in the latter case, such an existence, embittered through inevitable sufferings of all kinds, would be a glaring injustice. – The ancients, for example the Stoics, but also the Peripatetics and the Academics, tried in vain to prove that virtue was sufficient to make life happy: experience cried out loudly against this. These philosophers' efforts were, if unconsciously, guided by the assumption that there was *justice* in the matter: someone *innocent* should also be free of suffering, and therefore happy. The only serious and profound solution to the problem lies in the Christian doctrine that works do not justify;<sup>a</sup> and so even someone who has exhibited every justice and loving kindness, and thus the good, virtue,<sup>b</sup> is not for that matter, as *Cicero* claims, 'free of all guilt'<sup>c</sup> (*Tusculan Disputations* V, 1): rather, *el delito mayor del hombre es haber nacido* (man's greatest guilt is that he was born), as *Calderón*,<sup>d</sup> a poet enlightened by Christianity, expresses it, on the basis of a much more profound cognition than the aforementioned sages. The fact that this implies that human beings come into the world in a state of guilty indebtedness<sup>e</sup> can seem absurd only to those who claim that we come to be from nothing and are the work of another.<sup>127</sup> As a result of *this* guilt, which must therefore stem from his will, the human being remains abandoned, rightly, to physical and mental suffering, even if he has practised all those virtues, and so is *not* happy. This follows from the notion of *eternal justice*, which I discussed in § 63 of the First Volume. But, as *St Paul* (Romans 3:21ff.), *Augustine* and *Luther* teach, the fact that works cannot

693

\* This chapter relates to § 68 of the First Volume. It is also to be compared to Chapter 14 of the Second Volume of the *Parerga*.

<sup>a</sup> *rechtfertigen*

<sup>b</sup> ἄγαθόν, *honestum*

<sup>c</sup> *culpa omni carens*

<sup>d</sup> [*La vida es sueño* (*Life is a dream*), 1653, Act I, sc. 1]

<sup>e</sup> *verschuldet*

justify us, since we all essentially are and remain sinners, is ultimately based on the fact that, because works follow from essence,<sup>a</sup> if we acted as we should, we must also be what we should. But then we would need no *redemption*<sup>b</sup> from our present state, something that not only Christianity but also Brahmanism and Buddhism present as the highest goal (expressed in English by the term *final emancipation*): i.e. we would not need to become completely different, indeed the opposite of what we are. But because we are what we should *not* be, we necessarily do what we should *not* do. This is why we need a complete reconfiguration of our meaning and essence, i.e. a rebirth that results in redemption. Even if guilt lies in actions, in works,<sup>c</sup> the root of the guilt still lies in our essence and existence,<sup>d</sup> since the works proceed necessarily from these, as I have shown in the prize essay *On the Freedom of the Human Will*. Thus our only true sin is in fact original sin. Now the Christian myth claims that this came about only after humans were created, and therefore attributes free will to human beings, which is impossible:<sup>e</sup> but it does this only in the form of a myth. The innermost kernel and spirit of Christianity is the same as that of Brahmanism and Buddhism: they all teach a harsh guilty indebtedness of the human race by virtue of its very existence; except that, while those other ancient dogmas<sup>f</sup> all proceeded in a direct and straightforward manner by positing guilt as a direct result of existence itself, Christianity does not do this, claiming instead that guilt is brought about through a deed performed by the first human couple. This was possible only through the fiction of a *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae*,<sup>g</sup> and was necessary only because of the fundamental Jewish dogma on to which the doctrine of Christianity was to be grafted. In truth, the very origin of man himself is the act of his free will and thus the same as the fall into sin;<sup>h</sup> so the original sin of which all other sins are consequences had already arisen along with the person's *essentia* and *existentia*, even though Jewish dogma never permitted such an idea; this is what Augustine taught in his book *On Free Choice of the Will*,<sup>i</sup> that it was only as Adam before the Fall that human beings were innocent and in possession of a free will; from then on they were ensnared in the necessity of sin. – The law, *nomos*,<sup>j</sup> in the biblical sense, forever demands that we alter our deeds, while

<sup>a</sup> *operari sequitur esse*

<sup>b</sup> *Erlösung*

<sup>c</sup> *im operari*

<sup>d</sup> *essentia et existentia*

<sup>e</sup> *per impossibile*

<sup>f</sup> *Glaubenslehren*

<sup>g</sup> [free choice of indifference]

<sup>h</sup> *Sündenfall*

<sup>i</sup> *de libero arbitrio*

<sup>j</sup> ὁ νόμος

our essence remains unaltered. But because this is impossible, *Paul* claims that nobody is justified before the law: only a rebirth in Jesus Christ as a consequence of the effect of grace, which allows a new person to arise and the old to be abolished (i.e. a fundamental change of heart)<sup>a</sup> – only this could remove us from the state of sinfulness and place us into one of freedom and redemption. This is the Christian myth, with respect to ethics. But clearly the Jewish theism that the Christian myth is grafted on to had to be enhanced to an extraordinary degree to be joined to that myth: the fable of the Fall was the only place available for the grafted twig of the ancient Indian stem. It is because these difficulties were forcibly overcome that the Christian mysteries have acquired such a strange appearance, one that flies in the face of common sense; this complicated proselytism and (due to an inability to grasp the profound sense of the Christian mysteries) led to the opposition of Pelagianism or contemporary rationalism, which try to explain the mysteries away by exegesis,<sup>b</sup> thus reducing Christianity to Judaism.

695 But to speak without the use of myth, our world can be nothing other than it is, as long as our will is the same. Of course, everyone wants to be redeemed from the state of suffering and death: they would like, as people say, to achieve eternal bliss, to enter the kingdom of heaven, but not on their own two feet: they would like to be carried there by the course of nature. But this is impossible. For nature is only the image, the shadow of our will. Thus although it will never let us fall and become nothing: it still cannot lead us anywhere except back to nature again. Everyone experiences through his own living and dying how precarious it is to exist as a part of nature. – This is why existence is certainly to be seen as a mistake from which redemption is a return: indeed existence has this character throughout. The ancient Samana religions grasp the meaning of existence in this way, as does authentic and original Christianity, although in a roundabout manner: even Judaism itself contains at least the seed of such a view in the Fall (this is its *redeeming feature*).<sup>c</sup> Only Greek paganism and Islam are entirely optimistic; thus with the former, the opposing tendency had to get an airing in tragedy at least; but in Islam, the newest as well as the worst of all religions, it appeared as *Sufism*, this exceedingly beautiful phenomenon<sup>d</sup> that is thoroughly Indian in spirit and origin and has now survived for over a thousand years.<sup>128</sup> There is in fact no goal to our existence except the recognition that we would have been better off not existing. But this is the

<sup>a</sup> *Sinnesänderung*

<sup>b</sup> *wegzuexegesiren*

<sup>c</sup> [Schopenhauer uses the English phrase]

<sup>d</sup> *Erscheinung*

most important of all truths, and it must therefore be expressed however much it conflicts with today's European way of thought: by contrast, it is the most widely acknowledged fundamental truth in the whole of non-Islamic Asia, today just as much as three thousand years ago.<sup>129</sup>

Given what we have said, if we now consider the will to life as a whole and objectively, then we have to think of it as caught up in a *delusion*;<sup>a</sup> to return from this delusion, that is to say to negate the whole of its striving, is what religions describe as self-denial, abnegation of one's own self:<sup>b</sup> for the genuine self is the will to life. As we have shown, the moral virtues, that is to say justice and loving kindness,<sup>c</sup> spring (when pure) from the fact that the will to life sees through the principle of individuation<sup>d</sup> and recognizes itself again in all its appearances; as such, the virtues are in the first place a sign, a symptom that the appearing will is no longer entirely imprisoned in that delusion, but rather that the disillusionment has already begun; so one could say metaphorically it is already beating its wings to fly away. By contrast, injustice, malice, and cruelty signify the converse, which is to say therefore the deepest imprisonment in that delusion. In the second place, however, those moral virtues encourage self-denial and thus the negation of the will to life. This is because true righteousness, inviolable justice – this first and most important of the cardinal virtues – poses such a difficult task that whoever professes it unconditionally and from the bottom of his heart is forced to make sacrifices that soon deprive life of the sweetness that taking pleasure in it brings, thereby turning the will from life and leading it on to resignation. It is precisely the costly sacrifices that make righteousness honourable: it is not admired in trivial matters. Its essence consists precisely in the fact that someone who is just does not shift on to others – through cunning or violence – the burdens and sufferings that life entails, as the unjust do, but rather accepts his lot; which means that he has to bear undiminished the full load of evil that accrues to human life. In this way, a sense of justice encourages negation of the will to life, since need and suffering, the true destiny of human life, are the consequences of justice, but also lead the way to resignation. The virtue of loving kindness, *caritas*, is even further-reaching and leads to resignation even more quickly because it is the means for someone to assume even the sufferings that originally fell to others, and to take on an even greater quantity of these sufferings than the individual would encounter in the normal course of events. Someone

696

<sup>a</sup> *Wahn*

<sup>b</sup> *abnegatio sui ipsius*

<sup>c</sup> *Menschenliebe*

<sup>d</sup> *principium individuationis*



blessed with this virtue has recognized his own essence in every other. Through this virtue he identifies his own lot with that of humanity in general: but this lot is a hard one, with troubles, suffering, and death. Someone who renounces every accidental advantage and wills for himself no other lot than the lot of humanity in general, will not be able to do this for long: the attachment to life and its pleasures must soon fade and give way to a general renunciation: and thus appears the negation of the will. Now because according to this the most complete exercise of the moral virtues will lead to poverty, deprivations, and many types of personal suffering, many will reject  
 697 *asceticism*, narrowly conceived, as superfluous, and perhaps rightly so – asceticism that involves relinquishing all property, intentionally seeking out the unpleasant and repulsive, self-torture, fasting, hair shirts, and mortification of the flesh. Justice itself is the hair shirt that is a constant source of hardship for the owner, and the loving kindness that gives away life's necessities is the constant fasting.<sup>\*,130</sup> This is why *Buddhism* is free from that rigorous and excessive asceticism that plays such a large role in Brahmanism, that is to say intentional self-torture. It is satisfied with celibacy, voluntary poverty, the humility and obedience of the monks, as well as abstinence from animal food, as from all worldliness.<sup>131</sup> Further, since the goal to which the moral virtues lead is the one established here, the Vedanta philosophy\*\* rightly says that after true cognition<sup>a</sup> has appeared and in its wake complete resignation, which is to say rebirth, then the morality or immorality of the earlier behaviour is a matter of indifference, and here again it uses the frequently cited Brahmanic saying, 'the knot of the heart will be cut, all doubts resolved, and his works will come to nothing with the vision of the highest' (*Sankara, sloka 32*).<sup>b</sup> As repulsive as this view might be to many people who think that reward in heaven or punishment in hell constitutes a much more satisfactory explanation of the ethical significance of human action (just as the good *Windischmann* rejects the other view with horror even as he describes it), still, anyone who gets to the bottom of the  
 698 matter will find that it ultimately agrees with the Christian view, particularly

\* To the extent that one accepts asceticism, the list of the ultimate incentives of human action that I gave in my prize essay *On the Basis of Morals*, namely (1) one's own well-being (2) another's woe and (3) another's well-being, must be supplemented by a fourth: one's own woe. I mention this here in passing merely in the interest of systematic consistency. Since the prize question was posed in the context of the philosophical ethics dominant in Protestant Europe, this fourth wellspring had to be passed over in silence.

\*\* See F. H. H. Windischmann's *Sancara, sive de theologumenis Vedanticorum*, p. 116, 117 and 121–3; as well as *Oupnek'hat*, vol. 1, p. 340, 356, 360 [See p. 524, n.; p. 474, n. a]

<sup>a</sup> *Erkenntniß*

<sup>b</sup> *Finditur nodus cordis, dissolvuntur omnes dubitationes, ejusque opera evanescent, viso supremo illo* [see p. 524, n. c]

as urged by Luther, that it is not works but only faith, an effect of grace, that makes blessed, so that we can never be justified by our deeds but can achieve forgiveness for our sins only through the service of an intermediary. In fact, it is easy to see that in the absence of assumptions like these, Christianity would have to propose an endless punishment for all and Brahmanism an endless rebirth, so that there would be no redemption in either case. Sinful acts and their consequences must be removed and annihilated, whether through an outside source of mercy or through the emergence of one's own superior cognition; otherwise the world has no salvation to hope for: but afterwards these acts are a matter of indifference. This is also the 'repentance and forgiveness of sins'<sup>a</sup> that is finally announced by the already risen Christ to his Apostles as the totality of their mission (Luke 24:47).<sup>132</sup> The moral virtues are not the final goal, but only a step towards it. In Christian myth this step is designated by the eating from the tree of the knowledge<sup>b</sup> of good and evil, where moral responsibility enters along with original sin. In truth, this is itself the affirmation of the will to life; the negation of this will, on the other hand, is redemption, the result of the onset of superior cognition. Between the two is morality: it accompanies human beings as a lantern on their way from affirmation to negation of the will, or, mythically, from the entry of original sin up to redemption through faith in the mediation of the incarnate God (avatar); or, according to the Vedic doctrine, through all the rebirths that are the result of each work, up until true cognition and with it redemption (final emancipation),<sup>c</sup> *moksha*, i.e. reunification with *Brahman*, comes about. The Buddhists however are completely honest and describe the matter in purely negative terms, by means of *nirvana*, which is the negation of this world, or of *samsara*. If *nirvana* is defined as the nothing,<sup>d</sup> this is intended only to mean that *samsara* does not contain a single element that could serve to define or construct *nirvana*. This is why the *Jains*, who are different from Buddhists only in name, call the Veda-believing Brahmans *sabda-pramana*, a nickname that is supposed to show that the Brahmans believe hearsay that can be neither known nor proven (*Asiatic Researches*, vol. 6, p. 474).<sup>133</sup>

699

When many ancient philosophers, like Orpheus, the Pythagoreans, Plato (e.g. in *Phaedo*, p. 151, 183f. Bipont,<sup>e,134</sup> and see Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* III, p. 400f.) join St Paul in deploring the communion of the soul with the body and wish to be free of it, we understand the true and

<sup>a</sup> μετάνοια καὶ ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν

<sup>b</sup> *Erkenntniß*

<sup>c</sup> [Schopenhauer uses the English term]

<sup>d</sup> *das Nichts*

<sup>e</sup> [See, e.g., *Phaedo* 66b–67a, 114d–115a]

genuine meaning of this complaint to the extent that we have recognized, in the Second Book, that the body is the will itself, objectively intuited as spatial appearance.

The hour of death decides whether a person will fall back into the womb of nature, or whether he will no longer belong to nature but rather . . . : we have no image, concept, or word for this alternative, precisely because these are all derived from the objectivation of the will and thus belong to this objectivation, and consequently are in no way able to express the absolute opposite of these, which therefore remains a mere negation for us. At the same time, the death of the individual is the constant and tirelessly repeated question nature asks of the will to life: 'have you had enough? Do you want to leave me?' The individual life is short simply to allow this question to be posed often enough. This is the intended sense of Brahmanic ceremonies, prayers and exhortations at the time of death, as they are described in many passages in the Upanishads, and likewise of the Christian solicitude that the hour of death be used properly, with exhortation, confessions, communion and extreme unction: this also explains the Christian prayer to be preserved from a sudden end. The fact that this is precisely what many people hope for these days only shows that they no longer have a Christian perspective, which is that of the negation of the will to life, but rather that of affirmation, the pagan perspective.

700 But the person who will have the least fear of becoming nothing in death is the one who has recognized that he is already nothing, and who therefore does not take any more interest in his individual appearance, since cognition has, as it were, burned and consumed the will in him, so that no will, and thus no craving<sup>a</sup> for individual existence is left in him.

Individuality inheres firstly in the intellect, which reflects appearance and in virtue of this belongs to appearance, which itself assumes the form of the principle of individuation.<sup>b</sup> But it also inheres in the will to the extent that character is individual, while character is itself abolished in the negation of the will. Individuality therefore inheres only in the affirmation of the will, not in its negation. Even holiness, associated with every purely moral action, is due to the fact that every such action ultimately derives from the unmediated recognition of the numerical identity of the inner essence of all living things.\* But this identity is really present only in the state of negation of the will (*nirvana*) since the affirmation of this identity

\* Compare *The Two fundamental Problems of Ethics*, p. 274 [BM, 253–4 (Hübscher SW 4, 271)]

<sup>a</sup> *Sucht*

<sup>b</sup> *principium individuationis*

(*samsara*) has the form of the will's appearance in its multiplicity. Affirmation of the will to life, of the world of appearance, the diversity of all beings, individuality, egoism, hatred, malice, all stem from a *single* root; and, on the other side, so do the world of the thing in itself, the identity of all beings, justice, loving kindness, the negation of the will to life. But now, as I have sufficiently demonstrated, the moral virtues arise from an awareness of that identity of all beings; but this does not lie in appearance but rather only in the thing in itself, in the root of all beings; and so a virtuous action is a momentary passage through the point to which the negation of the will to life is a permanent return.

A corollary of what has been said is that we have no reason to assume that there are more perfect intelligences than those of humans. For it is plain that human intelligence already provides the will with insight enough for it to negate and abolish itself, and so individuality and hence intelligence (as a mere tool of individual, and so of animal nature) ceases to exist. This will seem less objectionable to us when we consider that even the most perfect intelligence that we might tentatively assume for this purpose can still not be thought of as existing throughout endless time, which would be much too impoverished to constantly provide it with new and worthy objects. Since the essence of all things is basically identical, all cognition of this essence is necessarily tautological: if it is grasped once, as this most perfect intelligence will quickly grasp it, what remains for such an intelligence except mere repetition and its boredom throughout all of endless time? Even from this angle we are referred to the fact that the goal of all intelligence can only be reaction to a will: but because all willing is an error,<sup>a</sup> the final work of the intelligence is the abolition of this willing, whose goals it has served to this point. Accordingly, even the most perfect intelligence possible can only be a transitional stage to something that no cognition could ever reach: indeed, such an intelligence can in the essence of things occupy only the moment of perfect, achieved insight.<sup>b</sup>

701

In agreement with all these observations and with the fact that, as the Second Book established, will is the origin of cognition and cognition serves its ends, thereby reflecting an affirmation of the will, while true salvation lies in the negation of the will – in agreement with this, we see all religions turning, at their apex, to mysticism and mysteries, i.e. obscurity and concealment; in fact these indicate a blind spot for cognition, namely the point at which all cognition necessarily comes to an end, a point, therefore, that can be expressed for thinking only through negations, for

<sup>a</sup> *Irrsal*

<sup>b</sup> *Einsicht*

sensible intuition through symbolic signs, and in temples through darkness and silence; and in Brahmanism through the requisite suspension<sup>a</sup> into the ground of one's own self, by mentally uttering the mysterious *oum*.<sup>\*,135</sup>

702 Mysticism in the broadest sense is any instruction leading towards direct awareness<sup>b</sup> of what is unreachable by either intuition or concept, and hence what cannot be reached by any cognition at all. The mystics are opposed to philosophers in that they begin from within while philosophers begin from without. More precisely, mystics proceed from their inner, positive, individual experience, in which they discover themselves to be the eternal, unique being, etc. But none of this can be communicated because we must take the mystic at his word in these claims: so he cannot convince. Philosophers on the other hand proceed from what is common to everyone, from objective appearances that everyone can see, and from facts of self-consciousness as they present themselves in each of us. The philosophers' method is therefore to reflect on all of this and the combination of the data thus given: this is why they can convince. But as a result, the philosopher must therefore guard against falling into the ways of the mystics and, by using something like intellectual intuitions or supposed direct rational perceptions, hold out false hopes of a positive cognition of what is eternally inaccessible to all cognition, what can be described at most by negation. Philosophy gets its value and dignity by disdaining ungrounded assumptions and using as data only what can be established with certainty within the intuitively given external world, within the forms of apprehension of this world constitutive of our intellect, and in the consciousness of one's own self that is common to everyone. This is

703 why philosophy must remain cosmology and cannot become theology. Its subject matter must restrict itself to the world: all that philosophy can honestly do is to express in every way what the world *is*, what it *is* in its deepest innermost aspect. – In keeping with this, when my teaching reaches

\* If we bear in mind this essentially *immanent nature of our own and every kind of cognition*, which stems from its being something secondary, arising only for the goals of the will – then we will be able to understand how mystics of every religion ultimately arrive at a type of *ecstasy* in which all and every *cognition* comes to a complete halt, together with its basic *subject–object* form, and how they are assured of reaching their highest goal only in what lies beyond all cognition, since they come to where there is no subject and no object and therefore no longer any type of cognition, precisely because there is no longer any will and the only function of cognition is to serve the will.

Whoever has grasped this will not find it so completely crazy that fakirs sit and, staring at their noses, try to banish all thought and representation, and that in many places in the Upanishads the direction is given to sink into one's innermost self where subject and object and all cognition fall away, by silent, inner utterance of the mysterious *oum*.

<sup>a</sup> *Einkehr*

<sup>b</sup> *Innewerden*

its highest point, it assumes a *negative* character, and thus ends with a negation. It can, to be exact, speak only of what is denied, surrendered: it needs (at the end of the Fourth Book) to describe as *nothing* what is thereby gained and grasped, and can merely add the consolation that that this is only a relative nothing, not an absolute one. For if something is nothing of all that we know,<sup>a</sup> then it is certainly nothing at all for us. But this still does not mean that it is absolutely nothing, that it has to be nothing from every possible perspective and in every possible sense; but only that we are restricted to a wholly negative cognition of it, due very probably to the restrictions of our standpoint.<sup>136</sup> – But this is precisely where the mystic proceeds positively; from this point onwards, nothing remains but mysticism. At the same time, anyone who wants this kind of supplement to the negative cognition that is all that philosophy can provide, will find it at its richest and most beautiful in the *Oupnek'hat*,<sup>b</sup> in the *Enneads* of Plotinus, in *Scotus Erigena*, and in passages in *Jacob Böhme*, but particularly in the wonderful work of *Madame Guyon*, *The Torrents*,<sup>c</sup> and in *Angelus Silesius*,<sup>d</sup> and finally in the poems of the *Sufis* (*Tholuck* has provided us with a collection of these in Latin and another in German translation)<sup>e</sup> as well as in many other works. The *Sufis* are the Gnostics of Islam; thus even *Sadi*<sup>f</sup> describes them using a word that is translated as 'insightful'. Theism, directed at the abilities of the masses, posits the fundamental source of existence outside of us, as an object: all mysticism, and so Sufism as well, gradually (at different stages of initiation) draws this source back into us, as the subject, and the adept ultimately recognizes with joy and wonder that he is himself this source. This procedure is common to all mystics, and we find it in *Meister Eckhart*, the father of German mysticism, articulated not only in the form of a prescription for the complete ascetic, 'that he not look for God outside himself' (Eckhart's *Works*, edited by Pfeiffer, vol. I, p. 626);<sup>g</sup> but also expressed with the greatest naïveté in Eckhart's spiritual daughter, after she had experienced this transformation in herself, looking for him to call to him joyfully 'Master, rejoice for me, I have become God!' (ibid., p. 465).<sup>137</sup> In precisely this spirit the mysticism of the *Sufis* expresses itself primarily as revelling in the consciousness that one is oneself the kernel of the world and the source of all existence to which all

704

<sup>a</sup> *kennen*

<sup>b</sup> [See p. 474, n. a]

<sup>c</sup> *Les Torrents* [Jeanne-Marie Bouvier de la Motte-Guyon, *Les Torrents Spirituels* (*Spiritual Torrents*) (1682)]

<sup>d</sup> [Angelus Silesius (Johann Scheffler), *Cherubinischer Wandersmann* (*Cherubic Wanderer*) (1674)]

<sup>e</sup> [Friedrich August Gottfried Tholuck, *Sufismus sive Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica* etc. (*Sufism or the pantheistic theosophy of the Persians*) (1821); *Blüthensammlung aus der morgenländischen Mystik* etc. (*Anthology of oriental mysticism*) (1825)]

<sup>f</sup> [See p. 108, n. f]

<sup>g</sup> [Franz Pfeiffer (ed.), *Meister Eckhart* (1857)]

things return.<sup>138</sup> Often, of course, this comes with the requirement to relinquish all willing, as the only thing that can liberate the individual from existence and its suffering; but this requirement is subordinate and demanded as something easy. In Hindu mysticism on the other hand, this last aspect is more pronounced, and in Christian mysticism it is completely dominant, so that in the Christian case the pantheistic consciousness essential to all mysticism emerges only as secondary, as the result of relinquishing all willing, as a unification with God. In keeping with this difference of interpretation, Mohammedan mysticism has a very cheerful character, Christian mysticism a dark and painful character, and Hindu mysticism, standing above both, holds the middle ground in this respect too.

705 Quietism (i.e. the cessation of all willing, asceticism, i.e. the intentional extirpation<sup>a</sup> of one's own will) and mysticism (i.e. consciousness of the identity of one's own being with that of all things, or the kernel of the world) stand in the closest of connections, so that someone professing one of them will gradually be led to adopt the other as well, even against his principles. – Given the most profound differences in their ages, countries, and religions, nothing can be more surprising than the concurrence of the authors teaching these doctrines, along with the unshakable certainty and inner confidence with which they describe the state of their inner experiences. They do not constitute anything like a *sect* that adheres to, defends, and propagates some theoretically popular and one-time convincing dogma;<sup>b</sup> rather, they are for the most part unaware of each other; indeed, the Indian, Christian, Mohammedan mystics, quietists, and ascetics are quite different in every respect except the inner meaning and spirit of their teachings. A very striking example of this can be seen by comparing Guyon's *Torrents* with the doctrine of the Vedas, especially the passage in *Oupnek'hat*,<sup>c</sup> vol. 1, p. 63, which has the same content as that French text, in abbreviated but accurate form, and even has the same images; yet it is impossible for Madame de Guyon to have been familiar with it around 1680. In the *German Theology* (the only undistorted edition, Stuttgart 1851)<sup>d</sup> it says, in Chapters 2 and 3, that the fall of the devil, like that of Adam, consisted of the one, like the other, attributing to himself the I and Me, the Mine and to Me.<sup>e</sup> On p. 89 it says: 'In true love there is neither I nor Me, Mine, to Me, You, Yours, and the like.' Correspondingly, it says in

<sup>a</sup> *Ertödtung*

<sup>b</sup> *ein Mal ergriffenes Dogma*

<sup>c</sup> [See p. 474, n. a]

<sup>d</sup> [*Theologia Deutsch*, ed. Franz Pfeiffer (1851). Schopenhauer refers to it as 'Deutsche Theologie'; it is also known as *Theologica Germanica*; the first text was published by Martin Luther in 1516]

<sup>e</sup> *das Ich und Mich, das Mein und Mir*

the *Kural*, translated from the Tamil by Graul,<sup>a</sup> p. 8, ‘the outward passion of Mine and the inward passion of I come to an end’ (compare verse 346). And in the *Manual of Buddhism* by Spence Hardy,<sup>b</sup> p. 258, Buddha says: ‘my students reject the idea “I am this”, or “this is mine”’. In general, disregarding the forms introduced by external circumstances and getting to the bottom of the matter, Shakyamuni<sup>c</sup> and Meister Eckhart teach the same thing; except that the former was allowed to express his thoughts straightforwardly while the latter was required to clothe them in the garb of Christian mythology and adapt his expressions to this mythology. But Meister Eckhart gets to the point where Christian mythology is little more than a metaphorical language, almost like Hellenic mythology for the Neoplatonists: he takes it all allegorically. It is noteworthy in this regard that St Francis’ passage from prosperity to beggary is very similar to the even greater transition of the Buddha Shakyamuni from prince to beggar, and that accordingly, Francis’ life as well as his order was really only a type of *sannyāsa*. Indeed, it should be mentioned that his relation to the Indian spirit also stands out in his great love of animals and his frequent interaction with them, in which he always described them as his brothers and sisters; it is the same with his beautiful *Cantico*,<sup>d</sup> which announces his innate Indian spirit by praising the sun, the moon, the stars, the wind, the water, the fire, and the earth.<sup>\*139</sup>

706

Even the Christian quietists would often have had little or no information about each other, e.g. Molinos and Guyon, of Tauler and the *German Theology*; or Gichtel of the former. Nor did great differences of education have any significant influence on their teachings; several, such as *Molinos* were educated, while others, like *Gichtel* and many more, were uneducated. Their great inner agreement proves that they speak from a real inner experience, and does so all the more convincingly because of the firmness and assurance of their claims; but this experience is not open to all, rather it is shared by only a favoured few, and is therefore described as the effect of divine grace,<sup>e</sup> although the reality of it cannot be doubted for the reasons

\* S. Bonaventurae vita S. Francisci [Saint Bonaventure’s *Life of St Francis*], ch. 8.– K. Hase, *Franz von Assisi*, ch. 10. – *I cantici di S. Francesco* [*The Canticles of St Francis*], edited by Schlosser and Steinle. Frankfurt am Main 1842.

<sup>a</sup> [Karl Graul, *Tamulische Schriften zur Erläuterung des Vedanta-Systems oder der rechtgläubigen Philosophie der Hindus* (Tamil writings to explain the Vedanta system or orthodox philosophy of the Hindus) (1854)]

<sup>b</sup> [See p. 519, n. a]

<sup>c</sup> [i.e. Buddha]

<sup>d</sup> [*Cantico delle Creature* (1224), also known as *Canticle of the Creatures*, *Canticle of the Sun*]

<sup>e</sup> *Gnadenwirkung*



given above. To understand all of this you must read them yourself and not make do with second-hand reports: for everyone must be heard before being judged. To familiarize yourself with quietism I particularly recommend Meister Eckhart,<sup>140</sup> *The German Theology*, Tauler, Guyon, Antoinette Bourignon, the Englishman Bunyan, Molinos,\* Gichtel: similarly, as practical evidence and examples of the deep seriousness of asceticism, the *Life of Pascal*, edited by Reuchlin, along with his *History of Port-Royal*,<sup>a</sup> as well as the *History of Saint Elisabeth* by the Count de Montalembert<sup>b</sup> and *The Life of Rancé* by Châteaubriand,<sup>c,141</sup> are very much worth reading, and this by no means exhausts the significant works in the genre. Anyone who had read such works and compared their spirit with that of asceticism and quietism that weaves its way through all the works of Brahmanism and Buddhism and speaks from every page of their writings, will admit that any philosophy that needs to reject this whole way of thinking for the sake of consistency (which can only happen by declaring those who represent this way of thinking to be liars or madmen) must necessarily and for this very reason be false. But all European systems except mine are in this position. Truly, it must be a very strange sort of madness that speaks with such unanimity over the greatest possible differences in circumstances and persons, and that was raised to the level of a fundamental religious doctrine by the most ancient and numerous peoples of the earth, namely by something like three quarters<sup>142</sup> of all the inhabitants of Asia. But no philosophy can leave the topic of quietism and asceticism alone once the question is put to it, because this topic is identical to all of metaphysics and ethics, with respect to content. Here then is a point on which I expect and demand every philosophy, with its optimism, to speak out. And if, in the judgment of contemporaries, the paradoxical and unexampled agreement of my philosophy with quietism and asceticism appears to be an obvious stumbling block, I see it instead precisely as proof that mine is the only philosophy that is accurate and true, as well as

\* *Michaelis de Molinos manuductio spiritualis*: hispanice 1675, italice 1680, latine 1687, gallice in libro non adeo raro, cui titulus: *Recueil de diverses pièces concernant le quétisme, ou Molinos et ses disciples*. Amstd. 1688. [Miguel de Molinos, *Spiritual guide*: Spanish, 1675, Italian 1680, Latin, 1687, French in a more commonly found book with the title: *Collection of different pieces concerning Quietism, or Molinos and his Students*. Amsterdam 1688].

<sup>a</sup> [Hermann Reuchlin, *Pascals Leben und der Geist seiner Schriften* (*Pascal's life and the spirit of his writings*) (1840); *Geschichte von Port-Royal* (1839, 1844)]

<sup>b</sup> [Charles Forbes René, Comte de Montalembert, *Histoire de Sainte Elisabeth de Hongrie, Duchesse de Thuringe* (1207–1231) (*History of Saint Elisabeth of Hungary, Duchess of Thuringia* (1207–1231) (1838)]

<sup>c</sup> [M. le Vicomte de Châteaubriand, *Vie de Rancé* (1844)]

an explanation of why it has been so slyly ignored and sequestered away by the *Protestant* universities.

Not only the religions of the Orient but true Christianity as well is shot through with that fundamental character of asceticism that my philosophy elucidates as negation of the will to life, even though Protestantism, particularly in its current form, tries to suppress this fact. But even the open enemies of Christianity that have emerged in the immediate past have attributed to it the doctrines of renunciation, self-denial, perfect chastity, and in general mortification of the will, which they quite rightly describe using the term 'anticosmic tendency' and they have given a thoroughgoing proof that these doctrines are essential characteristics of original and true Christianity. In this they are undeniably correct. But the fact that they hold this up as a clear and obvious reproach against Christianity, while this is precisely where its most profound truth, its great value, and its sublime character all lie, indicates a mental obscurity whose only explanation is that their minds have been completely corrupted, just as, unfortunately, thousands of others have been in Germany these days, and forever stunted by a miserable Hegelry,<sup>a</sup> this school of shallowness, this seat of misunderstanding and ignorance, this mind-destroying pseudo-wisdom that is only now finally beginning to be recognized as such, and only the Danish Academy will be left to admire this school, since in their eyes that unwieldy charlatan is a 'distinguished philosopher'<sup>b</sup> worthy of defence:

708

Because they always listen to the beliefs and the choices  
Of the stupid, ignorant, majority voices,  
Who elect the dullest among them for their judge.<sup>c</sup>

Rabelais

Nevertheless, the ascetic tendency is unmistakable in true and original Christianity as it was developed in the writings of the Church fathers out of the kernel of the New Testament: this is the summit that everything is striving to attain. We find its principal doctrine, the recommendation of true and pure celibacy (this first and most important step in the negation of the will), already expressed in the New Testament.\* *Strauß*, in his *Life of Jesus*<sup>d</sup> (vol. 1, p. 618 of the first edition) says the following about Matthew's

\* Matthew 19:11ff. – Luke 20:35–37. – Cor. 7:1–11 and 25–40. – (1 Thess. 4:3. – 1. John 3:3. –) Rev. 14:4.

<sup>a</sup> *Hegelei*

<sup>b</sup> *summus philosophus* [see p. 76, n. c]

<sup>c</sup> *Car tous suivront la créance et estude, / De l'ignorante et sottie multitude, / Dont le plus lourd sera reçu pour juge.* [from François Rabelais, *La vie de Gargantua et de Pantagruel* (*The life of Gargantua and of pantagruel*) (1534), ch. 58, lines 45–7]

<sup>d</sup> *Leben Jesu* [David Friedrich Strauß, *Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet* (1835)]

709 recommendation not to marry (Matthew 19:11ff.): ‘In order to prevent Jesus from saying something that runs contrary to current ideas, people have hurried to *surreptitiously introduce* the idea that Jesus commends the unmarried state only with a view to the conditions of the time and to allow the apostles’ activities to proceed without hindrance: but in the context there is even less indication of this than there is in the related passage, 1 Cor. 7:25ff.; so that, on the contrary, this is another place in which *ascetic principles*, widespread among the Essenes and probably even further among the Jews, can be seen in Jesus as well.’ – This ascetic direction appears more decisively later on than it does in the beginning when Christianity was still looking for followers and could not make its demands too taxing; but by the beginning of the third century it is urged emphatically. Genuine Christianity sees marriage merely as a compromise with a sinful human nature, as a concession, an allowance for those who lack the strength to strive for the highest, and as a way to prevent even greater corruption: it is in this context that it receives Church sanction, so that the bond is unbreakable. But celibacy and virginity are established as Christianity’s higher initiation,<sup>a</sup> by means of which one enters the ranks of the elect: this is the only way to attain the victor’s crown, which even to the present day is indicated by the wreath on the coffin of the unmarried, as well as by the wreath the bride lays aside on the day of her marriage.

The pregnant response of the Lord, quoted in Clement of Alexandra (*Stromata*, III, 6 and 9) from the Egyptian Gospel is evidence on this point from the first days of Christianity: ‘When Salome asked the Lord “how long will death rule?” He said: “as long as you women bear children”.’<sup>b</sup> ‘This means: as long as desires have the upper hand’,<sup>c</sup> adds Clement (Chapter 9), referring to the famous passage from Romans 5:12. Further on, in ch. 13, he cites the words of Cassianus: ‘When Salome asked when that of which she inquired would be revealed, the Lord replied: “When you trample the veil of modesty beneath your feet and when the two sexes become one and when male is like female and there is neither a male nor a female”’<sup>d</sup> – i.e. when you no longer need a veil of modesty since sexual difference will have ceased to exist.

<sup>a</sup> *böhre Weihe*

<sup>b</sup> Τῇ Σαλώμῃ ὁ κύριος πυνθανομένη, μέχρι πότε θάνατος ἰσχύσει; μέχρις ἂν, εἶπεν, ὑμεῖς, αἱ γυναῖκες, τίκτητε (*Salomae interroganti ‘quousque vigebit mors?’ Dominus ‘quoadusque’, inquit, ‘vos, mulieres, paritis’*)

<sup>c</sup> τουτ’ ἐστὶ, μέχρις ἂν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι ἐνεργῶσι (*hoc est, quamdiu operabuntur cupiditates*)

<sup>d</sup> Πυνθανομένης τῆς Σαλώμης, πότε γνωσθήσεται τὰ περὶ ὧν ἠρετο, ἔφη ὁ κύριος, ὅταν τὸ τῆς αἰσχύνης ἔνδυμα πατήσῃτε, καὶ ὅταν γένηται τὰ δύο ἓν, καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν μετὰ τῆς θηλείας οὔτε ἄρρεν οὔτε θῆλυ (*Cum interrogaret Salome, quando cognoscentur ea, de quibus interrogabat, ait Dominus: ‘quando pudoris indumentum conculcaveritis, et quando duo facta fuerint unum, et masculum cum foemina nec masculum nec foemineum’*)

It is the heretics, however, who have gone furthest on this point: in the second century there were already the Tatianites or Encratites, the Gnostics, the Marcionites, the Montanists, Valentinians, and Cassians; but they only did so insofar as they honoured the truth with ruthless consistency and thus preached complete abstinence, *enkrateia*,<sup>a</sup> in keeping with the spirit of Christianity, while the Church prudently declared everything that ran counter to its far-seeing policies to be heretical. *Augustine* reported of the Tatianites: 'they condemn marriage and equate it with fornication and other corruptions: nor do they accept any married people into their ranks, neither man nor woman. They do not eat meat and they detest it.' (*On Heresies, to Quodvultdeus*, Heresy 25).<sup>b</sup> But the orthodox Fathers regarded marriage in the light indicated above, and zealously preached complete abstinence, *hagneia*.<sup>c</sup> *Athanasius*<sup>143</sup> presents as the cause of marriage: 'that we are prey to the damnation of our forefathers; . . . because God's aim was that we not be born through marriage and corruption; but the violation of God's command, Adam's disobedience, was what caused marriage.' – (*On the Psalms*, 50).<sup>d</sup> *Tertullian* describes marriage as 'a type of lesser evil that comes from indulgence' (*On Modesty*, chap. 16)<sup>e</sup> and says: 'Marriage, like fornication, is a mixing of the flesh: for the Lord has equated the desire for marriage with fornication. So can someone object, saying that you condemn even the very first marriage which was then the only one? Certainly, and rightly so, since it too consisted in what was called fornication' (*On Exhortation to Chastity*, ch. 9).<sup>f</sup> Indeed, *Augustine* himself wholeheartedly professes this doctrine along with all of its consequences when he says: 'I know a few people who mutter and say: "But if everyone wanted to abstain from marriage, how would the human race continue?" If only everyone did want this! To the extent that this only came about from charitable love, from purity of heart, with a good conscience and upright faith: then the kingdom of God would come more quickly, since the end of the world would be

<sup>a</sup> ἐγκράτεια

<sup>b</sup> *Nuptias damnant, atque omnino pares eas fornicationibus aliisque corruptionibus faciunt: nec recipiunt in suorum numerum conjugio utentem, sive marem, sive foeminam. Non vescuntur carnibus, easque omnes abominantur (De haeresi ad quod vult Deum. haer. [1,] 25)*

<sup>c</sup> ἀγνεία [purity, chastity]

<sup>d</sup> ὅτι ὑποπίπτοντές ἐσμεν τῇ τοῦ προπάτορος καταδίκῃ. — — — ἐπειδὴ ὁ προηγούμενος σκοπὸς τοῦ θεοῦ ἦν, τὸ μὴ διὰ γάμου γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ φθορᾶς· ἡ δὲ παράβασις τῆς ἐντολῆς τὸν γάμον εἰσηγάμεν διὰ τὸ ἀνομήσαι τὸν Ἀδὰμ (*Quia subiacemus condemnationi propatoris nostri; — — — nam finis, a Deo praelatus, erat, nos non per nuptias et corruptionem fieri: sed transgressio mandati nuptias introduxit, propter legis violationem Adae. Exposit. in psalm. 50*)

<sup>e</sup> *genus mali inferioris, ex indulgentia ortum (de pudicitia, c. 16)*

<sup>f</sup> *Matrimonium et stuprum est commixtio carnis; scilicet cujus concupiscentiam dominus stupro adaequavit. Ergo, inquis, jam et primas, id est unas nuptias destruis? Nec immerito: quoniam et ipsae ex eo constant, quod est stuprum (de exhort[atione] castit[at]is, c. 9)*

711

accelerated' (*On the Good of Marriage*, chap. 10).<sup>a</sup> – And then: 'Do not be misled in this endeavour, in which you inspire many to emulate you, by the idle complaints of those who ask how the human race could continue if all people wanted to practice abstinence. As if this world would be given a reprieve for any other reason than that the predetermined number of saints had been achieved; but the more quickly it is achieved, the less the end of the world needs to be delayed' (*On the Good of Widowhood*, ch. 23).<sup>b</sup> It is quite clear that he identifies salvation with the end of the world. The other passages from Augustine's writings that concern this point are to be found collected in *Confessio Augustiniana e D. Augustini operibus compilata a Hieronymo Torrense*, 1610, under the headings 'On Matrimony', 'On Celibacy',<sup>c</sup> etc., and form a convincing argument that in ancient, true Christianity, marriage was a mere concession (and one aimed only at the procreation of children) and that complete abstinence was, by contrast, the genuine virtue and far preferable. But for those who for their own part do not wish to return to the sources, I recommend two writings that will remove any doubts as to the presence of the tendency at issue in Christianity: Carové, *On the Law of Chastity*, 1832,<sup>d</sup> and Lind, *On Christian Celibacy during the First Three Centuries*, Copenhagen, 1839.<sup>e</sup> I am by no means referring to the personal views of these writers, which are opposed to my own, but rather only to the reports and quotations that they have carefully collected; these we can trust completely to be wholly unbiased, since both authors are enemies of chastity, the first being a rationalist Catholic and the other a Protestant theological student (and speaks just like one). In the first of these texts we find, vol. 1, p. 166, the following conclusion expressed: 'According to the Church's views, – as they can be read in the canonical Church fathers, in the synodal and papal instructions, and in numerous writings of orthodox Catholics – the preservation of chastity is cited as a divine, heavenly, angelic virtue and the grant of divine assistance in achieving it is made dependent on earnest pleas to this end. – We have already proven

<sup>a</sup> *Novi quosdam, qui murmurent: quid, si, inquiunt, omnes velint ab omni concubitu abstinere, unde subsistet genus humanum? – Utinam omnes hoc vellent! dumtaxat in caritate, de corde puro, et conscientia bona, et fide non ficta: multo citius Dei civitas completeretur, ut acceleraretur terminus saeculi. (de bono conjugali, c. 10)*

<sup>b</sup> *Non vos ab hoc studio, quo multas ad imitandum vos excitatis, frangat querela vanorum, qui dicunt: quomodo subsistet genus humanum, si omnes fuerint continentes? Quasi propter aliud retardetur hoc seculum, nisi ut impleatur praedestinatus numerus ille sanctorum, quo citius impleto, profecto nec terminus seculi differetur (de bono viduitatis, c. 23).*

<sup>c</sup> *de matrimonio, de coelibatu* [in a collection of Augustine's works edited by Hieronymus Torrensis]

<sup>d</sup> [Friedrich Wilhelm Carové, *Ueber das Cölibatgesetz des römisch-katholischen Klerus (On the Law of Celibacy in the Roman Catholic clergy)* (1832)]

<sup>e</sup> *De coelibatu Christianorum per tria priora secula, Havniae, 1839* [by Peter Engel Lind]

that this Augustinian doctrine was mentioned in Casinius and in the Council of Trent as the invariable Church belief. But the June 1831 issue of the journal *The Catholic* gives clear proof that it remains a doctrine of faith up to the present day: there, on p. 263, it says: “In Catholicism the observance of *eternal chastity* for the sake of God, appears *in itself* as a human being’s *supreme* merit. The view that the observance of constant chastity as a person’s *own goal* elevates people and makes them holy, is, as everyone instructed in Catholicism well knows, deeply grounded with respect to both its spirit and its explicit rules. The Council of Trent has removed any possible doubts on this score” . . . It must certainly be admitted by any unbiased judge not only that the doctrine expressed in *The Catholic* is really Catholic, but also that the reasons put forward in support of this must be completely irrefutable for a Catholic faculty of reason, since they are drawn so directly from the church’s ecclesiastical views concerning life and its destination.’ – Further, it is written on p. 270: ‘Even if *Paul* describes the prohibition of marriage as a false doctrine and the even more Jewish author of the *Letter to the Hebrews* claims that “marriage should be held in honour by all and the marriage bed should be undefiled” (Hebrews 13:4); yet the main thrust of these two hagiographers cannot be mistaken. Virginity was for both of them perfect, and marriage was merely a necessary expedient for weaker people and is to be held inviolate only as such. The highest striving on the other hand was directed towards a complete material rejection of the self. The self should turn away and cast off everything that served to give joy only to *it*, and to it *only temporally*.’<sup>a</sup> – Finally, p. 288: ‘We concur with the Abbé *Zaccaria*, who wants to derive celibacy (not the law of celibacy) above all from the doctrine of Christ and the Apostle Paul.’

712

The only thing that is ever opposed to this genuinely Christian view is the Old Testament with its ‘and all was very good’.<sup>b</sup> This is particularly apparent in the important third book of *Clement’s Stromata*, where, in a polemic against the Encratite heretics mentioned above, Clement contrasts them only with Judaism and its optimistic creation story, which certainly conflicts with the New Testament and its world-negating tendency. But at base the connection of the New Testament with the Old is merely external and contingent, indeed forced, and the only point of contact for Christian doctrine that the Old Testament offered is the story of the fall from grace,<sup>c</sup> a story that, incidentally, stands in isolation in the Old Testament where no further use is made of it. Indeed, according to the account given in the

713

<sup>a</sup> zeitlich

<sup>b</sup> πάντα καλὰ λίαν [Genesis 1:31]

<sup>c</sup> Geschichte vom Sündenfall

Gospels, it is precisely the orthodox followers of the Old Testament who bring about the crucifixion of the Founder because they find his teachings to conflict with their own. In the third book of *Clement's Stromata* already mentioned, the antagonism between optimism along with theism on the one hand, and pessimism along with ascetic morality on the other, emerges with surprising clarity. This book is directed against the Gnostics, who taught pessimism and asceticism, namely *enkrateia*<sup>a</sup> (abstinence of every sort, but especially from any sexual satisfaction); this is why Clement strongly censures them. But at this point, the same antagonistic relation between the spirit of the Old Testament and that of the New Testament already shines forth. For, apart from the Fall (which stands in the Old Testament like something outside of the main work<sup>b</sup>) the spirit of the Old Testament is diametrically opposed to that of the New Testament: the former is optimistic, the latter pessimistic. Clement himself emphasizes this contrast at the end of the eleventh chapter, 'that Paul opposes himself to the Creator'<sup>c</sup> etc., although he does not want to let this stand and declares it to be an illusion – like the good Jew he is. In general it is interesting to see how Clement keeps running the New Testament together with the Old and how he tries to bring them into agreement, although usually the Old drives out the New. Right at the beginning of the third chapter he accuses the Marcionites of finding fault with the Creation (following Plato and Pythagoras), since Marcion teaches that nature is bad and made from bad materials (φύσις κακή, ἐκ τῆς ὕλης κακῆς); and so we should not populate the world but instead refrain from marrying (μὴ βουλόμενοι τὸν κόσμον συμπλήρουν, ἀπέχεσθαι γάμου). Now Clement takes this very badly: in general he finds the Old Testament much clearer and more to his taste than the New. In this he sees their gross ingratitude, enmity, and rage against the one who made the world, the rightful Demiurge, whose work they themselves are, and yet, 'forsaking the natural disposition' in godless rebellion, they disdain to make use of his creations ('by opposing their Creator . . . they persist in enmity against him, since they will not make use of his creations . . . and forsake the natural disposition in a sacrilegious struggle against God').<sup>d</sup> – In his holy zeal, he does not even want to allow the Marcionites the distinction of originality, but, armed with his famous erudition, he reproaches them and supports his case with the finest quotations to the effect that the ancient philosophers,

<sup>a</sup> ἐγκράτεια

<sup>b</sup> wie ein hors d'oeuvre

<sup>c</sup> προσαποτεινόμενον τὸν Παῦλον τῷ Κτίσῃ κ. τ. λ.

<sup>d</sup> ἀντιτασσόμενοι τῷ ποιητῇ τῷ σφῶν, – – ἐγκρατεῖς τῇ πρὸς τὸν πεποιηκότα ἔχθρᾳ, μὴ βουλόμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κτισθεῖσιν, – – ἀσεβεῖ θεομαχίᾳ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκστάντες λογισμῶν



that Heraclitus and Empedocles, Pythagoras and Plato, Orpheus and Pindar, Herodotus and Euripides and even the Sybil had already deeply lamented the miserable state of the world, and had thus taught pessimism. But amid this scholarly enthusiasm he does not notice that he is actually giving the Marcionites grist for their mill by in fact showing that

‘All the wisest, in all the ages’<sup>a</sup>

have taught and sung the very same thing they did. Instead, feeling comforted and heartened, he brings in the most decisive and energetic opinions of the ancients to this effect. He is of course not put off by them: let the wise bemoan the tragedy of existence, let the poets overflow with the most moving laments on this score, let nature and experience cry out just as loudly against optimism, – none of this has any effect on our Church father: he holds his Jewish revelation in his hand and remains consoled. The Demiurge made the world: and this gives a priori certainty that the world is excellent, however it might appear. – It is the same with the second point, *enkrateia*;<sup>b</sup> in his view this is the point at which the Marcionites make clear their ingratitude towards the Demiurge (ἀχαριστεῖν τῷ δημιουργῷ) and their obstinate rejection of his gifts (δι’ ἀντίταξιν πρὸς τὸν δημιουργόν, τὴν χρῆσιν τῶν κοσμικῶν παραίτουμενοι).<sup>c</sup> The tragedians also preceded the Encratites (to the detriment of their originality) and said the same thing; that is, they too lamented the endless misery of existence, adding that it would be better not to bring children into such a world; – again, he illustrates this with the finest passages while simultaneously reproaching the Pythagoreans for renouncing sexual pleasure on this ground. But none of this worries him: he sticks to his claim that all these people have sinned against the Demiurge through their abstinence, since they in fact do teach that one should not marry, should not have children, should not bring fresh unhappiness into the world, should not provide death with any more fodder (‘for through their abstinence they all sin against creation and the holy creator, the omnipotent, one God, and teach that people should not marry and have children, should not bring any more unhappy beings into the world and throw new fodder to death’,<sup>d</sup> ch. 6) – In so denouncing *enkrateia* the learned Church father does not seem to have any presentiment that immediately after his time the unmarried state would become more and more common

715

<sup>a</sup> [Goethe, ‘Koptisches Lied’ (‘Coptic song’), line 3: from *Gesellige Lieder* (*Convivial songs*) (1814)]

<sup>b</sup> ἐγκράτεια [abstinence]

<sup>c</sup> [Literally, ‘through opposition to the Demiurge, rejecting the use of things of the world’]

<sup>d</sup> δι’ ἐγκρατείας ἀσεβοῦσιν εἰς τε τὴν κτίσιν καὶ τὸν ἅγιον δημιουργόν, τὸν παντοκράτορα μόνον θεόν, καὶ διδάσκουσι, μὴ δεῖν παραδέχεσθαι γάμον καὶ παιδοποιεῖν, μηδὲ ἀντεισάγειν τῷ κόσμῳ δυστυχήσαντας ἐτέρους μηδὲ ἐπιχορηγεῖν θανάτῳ τροφήν [*Stromata* III, 6, 45]



among Christian priests until finally it would be written into law in the eleventh century, because this state is in keeping with the spirit of the New Testament. It is precisely this that the Gnostics grasped more deeply and understood more fully than our Church father, who was more of a Jew than a Christian. The Gnostic view emerges very clearly at the beginning of the ninth chapter, which quotes from the Egyptian Gospel: 'The redeemer himself said: "I have come to undo the works of woman." Of woman, i.e. of desire; these works however are procreation and negation'<sup>a</sup> – but this view emerges particularly at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth chapters. Of course, the Church had to consider the question of how to get a religion onto its feet so that it could stand up and walk in the world as it is, and among human beings; that is why it declared these people to be heretics. – At the end of the seventh chapter, our Church father compares Indian asceticism unfavourably to Christian–Jewish asceticism; – this brings out the fundamental difference in spirit between the two religions. That is: in Judaism and Christianity everything comes down to obedience or disobedience against God's command, – *hupakoê* and *parakoê*,<sup>b</sup> as befits us creatures, 'we who have been created through the will of the all-mighty'<sup>c</sup> (ch. 14). In addition, there is a second duty, λατρευεῖν θεῶν ζώντι,<sup>d</sup> serving the Lord, praising his works and overflowing with gratitude. – And of course Brahmanism and Buddhism have a very different outlook on this; in these religions, any hoped-for melioration, conversion, or redemption from this world of suffering, this *samsara*, comes from recognition of the four basic truths: (1) suffering, (2) the origin of suffering, (3) the abolition of suffering, (4) the eightfold path to the abolition of suffering.<sup>e</sup> *Dhammapadam*, ed. Fausbøll, pp. 35 and 347.<sup>f</sup> The explanation of these four truths can be found in Burnouf, *Introduction to the History of Buddhism*,<sup>g</sup> p. 629, and in all descriptions of Buddhism.<sup>144</sup>

In truth it is not Judaism with its 'and all was very good',<sup>h</sup> but rather Brahmanism and Buddhism whose spirit and ethical tendency are related to Christianity. But it is the spirit and ethical tendency of a religion, not the

<sup>a</sup> αὐτὸς εἶπεν ὁ Σωτὴρ, 'ἦλθον καταλῦσαι τὰ ἔργα τῆς θηλείας.' θηλείας μὲν, τῆς ἐπιθυμίας. ἔργα δέ, γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν (*ajunt enim dixisse Servatorem: »veni ad dissolvendum opera feminae»: feminae quidem, cupiditatis; opera autem, generationem et interitum*) [III, 9, 63]

<sup>b</sup> ὑπακοή καὶ παρακοή [obedience and disobedience: *Stromata* III, 14, 94–5]

<sup>c</sup> ἡμῖν, τοῖς πεπλασμένοις ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ Παντοκράτορος βουλήσεως (*nobis, qui ab Omnipotentis voluntate effecti sumus*)

<sup>d</sup> [Literally, 'serving the living God']

<sup>e</sup> (1) *dolor*, (2) *doloris ortus*, (3) *doloris interitus*, (4) *octopartita via ad doloris sedationem*.

<sup>f</sup> [Viggo Michael Fausbøll, *Dhammapadam* etc. (1855)]

<sup>g</sup> *Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme [Indien]*: Eugène Burnouf (1844)]

<sup>h</sup> πάντα καλὰ λαόν

myths in which the religion clothes them, that are its essential features. I therefore stand by my belief that the doctrines of Christianity are somehow derived from those primordial religions. I have already referred to some of the clues indicating that this might be the case in the second volume of *Parerga*, § 179. I can add that *Epiphanias (Against Heresies)*,<sup>a</sup> XVIII reports that the first Jewish-Christians in Jerusalem, who called themselves Nazarenes, rejected any food from animals.<sup>145</sup> It is because of this origin (or at least this agreement), that Christianity belongs to the ancient, true, and sublime faiths of humanity, which stand in contrast to the false, shallow, and corrupt *optimism* presented by Greek paganism, Judaism, and Islam. The Zend religion takes the middle ground in a sense, since it has Ahriman as a pessimistic counter-balance to Ormuzd. J. G. Rhode, in his book *The Sacred Myth of the Zend People*<sup>b</sup> proved conclusively that the Jewish religion developed from the Zend religion;<sup>c</sup> Jehovah came from Ormuzd and Satan from Ahriman. Still, Satan plays only a very subordinate role in Judaism, indeed he almost disappears altogether, thus giving optimism the upper hand and leaving the myth of the Fall, which stems likewise from the Zend-Avesta (as the fable of Mashya and Mashyana),<sup>d</sup> as the only pessimistic element; an element that is forgotten until it, as well as Satan, is taken up again in Christianity. Meanwhile *Ormuzd* himself comes from Brahmanism, although from a lower region of it: he is in fact none other than *Indra*, that subordinate god of the firmaments and atmosphere who is often in competition with human beings, as the excellent *I. J. Schmidt* proved very clearly in his work *On the Relation of the Gnostic-Theosophical Doctrine to the Religions of the Orient*.<sup>e</sup> This Indra-Ormuzd-Jehova must have later passed into Christianity, since Christianity came from Judea, but in keeping with the cosmopolitan character of Christianity, the god laid aside his own name in order to be called by the appellations of the superhuman individuals he displaced in the local language of each converted nation, that is, as *theos*,<sup>f</sup> *deus*, which comes from the Sanskrit *deva* (as does devil,<sup>g</sup> *Teufel*), or with the Gothic-Germanic peoples

717

<sup>a</sup> *Haeretic*. [presumably *Adversus Haereses*, also called *Panarion*]

<sup>b</sup> *Die heilige Sage des Zendvolkes* [Johann Gottlieb Rhode, *Die heilige Sage und das gesammte Religionssystem der alten Baktrer, Meder und Perser oder des Zendvolkes (The sacred myth and complete religious system of the ancient Bactrians, Medes and Persians, or the Zend people)* (1820)]

<sup>c</sup> [Schopenhauer's use of the term *Zend* throughout this discussion is based on a false assumption (widespread in nineteenth-century Persian philology) that this designates the manuscripts of the Avesta, the sacred texts of Zoroastrianism. In fact it designates a commentary on these manuscripts]

<sup>d</sup> [first man and woman in the Zoroastrian creation story]

<sup>e</sup> *Ueber die Verwandtschaft der gnostisch-theosophischen Lehren mit den Religionen des Orients* [Isaak Jacob Schmidt, 1828].

<sup>f</sup> θεός

<sup>g</sup> [Schopenhauer refers to the English word 'devil' here; likewise 'God' below]

by means of the word God, *Gott*, that comes from Odin or Wotan, Guodan, Godan. Likewise in Islam, which also came from Judaism, it adopted the name of Allah, a name that was already present in Arabia. In analogous fashion, when the gods of the Greek Olympus were transplanted to Italy in prehistorical times, they took on the names of the gods previously dominant there; so the Romans called Zeus Jupiter, Hera Juno, Hermes Mercury, etc.<sup>146</sup> Missionaries in China experienced their first humiliation in the fact that the Chinese language has no appellative of that nature nor any word for creation;\* for none of the three Chinese religions has a god, either in the plural or the singular.<sup>147</sup>

718 However all this may be, that 'all was very good'<sup>a</sup> of the Old Testament is truly foreign to authentic Christianity: for the New Testament only ever speaks of the world as something to which people do not belong, that we do not love, and that is indeed ruled by the devil.\*\* This accords with the ascetic spirit of the denial of one's own self and the overcoming of the world, which, like the boundless love of the neighbour, of even the enemy, is the basic feature that Christianity has in common with Brahmanism and Buddhism, attesting to their relationship. There is no other issue in which the kernel needs to be distinguished from the shell as much as in Christianity. It is precisely because I prize this kernel so highly that I sometimes have little to do with the shell: but it is thicker than one usually thinks.

By eliminating asceticism, and its central point, the meritorious nature of celibacy, Protestantism has in fact already abandoned the innermost kernel of Christianity and is to this extent to be seen as an apostasy. In our day, this is apparent in Christianity's gradual transition into shallow rationalism, this modern Pelagianism, which ultimately amounts to a doctrine of a loving father who made the world to proceed nicely and pleasantly<sup>b</sup> (something that must evidently have gone wrong) and who, if we only conform to his will in certain respects, will see to it that there is an even nicer world afterwards (where the only thing to complain about is that

\* Compare *On Will in Nature*, second edition, p. 124 [WN, 436–7 (Hübscher SW 4, 135–6)]

\*\* For instance John 12:25 and 31; 14:30; 15:18 and 19 and 16:33; Col. 2:20; Eph. 2:1–3; 1. John 2:15–17 and 4:4–5. This gives us the opportunity to see how certain Protestant theologians, in their attempts to misinterpret the text of the New Testament according to their rationalistic, optimistic and unutterably shallow worldview, go so far as to actually falsify the text through their translations. And so H. A. Schott, in his new Latin version, added to the Griesbach text of 1805, translated the word *kosmos* [κόσμος], John 15:18–19, as *Judaei* [Jews], 1 John 4:4, as *profani homines* [godless men], and Col. 2:20, *stoicheia tou kosmou* [στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου: laws of the world] as *elementa Judaica* [Jewish elements]; while Luther always honestly and properly used the word 'world'.

<sup>a</sup> πάντα καλὰ λίαν [Genesis 1:31]

<sup>b</sup> *hübsch vergnügt*

it has such a fatal entrance). This may be a good religion for comfortable, married, enlightened Protestant pastors: but it is not Christianity. Christianity is the doctrine of the profound guilt of the human race through its very existence, and the heart's longing for a redemption that can only be achieved by the most difficult sacrifice and denial of one's own self, and so by a complete overturning of human nature. — *Luther* might well have been completely correct from the practical standpoint, i.e. with respect to the abominations of the Church of his time that he wanted to remove, but he was not for that matter correct from a theoretical standpoint. The loftier a doctrine is, the more liable it is to abuse in the face of human nature, which is, on the whole, base and bad: this is why the abuses in Catholicism are so much greater and so much more frequent than in Protestantism. Take, for instance monasticism: this methodical negation of the will that is practised collectively for mutual encouragement, is a sublime institution that is for that very reason usually untrue to its spirit. The infuriating abuses of the Church evoked a high indignation in *Luther's* honest soul.<sup>a</sup> But this led him to want to cheapen Christianity itself as much as possible; to this end, he first of all restricted Christianity to the words in the Bible, but then went too far in his well-meaning zeal and attacked the heart of Christianity itself, the ascetic principle. For, when the ascetic principle had been removed, the optimistic principle necessarily soon took its place. But optimism, in religion as in philosophy, is a fundamental error that bars the path towards any truth. Given all this, Catholicism seems to me to be a shamefully abused form of Christianity, but Protestantism a degenerate one, so that Christianity in general seems to have suffered the fate that falls to everything noble, sublime, and great as soon as it is meant to survive among humanity.

Nonetheless, even in the seat of Protestantism, the essentially ascetic and Encratite spirit of Christianity has again come to light and has asserted itself in a phenomenon that has perhaps never before existed to such an extent and with such distinctness, namely, in the highly remarkable sect of the *Shakers* in North America, founded by an Englishwoman, Ann Lee, in 1774. This sect has already grown to 6,000 who, divided into 15 congregations, inhabit several towns in the states of New York and Kentucky, mainly in the district of New Lebanon near Nassau Village. The basic features of their religious precepts involve not marrying and abstaining completely from all sexual satisfaction. This rule is followed rigorously and with strict integrity even though brothers and sisters sometimes go so far as

<sup>a</sup> *Geist*

to live in the same house, eat at the same table, and indeed *dance* together in the church at services; all the English and North American visitors unanimously admit this, despite mocking and despising the Shakers in every other respect. This is because someone who has made this most difficult of all sacrifices is allowed to *dance* before the Lord: he is victorious, he has overcome. Their songs in the church are always cheerful, and indeed sometimes playful. And the church dance that follows the sermon is accompanied by the singing of the others: rhythmic and lively, it ends with a gallop that is continued to the point of exhaustion. Between each dance one of their teachers calls out: 'Think! You are rejoicing before the Lord for having mortified your flesh! For this dance is the only use that we make of our wayward limbs.' Most of their other features are natural consequences of their unmarried state. There are no families, and thus no private property, only goods in common. Everyone dresses the same, like Quakers, and with great cleanliness. They are industrious and hard-working; idleness is not tolerated. They also have the enviable directive to avoid all unnecessary noise such as shouting, slamming doors, cracking whips, loud knocking, etc. One of them describes their rules of conduct as follows: 'lead a life of innocence and purity, love your neighbours as yourself, live with all men in peace and refrain from war, bloodshed, and all acts of violence against others, as well as all efforts towards worldly honour and distinction. Give each his due and observe *holiness*: for no one can look upon the Lord without holiness. Do good to all at every opportunity and as long as you have the strength.' They do not persuade anyone to join, but instead test all applicants through a novitiate of several years. Anyone is free to leave, and it is very rare for anyone to be expelled for transgressions. Children who are brought in are raised carefully, and only when they are grown up do they voluntarily profess. It is said that in the controversies between their elders and the Anglican clergy, the clergy usually came out worse, since the arguments consist of biblical passages from the New Testament. – The best place to find out more about this is in Maxwell's *Run Through the United States*, 1841; but also in Benedict's *History of All Religions*, 1830;<sup>a</sup> similarly in the *Times*, Nov. 4, 1837; and in the German periodical *Columbus*, May edition, 1831. – A very similar German sect in America are the Rappites, who likewise live strictly in abstinence and without marriage; they are described in F. Löher's *History and Conditions of the Germans in America*,<sup>b</sup> 1853. In Russia as well the

721

<sup>a</sup> [Archibald Montgomery Maxwell, *A Run through the United States in 1840* (1841); David Benedict, *A History of All Religions* (first published in 1824)]

<sup>b</sup> *Geschichte und Zustände der Deutschen in Amerika* [Franz von Löher (first published in 1847)]

Raskolniki are said to be a similar sect. The Gichtelians also live in strict chastity. And even among the ancient Jews we find a model of all these sects, the Essenes – even Pliny reported on them (*Natural History*<sup>a</sup> V, 15) – who were similar to the Shakers, not only in terms of celibacy but in other respects as well, even in dancing at religious services,\* leading to the suspicion that the founder of the Shakers had taken this Jewish sect as a model.<sup>148</sup> – In the face of such facts, how can we understand Luther's claim: 'Where nature as implanted in us by God has been torn away, *there can never* be a chaste life outside of marriage'<sup>b</sup> (*Large Catechism*)– ?<sup>c</sup>

Although Christianity was essentially teaching only what all of Asia had already known for a long time and much better, this was nonetheless a great and novel revelation for Europe, and the spiritual direction of the European peoples was completely changed as a result. For it disclosed to them the metaphysical meaning of existence<sup>d</sup> and therefore<sup>149</sup> taught them to look away from the narrow, impoverished and ephemeral earthly life and to stop viewing it as an end in itself,<sup>e</sup> but rather to view it as a state of suffering, guilt, trial, struggle, and purification, out of which, through moral worthiness, severe renunciation and denial of one's own self, one can raise oneself to a better existence, although one that is incomprehensible to us. That is, it taught the great truth of the affirmation and<sup>150</sup> negation of the will to life, in the guise of allegory, saying that everyone was cursed by Adam's Fall so that sin entered the world and everyone inherited the guilt; while claiming on the other hand that everyone's sins were expiated by Jesus' sacrificial death, the world redeemed, the guilt removed, and justice reconciled. But in order to understand the truth contained in this myth, people must conceive of themselves not simply temporally, as beings independent of each other; they need to grasp the (Platonic) Idea of the human being, which is to the sequence of human beings what eternity in itself is to eternity pulled apart in time; thus the eternal Idea of the *human being* is temporally extended into the series of human beings, but reappears as a whole within time by means of the bonds of procreation that connect people together. But if one fixes one's gaze on the Idea of the human being,

722

\* Bellermann, *Geschichtliche Nachrichten über Essäer und Therapeuten* [*Historical Reports on Essenes and Therapeuts*], 1821, p. 106. [By Johann Joachim Bellermann; full title includes *Nachrichten aus dem Altherthume (Reports from Antiquity)*]

<sup>a</sup> *Hist[oria] nat[uralis]*

<sup>b</sup> *Ubi natura, quemadmodum a Deo nobis insita est, fertur ac rapitur, fieri nullo modo potest, ut extra matrimonium caste vivatur.*

<sup>c</sup> *Catech[ismus] Maj[or]* [originally *Deutsch Catechismus* (1529); Praeceptum VI, alinea 5]

<sup>d</sup> *metaphysische Bedeutung des Daseyns*

<sup>e</sup> *Selbstzweck*

one sees that Adam's Fall represents the finite, bestial, sinful nature of humans, and, in keeping with this, he is a being prey to finitude, sin, suffering and death. By contrast, the conduct, teachings and death of Jesus Christ present the eternal, supernatural side, the freedom, the redemption of humanity. Now, every human being is, as such and in potential,<sup>a</sup> both Adam and Jesus, depending on how he construes himself<sup>b</sup> and how his will accordingly determines him to be; as a result of this he is damned and given over to death or redeemed and attains eternal life.<sup>151</sup> – These truths, in both the allegorical and literal meanings, were completely novel<sup>152</sup> for both the Greeks and the Romans, who entered fully into life and did not look seriously beyond it. Whoever doubts this last point should look at how even *Cicero* (*In Defence of Cluentius*,<sup>c</sup> ch. 61) and *Sallust* (*The Conspiracy of Catiline*,<sup>d</sup> ch. 47) speak about the state after death. The ancients, although far advanced in almost every other respect, remained children when it came to the main point, and were surpassed by even the druids, who taught metempsychosis. The fact that a few philosophers like Pythagoras and Plato thought differently changes nothing as far as the whole is concerned.

723 So the great fundamental truth of Christianity as well as Brahmanism and Buddhism, namely the need for redemption from an existence given over to suffering and death, and our ability to attain this redemption by means of the negation of the will, that is, by assuming a decisive stand in opposition to nature, this is incomparably the most important truth that there can be; at the same time, it is both completely opposed to the natural tendency of the human race and its true grounds are difficult to comprehend; just as everything that is thought in a merely universal and abstract way will be completely inaccessible to the vast majority of people. So this great truth has always needed a *mythological vehicle*, as a kind of vessel, to bring it into the sphere of practical application for the majority; without this, it would dissipate and be lost. The truth therefore always had to borrow the garb of fable and to try to connect itself with what is historically given, already known, and already respected. What remains literally speaking<sup>e</sup> inaccessible, given the base character, intellectual obtuseness, and general brutality of the great masses of all ages and countries, must, for practical purposes, be taught to them in an allegorical form<sup>f</sup> if it is to be their guiding star. So the above-mentioned religious doctrines should be

<sup>a</sup> *potentiâ*

<sup>b</sup> *sich auffaßt*

<sup>c</sup> *Pro Cluentio*

<sup>d</sup> *Catil.* [*Bellum Catilinae*; in fact, chs. 51 and 52 are more relevant here]

<sup>e</sup> *sensu proprio*

<sup>f</sup> *sensu allegorico*

seen as the holy vessels in which the great truth that has been recognized and articulated for centuries, indeed perhaps since the beginning of the human race (a truth that nonetheless remains in itself an eternal mystery to the masses of humanity) can be preserved, made accessible to humanity in proportion to its powers, and passed down through the centuries. But everything that is not made entirely of the indestructible material of the pure truth is fated to be destroyed, and so every time such a vessel is faced with destruction through contact with an age that is different from it, the holy contents must somehow be saved in another vessel and preserved for humanity. It is philosophy, however, that has the task of presenting that content (which is identical with the pure truth) to the always extremely small number of people who are able to think; philosophy presents this content in a pure and unadulterated form, and thus solely in abstract concepts, without the vehicle. As such, it is to those religions what a straight line is to curves running alongside it, because it expresses literally<sup>a</sup> – and thus achieves directly – what religions show in disguise and reach in a round-about manner.<sup>153</sup>

724

Now if, to illustrate what has just been said through an example, and at the same time to fall in with contemporary philosophical fashion, I wanted to try to do something like solve the deepest mystery of Christianity, which is to say that of the Trinity, using the fundamental concepts of my philosophy, then, with the licenses allowed in such interpretations, this could be done in the following way. The Holy Spirit is the decisive negation of the will to life: the human being in whom this is concretely<sup>b</sup> represented is the Son. He is identical to the will that affirms life and thereby produces the phenomenon of this intuitive world, i.e. to the Father, identical, that is, to the extent that affirmation and negation are opposed acts of the same will whose capacity to do both is the only true freedom. – But this should be regarded as simply playing with ideas.<sup>c</sup>

Before concluding this chapter, I want to mention a couple of examples of what in § 68 of the First Volume I called ‘the second way’,<sup>d</sup> namely coming to a negation of the will through a personal and painful experience of suffering, and thus not simply by adopting someone else’s suffering, and by the resultant recognition of the misery and nothingness of our existence. What takes place inside a human being who experiences this sort of elevation and the cleansing process it introduces can be understood in

<sup>a</sup> *sensu proprio*

<sup>b</sup> *in concreto*

<sup>c</sup> *lusus ingenii*

<sup>d</sup> Δεύτερος πλοῦς [literally, ‘second voyage’ or ‘second sailing’; see *WWR* 1, 419 (Hübscher *SW* 2, 463)]



terms of what every person of feeling experiences when watching a tragedy, since tragedies are of a related nature. Specifically, in something like the third or the fourth act such a person will be painfully affected and made anxious by the sight of the hero, whose happiness is increasingly obscured and threatened; but in the fifth act, when this happiness is completely shattered and destroyed, he will feel a certain elevation of his mind<sup>a</sup> that affords him an infinitely higher type of satisfaction<sup>b</sup> than he could have derived from any happiness, however great, the hero might have achieved. Now this, in the weak watercolours of sympathy,<sup>c</sup> as it can rouse a well-known illusion, is the same thing that takes place with all the energy of reality in the sensation<sup>d</sup> of a person's own fate, when it is deep unhappiness that finally steers him into the harbour of complete resignation. This procedure is the basis for all conversions that transform a person completely, as I described them in the text. *Abbé de Rancé's* conversion story is strikingly similar to Ramon Llull's, which I reported in the text, and is worth considering because of its outcome, so I will summarize it here. Rancé's youth was devoted to pleasure and enjoyment: he finally lived in a passionate relationship with one Madame de Montbazon. One night he visited her and found her room empty, dark and in disarray. He bumped into something with his foot: it was her head, which had been severed from her body because otherwise the corpse of the suddenly deceased woman would not have been able to fit in the lead coffin that stood nearby. After recovering from boundless grief, Rancé then, in 1663, immediately entered the order of the Trappists, which had at that time entirely relaxed the rigour of its precepts; he reformed them and returned the order to that terrible degree of renunciation in which it still persists to the present day at La Trappe where the visitor, touched even upon entering by the humility of these true monks, is then filled with holy awe by the systematic negation of the will that is made possible by the most difficult renunciations and by an incredibly hard and painful way of life: emaciated by fasting, freezing, by night-time awakenings, begging and work, the monks kneel before the visitor, this sinner and child of the world, to entreat his blessing. This is the only monastic order in France to survive all the revolutions unscathed, something that can be ascribed to its profound seriousness, which is unmistakable and excludes any ulterior motive. It has even remained

<sup>a</sup> *Erhebung seines Gemüthes*

<sup>b</sup> *Genügen*

<sup>c</sup> *Mitempfindung*

<sup>d</sup> *Empfindung*

untouched by the decline of religion because its roots lie deeper in human nature than any positive dogma.

As I mentioned in the text, the great and rapid revolution of the innermost essence of a human being that we are now considering, and which philosophers have so far neglected completely, appears most frequently when someone is fully conscious of facing a violent and certain death, that is to say, on the occasion of his execution. But I certainly do not think that it is in any way beneath the dignity of philosophy to quote the statements of some criminals facing execution so as to view this process with much greater clarity, even if in so doing I should provoke ridicule for referring to sermons from the gallows. Rather, I believe that the gallows is the site of very peculiar revelations and a tower from which, if he retains his senses, someone can often see further into eternity and portray it more clearly than most philosophers are able in the course of paragraphs of their rational psychology and theology. – The following gallows sermon was given on 15 April, 1837 in Gloucester by a certain Bartlett, who had murdered his mother-in-law: ‘Englishmen and fellow countrymen! I have a few words to say, and very few they shall be. Yet let me entreat you, one and all, that these few words may strike deep into your hearts. Bear them in your minds, not only while you are witnessing this sad scene, but take them to your homes, take them and repeat them to your children and friends; I implore you as a dying man, one for whom the instrument of death is even now prepared. And these words are, that you may loose yourselves from love of this dying world and its vain pleasures. Think less of it and more of your God. Do this: turn, turn! For be assured, that without deep and true conversion, without turning to your heavenly Father, you will never attain, nor can hold the slightest hope of ever reaching those bowers of bliss and that land of peace, to which I trust I am now fast advancing.’ (According to the *Times* of 18 April, 1837.)<sup>a</sup> – More remarkable still are the last words of the famous murderer Greenacre, who was executed in London on 1 May, 1837. The English paper *The Post* reported on this as follows, which was also published in *Galignani’s Messenger* of 6 May, 1837: ‘On the morning of his execution, a gentleman recommended him to put his trust in God and pray to be forgiven through the intercession of Jesus Christ. Greenacre made answer that praying through the intercession of Christ was a matter of opinion; as for himself, he believed that a Mohammetan in the eyes of the supreme being was equal to a Christian and had as great a claim to salvation. He remarked that since his confinement he had turned his attention to theological matters, and had come to the conclusion: that the gallows was a

726

727

<sup>a</sup> [Though the text contains a German translation, this is original English wording, as transcribed by Schopenhauer. Likewise with the two following reports from 1837]

pass-port to Heaven.' It is precisely the obvious indifference to positive religions that gives this statement its greater weight; since it proves that it is not a piece of fantastic lunacy but is based on the man's own direct recognition. – We will also cite the following extract, which *Galignani's Messenger* of 15 August 1837 takes from the *Limerick Chronicle*: 'Mary Cooney, for the revolting murder of Mrs. Anna Anderson, was executed on Monday last. So deeply sensible of her crime was the wretched woman that she kissed the rope, which encircled her neck, and humbly implored God for mercy.' – And finally, this: in the *Times* of 29 April 1845, there were several letters written by *Hocker*, condemned for the murder of *Delarue*, on the day before his execution. In one he said: 'I am convinced that unless *the natural heart be broken*<sup>a</sup> and renewed by divine Grace, however noble and amiable it might appear to the world, it can never think of eternity without shuddering inwardly.' – These are the views of eternity that, as I mentioned above, open up from that tower, and I have all the less compunction about including them here since even Shakespeare said:

out of these convertites  
There is much matter to be heard and learn'd.  
(*As You Like It*, last scene)<sup>b,154</sup>

As we have shown, Christianity attributes the power of cleansing and sanctifying to suffering while ascribing an opposite effect to great well-being, a fact established by *Strauß* in his *Life of Jesus*<sup>c</sup> (vol. I, section 2, ch. 6, §§ 72 and 74). He said that the beatitudes in the Sermon on the Mount have a different meaning in Luke (6:21) than in Matthew (5:3): for only the latter adds to 'blessed are the poor'<sup>d</sup> the qualification 'in spirit'<sup>e</sup> and to 'the hungry'<sup>f</sup> the extra remark 'according to justice':<sup>g</sup> so only he has in mind the simple and humble etc., while on the other hand with Luke it is the genuinely poor, so that in that case the contrast is between present suffering and future prosperity. With the Ebionites it is a basic principle that whoever gets his share at *this* time will go without in the future, and the other way around. Accordingly, for Luke beatitudes are followed by just as many 'woes'<sup>h</sup> which are addressed to the 'rich', the 'satisfied', and the 'laughing'<sup>i</sup> in the Ebionite sense. *Strauß* says on p. 604, that the parable

<sup>a</sup> [In his German translation, Schopenhauer adds emphasis here, and the English phrase in parenthesis]

<sup>b</sup> [Schopenhauer quotes this in English, including the attribution, and gives the German in a footnote]

<sup>c</sup> [See p. 631, n. d]

<sup>d</sup> μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοί

<sup>e</sup> τῷ πνεύματι

<sup>f</sup> πεινῶντες

<sup>g</sup> τὴν δικαιοσύνην

<sup>h</sup> οὐαί

<sup>i</sup> πλουσίοις, ἐμπεπλησμένοις, *und* γελῶσι

of the rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19) is offered in the same sense; it contains absolutely no mention of any transgression on the part of the former or merit on the part of the latter, and it takes as a standard of future reward not the good done or evil<sup>a</sup> practised in this life, but the troubles<sup>b</sup> that have been undergone and the goods enjoyed here, in the Ebionite sense. Strauß adds that 'the other synoptic gospels claim that Jesus ascribes a similar value to external poverty (Matt. 19:16; Mark 10:17; Luke 18:18) in the story of the rich young man and the parable of the camel and the eye of the needle'.

If you get to the bottom of this issue, you will recognize that even the most famous passages from the Sermon on the Mount make indirect reference to voluntary poverty and thus to the negation of the will to life. Because the direction (Matt. 5:40ff.) to comply unconditionally with all the demands made of us, to give even the cloak to the one who sues us for our coat, etc., likewise (Matt. 6:25–34) to rid ourselves of all cares for the future, even for the coming day, and so to live in the day itself, these are rules of conduct that will, if followed, lead inexorably to complete poverty, and that therefore indirectly demand what *Buddha* prescribed directly to his followers and reinforced with his own example: throw everything away and become *bhikkhu*, i.e. beggars. This emerges even more decisively in the passage (Matt. 10:9–15), where the Apostles are forbidden any property, even shoes and a walking stick, and are told to go and beg. These precepts then became the foundations for the mendicant order of St Francis (*Bonaventure's Life of St Francis*,<sup>c</sup> ch. 3). This is why I say that the spirit of Christian morality is identical with that of Brahmanism and Buddhism. – Meister Eckhart also said something that is in accordance with the whole view presented here (*Works*,<sup>d</sup> vol. 1, p. 492): 'the fastest animal to carry you to perfection is suffering'.<sup>155</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Böse

<sup>b</sup> Uebel

<sup>c</sup> *Bonaventurae vita S. Francisci* [See p. 629, n.]

<sup>d</sup> [See p. 627, n. g]

*The Way to Salvation*<sup>a</sup>

There is only *one* innate error, and it is that we exist to be happy. It is innate in us because it coincides with our existence itself, and our whole being is really only a paraphrase of it, indeed our body is its monogram: we are in fact nothing but will to life, and what we think of under the concept of happiness is the successive satisfaction of all our willing.

As long as we persist in this innate error, and even find corroboration for it in optimistic dogmas, the world seems full of contradictions. For with every step, in matters both large and small, we must discover that the world and life are in no way constituted to contain a happy existence. While thoughtless people feel plagued only by what actually happens, anyone who thinks has, in addition to the pain of reality, the theoretical perplexity of why a world and a life that exist only for people to be happy fail so miserably to live up to this goal? This perplexity is expressed in deep sighs and pious exclamations such as: ‘Oh, why are there so many tears beneath the moon?’<sup>b</sup> and similar such things, but they are followed by disquieting scruples as to the assumptions made by those preconceived optimistic dogmas. People can always try to shift the guilt for their individual unhappiness, now on to circumstances, now on to other people, and now on to their own bad luck or botched efforts, and probably have a  
 730 good idea of how these have worked together to produce this effect; but this does not change the result, that they have missed the supposed true aim of life, which is supposedly to be happy; and these thoughts are often very depressing, particularly when life is in decline – this is why almost all elderly faces bear the expression of what the English term *disappointment*. And besides, every day of our lives to this point has taught us that even when we attain joys and pleasures, they are inherently deceptive and do not provide what they promise, do not put the heart at ease, and that in the end

<sup>a</sup> *Heilsordnung*

<sup>b</sup> [Christian Adolf Overbeck, ‘Trost für mancherley Thränen’ (‘Consolation for many tears’), first verse, in *Sammlung vermischter Gedichte* (Collection of assorted poems) (1794)]

their possession is soured, even if just by the annoyances that accompany them or arise from them; while on the other hand pains and sufferings prove very real and often exceed all expectations. – So everything in life is certainly suited to the task of bringing us back<sup>a</sup> from that original error and convincing us that the goal of our existence is not to be happy. In fact, if looked at more closely and without bias, life instead seems to be specifically intended to show us that we are *not* supposed to feel happy in it, since the whole structure of life has the character of something we have lost the taste for, something meant to disgust us, and that we have to distance ourselves from,<sup>b</sup> as from an error, so that our heart can be cured<sup>c</sup> of the craving<sup>d</sup> for pleasure or, in fact, for life, and can turn away from the world. In this sense it would be more accurate to posit the goal of life in our woe than in our well-being. For the discussion from the end of the previous chapter showed that the more one suffers, the sooner the true goal of life will be achieved; while the more happily one lives, the further it is delayed. This corresponds to the conclusion of Seneca's final letter: 'you will have your happiness when you see that the happiest people are the unhappiest';<sup>e</sup> which certainly seems to indicate the influence of Christianity. – The distinctive effect of tragedy is also fundamentally grounded in the fact that it disturbs that innate error by making palpable the futility of human striving and the nothingness of this whole existence in a great and striking example, thus revealing the deepest meaning of life; this is why tragedy is acknowledged to be the most sublime form of literature. – Now someone who in one way or another has distanced himself from that a priori inherent error, that 'first false step'<sup>f</sup> of our existence,<sup>156</sup> will soon see everything in a different light and find the world consonant, if not with his wishes, then at least with his views. Accidents of every shape and size will no longer surprise him, even if they injure him, since he has seen that it is precisely pain and suffering that work towards the true goal of life, the turning of the will away from it. Whatever might happen, this will give him a wonderful composure,<sup>g</sup> similar to the composure of the invalid who tolerates the pain of prolonged and excruciating treatment as evidence of its efficacy. – Suffering speaks clearly enough from the whole of human existence as its true destination. Life is deeply submerged in suffering and cannot escape it: we enter into

731

<sup>a</sup> zurückbringen<sup>b</sup> zurückzukommen haben<sup>c</sup> geheilt<sup>d</sup> Sucht<sup>e</sup> *bonum tunc habebis tuum, quum intelliges infelicissimos esse felices* [Epistles, 124, 24]<sup>f</sup> πρῶτον ψεύδος<sup>g</sup> Gelassenheit

life in tears, its course is basically always tragic, and the exit from it, even more so. There is an unmistakable touch of intentionality<sup>a</sup> in all of this. Fate typically crosses through a person's mind in a radical way at the very summit of his desires and strivings; this gives his life a tragic tendency that enables him to be freed from his craving (of which every individual existence is a presentation), and be led to separate from life without retaining any desire for it or its joys. Suffering is in fact the cleansing process through which alone, in most cases, a human being is saved,<sup>b</sup> i.e. led back from the false path of the will to life. This is why the salutary nature<sup>c</sup> of the cross and of suffering is mentioned so frequently in Christian devotional literature, and it is very fitting that the cross, an instrument of suffering undergone, not of deeds done, is the symbol of the Christian religion. Indeed, even the still Jewish (yet philosophical) Ecclesiastes rightly says: 'sorrow is better than laughter: for by the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better' (Ecclesiastes 7:3).<sup>d</sup> With the description of the 'second way'<sup>e</sup> I have presented suffering as a kind of surrogate for virtue and holiness,<sup>f</sup> but here I must boldly state that all things considered, we have greater hope for our salvation<sup>g</sup> and redemption from the sufferings we undergo than from the deeds we do. It is precisely in this sense that Lamartine so beautifully describes pain in his *Hymn to Sorrow*,<sup>h</sup>

No doubt you treat me as a favourite of heaven  
 Because you do not spare my eyes their tears  
 Good! I receive them as your gift,  
 Your sorrows will be my delights, your sighs my joy.  
 Without effort, I feel in you  
 A divine virtue in place of my own virtue  
 That you are not the death of the soul, but its life,  
 And your arm, while wounding, both heals and revives.<sup>i</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *Absichtlichkeit*

<sup>b</sup> *geheiligt*

<sup>c</sup> *Heilsamkeit*

<sup>d</sup> [The text here has (7:4)]

<sup>e</sup> δεύτερος πλοῦς

<sup>f</sup> *Heiligkeit*

<sup>g</sup> *Heil*

<sup>h</sup> [Alphonse de Lamartine, *Hymne à la douleur* (*Hymn to Sorrow*), from *Harmonies poétiques et religieuses* (*Poetic and religious harmonies*) (1813), II, 7, verse 59ff.]

<sup>i</sup> *Tu me traites sans doute en favori des cieux, / Car tu n'épargnes pas les larmes à mes yeux. / Eh Bien ! je les reçois comme tu les envoies, / Tes maux seront mes biens, et tes soupirs mes joies. / Je sens qu'il est en toi, sans avoir combattu, / Une vertu divine au lieu de ma vertu, / Que tu n'es pas la mort de l'âme, mais sa vie, / Que ton bras, en frappant, guérit et vivifie* [Schopenhauer's emphasis]

Death is feared more than any suffering, so if suffering already possesses such a sanctifying force, death will possess it to an even greater degree. Accordingly we feel an awe for the dead that is related to the awe that great suffering demands of us; indeed, every death presents itself like a type of apotheosis or beatification;<sup>a</sup> thus we cannot regard the corpse of even the most insignificant of men without respect, and as strange as this remark must sound in this context, we are on our guard in the face of every dead body. Dying is certainly to be seen as the true purpose of life: in the moment of death, everything is decided that was only prepared and introduced by the whole course of life. Death is the result, the *resumé* of life, or the total sum expressing in a single stroke the whole lesson that life has given us sporadically and piecemeal: and the lesson is this, that the whole of striving, the appearance of which is life, was futile, in vain, and contradictory, and it is a redemption to be returned<sup>b</sup> from it. As the whole, slow vegetation of the plant is to the fruit, which does in a single stroke a hundred times over what the plant did slowly and bit by bit – so life, with its obstacles, disappointed hopes, frustrated plans, and steady suffering is to death, which, in a single stroke, destroys everything, everything a person has willed, thereby crowning the teachings of life. – The completed course of life that the dying man looks back over has an effect on the whole of the will that objectifies itself in this perishing individuality, an effect analogous to that of a motive on someone's actions: it gives a new direction to the will, a direction that is, accordingly, the moral and essential result of life. It is because a *sudden* death renders such retrospection impossible that the Church views it as a misfortune, guarding against it with prayers. Since both this retrospection and a clear foresight into death are conditioned by reason, they are possible only in humans, not in animals; therefore we alone can really drain the cup of death, and humanity is the only level on which the will can negate itself, turning entirely away from life. While the will fails to negate itself, every birth provides it with a new and different intellect – until it has recognized the true nature of life and as a result wants no more of it.

733

In the natural course of events, the decay of the body in old age coincides with the decay of the will. The craving for pleasure disappears easily with the capacity for pleasure. The sex drive, which gives rise to the most vehement willing and is the focal point of the will, is extinguished first, placing the person in a condition similar to the innocence that existed prior to the development of the genital system. The illusions that posited

<sup>a</sup> *Heiligsprechung*

<sup>b</sup> *zurückgekommen*



734

chimeras as very desirable goods disappear, and in their place comes a recognition of the nullity of all earthly goods. Selfishness is displaced<sup>a</sup> by love of children, in which a person has already begun to live in another's I more than in his own, which will soon be no more. This course of events is most desirable: it is the euthanasia of the will. In hopes of this, the Brahmin<sup>b</sup> is ordered, after having finished the best years of his life, to leave his property and family and lead the life of a hermit (*Manu*, Book 6).<sup>c</sup> But if, conversely, greed<sup>d</sup> outlives the capacity for pleasure, and a person grieves over the loss of particular pleasures from life instead of realizing the emptiness and nothingness of them all, and then in place of the objects of lustful desires<sup>e</sup> (since the sense for these objects has decayed), there appears the abstract representative of all these objects, money, which now excites the same vehement passions that were formerly and more excusably aroused by the objects of *actual* pleasure, and so now, with the decay of the senses, an inanimate though indestructible object is willed with equally indestructible greed; or even if, in the same way, existence in the opinions of others takes the place of existence and action in the real world, and ignites the same passions; – then the will has been sublimated and spiritualized<sup>f</sup> in greed or ambition,<sup>g</sup> but in so doing is thrown into the final citadel in which it is besieged only by death. The goal of life has been lost.

All these considerations provide a more precise explanation for what in the previous chapter was designated with the phrase 'second way',<sup>h</sup> i.e. cleansing, turning of the will, and redemption brought on by the suffering of life. This is without a doubt the most frequent path. For it is the path of the sinner, and that is what we all are. The other path reaches the same destination by cognition alone and hence by making the suffering of the whole world one's own; it is the narrow road of the elect, the saints,<sup>i</sup> and should therefore be seen as a rare exception. And so without that first path, most people would have no hope for salvation.<sup>j</sup> But we struggle against entering on this path, and instead strive with all our might to prepare a safe and comfortable existence for ourselves, thus chaining our will even more tightly to life. Conversely, ascetics intentionally make their lives as poor,

<sup>a</sup> *verdrängt*

<sup>b</sup> *dem Brahmanen*

<sup>c</sup> [*The Lawbook of Manu*]

<sup>d</sup> *Gier*

<sup>e</sup> *Lüste*

<sup>f</sup> *sublimiert und vergeistigt*

<sup>g</sup> *Ehrsucht* [craving for honour]

<sup>h</sup> *Δεύτερος πλοῦς* [see p. 645, n. d]

<sup>i</sup> *Heiligen*

<sup>j</sup> *Heil*

hard, and joyless as possible, because they have their true and ultimate well-being<sup>a</sup> in view. But fate and the course of nature take better care of us than we do of ourselves because at every turn fate frustrates all our provisions for a life of luxury – the idiocy of which is already clear enough in the brevity, inconstancy, and emptiness of life as well as its termination in the bitterness of death – scatters thorn upon thorn along our path, and confronts us everywhere with salutary suffering,<sup>b</sup> the panacea for our misery. In truth what gives our life its amazing and ambiguous character is the fact that in it, two diametrically opposed fundamental aims are constantly crossing paths: that of the individual will, directed to chimerical happiness in an ephemeral, dreamlike, deceptive existence, where the happiness and unhappiness of the past are a matter of indifference while the present turns into the past at every moment; and, on the other hand, that of fate, which is quite clearly directed at the destruction of our happiness and hence at the mortification of our will and the abolition of the delusion that keeps us fettered in the bonds of this world.

735

The practicable and particularly Protestant view that the goal of life lies solely and directly in moral virtues, and thus in the exercise of justice and loving kindness, already reveals its inadequacy in the very fact that we encounter such a pitifully small amount of real and pure morality among human beings. I will not even mention the higher virtues, nobility, magnanimity, self-sacrifice, which are hardly found anywhere other than in plays and novels, and only mention those virtues that are made into a duty for everyone. Older people should think back on everyone they have ever dealt with: how many people will they be able to think of who were even really and truly *honest*? Was it not the case that the vast majority have in fact been the opposite, however shamelessly they might have carried on at the slightest suspicion of an iniquity or even untruth – indeed because of this? Abject self-interest, boundless greed over money, well-conceived trickery, and on top of those, venomous envy and satanic *schadenfreude* – were these not so universally dominant that the slightest exception to this was regarded with admiration? And loving kindness, how exceedingly rarely does it go further than a gift of something so disposable that it will never be missed? And the whole goal of existence is supposed to lie in such vanishingly rare and weak traces of morality? If on the other hand, we posit this goal in the complete reversal, occasioned by suffering, of the very essence of us that bears these bad fruits, then the matter starts to look quite different, and it is brought into agreement with – what in fact lies before us.

<sup>a</sup> *Wohl*

<sup>b</sup> *das heilsame Leiden*

736 Life then presents itself as a cleansing process, whose purifying lye is pain. If the process is completed, then the previous immorality and wickedness is left behind as dross, and what the *Veda* says will come to be: 'the knot of the heart will be cut, all doubts resolved, and his works will come to nothing'.<sup>a</sup> – The 15th *Sermon* of Meister Eckhart is well worth reading for its agreement with this view.<sup>157</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *Finditur nodus cordis, dissolvuntur omnes dubitationes, ejusque opera evanescent* [See p. 524, n. c]

*Epiphilosophy*

The conclusion of my discussion might be the place for a few observations concerning my philosophy itself. – As I have already said, my philosophy does not presume to explain the ultimate grounds for the existence of the world: rather, it sticks to the facts of outer and inner experience, as they are accessible to everyone, and establishes the true and most profound connection between them, but without ever actually going beyond these to any otherworldly things and their relations to the world. It therefore does not reach any conclusions concerning whatever might exist beyond all possible experience, and instead simply provides the interpretation<sup>a</sup> of what is given in the external world as well as in self-consciousness; it is thus content to grasp the essence of the world according to its inner connection to itself. So it is *immanent*, in the Kantian sense of the word. For this very reason it leaves many questions unanswered, in particular, the question of why what has been factually established is as it is and is not otherwise, etc. But every such question, or rather every answer to it, is in fact transcendent, i.e. it cannot be thought using the forms and functions of our intellect, it cannot be resolved into these forms and functions: our intellect is to these questions what our sensibility is to properties of bodies for which we have no sense organs. And so for instance, after all of my arguments, one can still inquire from where has this will arisen that is free to affirm itself (the appearance of this being the world) or to negate itself (an appearance of what we do not know<sup>b</sup>)? What is the fatality that lies beyond all experience, and that has put the will in the highly precarious dilemma of either appearing as a world governed by suffering and death or of negating its ownmost being? Or in fact what could have induced it to leave behind the infinitely preferable peace of blissful nothingness? An individual will, one might add, brings about its own ruin through mistaken choices alone, and so through the fault<sup>c</sup> of cognition:

737

<sup>a</sup> *Auslegung*<sup>b</sup> *kennen*<sup>c</sup> *Schuld*

but as for the will in itself, prior to any cognition, and consequently still lacking cognition, how could it go wrong and end up in its current state of ruin? Where does it come from, the great discord that fills this world? One can also ask how deeply the roots of individuality penetrate into the essence in itself of things. To this we can at best answer: they penetrate as deeply as the affirmation of the will to life; they come to an end where negation begins, because they arose with affirmation.<sup>158</sup> But one could even raise the question: 'What would I be if I were not the will to life?' – and more of the same. – The primary response to all such questions would be that the *principle of sufficient reason* is the expression of the most general and thoroughgoing form of our intellect, but for this very reason it has application only to appearance, not to the essence in itself of things: but every Whence and Why is based on this principle alone. As a result of Kant's philosophy, this principle is no longer an eternal verity<sup>a</sup> but merely the form, i.e. function of our intellect, which is essentially cerebral, and originally merely a tool in the service of our will; the principle therefore presupposes the will along with all its objectivations. But the whole of our cognition and conceptualizing are tied to the forms of this principle: accordingly, we need to grasp everything in time, hence as a before or after, and then as cause and effect, as well as above, below, whole and part, etc., and can never leave this sphere in which alone cognition is possible. Now, however, these forms are wholly unsuited to the problems we are raising, nor are they remotely appropriate for, or capable of, grasping their solution, even if this were given. And so, together with our intellect, this mere tool of the will, we keep bumping up against unsolvable problems as  
 738 against the walls of our prison.<sup>159</sup> – But, with the answer to all these questions, we can also assume it is at least probable that cognition is not merely impossible *for us*, but that no cognition is possible at all, which is to say never and nowhere; and so these relations are not just relatively but absolutely unfathomable; that it is not just that nobody knows them, but that they are in themselves not knowable, since they do not enter the form of cognition in general.<sup>160</sup> (This agrees with what *Scotus Erigena* says, 'concerning the miraculous divine ignorance by virtue of which God does not understand what He is', Book II.)<sup>b</sup> For it is only *appearance* and not the essence in itself of things that is amenable to cognition in general, with its essential and hence always necessary subject–object form. Where there is cognition and hence representation, there is only appearance, and we are already standing right there within the province of appearance: indeed, our

<sup>a</sup> *aeterna veritas*

<sup>b</sup> *de mirabilis divina ignorantia, qua Deus non intelligit quid ipse sit* [*On the Division of Nature (De divisione naturae)*, Book II, ch. 28]

only acquaintance with cognition in general is as a brain phenomenon, and we are not only unjustified but also incapable of thinking of it in any other way. We can understand what the world might be as a world: it is appearance, and we can cognize what appears in it directly from out of ourselves, by way of a thorough analysis of self-consciousness: this key to the essence of the world then allows the whole of appearance to be deciphered according to its connections; this, I believe, I have accomplished. But if we take leave of the world in order to answer the questions indicated above, then we also abandon the only standpoint on which not only the connection between ground and consequent, but even cognition itself is possible: then everything is 'land on which we cannot stand, water in which we cannot swim'.<sup>a</sup> The essence of things before or beyond the world, and consequently beyond the will, is closed to all investigation because cognition in general is itself only phenomenon and therefore takes place only in the world, just as the world takes place only in it. The inner essence in itself of things is not cognizant, it is not an intellect, but is rather devoid of cognition: cognition first emerges only as an accident, something to aid the appearance of that essence, and it can therefore accommodate that essence only within the constraints of its own constitution and hence very imperfectly, because cognition is directed to a completely different goal, that of the individual will. This is why a complete understanding of the existence, essence, and origin of the world, one that gets to the ultimate ground and satisfies all demands, is impossible. So much as to the limits of my own and every philosophy. —

739

The 'one and all',<sup>b</sup> i.e. the fact that the inner essence in all things is absolutely one and the same, had already been grasped and understood by my age, after the Eleatics, Scotus Erigena, Giordano Bruno, and Spinoza had taught it in detail and Schelling had revived this teaching. But *what* this one thing might be and how it came to present itself as many is a problem that I am the first to solve. — Similarly, man has been considered a microcosm since deepest antiquity. I have inverted the principle and shown the world to be a macranthropos, to the extent that will and representation exhaust the essence of the world as they do the human essence. But it is clearly more accurate to teach understanding of the world from human beings rather than human beings from the world: for we need to explain what is indirectly given, i.e. what is given in outer intuition, from what is given directly, i.e. from self-consciousness, not the other way around.

<sup>a</sup> *instabilis tellus, innabilis unda* [Ovid, *Metamorphoses* I, 16]

<sup>b</sup> ἓν καὶ πᾶν

I share that *hen kai pan*<sup>a</sup> with *pantheism*, but not the *pan theos*<sup>b</sup> because I do not go beyond experience (in the broadest sense), and still less do I contradict the data before me. Entirely in keeping with the spirit of pantheism, *Scotus Erigena* declares every appearance to be a theophany: but then this concept must also be applied to horrible and hideous appearances: nice theophanies! What further distinguishes me from pantheism is primarily the following: (1) the fact that its *theos*<sup>c</sup> is an *x*, an unknown quantity, while we are more minutely<sup>d</sup> acquainted with the *will* than we are with any other possible thing, it is the only thing that is immediately given, and thus the only one that is capable of explaining everything else. For the unfamiliar<sup>e</sup> must always be explained with reference to the familiar, not the other way around. – (2) The fact that its *theos* manifests himself at his pleasure<sup>f</sup> in order to display his majesty or even allow himself to be admired. Apart from the vanity this attributes to God, this puts the pantheists in the position of having to wipe away the colossal evils of the world with sophistries: but the world remains in glaring and horrible contradiction with this fantasy of excellence. With me, by contrast, the *will* achieves self-cognition through its objectivation, however this might come about, and this makes possible its abolition, turning, redemption. Accordingly, I alone provide a secure foundation for ethics, so that it can be completely realized in accordance with the sublime and profoundly conceived religions, which is to say Brahmanism, Buddhism, and Christianity, and not merely with Judaism and Islam. In addition, my basic truths are the first to completely explain the metaphysics of beauty, which no longer needs to seek refuge behind empty words. I alone acknowledge the full magnitude of the world's evils, because my answer to the question of their origin coincides with that of the origin of the world. By contrast, because all other systems are optimistic, the question of the origin of evils is an incurable and constantly recurring disease that afflicts them; they struggle through with palliatives and quack remedies but always relapse. – (3) The fact that I start with experience and the natural self-consciousness that is given to everyone, and lead up to the will as the single metaphysical principle, thus taking the ascending, analytic route. By contrast, the pantheists go in the opposite way, along a descending, synthetic route: they begin with their *theos*, even if they sometimes beg and threaten until God goes by the name of *substantia* or the Absolute, and this completely unfamiliar thing

<sup>a</sup> ἓν καὶ πᾶν [one and all]

<sup>b</sup> πᾶν θεός [everything is God]

<sup>c</sup> θεός [God]

<sup>d</sup> am genauesten

<sup>e</sup> Unbekannte

<sup>f</sup> animi causa

is supposed to explain everything more familiar. – (4) The fact that with me, the world does not fill the entire space of possibilities for all being, but instead still leaves a lot of room for what we can only describe negatively as the negation of the will to life. Pantheism on the other hand is essentially optimism: but if the world is the best thing, then we must leave it at that. – (5) The fact that for the pantheists, the intuitive world, which is to say the world as representation, is the intentional manifestation of the indwelling God, which does not really explain how the world emerged, but rather itself stands in need of explanation: with me, on the other hand, the world as representation appears merely accidentally,<sup>a</sup> since the intellect, with its outer intuition, is in the first instance only the medium of the motives for the more complete appearances of the will, but it rises gradually to that objecthood of intuition that constitutes the world. In this sense, I do real justice to its origin as intuitive object, and not, as with the pantheists, by means of untenable fictions.

741

As a result of the Kantian critique of all speculative theology, German philosophizers have almost all thrown themselves back on *Spinoza* so that the whole, well-known series of failed attempts that go by the name of post-Kantian philosophy is simply a tastelessly dressed up *Spinozism*, hidden under all sorts of incomprehensible language and distorted in other ways as well. After having explained the relationship of my theory to pantheism, I would like to indicate the relation in which it stands to *Spinozism* in particular. It bears the same relation to Spinozism as the New Testament does to the Old. What the Old Testament has in common with the New is the same creator-God. Analogously, for me as for Spinoza, the world exists as a result of its own inner force and through itself. But for *Spinoza* his eternal substance,<sup>b</sup> the inner essence of the world, which he himself calls *Deus* is, even in its moral character and its value, nothing other than Jehovah, the creator-God who applauds his creation and finds that everything has turned out very well, that ‘everything was very good’.<sup>c</sup> *Spinoza* did no more than remove its personality. For Spinoza too, the world and everything in it is entirely excellent and as it should be, and people have nothing more to do than ‘live, act, and preserve their existence, in accordance with the principle of seeking their own advantage’<sup>d</sup> (*Ethics* IV, prop. 67): they should even enjoy their lives, as long as they last, in full agreement with *Ecclesiastes* 9:7–10. In short, it is optimism: this is why the ethical side

<sup>a</sup> *per accidens*

<sup>b</sup> *substantia aeterna*

<sup>c</sup> πάντα κατὰ λίαν

<sup>d</sup> *vivere, agere, suum Esse conservare, ex fundamento proprium utile quaerendi*



742

is weak, just as the ethical side of the Old Testament is weak too, indeed, it is downright false and sometimes loathsome.\*<sup>161</sup> For me on the other hand, the will, or the inner essence of the world, is absolutely not Jehovah, but is rather the crucified Saviour, as it were, or the crucified thief, depending on how things are decided: accordingly, my ethics is also in complete agreement with Christian ethics, right up to its most elevated tendencies, and no less with the ethics of Brahmanism and Buddhism. Spinoza on the other hand could not break free from the Jews: a vessel 'retains the smell of what used to fill it'.<sup>a</sup> His contempt for animals which he declares to be without rights, mere things for us to use, is entirely Jewish and, at the same time, in conjunction with pantheism, absurd and repulsive: *Ethics* IV, Appendix, ch. 27.<sup>162</sup> – And yet despite all of this Spinoza remains a very great man. In order to judge his proper value, one must keep in mind his relation to *Descartes*. This latter sharply divided nature into spirit and matter, i.e. thinking and extended substance, and likewise put God and world in complete opposition to each other: Spinoza too, while he was still a Cartesian, taught all this in his *Metaphysical Thoughts*,<sup>b</sup> ch. 12, 1665. Only in his final years did he realize the fundamental falsity of that twofold dualism: and accordingly his own philosophy consisted primarily of the indirect abolition of those two opposites; nonetheless, partly so as not to harm his teacher and partly to be less repulsive, he gave that abolition a positive appearance by using a strongly dogmatic form even though the content is primarily negative. His identification of the world with God also has only this negative meaning. For to call the world God means to fail to explain it: it remains as much of a riddle under the one name as under the other. But these two negative truths had value for their age, as they do for any age in which there are still conscious or even unconscious Cartesians. Spinoza made the same mistake as all philosophers prior to *Locke* of starting with concepts such as substance, cause, etc. without first having investigated their origin, a procedure that gives these concepts much too extensive a range of validity. – Those who, most recently, have not wanted to profess the emerging neo-Spinozism, have

\* *Unusquisque tantum juris habet, quantum potentiâ valet*. [Each person is right to the extent that his power holds good.] *Tractatus Politicus*, ch. 2, § 8. – *Fides alicui data tamdiu rata manet, quamdiu ejus, qui fidem dedit, non mutatur voluntas*. [A promise made to somebody is valid as long as the will of the person who made the promise is not changed.] *ibid.*, § 12. – *Uniuscujusque jus potentiâ ejus definitur* [The right of every person is determined by his power]. *Ethics* IV, prop. 37, schol. 1. – In particular, Chapter 16 of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* is the true compendium of the immorality of the Spinozistic philosophy.

<sup>a</sup> *quo semel est imbuta recens servabit odorem*

<sup>b</sup> *Cogitatis metaphysicis*

been frightened away primarily by the horrifying image of *fatalism*, as was the case with Jacobi, for instance. Fatalism should be understood as that doctrine that refers the existence of the world, along with the critical condition of the human race within the world, back to some absolute necessity which, for that very reason, does not admit of further explanation. Those frightened of fatalism, on the other hand, believed in the supreme importance of deducing the world from the free act of will of a being located outside the world; as if it were certain from the outset which of the two was more accurate or even better simply with respect to us. But the parties presuppose in particular that ‘there is no third possibility’<sup>a</sup> and accordingly that every philosophy so far has advocated one or the other. I am the first to have begun by truly establishing the third way:<sup>b</sup> the act of will from which the world arises is our own. It is free because the principle of sufficient reason, from which alone all necessity becomes meaningful, is merely the form of its appearance. This is why once appearance exists, its course is an absolutely necessary one: it is only as a result of this that we can recognize in appearance the constitution of that act of will so that potentially<sup>c</sup> we may will differently.

<sup>a</sup> *non datur tertium*

<sup>b</sup> *das Tertium*

<sup>c</sup> *eventualiter*



## *Variants in Different Editions*

There were three editions of *The World as Will and Representation* during Schopenhauer's lifetime:

- A 1819: first edition of *The World as Will and Representation* (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung: vier Bücher, nebst einem Anhang, der die Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie enthält, von Arthur Schopenhauer*. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus) [1819 appears on title page; in fact published at the end of 1818]
- B 1844: second edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, 2 volumes (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Von Arthur Schopenhauer. Zweite, durchgängig verbesserte und sehr vermehrte Auflage. 2 Bände* (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus)
- C 1859: third edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, 2 volumes (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Von Arthur Schopenhauer. Dritte, verbesserte und beträchtlich vermehrte Auflage. 2 Bände* (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus)

The first edition (A) consisted of a single volume. So the present volume 2 occurs only as B and C. The text translated in this volume is that edited by Arthur Hübscher, *Arthur Schopenhauers Sämtliche Werke* (Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus, 1988), volume 3, which essentially follows edition C, though with later editorial changes introduced by Julius Frauenstädt in the first complete edition of Schopenhauer's works (1873), and by subsequent editors, some of which are noted here.

We chiefly catalogue changes that Schopenhauer made between B and C, and some later changes that were based on Schopenhauer's own handwritten additions to his copy of C.

It is neither useful nor possible (in a translation) to list all the changes between the editions. Our policy has been in general not to comment in these notes on the following: minor changes to wording that have little or no effect on the overall train of thought; Schopenhauer's references to

editions of his own works that appeared after the publication of B in 1844; Schopenhauer's Latin translations (inserted in C) of passages which he had quoted in Greek; footnotes (also inserted in C) providing German translations for passages in English, Spanish, and so on.

#### SUPPLEMENTS TO THE FIRST BOOK

1. The sentence 'There can never be . . . not the object' added in C.
2. The quotation from Lichtenberg in the footnote is Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
3. The sentence 'As as yet obscure . . . true' added in C.
4. The sentence 'However, the law of causality . . . beyond them' added in C.
5. The sentence 'The senses are merely . . . representation' added in C.
6. Three sentences, 'Physiologically it is due . . . sensation of this' added in C.
7. 'while someone congenitally blind is entirely rational from the very beginning' added in C.
8. Four sentences, 'This whole opposition . . . *On Vision and Colours*' added in C.
9. The reference to Lichtenberg in the footnote is Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C. The Lichtenberg text is an editorial addition by Frauenstädt.
10. The paragraph 'Just as we have . . . distant past' added in C.
11. 'Parmenides . . . a merely analytic one' added in C.
12. Two sentences 'But in fact Descartes . . . second hand' and 'The value . . . opposite as' added in C. In B: 'But *cogito, ergo est* [etc.]'
13. '(mathematical ones)' added in C.
14. Footnote added in C. In B: 'It was erroneous to ascribe nine to the sloth' in the main text.
15. Footnote added in C.
16. 'presenting it in the fourteenth chapter of the fourth book of the *Physics*' added in C.
17. The sentence 'If arithmetic were not . . . certainty' is Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
18. Four sentences, 'The fact that physiologically . . . effect of its cause' added in C.
19. 'seventy' added in C. In B: '60'.
20. 'the unsoundness of which I have demonstrated' and following sentence 'The most complete and detailed . . . I have said there' added in C. 'There I showed the vast difference [etc.]' in B: 'For there is a vast difference [etc.]'
21. 'immediately' added in C.
22. 'immediately' added in C.
23. 'sixty' added in C. In B: '40'.
24. 'and thus material content (which today's ignorant materialists mistake for matter)' added in C.
25. 'but Aristotle had . . . ch. 12, § 5' added in C.
26. The sentence 'This is precisely why . . . applied to itself' added in C.
27. 'as the indestructible foundation of everything existent' added in C.

28. Four sentences, 'But what can we say . . . as a prize question' added in C.
29. 'and to Maupertuis or his predecessor' added in C.
30. 'and these letters appeared at the same . . . Kant's theory' and 'Of course' added in C. In B: 'Are we supposed to believe that nothing of all this came to Laplace's notice?'
31. 'and is always absorbed entirely in the present' added in C.
32. 'because it gives us great amusement . . . hide away' and five subsequent sentences 'In general, animals . . . mistaken for it' added in C.
33. The sentence 'For specific information . . . 1802' added in C.
34. 'fifty' added in C. In B: '40'.
35. Three sentences 'Lest we think that it is only . . . rheumatism' and the two footnotes added in C.
36. The sentence 'All primordial thinking . . . except in mathematics' added in C.
37. 'he has written from reflection, not from intuition' and succeeding 'and' added in C.
38. 'or petrified stupefaction' added in C.
39. 'because the expressions have been inspired by intuition' added in C.
40. The sentence 'Thus *Vauvenargues* says . . . reflection [*réflexion*]' added in C.
41. The sentence 'This is because natural understanding . . . natural understanding' added in C.
42. 'and that the first are . . . never to be read' added in C.
43. 'thirty-five or forty' added in C. In B: 'thirty or thirty-five'.
44. 'just as the highest temperatures . . . grow shorter' is Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
45. Three sentences 'We find countless examples . . . thereby negated' added in C.
46. 'the comical always comes from a paradoxical . . . from it, and so' added in C.
47. 'realized, i.e.' added in C.
48. The sentence 'In fact, if you want . . . the comical' added in C.
49. The sentence 'In this third edition . . . solved' added in C.
50. Two sentences 'The audience of a theatre . . . unforced here' added in C.
51. The sentence 'There is a doctor's tombstone . . . preserving life' added in C.
52. Five sentences 'In English there is the additional pun . . . mere play on words' added in C (with minor modification to start of next sentence).
53. Three sentences 'They are very common in society . . . under the title *Inscription*' added in C.
54. Six sentences 'This is also what happens in the practice . . . belonging under the concept' added in C.
55. Two sentences 'When someone remarked . . . excludes company' and the next word 'Additionally' added in C.
56. Three sentences 'Two farm boys had loaded . . . slow down the effect' added in C.
57. 'foolish' added in C.
58. Three sentences 'Hence laughter is the privilege . . . in the present' added in C.

59. The sentence 'We could call this the double counterpoint of irony' added in C.
60. The sentence 'This is why we find masterpieces . . . in the moderns' added in C.
61. The sentence 'Heinrich Heine emerges . . . unconcealed' added in C.
62. From 'To express the serious thought that . . . ' to the end of the chapter ' . . . called a clown', including the quoted verse, added in C.
63. 'and shared a sample of it in the second volume of the *Parerga*' added in C.
64. 'simple reversal of a universal affirmative judgment' added in C.
65. Three sentences 'Accordingly, the meaning of the copula . . . when doing so' added in C.
66. 'although, indeed, nevertheless, rather' added in C.
67. The sentence 'In particular, it seems that *zwar* . . . a "then"' added in C.
68. Two sentences 'A *question* is a judgment . . . "who is a Roman?"' added in C.
69. 'Consequently, the essence of the syllogism . . . it is accordingly' added in C. In B: 'A syllogism is accordingly'.
70. 'and one should take care not to . . . *ad rem*' and 'The Chinese go . . . his claim' added in C.
71. The sentence 'A concept is *correct* . . . a relation is *evident*' added in C.
72. The sentence 'What an ugly, cacophonous . . . nitrogen!' added in C.
73. 'or particularly . . . instead of "adverb"' added in C.
74. 'pitched at the level of a journeyman barber' added in C.
75. 'tiresome' added in C.
76. 'whereas, for instance "*Speisebrei*" . . . children's food' and the sentence "*Lungensack*" . . . anatomists' added in C.
77. 'with these old technical terms [*terminis technicis*]' added in C.
78. The sentence 'This is because the works . . . you will be lost' added in C.
79. The footnote is an editorial insertion by Frauenstädt, following Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C 'Sen[ilia] 150' (a reference to a notebook passage).
80. "*Betracht*" and "*Betrachtung*" and in previous sentence 'and "*Verweis*"' added in C.
81. 'as in everything analogous' added in C.
82. Two sentences "'*Auflösen*" is the specific term . . . in every case' and 'But this has been the tendency . . . a hundred more, and' added in C. In B: 'But the meanest stinginess [etc.]'.
83. 'as is Shakespeare in his oldest editions' added in C. In B: 'Shakespeare almost as though from today'.
84. 'perfect and' added in C.
85. 'on condition that they know absolutely nothing about any other field' added in C.
86. The sentence 'The Pythagoreans had . . . graceful manner' is Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
87. Two sentences 'Even *Descartes* . . . imaginary figures etc.' added in C.

88. Twelve sentences 'Somebody trying to dredge up a memory . . . an immediate support' added in C.
89. 'organic' added in C.
90. 'because what controls the sensorium . . . thinking subject' and the following sentence 'Just as here the laws . . . next Book' added in C.
91. The parentheses '(sensible)' and '(the association of ideas)' added in C.
92. 'because our consciousness is not lasting but transient' and two following sentences 'The intellect apprehends things . . . carries the day' added in C.
93. 'rhapsodic and often' added in C.
94. The sentence 'But what can we really . . . meditations?' added in C.
95. 'the remark Diderot . . . in *Rameau's Nephew* [*Neveu de Rameau*]' added in C. In B: 'the remark'.
96. The sentence "'Man is entirely chance [Πάν ἐστι ἄνθρωπος συμφορῇ] . . . already said' added in C.
97. The sentence 'So *Augustine* is as correct . . . called the highest good' added in C.
98. 'eudaimonistic' added in C.
99. The sentence 'Stobaeus, *Eclogues*, Book II, ch 7 . . . highest goal' added in C. In B: a different Greek extract is attributed merely to 'Stob. Ecl.'
100. 'it is clearly expressed by Seneca . . . less there is to lose' and following sentence 'So . . . call your own' added in C.
101. 'They agree in their results, but' added in C.
102. Two sentences 'The fundamental difference between . . . path to happiness', including the quotation from Horace, added in C.
103. The sentence 'Also the eleventh chapter . . . of this view' added in C.
104. 'the imperturbability (*ataraxia* [ἀταραξία])' added in C.
105. Two sentences 'At the beginning of his consciousness . . . mother of metaphysics' added in C.
106. Two sentences 'It would be most beneficial . . . them both' added in C.
107. The paragraph 'Religions are necessary . . . shoes of a dwarf' added in C.
108. 'and then gradually from several English and French scholars . . . "Sinology"' added in C. In B: 'May it please this great expert on central Asiatic languages soon to make available to us from the treasure trove of entire Buddhist libraries to which he has access (and to whose content his understanding has access) some selected translations of the primary texts themselves.'
109. Two sentences 'The power with which . . . redemption' added in C.
110. 'like the overture to *Don Giovanni* [*Don Juan*]' added in C.
111. 'and so there is not a single shard . . . qualities' and the following 'Thus' added in C.
112. 'and the materialism that has been warmed over again in recent years' added in C. In B, after 'Cabanis': 'etc.'
113. 'the manner (the formal element) of this existence' added in C. In B: 'their more exact constitution'.
114. 'as § 7 of the First Volume argued . . . the objective exists' and two following sentences 'Our contemporary . . . of momentum' added in C.



- 115. 'in which alone it exists just like a dream' added in C.
- 116. Three sentences 'We are tempted to call every excessively microscopic . . . problem' added in C.
- 117. Five sentences 'This is because the ultimate solution . . . outright charlatans' added in C.
- 118. 'fifty' added in C. In B: '40'.
- 119. 'sometimes in the streets' added in C.

## SUPPLEMENTS TO THE SECOND BOOK

- 1. Two sentences 'This would be the case . . . divides into subject and object' added in C. In B: 'Already in being perception, it cannot do this, because as such it too has its subject and object'.
- 2. 'make *cognitive* consciousness the true essence . . . presented the I' added in C. In B: 'have grasped and presented consciousness, the I'.
- 3. 'to which there are no exceptions' added in C.
- 4. 'with its "simple substance"' added in C.
- 5. '(until recently)' added in C.
- 6. The paragraph 'The first consequence of this . . . is imperishable' added in C.
- 7. Four sentences 'This is because *consciousness* . . . reflect its rays' added in C.
- 8. Footnote added in C.
- 9. Two sentences 'We often do not know what we want . . . into consciousness' added in C.
- 10. The sentence 'In isolated cases . . . motive of his action' added in C.
- 11. 'and even provides a commentary . . . its difficulty' added in C. The text originally had 'Socratic', which Schopenhauer corrected to 'Delphic'.
- 12. The sentence 'The intellect is certainly . . . everything' added in C.
- 13. The sentence 'After sustained intellectual . . . manual labour' added in C.
- 14. Four sentences 'By contrast, the intellect takes . . . and this increases' added in C.
- 15. Eight sentences 'This is why every extended period . . . how it is a mere tool' added in C.
- 16. 'also, as nature's healing force [*vis naturae medicatrix*]' added in C.
- 17. Two sentences 'The first semblance of danger . . . scope of the danger' added in C.
- 18. The sentence 'We cling to many errors . . . falsehoods' added in C.
- 19. 'although of course . . . several relations' added in C.
- 20. The paragraph 'The only definitive . . . obstructs the will' added in C.
- 21. 'This is why Isaiah is right to say that vexation bestows intelligence [*vexatio dat intellectum*] . . . proverb' added in C. In B: 'On this also rests the Italian proverb *la vessazione da intelletto*, like the German'.
- 22. Three sentences 'We can come to understand this influence . . . in old age' added in C.
- 23. 'what I had just been thinking about . . . reached my ears' added in C.

24. Three sentences 'What lies at the bottom of this . . . conditioned by the will' added in C.
25. The sentence 'Pained by this anger . . . or even the next day' added in C.
26. 'or, as the saying . . . quartzes' added in C.
27. 'although he has on his side . . . without evil)' added in C.
28. The passage 'and Dr Johnson assures us . . . this man's advancement' added in C.
29. The passage 'This is why Pope called him . . . banishing [*confinare etc.*]' added in C.
30. Two sentences 'And likewise we ourselves . . . bribed' added in C.
31. Two paragraphs 'People trying . . . workable tool' and 'If someone . . . merely its tool' added in C.
32. The paragraph 'Great intellectual endowment . . . an endowment' added in C.
33. The paragraph 'If, looking . . . but moral' added in C.
34. 'since the brain comes increasingly to resemble a depleted instrument' added in C.
35. 'In *Don Juan* . . . rather than the heart' added in C.
36. 'in 1820' added in C. In B: 'some years ago'. Footnote also added in C.
37. Two sentences 'The Greeks seem to have understood . . . §§ 7, 8)' added in C.
38. The passage 'which proves that in spite of all . . . does not lie in time' added in C.
39. Four sentences 'As a result of our relation to the external world . . . that other perishes in death' added in C.
40. 'that seems to have been first proposed . . . § 216' and 'It is that the nutrition of the brain' added in C. In B: 'that its nutrition'.
41. Three sentences 'This is already apparent . . . falling asleep [*capere somnum*]' added in C. In B: 'specifically, it does not occur without a certain expression of energy [*Kraftäußerung*] and hence is prevented by great weakness, and sometimes even by extreme exhaustion'.
42. 'slept a great deal (Baillet, *Life of Descartes* [*Vie de Descartes*], 1693, p. 288' added in C. In B: 'spent a lot of time in bed, sometimes sleeping, sometimes reflecting' (Brucker, *History of Philosophy* [*Historia critica philosophiae* (1743–76)], vol. IV, Part II, p. 246)'.  
 43. 'the *medulla oblongata*, the spinal marrow, and' added in C.
44. Two sentences 'The tiredness we feel . . . do not get tired' added in C.
45. Two sentences 'But this should not . . . throw it off' added in C.
46. 'and the way it discharges its debt . . . external relations' added in C.
47. Two paragraphs 'So as to guard against . . . brain function' and 'But this is not the case . . . or the heartbest, etc.' are a long addition to C. The footnote 'Compare p. 314' is Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
48. The sentence 'It is remarkable to see . . . p. 389)' added in C.
49. 'Flourens'. In B: 'the excellent Flourens'.
50. The sentence '*Haller* says . . . last to die' added in C.
51. The sentence 'It should be added that . . . the brain' added in C.
52. The sentence 'All cramps . . . civil servants' added in C.

53. The sentence 'What, seen from the inside . . . from without, the brain' added in C.
54. 'the conclusion or product of which . . . act of will' added in C.
55. The sentence 'it can also be demonstrated . . . convulsions' and the reference to Most added in C.
56. The entire *Remark on what was said concerning Bichat* added in C. In the last sentence of the *Remark*, '(and there are always droves of them)' is Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
57. 'although even this certainly does not . . . disappearance' added in C.
58. The sentence 'Buddhism describes this as . . . *Prajñâpâramitâ*' is Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
59. The footnote 'Compare p. 284' is Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
60. The sentence 'I ask therefore . . . chapter' added in C.
61. 'and anything in excess of this is harmful . . . decisive will' added in C.
62. 'and in addition . . . of the cerebrum' added in C.
63. The sentence 'Another symptom . . . cut with them' added in C.
64. 'an organic' added in C. In B: 'a plastic [*plastisches*]'
65. The sentence 'As paradoxical as it now seems . . . view of the scholastics [*scholasticorum opinione*]' added in C.
66. The sentence 'In the first place, the life force . . . less apparent' added in C.
67. 'letting go of one thing . . . precipitate' added in C.
68. The two paragraphs 'One can achieve intuitive cognition . . . our actions' and 'An illuminating example . . . stronger motive' added in C.
69. 'it stands there motionless like a ghost' added in C.
70. 'and it is their implicit assumption . . . forces' added in C.
71. 'although at the present moment . . . by Hegel' added in C.
72. 'and thus only arithmetical quantities' added in C.
73. The three paragraphs 'The assumption of atoms . . . incomprehensible', 'Atoms could be defended . . . assault' and 'Think of two . . . dynamics' added in C.
74. 'and so what is objectively matter is subjectively will' added in C.
75. The paragraph 'So, because matter . . . the same thing' added in C.
76. The sentence 'This is why the scholastics said "matter strives for form"' added in C.
77. Five sentences 'As soon as the life conditions . . . which still occurs' added in C.
78. The passage 'and *Admiral Petit-Thouars* has just recently reported . . . p. 147)' and the remaining eight sentences of the paragraph 'Wherever decomposition . . . its members' added in C.
79. The sentence 'It attributes to matter . . . basic mistake' added in C.
80. The paragraph 'At this point it inevitably becomes *atomism* . . . aversion to all philosophy' added in C.
81. '(i.e. material, or rather materials)' added in C.
82. 'as a result of the natural law . . . size of its orbit' added in C.
83. The paragraph 'When we give ourselves over . . . in the brain' added in C.

84. The sentence 'Or that dolphins . . . do have them' added in C.
85. 'and likewise the *Proteus anguinus*' added in C.
86. The paragraph 'From here we can see . . . nature plays' added in C.
87. 'through the mediation of the nervous system' added in C.
88. 'that is by the need for oxidation . . . the organism' added in C.
89. 'under this hyperbolic name' added in C.
90. Three sentences 'Indeed, explaining the blossom . . . R. Owen, mentioned above' added in C.
91. Five sentences 'The lice on a negro are black . . . latitudes' added in C.
92. The sentence 'The same final cause . . . procreation' added in C.
93. The paragraph 'If anyone wants to misuse . . . Englishman' added in C.
94. 'but also many of the other things . . . found by the male' and 'However, both sexes . . . in the South' added in C.
95. Two sentences 'We find *Leibniz* too . . . same thing!' added in C.
96. The reference to Owen added in C.
97. In the footnote on Hume, 'along with Essay 20, *On National Character*' added in C.
98. '70' added in C. In B: '60'.
99. Three sentences 'His concern in all this . . . a monstrosity' added in C.
100. The sentence 'It follows from this . . . circumstances at hand' added in C.
101. 'and to the highest degree' added in C.
102. Five sentences 'There are analogous . . . and the creative drives' added in C.
103. 'of this century' added in C. In B: 'of these last 40 years'.
104. The long French text in the footnote is an editorial insertion, following Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C: 'Here the story of the squirrel and the snake: it is in the *Siècle* of 10 April 1859, which I preserve in [the notebook] *Philosophari*'. The remaining footnote text is based on Schopenhauer's notebooks.
105. Seven sentences '*Junghuhn* describes seeing in Java . . . to build houses of cards' added in C.
106. 'of course . . . *will to life*' added in C. In B: 'But this drama is the objectivation of the *will to life*'.
107. Four sentences 'Of course these systems of our century . . . pleasure' added in C.
108. Footnote added in C.

#### SUPPLEMENTS TO THE THIRD BOOK

1. The sentence 'Incidentally, the doctrine . . . (Book I, ch. 3)' added in C.
2. Two sentences 'There is a real antagonism here . . . external world' added in C.
3. 'have the effect of detaching the object progressively from the subject, and' added in C.
4. The sentence 'When consciousness of other things . . . been achieved' added in C.

5. Two sentences 'When poets sing of the cheerful . . . effect on us?' and 'Further' added in C.
6. The paragraph 'When directly intuiting the world . . . actively involved with it' added in C.
7. 'he awaits his life in the form of an interesting novel' added in C.
8. Five sentences 'The same thing, incidentally . . . to understand this' added in C.
9. Seven sentences 'Thus, genius consists in . . . in the human race' added in C.
10. The sentence 'All primordial thought takes place in images' added in C.
11. The sentence 'He will never achieve . . . mathematics' added in C.
12. The paragraph 'This *clarity of mind* . . . it originally serves' added in C.
13. 'which is doubtless . . . 30, 1' added in C.
14. The sentence 'In general, however . . . illuminated by' added in C.
15. 'not that the valet does not . . . (vol. 2, ch. 5)' added in C.
16. The sentence 'Genius therefore is an intellect untrue to its function' added in C.
17. The sentence 'All other human works . . . existence' added in C.
18. 'and to compare useful people . . . diamonds' added in C.
19. 'exhibit the same errors to which . . . First, it will' added in C.
20. Four sentences 'The following will serve to explain . . . unperturbed' added in C.
21. Four sentences '*Bacon of Verulam* . . . in the fresh' added in C.
22. The sentence 'The report from the postmortem . . . 3 pounds' added in C.
23. 'of the four cerebral arteries' added in C.
24. The sentence 'Schlichtegroll's . . . remained a child' added in C.
25. Two sentences 'Given what we have said . . . truly geniuses' added in C.
26. The sentence 'If, through constant retelling . . . insane' added in C.
27. Two sentences 'In the *Lalitavistara* . . . two passages' added in C.
28. The sentence 'Madness that arises . . . length of time' added in C.
29. 'there are no dodgy tricks here' added in C.
30. The paragraph 'And how aesthetic nature is! . . . characters' added in C.
31. The sentence 'That is why it is . . . communicate' added in C.
32. Two sentences 'An illuminating example . . . unsettling' added in C.
33. The sentence 'The winding column . . . first glance' added in C.
34. The sentence 'And like music . . . considered as such' added in C.
35. The sentence 'In fact, all things . . . urgent manner' added in C.
36. 'taking pleasure in arbitrary elements' added in C.
37. The sentence 'Every interruption of a straight line . . . of this sort' added in C.
38. The sentence 'Since we have seen . . . without purpose' added in C.
39. 'and was introduced . . . by the Spanish Goths' added in C.
40. 'but when it tries to set itself . . . to stand' and three following sentences 'What a salutary effect . . . Barbarians! [Βάρβαροι!]' added in C.
41. Seven sentences 'This arises primarily, as we have already seen . . . Gothic architecture' added in C.
42. 'and he should know that . . . of the Greeks' added in C.
43. 'and somewhat idealized' added in C.

44. Four sentences 'An odd illustration of this . . . nation to nation' added in C.
45. 'indeed today there is idolatry . . . old master' added in C.
46. 'Shakespeare' added in C.
47. The footnote reference to Lichtenberg: editorial insertion (by Frauenstädt) based on Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
48. The sentence 'The narrative poet . . . and in all ages' added in C.
49. Two sentences 'In fact, the gift of poetry . . . prefer prose' added in C.
50. 'a fetter but also' added in C.
51. The sentence 'He is only half responsible . . . other half' added in C.
52. Two sentences 'For me at least, there is no language . . . disdained' added in C.
53. The sentence 'The art is . . . *bouts-rimés*' added in C.
54. Three sentences 'And even when good poets . . . Spanish boots' added in C.
55. Two sentences 'Even in the best poets . . . classes at that time' added in C.
56. 'By contrast, how decisively . . . true to nature' and 'analogously to Greek and Gothic architecture' added in C.
57. The paragraph 'The goal of drama . . . the intrigue' added in C.
58. 'and then straight afterwards . . . naturalness' added in C.
59. The sentence 'Just as the seventh chord . . . demands' added in C.
60. Three sentences 'But the unity of action . . . existence in general' added in C.
61. 'By contrast, Lessing's . . . magnanimity' and 'and even' added in C.
62. The sentence 'Euripides himself said . . . p. 299)' is Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
63. The sentence 'Bourgeois characters lack the heights from which to fall' added in C.
64. Three sentences 'Since sciences are systems . . . then no longer' and 'Moreover, since' added in C.
65. Two paragraphs 'Hegelians, who go . . . Islam' and 'So an actual philosophy of history . . . earthly lot' added in C.
66. 'such as, e.g., the pyramids, temples, and palaces in Yucatan' added in C.
67. 'and accordingly the chief basis . . . human race' added in C.
68. Two sentences 'In opera, however . . . only the heart' and 'It never assimilates itself to the content' added in C.
69. 'it is "the discordant concord of the world [*rerum concordia discors*]"' added in C. In B: 'it [sc. the symphony] is'.
70. Three sentences 'At the same time, all the passions . . . its immediacy' added in C.
71. The sentence 'In musical notation . . . horizontal lines' added in C.
72. Two paragraphs 'I will add a couple . . . system' and 'Perhaps one or two . . . p. 215)' added in C.

#### SUPPLEMENTS TO THE FOURTH BOOK

1. The sentence 'Parallel to this . . . can befall him' added in C.
2. Footnote added in C.
3. 'and truly very comfortable' added in C.

4. 'primordial force' added in C. In B: 'inner force [*innere Kraft*]'.
  5. 'and every summer . . . times before' added in C. In B: 'and a new, fresh blood always circulates'.
  6. 'even their actions . . . before our eyes' added in C.
  7. In this paragraph the first two sentences 'But it should definitely be noted . . . difficult passage' added in C. The sentence 'For the suspension . . . is death' is an editorial insertion by Hübscher based on Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
  8. Footnote is an editorial insertion by Hübscher based on Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
  9. Two paragraphs 'Anyone who comprehends . . . after death, nothing' and 'No less worthy . . . after you have left [*quand vous en sortirez*]' added in C.
  10. Two sentences 'There is no greater contrast . . . wheel of time' added in C.
  11. Four sentences 'This claim of privilege . . . hand of nature!' added in C.
  12. Two sentences 'For there is of course a sense . . . philosophy in general' added in C.
  13. 'or form[*Gestalt*]' added in C.
  14. 'And what an unfathomable mystery lies in every animal!' added in C.
  15. The sentence 'Now death is . . . significance' added in C.
  16. The sentence 'You are supposed to . . . made real' added in C.
  17. 'no less in us than we are in it' added in C. In B: 'conditioned by us, as we are by it'.
  18. Two sentences 'What birth is . . . annihilation' added in C.
  19. The sentence 'For it follows from this . . . our intuition' added in C.
  20. 'in the sense of the claim attributed . . . I, 43, 6' added in C.
  21. The sentence 'This is why the ancients . . . to a good rest' added in C.
  22. 'the one is fundamentally as true as the other' added in C.
  23. The sentence 'In this sense, death remains a mystery' added in C.
  24. The sentence 'The opposition between . . . this context' added in C.
  25. The paragraph 'Within appearance . . . the individual' added in C.
  26. Two sentences 'Just as we are seduced . . . devoid of cognition' added in C.
  27. The sentence 'It is precisely because . . . of the mind' added in C.
  28. 'although it is in fact . . . of the intellect' added in C.
  29. The sentence 'But one could say to the dying man . . . have become' added in C.
  30. 'and arises from its sleep . . . another intellect' added in C.
  31. 'accordingly, this doctrine . . . metempsychosis' added in C.
  32. The paragraph 'This view also agrees . . . surrogate' added in C.
  33. 'this kind of palingenesis' added in C. In B: 'this kind of modified metempsychosis'.
  34. 'so that at all times and places . . . provinces' added in C.
  35. 'who has perished . . . has arisen' added in C.
  36. 'indeed as the doctrine of all religions . . . truth in Buddhism' and nine following sentences 'Accordingly, while Christians console . . . p. 391)' added in C.

37. The sentence '*Nemesius* . . . into another' added in C.
38. Three sentences 'Even the Edda . . . p. 336ff.' added in C. In B: 'It was equally the basis of the religion of the Druids (Caesar, *The Gallic Wars*, VI. It is also taught in the *Edda*)'.
39. The sentence 'Also, a book by *Ungewitter* . . . to the world' added in C.
40. Three sentences 'Just look how seriously . . . hearken to' and the footnote added in C.
41. Two sentences 'Even the biblical passage . . . palpable absurdity' added in C.
42. 'and it can be thought of as a punishment for our existence' added in C. The footnote is an editorial insertion by Frauenstädt, following Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C 'Senilia 149', referring to a notebook passage.
43. 'for the difference between outer and inner comes to an end' added in C.
44. Three sentences 'Now everyone remembers . . . seed of his being' added in C.
45. 'from the one-sidedness of an individuality . . . "restitution of wholeness" [*restitutio in integrum*]' added in C.
46. In the footnote, 'Obry also . . . as that of a fire [*que celle d'un feu*]' and 'In *Eastern Monachism* . . . *nir*' added in C.
47. The sentence 'In Delft a nesting stork . . . *History of Holland* [*Descriptio Hollandiae*])' added in C.
48. 'and in fact this has always been recognized . . . Catullus' added in C.
49. The sentence 'So for instance . . . accurate' added in C.
50. 'and children conceived . . . legitimate father' added in C.
51. 'Shakespeare provides the converse case . . . *gens Fabricia*' added in C.
52. 'It is the *gens Claudia* . . . lineage' added in C.
53. The sentence 'The son of the notorious . . . his father' added in C.
54. Three sentences 'Following Marcus Donatus . . . her murderer' added in C.
55. The sentence 'In the *Frankfurter Postzeitung* of 19 November . . . gallows' added in C. The sentence 'The fact that the Greeks . . . p. 213)' is Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
56. The sentence 'Most heritable of all is the tendency to suicide' and the paragraph 'If on the other hand we look . . . a cuckold' added in C.
57. The sentence 'Joseph II was the son of Maria Theresa' added in C.
58. Ten sentences 'In the first book of the *Confessions*, *J. J. Rousseau* . . . on the lineage' added in C.
59. Two sentences 'How frequently she is . . . abilities' added in C.
60. 'since his ballads make Schiller's seem cold and contrived in comparison' added in C.
61. 'Georges and Frédéric *Cuvier*' added in C.
62. The sentence 'It might be noted in passing . . . quasi-identity of their essence' and the paragraph 'Even if there were particular cases . . . phlegmatic' added in C.
63. The sentence 'Plato already had . . . warrior caste' added in C.
64. Footnote is an editorial insertion by Frauenstädt following Schopenhauer's marginal annotation to C: 'Lichtenberg, vol. 2, p. 477 old edition'.



65. Four sentences 'Another practical application is . . . national wealth' added in C.
66. 'with death' added in C.
67. The sentence 'For all that could be produced . . . already present' added in C.
68. The sentence 'But it is here that . . . this principle' added in C.
69. 'when *La Rochefoucauld* claims' added in C. In B: 'when a German writer (I don't exactly know which one) claimed'.
70. The sentence 'On the other hand, *Spinoza's* . . . demonstration' added in C.
71. The sentence 'They feel the longing . . . a single being' added in C.
72. The sentence 'This is why there is . . . husband's murder' added in C.
73. The sentence 'A great many degenerations . . . disgusting need' added in C.
74. 'the human being is a plantigrade' added in C.
75. Two sentences 'They prefer men between the ages . . . ability' added in C.
76. 'precisely because they are *not* inherited from the father' added in C.
77. The verse quotation 'Venus makes it so! . . . about it' added in C.
78. 'Byron' added in C.
79. 'human beings do not naturally have white skin, and that by nature they have black or brown skin' added in C. In B: 'human beings by nature have brown skin'; 'and so there is no white race . . . bleached' added in C.
80. 'Who ever lov'd . . . *As You Like It*, III, 5' and three sentences 'There is a passage that is remarkable . . . Book III, ch. 5' added in C.
81. The verse 'I ask not, I care not . . . thou art' added in C.
82. The verse 'I love and hate her . . . III, 5' added in C.
83. 'Goethe's verse is therefore . . . that as well!' added in C.
84. 'Shakespeare shows us an example . . . scenes 2 and 3' added in C.
85. The sentence 'So, as a rule, a successful Theseus will leave his Ariadne' added in C.
86. The whole 'Appendix to the previous chapter' added in C.
87. Two sentences 'In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* . . . did not even exist' is Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
88. Four sentences 'Conversely, what do . . . nothing more' added in C.
89. 'in that by virtue of it . . . amazement where they had been' and 'and so that of which time is the expression' added in C.
90. '*Mille piacer*' . . . Petrarch' and the footnote giving Schopenhauer's translation added in C.
91. 'accidents large and small . . . we live our lives' added in C.
92. The sentence 'Everything that we set about . . . overcome' added in C.
93. The sentence 'Whoever looks this straight . . . and they do it' and 'But overall' added in C.
94. Three sentences 'How human beings treat . . . a similar fate' added in C.
95. 'and says . . . be made happy by my joy [*soit heureux de ma joie*]' added in C.
96. 'Leibniz opposes Locke's work . . . *Celestial Motions*' added in C.
97. 'indeed destructive' added in C.
98. Three sentences 'The fact that philosophy professors everywhere . . . our *Leibniz*' and 'But returning to Leibniz' added in C.

99. 'delightfully' and '(namely hypocritical flattery . . . its success)' added in C.
100. The sentence 'For possible does not mean . . . and persist' added in C.
101. '(although *Newton* was of the opposite opinion)' and 'and that a mechanical . . . to a standstill' added in C.
102. The sentence 'A very moderate increase . . . springs' added in C.
103. 'basically unjustified self-praise on the part . . . of its works' and 'It is therefore' added in C.
104. 'and in a long letter to *Voltaire* . . . in favour of optimism' and the sentence 'Indeed, the basic tendency . . . humanism' added in C.
105. 'this is stated in a nice verse . . . so much suffering [*laetitia exsequi*]' added in C.
106. The sentence 'And, guided by the same feeling . . . a son is born' added in C.
107. 'This beautiful verse of *Theognis* . . . under much earth [*corpus humo*]' added in C.
108. The paragraph '*Balthasar Gracian* also brings . . . tragic farce' is Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
109. The paragraph 'Still, nobody has treated . . . exciting' added in C.
110. The sentence 'These in turn are continued . . . *Parerga*' added in C.
111. 'but for the most part he gives it up . . . schol. 2)' and the sentence 'For more than a hundred years . . . overestimation' added in C.
112. '(grossly misusing the claim . . . can be carved)' added in C.
113. 'than this view, which is based on the shallowest realism' added in C.
114. 'in 1813' added in C. In B: '31 years ago'.
115. 'and still unrecognized' added in C.
116. 'the ability to deliberate, and with it' added in C.
117. 'with *Spinoza*' added in C.
118. Three sentences 'Fundamentally this is nothing . . . based on honour' added in C.
119. 'nothing to want, hope for, and fear' added in C. In B: 'nothing missing'.
120. The sentence 'This is why it must be . . . family' added in C.
121. Two sentences 'Likewise those who in our days . . . morally valid' added in C.
122. 'the criminal is merely . . . determines the punishment' and the sentence 'This is what is meant . . . afoul of the law' added in C.
123. Two sentences 'Those who want to abolish it . . . results' added in C.
124. 'moral' added in C. In B: 'ethical'.
125. The sentence 'When determining the degree . . . forbidden action' added in C.
126. The sentence 'But the criminal code should . . . no hold on it at all' added in C.
127. The sentence 'The fact that this implies . . . another' added in C.
128. 'it appeared as *Sufism* . . . a thousand years' added in C.
129. 'today just as much as three thousand years ago' added in C.
130. In the footnote, 'Protestant' added in C.
131. Two sentences 'This is why *Buddhism* . . . worldliness' added in C.

132. The sentence 'This is also . . . (Luke 24:47)' added in C.
133. '(final emancipation), *moksha*, i.e. reunification with *Brahman*, comes about' and three following sentences 'The Buddhists however . . . p. 474)' added in C. In B: 'as absorption into Brahman, or with the Buddhists, as *nirvana*, comes about'.
134. 'e.g. in *Phaedo*, p. 151, 183 f. Bipont, and' added in C.
135. Footnote is an editorial insertion, originally by Frauenstädt, based on Schopenhauer's marginal handwritten addition to C 'Senilia 137', referring to a notebook passage which indicates insertion here or in Chapter 50 below.
136. Two sentences 'For if something is nothing . . . our standpoint' added in C.
137. Three sentences 'The *Sufis* are the Gnostics . . . p. 465)' added in C.
138. 'to which all things return' added in C.
139. Seven sentences 'In the *German Theology* . . . the fire, and the earth' and footnote added in C.
140. 'Meister Eckhart' added in C.
141. 'and *The Life of Rancé* by *Châteaubriand*' added in C.
142. 'three quarters' added in C. In B: <sup>2</sup>/<sub>3</sub>.
143. '*Athanasius*' added in C. In B: 'Origen, who as is well known castrated himself because of this'.
144. A long passage consisting of twenty-seven sentences, 'In the third book of *Clement's Stromata* already mentioned . . . in all descriptions of Buddhism' added in C.
145. Two sentences 'I have already referred to some of the clues . . . animals' added in C.
146. The sentence 'In analogous fashion . . . Mercury, etc.' added in C.
147. 'either in the plural or the singular' added in C.
148. Three sentences 'A very similar German sect . . . as a model' added in C.
149. 'disclosed to them the metaphysical meaning of existence and therefore' added in C.
150. 'affirmation and' added in C.
151. 'in the guise of allegory, saying . . . reconciled' and four following sentences, 'But in order to understand . . . attains eternal life', added in C.
152. 'These truths, in both . . . completely novel' added in C. In B: 'But this [sc. great truth] was novel'.
153. The sentence 'As such, it is to those religions . . . manner' added in C.
154. Three sentences and the attribution, 'And finally, this: in the *Times* . . . last scene)' added in C.
155. The paragraph 'If you get to the bottom . . . suffering' added in C.
156. 'that "first false step [πρῶτον ψεῦδος]" of our existence' added in C.
157. The paragraph 'The practicable and particularly Protestant view [etc.]' added in C, with the exception of the last sentence 'The 15th *Sermon* . . . this view', which is Schopenhauer's handwritten addition to C.
158. The sentence 'To this we can at best answer . . . with affirmation' added in C.

- 159. 'and originally merely a tool in the service . . . objectivations' and three following sentences 'But the whole . . . our prison' added in C.
- 160. 'since they do not enter the form of cognition in general' added in C.
- 161. In the footnote, the last sentence 'In particular . . . Spinozistic philosophy' added in C.
- 162. The sentence 'His contempt for . . . Appendix, ch. 27' added in C.

## *Glossary of Names*

- ACHILLES, Greek mythological hero
- ADAM, figure from the Hebrew Bible, first man
- ADAMS, JOHN QUINCY (1767–1848), American statesman, 6th president of the United States
- ADELUNG, JOHANN CHRISTOPH (1732–1806), German philologist
- AELIAN(US), CLAUDIUS (175–235), Roman author and rhetorician
- AESCHYLUS (c. 525–c. 456 BC), Greek tragedian, the ‘father of tragedy’
- AGAMEMNON, Greek mythological hero, son of Atreus
- (JULIA) AGRIPPINA OR AGRIPPINA THE YOUNGER (c. 15–59), Roman empress
- AHRIMAN, Middle Persian equivalent of Angra Mainyu, Zoroastrian evil spirit
- ALCIBIADES (450–404 BC), Athenian statesman, orator, general
- ALEMÁN, MATEO (1547–1615), Spanish novelist, author of *Guzmán de Alfarache*
- ALEXANDER THE GREAT (356–323 BC), King of Macedon, supreme military commander
- ALEXANDER VI, POPE (1431–1503), Renaissance pope known for corruption and nepotism
- ALTHOF, LUDWIG CHRISTOPH (1758–1832), German doctor and biographer of Gottfried August Bürger
- AMPÈRE, ANDRÉ-MARIE (1775–1836), French physicist and mathematician, one of the founders of the science of classical electromagnetism
- ANACREON (570–488 BC), Greek lyric poet
- ANAXAGORAS (c. 500–428 BC), pre-Socratic Greek philosopher
- ANGELUS SILESII (JOHANNES SCHEFFLER) (1624–77), German Catholic priest, mystic and poet
- ANTISTHENES (445–365 BC), Greek philosopher, student of Socrates, founder of Cynicism
- ANTONIO, a character in *Torquato Tasso*, a play by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
- ANTONINUS *see* Marcus Aurelius
- APHRODITE, Greek goddess of love, beauty and pleasure

- APULEIUS (LUCIUS APULEIUS MADAURENSIS) (125–80), Latin language prose writer and student of Platonist philosophy, author of the *Golden Ass*
- AQUINAS, SAINT THOMAS (1225–74), Italian Dominican friar and priest as well as scholastic philosopher and theologian
- ARIADNE, Greek mythological figure, rescued the hero Theseus from the labyrinth, later abandoned by Theseus and became the bride of the god Dionysus
- ARIOSTO, LUDOVICO (1474–1533), Italian poet, author of the romance *Orlando Furioso*
- ARISTIPPUS OF CYRENE (c. 435–c. 356 BC), student of Socrates and founder of the Cyrenaic school
- ARISTON OF CHIOS (EARLY TO MID THIRD CENTURY BC), Stoic philosopher
- ARISTOTLE (384–322 BC), the great and immensely influential Greek philosopher
- ARRIAN OF NICOMEDIA (c. 86–c. 160), Greek historian and philosopher
- ARTEMIS, Greek goddess of the hunt
- ASMUS *see* Claudius, Matthias
- ATHANASIUS OF ALEXANDRIA (c. 297–373), Egyptian leader, Christian theologian and Church Father
- AUDOUIN, JEAN VICTOIRE (1797–1841), French naturalist
- AUGUSTINE, SAINT (353–430), Church Father, Bishop of Hippo
- BACON (OF VERULAM), LORD FRANCIS (1591–1626), English philosopher, statesman, scientist and lawyer
- BAILLET, ADRIEN (1649–1706), French scholar, critic and biographer of Descartes
- BATHSHEBA, biblical figure, mistress and then wife of King David
- BAUMGÄRTNER, KARL HEINRICH (1798–1866) Professor of Physiology in Freiburg
- BAYARD, JEAN-FRANÇOIS ALFRED (1796–1853), French playwright
- BEAUSOBRE, ISAAC DE (1659–1738), French Protestant churchman and historian of Manichaeism
- BECCARIA, CESARE, MARQUIS (DI BECCARIA BONESANA) (1738–94), Italian criminologist, jurist, philosopher and politician
- BEETHOVEN, LUDWIG VAN (1770–1827), German composer
- BELL, CHARLES (1774–1842), Scottish surgeon and anatomist, one of the founders of clinical neurology
- BELLINI, VINCENZO SALVATORE CARMELO FRANCESCO (1801–35), Italian opera composer
- BENEDICT, DAVID (1779–1874), American Baptist historian

- BERKELEY, REV. GEORGE (1685–1753), Irish philosopher, proponent of idealism
- BERNOULLI FAMILY, famous Swiss family of mathematicians and artists
- BERZELIUS, JÖNS JACOB (1779–1848), Swedish chemist, one of the founders of modern chemistry
- BICHAT, MARIE FRANÇOIS XAVIER (1771–1802), French anatomist and physiologist
- BION OF BORYSTHENES (c. 325–c. 250 BC), Greek philosopher and satirist
- BIOT, JEAN-BAPTISTE (1774–1862), French physicist, astronomer and mathematician
- BOCCACCIO, GIOVANNI (1313–75), Italian author, poet and Renaissance humanist
- BOERHAAVE, HERMAN (1668–1738), Dutch botanist and physician
- BÖHME, JACOB (1575–1624), Lutheran mystic and theosophist born in Silesia
- BOILEAU, NICOLAS (1636–1711), French poet and critic
- BOLEYN, ANNE (1501–36), Queen of England and second wife of King Henry VIII
- BOLINGBROKE, HENRY ST JOHN, 1ST VISCOUNT (1678–1751), English politician and political philosopher
- BONAVENTURE, O. F. M, SAINT (1221–74), Italian medieval scholastic theologian and philosopher, biographer of Saint Francis of Assisi
- BORGIA, CESARE (c. 1475–1507), Italian strongman, nobleman, politician and cardinal
- BOSWELL, JAMES (1740–95), lawyer, diarist, biographer of Samuel Johnson
- BOURIGNON (DE LA PORTE), ANTOINETTE (1616–80), French-Flemish mystic and spiritual leader
- BRANDIS, AUGUST CHRISTIAN (1790–1867), German philologist and historian of philosophy
- BRANDIS, JOACHIM DIETRICH (1762–1846), physician in Braunschweig, professor in Kiel, physician in ordinary at the royal court in Copenhagen
- BRONGNIARD, ADOLPHE-THÉODORE (1801–76), French botanist
- BROUGHAM, HENRY PETER, 1ST BARON BROUGHAM AND VAUX (1778–1868), Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, educational reformer and opponent of the slave trade
- BROWN, THOMAS (1778–1820), Scottish Enlightenment physician credited as a founder of association psychology, author of *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*
- BRUNO, GIORDANO (1548–1600), Italian philosopher of nature, burned to death as a heretic
- BUFFON, GEORGE-LOUIS LECLERC, COMTE DE (1707–88), French naturalist, progenitor of the concept of natural selection

- BUNDAHISHN, the name given to a collection of Zoroastrian cosmogony and cosmology
- BUNYAN, JOHN (1628–88), English Christian writer and preacher, author of *The Pilgrim's Progress*
- BURDACH, KARL FRIEDRICH (1776–1847), physiologist and professor of anatomy and physiology in Königsberg
- BÜRGER, GOTTFRIED AUGUST (1747–94), German jurist and poet, author of *Lenore*, said to have created the German ballad
- BURKE, SIR EDMUND (1729–97), Irish statesman and philosopher
- BURNET, THOMAS (c. 1635–1715), English theologian and writer
- BURNOUF, EUGÈNE (1801–52), French scholar and orientalist, scholar of Sanskrit
- BYRON, LORD GEORGE GORDON (1788–1824), British Romantic poet
- CABANIS, PIERRE JEAN GEORGES (1757–1808), French physiologist, proponent of the materialist view of consciousness
- CAESAR, JULIUS (100–44 BC), Roman general, politician and author
- CALDERÓN DE LA BARCA, DON PEDRO (1600–81), Spanish dramatist
- CALIGULA (GAIUS JULIUS CAESAR AUGUSTUS GERMANICUS) (12–41), 3rd emperor of Rome
- CAMPE, JOACHIM HEINRICH (1746–1818), German Enlightenment writer, educator and linguist
- CANOVA, ANTONIO (1757–1822), Italian neoclassical sculptor
- CARAVAGGIO, MICHELANGELO MERISI DA (c. 1571–1610), Italian painter
- CARDANUS, HIERONYMUS (GIROLAMO CARDANO) (1501–76), Italian Renaissance mathematician, physician, astrologer, author of *De Utilitate ex Adversis Capienda*
- CAROVÉ, FRIEDRICH WILHELM (1789–1852), German jurist, publicist and philosopher
- CARRACCI, ANNIBALE (1560–1609), Italian baroque painter
- CASINIUS, PETER (1521–97), author of a popular catechism
- CASPER, JOHANN LUDWIG (1796–1864), German state physician
- CASSANDRA, Greek mythological prophet
- CASSIANUS, ST JOHN (c. 360–435), Christian monk, theologian and mystic
- CASSINI FAMILY, famous family of French astronomers and naturalists
- CATULLUS, GAIUS VALERIUS (84–54 BC), Latin poet
- CELSUS, AULUS CORNELIUS (c. 25 BC–c. 50 AD), Roman encyclopedist and medical author
- CERVANTES, MIGUEL DE (MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA) (1547–1616), Spanish novelist, poet and playwright, author of *Don Quixote*
- CHAMFORT, NICOLAS (1741–94), French aphorist



- CHÂTEAUBRIAND, FRANÇOIS-RENÉ DE (1768–1848), French Romantic author and politician
- LORD CHATHAM (WILLIAM PITT THE ELDER) (1708–78), English politician and orator
- CHEVREUL, MICHEL EUGÈNE (1786–1889), French chemist and gerontologist
- CHRYSIPPUS (*c.* 280–*c.* 206 BC), Greek philosopher, head of the early Stoic school in Athens
- CICERO, MARCUS TULLIUS (106–43 BC), pre-eminent Roman statesman and orator who composed the first substantial body of philosophical work in Latin
- CIMON (510–450 BC), Athenian statesman and military hero
- CLAUDIA GENS, powerful and prominent Roman patrician house
- CLAUDIUS (TIBERIUS CLAUDIUS CAESAR AUGUSTUS GERMANICUS) (10 BC–54 CE), 4th emperor of Rome
- CLAUDIUS, MATTHIAS (PEN-NAME ASMUS) (1740–1815), German poet
- CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA (*c.* 150–215), Christian Platonist philosopher
- COLEBROOKE, HENRY THOMAS (1765–1837), English Indologist, translator of the Upanishads
- COMMODOUS (MARCUS AURELIUS COMMODOUS ANTONINUS AUGUSTUS) (161–92), 17th emperor of Rome
- CONDILLAC, ETIENNE BONNOT DE (1715–80), French philosopher of the Enlightenment and populariser of Locke's ideas in France
- CONDORCET, MARIE JEAN ANTOINE NICOLAS DE CARITAT, MARQUIS DE (1743–94), French Enlightenment philosopher, mathematician and political scientist
- CORNEILLE, PIERRE (1606–84), French dramatist, one of the founders of French tragedy
- COUSIN, VICTOR (1792–1867), French philosopher and education reformer
- CRATES OF THEBES (FL. FOURTH CENTURY BC), Cynic philosopher and pupil of Diogenes
- CSOMA KÖRÖSI, SÁNDOR (ALEXANDER) (1784–1842), Hungarian scholar, founder of Tuberology
- CUPID, Roman god of love
- CUVIER, FRÉDÉRIC (GEORGES-FRÉDÉRIC) (1793–1838), French naturalist, brother of Georges Cuvier
- CUVIER, GEORGES-LÉOPOLD-CHRÉTIEN-FRÉDÉRIC-DAGOBERT, BARON (1769–1832), French naturalist and zoologist who helped establish the field of comparative anatomy
- D'ALEMBERT, JEAN LE ROND (1717–83), French philosopher and mathematician

- DALTON, EDWARD JOSEPH (1772–1840), archaeologist and anatomist, professor in Bonn
- DANTE ALIGHIERI (1265–1321), Italian poet, author of the great trilogy *La Divina Commedia* (*The Divine Comedy*)
- DAVID, biblical King of Israel
- DAVIS, SIR JOHN FRANCIS (1795–1890), English diplomat, Sinologist, known for his English translations of Chinese literature
- DECIUS MUS, PUBLIUS, three Romans in legend who sacrificed themselves for their city
- DELAMARK *see* Lamarck
- DEMOCRITUS (c. 460–370 BC), pre-Socratic philosopher who believed that matter is not infinitely divisible and named its smallest part ‘atom’
- DEMODOCUS, a bard in Homer’s *Odyssey* who sings in the court of King Alcinoüs
- DESCARTES, RENÉ (1596–1650), important early modern rationalist French philosopher who maintained a dualism between mind and body
- DIANA, mythological Roman goddess of the hunt
- DIDEROT, DENIS (1713–84), French philosopher, critic, mathematician and poet of the Enlightenment
- DIODEGENES OF SINOPE (c. 412– c. 323 BC), Greek philosopher, Cynic
- DIODEGENES LAËRTIUS (FL. THIRD CENTURY), Athenian historian of ancient philosophy whose *Lives of the Philosophers* is a rich source of knowledge about earlier thinkers
- DIONYSUS THE AREOPAGITE (c. FIRST CENTURY), Greek judge who converted to Christianity
- DOMENICHINO (DOMENICO ZAMPIERI) (1581–1641), Italian baroque painter
- DOMITIAN (51–96), 11th Roman emperor, son of Vespasian, historically reputed to be cruel and tyrannical
- DOMITIUS (GNAEUS DOMITIUS AHENOBARBUS) (17 BC–40 AD), close relative of Roman emperors, biological father of Nero
- DONATELLO (DONATO DI NICCOLÒ DI BETTO BARDI) (1386–1466), Florentine sculptor of the early Renaissance
- DUNS SCOTUS (JOHN DUNS) (1266–1308), medieval Scottish philosopher and theologian
- DUPETIT-THOUARS, ABEL AUBERT (1793–1864), French naval officer
- DÜRER, ALBRECHT (1471–1528), German painter, engraver, printmaker, mathematician and author of important theoretical works on mathematics, art and aesthetics
- ECKHART, MEISTER (1260–1328), German theologian, philosopher and mystic

- EDWARD II (1284–1327), King of England, 1307–27
- ELIZABETH I (1533–1603), Queen Regnant of England and Ireland, 1558–1603
- ST ELIZABETH, biblical figure, mother of John the Baptist
- EMPEDOCLES (c. 495–c. 435 BC), Greek philosopher important for his cosmology
- EPICTETUS (c. 55–c. 135), Greek Stoic philosopher
- EPICURUS (341–270 BC), Greek philosopher, founder of the school of Epicureanism
- EPIPHANIAS (c. SIXTH CENTURY), Italian saint
- ESQUIROL, (JEAN-)ÉTIENNE (DOMINIQUE) (1772–1840), French psychiatrist, author of a treatise on mental illness (1838)
- EUCLID (c. 300 BC), Greek mathematician, first axiomatic geometer
- EULER, LEONHARD PAUL (1707–83), Swiss mathematician and physicist
- EURIPIDES (c. 480–406 BC), Athenian tragedian
- FABIA GENS, ancient and powerful Roman patrician family, many members of which were active in the Roman military as well as literature and arts
- FABRICIA GENS, Roman plebian family
- FAUSBÖLL, MICHAEL VIGGO (1821–1908), Danish Indologist, editor and translator of the *Dhammapadam* (1855)
- FAUSTINA THE YOUNGER (ANNIA GALERIA FAUSTINA MINOR) (c. 125–75), empress of Rome, wife of Marcus Aurelius
- FICHTE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB (1762–1814), German philosopher, one of the chief figures in German Idealism in the period immediately after Kant, author of the *Wissenschaftslehre* (*Science of Knowledge*) and *System der Sittenlehre* (*System of Moral Philosophy*); Schopenhauer attended Fichte's lectures in 1811–13, but describes him as a pompous and inferior thinker
- FLOURENS, MARIE JEAN PIERRE (1794–1867), French physiologist and brain scientist
- FRANCIS OF ASSISI, SAINT (1181–1226), founder of the Franciscans, patron saint of animals
- FRAUENSTÄDT, JULIUS (1813–79), Schopenhauer's associate and editor of the first complete edition of his works in 1873
- FREDERICK THE GREAT (FRIEDRICH II) (1712–86), King of Prussia
- FREYCINET, LUIS DE (1779–1841), French navigator who published the first map of the full coastline of Australia in 1811
- GALEN[US], CLAUDIUS (c. 129–200), Roman physician
- GALL, FRANZ JOSEPH (1758–1828), German neuro-anatomist, physiologist, phrenologist and brain scientist
- GARRICK, DAVID (1717–79), English actor, playwright and influential theatre manager and producer
- GEOFFROY SAINT-HILAIRE, ÉTIENNE (1772–1844), French naturalist

- GICHTEL, JOHANN GEORG (1638–1710), German mystic and disciple of Jakob Böhme
- GILBERT, LUDWIG WILHELM (1769–1824), German physicist and chemist
- GIORDANO, LUCA (1634–1705), Italian painter and printmaker of the late baroque
- GLEDITSCH, JOHANN GOTTLIEB (1714–86), professor of botany in Berlin
- GOETHE, JOHANN WOLFGANG VON (1749–1832), poet, dramatist and scholar in many fields, Germany's greatest writer and prominent Enlightenment figure. Schopenhauer knew Goethe in the period 1813–14 and collaborated with him over his theory of colours
- GOLDONI, CARLO (1707–93), Italian playwright and librettist, author of *Servant of Two Masters*
- GORGAS (c. 487–376 BC), Greek pre-Socratic philosopher and Sophist
- GOZZI, COUNT CARLO (1720–1806), Italian dramatist
- GRACIÁN Y MORALES, BALTAZAR (1601–58), Spanish baroque author, intensively studied and translated into German by Schopenhauer
- GRAUL, KARL (1814–64), German Lutheran missionary and Tamil scholar
- GRIESBACH, JOHANN JAKOB (1745–1812), German Bible scholar and textual critic
- GUICCIARDINI, FRANCESCO (1483–1540), Italian Renaissance historian and statesman
- GUYON, MADAME (JEANNE-MARIE BOUVIER DE LA MOTTE-GUYON) (1648–1717), French mystic and Quietist
- HADRIAN[US] JUNIUS (1511–75), Dutch physician, classicist, translator and historian
- HALL, MARSHALL (1790–1857), English physician and physiologist
- HALLER, ALBRECHT VON (1708–77), anatomist, physiologist, botanist, physician and poet, considered by some to be the founder of modern experimental biology
- HAMILCAR BARCA (c. 275–228 BC), Carthaginian general and statesman
- HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM, 9TH BARONET (1788–1856), Scottish metaphysician and scholar
- HAMANN, JOHANN GEORG (1730–88), German philosopher and theologian
- HANNIBAL (247–c. 183 BC), Carthaginian military commander
- HARDY, REV. ROBERT SPENCE (1803–68), author of *Manual of Buddhism* and *Eastern Monachism*
- HARVILLE, JEAN-FRANÇOIS COLLIN D' (1755–1806), French dramatist
- HAÛY, RENÉ JUST (1743–1822), French mineralogist, honorary canon of Notre-Dame, one of the founders of the science of crystallography
- HAYDN, JOSEPH (1732–1809), Austrian classical composer

- HAYDN, MICHAEL (1737–1806), Austrian classical composer, younger brother of the more famous Joseph
- HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770–1831), German philosopher, leading figure in the German Idealism movement, author of *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (*Phenomenology of Spirit*) and *Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften* (*Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*), professor of philosophy in Berlin and dominant intellectual figure in the first four decades of the nineteenth century. Consistently critized and satirized by Schopenhauer as a charlatan
- HEINE, CHRISTIAN JOHANN HEINRICH (1797–1856), German poet, essayist, literary critic and political radical
- HELVÉTIUS, CLAUDE ADRIEN (1715–71), philosopher of the French Enlightenment
- HENRY VIII (1491–1547), King of England
- HERACLITUS (c. 535–475 BC), Greek pre-Socratic philosopher
- HÉRAULT DE SÉCHELLES, MARIE-JEAN (1759–94), French judge, politician and writer
- HERBART, JOHANN FRIEDRICH (1776–1841), professor of philosophy in Göttingen and elsewhere, nemesis of Schopenhauer who reviewed the first edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, irritating Schopenhauer by claiming that his philosophy was a development of those of Fichte and Schelling
- HERCULES, legendary Greek hero of great strength and prowess
- HERDER, JOHANN GOTTFRIED VON (1744–1803), German philosopher, humanist, poet, translator and literary critic
- HERMES TRISMEGISTUS, the purported, supposedly divine author of the Hermetica texts of the second and third centuries
- HERODOTUS OF HALICARNASSUS (c. 484–c. 425 BC), ancient Greek historian and perhaps the first European historian
- HERSCHEL FAMILY, an Anglo-German family of famous astronomers and musicians
- ST HIERONYMUS *see* St Jerome
- HIPPIAS OF ELIS (MID-FIFTH CENTURY), Greek pre-Socratic philosopher and Sophist
- HIPPOCRATES (c. 450–c. 380 BC), Greek physician
- HIPPOLYTUS, Greek mythological figure, a son of Theseus who was falsely accused of rape and killed
- HOBBS, THOMAS (1588–1679), English philosopher
- HOLBACH, PAUL-HENRI THIRY, BARON DE (1723–89), French-German Enlightenment philosopher and encyclopedist

- HOLBERG, LUDVIG, BARON OF HOLBERG (1684–1754), Danish-Norwegian writer, essayist, philosopher, historian and playwright
- HOME, HENRY (LORD KAMES) (1696–1782), Scottish Enlightenment philosopher
- HOMER (FL. c. 700 BC), the early ancient Greek poet, author of the epic poems the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*
- HOOKE, ROBERT (1635–1703), English natural philosopher and mathematician
- HORACE (QUINTUS HORATIUS FLACCUS) (65–8 BC), Roman poet, frequently quoted by Schopenhauer
- HUECK, ALEXANDER FRIEDRICH (1802–42), professor of medicine at Dorpat
- HUFELAND, CHRISTOPH WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1762–1836), doctor
- HUMBOLDT, ALEXANDER VON (1769–1859), German naturalist, explorer and biogeographer
- HUME, DAVID (1711–76), Scottish philosopher, essayist and historian
- HUTCHESON, REV. FRANCIS (1694–1746), Scottish-Irish Enlightenment philosopher
- IFFLAND, AUGUST WILHELM (1759–1814), German actor and dramatist
- ILLGEN, CHRISTIAN FRIEDRICH (1786–1844), professor of theology in Leipzig
- IPHIGENIA, Greek mythological figure, daughter of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, sacrificed by Agamemnon to enable his voyage to Troy
- PRINCESS ISABELLA OF PARMA (1741–63), granddaughter of Philip V of Spain
- JACHMANN, REINHOLD BERNHARD (1767–1843), German student, friend and biographer of Kant; also a pastor and educational reformer
- JACOBI, FRIEDRICH HEINRICH (1743–1819), German polemicist, critic of the Enlightenment and idealism
- JEAN PAUL (PEN-NAME FOR JOHANN PAUL FRIEDRICH RICHTER) (1763–1825), German novelist and humorist
- JEHOVAH, biblical figure, God of Israel
- ST JEROME (c. 347–420), Illyrian Latin Christian priest, theologian, writer and historian, translated the Bible into Latin
- JESUS BEN SIRACH (ALSO ECCLESIASTICUS) (c. 180 BC), author of a book of the Hebrew Bible
- JOB, biblical figure whose travails are the subject of the Book of Job
- JOHANNES SECUNDUS (1511–36), Dutch author of New Latin poetry
- JOHN THE BAPTIST, biblical figure, messianic prophet of Jesus
- JOHNSON, SAMUEL (1709–84), English man of letters, lexicographer and subject of famous biography by James Boswell

- JOSEPH II (1741–90), Holy Roman Emperor and Habsburg ruler
- JULIAN THE APOSTATE, (331/2–63), Roman emperor
- JULIEN, STANISLAS AIGNAN (1799–1873), Sinologist, translator of the *Tao te King*
- JUNG-STILLING (JOHANN HEINRICH JUNG; ASSUMED NAME HEINRICH STILLING), (1740–1817), German physician and writer
- JUNGHUHN, FRIEDRICH FRANZ WILHELM (1809–64), German-Dutch botanist, geologist and socialist
- JUSTIN, Latin historian who probably wrote in the second century
- JUVENAL, DECIMUS IUNIUS (c. 58–138), Roman satirist
- KANT, IMMANUEL (1724–1804), German philosopher, commonly considered the greatest philosopher of modern times, a view Schopenhauer shares. Author of *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*Critique of Pure Reason*) (1781 and 1787), *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (*Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals*) (1785) and *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (*Critique of Practical Reason*) (1788) among other works, Kant is the most important single influence on Schopenhauer, who especially admires his resolution of the problem of freedom and necessity and his idealist account of space and time, but is highly critical of many aspects of Kant's philosophy
- KEPLER, JOHANNES (1571–1630), German astronomer and mathematician
- KERNER, JUSTINUS ANDREAS CHRISTIAN (1786–1862), German poet and spiritualist writer
- KIELMAYER, CARL FRIEDRICH (1765–1844), German biologist and naturalist
- KIESER, DIETRICH GEORG (1779–1862), physician and botanist, professor of medicine
- KIRBY, WILLIAM (1759–1850), wrote *Introduction to Entomology* with William Spence
- KNEBEL, KARL LUDWIG VON (1744–1834), poet, translator and friend of Goethe
- KÖPPEN, KARL FRIEDRICH (1775–1858), Lutheran minister in Bremen, professor of philosophy, author of *Die Religion des Buddha*
- KOTZEBUE, AUGUST FRIEDRICH FERDINAND VON (1761–1819), dramatist and author
- KRAUS, CHRISTIAN JAKOB (1753–1807), professor of practical philosophy and cameralism at Königsberg, a student of Kant and follower of Adam Smith
- KRISHNA, Hindu god, hero of the *Bhagavadgītā*
- LAMARCK, JEAN-BAPTISTE PIERRE ANTOINE MONET DE (1744–1829), author and professor of zoology at the Jardin des Plantes

- LAMARTINE, ALPHONSE DE (1790–1869), politician in the Second Republic, Romantic poet, orientalist
- LAMPERT, JOHANN HEINRICH (1728–77), Swiss mathematician, physicist and astronomer
- LAO-TZU (c. FIFTH CENTURY BC), Chinese philosopher, founding figure of Taoism
- LAPLACE, PIERRE-SIMON (1749–1827), French mathematician and astronomer
- LAUK, EVA (1824–?), Estonian girl, born quadriplegic
- LEE, ANN (1736–84), founder of the Shakers, a religious sect
- LEIBNIZ, GOTTFRIED WILHELM (1646–1716), German-born philosopher and mathematician, a leading figure in seventeenth-century intellectual life
- LEOPARDI, GIACOMO (1798–1837), Italian philosopher, essayist and romantic poet
- LEROY, CHARLES GEORGES (1723–89), French natural scientist, one of the precursors of the science of ethology
- LESSING, GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM (1729–81), German Enlightenment philosopher, dramatist and art critic
- LESZCZYNSKI, STANISLAW (1677–1766), King of Poland, patron of arts and proponent of Enlightenment
- LEUCIPPUS (FIFTH CENTURY BC), Greek philosopher, proponent of atomism
- LICHTENBERG, GEORG CHRISTOPH (1742–99), German scientist, satirist and public intellectual, professor of philosophy at the University of Göttingen
- LIEBIG, JUSTUS (1803–73), German chemist
- LINNAEUS, CAROLUS (CARL VON LINNÉ) (1707–78), Swedish botanist and originator of taxonomic classification and nomenclature
- LIVY (TITUS LIVIUS) (59 BC–17 AD), Roman historian
- LLULL, RAMON (1232–1315), Majorcan writer, mystic and philosopher
- LOCKE, JOHN (1632–1704), English philosopher, important as first British empiricist, author of *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*
- LÖHER, FRANZ VON (1818–92), German jurist and historian, active in the 1848 uprisings, toured the United States and wrote about his experiences
- LUCRETIVS (TITUS LUCRETIVS CARUS) (c. 99– c. 55 BC), Roman poet and philosopher
- LUTHER, MARTIN (1483–1546), German Protestant theologian of great influence
- MACHIAVELLI, NICCOLÒ (1469–1527), Florentine statesman and historian, author of *The Prince*
- MAGENDIE, FRANÇOIS (1783–1855), French physiologist



- MAINE DE BIRAN, FRANÇOIS PIERRE GAUTHIER (1766–1824), French philosopher
- MANU, Hindu half-divine progenitor of humanity
- MANZONI, ALESSANDRO FRANCESCO TOMMASO (1785–1873), Italian poet and novelist
- MARCUS AURELIUS (ANTONINUS AUGUSTUS) (121–80), Roman emperor and Stoic philosopher
- MARIA THERESA (WALBURGA AMALIA CHRISTINA) (1717–80), ruler of the Habsburg dominions and Holy Roman Empress
- MARY I OF ENGLAND (1516–58), daughter of Henry VIII and restorer of Roman Catholicism
- MARY, QUEEN OF SCOTS (1542–87), Queen Regnant of Scotland
- MASHYA AND MASHYANA, in Zoroastrian cosmogony, these were the first man and the first woman who gave rise to the human race
- MAUPERTUIS, PIERRE LOUIS MOREAU DE (1698–1759), French physicist and mathematician, president of the Berlin Academy
- MAXIMUS OF TYRE (CASSIUS MAXIMUS TYRIUS) (LATE SECOND CENTURY), Greek rhetorician and philosopher
- MAXWELL, ARCHIBALD MONTGOMERY (?–1845), British military commander and travel writer
- MEDWIN, THOMAS (1788–1869), English poet, translator and biographer
- MELISSUS OF SAMOS (FIFTH CENTURY BC), Eleatic philosopher and military commander of the Samian fleet
- MEMNON, in Greek mythology, an Ethiopian king whose statue Pausanias describes as making a sound at sunrise
- MEPHISTOPHELES, fictional character, the devil in the Faust legend
- MERCK, JOHANN HEINRICH (1741–91), German military advisor and correspondent with literary figures
- MERCUTIO, fictional character in Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*
- MOHAMMED (c. 570–632), central figure of Islam, in which he is considered messenger and prophet of God
- MOLINOS, MIGUEL DE (1628–97), Spanish theologian and champion of Quietism
- MONTAIGNE, MICHEL EYQUEM DE (1533–92), French philosopher and essayist
- MONTALEMBERT, CHARLES FORBES RENÉ, COUNT DE (1810–70), French publicist and historian
- MOST, GEORG FRIEDRICH (1794–1832), professor of medicine in Rostock
- MOZART, WOLFGANG AMADEUS (1756–91), Austrian classical composer
- MÜLLER, ADAM HEINRICH (1779–1829), German Romantic literary critic and political economist

- MÜNCHHAUSEN, KARL FRIEDRICH HIERONYMUS, FREIHERR VON (1720–97), German baron, military figure and story-teller
- MUSAGETES, epithet of the Greek god Apollo, in his capacity as the god of music and the arts
- NEMESIUS (c. 390), Christian philosopher who wrote about anthropology, physiology and theology
- NERO, LUCIUS DOMITIUS (37–68), Roman emperor famed for egoism and vanity
- NEUMANN, KARL GEORG (1774–1850), German psychiatrist, specialist in brain disease
- NEWTON, ISAAC (1632–1727), the great English mathematician, physicist and astronomer
- NISSEN, GEORG NIKOLAUS VON (1761–1826), Danish diplomat, music historian, biographer of Mozart
- NITZSCH, CHRISTIAN LUDWIG (1782–1837), German professor of zoology at Halle
- OBRY, JEAN BAPTISTE FRANÇOIS (1793–1871), French orientalist
- OVERBECK, CHRISTIAN ADOLF (1755–1821), German poet
- OKEN, LORENZ (1779–1851), German naturalist and biologist, proponent of *Naturphilosophie*
- OLYMPIODORUS THE ELDER (FIFTH CENTURY), peripatetic philosopher, teacher of Proclus
- OPHELIA, character in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*
- ORESTES, Greek mythological figure, son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra (whom he kills)
- ORMUZD, Middle Persian equivalent of Ahura Mazda, Zoroastrian deity, the one uncreated Creator
- ORPHEUS, Greek mythological figure
- ORTIS, JACOPO, fictional character (modelled on Goethe's Werther) in *The Last Letters of Jacopo Ortis* (1798) by Ugo Foscolo (1778–1827)
- OSIRIS, Egyptian mythological figure, god of the afterlife
- OVID (PUBLIUS OVIDIUS NASO) (43 BC–17/18 AD), Roman poet
- OWEN, SIR RICHARD (1804–92), English zoologist and anatomist
- OWEN, JOHN (OVENUS) (1564–c. 1622), Welsh writer of Latin epigrams
- PANDER, CHRISTIAN HEINRICH (OR HEINZ CHRISTIAN) (1794–1865), Baltic German biologist and embryologist
- PARACELSUS (PHILIPPUS AUREOLUS THEOPHRASTUS BOMBASTUS VON HOHENHEIM) (1493–1541), Swiss physician and natural philosopher
- PARMENIDES OF ELEA (FIFTH CENTURY BC), Greek pre-Socratic philosopher

- PASCAL, BLAISE (1623–62), French mathematician, inventor, physicist, philosopher and Jansenist theologian
- PAUL, SAINT (DIED *c.* 64), apostle and one of the first Christian theologians
- PERICLES (495–429 BC), statesman, orator and general during the Athenian golden age
- PESTALOZZI, JOHANN HEINRICH (1746–1827), Swiss pedagogue and educational reformer
- PETIT-THOUARS *see* Dupetit-Thouars
- PETRARCH (PETRARCA), FRANCESCO (1304–74), Italian poet and scholar
- PHIDIAS (FIFTH CENTURY BC), Greek sculptor
- PHILIP II OF MACEDON (382–336 BC), King of Macedon, father of Alexander the Great
- PHILIP IV OF FRANCE (1268–1314), King of France, responsible for the expulsion of the Jews and the dissolution of the Order of the Knights Templar
- PHILOLAUS (*c.* 480–*c.* 385 BC), Greek Pythagorean, pre-Socratic philosopher
- PHINEUS, Greek mythological King of Thrace, punished by having his food fouled by Harpies
- PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, COUNT GIOVANNI (1463–94), Italian Renaissance philosopher
- PICTET, ADOLPHE (1788–1875), Swiss Romantic linguist
- PINDAR (522–443 BC), Greek lyric poet
- PINEL, PHILIPPE (1745–1826), French physician and psychiatrist
- PITT, WILLIAM, THE YOUNGER (1759–1806), British prime minister
- PLATNER, ERNST (1744–1818), physician, philosopher and aesthetician
- PLATO (427–347 BC), the great Greek philosopher of immense influence on subsequent philosophy, and one of Schopenhauer's most important influences
- PLINY THE YOUNGER (GAIUS PLINIUS CAECILIUS SECUNDUS) (*c.* 61–112), Roman statesman and author
- PLOTINUS (204–70), Neoplatonist philosopher
- PLUTARCH (46–125), Greco-Roman statesman and historian
- POMPONATIUS, PETRUS (PIETRO POMPAZZI) (1462–1524), Renaissance neo-Aristotelian philosopher
- POPE, ALEXANDER (1688–1744), English poet
- POUCHET, FÉLIX ARCHIMÈDE (1800–72), French naturalist, professor of comparative anatomy and proponent of spontaneous generation
- PRAXITELES (FOURTH CENTURY BC), Attic sculptor
- PRELLER, LUDWIG (1809–61), German philologist and historian of philosophy
- ST PREUX, fictional character in Rousseau's novel *Julie, or the New Heloise*

- PRIESTLEY, JOSEPH (1733–1804), English theologian, philosopher and scientist
- PROCLUS (412–85), Greek Neoplatonic philosopher and commentator on Plato
- PROPERTIUS (c. 50–15 BC), Roman poet
- PROTAGORAS (c. 490–c. 420 BC), pre-Socratic Greek philosopher
- PÜCKLER-MUSKAU, HERMANN LUDWIG HEINRICH VON, PRINCE (1785–1871), German nobleman, travel writer and landscape gardener
- PYTHAGORAS (c. 570–c. 497 BC), early Greek sage, founder of Pythagorean tradition in philosophy
- RABELAIS, FRANÇOIS (1483–1553), French Renaissance humanist writer, doctor and Greek scholar
- RADIUS, JUSTUS WILHELM MARTIN (1797–1884), German physician
- RANCÉ, (ABBÉ) ARMAND JEAN LE BOUTHILLIER DE (1626–1700), abbot, founder of the Trappist Cistercians
- RAPHAEL (1483–1520), High Renaissance Italian painter and architect
- RASKOLNIKI, a group of people who split from the Russian Orthodox Church in the mid seventeenth century
- REID, THOMAS (1710–96), Scottish Enlightenment philosopher and proponent of the Common Sense school
- RENI, GUIDO (1575–1642), Italian high baroque painter
- REUHLIN, JOHANN (1455–1522), German humanist and scholar of classical Greek and Hebrew
- RHODE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB (1762–1827), German orientalist
- RICHTER, JOHANN PAUL FRIEDRICH *see* Jean Paul
- RIEMER, FRIEDRICH WILHELM (1774–1845), German scholar, literary assistant and correspondent of Goethe
- RINCK (RINK), FRIEDRICH THEODOR (1770–1811), student of and literary assistant to Kant
- RITTER, HEINRICH (1791–1869), German philosopher and historian of philosophy
- LA ROCHEFOUCAULT, FRANÇOIS DE (1613–80), French writer, famous for his *Maxims*
- ROCHESTER, 2ND EARL OF (JOHN WILMOT) (1647–80), English Restoration poet and satirist, courtier of King Charles II
- ROSENKRANZ, JOHANN CARL FRIEDRICH (1805–79), professor in Königsberg, editor of an important edition of Kant's works
- ROSINI, GIOVANNI (1776–1855), Italian dramatist, poet and art historian
- ROUSSEAU, JEAN JACQUES (1712–78), French writer of the Enlightenment
- RUTILIUS LUPUS, PUBLIUS (c. FIRST CENTURY), Roman rhetorician

- SADI (MUSHARRIF-UDDIN SA'DI) (c. 1213–92), Persian poet and popular writer
- SAINT-HILAIRE, AUGUSTIN FRANÇOIS CÉSAR PROUVENÇAL DE (1779–1853), French botanist and traveller
- SALLUST (GAIVS SALLUSTIVS CRISPVS) (86–c. 35 BC), Roman historian and politician
- SALOME (14–c. 71), daughter of Herod II and Herodias, according to legend responsible for the death of John the Baptist
- SANGERMANO, VINCENZO (1758–1819), Italian Barnabite missionary who wrote of his work in Burma
- SAPHIR, MORITZ GOTTLIEB (BORN MOSES) (1795–1858), Austrian satirical writer and journalist
- SATAN, malevolent deity of the Abrahamic religions
- SCALIGERI FAMILY, a noble family of Lords of Verona in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
- SCHELLING, FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON (1775–1854), philosopher of German Idealism and Romanticism, much criticized by Schopenhauer, though with somewhat more respect than Hegel and Fichte
- SCHILLER, JOHANN CHRISTOPH FRIEDRICH (1759–1803), German poet, dramatist and aesthete
- SCHLEGEL, AUGUST WILHELM (1767–1845), German romantic poet, critic, theorist and translator of Shakespeare, among other things
- SCHLEGEL, KARL WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1772–1829), German Romantic literary critic, philosopher and writer, one of the principal figures in the Jena Romantic circle
- SCHLEIERMACHER, FRIEDRICH DANIEL ERNST (1768–1834), German theologian and philosopher
- SCHLICHTEGROLL, FRIEDRICH (1765–1822), German teacher, scholar and biographer of Mozart
- SCHMIDT, ISAAC JACOB (1779–1847), Moravian missionary and orientalist
- SCHNURRER, FRIEDRICH (1784–1833), German public health officer and epidemiologist
- SCHOPPE, fictional character in Jean Paul's four-volume *Bildungsroman*, *Titan*
- SCHUBERT, FRIEDRICH WILHELM (1799–1868), German historian, politician and biographer of Kant
- SCHULTZ, CARL HEINRICH (1805–67), German botanist
- SCHULZE, GOTTLIEB ERNST (1761–1833), German professor, sceptical critic of Kant and Schopenhauer's teacher at the University of Göttingen
- SCHWAB, GUSTAV (1792–1850), German pastor, classicist and poet
- SCIPIO FAMILY, prominent patrician Roman family during the fourth to second century BC

- SCOPAS (c. 395–350 BC), Greek sculptor and architect
- SCORESBY, WILLIAM (1789–1857), English Arctic explorer, scientist, traveller and clergyman
- SCOTT, SIR WALTER (1771–1823), Scottish novelist
- SCOTUS ERIGENA (c. 800–877), Christian Neoplatonist philosopher
- SCRIBE, AUGUSTIN EUGÈNE (1791–1861), French playwright and librettist
- SEMIRAMIS, Greek legendary Queen of Assyria
- SENECA, LUCIUS ANNAEUS (4 BC– 65 AD), Roman poet and Stoic thinker, committed suicide at the instigation of Nero
- SHAFTESBURY, ANTHONY ASHLEY-COOPER, 3RD EARL OF (1671–1713), English politician and writer
- SHAKESPEARE, WILLIAM (1564–1616), English dramatist and poet
- SHAKYAMUNI (GAUTAMA BUDDHA, SIDDHARTHA GAUTAMA), an Indian spiritual leader who lived in the sixth and fifth centuries BC and founded Buddhism
- SHENSTONE, WILLIAM (1714–63), English poet and landscape gardener
- SHIVA, god in Hindu mythology, the destroyer or transformer, one of the Trimurti
- SILESIOUS, ANGELUS (JOHANNES SCHEFFLER) (1624–77), German mystic and poet
- SOCRATES (470–399 BC), Greek philosopher, teacher of Plato
- SOLOMON, biblical King of Israel, Son of David
- SÖMMERING, SAMUEL THOMAS VON (1755–1830), German physician, anatomist and inventor
- SOPHOCLES (c. 496–406 BC), Greek tragedian
- SOUTHEY, ROBERT (1774–1843), English romantic poet
- SPALLANZANI, LAZZARO (1729–99), Italian priest and natural scientist
- SPENCE, WILLIAM (c. 1783–1860), natural scientist and economist, co-author with William Kirby of *Introduction to Entomology*
- SPINOZA, BENEDICT (BARUCH) DE (1632–77), Jewish Dutch philosopher
- SPRENGEL, CHRISTIAN KONRAD (1750–1816), German theologian and botanist
- STAHL, GEORG ERNST (1660–1734), physician, chemist and physiologist
- STEWART, DUGALD (1753–1828), Scottish Enlightenment philosopher and mathematician
- STOBAEUS, JOANNES (FIFTH CENTURY), Neoplatonist, author of an anthology of excerpts from previous writers, valuable as a source book for ancient philosophy
- STRAUSS, DAVID FRIEDRICH (1808–74), German theologian and historian
- SUETONIUS (GAIUS SUETONIUS TRANQUILLUS) (c. 69–c. 122), Roman historian

- SUIDAS, historically thought to be the author of the *Suda*, a tenth-century Byzantine encyclopedia
- SWIFT, JONATHAN (1667–1745), Anglo-Irish satirist, poet, cleric and political pamphleteer
- TASSO, a character in the play *Torquato Tasso* by Goethe, about the sixteenth-century Italian poet of the same name
- TAULER, JOHANNES (c. 1300–61), German mystic, Catholic preacher and theologian, a disciple of Meister Eckhart
- TENCIN, CLAUDINE GUÉRIN DE, BARONESS OF SAINT-MARTIN-DE-RÉ (1682–1749), French salonist and author
- TERENCE (PUBLIUS TERENTIUS AFER) (c. 195–159? BC), Roman comic dramatist
- TERTULLIAN (c. 160–c. 220), theologian and early Church Father
- THAMYRIS, Greek mythological figure, Thracian singer and lover of Hyacinth
- THEON OF SMYRNA (EARLY SECOND CENTURY), Greek philosopher and mathematician
- THEOGNIS (SIXTH CENTURY BC), Greek lyric poet of Megara
- THESEUS, Greek mythological hero, founder-king of Athens
- THILO, LUDWIG (1789–1831), German scientist and writer
- THOLU[C]K, FRIEDRICH AUGUST GUTTREU (1799–1877), German Protestant theologian and church leader
- THORWALDSEN (THORVALDSEN), BERTEL (1770–44), Danish sculptor
- TIBERIUS (42 BC–37 AD), 2nd emperor of Rome
- TIEDEMANN, DIETRICH (1748–1803), professor of philosophy and Greek in Marburg
- TISCHBEIN, JOHANN HEINRICH WILHELM (1751–1828), German painter
- TITUS (39–81), 10th emperor of Rome, son of Vespasian, well regarded by contemporary historians
- TOURNAI, CASPAR THEOBALD (1802–65), German physiologist of vision and psychologist
- TREVIRANUS, GOTTFRIED REINHOLD (1776–1835), German natural scientist and mathematician
- UNZELMANN, KARL WILHELM FERDINAND (1753–1832), German singer, actor and comedian
- UPHAM, EDWARD (1776–1834), English bookseller, antiquarian and orientalist
- VANINI, LUCILIO (GIULIO CESARE) (1584–1619), Italian Renaissance thinker, tortured and executed by the Catholic Church
- VANINUS, JULIUS CAESAR *see* Vanini

- VAUVENARGUES, LUC DE GLAPIER, MARQUIS DE (1715–47), French moralist
- VESPASIAN (9–79), 9th Roman emperor
- VIRGIL (PUBLIUS VERGILIUS MARO) (70–19 BC), leading Roman poet
- VITRUVIUS (MARCUS VITRUVIUS POLLIO) (c. 80–c. 15 BC), Roman author, architect and civil engineer
- VOLTAIRE (FRANÇOIS-MARIE AROUET) (1694–1778), French Enlightenment philosopher and author
- VYASA, Hindu mythological figure
- WERTHER, fictional character in the eponymous *Sturm und Drang* novel by Goethe
- WHEWELL, WILLIAM (1794–1866), English philosopher, scientist, historian of science, poet and theologian
- WIELAND, CHRISTOPH MARTIN (1733–1813), German poet and writer
- WILLDENOW, CARL LUDWIG (1765–1812), German botanist and phyto-geographer
- WINDISCHMANN, KARL JOSEPH HIERONYMUS (1775–1839), German Christian philosopher and anthropologist
- WOLFF, CHRISTIAN (1679–1754), German Enlightenment philosopher
- WOLFF, KASPAR FRIEDRICH (1735–94), German physiologist and pioneer embryologist
- WOLFF, PIUS ALEXANDER (1782–1828), German playwright and actor
- WORDSWORTH, WILLIAM (1770–1850), English romantic poet
- XANTHIPPE (FIFTH–FOURTH CENTURY BC), wife of Socrates
- XENOPHANES (SIXTH–FIFTH CENTURY BC), pre-Socratic Greek philosopher
- XENOPHON (c. 431–355 BC), Greek soldier and writer, friend and student of Socrates
- YAMA, Hindu god of death
- ZACCARIA, FRANCESCO ANTONIO (1714–95), Italian theologian and historian



# Index

- Absolute, 47, 89, 153, 189, 195, 302, 366, 660  
 Abyssinia, 76, 238  
 Academy of Sciences, 327, 521  
 Achilles, 182, 466, 681  
 Adam, 619, 628, 633, 643, 644, 681  
 Adelung, Johann Christoph, 395, 681  
 Aelian, Claudius, 228, 681  
 Aeschylus, 451, 584, 681  
     *Agamemnon*, 451  
 aesthetics, 28, 130, 428, 436, 441, 682  
 Agamemnon (mythological character), 466, 681, 690, 694  
 Ahriman, 181, 639, 681  
 Alcibiades, 577, 681  
 Alexander the Great, 535, 681, 695  
 algebra, 44, 79, 95, 135, 182, 189, 326  
 allegory, 175, 176, 177, 178, 439, 595, 629, 643, 644  
 America/American, 34, 102, 324, 325, 522, 611, 641, 642, 681, 682  
     California, 581  
 amphiboly, 343  
 Anacreon, 584, 681  
 anatomy, 25, 131, 132, 136, 152, 258, 275, 276, 285, 310, 343, 345, 355, 409, 513, 682, 683, 684, 685, 688, 694, 695, 698  
 Anaxagoras, 282, 283, 306, 337, 343, 595, 681  
 Angelus Silesius, 627, 681, 698  
 anger, 100, 105, 215, 219, 222, 223, 224, 227, 235, 237, 245, 249, 275, 276, 278, 406, 455, 636  
 animals, 35, 74, 75, 76, 105, 106, 136, 151, 157, 169, 180, 202, 210, 215–18, 233, 234, 237, 255, 271, 275, 278, 281, 290–304, 307, 324, 339, 342, 347, 352, 354, 357–63, 367, 368, 393, 399, 404, 414, 421, 436, 462, 464, 480, 482, 489, 490, 492, 495, 498, 499, 501, 526, 528, 531, 534, 555, 558, 586, 596, 599, 610, 629, 653, 662  
     animal consciousness, 65–8, 215, 283, 304, 531  
     animal intellect, 67, 68, 151  
     animal magnetism, 188, 617  
 annihilation, 21, 51, 210, 339, 481, 487–93, 498, 500, 504, 513, 524, 525, 589, 623  
 antinomy, 509, *See also* Kant  
 Antisthenes, 163, 681  
 Anwari Soheili, 108  
 anxiety, 219, 229, 232, 255, 349, 366, 482, 490, 506, 550, 564, 591, 594, 596, 603, 646  
 apes, 105, 191, 293, 324, 325, 413, 414, 493  
 Apollo, 581, 694  
 Apuleius, 163, 533, 605, 682  
 Aquinas, Thomas, 44, 88, 322, 682  
 architectonic, 375  
 architecture, 425, 428–35, 438, 448, 470, 471  
     Gothic, 434, 435, 448  
 Ariosto, Ludovico, 103, 682  
 Aristippus of Cyrene, 138, 172, 682  
 Ariston of Chios, 138, 682  
 Aristotle, 37, 39, 44, 48, 49, 50, 77, 88, 94, 110, 114, 119, 124, 130, 138, 140, 151, 159, 160, 169, 172, 184, 252, 268, 283, 306, 345, 347, 348, 354, 364, 371, 374, 382, 400, 421, 432, 452, 456, 577, 579, 580, 581, 682  
     *Physics*, 32, 39, 50, 181, 355  
     *Topics*, 44  
 arithmetic, 38, 39, 50, 56, 135, 186, 194, 315, 467, 469  
 Arrian of Nicomedia, 161, 168, 682  
 Artemis, 451, 682  
 asceticism, 164, 167, 622, 627, 628, 630, 631, 636, 638, 640, 641, 654  
 Asia, 325, 521, 523, 578, 580, 601, 621, 630, 643  
 astronomy/astronomer, 58, 136, 309, 312, 598, 683, 684, 689, 691, 692, 694  
     Ptolemaic astronomy, 279, 307  
     Pythagorean astronomy, 307  
 Athanasius of Alexandria, 633, 682  
 atheism, 11, 171, 179, 185, 461  
*ātman*, 474  
 atoms/atomism, 18, 52, 55, 56, 152, 314–16, 323, 326–8, 496, 686  
 Augustine, 160, 176, 213, 373, 618, 619, 633, 634, 682

- Australia, 324, 522, 687  
 Avesta, 595, 639
- Bacchus, 581  
 Bacon (of Veralum), Francis, 45, 230, 241, 245, 295, 352, 353, 355, 408, 443, 541, 682  
 Baumgärtner, Karl Heinrich, 268  
 beards, 148, 249, 349, 535, 560  
 Beethoven, Ludwig van, 467, 682  
 Bell, Charles, 286, 682  
 Bellini, Vincenzo, 682  
     *Norma*, 452  
 Berkeley, George, 6, 7, 15, 326, 489, 683  
 Berlin Academy, 91, 693  
*Bhagavadgītā*, 339, 490, 691  
 Bhagavatas, 504  
 Bichat, Marie François Xavier, 214, 274–81, 285, 411, 515, 683  
 Bion of Borysthenes, 138, 683  
 Biot, Jean-Baptiste, 152, 683  
 Black Death, 519, 599  
 bliss/blissfulness, 167, 176, 474, 505, 548, 567, 570, 620, 647, 657  
 Böhme, Jacob, 627, 683, 688  
 Boileau, Nicolas, 548, 683  
 Bolingbroke, 600, 683  
 boredom, 78, 79, 91, 100, 195, 293, 372, 373, 374, 425, 507, 508, 590, 613, 625  
 Borgia, Cesare, 536, 683  
 botany, 136, 184, 688  
 bourgeoisie, 454, 466  
 Brahṃā, 178, 179, 505  
 Brahman/Brahmanism, 171, 414, 451, 461, 480, 504, 521, 595, 600, 616, 617, 619, 622, 623, 624, 626, 630, 638, 639, 640, 644, 649, 654, 660, 662  
 Brahmin, 654  
 brain, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 37, 50, 51, 71, 84, 86, 87, 88, 144, 151, 183, 187, 195, 202, 203, 205, 207, 210, 212, 214, 216, 222, 225, 228, 245, 246, 250, 251, 253, 254, 258–80, 284, 286–99, 305, 339, 343, 347, 348, 359, 361, 384, 390, 394, 409, 410, 411, 418, 420, 441, 485, 486, 507, 511, 515, 516, 527, 542, 543, 544, 557, 617, 659, 694  
 Brandis, August Christian, 92, 683  
 Brandis, Joachim Dietrich, 274, 683  
 Brazil, 323, 323  
*Bridgewater Treatise*, 352  
 Brown, Thomas, 41, 353, 683  
 Bruno, Giordano, 37, 49, 93, 319, 321, 365, 398, 659, 683  
 Buddha, 178, 504, 520, 629, 649, 698  
 Buddha Shakyamuni, 178, 417, 629, 698  
 Buddhism, 123, 178, 288, 451, 461, 480, 484, 504, 519, 520, 521, 525, 546, 576, 595, 600, 619, 622, 623, 630, 638, 640, 644, 649, 660, 662  
 Buffon, George-Louis Leclerc, Comte de, 79, 539, 683  
 Bunyan, John, 630, 684  
 Burdach, Karl Friedrich, 254, 265, 266, 267, 351, 360, 362, 494, 526, 532, 543, 684  
 Burke, Edmund, 73, 684  
 burlesque, 374, 455  
 business/businessman, 81, 85, 221, 234, 252, 368, 389, 399, 478, 530, 538, 565, 589, 594  
 Byron, Lord George Gordon, 87, 155, 229, 250, 410, 450, 542, 561, 586, 592, 600, 603, 684
- Cabanis, Pierre-Jean Georges, 87, 184, 222, 223, 285, 684  
 Calderón de la Barca, Don Pedro, 448, 552, 568, 618  
 Campe, Joachim Heinrich, 172, 684  
 Canova, Antonio, 438, 684  
 Caravaggio, Michelangelo, 439, 684  
 card games, 85, 104, 371  
 Carové, Friedrich Wilhelm, 634, 684  
 Cassandra, 451, 684  
 Catullus, Gaius Valerius, 533, 684  
 Celts, 577  
 Cervantes, Miguel de, 79, 684  
     *Don Quixote*, 79, 104  
 Chamfort, Nicolas, 407, 408, 569, 684  
 character, 357, 358, 518, 524, 534, 539, 542, 543, 545, 553, 561, 571, 585, 605, 607, 609, 614, 616, 624, 644  
 character sketch, 309, 449  
 chemistry/chemical/chemist, 57, 118, 121, 124, 133, 136, 177, 182, 187, 191, 220, 273, 279, 310, 312, 313, 314, 323, 327, 328, 394, 465, 562, 599, 683, 685, 688, 692, 698  
     chemical atoms, 315  
 Chevreul, Michel Eugène, 327, 328, 685  
 childhood/children, 39, 66, 67, 76, 86, 86, 102, 105, 132, 171, 174, 175, 196, 223, 237, 246, 248, 251, 255, 293, 327, 362, 403, 411, 411–14, 413, 433, 446, 490, 512, 519, 531, 533, 535, 539, 558, 560, 561, 564, 579, 580, 601, 615, 634, 637, 642, 644, 654  
 Chiliasts, 76  
 China/Chinese, 81, 127, 421, 446, 578, 640, 686, 692  
 Christ. *See* Jesus  
 Christianity, 160, 167, 176, 177, 197, 210, 435, 436, 448, 451, 453, 461, 504, 505, 520, 523, 578, 595, 596, 600, 618–24, 628–49, 651, 652, 660  
 Chrysippus, 160, 685

- Cicero, 98, 99, 159, 167, 168, 238, 400, 483, 577, 618, 644, 685  
 circle, 99, 118, 493, 498  
 circulation of blood, 253, 265–9, 276, 277, 293, 347, 410, 487, 542, 563  
 clairvoyance, 195, 268  
 clarity of mind, 65, 293, 399, 400, 404  
 Claudius, 249  
 Clement of Alexandria, 36, 623, 632, 635, 636, 685  
 Colebrooke, Henry Thomas, 504, 522, 524, 525, 685  
 colour, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 71, 152, 327, 348, 381, 390, 392, 425, 438, 439, 450, 646  
     Goethe's theory of, 230, 440  
     Newton's theory of, 96, 152, 327  
     Schopenhauer's theory of, 32  
 comedy/comic, 98–109, 230, 374, 448, 454, 466, 547, 569, 570, 573, 597  
 communism, 611  
 comparative physiology, 136  
 compassion, 159, 366, 481, 607, 609, 616, 617  
 Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de, 15, 25, 314, 685  
 Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de  
     Caritat, Marquis de, 25, 685  
 conscience, 139, 175, 236, 248, 302, 503, 550, 569, 633  
 copula, 38, 70, 112, 114, 118, 125  
 Corneille, Pierre, 443, 685  
 cosmogony, 337  
 cosmological proof, 47, 180  
 cosmology, 298, 626  
 Crates of Thebes, 163, 163, 685  
 creative drive, 65, 357–63, 529, 557  
 Cristoforo, 163  
 Crusades, 76  
 crystal/crystallization, 308, 309, 315, 341, 434, 489  
 cunning, 175, 233, 234, 337, 414, 592, 621  
 Cupid, 439, 565, 573, 685  
 Cuvier, Frederic, 414, 415, 541  
 Cuvier, Georges, 38, 137, 267, 359, 410, 541, 685  
 Cynicism, 159, 161, 161–4, 162, 164, 165, 167, 681, 685, 686  
  
 D'Alembert, Jean le Rond, 539, 685  
 Dalton, Edward Joseph, 137, 686  
 dance, 219, 642  
 Danish Academy, 76, 604, 631  
     Scandinavian Academy, 478  
 Dante, Alighieri, 134, 155, 443, 593, 686  
 Dark Ages, 76  
 death, 91, 169, 170, 172, 181, 210, 221, 246, 251, 252, 281, 293, 338, 360, 362, 364, 366, 372, 408, 463, 480–525, 527, 542, 548, 568, 571, 576, 584, 587, 588, 589, 591, 593, 594, 596, 603, 616, 620, 622, 624, 632, 643, 644, 647, 653, 654, 657  
     death penalty, 544, 578, 613  
 debt, 230, 260, 583, 584, 595, 596, 618  
*Decameron*, 569  
 decapitation, 259, 271  
 Delamark. *See* Lamarck  
 Demiurge, 636, 637, 637  
 Democritus, 17, 184, 327, 328, 330, 355, 686  
 Descartes, René, 7, 36, 59, 141, 203, 250, 255, 256, 279, 325, 493, 662, 682, 686  
 determinism, 334  
 dialectic, 79, 88, 110, 129, 315  
 dianoiology, 302  
 Diderot, Denis, 154, 465, 497, 686  
 digestion, 184, 210, 225, 258, 265, 272, 360  
 Diogenes Laertius, 86, 138, 162, 163, 166, 167, 168, 172, 287, 484, 686  
 Diogenes of Sinope, 161, 162, 593, 685, 686  
 Dionysius the Areopagite, 92  
 disease, 270, 273, 282, 322, 349, 485, 486, 501, 541, 559, 592, 660  
 dogmatism, 92, 191, 301, 365  
 dogs, 34, 66, 67, 94, 105, 106, 162, 165, 234, 278, 370, 492, 493, 499, 500, 532, 593  
 Domenichino, 436, 686  
 Donatello, 436, 686  
 drama/dramatic works, 247, 310, 371, 388, 449, 453, 466, 547, 551, 591  
     Chinese drama, 446  
 dream, 7, 21, 66, 143, 148, 219, 228, 255, 339, 359, 360, 460, 484, 485, 486, 508, 517, 519, 588, 591  
     daydream, 530  
 Druid, 521, 644  
 Duns Scotus, 72, 686  
 Dutch, 224  
 duty, 91, 175, 360, 568, 638, 655  
  
 earthquake, 599  
 Ebionites, 648  
 Ecclesiastes, 652, 661  
 Eckhart, Meister, 627, 629, 630, 649, 656, 699  
*Edda*, 521  
 egoism, 204, 226, 232, 248, 421, 523, 554, 557, 593, 609, 611, 615, 616, 625  
 Egypt/Egyptian, 463, 504, 521, 632, 638  
 Eleatics, 92, 496, 659, 693  
 elect/election, 632, 654. *See* grace (religious concept)  
 elective affinity, 184, 310, 395  
 electricity, 57, 182, 185, 314, 488  
 elephants, 68, 72, 324, 346, 493, 495  
 Empedocles, 287, 306, 307, 356, 497, 637, 687  
 empiricism, 184, 186, 188, 306, 522, 692  
 Encratites, 633, 635, 637, 641

- England/English, 25, 34, 40, 41, 56, 59, 101, 109,  
133, 135, 168, 178, 210, 224, 350, 352, 353, 421,  
443, 447, 448, 481, 522, 531, 548, 553, 572, 578,  
607, 642, 647, 650, 683, 684, 685, 686, 688,  
689, 690, 692, 693, 694, 696, 698, 699, 700
- envy, 223, 236, 240, 389, 403, 443, 593, 655
- Epictetus, 159, 161, 164, 167, 687
- Epicurus, 17, 184, 484, 489
- Epiphanias, 639, 687
- Eros, 529, 571, 573
- errors, 25, 75, 76, 81, 92, 94, 96, 97, 126, 195, 210,  
217, 223, 230, 242, 245, 246, 261, 298, 299,  
356, 372, 406, 450, 451, 508, 523, 539, 543,  
575, 625, 650, 651
- Esquirol, Étienne, 374, 419, 541, 687
- eternity, 18, 32, 38, 48, 50, 54, 140, 174, 176, 179,  
243, 245, 284, 289, 298, 313, 332, 333, 338, 369,  
382, 383, 388, 435, 459, 461, 481, 482, 488,  
498, 499, 500, 503, 504, 508, 511, 515, 517, 519,  
522, 529, 542, 568, 583, 596, 606, 618, 620,  
626, 635, 643, 645, 647, 648, 658, 661
- Euclid, 6, 130, 139, 687
- Euler, Leonhard Paul, 13, 26, 27, 29, 154, 687
- Euripides, 451, 454, 602, 607, 637, 687
- eyes, 28, 30, 32, 146, 158, 335, 344, 346, 347, 362,  
369, 420, 438, 445, 495, 498, 499, 500, 501,  
548, 553, 560  
eye of the world, 388
- fancy dress costumes, 97
- fatalism, 663
- females. *See* women
- Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 16, 128, 291, 687, 689,  
697
- Flagellants, 76
- Flourens, Marie Jean Pierre, 216, 260, 266,  
278–81, 414, 539, 687
- flowers, 70, 305, 335, 351, 405, 421, 556
- folly, 139, 242, 563
- France/French, 15, 16, 25, 40, 133, 152, 178, 210,  
266, 278, 285, 290, 303, 314, 327, 421, 422,  
445, 447, 453, 473, 548, 572, 578, 630, 646
- Francis of Assisi, Saint, 629
- Frauenstädt, Julius, 58
- freedom, 6, 154, 333, 524, 546, 590, 614, 620, 644,  
645  
intellectual of the will, 38, 181, 333, 608, 619
- French Academy, 324
- Gall, Franz Joseph, 76, 248, 259, 279, 280, 285,  
687
- gallows, 537, 647, 647
- galvanism, 32, 262, 270, 489
- Garrick, David, 105, 297, 687
- Gauls, 535, 578
- genitals, 272, 308, 349, 351, 411, 526, 527,  
530, 653
- genius, 73, 78, 80, 81, 152, 155, 214, 216, 217, 218,  
231, 232, 243, 244, 248, 249, 295, 296, 304,  
387, 388, 393–413, 426, 427, 480, 538, 540,  
542, 548, 561  
of the species, 565, 566, 569, 570, 572, 574
- Geoffroy St-Hilaire, Étienne, 137, 345, 351, 687
- geology, 136, 191, 691
- geometry, 38, 50, 56, 89, 135, 140, 431, 453
- German/Germany, 76, 103, 108, 112, 131–5, 203,  
204, 210, 224, 315, 327, 371, 388, 429, 447,  
481, 544, 597, 600, 631, 639
- German Idealism, 687
- German Theology*, 628, 629, 630
- Gichtel, Johann Georg, 629, 688
- Gichtelians, 643
- Giordano, Luca, 37, 49, 93, 319, 321, 365, 398, 439,  
659, 683, 688
- Gnostic, 523, 627, 633, 636, 638
- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 3, 33, 58, 116, 137,  
148, 151, 153, 178, 188, 199, 225, 230, 240, 248,  
256, 294, 309, 310, 347, 389, 391, 397, 400,  
403, 405, 408, 410, 412, 413, 426, 437, 440,  
443, 448, 450, 451, 454, 465, 471, 540, 547,  
572, 585, 589, 613, 637, 681, 688, 691, 696,  
699, 700
- Elective Affinities*, 309, 403
- Faust I*, 148, 188, 256, 307, 427, 516, 517, 518,  
572, 585, 589, 693
- The Sorrows of Young Werther*, 547,  
567, 694
- Torquato Tasso*, 295, 405, 407, 572,  
681, 699
- golden age, 155
- Goldoni, Carlo, 454, 688
- goodness of heart, 239, 244, 248, 560, 614
- Gorgias, 107
- Gorgias (later), 110
- Gospels, 569, 632, 636, 638, 649
- Gozzi, Carlo, 418
- Zobeide*, 102
- grace (aesthetic concept), 421, 432, 436, 437, 445
- grace (religious concept), 281, 413, 620, 623, 629,  
635, 648
- Gracián, Balthasar, 81, 227, 239, 603
- gravity, 17, 48, 57, 59, 182, 183, 305, 309, 310, 314,  
316, 320, 326, 356, 431, 434, 435, 465, 487, 597
- Greece/Greek, 73, 86, 131, 132, 135, 143, 179, 433,  
437, 438, 448, 451, 454, 463, 521, 527, 537,  
549, 577, 580, 581, 601, 640, 644
- greed, 175, 248, 535, 553, 597, 609, 654, 655
- guilt, 179, 242, 504, 542, 569, 571, 584, 595, 596,  
605, 612, 614, 618, 619, 641, 643, 650
- Guyon, Madame de, 627, 628, 629, 630, 688

- Hall, Marshall, 270, 271, 286, 688  
Haller, Albrecht von, 274, 541, 688  
Hamann, Johann Georg, 597, 688  
happiness, 159–68, 219, 227, 245, 249, 276, 293,  
294, 306, 385, 390, 392, 407, 451, 455, 460,  
467, 472, 474, 478, 486, 529, 530, 548, 550,  
556, 560, 569, 571, 572, 584, 588, 590, 591,  
594, 600, 601, 618, 646, 650, 651, 655  
Hardy, Rev. Robert Spence, 519, 520, 525, 629  
hatred, 213, 215, 229, 241, 249, 276, 353, 390, 467,  
571, 572, 625  
Haydn, Joseph, 541, 688  
Haydn, Michael, 541, 689  
health, 273, 277, 416, 417, 487, 542, 550, 553, 559,  
580, 590  
    mental, 144, 416  
hearing, 30, 31, 32–5, 288, 446  
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 16, 38, 44, 45,  
76, 91, 204, 315, 459, 597, 605, 631, 689  
Hegelians, 71, 94, 460  
    Young Hegelians, 481  
Heine, Heinrich, 108  
hell, 389, 592, 593, 596, 622  
Hévétius, Claude Adrien, 87, 238, 240, 287, 594,  
689  
Heracles. *See* Hercules  
Heraclitus, 86, 602, 637, 689  
Herbart, Johann Friedrich, 597, 689  
Hercules, 162, 162, 451, 581, 689  
Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 412, 609, 689  
heretics, 76, 504, 523, 536, 633, 635, 638, 683  
Hermes Trismegistus, 506, 689  
Herodotus, 158, 461, 521, 601, 637, 689  
Hindu, 463, 484, 486, 505, 546, 563, 578, 628, 691,  
693, 698, 700  
Hindustan, 76, 522  
Hippias of Elis, 107, 689  
Hippocrates, 246  
Hippolytus, 451, 607, 689  
history, 136, 156, 191, 239, 456–63, 468, 495, 534,  
535  
Hobbes, Thomas, 240, 245, 369, 689  
Holbach, Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron de, 16, 184,  
689  
Holberg, Ludvig, Baron of, 185, 690  
Homer, 249, 427, 453, 602, 690  
    *Iliad*, 222, 250, 492, 494, 602, 690  
    *Odyssey*, 255, 607, 686, 690  
homosexuality, 577, 581, *See also* pederasty  
Hooke, Robert, 59, 690  
Horace, 101, 164, 173, 237, 301, 327, 387, 427, 443,  
448, 467, 504, 548, 561, 578, 607, 690  
horses, 101, 156, 224, 234, 419, 504, 563  
humanism, 600  
Humboldt, Alexander von, 369, 690  
Hume, David, 14, 41, 353, 522, 540, 597  
    *Natural History of Religion*, 353, 597  
humour, 107, 108, 342, 529, 601  
hunger, 368, 369, 501, 532, 590, 648  
Hutcheson, Rev. Francis, 98  
hydraulics, 309  
*Ichneumonía*, 556  
Idea, 81, 83, 86, 87, 154, 367, 371, 379, 381–3, 393,  
396, 422, 425, 431, 439, 442, 444, 459, 460,  
465, 492, 495, 499, 500, 521, 526, 527, 553,  
643  
    Kantian, 460, 522  
    Platonic, 140, 150, 304, 381, 382, 383,  
492, 499  
idealism, 6–12, 15, 17, 23, 26, 27, 204, 489, 502,  
508, 683, 690  
    Berkeleyan, 11, 16, 489  
    German, 697  
    Kantian, 11  
idiocy. *See* stupidity  
idolatry, 442  
Iffland, August Wilhelm, 224, 454, 690  
illnesses. *See* disease  
immortality, 170, 251, 283, 338, 397, 403, 407, 481,  
483, 493, 495, 496, 498, 503, 504, 506, 508,  
515, 522, 527, 565, 575  
India/Indian, 167, 420, 480, 492, 495, 504, 521,  
527, 547, 563, 607, 611, 616, 620, 623, 624,  
628, 629, 633, 638, 698  
industry, 368, 372, 457, 460, 588, 593, 638, 642  
injustice, 93, 168, 593, 618, 621  
insanity. *See* madness  
insects, 155, 217, 233, 270, 322, 334, 339, 342, 351,  
352, 355, 357–62, 358, 359, 365, 368, 487, 489,  
490, 492, 493, 495, 506, 527, 552, 553, 556,  
557, 568, 572, 610, 615  
intellectual intuition, 28, 195, 203, 302, 395, 626  
Iphigenia, 451  
irony, 96, 102, 107, 529, 598  
Isaiah, 233  
Islam, 461, 521, 578, 620, 627, 639, 640, 660, 693  
Italy/Italian, 429, 435, 442, 447  
Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich, 10–11, 663, 690  
Java, 369, 370  
jealousy, 223, 224, 276, 455, 568, 609  
Jean Paul, 33, 98, 108, 395, 397, 398, 690,  
696, 697  
Jehovah, 639, 661, 662, 690  
Jesus, 436, 439, 620, 623, 632, 635, 643, 644, 647,  
649  
Job, 601, 690  
Johannes Secundus, 438, 690  
Johnson, Samuel, 240, 683, 690

- joy. *See* happiness
- Judaism, 101, 121, 177, 179, 327, 390, 461, 504, 520, 522, 595, 619, 620, 632, 635, 637, 638, 639, 640, 643, 652, 660, 662
- Julian the Apostate, 172, 691
- Jung-Stilling, 76, 691
- justice, 460, 609, 617, 618, 621, 622, 625, 643, 648, 655  
     criminal, 612  
     eternal, 583, 584, 606, 618  
     poetic, 569
- Kahgyur, 178
- Kant, Immanuel, 10, 16, 23, 33, 36, 38, 40–5, 57–8, 61, 72, 89, 92, 98, 113, 121, 148, 151, 176, 182, 184, 186, 189–91, 192, 202–8, 225, 253, 256, 264, 272, 285, 286, 289, 298, 299, 301, 313, 315, 317, 322, 326, 327, 336, 342, 349, 353, 354, 365, 410, 433, 445, 460, 484, 492, 500, 505, 509, 510, 540, 542, 597, 612, 657, 658, 661  
     antinomies, 12, 315  
     *Critique of Practical Reason*, 454, 691  
     *Critique of Pure Reason*, 11, 12, 47, 72, 88, 89, 148, 172, 177, 183, 186, 210, 264, 299, 300, 315, 597, 598, 691  
     *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, 50, 57, 313  
     *Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, 58  
     *On the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, 549  
     *Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God*, 48, 58  
     transcendental aesthetic, 27
- Kerner, Justinus Andreas Christian, 268, 691
- Kielmayer, Carl Friedrich, 137
- Knebel, Karl Ludwig von, 225, 691
- Koran, 171
- Körösi, Csoma, 178
- Kotzebue, August Friedrich Ferdinand von, 224, 454, 537, 691
- Krishna, 490, 691
- La Rochefoucauld, François de, 221, 253, 547
- Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste Pierre, 137, 184, 691
- Lamartine, Alphonse de, 652, 692
- landscape, 391, 397, 420, 421
- language, 72, 78, 112, 130, 131, 134, 178, 259, 276, 423, 445, 446, 447, 463, 466, 468, 481, 491, 561, 586, 639, 661
- Laocoön, 440
- Laodamas, 130
- Lao-Tzu, 475, 692
- Laplace, Pierre-Simon, 58, 336, 337, 692
- Latin, 28, 41, 86, 130, 132, 250, 438, 445, 447, 596, 682, 684, 685, 690, 694
- laughter, 98–107, 163, 404, 455, 561, 648, 652
- Lauk, Eva, 42, 692
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 72, 352, 597, 600, 692  
     *Theodicy*, 598
- Leopardi, Giacomo, 603, 692
- Leroy, Charles George, 68, 233, 692
- Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 11, 454, 522, 595, 597
- Leucippus, 17, 184, 327, 330, 692
- Lichtenberg, Georg Christoph, 13, 33, 34, 240, 297, 443, 522, 544, 547, 692
- light, 28, 31, 32, 57, 152, 297, 314, 327, 369, 505, 585, 596, 604
- Linnaeus, Carolus, 543
- literature, 90, 108, 130, 132, 133, 134, 278, 426, 441, 456, 462, 572, 651, 652
- Lull, Ramon, 20, 646, 692
- Locke, John, 14, 23–4, 44, 88, 205, 285, 298, 314, 326, 597, 600, 662, 685, 692
- logic, 37, 94, 96, 110–14, 129, 130, 134, 135, 191, 382, 420
- love, 213, 215, 219, 234, 276, 390, 418, 440, 448, 452, 467, 482, 508, 526, 531, 545, 561, 567, 568, 571, 584, 609, 640  
     maternal, 366, 531–2  
     paternal, 584  
     of the self, 221, 366, 531  
     sexual, 437, 479, 547–76, 582, 617
- loving kindness, 617, 618, 621, 622, 625, 655
- Lucretius, 352, 353, 443, 529, 692
- Luther, Martin, 176, 596, 618, 623, 641, 643, 692
- madness, 144, 225, 242, 251, 259, 278, 405, 406, 410, 416–19, 487, 498, 541, 548, 566, 571, 606, 608, 630
- Magendie, François, 286
- magic, 278, 328, 338, 339, 340, 370, 371, 387, 391, 418, 445, 588, 617  
     magic lantern, 147
- magnanimity, 248, 454, 655
- Maine de Biran, François Pierre Gauthier, 40, 48, 693
- malice, 175, 242, 248, 593, 621, 625
- Manichean, 523
- mannerism, 401
- Marcion, 636
- Marcionite, 523, 633, 636, 637
- Marcus Aurelius, 166, 172, 537, 685, 687
- marriage, 243, 534, 545, 551, 554, 556, 561, 567, 573, 574, 609, 631–8, 642, 643
- Mars, 581
- materialism, 15–17, 18, 20, 49, 171, 184, 186, 196, 286, 325–30, 489, 502, 549  
     French, 16

- mathematics, 78, 92, 96, 129, 139–41, 152, 189, 191, 206, 342, 396  
 matter, 6, 7, 12, 15–21, 54–6, 204, 212, 260, 301, 308, 314, 317–30, 381, 488, 489  
     as the visibility of the will, 49, 319, 321, 322, 325, 329  
 Maupertuis, Pierre Louis Moreau de, 58, 693  
 Maximus of Tyre, 93, 693  
*māyā*, 334, 617  
 mechanical drive, 270, 282  
 melancholy, 374  
 Melissus, 50, 92, 497, 693  
 Memnon, 33, 693  
 memory, 35, 65, 80, 82, 84, 116, 142, 143, 148, 149, 150, 151, 234–5, 241, 245, 247, 249, 251, 253, 284, 359, 386, 416, 417, 418, 438, 506, 517, 518, 587, 607, 609  
 Mephistopheles, 516, 693  
 Merck, Johann Heinrich, 240, 441, 693  
 Mercury, 581, 640  
*Messiah* (by Klopstock), 427  
 metaphor, 57, 79, 117, 137, 212, 273, 338, 339, 394, 395, 489, 562, 567, 615, 621, 629  
 metaphysics/metaphysical, 17, 136, 169–97, 212, 218, 226, 249, 251, 252, 253, 262, 267, 272, 283, 297, 301, 302, 304, 305, 307, 311, 313, 314, 322, 324, 325, 329, 336, 339, 343, 346, 353, 373, 464, 467, 469, 472, 474, 480, 484, 500, 502, 509, 511, 520, 527, 544, 549, 566, 575, 582, 595, 616, 617, 630, 643, 660  
     metaphysics of love, 547, 573, 575, 582  
 metempsychosis, 496, 518–23, 616, 644  
 Mexico/Mexican, 601  
 Middle Ages, 132, 133, 435, 445, 463, 578  
 Milton, John  
     *Paradise Lost*, 427  
 Minerva, 86  
 miracles, 40, 155, 174, 175, 188, 261, 263, 325, 348, 498, 658  
     miracle *par excellence*, 214  
 mirror, 149, 213, 217, 228, 238, 270, 290, 291, 295, 324, 337, 384, 390, 391, 397, 439, 453, 468, 514, 545, 599, 615  
 misery, 370, 373, 400, 402, 406, 450, 466, 508, 571, 583, 584, 591, 593, 595, 600, 601, 602, 606, 607, 613, 637, 645, 655  
 Mohammedan. *See* Muslim  
 Molinos, Miguel de, 629, 630, 693  
 Moloch, 76  
 monarchy, 610  
 money, 11, 77, 82, 108, 537, 574, 612, 654, 655  
 monotheism, 179, 197, 461  
 Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de, 134, 255, 584, 693  
 Moore, Thomas, 571  
 Moravians, 34, 697  
 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 412, 538, 693, 694, 697  
     *Don Giovanni*, 181, 427, 469  
 Münchhausen, Karl Friedrich Hieronymus, 104, 694  
 Musagetes, 480, 694  
 muscles/muscular system, 31, 40, 41, 223, 228, 256, 258, 262, 263, 265, 267, 268, 269, 271, 279, 284, 293, 297, 303, 347, 411, 414, 487, 527, 560, 563  
 music, 31, 34, 130, 136, 137, 294, 327, 337, 405, 421, 423, 425, 426, 431, 442, 446, 449, 453, 464–74, 538  
 Muslim, 121, 442, 522, 628, 647  
 mystery, 145, 148, 175, 176, 183, 188, 203, 206, 300, 311, 327, 331, 367, 382, 435, 499, 505, 509, 521, 586, 620, 625, 645  
 mysticism/mystics, 185, 300, 339, 625–8, 681, 683, 684, 686, 688, 688, 692, 698, 699  
 myth/mythology, 328, 459, 521, 527, 549, 587, 595, 629, 639, 643, 644  
     Christian, 448, 619, 620, 623, 629  
     Jewish, 598  
  
*natura naturans*, 185, 335, 586  
 naturalism, 184–7, 196, 301, 329, 490  
 Nemesius, 521, 694  
 Neoplatonism, 381, 629, 695, 696, 698  
 nerve, 13, 24, 29, 30, 33, 40, 41, 88, 147, 212, 253, 255, 256, 259–71, 287, 292, 296, 297, 303, 344, 347, 359, 410, 411, 507, 515, 557  
 Neumann, Karl Georg, 254  
 New Testament, 504, 578, 595, 600, 631, 635, 636, 638, 640, 642, 661  
 New Zealand, 76, 531  
 Newton, Isaac, 59, 61, 96, 151, 597, 599, 694  
*nirvana*, 525, 576, 623, 624  
 Nitzsch, Christian Ludwig, 495, 694  
 nominalism, 70, 383  
 non-being. *See* nothing  
 nothing, 21, 180, 482, 483, 491, 492, 493, 497, 498, 503, 505, 506, 509, 594, 595, 618, 623, 624, 627  
 nothingness, 173, 209, 403, 443, 451, 452, 461, 482, 491, 492, 493, 494, 500, 502, 517, 588, 589, 645, 651, 654, 657  
 novel, 163, 241, 251, 310, 391, 458, 539, 547, 548, 549, 568, 569, 591, 655, 695, 700  
  
 objecthood, 212, 263, 320, 337, 381, 388, 516, 530, 661  
 objectivation, 169, 214, 258, 272, 288, 289, 290, 305, 310, 314, 320, 324, 370, 400, 421, 428, 465, 485, 495, 496, 500, 515, 526, 552, 570, 585, 587, 624, 658, 660

- Odysseus, 187, 488, 607  
 Oedipus, 451  
 Oken, Lorenz, 349, 694  
 Old Testament, 504, 578, 595, 635, 636, 640, 661  
 Olympiodorus the Elder, 381  
 ontology, 50, 298, 302  
 opera, 101, 181, 427, 452, 465, 466, 682  
 optimism, 179, 181, 194, 197, 459, 461, 585, 595,  
     596–601, 620, 630, 636, 639, 641, 650, 660,  
     661  
 order of rank, 155  
 Orestes, 540, 694  
 original sin, 523, 595, 600, 619, 623  
 Ormuzd, 181, 639, 694  
 Orpheus, 521, 577, 623, 637, 694  
 Ortis, Jacopo, 548, 567, 694  
*Outpek'hat*, 377, 474, 524, 622, 627, 628  
 Ovid, 95, 443, 659, 694  
 Owen, Sir Richard, 345, 348, 352, 694  
 Owenus, John, 438, 694  
  
 paganism, 179, 620, 624, 639  
 painter/painting, 81, 388, 389, 395, 399, 401, 425,  
     427, 436, 438, 439, 440, 441, 463, 496, 538,  
     684, 686, 688, 696, 699  
 palingenesis, 519, 520  
 pantheism, 168, 179, 364, 371, 605, 606, 628, 660,  
     661, 662  
 Pantheon, 435  
 Papua, 522  
 Paracelsus, 503, 566, 694  
 paralognism, 299  
 Parmenides of Elea, 36, 92, 497, 694  
 parody, 102, 139  
 Pascal, Blaise, 630, 695  
 pathology, 136, 270, 273  
 Paul, Saint, 618, 620, 623, 635, 636  
 pederasty, 558, 576–82  
 Pelagianism, 176, 177, 620, 640  
 Penelope, 138, 187  
 Pericles, 544, 695  
 personal identity, 251  
 pessimism, 179, 371, 636, 637, 639  
 Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich, 39  
 Petit-Thouars, 323  
 Petrarch, Francesco, 134, 449, 567, 572, 573, 591,  
     695  
 Phalaris, 160  
 Philolaus, 577, 695  
 philosophaster, 74, 91  
 philosopheme, 11, 71, 401, 522  
 phronomy, 50, 56  
 phrenology, 248, 259, 280, 687  
 physics, 17, 136, 181–7, 191, 230, 311, 325, 326, 343,  
     353, 490, 520  
 physiology, 136, 263, 274, 275, 280, 285, 298, 310,  
     342, 345, 348, 384, 394, 409, 526, 530, 557, 562  
 piano, 34  
     piano of colours, 34  
 Pico della Mirandola, Count Giovanni, 74, 695  
 picture. *See* painting  
 Pindar, 637, 695  
 Pinel, Philippe, 419, 695  
 plagiarism, 239  
 plants, 136, 151, 184, 213, 217, 237, 248, 291, 294,  
     297, 303, 305, 306–9, 323, 334, 347, 351, 421,  
     464, 489, 491, 495, 563, 596, 653  
 Platner, Ernst, 98, 549  
 Plato/Platonism, 16, 17, 19, 36, 44, 90, 92, 107,  
     129, 130, 140, 151, 158, 159, 176, 180, 184, 196,  
     228, 283, 306, 359, 381, 382, 458, 459, 460,  
     461, 480, 492, 499, 521, 537, 544, 549, 553,  
     557, 572, 577, 581, 601, 623, 636, 637, 644,  
     695, 696, 698  
     *Apology*, 196, 359, 482, 601  
     *Laus*, 521  
     *Meno*, 36  
     *Phaedo*, 283, 480, 623  
     *Phaedrus*, 549  
     Platonic dialogues, 110  
     Platonic ethics, 167  
     *Republic*, 17, 176, 544  
     *Symposium*, 553, 577  
 Pliny, 585, 603, 643, 695  
 Plotinus, 16, 49, 319, 321, 500, 627, 695  
 Plutarch, 138, 160, 382, 497, 581, 601, 695  
 poems/poetry, 78, 80, 156, 387, 393, 395, 396, 401,  
     424, 425, 426, 438, 439, 441–9, 465, 472, 540,  
     570, 572  
     epic, 310, 427, 449, 453, 547, 591  
     erotic, 567  
     folk, 174  
     lyric, 448, 449, 547  
     romantic, 448  
 poets, 130, 230, 296, 310, 387, 399, 424, 437, 438,  
     442, 444–50, 453, 540, 547, 548, 551, 567, 577,  
     578, 591, 637, 681–700  
 Poland, 388, 613, 692  
 polygamy, 581  
 Polynesia, 323  
 polytheism, 179  
 Pope, Alexander, 85, 241, 600, 695  
 Pouchet, Félix Archimède, 324  
*Prabodha Chandrodaya*, 20, 519  
 Priestley, Joseph, 57, 315, 696  
 principle of contradiction, 37, 111, 139  
 principle of individuation, 55, 499, 512, 517, 576,  
     584, 616, 621, 624  
 principle of parsimony, 292, 296, 322, 354, 355,  
     432, 501



- principle of sufficient reason, 55, 111, 135, 136, 142, 145, 149, 333, 389, 499, 546, 594, 607, 617, 658, 663
- Proclus, 45, 89, 90, 92, 130, 381, 694, 696
- procreation, 186, 272, 282, 349, 368, 369, 492, 497, 500, 501, 502, 506, 512, 518, 523, 526–9, 531, 533, 543, 545, 551, 557, 559, 560, 561, 565, 579, 581, 582, 584, 585, 595, 634, 638, 643
- professors
- of philosophy, 11, 38, 42, 47, 112, 131, 172, 173, 290, 296, 582, 598
- Protagoras, 107, 696
- Protestantism, 600, 622, 631, 640, 641, 655
- psychology, 136, 209, 212, 326, 389, 526, 647, 683, 699
- punishment, 159, 242, 508, 523, 544, 595, 612–14, 622
- puppets, 334, 372, 373, 374, 404
- purposiveness, 271, 323, 335, 336, 337, 341–4, 350, 351, 352, 354, 356, 357, 412, 433
- Pythagoras, 382, 521, 605, 636, 637, 644, 696
- Pythagoreans, 137, 356, 521, 623, 637, 695
- quietism, 508, 588, 628, 629, 630, 688, 693
- rage. *See* anger
- rainbow, 495, 499
- Rancé, Abbé de, 646
- Raphael, 250, 412, 442, 538, 696
- Rappites, 642
- Raskolniki, 643, 696
- rationalism, 177, 620, 634, 640, 686
- realism, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 26, 50, 70, 112, 383, 459, 461, 552, 606
- recollection, 462. *See* memory
- redemption, 179, 371, 451, 582, 613, 619, 620, 623, 638, 641, 644, 652, 653, 654, 660
- Reid, Thomas, 24, 25, 28, 40, 74, 696
- religion, 170, 174–9, 195, 229, 243, 353, 414, 458, 480, 483, 515, 520, 522, 578, 580, 620, 625, 628, 631, 638, 641, 645, 647, 648, 660
- remorse, 236
- Reni, Guido, 440, 696
- renunciation, 163, 165, 451, 593, 622, 631, 643, 646
- resignation, 450, 451, 452, 454, 483, 525, 591, 621, 622, 646
- rhetoric, 34, 110, 126–7, 681, 693, 696
- rhythm, 31, 52, 219, 445, 469, 470, 471, 472, 642
- riddle, 51, 179, 180, 182, 187, 190, 194, 208, 333, 484, 500, 515, 520, 585, 586, 662
- riddle of existence/the world, 148, 170, 188, 195
- right (legal concept), 136, 139, 609–14, 662
- Rishis, 171
- Rochester, Earl of. *See* Wilmot, John
- Rome/Roman, 73, 133, 158, 165, 179, 250, 404, 448, 463, 535, 536, 577, 580, 640, 644, 681, 684, 685, 687, 699, 700
- Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 164, 365, 539, 547, 549, 600, 696
- Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, 164, 549
  - New Heloise*, 547
  - Social Contract*, 365
- Russia/Russian, 473, 642
- Rutilius Lupus, Publius, 110, 696
- Sadi, 108, 578, 627, 697
- Saint-Hilaire, Augustin, 323, 697
- saints, 283, 634, 654, 687
- Sallust, 93, 644, 697
- Salome, 632, 697
- salvation, 545, 623, 625, 634, 647, 650, 652, 654
- Sanskrit, 525, 639, 684
- Sanyassis, 163
- Saphir, Moritz Gottlieb, 101, 697
- Satan, 585, 639, 697
- scaffold, 197, 390
- scepticism, 171, 177, 181, 191, 353, 522
- Cartesian scepticism, 7
- schadenfreude*, 655
- Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, 11, 16, 71, 90, 659, 689, 697
- philosophy of nature, 328
- Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich, 103, 139, 403, 452, 454, 540, 570, 697
- Schlegel, August Wilhelm, 339, 542
- Schlegel, Friedrich, 541, 601, 697
- Schleiermacher, 91, 597, 697
- scholastics/scholasticism, 44, 46, 74, 77, 188, 305, 307, 322, 383, 448, 682, 683
- Schopenhauer, Arthur
- Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, 76, 181, 478, 604
  - On the Basis of Morals*, 157, 226, 289, 524, 609, 615, 616, 622
  - On the Freedom of the Will*, 48, 242, 332, 333, 608, 612, 614, 619
  - On the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, 28, 41, 48, 49, 55, 135, 149, 204, 214, 318
  - On Vision and Colours*, 28, 33, 48, 246
  - On Will in Nature*, 41, 48, 49, 178, 191, 202, 209, 258, 274, 282, 286, 292, 302, 303, 306, 340, 341, 363, 478, 510, 606, 640
  - Parerga and Paralipomena*, 34, 59, 110, 135, 236, 538, 564, 588, 604, 615, 618, 639
- Schultz, Carl Heinrich, 268, 697
- Schulze, Gottlob Ernst, 131, 697

- Scott, Sir Walter, 225, 248, 541, 591, 601, 698  
 Scotus Erigena, 137, 627, 658, 659, 660, 698  
 sculpture, 89, 395, 425, 433, 436, 438, 470  
 self-denial, 159, 384, 557, 621, 631, 640, 643  
 selfishness, 248, 481, 654  
 self-love. *See* love  
 Seneca, Lucius Annaeus, 69, 159, 160, 161, 166, 167, 168, 246, 249, 651, 698  
 sense/senses, 24, 30–5, 69, 88, 216, 260, 285, 288, 292, 654, 657  
   inner sense, 39  
   outer sense, 31  
   sixth sense, 290  
 sex drive, 250, 366, 412, 437, 501, 526–31, 544, 549, 551, 555, 565, 575, 580, 582, 583, 586, 653  
 sexes (male and female), 307, 344, 351, 533, 545, 632  
 sex-linked inherited traits, 544  
 Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 600, 698  
 Shakers, 34, 641, 643, 692  
 Shakespeare, William, 73, 85, 126, 134, 151, 178, 310, 426, 443, 447, 448, 450, 451, 453, 461, 535, 547, 561, 567, 571, 572, 603, 648, 693, 694, 697, 698  
   *Hamlet*, 107, 247, 427, 486, 540, 615  
   *Julius Caesar*, 126  
   *King Lear*, 245  
   *Romeo and Juliet*, 100, 547, 570  
 shame, 32, 75, 126, 134, 219, 221, 308, 568, 576, 577, 584, 585, 614  
 Shenstone, William, 102, 698  
 Shiva, 527, 698  
 sight, 288. *See* vision  
 Sinology, 178  
 servitude/slavery, 86, 104, 271, 292, 297, 300, 422, 593, 683  
   intellect as servant/slave of the will, 145, 170, 216, 220, 224, 228, 237, 304, 380, 394, 397, 404, 406, 415, 427, 492, 658  
 sleep, 144, 146, 151, 252, 253–7, 258, 260, 338, 339, 385, 398, 484, 485, 487, 493, 495, 496, 517, 601  
   magnetic, 617  
 sleepwalking, 337, 462  
 small talk, 85  
 socialism, 481, 691  
 Socrates, 107, 172, 196, 283, 359, 480, 482, 561, 577, 601, 605, 606, 681, 682, 698, 700  
   Socratic method, 436  
 solar system, 58, 336  
 somnambulism, 268, 359  
   magnetic, 143, 257, 339, 359  
 song, 130, 276, 397, 426, 446, 465, 466, 573, 642  
 sophism/sophistry, 16, 92, 93, 94, 107, 127, 165, 172, 229, 238, 299, 315, 598, 605, 660, 688, 689  
 Sophocles, 451, 576, 602, 698  
 soul, 26, 38, 153, 158, 168, 184, 210, 217, 226, 228, 253, 254, 276, 279, 283, 289, 291, 307, 311, 364, 395, 483, 487, 504, 521, 527, 537, 554, 561, 562, 592, 598, 623  
 Southey, Robert, 225, 698  
 Spain/Spanish, 224, 239, 388, 434, 574  
 Spallanzani, Lazzaro, 259, 698  
 Spinoza, Baruch, 16, 19, 44, 74, 94, 179, 180, 194, 352, 354, 355, 365, 371, 503, 511, 549, 592, 605, 610, 659, 661, 662, 698  
 spontaneous generation, 322, 323, 324, 339, 366, 695  
 squirrel, 370, 371  
 St. Petersburg Academy, 178, 618, 620, 623, 629, 635, 636, 649, 683, 687, 695  
 statue, 79, 423, 440, 441  
 Stewart, Dugald, 59, 74, 698  
 Stobaeus, Joannes, 49, 137, 138, 161, 162, 167, 328, 454, 497, 506, 537, 577, 579, 698  
 Stoicism, 34, 157, 159, 164–8, 451, 577, 593, 618, 682, 685, 687, 693, 698  
 stomach, 71, 184, 210, 225, 253, 258, 264, 265, 276, 339, 359, 370, 409  
 Strauss, David Friedrich, 648  
 stupidity, 152, 168, 225, 239, 242, 246, 248, 354, 405, 459, 544, 561, 606, 614, 631, 655  
 subject of cognition, 9–10, 23, 214, 231, 252, 288, 290, 388, 397, 423, 500, 514, 515, 516  
 sublime, 34, 102, 107, 109, 392, 411, 421, 435, 450, 466, 492, 549, 551, 565, 567, 570, 572, 631, 639, 641, 651, 660  
 suffering, 67, 168, 170, 364, 369, 385, 388, 407, 418, 452, 462, 486, 508, 517, 548, 572, 576, 583, 588, 590–602, 606, 618, 620, 621, 628, 638, 643, 644, 648, 649, 651, 653, 654, 655, 657  
 Sufism, 620, 627  
 suicide, 253, 374, 418, 537, 548, 566, 571  
 Suidas, 162, 699  
 superstition, 353, 493  
 Swift, Jonathan, 225, 601, 699  
 Sybarites, 34  
 symbol, 226, 249, 400, 493, 527, 586, 600, 606, 626, 652  
 sympathy, 126, 215, 351, 366, 568, 569, 617, 646  
 synthetic unity of apperception. *See* transcendental unity of apperception  
 Talmud, 523  
 Tasso, Torquato (historical figure), 427. *See also* Goethe's play, *Torquato Tasso*  
   *Gerusalemme liberata*, 427  
*tat tvam asi*, 616  
 Tatianites, 633  
 technology, 136, 460

- teleology, 341–56, 596  
 anthropo-teleology, 355  
 ateleology, 350  
 Tertullian, 176, 523, 633, 699  
 Thamyras, 577, 699  
 theatre, 26, 85, 100, 103, 155, 331, 404, 413  
 theism, 171, 180, 181, 185, 354, 605, 606, 620, 627, 636  
 Theognis, 602, 699  
 theology, 89, 174, 298, 302, 352, 354, 626, 647, 690, 694  
 physico-theology, 283, 354, 355  
 Theseus, 573, 682, 689, 699  
 thing in itself, 6, 13–20, 23, 24, 26, 78, 183, 184, 186, 188, 192, 202–11, 212, 218, 260, 288, 298, 301, 306, 314, 317, 319, 328, 331, 333, 334, 335, 338, 350, 363, 381, 494, 500, 509, 510, 511, 517, 566, 576, 594, 604, 614, 617  
 Thorwaldsen, Bertel, 438, 699  
 Tibet, 178  
 Tiedemann, Dietrich, 259, 699  
 Tischbein, Johann Heinrich Wilhelm, 108, 699  
 Tourtual, Caspar Theobald, 25, 699  
 tragedy/tragic, 253, 450–5, 547, 570, 571, 597, 601, 603, 620, 637, 646, 651  
 French tragedy, 453  
 Greek tragedy, 446  
 tragicomedy, 371, 373  
 transcendental unity of apperception, 148, 264, 290  
 Trappists, 646, 696  
 trees, 12, 87, 113, 149, 174, 287, 323, 352, 405, 421, 432, 494, 501, 526, 527, 592  
 family tree, 535  
 tree of knowledge, 586, 623  
 Treviranus, Gottfried Reinhold, 259, 307, 699  
 triangle, 37–8, 191, 457, 498, 503  
 trigonometry, 68, 189  
 Trinity, 645  
 Turkey/Turkish, 121, 224  
 unconscious, 18, 27, 57, 145, 169, 210, 230, 231, 247, 265, 290, 305, 339, 417, 423, 426, 485, 490, 559, 560, 565, 566, 588, 618, 662  
 Upanishads, 171, 474, 492, 624, 685  
 Upham, 504, 699  
 Vanini, Lucilio, 305, 365, 699, 699  
 Vauvenargues, Luc de Glapier, Marquis de, 82, 700  
 Vedanta, 622, 629  
*Vedas*, 171, 474, 492, 521, 524, 623, 628, 656  
 Venus, 529, 561  
 Virgil, 577, 700  
*Aeneid*, 427  
 virtue, 83, 91, 93, 159, 167, 241, 243, 544, 616, 618, 621, 622, 625, 634, 652, 655  
 vision, 25, 26, 27, 32, 35, 79, 84, 438, 699  
 visual art, 34, 80, 387, 388, 393, 396, 424, 426, 436, 440, 441, 442. *See also* painting, sculpture  
 vital force, 251  
 Vitruvius, 430, 431, 700  
 voltaic pile, 125, 225, 273, 328  
 Voltaire, 103, 225, 259, 353, 425, 482, 591, 598, 600, 606, 700  
*Candide*, 598, 600  
 war, 171, 174, 196, 369, 458, 529, 535, 565, 572, 600, 642  
 wax figures, 425  
 weeping, 481, 607  
 Whewell, William, 140, 700  
 wickedness, 248, 537, 550, 581, 656  
 Wieland, Christoph Martin, 225, 441, 700  
 will to life, 252, 323, 324, 337, 364, 365, 370, 371, 372, 373, 375, 400, 436, 450, 451, 479, 482, 485, 495, 496, 517, 523, 528, 530, 566, 570, 576, 582, 583–7, 589, 599, 606, 615, 621, 623, 625, 650, 652, 658  
 negation of the, 450, 451, 454, 516, 525, 576, 600, 618, 621, 623, 624, 625, 631, 643, 645, 649, 661  
 Wilmot, John, 590, 696  
 windbag, 195, 302  
 Windischmann, Karl Joseph Hieronymous, 524, 622, 700  
 wit, 78, 101, 103, 245, 249, 417, 443, 471, 529  
 mother wit, 538, 541  
 Wolff, Alexander, 454  
 Wolff, Kaspar Friedrich, 57, 58, 194, 267, 347, 700  
 women, 101, 349, 409, 439, 448, 539, 540, 544, 554, 555–67, 569, 577, 578, 581, 638  
 Wordsworth, William, 225, 700  
 World-Soul, 364  
 Xenophanes, 50, 92, 287, 700  
 Xenophon, 577  
 youth, 87, 226, 237, 248, 391, 413, 444, 493, 495, 498, 517, 538, 553, 559, 580, 581, 586, 590, 603  
 Zaccaria, Francesco Antonio, 635, 700  
 Zend, 595, 639  
 Zeus, 581, 640  
 zoology, 136, 137, 191, 285, 343, 691, 694  
 zootomy, 136